References to this edition are by volume and page. Line numbers are sometimes given after a dot. E.g. "p.211.14" refers to page 211 line 14.

A page number asterisked (e.g. p.32\*) will be found in the frontmatter.

In references, the numeral after "/" is the page number in the Intelex electronic edition: "p.605/644" refers to p.605 in the print edition, which is p.644 in the electronic edition. A reference to a range of pages gives only the first page in the electronic edition.

Titles of Ockham's works are abbreviated as in Spade, Paul V. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.xv.

Translations are mine. Generally I also refer, in brackets, to a published translation (if any exists) so that readers can read the passage in context.

For publication details and explanation of abbreviated titles see "Publications referred to", p.68 \*XR\*

**Brief accounts:** Spade and Panaccio in the *Stanford Encyclopedia*; Moody, "William of Ockham"; Courtenay, "Ockham, William"; Keele *Ockham Explained*; Vignaux, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: An Introduction*, pp.165ff.

**Longer treatments:** Adams, William Ockham; Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>. References to the Latin text of Ockham's works: William of Ockham, OPh, OTh: *Opera Philosophica et Theologica*, ed. Gedeon Gál et al. (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1967-88). Republished as an electronic edition by Intelex, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2011 (http://pm.nlx.com).

- <sup>2</sup>. Any occurrence: If I say "Socrates is a human being, and Plato is a human being", there are two occurrences of the term "human being". (In the terminology of C.S. Peirce, there are two tokens of one type: a type is a universal.)
- <sup>3</sup>. "Predicated" means to be the predicate in a statement of the form "X is/is not a human being", where "human being" is the predicate.
- <sup>4</sup>. "A universal is that which is fit (*natum est*) to be predicated of many", Expos. Perih. 1 c.5 §3, OPh II, p.399/430; cf. Aristotle, "A universal is that which is apt to be predicated of many", *De Interpr.* 17a 38 -b 3. "Is apt", "*natum est*", means "is suited": "human being" may not be *actually* predicated of many human beings (e.g. we may be talking about the term "human being" itself, as in "'Human being' is a universal"), but it is suited to be predicated of many human beings.
- <sup>5</sup>. Plato explores some of the difficulties of his theory in *Parmenides* 128e-134e. \*https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplement s/article/abs/an-introduction-to-platos-theory-of-forms/857C292D585DB8DFAD6D 127F9A06E44E\*
- <sup>6</sup>. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 990 b.\*?\*
- <sup>7</sup>. Cf. Conti, "Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages", p.376.
- <sup>8</sup>. Ockham writes: "All I have seen agree in saying that the nature, in some way universal (at least potentially and incompletely), is really in the individual, though some say that it is distinguished really, others that it is distinguished only formally, others that it is distinguished in no way in reality [*ex natura rei*] but only according to reason or by consideration of the intellect", Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.225/258. Historians call such theories "moderate realism", i.e. moderate in comparison with Plato's theory in the degree of reality they attribute to the nature. Ockham explains and criticises these theories in Ord.1 d.2 qq.4-7, OTh II, p.99ff/132ff (translated Spade, *Five Texts*, pp.114-231).
- <sup>9</sup>. See Boethius in Spade, *Five Texts*, p.25. On Thomas Aquinas's version of this theory see Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.79-80.

- <sup>10</sup>. For the ancestor of such theories of individuation see Plato, Timaeus, 49a-52d.
- 11. "In so far as an opinion asserts that there are *additional things besides singulars* existing in them, I regard it as quite absurd and destructive of the whole of Aristotle's philosophy and every science and every truth and reason, and that it is the worst error in philosophy... and that those who hold it are unfit for science", Expos. Perih. 1 Proem. § 8, OPh II, p.363/394. Strong language!
- 12. "[J]ust as every spoken word (*vox*), however much it is common by institution, is truly and really singular and one in number because it is one and not many, so an intention of the mind [i.e. a concept] signifying\* many external things is truly and really singular and one in number, because it is one and not many things, though it signifies many things", SL 1 c.14, OPh I, p.48/126 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.78). "Every universal is a singular thing, and therefore is universal only by signification, because it is a sign of many", ibid.
- <sup>13</sup>. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.49). Some words signify\* words, some concepts signify\* other concepts SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.43-4/120 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.74-5). \*In Qdl V.12-13 pp. 530-1/570 O says that the only universals are concepts. But see p.571.48-9/610 and 573.114/612\*
- <sup>14</sup>. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham", pp.315-6; Gál, "Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de Natura Conceptus Universalis".
- 15. "Some say [1] that an intention [concept] is simply something made (*fictum*) by the soul, others [2] that it is some quality subjectively existing in the soul, distinct from the act of understanding. Others say [3] that it is the act of understanding. And in their [those who hold 3] favour is the argument 'in vain is something done by many that can be done by fewer' (*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*). But whatever can be 'saved' [i.e. accounted for] by positing [i.e. asserting the existence of] something that is distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without such a distinct thing, because, as much as any other sign, an act of understanding can stand for and signify\* something. Therefore it is not necessary to posit anything besides the act of understanding... it is enough for now that an intention is something in the soul naturally signifying\* something for which

