

OCKHAM'S PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

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[This is work in progress]

Ockham's pre-Avignon writings fill 18 volumes in the modern edition and there is an extensive secondary literature growing all the time.¹ The following is a sketch, mainly of his theses or conclusions, generally without much discussion of his reasons. The purpose of this summary is to help readers unfamiliar with Ockham's work decide whether it is worth studying.

This sketch supplements the sketch included at pages 13-23 in Ockham, *On Heretics, Books 1-5, and Against John, Chapters 5-16*:

<https://www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/book/10.3828/9780197267592>

The notes are meant to be read alongside the text. To enable that, open another browser window (not tab), copy the URL of this page into the address bar of the second window, and view the two windows side-by-side. Zoom to a larger size. Or print a hard copy. The notes follow p.25.

For publications referred to, open:

<https://ockhamdialogus.net/PhThPublications.pdf>

Note on references

Titles of Ockham's works are abbreviated as in Spade, Paul V. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.xv.

References to the **Latin text** of Ockham's works: William of Ockham, OPh, OTh: *Opera Philosophica et Theologica*, ed. Gedeon Gál et al. (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1967-88). Republished as an electronic edition by Intalex, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2011,

<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/search?browse-collections=true>

References to OPh, OTh, are by volume and page. Line numbers are sometimes given after a dot. E.g. "p.211.14" refers to page 211 line 14.

A page number asterisked (e.g. p.32*) is a reference to the frontmatter.

In references, the numeral after "/" is the page number in the Intalex electronic edition: "p.605/644" refers to p.605 in the print edition, which is p.644 in the electronic edition. A reference to a range of pages gives only the first page in the electronic edition.

Translations are mine. Generally I also refer, in brackets, to a published translation (if any exists) so that readers can read the passage in context.

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A universal is a term any occurrence² of which can be predicated³ of any member or members⁴ of a set of similar things.

For example, the statement “Socrates was a human being” predicates the term “human being” of Socrates, “Some animals are human beings” predicates “human being” of some members of the set of animals. Other examples of universal terms: “horse”, “animal”, “living being”, “planet”, “chair”, “individual”, “term”, “universal”.

Does the use of such a term presuppose or imply that the members of the class *share something real*? E.g. is “human nature” a reality shared by all human beings?

According to Plato, the individual members of a class do share something, generally referred to (in English translation) as an “Idea” or “Form”. According to Plato, the Form of humanity is something real — more real than any individual human being — which exists separately from the individuals that share the Form.⁵ Aristotle rejected the thesis that Forms exist separately from the individuals that share in them.⁶ Medieval thinkers followed him in this, but many of them did attribute some kind or degree of reality to shared natures.⁷ A common medieval view can be set out as follows

- (1) Each member of a set of similar things (e.g. human beings) has as one of its constituents something (human nature) that it shares with other members of the set; this constituent is something real which is present in every member.
- (2) The shared nature does not exist separately from the individuals that share it.
- (3) The nature is in some way a unity (e.g. human nature is *one and the same* in all human beings).
- (4) The nature is in some way *distinct* from the individual of which it is a constituent.⁸
- (5) The mind forms a universal concept by “abstracting” (i.e. “drawing out”) the nature from one or more of the individuals in which it exists and giving it mental existence as a universal; the same nature thus has two kinds of existence, one in individuals outside the mind and the other in the mind.⁹
- (6) When an individual comes into existence, the nature is in some way “individuated” to this particular instance (e.g. by being received into a quantum of matter).¹⁰

Against all such theories Ockham maintains that every thing is individual “of itself”, right through, in all its constituents -- “of itself”, that is, the nature does not need to be individuated. No part (the nature) of one individual is also a part of another individual.¹¹

Ockham’s own account of universality is in terms of signs and likenesses. A barber pole is an individual thing that is a sign of one other individual thing, namely the barber’s shop.¹² A universal term is an individual thing that can function as a sign signifying any

number of other individual things that are like one another.¹³ 4

Universal terms include written signs, vocal utterances and concepts.¹⁴ A written word or phrase, e.g. “human being”, is an individual, namely a collection of particles of ink on paper, which can stand for you or me or some or all of the individuals that resemble us. The spoken term “human being” is an individual disturbance in the air. A concept is also an individual. Ockham hesitated over what kind of individual a concept is. At first he thought it was something like a picture in the mind. But later, convinced by the arguments of his Franciscan colleague Walter Chatton,¹⁵ he decided that a concept is an individual act of understanding.¹⁶

A spoken or written sign signifies whatever thing the concept signifies, so if the concept changes, the signification of the spoken or written word will change.¹⁷ Spoken and written signs are conventional, i.e. they are given meaning by some process of agreement among members of a language community; but the mental act and its standing for things outside the mind is *natural*, in the sense that it arises in a way we cannot control, without any act of will, and it is what it is irrespective of the language community we belong to.

The thing and the mind jointly cause naturally an understanding of the individual thing and leave an effect in the mind, a “habit”;¹⁸ this and other similar knowledges of other resembling things naturally (i.e. without any act of will) cause a universal concept.¹⁹

Universal concepts are not arbitrary. Individuals are really (i.e. truly, i.e. it is true to say they are) alike and unlike, apart from human interests and human thought.²⁰

Though some signs may not resemble the thing signified (e.g. the verbal utterance “human being” does not resemble a human being), a concept, according to Ockham, does (in some way) resemble the things it signifies.²¹

In short: there is nothing real that different things share as part of their make-up, yet they do truly resemble one another, and in our thought, speech and writing there are signs that can signify any or all of the resembling individuals.²²

Ockham’s account has some puzzling aspects. What does it mean for one thing to “signify” or “stand for” another? How can an act of understanding be also a sign? And how can an act of understanding resemble a thing?²³

These days those who deny that universals are real (i.e. realities additional to individuals) are called nominalists.²⁴ Ockham did not call himself a Nominalist. The term was (apparently) not in use in the 14th century; it had been used earlier and was used again in the 15th century; the earlier and later senses were different.²⁵ Some fifteenth century scholastics who called themselves

nominalists regarded Ockham as one of the founders of their school.²⁶

Distinctions

According to point (4) of the common theory sketched above,²⁷ there is some sort of distinction between the nature that is present in the individual and that individual (e.g. between your human nature and you).

According to Duns Scotus, the nature is an entity with a “less-than-numerical” unity²⁸ present in all the individuals, which is “contracted” to a given individual by a numerically unique individuating entity (which Scotus sometimes calls its “thisness”, *haecceitas*); between the nature as it exists in the individual and the individuating entity there is a “formal distinction” or “formal non-identity”, meaning that though these two entities cannot exist separately (i.e. a human nature cannot exist separately from any human individual, and a “thisness” cannot exist by itself), nevertheless the nature and the individuating entity are not simply identical, because neither is mentioned in the essential definition of the other.²⁹ A formal distinction or non-identity is a “real” distinction, in the sense that it is not fabricated by our minds, but it is not a distinction between separately existing things. Formal distinctions figured in several parts of Scotus’s philosophy and theology.³⁰

According to Ockham there are no formal distinctions in creatures. The only distinctions in creatures³¹ are (1) between thing and thing (between *res* and *res*, a “*real*” distinction), (2) between concept and concept (a “distinction of reason”, of *ratio*), (3) between thing and concept, or (4) between an aggregate of thing and concept and a thing or a concept.³²

The only way to prove a *real* distinction between X and Y is to show the truth of “X is Z” and “Y is not Z”. If such an argument ever proved a merely formal distinction, there would be no way to prove a real distinction.³³

The Category of Relation

Relational terms are very frequent in human thought: “alike”, “different”, “greater than”, “after”, “father”, etc. Ockham’s account of the universal (as a sign standing for individuals that are *similar to* one another) uses the notion of similarity, which is a relation.

Some of Ockham’s contemporaries (notably Duns Scotus) regarded a relation as a reality (or entity or thing) additional to the things related.³⁴ As Ockham sometimes puts it, they regarded a relation as a *res parva* (“little thing”) or *res media* (“intermediate thing”).³⁵ If you are looking at a white wall, and someone in Rome is painting a wall white, then as you look at your wall another entity imperceptibly comes upon it, namely a likeness with the wall in Rome.³⁶

According to Ockham, however, anyone following the principles of Aristotle's philosophy would reject that opinion.³⁷ For Aristotle, only absolute things exist, namely substances and their qualities — in case of the white walls, the two walls and the two whitenesses: to say that the two walls are “alike in being white” is just another way of saying that the two walls are white.³⁸

Aristotle's account does not mean that relationships are invented by the human mind and are in that sense not “real”. Things *really* are related, i.e. it is true to say that things are related, apart from any human invention. Even if no mind existed, things would still truly be similar and dissimilar, there would still be unity and order in the universe,³⁹ though there would be no one to know these truths. The reality (in this sense) of relations is why complexes are real: a complex is unified by the relationships of its parts.⁴⁰

But Aristotle's position is at some points wrong, Ockham believes;⁴¹ some relations are indeed relative things additional to the absolute things related. He believes this for theological reasons that (he says) would not convince a philosopher.⁴² These reasons arise in reference to the Christian doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation, and the Eucharist (discussed below, p.20ff). In addition, Ockham seems to recognise the thinghood of some relations of union.⁴³ As Adams remarks, “On examination, Ockham's concessions to the thing-theory of real relation are quite substantial”.⁴⁴

Intuitive and abstractive cognition

Factual knowledge of individuals is caused by what Ockham calls “intuitive” cognition. (In Latin *intueri* means “to look at”, *cognitio* means knowledge.) Looking at the page of a book you are now reading is an example of “intuitive” cognition. Remembering the look of the page after you have closed the book is “abstractive” cognition.

Intuitive cognitions give us, *immediately* (i.e. not by any process of inference), *evident* knowledge of present-tense statements about an individual's existence or non-existence and other contingent facts about it.⁴⁵

Intuitive cognition can cause⁴⁶ evident knowledge of an affirmative or negative contingent proposition characterising a subject (“S is P”, or “S is not P”), and it can cause evident knowledge of the subject's existence or non-existence (“S exists” or “S does not exist”) — though intuitive cognition of something that does *not* exist cannot happen naturally, without a miracle.⁴⁷

Since a cognition is itself an individual mental act distinct from the thing cognised, God could create or conserve an intuitive cognition without the existence or presence of the thing;⁴⁸ in that case we would know evidently that the thing did *not* exist or is *not* present⁴⁹ (otherwise the cognition would not be true and would therefore not be intuitive — only true cognition is evident).⁵⁰ However, God does have power to deceive us; he could therefore cause in us an (abstractive) cognition by which we would believe that a thing exists when it does not.⁵¹

Besides intuitive cognitions, Ockham posits abstractive cognitions; that is, cognitions that “abstract from” contingent facts.⁵² Abstractive cognitions are sufficient to cause knowledge of necessary propositions, i.e. propositions that are true no matter what contingent propositions may be true or false.⁵³

There are also “imperfect” intuitive cognitions that enable us to assert that some contingent proposition *was* true. These are also called “recordative” cognitions. Properly speaking imperfect intuitive cognitions are abstractive cognitions.⁵⁴ They do not give evident knowledge — memories can be wrong.⁵⁵

Every intuitive cognition is accompanied by (because it causes) an abstractive cognition, which generates a habit,⁵⁶ which enables us to think about the object afterwards when it no longer exists or is no longer present.⁵⁷ An alternative theory is that the intuitive cognition, without any accompanying abstractive cognition, directly generates the habit that enables future abstractive cognitions.⁵⁸ An intuitive cognition does not generate any habit that would facilitate a future intuitive cognition: seeing now will not help you see later.⁵⁹

Ockham took over the terms intuitive and abstractive cognition from Scotus, but changed their meaning somewhat.⁶⁰ Ockham’s intuitive and abstractive cognitions are the counterpart of Hume’s impressions and ideas.⁶¹

Species in medio

Intuitive cognition perceives its object *directly*, according to Ockham. Many of his contemporaries held that we perceive external objects through an intermediary — that perception needs a chain of causes and effects from the thing through the medium to the eye. The intermediate effects were called *species in medio* (“likenesses in the medium”, not to be confused with *species* as a sub-class of a genus).⁶² According to Ockham such intermediaries would not facilitate, but would obstruct, intuitive cognition — we would intuit the intermediary, not the object, and all cognition of the object would be inferential and uncertain, not immediate and evident. Sensible and intelligible species should therefore not be posited.⁶³

According to Ockham, perception involves “action at a distance”: the object acts on our cognitive faculties directly from a distance, provided the distance is not too great.⁶⁴

There is an effect on the sense organ — not a *species* but some other quality — which may persist after the object changes or is removed. If the persistence of this quality makes us think we see what is not really there (e.g. when a burning stick whirled around seems to make a fiery circle), it is because we make a faulty inference, which further experience and thought may correct.⁶⁵

Science

Only individuals exist, immediate and evident knowledge is of

individuals, but we can form universal concepts (including relational concepts), which are also individuals, namely individual mental acts. *Scientia* (knowledge) begins with intuitive cognitions, which give rise to universals.⁶⁶ According to Aristotle, science is of universals.⁶⁷ That means, for Ockham (since universals are terms, i.e. parts of statements), that science is of *terms* that may *stand for* individual things; science is not directly of things. Science is knowledge of propositions, which are complexes of terms including universals.

The terms of a science may stand for other terms (as in grammar or logic, which are *scientie sermocinales*), but in the “real” sciences (e.g. physics) they stand for individual things outside the mind.⁶⁸

A science is an ordered collection of statements, arguments, explanations etc., unified not by its concern with a certain nature but by the occurrence in its statements of a set of interrelated terms.⁶⁹ These collections may overlap; the same proposition may belong to more than one science.⁷⁰ One science may be “subalternate” (subordinate) to another (e.g. optics to geometry).⁷¹

According to some theologians, theology is a science; Thomas Aquinas, for example, held that theology is a subalternate science “because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the knowledge had by God and the blessed”.⁷² Ockham rejects this. “No one ever knows those conclusions evidently unless he knows them through experience or through premises evidently known. Hence it is nothing to say that *I* know some conclusions because *you* know principles that I believe on your say-so. Similarly it is childish to say that I know theological conclusions because God knows principles that I believe because he reveals them”.⁷³ According to Ockham, evident knowledge of contingent truths is given only by intuitive cognition, and in this life we cannot (at least, not without a miracle)⁷⁴ have intuitive knowledge of God. Therefore contingent propositions of theology (e.g. that God became a human being) cannot be evident to us (without miracle) in this life; they are believed by faith, they are not items of scientific knowledge.⁷⁵

In 1 Dial. 1 Ockham sometimes refers to the science of theology and the science of the canonists, and says that the science of the canonists is subalternate to theology; but these are sciences only in a broad sense.⁷⁶

Motion, Time and Place⁷⁷

Natures are not things, relations are not things; there are only individuals (including signs). Ockham believed that many moderns⁷⁸ were too ready to posit (i.e. assert the existence of) extra “things” — little things, realities, formalities, entities. These moderns seemed to suppose that to every term there must correspond some entity; this led them, he thought, into many mistakes.⁷⁹

Some moderns regarded the nouns “motion”, “time”, “the instant”, “place”, etc. as names of things,⁸⁰ whereas in fact the purported

things are not things. He argues⁸¹ in reference to each of these terms that it is not the name of “a thing totally distinct” from a substance or quality.⁸² Such a term signifies not any of these pseudo-things, but a substance or a quality, and in addition conveys some information about it. Ockham calls a term of this kind “connotative”;⁸³ it “consignifies” or “gives to understand” or “imports” or “signifies secondarily” something about the substance or quality that it primarily signifies.⁸⁴ Statements that include connotative terms are “exponible”, i.e. they can be expounded (i.e. laid out) in a set of statements in which those terms do not occur.⁸⁵

Many abstract terms have been introduced for decoration or brevity of speech.⁸⁶ To understand statements in which they are included, we may need to spell out a “brief expression” (*brevis oratio*) into a “long expression” (*longa oratio*). Some words in the short expression may need to be replaced by definitions or descriptions, and single statements may need to be resolved or expounded into sets of several statements. It will then be possible to accept or reject the short expression by considering whether the statements that make up the long expression are all true.⁸⁷ Ockham does not propose that we never use the short version,⁸⁸ and he does not insist that there is just one correct resolution.⁸⁹

The only *things* in the universe, according to Ockham, are individual substances and their individual qualities, for example Socrates and Socrates’ whiteness.⁹⁰ Some substances are bodies (including bodies of air and bodies of water). A bodily substance or quality is one that has “part outside of part”.⁹¹ Whatever causes a bodily substances and its qualities to come into being causes them to come into being with part outside of part⁹² and causes them to be in a place (if they have a place).

Space or place is not there waiting empty until something is produced into it; space is produced in the production of bodies. A body’s place is the surface of the bodies (which may be air or water) that bound it.⁹³ The world, i.e. the totality of bodies, is not in any place, since there are no bodies outside it.⁹⁴ Causes make some bodies move. The world as a whole does not move into new places, since there is no outside place, but the *primum mobile*, i.e. the outermost sphere of the world, does move,⁹⁵ rotating with the swiftest and most uniform of all motions.⁹⁶

“Motion” (*motus*) in a broad sense includes both successive change (which is motion in the strict sense) and sudden or instantaneous change; successive change includes acquisition or loss of a quality (e.g. warming, cooling) and local motion, i.e. change from one place to another passing through all intermediate places.⁹⁷ Motion is not an extra reality or thing that comes upon something for the (perhaps brief) time of its movement. Ockham argues that motion is no such transient thing, that the only things involved in motion are permanent,⁹⁸ namely the thing that causes the change, the thing that changes, the quality it acquires or loses, or (in local motion) the places it successively occupies. For continuous local motion, the “*longa oratio*” is that something causes something that at a certain time is in a certain place to be sometime afterwards, without any intermediate rest, in another

place, and so on without pause while the motion lasts.⁹⁹ He offers resolutions for various statements about motion.¹⁰⁰

The local motion of a body can be *perceived* only because there are minds that can know where the body is from instant to instant. Moving body X *was* there then, it is here now, it *will be* somewhere else in the future. Movement involves past, present and future; past and future do not exist but can be known by mind. A mind can remember the earlier state of a moving body and it can anticipate its later state, and thus it can comprehend motion.¹⁰¹ If mind could not exist, things would still move, but their motion would not be known.