it can stand and that it can be part of a mental proposition"; SL 1 c.12, OPh I, pp.42-3/120 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.74). According to theory [1], a concept is the concept's object in "objective being", i.e. the being of an object of thought, as distinct from its "subjective" being as an extra-mental subject. For a review of Ockham's treatments of these theories see Boehner, "Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", pp.315-19. The relevant texts include: Ord.1 d.2 q.8, OTh II, pp.266ff/300 (translated Spade, p.215ff); Expos. Perih., proem., OPh II, p.347-371/378; Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, OTh IX, p.472ff/512 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.389-90); Qq. Phys. q.1-7, OPh VI, p.397-412/444. See *Selection* pp.41-5, Maurer, *Philosophy* pp.496-510. \*Perihermeias para.4 [Estne passio qualitas animae distincta ab actu intelligendi? \*subjective and objective reality, Scotus, Descartes\* <sup>16</sup>. SL 1 c.1, OPh I, p.7-8/84 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.49-50); Expos. Perih. Prooem. §2, OPh II, p.347/378. See Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.16-17. A word does not signify\* a concept; it signifies the thing that the concept signifies. \*explain signifies\* In saying that a concept changes we mean \*\*\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>. \*Reference\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. The habit is caused by the abstractive cognition that accompanies every intuitive cognition; see note \*XR\* below. \*what habit means

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>. "[T]he two incomplex knowledges of singular whitenesses... cause naturally, like fire causes heat, a third knowledge, distinct from them, that produces in objective being the whiteness previously seen in subjective being, without any activity of intellect or will, because such things are caused merely naturally"; Qq. Var. q.5, OTh VIII, p.175/200. (This passage reflects the "fictum" theory, above, note ) \*XR\* "Nature works hiddenly in [producing] universals", Ord.1 d.2 q.7, OTh II, p.261/294. Cf. Aristotle: "The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process;" Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100 a13. Cf. Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.494-6; Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.525-9. \*needs more explanation VI 65/86\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.211-12/244 (Socrates and Plato really are more alike than Socrates and an ass: answering the objection that "every universal would be a figment of the intellect", p.211.14). Cf. Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.679-80/718, lines 18-26, 50-8 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.572-3). ("Sortes" or "Socrates" and "Plato" are dummy names, like "Joe Blow" or "John Doe".)

<sup>21</sup>. Boehner, "Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham", pp.309-11, suggests that concept resembles thing because effect resembles cause. Ockham does say that the intuitive cognition of an individual is *of* that individual because that individual is its cause (Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314; Qdl. 1 q.13, OTh IX, p.76, translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.66). He also says that concepts resemble things signified: "The cognition of a man is not more like one man than another, but by such a cognition is understood a man rather than an ass, because such a cognition, in *some* mode of likeness, is more like a man than an ass"; Qq. Phys. q.6, OPh VI, p.408/456 (my emphasis). Cf. Expos. Perih. 1 Proem. §6, OPh II, p.355/386. But I do not know of any text in which Ockham explains this mode or says that it is due to causation.

(The main texts Boehner refers to are found in the modern edition as follows. Note 4: OTh V, p.287.16-289.7/314. Note 5: OTh V, p.261ff/288. Note 6: OPh II, p.351ff/382. Note 7: OTh II, p.261/294 Note 8: OTh VIII, p.175/200. Note 9: OTh IV, p.241/264. Note 10: OTh II, p.283/316.)

\*Stanford: The respective role of causality and similarity with respect to natural signification in Ockham has been a somewhat controversial issue in recent secondary literature. See e.g. Adams [1987], Chap. 4, Panaccio [2004], Chap. 7, and [2015].\*

- <sup>22</sup>. For more, see Kilcullen "Ockham on Universals", https://johnkilcullen.net/z3608.html.
- <sup>23</sup>. See King, "Ockham on the Role of Concepts", pp.3-6; King, "The Failure of Ockham's Nominalism". Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.121-141 ("I do not see how Ockham can specify, either on the objective existence theory or on the mental act theory [cf. note above], \*XR\* a similarity relation that can constitute the natural signification relation for general concepts", p.132; neither theory "gives an adequate account of what makes a thought a thought of a given particular", p.141).
- <sup>24</sup>. See above, note . \*XR\*
- <sup>25</sup>. Each individual has "numerical unity", i.e. if they are "numbered" or counted, each counts as one ("one, two..."). The nature is also one, but it is not as much a unity as the individuals are.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>. For Ockham's statement and criticism of Scotus's account of universals, including criticism of the formal distinction, see Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II, p.161ff/194, translated Spade, *Five Texts* p.153ff (p.156 on the formal distinction). See also SL 1 c.16, OPh I, p.54/132ff, lines 11-18, 66-85 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.82ff); Maurer, *Philosophy* pp.73-5. See Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.22-9, 46-52. \*a parte rei?\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>. Adams, William Ockham, pp.931-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>. "In creatures": there are formal distinctions in God. See below, note . \*XR\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>. "Therefore I say that -- with the exception of the formal distinction or nonidentity, which is real (ex natura rei), and which is very difficult to understand and is not to be posited except where faith compels it -- nothing is distinguished from something except: [1] As a real being (ens reale) from a real being; and every such distinction is a real distinction (distinctio realis), and does not depend on the intellect any more than that being (entitas) depends on the intellect. Or [2] it is distinguished as a being of reason (ens rationis) from a being of reason; and every such distinction is a distinction of reason, because it simply excludes real identity, as a being of reason cannot be a real being. Or [3] it is distinguished as a real being from being of reason or the converse; and that distinction is strictly and properly neither real nor of reason, just as the distinct things are not real beings or beings of reason, but it is as it were a middle distinction, because one extreme is a real being and the other is a being of reason (what to call it I do not care at present, because this is at the speakers' choice). Or [4] it is distinguished as an aggregate of a thing and a concept (ratio) from a real being or a being of reason, or from some similar aggregate, and that distinction, like the preceding, is neither properly and strictly real nor of reason, for the same reason. And as I say of a real distinction and distinction of reason, in proportionately the same way I say of real identity and identity of reason, which are the opposites": Ord.1 d.2 g.3, OTh II, p.78/112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, pp.14-20/48. For more on Ockham on distinctions see https://johnkilcullen.net/z3608.html. What sorts of distinctions there are and how they are proved continued to be controversial in philosophy into the seventeenth century. See Alanen, "On Descartes Argument for Dualism", Ariew, "Descartes and Leibniz as readers of Suarez".

- <sup>31</sup>. According to this opinion "every relation is a thing really distinct from its foundation, so that the resemblance by which white Sortes resembles white Plato is a thing really and totally distinct from Sortes and from the whiteness that is the foundation of that resemblance...Though the expression "foundation of the relation" is not a philosophical expression according to Aristotle's philosophy [cf. Expos in Phys 3.2, para.3 OPh IV p.417-8/430], yet they say that a relation has a foundation and a term from both of which it is really distinguished"; SL 1 c.54, OPh I, p.177-8/254 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.176). (The "term" is the other member in the relationship, here Plato.) Ockham's views on relations (and other categories see below) were an early concern of his Franciscan colleages: Etzkorn, "Ockham at a Provincial Chapter".
- <sup>32</sup>. The terms *res parva* and *res media* are used often in Qdl. See for example OTh IX, pp.359/398, 611-6/650, 614/654, 631/670, 635/674, 645/684, 652/692, 674/714, 679/718, 683/722 (or *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.297, 512-8, 531, 535, 544, etc.). See also Qq. Phys. q.63, OPh VI, p.569/616. For arguments against the *res parva*, see Qdl.6 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.512ff).
- <sup>33</sup>. "If relations were such things, it would follow... that a whiteness could not come to exist in one thing without a new positive thing coming into existence in something very distant"; Expos. Predic. c.12, OPh II p.241/272. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV p.284.7-9/308, p.311.3-10/334; Rep.2 q.2, OTh V p.37.5-7/37; Qdl 6 q. 8 p.613-4/654.
- <sup>34</sup>. "Some [including Ockham] say that a relation is not a thing outside the soul distinct really and totally from an absolute thing and from absolute things. Others, however, assert that a relation is a thing that is no more an absolute thing than a man is an ass [i.e. not at all], but is really and totally distinct from an absolute thing and from absolute things. Many theologians are of this opinion, and I also once believed that it was Aristotle's opinion, but now it seems to me that the opposite opinion follows from his principles", SL 1 c.49, OPh I, p.154/232 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.158)."
- <sup>35</sup>. "Sortes' likeness to Plato [in being white] imports nothing except that Sortes is white and Plato likewise....Whoever could understand Sortes and Plato and their whitenesses, without understanding anything else, would straightway say that Sortes is like Plato"; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.310.1-8/334. See also Ord. 1 d.30 q.4,

OTh IV, p.367.10-368.24/390.

- 36. "In one way a relation is said to be 'real' because it signifies some little thing outside the mind distinct from absolute things, in another way because it signifies absolute things outside the mind or in the mind that are said to be *such as they are denoted to be* by such a relative term *without any operation of the intellect*. I say that in the first way there are no real relations, because there are no such little things between absolute things... I say that in the second way there are real relations, because they signify\* absolute things in the way explained (e.g. 'likeness' signifies two white things and that each white thing is similar to the other without any operation of the intellect)..."; Qdl.6 q.25, OTh IX, p.678/718 lines 9ff (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.571-2). "[T]he intellect does nothing to make it fact that the universe is one, or that a whole is composed, or that adjacent causes cause, or that a triangle has three angles, and so on, any more than that Socrates is white or fire hot or water cold", Ord.1 d.30, q.1, OTh IV, p.316-7/340. Cf. Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.728/768, lines 45-7, 56-66 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.614-5). Cf. note \*XR\* above.
- <sup>37</sup>. 127. WND 6.413ff, pp.150-1; 62.206ff, pp.428-31; CB 1.8, pp.189-92. Cf. Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie*, pp.502-16. See also Pelletier. (That the Church can act as a unity does not imply that the pope or a general council acts infallibly on behalf of the Church.)
- <sup>38</sup>. One of Ockham's most detailed discussion of relations is in answer to the question: "Whether aside from any authority of faith and of any philosophers it could more easily be denied than held that every relation is something real in some way distinguished from every absolute and absolutes?" He explains: "This question is not about the truth that is, what must be held according to the truth of things but it is what would be held by someone wishing to rely precisely on the reason possible for this life, and not wishing to accept any school of thought or authority", just as such a person "would say that it is impossible for three persons really distinct to be the one most simple thing.... that God is not man, and many other things that nevertheless according to the truth of things are false"; Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV pp.281-3/304.
- \*"More easily denied than held" does not imply "not possible to hold". Ockham does not say that philosophical arguments show that there cannot possibly be relative entities; only that there is a philosophical answer to every philosophical

argument to prove that *all* relations are things. [\*Is this right? Is his position stronger than that?] This leaves room for arguments to prove that some relations are things. \*