Time is doubly dependent on mind: time is the motion against which a mind measures other motions.¹⁰² The definition of motion does not refer to mind, but the definition of time does: “Time is the motion by which *the soul* knows how great another motion is.”¹⁰³ A mind perceives time when it measures one motion against another, for example against the movement of a clock or the movement of the sun, or (in the last analysis) against the movement of the *primum mobile*, the outermost heavenly sphere.¹⁰⁴ If mind could not exist, there could be no time. The *primum mobile* would move even if no mind were possible, but its motion would not be perceived, and its motion would not be time because no mind would use it to measure other motions.¹⁰⁵ The motion of the *primum mobile* is time because of mind, though time is not caused by mind.¹⁰⁶

Statements about time are to be resolved into a “*longa oratio*” by substituting references to the motion of the *primum mobile*:

If anyone is in doubt about a proposition in which the noun ‘time’ appears, let them put in its place this whole locution (*oratio*), ‘Something [i.e. the *primum mobile*] moves most swiftly and uniformly, considering which the intellect can ascertain how much or how long something [else] moves, lasts, or rests’, or something similar. And sometimes in place of another term another locution should be put (or sometimes various locutions according to the variety of the other), as in place of ‘Time is continuous’ should be put this whole locution ‘Something moves without rest uniformly and most swiftly’. And so concerning similar cases it must be understood that we use the noun ‘time’ for a long locution, and similarly sometimes we use a short proposition for a long one composed of other terms than those put in the short proposition.¹⁰⁷

Some held that the instant (“now”) is one and the same thing passing rapidly through time (*res raptim transiens*, a thing passing suddenly), others held that every new instant is a new thing that exists just for that instant (*res statim desinens*, a thing immediately ceasing to exist).¹⁰⁸ In Ockham’s view neither opinion is true, because “now” is not a *res* (thing) at all.¹⁰⁹ “Now” refers to a definite position of the continuously moving *primum mobile*, defined by the relation of its parts to other bodies.¹¹⁰

Though time and the perception of motion require minds, this does not mean that motion is “unreal” or imaginary, that if there were

no minds there would be no motion. Bodies would move, some swiftly, some slowly, just as they do now; only no one would know their movement.

Ockham is not trying to get rid of the language of time and space. He uses “outside”, “now”, “here”, “swift” and similar terms. He is trying to get rid of the extra entities.

Philosophers find time, space and motion puzzling, but ordinary people do not.¹¹¹ Philosophers, or rather inadequately-trained philosophers, have been misled by the language that has become customary in their discipline.¹¹²

For Ockham space and time were not — as they were after Newton for almost everyone¹¹³ until recently — infinite and eternal and prior to things that come to exist in space and time. For Ockham there is no sense in asking why the world was created when it was and not sooner or later (because without moving body there is no time), or where it was and not somewhere else (because there is no where else). According to Ockham, space and time are not entities. Bodies that are caused by God and by secondary causes are caused with “part outside part” and thereby occupy and constitute places or space; some bodies are caused to move; minds perceive motion, and when mind measures motion, the motion that is the ultimate standard by which motion is measured is time.

Quantity

Ockham’s treatment of motion, time and place is part of his treatment of terms belonging to the category of quantity. He rejects the opinion that quantity, number, point, line, surface, and body are things distinct from substances and qualities.¹¹⁴ Ockham argues that each of these terms signifies some substance or quality and connotes some additional information about the thing signified.¹¹⁵

On quantity Ockham expresses himself circumspectly, “reciting” what he believes was Aristotle’s opinion without asserting it,¹¹⁶ because the opinion he rejects had been used by many theologians in formulating the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. This made his account of the eucharist controversial.¹¹⁷

Categories

Relation and quantity are among Aristotle’s categories or “predicaments”, which are: substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, position and habit.¹¹⁸ These are abstract nouns, but Ockham points out that Aristotle used other parts of speech also.¹¹⁹ The list of categories is often interpreted as an attempt to list the kinds of things there are. Ockham instead adopts the suggestion of Averroes that the categories classify answers to the various questions that can be asked about a thing.¹²⁰ The answers are terms, so according to Ockham the list of categories is a classification not of things but of terms.

Only some of the category terms directly stand for things: “It must not be imagined that the ten categories are so many things really

and totally distinct among themselves”.¹²¹ Terms of substance and quality (though not all qualities),¹²² and also a few relations, are the only category terms that directly stand for things. Others are “connotative” (above, p.9), i.e. they stand for some substance or quality and convey some information about it, e.g. how big it is, where it is, what it resembles, and so on.¹²³

Ockham on quality

Entities not to be posited without justification

Ockham sometimes argues like this: “Some moderns posit such-and-such an entity. Aristotle does not; it does not fit into the framework of Aristotle’s philosophy; positing it has inconvenient or absurd implications; *and anyway we don’t need it*, since there is an alternative account (namely...) that explains whatever the former account explains. *No unnecessary entities should be posited*. Therefore this entity should not be posited.”¹²⁴

“Posit” means “to assert the existence of”. “Not to posit” means “not to assert the existence of”, which does not mean “to *deny* the existence of”.¹²⁵ sometimes we should not assert the existence of something that does, in fact, exist. There may be more things in heaven and earth than we know about.

The dictum that no unnecessary entities should be posited is sometimes called (inappropriately) “Ockham's razor”.¹²⁶

One version reads:

It is pointless to do by many what could be done by fewer (*Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). This is a principle that should not be denied, because no plurality should be posited unless it can be proved [1] by reason, or [2] by experience, or [3] by the authority of Him who cannot be deceived or err.¹²⁷

Point 3 means: by God’s revelation, found in the Bible and the teaching of the Church. (Perhaps we should add: “or by the report of some trustworthy person who is likely to know” — such reports of course being fallible.)¹²⁸

Another version:

When a proposition is verified of things, if two things are sufficient for its truth, it is superfluous to posit a third.¹²⁹

Sometimes the idea is expressed in terms of “saving” something: we should not posit anything more than is sufficient to “save” (i.e. explain or satisfy) this or that.¹³⁰ This last version figures in Ockham’s discussion of the Church: Christ’s promise to be with the Church all days (Matthew 28:20) will be “saved” (satisfied) if even one Christian avoids falling into heresy.¹³¹

This should not be described as a “principle of parsimony”. According to Ockham, the universe may not be as simple as it could be:

God does many things by many that he could do by fewer, and no other reason [besides his will] need be sought; and from the

God's freedom is the reason why we may have to recognise some realities which, were it not for (2) experience or (3) divine revelation, there would have been no (1) reason to posit. What God has chosen to create we find out by experience or revelation.

Perhaps the point is not that *unnecessary* entities should not be posited, but rather that entities should not be posited without certain kinds of justification.

To attempt a summary: I should not assert that X exists unless I observe it, or someone (God, or someone else who knows) tells me that it does, or its existence can be proved by reasoning, or it is needed to explain some fact; but even if I should not assert its existence, it may nevertheless exist.

Did Ockham have a program of reducing the catalogue of entities to a minimum? Did he have *any* overall program?¹³³ This is a matter for conjecture. Perhaps he did not have any grand philosophical project but simply tried to answer the various questions that academic tradition and his own reflection put before him. But in doing that job he seems to have come to the opinion that many of his contemporaries and predecessors had misunderstood Aristotle on certain points on which, in his opinion, Aristotle was right. The attempt to correct these mistakes led him to eliminate many entities postulated by his contemporaries and predecessors (especially by Duns Scotus). Perhaps this developed into a general campaign to eliminate as many entities as possible, or perhaps it did not. In any case his philosophical techniques have been of interest to later philosophers who do have an interest in constructing minimalist theories.¹³⁴

Causes

If some things cannot be asserted to exist unless [1] their existence can be proved by reasoning (see above, p.12), we need to ask how existence can be proved. Can we prove the existence of something not directly experienced from [2] things that are experienced? Philosophers have argued that some things must be posited as the *causes* of things we experience. On "efficient" causes (i.e. causes that bring things into existence) Ockham holds that the proposition that X is the efficient cause of Y cannot be proved. God could have ordained (perhaps he did, for all we know) that God himself alone would cause combustion to happen whenever fire is near a combustible, without the fire having that effect. We can never prove from an effect that something is a man, because an angel could produce the same effect.¹³⁵ From experience all we know is that when one thing is experienced some other thing is experienced that otherwise is not experienced.¹³⁶ It is also not true that the moving cause of a change must be distinct from the thing that changes.¹³⁷ On ends or "final" causes, Ockham held that it cannot be proved that every effect has a final cause; it cannot be proved that an agent that always acts in the same way acts for the sake of an end.¹³⁸ In short, there is no principle of causation that can extend our knowledge beyond experience.¹³⁹

Existence of God

In some places Ockham says that God's existence can be proved,¹⁴⁰ but in fact his opinion seems to be that the existence of the being Christians call God cannot be demonstrated, though perhaps there are persuasive arguments. The proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident; it cannot be proved from self-evident premises, because every argument assumes something doubtful or something believed (*creditum*); nor is it known by experience.¹⁴¹

Philosophers since Plato had tried to prove the existence of a god by way of causation.¹⁴² Unsurprisingly, in view of his remarks on causation, Ockham rejects such proofs.

It is difficult or impossible to prove that there cannot be a regress to infinity¹⁴³ in causes of the same kind one of which can exist without the other (as, for example, a child may continue to exist after its parents die), or that such a series must have a cause external to the series.¹⁴⁴

Conserving causes might seem to offer a stronger argument for God's existence: if something is produced it needs to be conserved; a conserving cause must exist at the same time as the thing it conserves, and if such causes form a chain all its links must exist at the same time as one another; and (according to Aristotle) there cannot be a simultaneous infinity; therefore there must be at least one unproduced conserving cause at the head of any such finite series.¹⁴⁵

But perhaps there is nothing that is (in the relevant sense) produced or conserved, there may be only permanent things that are moved or changed, i.e. there may not be any effects besides the things caused by celestial bodies or separated substances (that is, the moving causes posited in Aristotle's account of the machinery of the world).¹⁴⁶

And even if some things are produced and conserved, it still could not be sufficiently proved that there is *only one* unproduced conserving cause.¹⁴⁷ There may not be a single cause of the totality of things.¹⁴⁸

An argument like Anselm's to prove the existence of a nature than which none is nobler or better cannot prove that there is only one such being.¹⁴⁹

An argument from the apparent purposiveness of nature¹⁵⁰ will not succeed since we have no reason to think that an agent that always acts in the same way acts for an end, or that a non-intelligent agent acts for a purpose appointed by an intelligence.¹⁵¹

God as Cause

If, however, we accept *by faith* that God does exist, still it cannot be demonstrated that God is the cause, mediate or immediate, total or partial, of *any* effect, or that he is able to cause directly, without

any co-cause, whatever any other cause can cause.¹⁵² It cannot be demonstrated that he knows or wills anything other than himself.¹⁵³ It cannot be philosophically demonstrated that God's causation of things is contingent and free.¹⁵⁴ These propositions are, like God's existence, held by faith.

God's Ideas

According to Augustine, adapting Plato, God causes individuals in accordance with the Ideas in his mind of their natures.¹⁵⁵ Since according to Ockham's account of Universals natures are not things, a different account is needed. "Almost all doctors agree in a common conclusion, namely that an idea is the divine essence really and differs from it only conceptually [*ratione*]"¹⁵⁶ Ockham rejects this. Nothing real differs from something real by a distinction of reason.¹⁵⁷

According to Ockham, God creates each individual in accordance with his knowledge of *the very individual* to be created. The ideas are the infinity¹⁵⁸ of individual things he could create, which are known by God as individuals before they exist (if they ever do)¹⁵⁹ — he knows them by intuitive knowledge when they are nothing.¹⁶⁰ A human being could have intuitive knowledge of a non-existent thing only by miracle:¹⁶¹ God has such knowledge as a matter of course.

God's attributes, faculties

According to Scotus, God's attributes (his power, goodness, knowledge, wisdom, etc.) are "formally distinct" from the divine essence and from one another. Ockham once again rejects a formal distinction.¹⁶² God is absolutely simple, without parts of any kind.¹⁶³

God's attributes are terms, i.e. words or concepts. The terms are distinct, but what each term *stands for* is in no way distinct from God himself or from what any other attribute stands for. God's justice is himself, his wisdom is himself, his justice is his wisdom.¹⁶⁴ Likewise terms referring to God's will, volitions, intellect, cognitions, etc., are many but stand for the one simple being, namely God himself.¹⁶⁵

Attributal and other terms applied to God are not synonyms because they have application also to creatures, in which the realities they stand for are not identical.¹⁶⁶ The wisdom of Socrates and the justice of Socrates are not Socrates himself.

God's power and freedom

Ockham holds by faith, though he does not think it can be proved, that God's attributes include omnipotence and freedom: that is, God can do anything doable, and he freely chooses to do only some of the things he can do.¹⁶⁷

The Christian creed begins with the affirmation, "I believe in God the father almighty". Ockham takes "almighty" (*omnipotens*, "all

powerful”) to mean that God is able to do everything the doing of which does not include a contradiction.¹⁶⁸

From that article of faith follows (since God can do anything doable by any agent) the “famous proposition of the theologians”, that whatever God produces by means of secondary causes he can produce and conserve immediately without them.¹⁶⁹

It follows also that “every absolute thing distinct in place and subject from another absolute thing can by God’s power exist with the second thing destroyed”;¹⁷⁰ for example, there can be an intuitive cognition of something (by which one would know that it does *not* exist) even after it ceases to exist.¹⁷¹

Like Duns Scotus and others,¹⁷² Ockham distinguishes between God’s “ordinate” and “absolute” power. God’s power can be considered “absolutely”, i.e. without reference to any decision he has actually made, or “ordinately”, i.e. with reference to the decisions (ordinances) he *has* made. Ockham explains:

This distinction is not to be understood as meaning that in God there are really two powers, one ordinate and the other absolute, because in God there is just one power *ad extra* [i.e. in respect of things other than himself], which is in every way God himself.¹⁷³ Nor is it to be understood that God can do some things ordinately and others absolutely and not ordinately, because God can do nothing inordinately. But it is to be understood that ‘to be able to do something’ is sometimes taken in accordance with laws¹⁷⁴ ordained and established by God, and God is said to be able to do those things by ordinate power (*de potentia ordinata*); in another way ‘to be able’ is taken for ‘to be able to do everything the doing of which does not include a contradiction *whether God ordains that he will do it or not*’ (because God *can* do many things he does not will to do)... and these things God is said ‘to be able’ [to do] by his absolute power (*de potentia absoluta*).¹⁷⁵

(Of course things done *de potentia ordinata* are also possible *de potentia absoluta*.)

So whatever God actually does is done in accordance with his ordinances. A miracle is an exception to the “common course” of nature,¹⁷⁶ but it is not an exception to God’s ordinances, which allow for miracles.

God’s power is not narrowed by what he has done in the past.¹⁷⁷ He cannot cause the past not to have happened,¹⁷⁸ but what he did he still has power never to have done.¹⁷⁹

Must God keep his promises? Do his ordinances put him under obligation?¹⁸⁰ Can he change his ordinances, as apparently he did when the Old Covenant was superseded by the New, and if so might the present religious, moral and natural order be replaced? Such questions occur to Ockham’s modern readers,¹⁸¹ but they do not seem to have occurred to Ockham himself. It has been suggested that the loving nature that has been revealed in God’s actions gives assurance that he will not give us any unpleasant surprises,¹⁸² but it seems to me that in Ockham’s theology there are

no constraints upon God's treatment of creatures (see below, p.19)
— God's actions in future may not resemble his loving actions in the past.