- <sup>39</sup>. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.370.11-13/394. See Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.269-276.
- <sup>40</sup>. Union of matter and form, union of substance and accident, union of the parts of a continuum: Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.369-74/392. See \*Etzkorn, "William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union", p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. \*Cross *Christology the union of the human nature to the divine, the union of matter to form and vice versa, the union of accident to substance Ockham, Ord. I, d. 30, q. 4 OTh IV, 369.3–9.Cross refers to Qu. var., q. 6, a. 2, ll. 58–94 (OTh, VIII, 208)\* \*But see Ockham's Theory of Terms, p.170\* For more on Ockham on relations see https://johnkilcullen.net/z3609.html.*
- <sup>41</sup>. Adams, William Ockham, pp.274-5.
- <sup>42</sup>. Ockham takes over the terms intuitive and abstractive cognition from Scotus, but changes their meaning somewhat. (\*See Ord. prol. q.1, OTh I, pp.33-8/74.\*) For modern readers "intuitive" may be misleading. In Ockham's language *intueri* means "to look at", *cognitio* means knowlege. Looking at the page of a book you are now reading is an example of "intuitive" cognition. Remembering the look of the page after you have closed the book is "abstractive" cognition. Ockham's intuitive and abstractive cognitions are the counterpart of Hume's impressions and ideas.
- <sup>43</sup>. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31-2/72; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.256-67/284; Rep.2 q. 12-13, OTh V, p.334-7/362; Qdl.5 q.5, OTh IX, p.495ff/534 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.413ff). The existence of intuitive cognitions is presumably a hypothesis to explain the assumed fact that we truly have knowledge of things, which we could not have without direct apprehension. This reason is implied here: "And yet it is certain that these [i.e. contingent] truths can be known evidently", Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32.16/74.
- <sup>44</sup>. The intuition is not itself knowledge. See the passage quoted in Stump, "The Mechanisms of Perception", p.189.

<sup>45</sup>. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.70.18/112; Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, p.259/286. See Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham", and Boehner "The Notitia Intuitiva Of Non-Existents." Perhaps Ockham thinks that normally a judgment of non-existence or absence is not intuitive but an inference, e.g. from the premise: "I would have seen it by now if it were here".

<sup>46</sup>. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38-9/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.506-8). Ockham differs from Scotus in not specifying in the definition of intuitive cognition that the object must exist and be present, Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.259/286.

<sup>47</sup>. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I p.31.13-16/72.

<sup>48</sup>. "God cannot cause in us a cognition such that it appears to us *evidently* that a thing is present when it is absent, because this includes a contradiction"; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.415).

<sup>49</sup>. "However, God can cause a creditive act by which I believe that an absent thing is present. And I say that that creditive cognition will be abstractive, not intuitive; by such an act of faith [i.e. belief] a thing can appear to be present when it is absent, but not by an evident act"; Qdl.5 q. 5, OTh IX, p.498/538 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.416). The possibility that God might cause false belief has sceptical implications (Descartes!), but Ockham did not draw any sceptical conclusions. Can God cause a false judgment about an intuited existing thing? Would there then be two conflicting judgments? Stump, "The mechanisms of perception", pp. 186, 188, says that according to Ockham an intuition need not cause a judgment. But what then determines whether a judgment does occur?

<sup>50</sup>. "Abstractive cognition is taken according as it abstracts from existence and non-existence and from other conditions that contingently happen to a thing or are predicated of a thing", Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.31.4-6/72. "Abstractive" in this context does not have the meaning it has when we speak of abstract nouns or concepts. On the two kinds of cognitions see *Selection*, pp.22-5.

<sup>51</sup>. Ord.1 prol. q.2, OTh I, p.86.21-3/128.

- <sup>54</sup>. "Positing that an intuitive cognition always necessarily has with it an incomplex abstractive cognition, then the intuitive cognition will be the partial cause of that abstractive cognition, and that abstractive cognition will be the partial cause of a habit inclining one to another incomplex abstractive cognition like the one from which the inclining habit is generated"; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.263.7ff/290. (This passage, down to p.264 line 10, is thought to be an addition, which may belong after p.265.7; see Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosphie*, p.174 n.147.) "The intuitive cognition is a partial cause of the [abstractive] cognition, though not of the habit generated by the abstractive cognition"; ibid., p.265.5-7.
- <sup>55</sup>. A habit is something in some way accessory to a substance its clothing, as it were. A habit may be caused in us by some other agent (as when God infuses grace), or it may be formed by repeated acts, or even by a single act. See Baudry, *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham*, p.107.
- <sup>56</sup>. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.261ff/288. Alternatively, Ockham suggests (p.265-6/292), the generally-valid principle that a habit is generated by acts of the same kind might not apply here, so that an *intuitive* cognition might itself cause a habit that enables future *abstractive* cognitions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>. "Imperfect intuitive" cognition is in fact abstractive: Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.262.5-6/290, but it differs from other abstractive cognitions, and resembles intuitive, in that it enables a judgment (but fallible!) of existence (in the past tense), p.266-7/294. To remember a particular individual, such as a person, requires a complex of abstractive cognitions covering various characteristics of the individual; Qdl.1 q. 13, OTh IX, pp.77/116 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.67).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>. On memory see Rep.2, q. 12-13, OTh V, pp.261-2/288; Rep.4 q.14, OTh VII, p.278ff/308.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>. Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.264.15ff/292.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>. On theories of Ockham's contemporaries see Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>. Ord.1, d.27 q.3, OTh IV, p.241/264; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.268-76/296; Rep.3

q.2, OTh VI, p.44ff/66. \*the last is the main text\*

- $^{60}$ . Rep.3 q.2, OTh VI, p.48ff/70. "In debita approximatione", Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, p.258.15ff/286.
- <sup>61</sup>. Rep.3 q.3, OTh VI, p.107ff/128; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.60652-9/646 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.507). On intuitive cognition and species see Stump, "The Mechanisms of Cognition". For more on Ockham's theory of knowledge see https://johnkilcullen.net/z3610.html.
- <sup>62</sup>. Ord.1 Prol. q.1, OTh I, p.32-3/34. On science see *Selection*, p.2-16. \*\*\*Livesey
- <sup>63</sup>. Ockham: "However, there is no science properly speaking of individuals, but only of universals *for* individuals", i.e. *standing for* individuals; Expos. Predic. c.2 §11, OPh II, pp.45.40-2/76.
- <sup>64</sup>. Expos. Phys. prol. §4, OPh IV, p.11/24; Ord.1 d.2 q.4, OTh II, p.134-138/168.
- <sup>65</sup>. SL 3-2 c.20, OPh I, p.537.7-9/614; Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.8-11/50; Expos. Phys. prol. §2, OPh IV, p.6-10/20, line 55ff, § 3 line 64ff.
- <sup>66</sup>. Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10.15/52.
- $^{67}.\ SL\ 3-2\ c.21,\ OPh\ I,\ p.539ff/616$  (translated Longeway); Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.10/52, 14/56.
- <sup>68</sup>. ST 1 q.1 a.2. On discussion in 13th century Paris on the possibility of a science of theology see Dumont, "Theology as a Science".
- <sup>69</sup>. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.199/240.
- $^{70}$ . Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187.17-20/228. Ockham thinks that Paul may have had intuitive vision of God, Qdl.6 q.1 , OTh IX, p.587/626 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.492-3). Cf. 2 Cor. 12:2. (But such intuition would not be the "beatific vision".)

<sup>71</sup>. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.187ff/228.

- <sup>73</sup>. Someone, probably not Ockham himself, gathered together passages from Expos. Phys. into a tract *De successivis*, on motion, time and place, included as an addition volume in the electronic edition of *Opera Philosophica*, after vol.VII.
- <sup>74</sup>. By "moderns" Ockham meant theologians of his own time and just before. In their footnotes the editors of OPh and OTh identify the writers Ockham criticises. He is himself a modern, so sometimes he ascribes his own opinion to "some moderns"; cf. Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §7, OPh IV, p.436.18-9/450.
- 75. "It is the beginning of many errors in philosophy to think that to every distinct vocable there corresponds a distinct significate, so that there is as much distinction of signified things as there is of names or vocables that signify even when those names or vocables are not synonyms"; Sum. phil. nat. 3 c.7, OPh VI, p.270/318. "The making of abstract nouns from adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions, verbs and syncategorematics causes many inexplicable difficulties and leads many people into error. For many imagine that for each distinct noun there is a distinct corresponding thing, ... And therefore in modern times, because of errors arising from the use of such abstractions, it would be better, for the sake of simple people in philosophy, not to use such abstracts"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433-4/446. Many moderns are misled by the language they find in philosophical texts: SL 1 c.51, OPh I, pp.170-1/248 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.170-1). Cf. note below. \*XR\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>. Ord.1 prol. q.7, OTh I, p.200.12-15/242. \*check; supply references to 1 Dial.1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup>. SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.151).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>. For the arguments see Sum. phil. nat., OPh VI, p.261/308 (motion), p.344/392 (the instant), p.347/394 (time), p.391/438 (place). Motion: Rep.2 q.7, OTh V, 103ff/130; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §3, OPh IV, p.430ff/444; Qdl 1 q.5 a.1, OTh IX, p.475/514 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.28). For commentary on the arguments see Maurer, *Philosophy*, pp.417-451 and Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.799ff.