The soul

Ockham rejects Thomas Aquinas's thesis that the intellectual soul is the one and only substantial form of a human being.¹⁸³ According to Ockham, a living human being is a complex informed by three forms that are distinct from one another as thing from thing, namely the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul and the form of bodily existence.¹⁸⁴

However, between the intellectual soul and its powers, viz. intellect and will, there is no real distinction (though an intellection is not a volition**).¹⁸⁵ Likewise there are no real distinctions among the powers of the sensitive soul.¹⁸⁶

Whereas the sensitive soul is corruptible and extended, with various parts of it informing different parts of the body, the intellectual soul is an immaterial and incorruptible form existing as a whole in the whole body and as a whole in each part.¹⁸⁷ However, according to Ockham it cannot be proved that such an intellectual soul exists or that we have acts proper to such a soul; Christians believe these things by faith.¹⁸⁸

Morality

According to Ockham, morality is partly "positive" (*positum*, i.e. "put there" or "laid down", i.e. by some authority) and partly non-positive (i.e. not based on any command).¹⁸⁹ Non-positive moral science (natural morality¹⁹⁰) includes self-evident propositions¹⁹¹ and also propositions based on experience.¹⁹² Non-positive morality requires that God be loved and obeyed,¹⁹³ which is the basis of the positive morality determined by divine laws. Non-positive morality also requires that agreements be kept, which is the basis of the positive morality determined by human law and custom.¹⁹⁴ Non-positive morality and divine positive law are mutually reinforcing: natural reason enjoins us to obey God,¹⁹⁵ and God commands us to obey reason (even erroneous reason).¹⁹⁶

God's particular command, however, can override any general rule of morality.¹⁹⁷ God's command could justify particular acts of hate, theft, or adultery (though they should not then be called by those names).¹⁹⁸ Hatred of God could be a right act if God commanded it.¹⁹⁹

Sin does not consist in anything in the sinful act itself²⁰⁰ but in its being done contrary to one's obligation.²⁰¹

Actual performance of a willed act adds nothing of moral goodness or evil, which belong only to acts of will.²⁰²

Ockham's opinion that God's command overrides moral rules and statements that obligations hold "while the divine precept stands (*stante divino precepto*)"²⁰³ may suggest that Ockham holds a

“divine command” theory of moral obligation, i.e. that something is morally right only because God commands or permits it, and wrong only because God forbids it.²⁰⁴ But to say that God’s command can override any moral rule does not mean that moral rules hold, when they do hold, only because they are imposed by God’s command. Like Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and other Christian theologians, Ockham knew that *transfer to n.148* in some Bible passages God commanded things that would normally be immoral,²⁰⁵ but all three held a “natural law” theory of morality, which bases morality on “right reason”. According to Scotus, moral propositions which “are true by reason of their terms . . . would be true even if, to assume the impossible, no act of willing existed”.²⁰⁶ According to Gregory of Rimini, “if, to assume the impossible, the divine reason or God himself did not exist, or his reason was in error, still, if someone acted against angelic or human right reason or any other (if there were any), he would sin. And *if there existed absolutely no right reason*, still, if someone acted against what some right reason, if it did exist, *would* say should be done, he would sin”.²⁰⁷ Natural morality does not hold only by God’s command, but God’s command can override natural law because natural law dictates that God must always be obeyed.²⁰⁸

More on moral theory: virtue; external action.

Human free choice

According to Ockham, deliberation, praise and blame assume free choice,²⁰⁹ and experience shows that we have it.²¹⁰ Free will, according to Ockham, following Duns Scotus, is the capacity to choose either X or not-X without being determined one way or the other by any cause other than the will itself.²¹¹ According to Scotus this “power of opposites” exists at an instant; according to Ockham there must be some passage of time.²¹² Our choice is free in the sense that we can choose X, and then not-X, even if meanwhile nothing else in the universe changes.²¹³ One choice can constrain another, but only while the former lasts.²¹⁴ Habits incline a person to make certain choices, but not inescapably.²¹⁵

According to Ockham freedom of choice is wider in scope than many others (e.g. Thomas Aquinas) believed. According to Ockham, we can reject (*nolle*) happiness, the good, our ultimate end, we can reject God even intuitively seen, we can choose to hate God; we can will evil *qua* evil.²¹⁶

God’s foreknowledge of human choices

Though our choices are free, God knows with certainty what they will be. How this is possible we cannot understand. That he has such knowledge is a matter of faith.²¹⁷

Ockham rejects Aristotle’s view that statements about future events that depend on free choice are neither true nor false.²¹⁸ Such propositions can be true and God knows them certainly beforehand, though they remain contingent and God’s knowledge

of them is contingent.²¹⁹ “However much this is true, ‘God knows that this side of the contradiction will be true’, it is nevertheless *possible* that it *never was* true.”²²⁰

Prophecies inspired by God regarding future contingents are always true, but they are always conditional (even if not explicitly so),²²¹ and if they do not come true it is because the condition has not been met.²²²

Predestination and Grace

*See McGrath

Ockham rejects the theory of Peter Aureol that a quality God creates in the soul, called “grace”, is necessary and sufficient for salvation. According to Ockham, no quality, natural or supernatural, can require God to confer eternal life on any creature (so grace is not sufficient), and he can (*de potentia absoluta*) confer eternal life in the absence of any quality (so grace is not absolutely necessary).²²³

However, God has *ordained* that salvation *does* require a quality that God creates in the soul, namely grace (or charity²²⁴), and according to this ordinance no one can enter heaven unless he or she is in the state of grace at the moment of death. (So Peter Auriol’s position is correct, not *de potentia dei absoluta*, but *de potentia ordinata*.)

On grace and predestination the western Church generally followed Augustine. Augustine attacked Pelagius²²⁵ for preaching that we can all be good and attain salvation if only we choose rightly, which anyone can do. According to Augustine no one can choose rightly without the aid of God’s grace, which he does not give to everyone and no one can earn; God gives final grace (i.e. grace possessed at the end of life) to those he has predestined to eternal salvation, and we cannot know who they are or why God has chosen them. Theologians at various times have tried to amend this doctrine to allow more scope for human initiative and to make it seem fairer, and others have attacked such modifications as Pelagian or semi-Pelagian.²²⁶

An amendment made by some theologians was expressed in the saying “God does not deny grace to those who do what is in them” (“*Facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam*”), meaning that God reliably will give grace — not as something earned but gratuitously — to those who at every stage do their best, so that they will in the end achieve salvation.²²⁷ If this is so, then Pelagius was right in saying that by consistently doing our best we can all attain salvation, and Augustine was also right in saying that to attain salvation we need grace that cannot be earned. As far as I know, Ockham never adopted the *facientibus* idea, though some have attributed it to him.²²⁸

According to Ockham, following the Bible,²²⁹ God owes nothing to any creature. Nothing God does can be unjust or unfair or morally bad.²³⁰ God could, without injustice, annihilate any person without giving them eternal life;²³¹ he could give eternal life to those who

live a naturally good life, without faith or grace;²³² he could send good persons to eternal punishment (though “punishment” would not be the appropriate word);²³³ he could ordain that someone found good on Tuesday will have eternal life but not someone found good on Wednesday.²³⁴ Absolutely speaking (i.e. *de potentia absoluta*) he *could* do such things, i.e. there would be nothing contradictory if he did;²³⁵ but Christians believe that in accordance with his freely-chosen ordinances God will give eternal life to all who die in a state of grace.²³⁶

Only by God’s gracious acceptance can a morally good act (or anything else) merit eternal life, but a person not in a state of grace can do acts that are morally good though they do not merit eternal life. An act necessarily and intrinsically virtuous is one chosen out of love of God above all things and for God’s own sake.²³⁷ Such love is possible for pagans as well as for Christians; it does not require infused faith or grace.²³⁸ Persons not in a state of grace must do good acts as a preparation for grace, but — though they are in some way the reason why God gives them grace — their acts do not *earn* grace,²³⁹ i.e. there would be no injustice if grace were withheld. The reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will be in charity at the time of death.²⁴⁰

Bringing every understanding into captivity to Christ

Paul writes of “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ”, 2 Corinthians 10:5.

In Ockham’s view, a Christian’s understanding owes no obedience to anyone but Christ, but must accept as true whatever God communicates through the Bible or the teaching of the Church.²⁴¹ Human judgment must therefore defer to divine revelation. If God tells us through Bible or Church teaching that something is true, then it is true.

Hence at various points Ockham modifies positions that seem to be (or are!) established by philosophical or theological argument to conform to the teaching of the Church, even when that seems “more difficult to hold” or even “repugnant to reason”.²⁴² This will be seen at various points in the following sections.²⁴³

Trinity

The Church teaches (i) that there is only one God, (ii) that there are three persons — Father, Son and Holy Spirit — each of whom is God, and (iii) that the persons are really distinct, i.e. none of the three is either of the others (so, for example, “The Son is the Father” is *false*).²⁴⁴ The obvious question is whether this set of propositions is self-consistent.

Ockham often refers to God as “the Divine Essence”. Like other medieval theologians, he holds that the Divine Essence is numerically singular and absolutely simple, i.e. without parts. He holds (following theological tradition) that the three Persons are constituted by relations, the Father by paternity, the Son by

filiation, the Spirit by passive spiration (i.e. by “being breathed” by Father and Son).²⁴⁵

The difficulty in the doctrine of the Trinity is to reconcile the plurality of really distinct Persons each of whom is God with the numerical singularity and simplicity of the Divine Essence.²⁴⁶ To deal with this difficulty, Ockham gave limited acceptance to two things he had elsewhere argued against, namely, **first** the formal distinction,²⁴⁷ and **second** the reality of relations.²⁴⁸

First: Consider this syllogism: “The Divine Essence is the Father; the Divine Essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father”. This seems to be an expository syllogism (i.e. a third-figure syllogism in which the terms are all singular) arguing validly from premisses Christians hold as true to a conclusion they regard as false, viz. that the Son is the Father. According to Ockham this syllogism is not valid, and it is not an expository syllogism,²⁴⁹ because the divine essence is *numerically one unique simple thing that is really several things* distinguished by a formal distinction.²⁵⁰ A formal distinction is not merely a distinction of reason, because it does not depend on any mind, and it is not a fully *real* distinction, since God is numerically one, unique and simple. Positing a formal distinction does not mean that there are several “formalities” in God.²⁵¹ The things formally distinct are numerically one and simple.

Ockham’s understanding of the “formal distinction” is this. **If x and y are really the same thing**, call it w, **but x is z and y is not z** (z being one thing), then x and y are formally distinct and w is two things (viz. x and y). The paradox in this (or singularity, as Ockham calls it — though perhaps it is a contradiction!) is that w is both one thing and two things.²⁵²

this is not clear Compare this with his understanding of how a real distinction is proved:²⁵³ If x is z and y is not z, then x and y are distinct *as one thing from another*. For a formal distinction two conditions must be met: (i) that x and y are one thing, and (ii) that x is, and y is not, some other thing. Because of (ii), a formal distinction is real (*ex natura rei*).²⁵⁴

Positing a formal distinction is not an explanation; it just restates the problematic doctrine: “I do not believe that a formal distinction is easier to hold than a trinity of Persons with unity of Essence”.²⁵⁵

Second: The Persons are constituted by three relations. Normally a relation cannot constitute a subsistent being; a relation presupposes the existence of the things related, and relational actions (such as begetting) presuppose the existence of the thing acting. (This will be true whether or not relations are additional entities.) In the case of the Trinity this is not so: the relations constitute the things related. Despite these difficulties, it must be held that the divine Persons are constituted by relations, because (as Ockham understood it) this was the teaching of the Church.²⁵⁶ In the case of the divinity it must be conceded that relations are realities formally distinct from the things related.

Duns Scotus had suggested that the divine intellect was the principle of filiation (the relative property constituting the Son)

and the divine will the principle of spiration (constituting the Spirit). According to Scotus there is a formal distinction between God's will and his intellect; according to Ockham there is not.²⁵⁷ In Ockham's view, the position of Scotus is tenable only if intellect and will are taken as terms standing for the Divine Essence in its simplicity.²⁵⁸

Incarnation

this section needs rewriting

<https://academic.oup.com/book/46734/chapter-abstract/413259526?redirectedFrom=fulltext>

The Church teaches that one of the three divine Persons, namely the Son or Word, while remaining God, became a man, Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose from the dead; and that, though Christ has two natures, divine and human, he is only one person, namely the divine person.²⁵⁹ The person is *who acts*, so both acts done according to the divine nature and acts done according to human nature can be attributed to the person Jesus Christ.²⁶⁰

In his book "On Christ's person and two natures against Eutyches and Nestorius", Boethius defined a *person* as an individual rational substance.²⁶¹ Medieval theologians added a number of negations to this definition, to exclude from personhood some entities that might qualify under the definition of Boethius.²⁶² Ockham builds such negations into his definition of "*suppositum*", the more general concept covering person: "A supposit is a complete being, not constituting any being,²⁶³ not apt to inhere in another, nor to be sustained by another".²⁶⁴ His definition of "person": "A person is an intellectual supposit."²⁶⁵ His definition of "a nature": "By a nature I understand an absolute positive thing apt to exist outside the soul."²⁶⁶

In Ockham's terminology, the teaching of the Church is that Christ unites two natures, divine and human, in one person or rational *suppositum*, that person being the person of the Son, Christ's humanity not being another *suppositum*.

As a faithful Catholic Ockham accepted this teaching and tried to fit it into his philosophy, to which he made some adjustments.²⁶⁷ First, he made an exception (another exception) to his ordinary position that relations are not entities really distinct from the absolute things related. Since the union of the Son with a human nature took place at a particular time and was not a mere spatial juxtaposition, there must have been at that time the production of some new entity²⁶⁸ distinct from the Son and Christ's humanity — not an absolute entity²⁶⁹ but a relative entity. This relative entity must have come into being in the humanity, since the divine nature is eternally perfect and therefore does not receive new modifications.²⁷⁰

Another adjustment was needed to accommodate the point that Christ's humanity was not itself a person, a *suppositum*.²⁷¹ The humanity of Socrates is a man, namely Socrates. But the humanity of Christ is not a man, because Christ's person is divine and there

is in Christ no human person. In this case, Ockham says, ~~the~~ humanity is “sustained” by the divinity somewhat as an accident is sustained by a substance.²⁷² (Being sustained is apparently not the same as inhering,²⁷³ but the idea is not clearly explained.)

This para needs rewriting This leads him to make another adjustment to the understanding of *suppositum*. ~~***For Aristotle (as Ockham interprets him), Socrates and Socrates’ humanity are identical.~~ For Aristotle, a substance is something *that is not sustained* by anything else, whereas something that exists in or is sustained by something else is an accident. Because Christ is a divine person sustaining a human nature that is not a person, Ockham revises Aristotle’s account by eliminating from the notion of a substance the implication *that it is not sustained* — so that of any particular substance it will be a question whether it is sustained or not. According to Ockham, to say that something is a substance does not imply either that it *is* sustained, or that it *is not*.²⁷⁴ The humanity of Socrates is *not* sustained and is a person, the humanity of Christ *is* sustained by the divine person and is a substance but not a person. Aristotle’s conception holds in every case except that of Christ. By divine power both a substance and an accident can be sustained in existence by something else.²⁷⁵ Though in this special case Christ’s humanity is sustained by his divine Person, it is nevertheless in the same category (substance) and the same species (human being) as other men: Christ is a man.

Ockham adds some observations of his own, not required by the teaching of the Church. Since human nature includes prime matter, sensitive form and intellective form, there are three corresponding unions with the divine Person.²⁷⁶ Each of the three divine persons could sustain the same human nature²⁷⁷ — indeed any other nature, e.g. a stone or an ass²⁷⁸ — just as the second person now sustains a human nature. The Son could lay aside the human nature he has assumed, though we can be certain he will not.²⁷⁹

The Eucharist²⁸⁰

Ockham affirms the Catholic Church’s doctrine of transubstantiation.²⁸¹ According to Ockham, transubstantiation is the annihilation of the substance of the bread or wine and, by God’s power, its immediate replacement by Christ, the accidents of bread and wine remaining (but not inhering in Christ); God has power to effect this.²⁸² When the bread is consecrated, the formal object (i.e. objective) of the action is to substitute Christ’s body for the bread,²⁸³ and when the wine is consecrated the formal object is to substitute Christ’s blood for the wine; but in both bread and wine the whole Christ becomes present.²⁸⁴

Ockham distinguishes between two ways of being in a place, namely “circumscriptively” and “definitively”. To say that bread is in a place **circumscriptively** means that *each distinct part* of the bread occupies *its own distinct part* of the place, part outside of part.²⁸⁵ But when Christ replaces the bread, he is in its place **definitively**, meaning that the *whole* Christ is present to *each and*

every part of the place previously occupied by the bread.²⁸⁶ It is ~~not~~ contradictory, and therefore possible to God, to make two bodies exist in the same place, and therefore it is likewise possible to make all the parts of one body to exist in all the parts of a place, i.e. definitively.²⁸⁷ Christ continues to be present in heaven circumscriptively while he exists on the many altars definitively.²⁸⁸ The sensible qualities of the bread and wine continue to exist circumscriptively, with whatever quantity they had before consecration.

When Christ comes to exist on the altar, it is true to say that by consecration Christ is moved, even that he is moved locally; but this is not local motion in the usual sense, since he does not leave heaven and does not pass through successive places on the way to the location of the bread and wine.²⁸⁹

When the substance of the bread and wine is annihilated, their accidents remain; these (the “species”, meaning “appearances”) are what we see, taste and feel. Ockham thinks that it would have been simpler to suppose that the bread and wine are not annihilated but continue to exist in the same place as Christ in the sacrament,²⁹⁰ but he rejects this view because it has been rejected by the Church; the Church teaches transubstantiation.²⁹¹ He holds that by God’s power the accidents continue to exist without inhering in any substance; they do not inhere in Christ.²⁹² According to Thomas Aquinas, the sensible qualities of the bread and wine inhere in the *quantity* of the bread and wine.²⁹³ According to Ockham, quantity is not a thing²⁹⁴ and qualities never inhere in it: after transubstantiation the qualities of the bread and wine, quantified as before, are sustained, without inhering in any subject, by the power of God.²⁹⁵

Since Christ is really present in the Eucharist, he should have effects on our sense organs and we should be able to perceive him. We do not perceive him, however, because God withholds his concurrence in the production by Christ’s body of any sense effects; we perceive only the qualities of the bread and wine.²⁹⁶ Christ in the Eucharist knows where he is and perceives things around him.²⁹⁷

When the consecrated host is moved (e.g. when the priest carries the host) Christ is moved.²⁹⁸ However, the priest carrying the host does not feel Christ’s weight because the priest exerts no force: he does not cause Christ to move. No created cause can move Christ’s body.²⁹⁹ When the host is moved, Christ moves voluntarily, or God moves him.³⁰⁰

The various actions ascribed to God in this account of the Eucharist do not involve any contradiction, so they are within God’s absolute power.³⁰¹ Whatever God does is done *de potentia ordinata*: if something can be done without contradiction and is therefore within God’s absolute power, it is also within his ordinate power if he chooses to do it. The Eucharist and other sacraments are among God’s ordinances.³⁰²

Ockham constantly used the techniques of medieval logic, to which he himself contributed, to disentangle issues in every area of philosophy and theology. However, I will not attempt to give any account of his logic.³⁰³

1. Brief accounts: Spade and Panaccio in the *Stanford Encyclopedia*; Moody, “William of Ockham”; Courtenay, “Ockham, William”; Keele *Ockham Explained*; Vignaux, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: An Introduction*, pp.165ff.