- <sup>78</sup>. For "a thing totally distinct" Ockham uses a number of apparently equivalent expressions. Of motion or time, etc., he says that it is not a thing "really and totally distinct" from every permanent thing, or "distinct according to its whole self"; it is not "outside the essence of" a permanent thing (Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.421/434), or "inhering in it in the way whiteness is something belonging to a white thing" (Expos. Phys. 4 c.20 §2, OPh V, pp.212-3/222), "just as a man and whiteness are two things outside the mind, totally distinct, so that nothing that is one of them or part of one of them is the other or an essential part of the other" (Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190); "Time is not something absolute really distinct from enduring things and from motion", Rep.2 q.10, OTh V, p.185/212.
- $^{79}$ . SL 1 c.10, OPh I, p.36-8/114 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.70-71). See below, note . \*XR\*
- <sup>80</sup>. "Import" covers both [1] referring to and [2] asserting propositions about: "The noun 'motion' imports [1] many permanent things, namely the changing thing and what is acquired by the changing thing, and [2] that one [part] is acquired after another;" Expos. Phys. IV c.18 §3, OPh V, p.196/206.
- <sup>81</sup>. Nouns derived from verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and syncategorematics "were introduced only for brevity or elegance of locution"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.425/438. Many terms relating to motion "have been invented so that we can have an abundance of words to express in a fancy way (*ornate*) what we conceive in our minds, and not because they are necessary"; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.
- $^{82}$ . Propositions that need to be expounded in this way are called "exponible"; SL 2 c.11, OPh I, pp.279-282/356.
- <sup>83</sup>. "And therefore such short propositions must be expounded by other long ones, and by the long ones that are more proper and clearer and plainer we must judge of the others"; Sum. phil. nat., 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.
- <sup>84</sup>. "One must speak as most do", Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, p.199.134/208. "What is said for the sake of elegance (*propter ornatum eloquii*), even though improperly, is not said in vain (*frustra et vane*) but well. However, such expressions must be understood sensibly (*sane*), and to see whether they are true or false they

must be resolved into the proper words for which the improper have been put"; Sum. phil. nat., 3 c.4, OPh VI, p.253/300.

- <sup>85</sup>. "Such propositions should be expounded in the above way, or in some other more suitable way if one is found. Because it is enough for me that besides permanent things past present and future there is no other thing distinct from them according to its whole self. I care little about the manner of speaking, as long as there is a good understanding"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2, OPh IV, p.447/460.
- <sup>86</sup>. And maybe a few relations. See above at note . \*XR\*
- <sup>87</sup>. "Permanent continuous quantity is nothing but one thing that has part situationally distant from part, so that 'continuous permanent quantity' and 'thing having part distant from part' are equivalent in meaning... And therefore, since a substance may have part situationally distant from part, and similarly a quality, some quantity will not be another thing than a substance, and some quantity will not be another thing than a quality"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145). De Corp. Christi, c.12, OTh X p.112ff/144 (translated Birch p.107-8).
- <sup>88</sup>. "In being produced by some created agent, they [the parts] are produced in a distinct situation, so that one part stands apart from another in situation and is outside the other"; De quant. q.3 a.2, OTh X, p.53/84. "Whence a quantity is nothing but a thing that has part outside part and has part standing apart in situation from another... It is not necessary to posit some thing that drags one part outside another, but the extrinsic causes of the thing, i.e. efficient and final, suffice to produce diverse parts, one in one situation and another in another situation, without any 'middle thing' between them. Therefore the substance itself is quantified without any other thing applied to it or made at the same time with it. And as I say of substance, so I say proportionately of every bodily quality"; De quant. q.3 a.3, OTh X, p.64/96. Cf. Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, 210-11/242; Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, pp.412-415/452 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.340-3). \*Beuscher: De corp. Christ, c 28; De corp. Christi, c. 15; Qdl.4 q.26. \*
- <sup>89</sup>. "It is Aristotle's opinion that the whole world is not in a place, because it does not have anything outside it that contains the world; but many parts of the world are in a place, namely all parts contained by other parts"; Expos. Phys. 5 c.8 §1, OPh V,

p.95/104.

- <sup>90</sup>. It moves in comparison with imagined bodies outside the world: "... the *primum mobile*, which does not have any body around it, truly and really moves.... because *if there were* a surrounding body that did not move, one part of the *mobile* would truly coexist with one part of the surrounding body and afterwards with another"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. Also, the *primum mobile* moves because its parts vary in distance from given parts of the earth; *ibid.*, lines 110-2. This would be true even if the earth moved; Expos. Phys. 4 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.97.116ff/106.
- <sup>91</sup>. It moves in comparison with imagined bodies outside the world: "... the *primum mobile*, which does not have any body around it, truly and really moves.... because *if there were* a surrounding body that did not move, one part of the *mobile* would truly coexist with one part of the surrounding body and afterwards with another"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. Also, the *primum mobile* moves because its parts vary in distance from given parts of the earth; *ibid.*, lines 110-2. This would be true even if the earth moved; Expos. Phys. 4 c.8 §1, OPh V, p.97.116ff/106.
- <sup>92</sup>. Expos. Phys. 5 c.10 §8, OPh IV, pp.438-9/452.
- <sup>93</sup>. "Permanent" is puzzling. In local motion the cause, the body that moves, and the places, all exist both before and after the motion, but in other motion, viz. the gradual acquisition or loss of a quality, Ockham says that the "permanent" things include past and future things which do not at present exist. Cf. Expos. Phys. 6 c.1 §2, OPh IV, pp.443.124/456, 446.195-6/460, 447.227/460.
- <sup>94</sup>. Local motion means "first to be in one place (no other [transient] thing then posited), afterwards without an intermediate rest to be in another place (without any other thing besides the place and the body and other things that are permanent), and so on. And consequently there is nothing but permanent things and we need add only that the body is not in all those places at once and that it does not rest in those places"; Expos. Phys. 3 c.2 §6, OPh IV, p.433/446.
- 95. Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §1, OPh V, p.230/240; 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.425/438; 3 c.2 §6, 435/448 \*

- <sup>98</sup>. Expos. Phys. 4 c.27 §4, OPh V, 291-6/300. "In the definition of time soul should be put, or speaking more properly the noun 'soul'; because measure is put in the definition of time; but in the definition of measure soul is mentioned, because a measure is that through which the soul should be made certain of some unknown quantity"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.387/434. "Because the noun 'time' imports an act of the soul numbering, which the noun 'motion' does not import, therefore these nouns do not have the same definitions expressing *quid nominis*, and are not synonyms"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.21 §6, OPh V, p.228/238. "'Time' imports, beyond motion, an act of the soul actually measuring, because time is the motion by which the soul knows how great another motion is; and therefore it is impossible that time be time except through the soul"; Qq. Phys. q.40, OPh VI, 504/552.
- <sup>99</sup>. Qq. Phys. q.42, OPh VI, pp.508/556; q.43, pp.510-11/558. The motion of the *primum mobile* is the ultimate standard of comparison since it is the swiftest and most uniform motion: a very swift motion can be measured against the swiftest, the irregularity of an irregular motion can be detected by comparison with the most uniform. But time can also be measured, though with less certainty, by comparison with other motions, such as the motion of the sun or a clock or one's inner sense of change.
- <sup>100</sup>. "If soul could not exist, nothing could be time, because nothing could be a number or measure. Whence the first movement [i.e. the movement of the *primum mobile*] could be uniform and most swift though soul did not exist, but if soul did not exist, that movement could not be time"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.388/436
- <sup>101</sup>. "Time is really outside the soul and it does not depend really on the soul; however, time could not be time, or *that which is* time could not be time, without the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup>. "For example, while motion lasts, it must be the case that something is in such a way future that it does not have being outside the soul though it can be known by the soul, or it must be that something coexists with something else that does not yet coexist with it outside the soul (which I say on account of the local motion) and yet it can be known by the soul that it will coexist with it"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §3, OPh V, pp.196-7/206. \*check translation\*

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup>. Qq. Phys. q.38, OPh VI, p.497/544.

soul, i.e. unless the soul could exist; just as a cause depends in no way on its effect, and yet a cause could not be a cause without an effect"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.15, OPh VI, p.389/436

- <sup>102</sup>. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.10, OPh VI, p.365/412.
- <sup>103</sup>. Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4-§6, OPh V, pp.201-3/210; 4 c.22 §4, p.234ff/244. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 218a 8-30. Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344ff/392.
- <sup>104</sup>. "It should not be granted that the same 'now' always remains, as if it were some thing continuously remaining; and it should not be granted that it is other and other, as if there exists some such thing, first one and then another"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.18 §4, OPh V, p.203/212.
- <sup>105</sup>. "An instant is not a thing distinct from permanent things, but it imports the *primum mobile* existing in a determinate place so that immediately before it was in another [place] and immediately afterwards will be in another"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.8, OPh VI, p.360/408. See the whole chapter. "And so it is clear how we can assign an earlier 'now' and a later 'now', by saying first that this part of the mobile is now in this position, and afterwards in another position, yet without any newness of a thing produced: but not without the coexistence of the parts of the mobile with different parts of a stationary ambient body (if there were such), or also a variation of distance between a given part of the heaven and a given part of the stationary earth [see \*XR\* above, n.] For continually, as the heaven moves, a given part of the heaven changes its distance from another part of the earth before and afterwards, and yet nothing new need be posited in the heaven because of this"; Expos. Phys. 4 c.22 §4, OPh V, p.237/246. For more on the instant see Rep.2 q.10, p.208/236
- <sup>106</sup>. Perhaps he is thinking of Augustine's remark: "If no one asks me [what is time?], I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not", Confessions XI.xiv.17, https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110111.htm
- $^{107}$ . "Time is not something hidden to us and unknowable by us, as some say; ... indeed it is known to all who have the use of reason... But time is said to be quite unknown because of the many difficulties that come up in treatments of the nature of time from badly-understood texts of philosophers"; Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.3, OPh VI, p.350/398. On the reality of action see also WND 67.40ff, pp.451-9, especially

pp.456, 458-9.