Longer treatments: Adams, *William Ockham*; Maurer, *The Philosophy of William of Ockham*.

2. “Any occurrence”: If I say “Socrates is a human being, and Plato is a human being”, there are two occurrences of the term “human being”. “Human being” is a universal. See Liebesman, “Types and Tokens”,

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2026/entries/types-tokens/>.

3. “Predicated” means to be the predicate in a statement of the form “S is P”, or “S is not P”, where “S” is the subject and “P” is the predicate (with appropriate quantifiers and the verb grammatically appropriate— “is”, “was”, “may be”, etc.).

4. “A universal is that which is fit (*natum est*) to be predicated of many”, Expos. Perih. 1 c.5 §3, OPh II, p.399/430; cf. Aristotle, “A universal is that which is apt to be predicated of many”, *De Interpr.* 17a 38 -b 3. “Is fit” or “apt”, means “is suited”, “can suitably/appropriately be predicated”. “Human being” may not be *actually* predicated of many human beings (e.g. we may be talking about the term “human being” itself, as in “‘Human being’ is a universal”), but it is *suited to be* predicated of many individual human beings.

5. On the theory of Forms, see Sedley. Plato explores some of the difficulties of his theory in *Parmenides* 128e-134e.

6. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.9, *Ethics* I.6.

7. “In conclusion, the legacy to the late Middle Ages left by the debate on universals which took place in between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries can be summed up as follows: (1) universals exist in a threefold way, as ideas in the mind of God, as common natures in re, and as general concepts in our mind. (2) Real universals are forms naturally apt to be present in many individual items as their main metaphysical components. (3) Real universals have no being outside the being of their individuals. (4) Real universals are partially identical-with and partially different-from their own individuals. (5.1) Real universals exist *in potentia* only outside our minds, or, (5.2) according to Duns Scotus’s and Burley’s views, they exist *in actu* outside our minds”; Conti, “Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages”, p.376.

8. Ockham writes: “All I have seen agree in saying that the nature, in some way universal (at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, though some say that it is distinguished really, others that it is distinguished only formally, others that it is distinguished in no way in reality [*ex natura rei*] but only according to reason or by consideration of the intellect”, Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.225/258. Historians call such theories “moderate

realism”, i.e. moderate in comparison with Plato’s theory in the degree of reality they attribute to the nature. Ockham explains and criticises these theories in Ord.1 d.2 qq.4-7, OTh II, p.99ff/132ff (translated Spade, *Five Texts*, pp.114-231).

9. See Boethius in Spade, *Five Texts*, p.25. On Thomas Aquinas’s version of this theory see Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.79-80.

10. For the ancestor of such theories of individuation see Plato, *Timaeus*, 49a-52d.

11. “In so far as an opinion asserts that there are *additional things besides singulars existing in them*, I regard it as quite absurd and destructive of the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy... and that those who hold it are unfit for science”, Expos. Perih. 1 Proem. § 8, OPh II, p.363/394. Strong language!

12. A barrel hoop signifies wine in a pub: “*circulus significat vinum in taberna*”, SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.9/86. Apparently the hoop was hoisted to show that wine was now available.

13. “[J]ust as every spoken word (*vox*), however much it is common by institution, is truly and really singular and one in number because it is one and not many, so an intention of the mind [i.e. a concept] signifying many external things is truly and really singular and one in number, because it is one and not many things, though it signifies many things”, SL 1 c.14, OPh I, p.48/126 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.78). “Every universal is a singular thing, and therefore is universal only by signification, because it is a sign of many”, *ibid*.

14. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.49). Some words signify* words, some concepts signify* other concepts SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.43-4/120 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.74-5). *In Qdl V.12-13 pp. 530-1/570 O says that the only universals are concepts. But see p.571.48-9/610 and 573.114/612*

15. Boehner, “The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham”, pp.315-6; Gál, “Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de Natura Conceptus Universalis”.

16. “Some say [1] that an intention [concept] is simply something made (*fictum*) by the soul, others [2] that it is some quality subjectively existing in the soul, distinct from the act of understanding. Others say [3] that it is the act of understanding. And in their [those who hold 3] favour is the argument ‘in vain is something done by many that can be done by fewer’ (*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). But whatever can be ‘saved’ [i.e. accounted for] by positing [i.e. asserting the existence of] something that is distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without such a distinct thing, because, as much as any other sign, an act of understanding can stand for and signify* something. Therefore it is not necessary to posit anything besides the act of understanding... it is enough for now that an intention is something in the soul naturally signifying* something for which it can stand and that it can be part of a mental proposition”; SL 1 c.12, OPh I,

pp.42-3/120 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.74). According to theory [1], a concept is the concept's object in "objective being", i.e. the being of an object of thought, as distinct from its "subjective" being as an extra-mental subject. For a review of Ockham's treatments of these theories see Boehner, "Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", pp.315-19. The relevant texts include: Ord.1 d.2 q.8, OTh II, pp.266ff/300 (translated Spade, p.215ff); Expos. Perih., proem., OPh II, p.347-371/378; Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, OTh IX, p.472ff/512 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.389-90); Qq. Phys. q.1-7, OPh VI, p.397-412/444. See *Selection* pp.41-5; Klima; Maurer, *Philosophy* pp.496-510. (The contrast "subjective/ objective being" is found also in Scotus, Descartes, and many other authors.)

17. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.49-50); Expos. Perih. Proem. §2, OPh II, p.347/378. See Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.16-17. A word does not signify* a concept; it signifies the thing that the concept signifies. Our concept may change, and our classification of things may change, as we experience individuals; see "Intuitive and abstractive cognition" below.

explain signifies In saying that a concept changes we mean ***

18. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288.

19. "[T]he two incomplex knowledges of singular whitenesses... cause naturally, like fire causes heat, a third knowledge, distinct from them, that produces in objective being the whiteness previously seen in subjective being, without any activity of intellect or will, because such things are caused merely naturally"; Qq. Var. q.5, OTh VIII, p.175/200. (This passage reflects the "fictum" theory, above, note 16) *XR* "Nature works hiddenly in [producing] universals", Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.261/294. Cf. Aristotle: "The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process;" Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100 a13. Cf. Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.494-6; Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.525-9. *needs more explanation VI 65/86*

20. Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.211-12/244 (Sortes and Plato really are more alike than Sortes and an ass: answering the objection that "every universal would be a figment of the intellect", p.211.14). Cf. Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.679-80/718, lines 18-26, 50-8 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.572-3). ("Sortes" or "Socrates" and "Plato" are dummy names, like "Joe Blow" or "John Doe".)

21. Boehner, "Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham", pp.309-11, suggests that concept resembles the thing because effect resembles cause. (The main texts Boehner refers to are found in the modern edition as follows. Note 4: OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314. Note 5: OTh V, p.261ff/288. Note 6: OPh II, p.351ff/382. Note 7: OTh II, p.261/294 Note 8: OTh VIII, p.175/200. Note 9: OTh IV, p.241/264. Note 10: OTh II, p.283/316.) But it seems to me that Ockham does not explain resemblance by causation. He does say that the intuitive cognition of an individual is *of* that individual because that individual is its cause (Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314; Qdl. 1 q.13,

OTh IX, p.76, translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.66). He also says that concepts resemble things signified: “The cognition of a man is not more like one man than another, but by such a cognition is understood a man rather than an ass, because such a cognition, in *some* mode of likeness, is more like a man than an ass”; Qq. Phys. q.6, OPh VI, p.408/456 (my emphasis). Cf. Expos. Perih. 1 Proem. §6, OPh II, p.355/386. But I do not know of any text in which Ockham explains this mode or says that it is due to causation. “The respective role of causality and similarity with respect to natural signification in Ockham has been a somewhat controversial issue in recent secondary literature”; Spade and Panaccio, n.23, with references.

22. “Ockham... does not deny that forms are real - a real form exists in each of the many individuals. But instead of saying that these are the same form, he says that the many forms of the many things resemble one another, and because they do resemble one another each of them can be referred to by the one sign-type [as distinct from sign-token], such as a word or a concept. At different times Ockham entertained two theories about the concept: in the earlier theory he held that the concept itself resembles the things it can signify, like a picture of them; in the later theory he held that the concept is a mental entity or act that can stand for things without picturing them, as a red lion outside a pub signifies that this is a pub without resembling a pub. On both of these theories there are concepts in the mind, and words in language, that can signify or refer to stand for any member of a set of resembling things. He does not deny that the forms of individuals truly resemble one another, or that their forms are real; what he denies is that it is the one form that exists both multiplied in the things and as a universal in the mind”; Kilcullen “Ockham on Universals”

<https://johnkilcullen.net/z3608.html>

Also “Boethius on Porphyry”,

<https://johnkilcullen.net/x52t02.html>

23. See King, “Ockham on the Role of Concepts”, pp.3-6; King, “The Failure of Ockham’s Nominalism”. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.121-141 (“I do not see how Ockham can specify, either on the objective existence theory or on the mental act theory [cf. note 16 above], *XR* a similarity relation that can constitute the natural signification relation for general concepts”, p.132; neither theory “gives an adequate account of what makes a thought a thought of a given particular”, p.141).

24. See Cowling, Sam and Daniel Giberman.

25. Courtenay has studied the history of the term. See his “Introduction,” to *Vivarium*, 30; “*Nominales* and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century”.

26. Statement of Nominalist Masters of the University of Paris: “Those doctors are called nominalists who do not multiply things that are principally signified by terms according to the multiplication of terms. Realists, on the other hand, are those who contend that things are multiplied with the multiplication of terms. For instance, nominalists say that deity and [divine] wisdom are one and the same, but realists say that divine wisdom is divided

from deity”; Thorndike, *University Records*, p.355-60, “Nominalism” covered more than would now come under the term, especially technicalities of Logic. The statement continues: “Also nominalists are called those who apply diligence and study to know all the properties of terms from which depend the truth and falsity of speech, and without which there can be no perfect judgment of the truth and falsity of propositions. These properties are *suppositio*, *appellatio*, *ampliatio*, *restrictio*, *distributio exponible*. In addition they know obligations and insolubles, the true foundations of argumentation and dialectic, and all their defects. Instructed in these matters, they readily recognize what is good and bad in any argument. But the realists neglect and despise all these things, saying, ‘We attend to things; we don’t care about terms’. Among the nominalists the first to be condemned is said to have been William Ockham, whom John XXII persecuted...”; *ibid.*. Thorndike translates the Latin text in Du Plessis d’Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus*, 1755, I, ii, 286-88,

<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210010976288&seq=700>.

27. See above, note 7. *XR*

28. Individuals have “numerical unity”, i.e. if they are “numbered” or counted, each counts as one (“one, two...”). The nature is also one, but it is not as much a unity as the individuals are.

29. For Ockham’s statement and criticism of Scotus’s account of universals, including criticism of the formal distinction, see Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.161ff/194, translated Spade, *Five Texts* p.153ff (p.156 on the formal distinction). See also SL 1 c.16, OPh I, p.54/132ff, lines 11-18, 66-85 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.82ff); Maurer, *Philosophy* pp.73-5. See Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.22-9, 46-52. *a parte rei?*

30. Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.931-9.

31. “In creatures”: there are formal distinctions in God. See below, note 252. *XR*

32. “Therefore I say that -- with the exception of the formal distinction or non-identity, which is real (*ex natura rei*), and which is very difficult to understand and is not to be posited except where faith compels it -- nothing is distinguished from something except: [1] As a real being (*ens reale*) from a real being; and every such distinction is a real distinction (*distinctio realis*), and does not depend on the intellect any more than that being (*entitas*) depends on the intellect. Or [2] it is distinguished as a being of reason (*ens rationis*) from a being of reason; and every such distinction is a distinction of reason, because it simply excludes real identity, as a being of reason cannot be a real being. Or [3] it is distinguished as a real being from being of reason or the converse; and that distinction is strictly and properly neither real nor of reason, just as the distinct things are not real beings or beings of reason, but it is as it were a middle distinction, because one extreme is a real being and the other is a being of reason (what to call it I do not care at present, because this is at the speakers’ choice). Or [4] it is distinguished as an aggregate of a thing and a concept (*ratio*) from a real being or a being of reason, or from some similar aggregate,

and that distinction, like the preceding, is neither properly and strictly real nor of reason, for the same reason. And as I say of a real distinction and distinction of reason, in proportionately the same way I say of real identity and identity of reason, which are the opposites”; Ord.1 d.2 q.3, OTh II, p.78/112.

33. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, pp.14-20/48. For more on Ockham on distinctions see

<https://johnkilcullen.net/z3608.html>

What sorts of distinctions there are and how they are proved continued to be controversial in philosophy into the seventeenth century. See Alanen, “On Descartes Argument for Dualism”, Ariew, “Descartes and Leibniz as readers of Suarez”.

34. According to this opinion “every relation is a thing really distinct from its foundation, so that the resemblance by which white Sortes resembles white Plato is a thing really and totally distinct from Sortes and from the whiteness that is the foundation of that resemblance...Though the expression “foundation of the relation” is not a philosophical expression according to Aristotle’s philosophy [cf. Expos in Phys 3.2, para.3 OPh IV p.417-8/430], yet they say that a relation has a *foundation* and a *term*, from both of which it [the relation] is really distinguished”; SL 1 c.54, OPh I, p.177-8/254 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.176). (The “term” in this context is not a part of a statement, but the other member in a relationship, here Plato.) Ockham’s views on relations (and other categories — see below) were an early concern of his Franciscan colleagues: Etzkorn, “Ockham at a Provincial Chapter”.

35. In Latin *res* means “thing”. Some theologians used the abstract nouns “reality”, “entity”, to mean quasi-things. In reporting their opinions, Ockham uses the terms *res parva* and *res media*. See for example OTh IX, pp.359/398, 611-6/650, 614/654, 631/670, 635/674, 645/684, 652/692, 674/714, 679/718, 683/722 (or *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.297, 512-8, 531, 535, 544, etc.). See also Qq. Phys. q.63, OPh VI, p.569/616. For arguments against the *res parva*, see Qdl.6 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.512ff).

36. “If relations were such things, it would follow... that a whiteness could not come to exist in one thing without a new positive thing coming into existence in something very distant”; Expos. Predic. c.12, OPh II p.241/272. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV p.284.7-9/308, p.311.3-10/334; Rep.2 q.2, OTh V p.37.5-7/37; Qdl 6 q. 8 p.613-4/654.

37. “Some say that a relation is not a thing outside the soul distinct really and totally from an absolute thing and from absolute things. Others, however, assert that a relation is a thing that is no more an absolute thing than a man is an ass [i.e. not at all], but is really and totally distinct from an absolute thing and from absolute things. Many theologians are of this opinion, and I also once believed that it was Aristotle’s opinion, but now it seems to me that the opposite opinion follows from his principles”, SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.158).”

38. “Sortes’ likeness to Plato [in being white] imports nothing

except that Sortes is white and Plato likewise....Whoever could understand Sortes and Plato and their whitenesses, without understanding anything else, would straightway say that Sortes is like Plato"; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.310.1-8/334. See also Ord. 1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.367.10-368.24/390.

39. "In one way a relation is said to be 'real' because it signifies some little thing outside the mind distinct from absolute things, in another way because it signifies absolute things outside the mind or in the mind that are said to be *such as they are denoted to be* by such a relative term *without any operation of the intellect*. I say that in the first way there are no real relations, because there are no such little things between absolute things... I say that in the second way there are real relations, because they signify* absolute things in the way explained (e.g. 'likeness' signifies two white things and that each white thing is similar to the other without any operation of the intellect)..."; Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.678/718 lines 9ff (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.571-2). "[T]he intellect does nothing to make it fact that the universe is one, or that a whole is composed, or that adjacent causes cause, or that a triangle has three angles, and so on, any more than that Socrates is white or fire hot or water cold"; Ord.1 d.30, q.1, OTh IV, p.316-7/340. Cf. Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.728/768, lines 45-7, 56-66 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.614-5). Cf. note 20 *XR* above.

40. WND 6.413ff, pp.150-1; 62.206ff, pp.428-31; CB 1.8, pp.189-92. Cf. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, pp.502-16. See also Pelletier. (But the fact that the Church can act as a unity does not imply that the pope or a general council acts infallibly on behalf of the Church.) Even a heap of sand is really, i.e. truly, unified by spatial relationships among the grains—it is a heap.

41. One of Ockham's most detailed discussion of relations is in answer to this carefully-formulated question: "Whether — aside from any authority of faith and of any philosophers — it could more easily be denied than held that every relation is something real in some way distinguished from every absolute and absolutes?" He explains: "This question is not about the truth -- that is, what must be held according to the truth of things -- but it is what would be held by someone wishing to rely precisely on the reason possible for this life, and not wishing to accept any school of thought or authority", just as such a person "would say that it is impossible for three persons really distinct to be the one most simple thing.... that God is not man, and many other things that nevertheless according to the truth of things are false"; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV pp.281-3/304.

*"More easily denied than held" does not imply "not possible to hold". Ockham does not say that philosophical arguments show that there cannot possibly be relative entities; only that there is a philosophical answer to every philosophical argument to prove that *all* relations are things. [*Is this right? Is his position stronger than that?] This leaves room for arguments to prove that some relations are things. *

42. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.370.11-13/394. See Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.269-276.

33
43. Union of matter and form, union of substance and accident, union of the parts of a continuum: Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.369-74/392. See *Etzkorn, "William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union", p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. *Cross *Christology* the union of the human nature to the divine, the union of matter to form and vice versa, the union of accident to substance Ockham, Ord. I, d. 30, q. 4 OTh IV, 369.3-9. Cross refers to Qu. var., q. 6, a. 2, ll. 58-94 (OTh, VIII, 208)* *But see SL 1 c.51, OPh I, pp.169.204-70/246 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.170), where Ockham seems to reject the view that the unions abovementioned are things. Perhaps where he seems to say they are, he means in the theological doctrine of incarnation.

44. Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.274-5.

45. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31-2/72; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.256-67/284; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.334-7/362; Qdl.5 q.5, OTh IX, p.495ff/534 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.413ff). The existence of intuitive cognitions is presumably a *hypothesis* to explain the assumed fact that we do truly have knowledge of things, which we could not have without direct apprehension. This reasoning is implied here: "And yet it is certain that these [i.e. contingent] truths can be known evidently", Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32.16/74.

46. The intuition is not itself knowledge. See the passage quoted in Stump, "The Mechanisms of Cognition", p.189.

47. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.70.18/112; Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, p.259/286. See Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", and Boehner "The Notitia Intuitiva Of Non-Existents." Perhaps Ockham thinks that normally a judgment of non-existence or absence is not intuitive but an inference, e.g. from the premise: "I would have seen it by now if it were here".

48. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38-9/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.506-8). Ockham differs from Scotus in not *specifying in the definition* of intuitive cognition that the object must exist and be present, Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.259/286.

49. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I p.31.13-16/72.

50. "God cannot cause in us a cognition such that it appears to us *evidently* that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction"; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.415).

51. "However, God can cause a creditive act by which I believe that an absent thing is present. And I say that that creditive cognition will be abstractive, not intuitive; by such an act of faith [i.e. belief] a thing can appear to be present when it is absent, but not by an evident act"; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.416). The possibility that God might cause false belief has sceptical implications (Descartes!), but Ockham did not draw any sceptical conclusions. Can God cause a

false judgment about an intuited existing thing? Would there then be two conflicting judgments? Stump, “The mechanisms of cognition”, pp. 186, 188, says that according to Ockham an intuition need not cause a judgment. But what then determines whether a judgment does occur?

52. “Abstractive cognition is taken according as it *abstracts from* existence and non-existence and from other conditions that contingently happen to a thing or are predicated of a thing”, Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31.4-6/72. “Abstractive” in this context does not have the meaning it has when we speak of abstract nouns or concepts. On the two kinds of cognitions see *Selection*, pp.22-5.

53. Ord.1 prol. q.2, OTh I, p.86.21-3/128.

54. “Imperfect intuitive” cognition is in fact abstractive: Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.262.5-6/290, but it differs from other abstractive cognitions, and resembles intuitive, in that it enables a judgment (but fallible!) of existence (in the past tense), p.266-7/294. To remember a particular individual, such as a person, requires a complex of abstractive cognitions covering various characteristics of the individual; Qdl.1 q. 13, OTh IX, pp.77/116 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.67).

55. On memory see Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.261-2/288; Rep.4 q.14, OTh VII, p.278ff/308.

56. A habit is something in some way accessory to a substance — its clothing, as it were. A habit may be caused in us by some other agent (as when God infuses grace), or it may be formed by repeated acts, or even by a single act. See Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham*, p.107.

57. “Positing that an intuitive cognition always necessarily has with it an incomplex abstractive cognition, then the intuitive cognition will be the partial cause of that abstractive cognition, and that abstractive cognition will be the partial cause of a habit inclining one to another incomplex abstractive cognition like the one from which the inclining habit is generated”; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.263.7ff/290. (This passage, down to p.264 line 10, is thought to be an addition, which may belong after p.265.7; see Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, p.174 n.147.) “The intuitive cognition is a partial cause of the [abstractive] cognition, though not of the habit generated by the abstractive cognition”; *ibid.*, p.265.5-7. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288.

58. Perhaps the generally-valid principle that a habit is generated by acts of *the same kind* might not apply here, so that an *intuitive* cognition might itself cause a habit that enables future *abstractive* cognitions; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.265-6/292

59. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.264.15ff/292.

60. *See Ord. prol. q.1, OTh I, pp.33-8/74. explain the difference*

61. *Reference to Hume*

62. On theories of Ockham's contemporaries see Tachau, *Visions and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*.

63. Ord.1, d.27 q.3, OTh IV, p.241/264; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.268-76/296; Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.44ff/66. *the last is the main text*

64. Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.48ff/70. "In debita approximatione", Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.258.15ff/286. (Why should distance matter?)

65. Rep.3 q.3, OTh VI, p.107ff/128; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.60652-9/646 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.507). On intuitive cognition and species see Stump, "The Mechanisms of Cognition". For more on Ockham's theory of knowledge see <https://johnkilcullen.net/z3610.html>

66. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32-3/34. On science see *Selection*, p.2-16. ***Livesey

67. Ockham: "However, there is no science properly speaking of individuals, but only of universals *for* individuals", i.e. *standing for* individuals; Expos. Predic. c.2 §11, OPh II, pp.45.40-2/76.

68. Expos. Phys. prol. §4, OPh IV, p.11/24; Ord.1 d.2 q.4, OTh II, p.134-138/168.

69. SL 3-2 c.20, OPh I, p.537.7-9/614; Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.8-11/50; Expos. Phys. prol. §2, OPh IV, p.6-10/20, line 55ff, § 3 line 64ff.

70. Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10.15/52.

71. SL 3-2 c.21, OPh I, p.539ff/616 (translated Longeway); Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10/52, 14/56.

72. ST 1 q.1 a.2. On discussion in 13th century Paris on the possibility of a science of theology see Dumont, "Theology as a Science".

73. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.199/240.

74. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187.17-20/228. Ockham thinks that Paul may have had intuitive vision of God, Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.587/626 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.492-3). Cf. 2 Cor. 12:2. (But such intuition would not be the "beatific vision".)

75. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187ff/228.

76. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.200.12-15/242. *check; supply references to 1 Dial.1.

77. Someone, probably not Ockham himself, gathered together passages from Expos. Phys. into a tract *De successivis*, on motion, time and place, included as an addition volume in the electronic edition of *Opera Philosophica*, after vol.VII.

78. By "moderns" Ockham meant theologians of his own time and just before. In their footnotes the editors of OPh and OTh identify

the writers Ockham criticises. He is himself a modern, so sometimes he ascribes his own opinion to “some moderns”; cf. Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §7, OPh IV, p.436.18-9/450.

79. “It is the beginning of many errors in philosophy to think that to every distinct vocable there corresponds a distinct significate, so that there is as much distinction of signified things as there is of names or vocables that signify even when those names or vocables are not synonyms”; Sum. phil. nat. 3 c.7, OPh VI, p.270/318. “The making of abstract nouns from adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, verbs and syncategorematics causes many inexplicable difficulties and leads many people into error. For many imagine that for each distinct noun there is a distinct corresponding thing, ... And therefore in modern times, because of errors arising from the use of such abstractions, it would be better, for the sake of simple people in philosophy, not to use such abstracts”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433-4/446. Many moderns are misled by the language they find in philosophical texts: SL 1 c.51, OPh I, pp.170-1/248 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.170-1). Cf. note 112 below. *XR*

80. SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.151).

81. For the arguments see Sum. phil. nat., OPh VI, p.261/308 (motion), p.344/392 (the instant), p.347/394 (time), p.391/438 (place). Motion: Rep.2 q.7, OTh V, 103ff/130; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §3, OPh IV, p.430ff/444; Qdl 1 q.5 a.1, OTh IX, p.475/514 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.28). For commentary on the arguments see Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.417-451 and Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.799ff.

82. For “a thing totally distinct” Ockham uses a number of apparently equivalent expressions. Of motion or time, etc., he says that it is not a thing “really and totally distinct” from every permanent thing, or “distinct according to its whole self”; it is not “outside the essence of” a permanent thing (Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.421/434), or “inhering in it in the way whiteness is something belonging to a white thing” (Expos. Phys. 4 c.20 §2, OPh V, pp.212-3/222), “just as a man and whiteness are two things outside the mind, totally distinct, so that nothing that is one of them or part of one of them is the other or an essential part of the other” (Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190); “Time is not something absolute really distinct from enduring things and from motion”, Rep.2 q.10, OTh V, p.185/212.

83. SL 1 c.10, OPh I, p.36-8/114 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.70-71). See below, note 85. *XR* *see also SL 1 c.5, OPh I, p.16/94 *

84. “Import” covers both [1] referring to and [2] asserting propositions about: “The noun ‘motion’ imports [1] many permanent things, namely the changing thing and what is acquired by the changing thing, and [2] that one [part] is acquired after another;” Expos. Phys. IV c.18 §3, OPh V, p.196/206.

85. SL 2 c.11, OPh I, pp.279-282/356. Spade, “Ockham, Adams

and Connotation” criticises Ockham on connotative terms, pp.602-3, and on explicable propositions, pp.609-11.

86. Nouns derived from verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and syncategorematics “were introduced only for brevity or elegance of locution”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.425/438. Many terms relating to motion “have been invented so that we can have an abundance of words to express elegantly (*ornate*) what we conceive in our minds, and not because they are necessary”; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

87. “And therefore such short propositions must be expounded by other long ones, and by the long ones that are more proper and clearer and plainer we must judge of the others”; Sum. phil. nat., 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

88. “One must speak as most do”, Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, p.199.134/208. “What is said for the sake of elegance (*propter ornatum eloquii*), even though improperly, is not said in vain (*frustra et vane*) but well. However, such expressions must be understood sensibly (*sane*), and to see whether they are true or false they must be resolved into the proper words for which the improper have been put”; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

89. “Such propositions should be expounded in the above way, or in some other more suitable way if one is found. Because it is enough for me that besides permanent things past present and future there is no other thing distinct from them according to its whole self. I care little about the manner of speaking, as long as there is a good understanding”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.447/460.

90. And maybe a few relations. See above at note 1. *XR*

91. “Permanent continuous quantity is nothing but one thing that has part situationally distant from part, so that ‘continuous permanent quantity’ and ‘thing having part distant from part’ are equivalent in meaning... And therefore, since a substance may have part situationally distant from part, and similarly a quality, some quantity will not be another thing than a substance, and some quantity will not be another thing than a quality”; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145). De Corp. Christi, c.12, OTh X p.112ff/144 (translated Birch p.107-8).

92. “In being produced by some created agent, they [the parts] are produced in a distinct situation, so that one part stands apart from another in situation and is outside the other”; De quant. q.3 a.2, OTh X, p.53/84. “Whence a quantity is nothing but a thing that has part outside part and has part standing apart in situation from another... It is not necessary to posit some thing that drags one part outside another, but the extrinsic causes of the thing, i.e. efficient and final, suffice to produce diverse parts, one in one situation and another in another situation, without any ‘middle thing’ between them. Therefore the substance itself is quantified without any other thing applied to it or made at the same time with it. And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of every bodily quality”; De

quant. q.3 a.3, OTh X, p.64/96. Cf. Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh H, 210-11/242; Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, pp.412-415/452 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.340-3). *Beuscher: De corp. Christ, c 28; De corp. Christi, c. 15; Qdl.4 q.26. *

93. *Quote Aristotle. Physics 4.4, 212a 201

94. “It is Aristotle’s opinion that the whole world is not in a place, because it does not have anything outside it that contains the world; but many parts of the world are in a place, namely all parts contained by other parts”; Expos. Phys. 5 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.95/104.

95. It moves in comparison with imagined bodies outside the world: “... the *primum mobile*, which does not have any body around it, truly and really moves.... because *if there were* a surrounding body that did not move, one part of the *mobile* would truly coexist with one part of the surrounding body and afterwards with another”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. Also, the *primum mobile* moves because its parts vary in distance from given parts of the earth; *ibid.*, lines 110-2. This would be true even if the earth moved; Expos. Phys. 4 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.97.116ff/106.

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96. The points summarised in this paragraph are common to medieval Aristoteleans. See Grant, “Cosmology”. **

97. Expos. Phys. 5 c.10 §8, OPh IV, pp.438-9/452.

98. “Permanent” is puzzling. In local motion the cause, the body that moves, and the places, all exist both before and after the motion, but in other motion, viz. the gradual acquisition or loss of a quality, Ockham says that the “permanent” things include past and future things which do not at present exist. Cf. Expos. Phys. 6 c.1 §2, OPh IV, pp.443.124/456, 446.195-6/460, 447.227/460. *look at scotus*

99. Local motion means “first to be in one place (no other [transient] thing then posited), afterwards without an intermediate rest to be in another place (without any other thing besides the place and the body and other things that are permanent), and so on. And consequently there is nothing but permanent things and we need add only that the body is not in all those places at once and that it does not rest in those places”; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433/446.

100. Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §1, OPh V, p.230/240; 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.425/438; 3 c.2 §6, 435/448 *

101. “For example, while motion lasts, it must be the case that

something is in such a way future that it does not have being outside the soul though it can be known by the soul, or it must be that something coexists with something else that does not yet coexist with it outside the soul (which I say on account of the local motion) and yet it can be known by the soul that it will coexist with it”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, pp.196-7/206. *check translation*

102. Qq. Phys. q.38, OPh VI, p.497/544.

103. Expos. Phys. 4 c.27 §4, OPh V, 291-6/300. “In the definition of time soul should be put, or speaking more properly the noun ‘soul’; because measure is put in the definition of time; but in the definition of measure soul is mentioned, because a measure is that through which the soul should be made certain of some unknown quantity”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.387/434. “Because the noun ‘time’ imports an act of the soul numbering, which the noun ‘motion’ does not import, therefore these nouns do not have the same definitions expressing *quid nominis*, and are not synonyms”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.21 §6, OPh V, p.228/238. “‘Time’ imports, beyond motion, an act of the soul actually measuring, because time is the motion by which the soul knows how great another motion is; and therefore it is impossible that time be time except through the soul”; Qq. Phys. q.40, OPh VI, 504/552.

104. Qq. Phys. q.42, OPh VI, pp.508/556; q.43, pp.510-11/558. The motion of the *primum mobile* is the ultimate standard of comparison since it is the swiftest and most uniform motion: a very swift motion can be measured against the swiftest, the irregularity of an irregular motion can be detected by comparison with the most uniform. But time can also be measured, though with less certainty, by comparison with other motions, such as the motion of the sun or a clock or one’s inner sense of change.

105. “If soul could not exist, nothing could be time, because nothing could be a number or measure. Whence the first movement [i.e. the movement of the *primum mobile*] could be uniform and most swift though soul did not exist, but if soul did not exist, that movement could not be time”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.388/436

106. “Time is really outside the soul and it does not depend really on the soul; however, time could not be time, or *that which is* time could not be time, without the soul, i.e. unless the soul could exist; just as a cause depends in no way on its effect, and yet a cause could not be a cause without an effect”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.389/436

107. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.

108. Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4-§6, OPh V, pp.201-3/210; 4 c.22 §4, p.234ff/244. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 218a 8-30. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344ff/392.

109. “It should not be granted that the same ‘now’ always remains, as if it were some thing continuously remaining; and it should not be granted that it is other and other, as if there exists some such

thing, first one and then another”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4, OPh VI, p.203/212.

110. “An instant is not a thing distinct from permanent things, but it imports the *primum mobile* existing in a determinate place so that immediately before it was in another [place] and immediately afterwards will be in another”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.8, OPh VI, p.360/408. See the whole chapter. “And so it is clear how we can assign an earlier ‘now’ and a later ‘now’, by saying first that this part of the mobile is now in this position, and afterwards in another position, yet without any newness of a thing produced: but not without the coexistence of the parts of the mobile with different parts of a stationary ambient body (if there were such), or also a variation of distance between a given part of the heaven and a given part of the stationary earth [see *XR* above, n. 95] For continually, as the heaven moves, a given part of the heaven changes its distance from another part of the earth before and afterwards, and yet nothing new need be posited in the heaven because of this”; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. For more on the instant see Rep.2 q.10, p.208/236

<https://www.fishpond.com.au/Books/Instant-of-Change-Medieval-Philosophy-and-Beyond-Frdric-Goubier-Volume-Editor-Magali-Roques-Volume-Editor/9789004367913>

111. Perhaps he is thinking of Augustine’s remark: “If no one asks me [what is time?], I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not”, *Confessions* XI.xiv.17

<https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110111.htm>

112. “Time is not something hidden to us and unknowable by us, as some say; ... indeed it is known to all who have the use of reason... But time is said to be quite unknown because of the many difficulties that come up in treatments of the nature of time from badly-understood texts of philosophers”; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.3, OPh VI, p.350/398. On the reality of action see also WND 67.40ff, pp.451-9, especially pp.456, 458-9.

113. An exception is Leibniz. See Loemker, pp.1108-9, 1145-9; McDonough, “Leibniz’s Philosophy of Physics”. On Newton see Rynasiewicz, “Newton’s Views on Space, Time, and Motion”.

114. “It is commonly asserted by modern writers that every quantity is a thing really and totally distinct from substance and quality, so that continuous quantity is an accident intermediate between substance and quality, which is asserted to be in substance as its subject and to be the subject of qualities. Similarly it is posited that discrete quantity is a thing really distinct from substances; and the same is asserted of place and time;” SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.132/210 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.142). “I argue that a point is not another thing than a line, or a line another thing than a surface, or a surface another thing than a body; and by the same argument a body is not another thing than substance and quality, according to him [Aristotle];” SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.133/210 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.143). “I say therefore that the intention of Aristotle and of many others was that every quantity is not some thing totally distinct from substance and quality, and that point, line, surface and body are not things wholly (*secundum se*

totas) distinct from one another;" SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/224 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.151). "It is not Aristotle's opinion that quantity is a predicament importing some absolute thing, really and wholly distinct from things in the genus of substance and in the genus of quality, as is commonly held; but it is his opinion that no thing is imported by the genus of quantity that is not really some substance or quality"; Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, p.205ff/236.

115. For Ockham's treatment of quantity see SL 1 c.44, OPh I, pp.133-153/210ff (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.142-58), and Expos. Predic. c.10, OPh II, 203-238/234ff (where he argues about point, line, surface, body, time, instant, place); De quant., OTh X p.5ff/36; Qdl.4 q.24-34, OTh IX, pp.412ff/452 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.340ff).

Beuscher's references: See Ockham. Report. 4, q 4 ; Quodl 4, qq. 23-39; Quodl 6, q 3, Quodl. 7, q 25; Summa totius logicae (Venice. Lazarus de Soardis, 1508), p 1, cc 44-8, fol 17 r -19 v ; Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum, cc 10-11; De sac alt , passim

*Stump, "Theology and Physics in Ockham's *De sacramento altaris*: Ockham's Theory of Indivisibles"

116. "There is another opinion [besides that of some moderns] about quantity, which seems to me to be in accordance with Aristotle's thinking, whether it is heretical or Catholic, which I wish to recite now, though I do not wish to assert it. And therefore when I have set out this opinion and written on philosophy, I have not written it as mine but as Aristotle's and explained it as it seemed to me, and likewise I will now recite it without assertion"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.136/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145). Ockham distances himself from Aristotle on quantity also in other places: De quant., OTh X, p.5-6/36, p.90/122, p.125/156; Expos. Phys. Prol. §1, OPh IV, p.3-4/16. *check these*

117. *References, de corp. etc.*

118. "It is difficult to prove that there are only ten predicaments", Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.161/192. For questions relating to the categories see Qdl.4 q.25-8, OTh IX, p.416ff/456 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.343ff) and Qdl.6 q.8 up to Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.512-616).

119. SL 1 c.41, OPh I, pp.114-7/192 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.128-31); Quodl.5 q.22, OTh IX, pp.564-9/604 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.471-5).

120. E.g. the answer to "When?" might be "Today", to "Where?" "Here", to "In what position?" "Seated". SL 1 c.41, OPh I, p.116/194 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.130), Qdl.5 q.22 a.2, OTh IX, p.567/606 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.473-4).

121. Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190.

122. SL 1 c.55, OPh I, p.180/258 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.178).

123, [Adams, p.275ff maybe only substances, but eucharist*] 42

124. For an example of such an argument, see Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344-7/391.

125. Spade and Panaccio, “William of Ockham”, sec. 4.1.

126. Ockham did not invent it, no one in the middle ages called it a razor or attributed it to Ockham. See Pelletier “Ockham’s Razor”. See Wey’s note on Qdl.4 q.27, OTh IX, p.433/472, referring to Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.6, 259a 8-15. Ockham himself refers it to Aristotle, Qq Phys. q.11, OPh VI, p.420.14/468, which the editor takes as a reference to *Physics* I.4, 188a17-18. Other people used it: cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.2 a.3 obj.2.; Duns Scotus *Cross ecclesiology Ord. 4.1.4–5, n. 9 (Wadding, 8:90).). For examples of Ockham’s use, see index, OPh VI, p.868/916.

127. De corp. Christi, c.29, OTh X, p.157-8/188, punctuation altered. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.290.1-3/314.

128. “... if a general council were to err, either about matters that consist in fact or about other matters, he to whom this was evident ought not believe it and would be permitted in this matter to contradict and deny the general council. He to whom this was not evident, however, *ought, with respect to matters of fact, to believe the assertion and testimony of the general council, on the presumption that, with respect to matters of fact, the general council would assert nothing about which it was not certain, just as a judge too is bound to believe witnesses whom he can not reject but regards and ought to regard as suitable and truthful*, even if in point of fact they make a false deposition. A judge who in ignorance believes false witnesses does not sin; on the contrary, he would sin if he did not believe, because he has nothing against them on the basis of which he can suspect that they speaking falsehood. Thus the faithful who in ignorance believe a general council which is in error do not sin in matters of this kind [i.e., of fact]; on the contrary, they would sin if they were to refuse to show trust, because they have nothing against that general council”; 3.1 Dial. 3.6.

129. Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, p.413.15-17/452; cf. Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, p.472.70-2/512 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.389); “If one thing is sufficient... it is superfluous to posit two”, Qdl.7 q.2, OTh IX, p.707.23-4/746; “If two or three are sufficient... then a fourth thing is superfluous”, Qdl.7 a.1, OTh IX, p.704.17-19/744. On the other hand: “If two things are not sufficient... it is necessary to posit a third”, Qdl.1 q.5, OTh IX, p.31.40-2/70; “When a proposition is true for things, if permanent things are not sufficient for its truth it is necessary to add something further,” Qq. Phys. q.13, OPh VI, p.425.4-6/472. Walter Chatton weakened the requirement: “So great a necessity to plurify things is not required that it be evident that a contradiction follows if they be not plurified... It is enough that all be saved more suitably by many than by few”; quoted Tachau, “The problem of the species in medio”, pp.394-443, n.64, p.412 (my translation). See Maurer, “Ockham’s Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor”; Keele, “Walter Chatton”. *Subtle discussion: Qdl.1 q.5 ad 1m, OTh IX, pp.32-

3/72 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.30-1).* *not Anti-razor
Keele, Res, n.21*

130. “But setting aside everything but matter, form, an agent and other permanent things, if the matter first does not have the form and afterwards has it, and not part before part, the matter truly is changed; therefore, to *save* change, it is vain to posit anything besides matter, form, an agent and other permanent things”; Expos Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.423/436. “Save” is used in the same way in the phrase (from Simplicius) “saving the phenomena”.

131. Ockham, 1 Dial. 4.10.

132. Ord.1 d.14 q.2, OTh III, p.432/454. Cf. d.17 q.3, p.478.18-20/500. “Sometimes several miracles should be posited in relation to something that could be done by fewer, and this pleases God”; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490.

133. Maurer, *The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles*, pp. 7-8, puts forward several principles he believes shape Ockham’s philosophy.

134. For a philosophical account of Ockham’s philosophy as a nominalism, see Panaccio.

135. Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.72.21-73.9/100. *Cf Descartes on automata*

136. An efficient cause is that upon the existence of which something else totally distinct from it begins to exist; Sum. phil. nat. 2 c.3, OPh VI, p.218/266. When the cause, apart from anything else, is posited, something else can be posited, and when it is not posited the other cannot (naturally) be posited; Ord.1 d.45 q.1, OTh IV, p.664-5/688; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, pp.269.10-13/296, 276.19-21/304.

137. Expos. Phys. 7 c.1 §1, OPh V, p.598-600/608. This is a rejection of Thomas Aquinas’s dictum that whatever moves is moved by another, ST 1 q.2 a.3.

138. Qdl.4 q.1, 2, OTh IX, 293/332-309/348 (translated, *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.245-56.)

139. For more on Ockham’s treatment of causation see Moody, “William of Ockham”; Adams, “Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?”; Courtenay, “The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism”.

140. God’s existence is one of the “truths naturally known or knowable”, Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.7. “The argument proving the primacy of the efficient is sufficient, and is the argument of practically all philosophers”, *check* Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.354/388. “God’s existence can be demonstrated” , Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.

141. Qdl.1, q.1, OTh IX, p.2/42 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.6).

142. Plato, *Laws* X 893b-899d.

143. *See Thomas Aquinas*

144. Ord. 1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.3-11/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.765/812.

145. Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.12ff/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.767ff/814.

146. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.93-4). *check: Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2.

147. “There is only one simply first being, though against *protervientes* [last-ditch objectors] it is difficult to prove this.” In an addition he remarks: “This argument seems probable, though it does not demonstrate sufficiently”; Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.356-7/390.

148. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.109ff/148, line 61ff (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.94-5); Qdl.4 q.2 OTh IX, p.306-8/346, line 138, line 175 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.254-5).

149. Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.43/42 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.6).

150. E.g. Thomas Aquinas’s “fifth way”, ST 1 q.2 a.3: “For we see that some things that lack cognition... operate for an end, which appears from the fact that they always or most often operate in the same way so as to seek what is best.”

151. See above, note 1. *XR*

152. Ord.1 d.42 q.un, OTh IV, p.617-21/640; Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.93-4).

153. Ord.1 d.35 q.2, OTh IV, p.441.12-18/464; Qdl.2 q.2 ad 1, OTh IX, p.115/154 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.98).

154. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636.10-14/660; Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.55.16-18/82; Qdl.2 q.2 OTh IX, p.116/156 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.99).

155. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, Q.46 De ideis (translation https://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Reading_Groups/Translations.html). Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29. See Rich, “The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God”; Dillon, “The Ideas as thoughts of God”.

156. Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.480/504.

157. See above, note 33. *XR*

158. “God has an infinity of ideas, because infinite things are producible by him”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.493/516.

159 “God foreknows the very things that he afterwards produces... He knows what he does perfectly, not only in a universal but also in particular and most distinctly”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.504/528. “God not only has knowledge of universals, as a created

craftsman has of things he will make, but has also distinct and particular knowledge of whatever particular is to be made. Therefore for him the very particular is the idea”, *ibid.* p.505/528. Cf. Rep.3, q.3, OTh VI, p.121-2/143.

160. A human maker thinks of a thing of a certain *kind* or description, without intuitive knowledge of the very thing. “God foreknows something that does not actually exist to make what he makes in accordance with it. However *he intuits something that is not himself, nor anything real*, but which can be real, to make in accordance with it that very thing”; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.506/530. In this case intuitive cognition is of something non-existent.

161. Above, n.47. *XR*

162. On the formal distinction see above, note 29. *XR* “Because a formal distinction or formal non-identity is very difficult to posit anywhere,... it should not be posited except where it evidently follows from beliefs handed down in sacred Scripture or the determination of the Church and the sayings of the Saints,... [and since these] can be saved without positing it [i.e. a formal distinction] between the [divine] essence and the [divine] wisdom, therefore I simply deny that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it universally in creatures... Because one [viz. a formal distinction in God] is expressed in Scripture and the other [a formal distinction in creatures] is not, and it seems repugnant to reason, therefore the one is to be posited and the other denied”; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17-18/50. Ockham believed that the formal distinction was expressed in Scripture in the sense that it was needed to make sense of Scripture teaching on the Trinity. See below, n.250. *XR*

163. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17/50.

164. Ockham answers Yes to the question: Whether the identity of the divine essence (and in every manner of identity *ex natura rei*) with the attributal perfections, and of those perfections with one another, is as great as the identity of the divine essence with the divine essence (Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.3/36). God is identical with God, any thing is identical with itself: God’s wisdom is *just as identical as that*, with God’s goodness and with God himself.

*Ord 1 d.2 q 1, p.25/58 respondeo ad formam quaestionis quod perfectiones attributales nullo modo distinguuntur ex natura rei ab essentia divina. Qualiter autem distinantur patebit in sequenti quaestione [pp.61-74/94]

165. Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.73/106; d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.329/350. Scotus sometimes represents God’s activities in terms of “instants of nature”, as if God first does this (e.g. knows) and then does that (e.g. wills); cf. Ockham, Ord.1 d.35 q.4, OTh IV, p.467-8/490. Ockham rejects these “instants”, Ord.1 d.9 q.3, OTh III, p.311-2/332; Expos. Praed. c.18, OPh II, p.327-8/358. Whatever God is *or does* is identically and simply himself. Cf. Adams, *William Ockham*, p.237-9.

166. “All attributes either connote some things really distinct or are common to things really distinct”, Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.70/104.

“From created wisdom and from deity a concept can be abstracted, which is predicable *in quid* of both, and it will be a quidditative concept... And thus there can be many quidditative and simple concepts because of the diversity of extrinsic things, but they will not be convertible because always something is contained under one that is not under the other”; Ord.1 d.3 q.3, OTh II, p.425/458.

167. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636-7/660; Cf. WND 95.112ff, pp.643-55.

168. “The omnipotent cannot effect *everything* that does not include a contradiction, because he cannot effect God. However the omnipotent can effect every *makeable* that does not include a contradiction”, Ord.1 d.20 q.un., OTh IV, p.36/60. The editors quote a formulation from *De principiis theologiae* that makes the point more explicitly: “God can make everything the making of which (*quod fieri*) does not include a contradiction. Note that I do not say that God can make everything that does not include a contradiction, because then he could make himself, since he does not include a contradiction; but he can make everything the making of which does not include a contradiction, that is, everything of which a contradiction does not follow upon the proposition ‘He makes it’”; OPh VII, p.507/540. *De principiis* is not by Ockham, but the editors consider it a faithful compilation of Ockham’s thought, p.26*. See also Adams, *William Ockham*, p.1152ff.

169. Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644. Cf. 1277 condemnations art. 63, CUP I, p.547. See above, n.135. *XR*

170. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.605/644.

171. See above, note 48. *XR*

172. Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence”. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.25 a.5.

173. See above, note 165. *XR*

174. It is not clear whether this means general laws or a plan that includes some singular events; Adams, *William Ockham*, p.1198-1207. Miracles are part of the divine plan and likewise the supersession of the Old Law and occasional divine commands that override the moral law.

175. Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.585-6/624 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.491-2). See also CB 4.3, p.230ff, *OND 95.374-437.*

176. Ockham refers to “laws of God *commonly* ordained” in contrast with events that happen “by *special* miracle and divine dispensation”; QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.444/470.

177. See Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism*, pp.58-9; Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past”, p.147ff.

178. “It is commonly conceded by philosophers and theologians

that God cannot make the past not be past so that it is not forever afterwards true to say that it happened”, Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.578-9/602; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.507-8/538.

179. Present and past contingent events remain contingent, even though they cannot be undone: “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.587/610. And, if it had not been done, God would never have known that it was done (because it wasn’t): “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “The proposition ‘Everything that is, when it is, must be [*necesse est esse*]’ is literally [*de virtute sermonis*] simply *false*”, Expos. Perih. 1 c.6, OPh II, p.420/452. *See Courtenay, Mirecourt, past, part 2, p.149ff. p.162: Pierre D’Ailly said that Ockham said that God cannot undo the past.*

180. Some historians have used the language of contract, agreement, or pact to refer to divine ordinances insofar as they promise benefits. Ockham does use this language, but not often: “*foedus*” (Rep.4 q.1, OTh VII, p.6/36), “*ex pactione*” (Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.215.15/244). Later theologians often used the language of covenant. However, “Nominalist covenants... were in no sense made by man as an equal or participating partner” (Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, p.118). If God’s will alone counts, without requiring any volition from human beings, then it seems to me that the language of pact or covenant is inappropriate.

181. See the discussion between E. Sylla, H. Oberman and J. Murdoch in Sylla, “Autonomous and Handmaiden Science”, pp.394-6.

182. See Courtenay, “Covenant and causality in Pierre d’Ailly”, pp.116-119 (referring to the “Nominalists” generally). According to McGrath (“The anti-Pelagian structure of ‘Nominalist’ doctrines of justification”, pp.111-2), God’s “ordained power refers to that subset of possibilities which he chose to actualise – and having actualised them, *abides by them*. Thus there was no absolute necessity for God to choose any course of action; however, having finally chosen a particular course of action, there is now a self-imposed conditional necessity in respect to it, in that God has freely chosen to be faithful to a certain ordering of his creation” [my emphasis]. I have not found any place where Ockham speaks of a self-imposed necessity. It seems to me that what God has freely chosen he can freely unchoose. Or perhaps his ordinance may have been that up to such-and-such a date ordinance X will hold, but after that ordinance Y— as the New Testament superseded the Old.

183. Qdl.2 q.10-11, OTh IX, p.156-1644/196 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.132-39). *Also also Rep.4 q.7F = q.9, p.161/190* See above, *p.. *XR*

184. Ockham says that it is difficult to prove this, but it is persuadable. Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.161/190; Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX,

p.157ff/196 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.132); Qdl.4 q.148 OTh IX, p.369/408 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.305).

185. Ord.1 d.1 q.2, OTh I, p.396/438, 402/444; Rep.2 q.20, OTh V, p.435/462, 441/468.

186. Rep.3 q. 4, OTh VI, p.136-7/158; Qdl.2 q.11, OTh IX, p.164/204 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.138). **Qdl irrelevant*

187. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2m, OTh IX, p.63/102 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.56); Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.159/198 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.134).

188. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2, OTh IX, p.63-4/102 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.56-7); Qdl.1 q.12 OTh IX, p.68/108 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.61).

189. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.148-50); the same distinction is implied in 3.1 Dial. 2.24.106-116, p.219. *What does Adams say on this? See also Osbourne*

190. See

<https://johnkilcullen.net/NaturalLaw.html#ockham>

191. Examples: “Every *honestum* is to be done”, Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.149); there are “many” such principles, line 39. “Everything dictated by right reason on account of a due end (and likewise concerning other circumstances) is to be done”, “Everything dictated by right reason is to be loved”, Rep.3 q.12, OTh VI, p.425/446. “Every indigent person in extreme necessity is to be helped lest he perish”, QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.423.310/448. “Every benefactor is to be benefited”, QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281.223/306. “By a natural law which is immutable, when something does me good and you no harm, it is fair that you should not prohibit me”, WND 66.47-9, p.449. Not to kill a person who never did harm is a principle *per se nota*, 3.2 Dial. 1.15. There are also many natural laws “on supposition”, 3.2 Dial., 3.6 (translated in LFMOW, pp.286-93). That these examples are known *per se* is not clear to me.

192. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177-8/216, lines 26 and 42 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.149); QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281-2/306. I do not know of any examples.

193. Ord.1 d.1 q.4, OTh I, p.447.5-6/488 (“Only God is to be loved above all, because he is the highest good”); Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.257.87/296, translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.214, (“This is to love God above all: to love whatever God wills to be loved”); QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.358-9/384, lines 413, 416 (“Who rightly loves God, loves God above all”... “Who rightly loves God, loves everything that God wills to be loved”). The principle “No one should be led to act against the precept of his God” is known *per se*, QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.366.583/392.

194. Ockham does not seem to explain the moral authority of human law in OPh or OTh, but he does in WND 65.55-75, p.437.

195. Above, note 193. *XR*

196. If the error is invincible: QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.411/436.
197. It seems that the principle “No one should be led to act against the precept of his God” (above, note 193) overrides every other principle. *XR*
198. Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352/380. Cf. 3.1 Dial. 2.24.110, p.219.
199. Rep.4 q.16, OTh VII, p.352/382. *What does Gregory of Rimini say about hatred of God?*
200. Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.195-7/224, 223/252.
201. Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, 225-6/254.
202. Qdl.1 q.20, OTh IX, pp.99ff/138 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.85-90). See Adams and Wood, “Is To Will It As Bad As To Do It?”, pp.12-14. *Abelard, Kilcullen, “Bayle on the Rights of Conscience”*. For more on Ockham’s moral philosophy see King* *Huguccio*
203. Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352.10/380.
204. ~~Are things wrong because forbidden, or forbidden because wrong? The question has often been discussed. See Augustine, *in Aristotle; see Suarez vi.11, III, pp.92-4. See also Plato, *Euthyphro* 10a; Aristotle, EN V.7, 1134b 18-22; Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-2 q.57 a.2 ad 3; Ockham, *3.1 Dial., 2.20.)~~ On the question whether there really is room in Ockham’s thinking for a “non-positive” morality see Freppert *Basis of morality*, p.171-81; Adams “Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality”, p.265-6. *OT/ NT not in point, because this is positive morality* *Osbourne argues that O has a divine command theory* *By God’s absolute power, he could do something inconsistent with his ordinances: But also, he could *ordinately* change the ordinances.* *Kilcullen “Natural Law and Will in Ockham” King ethical theory McGrade*
205. *List; references to Augustine, Thomas, Scotus*
206. (Wolter, p.275*)
207. Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, p.235.*Reference incomplete* Cf. St Leger, *The “etiamsi daremus” of Hugo Grotius*. See Kilcullen, “Medieval Theories of Natural Law”.
208. McGrade, “Natural Law and Divine Omnipotence”, pp.282-3. (For an account of the role of reason in Ockham’s moral theory see McGrade, “Right(s) in Ockham”, pp.66-70) *But why does that dictate override others?*
- Gregory of Rimini and Suarez argued that acts contrary to natural law are also forbidden by God, so that there is a *double* obligation not to do such an act. See Kilcullen, “Medieval Theories of Natural Law”. On such a view it might be said that, while murder is (1) contrary to natural law and also (2) contrary to the current divine precept, if God in some case commanded murder, murder would in that case not be wrong, because the principle that God must be obeyed (above n.193) is overriding. *XR*

209. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8, OPh IV, p.321/334; Expos. Perih. 1 c.5 §11, 12, 15, OPh II, pp.418-9/450, 422-3/454.

210. “It cannot be proved by any reason... But it can be known evidently through experience, by the fact that a man experiences that however much reason dictates something, nevertheless the will can will it or not will it or nill it”; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87-8/126 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.75).

211. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.580-1/604. “I call freedom the power by which I can... cause and not cause the same effect, without there being any diversity elsewhere outside that power”; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87/126 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.75). Cf. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8 §1, OPh IV, p.319-20/332; Praedest. q.3, OPh II, p.536.92ff/568. Scotus seems to have been the first to maintain that freedom is a power for opposites undetermined by any cause but the will. This idea was rejected by Hume and Mill and many modern philosophers. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk.2 pt.3 sec.1, 2 (p.399); Hume, *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section 8; Mill, “Of Liberty and Necessity”; Kilcullen, “Freewill and determinism”.

212. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.578/602. My comment: If we say that a person is sitting but can stand up, we obviously don't mean that he can stand up precisely while he is sitting, doing both simultaneously. We mean that although he *is actually* sitting at this moment, he is at this moment *able* to stand up. The power to sit and the power to stand can coexist, the acts of these opposite powers cannot coexist, but the act of one power can coexist with the opposite power. We don't have a power only when we exercise it. We can't stand while we are sitting, but not because when we are sitting we don't have the power to stand.

213. Apart from the motion that defines time: this is implied by “later”.

214. Rep.3 q.7, OTh VI, p.211/232.

215. Rep.3 q.11, OTh VI, p.357-8/378.

216. Ord.1 d.1 q.6, OTh I, pp.503-507/544; Rep.4, q.16, VII, p.350ff/380; Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory”, pp.13-14. For more on Ockham on free will see <https://johnkilcullen.net/z3607.html>

217. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.583-5/606; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.517-8/548.

218. See Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 18a 28ff, and Ockham’s commentary, Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §15, OPh II, p.421-2/452.

219. Praedest. q.2 art.4, OPh II, p.529ff/560. For more see Adams and Kretzman: William Ockham, *Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*; Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, p.146-168. *Scotus on contingency: Stanford, Medieval modal*

220. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.586/610. “Though the proposition

‘Peter is predestinate’ is now true and could be false, because, however, when it will be false [i.e. if it is in future false *check transl at the time when] it is true to say that it was never true, therefore it is not changeable from truth into falsity”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.512/544. “He [God] knows contingently and can [*potest*] not know and could [*potuit*] never have known”; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. “It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true”; p.587/610. “There is some proposition that cannot be first true and then false or vice versa, and yet it is not necessary but contingent. The reason is that, however much it is or was true, it is possible that it is not true and never was true”; Ord.1 d.40 q.un., OTh IV, p.594-5/618. *See Qdl.4 q.4, OTh IX, p.315-6/354, line 31ff (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.261).*

221. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.583/606; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.518/550. *Repeats note 181; check appropriateness of references in this section*

222. Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.513/544. In the late 15th century there was controversy in Louvain concerning the obligation to believe as being true prophecies about future contingent events; see Baudry, *La querelle des futurs contingents*.

223. Ord.1 d.17 q.1, OTh III, p.454-5/476; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.587/624 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.492). On this point Ockham agrees with Scotus.

224. Grace and charity are the same thing: Rep.4 q.3-5, OTh VII p.47.5-7/76.

225. Not the Pope Pelagius often quoted in the *Dialogus*. **

226. Information about these controversies can be searched for under the terms: Congregatio de auxiliis, Molinism, Jansenism, Synod of Dort, Arminianism.*

227. For the *facientibus* maxim see Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, IV, p.993-6; Thomas Aquinas *De Veritate* q.24 a.1 ad 2; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, pp.83-91. I have not found it in Ockham. Oberman, who believes that Ockham does subscribe to *facientibus*, judges that this doctrine is “essentially Pelagian”: God’s ordinances establish a “dome” under which we can live as if Pelagius were right, while Augustine’s doctrine holds *de potentia absoluta*. See Oberman, *Harvest*, pp.176-8, 186, 214. See also Oberman, “Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s Theology”, section II. Also McSorley, “Was Gabriel Biel a Semi-Pelagian?”

*St. Augustine in 2 Super Gen. c. 5 PL 34: 267. *

228. For more on this topic see Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism”. Ockham seems to differ from Augustine (or at least from followers of Augustine in his time) on two points: Ockham holds that a person without grace can do morally good acts, and that the reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will die in a state of grace. *What did the Avignon masters say on these points*

230. God owes nothing to anyone and can do no wrong: Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343.20-3/370; Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; *ibid.* p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198.7-9/228, *ibid.*, pp.225-6/254.

~~SOME OF THESE TEXTS QUOTED BELOW god owes nothing: “eo ipso quod ipse vult, bene et iuste factum est”, Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; “Deus autem nulli tenetur nec obligatur tanquam debitor, et ideo non potest facere quod non debet facere nec non facere quod debet facere”, Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343/370; Rep.4 q.3-4, “Et ideo potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta non remittere culpam, sine omni iniustitia, sicut potest aliquem punire sine omni demerito absque hoc quod dicatur iniustus... Unde sicut Deus potest semper continuare et detinere unum brutum in poenis sine omni peccato vel iniustitia a parte sui, ita eodem modo posset facere cum homine. Si dicatur quod Deus est debitor praemii pro meritis, respondeo dico quod Deus nullius est debitor nisi quia sic ordinavit; de potentia tamen absoluta potest facere contrarium cum creatura sua sine omni iniuria”, Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; “sicut Deus creat creaturam quamlibet ex mera voluntate sua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest facere de creatura sua quidquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis semper diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta, posset eum Deus adnihilare sine aliqua iniuria, ita sibi post talia opera potest non dare vitam aeternam sed poenam aeternam sine iniuria. Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo eo ipso quod Deus aliquid facit, iuste factum est.” *ibid.* p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, “Nec deus peccare dicitur propter illum actum, quia nullus dicitur peccare nisi quia facit aliquid ad cuius oppositum obligatur vel quia non [facit] illud ad quod obligatur. Deus autem ad nihil faciendum vel non faciendum obligatur... potest Deus aliquem obligare ad poenam aeternam sine omni peccato”; *ibid.*, pp.225-6/254.~~

231. Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, pp.591.37-42/630 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.495).

232. God could ordain that “whoever lives according to right reason so that he does not believe anything except what natural reason concludes he should believe” is worthy of eternal life, Rep.3 q.9, OTh VI, p.280-1/302. Such naturally-good acts would not merit eternal life except by God’s free acceptance, Ord.1 d.17 q.2, OTh III, p.470-472/492. Also Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, pp.587-9/626 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.493).

233. Of his absolute power he could send someone having charity to hell but accept another not having charity to eternal life, and he would not from this be an “acceptor of persons” because he is no one’s debtor; QV q.1 a.3 OTh VIII, p.22/48. (“Acceptor personarum” in Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:11 is sometimes translated as “partial”: God is not an acceptor of persons means that he treats all persons impartially.) “Of his absolute power God... could punish someone without any demerit without being said to be unjust (though the punishment would not be properly a penalty...); just as God could always continue and detain a brute in pain without any sin or injustice on his part, he could do the same with a man”;

Rep.4, q.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74. “Just as God creates any creature of his mere will, so of his mere will he can do with his creature whatever pleases him. For just as, if someone always loved God and did everything acceptable to God, God could annihilate him without any injustice, so he could after such acts not give him life eternal but eternal pain, without injustice. And the reason is because God is no one’s debtor, but whatever he does to us he does of mere grace, and therefore, by the very fact that God does something, it is done justly”; *ibid.* p.55/84.

234. QV q.1 a.3, OTh VIII, p.25-6/50.

235. See above, note 168. *XR*

236. Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, pp.477-8/498; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.588-9/624 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.493); Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, p.591/630 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.496).

237. Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.255-6/294 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.213); De connex. virt, OTh VIII, pp. 335-6/360.

238. Rep.3 q.9 a.1, OTh VI, p.279.18-20/300, 281.14-17/302. See also 1 Dial. 6.79 on the morality of pagans.

239. Ord.1 d.41 q.un., OTh IV, p.600/624; Qdl.6 q.2, OTh IX, p.592/632 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.496). Other medieval theologians also held that we must prepare for grace by doing good works (e.g. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1-2 q.112 a.2, 3), but also did not hold that good works earn grace. See Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism”, pp.361-2.

240. Ord.1 d.41 q.un, OTh IV, p.606-7/630. In most cases. Some, e.g. the Blessed Virgin, are given a special grace to prevent them from ever falling out of charity.

241. In CI Ockham says clearly that the rule of faith is Scripture and the teaching of the Church, and in *Dialogus* there is a clear discussion of the sources of faith. (See Ockham, *On Heretics and Against John*, pp.113, 466-7.) In his pre-Avignon writings he often speaks more vaguely, e.g. invoking the writings of “The Saints”.

242. Cf. n.162. *XR*

243. Sylla p.372, n.115; Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason”; Adams, *William Ockham*, pp. 1007-10.”.

244. *give references to church councils*

245. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, pp.370-1. *insert some translation*

246. “The difficulty in this question [whether the divine unity is consistent with a plurality of persons] arises from the identity of the divine Essence with the Relation and with the Person, because, if the Essence, Relation and Person are simply one thing not distinct in number, it is difficult to see how there are several Relations and several Persons and not several Essences”; Ord. 1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, pp.358-99/392.

For Ockham’s treatment of the logic of the Trinity see: Boehner, “The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the

‘Centiloquium’ Attributed to Ockham”; Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp.177-185, 216-226; Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*, pp.65-71; Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.996-1007; Thom, *The Logic of the Trinity*, pp.161-180; Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, ch.3. *Quote Friedman on the increasing concern with unity*

247. See above, n.162. *XR*

248. See above, n.1. *XR*

249. On the expository syllogism see SL 3-1 c.16, OPh I, p.403/480f.

250. A formal distinction can be posited “when there is *some circumlocution* that enables one of two contradictories to be verified of a thing of which the other is negated”, as for example “paternity is *that thing which is* communicable” is true although “paternity *is not* communicable” is also true; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II p.374-5/408. See Boehner, “Medieval Crisis of Logic”, p.157-167. *SL II c.27; III-1 c.4-5*

251. “Some things are distinguished formally and yet there are not several formalities, just as there are not several realities... The Essence and the Relation are distinguished formally, but they do not bespeak several realities or several formalities”; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, p.368-9/402.

252. A formal distinction can be posited only when there is one simple thing that is several things, SL 2 c.2.124ff, OPh I, p.253/330. Cf. S.L 3-1 c.16, OPh I, pp.403.13-17, 404.32-37/480f; Ord.1 Prol. q.7, OTh I, p.202.1-6/244. This is true only of God: “Just as it is singular in God that three things are one thing in number, and therefore that thing one in number is each of those three things and yet one of those three things is not another, so it is singular and beyond all understanding that this [inference] does not follow: ‘the Essence, one in number, is the Son, the Father is not the Son, therefore the Father is not the Essence’. And therefore that singular should not be posited except with the authority of sacred Scripture compels. And therefore such a consequence [i.e. inference] should never be denied in creatures, because no authority of sacred Scripture compels, since in creatures no one thing [singular subject] are [plural verb] several things and each of them”; Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II p.175/208.

253. Above, text at n.33. *XR*

254. “Thence I say universally that it is never verified of any things that they are distinguished formally *except on account of a real distinction*, when, that is, of one of them it is truly said that it is one thing and of the other is truly said that it is not that thing”; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.19/52. “Real distinction is twofold: one is a distinction of things, the other is a distinction by which one, say *b*, is not formally *a*, and it is said to be a real distinction because it is *ex natura rei*, but it is not real in the first way”; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, p.370/404. Compare n.1 above. *XR*

255. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17.16-18/50.

256. Ord.1 d.26 q.1, OTh IV, p.142ff/166. The question here ⁵⁵ is how the divine Persons are constituted and distinguished. Ockham reports 4 opinions: (1) the Persons are distinguished through themselves; (2) through real relations; (3) firstly by absolute properties and quasi-secondarily by relations; (4) by absolute properties. He says that the common element in opinions (3) and (4), viz that the Persons are distinguished by absolutes, is more easily held, but opinion (2) must be held because of the authorities of the Saints (i.e. the teaching of the Church). *Adams p.276*

257. See above, n.165. *XR*

258. “I say that taking liberty properly and strictly, according as it is distinguished against a natural active or productive principle, it is not to be conceded that one emanation is through the mode of intellect or of nature, and the other through the mode of will or freedom, because |§ this would be to say that one person was produced naturally and the other was not produced naturally but freely. But this is impossible, because properly speaking nothing is produced freely and not naturally except what is produced contingently, and can be produced and not produced. But every person is necessarily and naturally produced, because the Father has to produce the Holy Spirit by nature, just as [he has to produce] the Son, and thus the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily, just as the Son. But speaking metaphorically and largely §|, it can in a way be conceded that one person is produced through the mode of nature or intellect, and the other through the mode of will or liberty -- and this understanding that the intellect and the will in one way, as they are used by the saints, connote the act of generating and the act of spiration, so that the intellect bespeaks the divine essence itself eliciting the act of generating and the will bespeaks the divine essence itself eliciting the act of spiration. And in this way it can be conceded that the Son is produced through the mode of intellect and the Holy Spirit through the mode of will”; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.34/68. (The passage marked out by “§ ... §” is an addition Ockham made to his original text.) Cf. Ord.1 d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.326-30/348. See Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, pp.*

259. The creed of the Council of Chalcedon: “one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons...”;

<https://www.ccel.org/creeds/chalcedonian-creed.html>

260. See the Tome of Leo, c.3, c.4

<https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3604028.htm>

Cf. Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV c.39 [2]. On the *communicatio idiomatum* see Thomas Aquinas, ST III q.16.

261. “*Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*”; in Boethius, *Liber de Persona Christi et Duabus Naturis Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, c. 3, PL 64, 1343c. Eutyches was said to have maintained that in Christ there was one nature and one

person, Nestorius two natures and two persons — orthodoxy says two natures and one person (above n.259) *XR*

*See

<https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03555a.htm>*

262. See Cross, pp.134-8.

263. Rather, according to a variant, “not making a *per se* unity with another”, Ord. 1 d.23 q.un, OTh IV, p.61.15/84; also Ord.1 d.26 q.3, OTh IV, p.187.2/?. Compare Rep. 3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26: “A person is a complete intellectual nature that is not sustained by another and is not destined (*nata*) to make a *per se* one with another as a part... By ‘not making a *per se* unity with another’ is excluded the divine Essence and the Relation which make *per se* one.” Qdl.4 q.7 OTh IX, p.328/368 has “*incommunicabile per identitatem*”, which excludes the divine Essence, which is communicable to the divine Persons through identity.

**suppositum est illud quod est ens completum, non constituens aliquod ens per se unum, nec natum alteri inhaerere, nec ab aliquo alio sustentificatum. Ord.1 d.26 q.3, OTh IV, p.187*

264. Ord. 1 d.23 q.un, OTh IV, p.61-3/84. Cf. Qdl.4 q.7, OTh IX, p.328/368; Rep. 3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26. In short, not a constituent part of a *per se* unity, not inhering, not sustained. For Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of these terms see ST I q.29 a.1, a.2.

265. Ord. 1 d.23 q.un, OTh IV, p.62/86.

266. Ord. 3 q.1, OTh VI p.5/26.

267. See Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.979-999.

268. “Union adds something beyond the extremes united. This is proved: because it is impossible to pass from contradictory to contradictory without the destruction or acquisition of something positive; but the nature now united can be not united without the destruction or acquisition of anything absolute; therefore the union bespeaks something beyond the absolutes, because this cannot be evaded by negations and connotations, as it can be in other relations”; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.5/26. *See Etzkorn on Hypostatic Union “However, Ockham does believe that some relations do require a reality over and above the things related. The examples he generally gives are the relations of substance to accident, matter to form, the divine persons to one another and to the divine essence, and the union of the Son of God to human nature.” p.187. “The union... which theologians call the hypostatic union, is a relation. The relation in question holds between 1) the 2nd person of the Trinity together with his divine nature and 2) a human nature to which there corresponds no human person. Now, according to Ockham, the Son of God can, without any change of time or place and without destroying or creating anything (other than a human nature which is already required as one term of the relation) assume or not assume human nature. However, this union does not add anything absolute -- in Ockham’s perspective: either substance or quality -- to the two terms of the relation, namely the Son of God and a human nature. Therefore, Ockham

concludes that the union itself (the relation) is in truth something real over and above the two terms taken as non-related. Only if this is the case can statements ‘The Son of God suffered, died and was buried’ be understood correctly and be true.” p.188. Continues with edition and translation of Rep.3 q.1, three articles.*

269. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.8/30.

270. “I say that that union is a *real respect* really different from the extremes. And it is based in human nature and not divine, because only human nature is imperfect and capable of it, and not the divine. It is not to be imagined that the union is some bond linking human nature with the divine or the converse. But it is that by which the extremes are formally and denominatively said to be united. Just as something is called white from whiteness, so something is said to be united to another by union”; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.9/30. “I say that this union cannot be demonstrated, but is held solely by faith. Yet for understanding this union we are able to be led by other unions, e.g. of matter and form, substance and accidents. For in the union of matter with form, matter and form remain distinct according to their entities just as before, and this notwithstanding the fact that because of the union of one to the other the matter is denominated by the properties of the form and vice versa. Thus in the present case, divine and human nature remain distinct after the union just as before, and they do not make one *per se* as matter and form do, but rather one *quasi per accidens* like substance and accident – though not thus *truly per accidens* because they do not bespeak things of diverse genera – and notwithstanding such a distinction between the natures, nevertheless they communicate with one another their properties by predication in the concrete, as ‘the son of God was incarnate, dead, suffered’, and similarly ‘a man created the stars’. Therefore just as the union of matter and form, substance and accident, is possible, so also the union in the present case”; *ibid.* pp.10-11/32. *Etzkorn, “William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union”, p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. *Repeated below n.1.* *XR*

271. A possible confusion here: “supposition” is a property of terms, “a suppositum” is a substance; a “person” is an intellectual substance. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26; Ord. 1 d.23 q.unica, OTh IV, pp.61-2/84. Cf. Qd.4 q.7, OTh IX, p.328/368. On account of the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, several other particulars must be stipulated, **notably that to be person or supposit the substance must not be “sustained” by anything. See above, text following n.261. *XR*

272. “For human nature to be assumed in the unity of a divine person can be understood in two ways. In one way that human nature becomes one person with the person of Christ and *becomes* the person of Christ: and that understanding is false, because it is more repugnant to it to become the person of Christ than that it become an ass. In another way it can be understood in the sense that human nature is *sustained by* a divine person. That understanding is true, because that nature does not subsist in its own supposit but it is sustained by the Word in the way an accident is sustained by a subject.”; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.9/30.

273. See Duns Scotus quoted by Cross, “Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham”, p.135 n.24.⁵⁸
274. SL pars 1 c.7, OPh I, p.25/102 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.62)
275. It then becomes difficult to see what the distinction is between substance and accident, as Adams points out, *William Ockham*, pp.994-5. She suggests that perhaps the difference is that whereas a substance can sustain another substance, an accident cannot sustain anything else.
276. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.22/44.
277. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.21/42.
278. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.33/54
279. “What he once assumed he has never laid aside”; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.22/44
280. The eucharist is also called “the sacrament of the altar”, “the Lord’s supper”, “holy communion”. I am indebted to Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, for guidance through this topic.
281. *Rep. 7 qq. 6, 7, 8, 9. *Adams p.186ff* *check this reference*
282. Ockham’s statement of the doctrine: “Catholic doctors approved by the Roman church who have written about the sacrament of the Eucharist intend to assert this: That the body of Christ — that was received from the Virgin Mary, that suffered and was buried, and also arose and ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father, and in which the son of God will come to judge the living and the dead — is truly and really contained under the appearance of bread. And although under the appearance of bread it [i.e. Christ’s body] is really hidden (for it is not seen by us by our physical eye), the faithful mentally believe and hold that it is concealed by the appearance of bread; into which [i.e. Christ’s body] the substance of the bread is transubstantiated, converted or changed, so that the substance of the bread does not remain, but the accidents alone remain, subsisting by themselves without a subject. And when transubstantiation of the bread occurs, not only is Christ’s body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man, is contained truly and really under the whole host [i.e. the bread] and every part of it at once (though taking “conversion” and “transubstantiation” properly, the substance of the bread is not converted into the deity nor into the rational soul nor into any accident). This is my faith, because it is the Catholic faith. For whatever the Roman Church believes explicitly, this alone, and nothing else, explicitly or implicitly, I believe”; De Corp. Christi c.2, OTh X p.91/122; translated Birch, *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham*, p.82.

282. “Transubstantiation is the succession of one substance to another substance, which [i.e. the latter] ceases to exist simply in itself, under certain accidents proper to the preceding substance. The possibility of this is clear, because it is not repugnant to divine power to destroy a substance in itself and conserve its accidents, and that another substance immediately coexist with those accidents (not informing it).” Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.136-7/166. Though Ockham uses the terms “transubstantiation” and “conversion”, in his theory there is no conversion or changing one thing into another but rather a substitution. See Beuscher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.45-51.

283. “The first terminus of transubstantiation is what the converter or transubstantiator primarily intends... And that is said to be the terminus *per accidens* that is intended by that agent secondarily, namely because he [the transubstantiator] cannot transubstantiate without the others (especially when they are united), or because he does not wish to do so. Thus it is said that Christ’s body – composed of matter and form preceding the intellective soul, whatever that may be (assuming several forms in a man, as we must because of the article [a reference to Kilwardby’s condemnation] – is the first terminus of this transubstantiation. Because God, who is the principal agent in that conversion, intends primarily to convert the bread into Christ’s body, so that if his soul were separate, as it was in the three days [i.e. between the crucifixion and the resurrection], then the conversion would be into Christ’s body only. The intellective soul is a terminus accidentally, because God secondarily intends to convert the bread into the soul so far as it is united to the body”; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.142/172. See De Corp. Christi c.5, OTh X p.97/128, translated Birch pp.89-91 (where the distinction is made not in terms of primary and secondary objectives, but in terms of strict and broad senses of “transubstantiation”).

284. “Not only is Christ’s body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man”; above, n.282. *XR*

285. Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.65/94. Cf. Qdl.1 q.4, OTh IX, p.25/64; Qdl.4 q.21, OTh IX, p.400-1/440. Sometimes for “circumscriptively” Ockham puts “quantitatively”, e.g. below at note 297. *XR*

286. Cf. the doctrine that the intellective soul is present to the whole body and to each of its parts, above note 187. *XR*

287. “There is no greater difficulty that two parts of the body exist together than that two bodies exist together; but one can happen by the power of God, therefore the other;” Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.79/108. p.79. “We hold by faith that bodies (the same in species or different) exist together in the same place: this is clear when Christ went in to the disciples with the doors closed [i.e. his body transiently occupied the same place as the wood of the doors], when he was born with the Virgin’s womb closed, when he ascended into heaven without any division of the celestial body. Therefore in the same way it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body exist in the same place; and, by the same argument,

all parts of Christ's body can without contradiction be in the same place. From these two points I argue the point intended, because if it is possible that all parts of Christ's body are in the same place by divine power (just as it is possible for two bodies to be together in the same place), and if it is possible that every part of the body of Christ is in different places according to its whole self (just as the soul and an angel are together and at the same time wholly in diverse places), it follows that it is possible for the whole body of Christ to coexist with the whole place of the host and the whole in each part; which is the point mainly intended, namely how Christ's body is definitively in place under the consecrated host"; **Qdl.4 q.31, OTh IX, p.453/492. Cf. De Corp Christi c.7, OTh X, p.103-5/134, translated Birch pp.95-8.

288. "Though Christ's body is of itself limited, yet by God's power it can be unlimited to many places, as it can be on many altars"; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.104/134.

289. [*Cf. Thomas Aquinas ST 3 q.75 a.2]

"A body can be in a place where it was not before without being moved to that place or the place to it, because this can happen suddenly without any motion (though not without any change of that body [see above, note 97]). *XR* For example: the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist is now present where previously it was not, and yet suddenly and in the same way it can be in different places circumscriptively, but without motion. And when you say 'if it is moved to another place, it leaves the first', I say that just as according to the faith Christ's body is now present where it was not present, and thus is changed, yet *does not leave its place in heaven*, so it can come to be circumscriptively where before it was not and yet not leave the first place"; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.102/132. Also: "Since therefore Christ's body passes from not being here to being here, because of which this is a true change, it follows that Christ's body is truly changed. Therefore I say that Christ's body is changed locally, because just as through its substance it is immediately here where it previously was not, not through the substance of the bread, so immediately it is changed. But that it is immediately in place, was proved before. Therefore I say that here there is a double mutation: one acquisitive, the other deprivative. The acquisitive is in Christ's body, because it receives existence here where previously it did not have it, but the deprivative is of the substance of the bread itself, which does not remain where it was previously"; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.145-6/174. "I say that extending 'to be changed locally' to mean existing somewhere really after being elsewhere and not there... so the body of Christ is changed locally when it begins to exist sacramentally under the host, and this mutation is acquisitive of a new place not had before but is *not deprivative of a place had before*. But taking 'to be changed locally' strictly, as the Philosopher speaks, for acquisition of one place *and* deprivation of another, thus I say that Christ's body is not locally changed by beginning to exist sacramentally under the host. I prove this, because if it were so, then it would cease to exist in heaven when it begins to exist on the altar, which is heretical"; Qdl.6 q.3, OTh IX, p.595/634.

290. "The third opinion would be very reasonable if there were not

a determination of the Church to the contrary, because that opinion saves and avoids all difficulties that follow from the separation of accidents from a subject, nor is its opposite found in the canon of the Bible. Nor does it include any contradiction for the body of Christ to coexist with the substance of the bread more than with its accidents; nor is it repugnant to reason, first because quantity is repugnant with quantity as much as substance with substance, but two quantities can exist together in the same place, as is clear of two bodies existing in the same place, second because Christ's substance can be in the same place with the quality of the host, therefore by the same argument with its substance. To the argument at the beginning, I say that sometimes more miracles are to be posited concerning something where it could be done by fewer, and this pleases God. And this is certain to the church through some revelation, I suppose"; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490. Cf. De Corp. Christi c.6, OTh X p99/130, translated Birch pp.92-4.

291. "But because the determination of the Church is to the contrary (as is clear Extra, *De Summa Trinitate et fide catholica* and *De celebratione missarum*), and commonly all the doctors hold the opposite, therefore I hold that not the substance of the bread but the species remains there, and the body of Christ coexists with it. And that this is possible is clear, because this transubstantiation includes only that the species remain there really and the substance does not remain in itself really, and that the body of Christ is there really, not quantitatively [i.e. not circumscriptively]. But each of these [statements] is possible, therefore et cetera"; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.139-40/168.

292. De Corp. Christi c.9, OTh X p.107-8/138, translated Birch p.102.

293. ST 3.77.2; In Sent IV d.11 q.1 a.1 qu.3 sol.1

<https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4073.htm>

294. See above, note 114. *XR*

295. "Concerning the sacrament of the altar they say [and Ockham says] that after the consecration of Christ's body one quantity, which preceded, was the same really with the substance of the bread, and that [quantity] does not remain; but, besides that, there remains a quantity which is the same as the quality, but in that quantity no quality exists subjectively [i.e. as in a subject], but all accidents remaining after consecration remain, together with Christ's body, without any subject, because they subsist per se"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137-8/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145-6); Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.153-65/183ff *See Adams p.194 n.56. De corp. Christi c.13, OTh X p.115/146, translated Birch p.110-1. *More extensive reference to Adams?*

296. "It cannot be proved by argument that it is not the case that every action and passion terminating at an absolute form a body can have existing in a place circumscriptively and quantitatively it can also have existing in a place definitively and not quantitatively. I prove this, because no less can a principle of action have an action wholly present to some patient, for example

a warm-able, than through one part present to one and through another part present to another. But Christ's body in the host is wholly present to the whole host and to every part. Therefore the warmth of Christ's body can act upon the host and make it warm. And by the same argument it can be proved that Christ's body can be seen in the host by the bodily eye, because it is sufficiently active both on the medium and on the eye, because wholly present to every part of the eye and the medium"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.118/148. "But the experience we now in fact have of Christ's body is not conclusive [i.e. does not prove that Christ's body could not be seen], because God suspends the action of those qualities, not co-acting with them so that they act; and if he did co-act, they would be seen"; *ibid.*, p.119. "I say that it is not from the nature of things repugnant to the intellect of the wayfarer to see Christ's body in the host, if it were permitted, for example if God co-acted with it, but that does not in fact happen because it is not permitted"; *ibid.* p.135/164.

297. "I say that Christ in the sacrament of the altar can naturally and intuitively understand everything else as if he were there quantitatively [= circumscriptively]. He can also be understood and seen naturally and intuitively, not only by the angelic intellect or the separated soul but also by the bodily eye (unless there were some special impediment, as explained above [note 296]). *XR* And this is true not only in respect of substantial things but also of accidental. These points are clear, because positing a sufficient active [principle] and a patient disposed and approximate, action follows – or this is not to be denied unless there appear some evident argument to the contrary, or certain experience, or certain authority, none of which appear in the present case, as was said above. This is confirmed, because it is not repugnant to the intellect to be affected by something that does *not* have a quantitative mode, nor by something that *does* have a quantitative mode: for intellect to understand this or that, therefore, it is irrelevant whether it has a quantitative mode or not. For it would be remarkable if Christ existing in the host did not know where he was. Therefore I hold that every action and passion that he can have when he exists circumscriptively in place, he can have in the Eucharist (if nothing else impedes, such as the divine will, as explained above)"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.124-5/154.

298. "I say that Christ's body can be moved really and locally in the sacrament, because it is wherever the host is"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.120/150. Christ in heaven moves "organically" [i.e. by means of organs, e.g. legs] but in the eucharist "non organically": "To move organically is to move first one part and afterwards, by means of the part moved, to move another part distant in place and situation from the part first moved, so that to move organically necessarily requires these two: (1), that one part be moved locally first and, after that, by means of the first part, the second; (2) that between the parts of the body moved there be local distance"; Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.370/410.

299. Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX p.371/410

300. "I say that Christ's intellective soul under the host can move Christ's body non-organically. For it cannot move organically in

the sacrament, because it cannot first move one part and afterwards another part by means of the first, because between the parts of [Christ's] body, as it is there, there is no local distance, because the whole is in the whole and the whole is in every part, and therefore it cannot move one part before another because each part is together with the other. But non-organically it [Christ's intellectual soul] can move [Christ's body] locally, because it can *will*. And I believe that it wills in fact that his body be moved with the motion of the host, and this on account of the conformity of his will to the divine will willing that host be moved in that way. And willing thus, if the host is moved, it [i.e. Christ's intellectual soul] then moves his body non-organically, because [it moves] equally firstly the whole and every one of its parts, because the whole [i.e. of Christ's body] is with the whole and with every part, and there is no distance between parts, which is necessarily required for moving organically. And from this it is clear that when the host is moved, Christ's intellectual soul by means of his will moves Christ's body under the host non-organically, as a partial cause concurrent with the divine will contingently causing and contingently disposing the body to be moved with the motion of the host. And this whole is because of the conformity of the human will in Christ to the divine will"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.123-4/152. Cf. Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.371ff/410.

301. See above, note 175. *XR*

302. For a discussion of the articles relating to the Eucharist drawn up against Ockham in the Avignon process, see Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.145-150.

303. See King, "William of Ockham: *Summa logicae*"; Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham*; Boehner, *Medieval Logic*; Novaes and Read, *Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic*. *Panaccio*