- <sup>108</sup>. An exception is Leibniz. See Loemker, pp.1108-9, 1145-9; McDonough, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Physics". On Newton see Rynasiewicz, "Newton's Views on Space, Time, and Motion".
- <sup>109</sup>. "It is commonly asserted by modern writers that every quantity is a thing really and totally distinct from substance and quality, so that continuous quantity is an accident intermediate between substance and quality, which is asserted to be in substance as its subject and to be the subject of qualities. Similarly it is posited that discrete quantity is a thing really distinct from substances; and the same is asserted of place and time;" SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.132/210 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.142). "I argue that a point is not another thing than a line, or a line another thing than a surface, or a surface another thing than a body; and by the same argument a body is not another thing than substance and quality, according to him [Aristotle];" SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.133/210 (tranlated *Theory of Terms*, p.143). "I say therefore that the intention of Aristotle and of many others was that every quantity is not some thing totally distinct from substance and quality, and that point, line, surface and body are not things wholly (secundum se totas) distinct from one another;" SL 1 c.45, OPh I, p.145/222 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.151). "It is not Aristotle's opinion that quantity is a predicament importing some absolute thing, really and wholly distinct from things in the genus of substance and in the genus of quality, as is commonly held; but it is his opinion that no thing is imported by the genus of quantity that is not really some substance or quality"; Expos. Predic. c.10 §4, OPh II, p.205ff/236.
- <sup>110</sup>. For Ockham's treatment of quantity see SL 1 c.44, OPh I, pp.133-153/210ff (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.142-58), and Expos. Predic. c.10, OPh II, 203-238/234ff (where he argues about point, line, surface, body, time, instant, place); De quant., OTh X p.5ff/36; Qdl.4 q.24-34, OTh IX, pp.412ff/452 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.340ff).
- \*Beuscher's references: See Ockham. Report. 4, q 4; Quodl 4, qq. 23-39; Quodl 6, q 3, Quodl. 7, q 25; Summa totius logicae (Venice. Lazarus de Soardis, 1508), p 1, cc 44-8, fol 17 r -19 v; Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum, cc 10-11; De sac alt, passim\*
- <sup>111</sup>. "There is another opinion [besides that of some moderns] about quantity, which seems to me to be in accordance with Aristotle's thinking, whether it is heretical or Catholic, which I wish to recite now, though I do not wish to assert it. And therefore

when I have set out this opinion and written on philosophy, I have not written it as mine but as Aristotle's and explained it as it seemed to me, and likewise I will now recite it without assertion"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.136/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145). Ockham distances himself from Aristotle on this topic also in other places: De quant., OTh X, p.5-6/36, p.90/122, p.125/156; Expos. Phys. Prol. §1, OPh IV, p.3-4/16. \*check these\*

- <sup>112</sup>. \*References, de corp. etc.\*
- 113. "It is difficult to prove that there are only ten predicaments", Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.161/192. For questions relating to the categories see Qdl.4 q.25-8, OTh IX, p.416ff/456 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.343ff) and Qdl.6 q.8 up to Qdl.7 q.8, OTh IX, p.611ff/650 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.512-616).
- <sup>114</sup>. SL 1 c.41, OPh I, pp.114-7/192 (translated *Theory of Terms*, pp.128-31); Quodl.5 q.22, OTh IX, pp.564-9/604 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.471-5).
- <sup>115</sup>. E.g. the answer to "When?" might be "Today", to "Where?" "Here", to "In what position?" "Seated". SL 1 c.41, OPh I, p.116/194 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.130), Qdl.5 q.22 a.2, OTh IX, p.567/606 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.473-4).
- <sup>116</sup>. Expos. Predic. c.7 §1, OPh II, p.159/190.
- <sup>117</sup>. SL 1 c.55, OPh I, p.180/258 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.178).
- <sup>118</sup>. Spade, "Ockham, Adams and Connotation" criticises Ockham on connotative terms, pp.602-8, and on exponible propositions, pp.609-11.
- $^{119}$ . For an example of such an argument, see Sum. phil. nat. 4 c.1, OPh VI, p.344-7/391.
- 120. Spade and Panaccio, "William of Ockham", sec. 4.1.
- 121. Ockham did not invent it, no one in the middle ages called it a razor or

attributed it to Ockham. See Pelletier "Ockham's Razor". See Wey's note on Qdl.4 q.27, OTh IX, p.433/472, referring to Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.6, 259a 8-15. Ockham himself refers it to Aristotle, Qq Phys. q.11, OPh VI, p.420.14/468, which the editor takes as a reference to *Physics* I.4, 188a17-18. Other people used it: cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.2 a.3 obj.2.; Duns Scotus \*Cross ecclesiology Ord. 4.1.4–5, n. 9 (Wadding, 8:90).). For examples of Ockham's use, see index, OPh VI, p.868/916.

- <sup>122</sup>. De corp. Christi, c.29, OTh X, p.157-8/188, punctuation altered. Cf. Ord. 1 d.30 q.1, OTh IV, p.290.1-3/314.
- 123. "... if a general council were to err, either about matters that consist in fact or about other matters, he to whom this was evident ought not believe it and would be permitted in this matter to contradict and deny the general council. He to whom this was not evident, however, ought, with respect to matters of fact, to believe the assertion and testimony of the general council, on the presumption that, with respect to matters of fact, the general council would assert nothing about which it was not certain, just as a judge too is bound to believe witnesses whom he can not reject but regards and ought to regard as suitable and truthful, even if in point of fact they make a false deposition. A judge who in ignorance believes false witnesses does not sin; on the contrary, he would sin if he did not believe, because he has nothing against them on the basis of which he can suspect that they speaking falsehood. Thus the faithful who in ignorance believe a general council which is in error do not sin in matters of this kind [i.e., of fact]; on the contrary, they would sin if they were to refuse to show trust, because they have nothing against that general council"; 3.1 Dial. 3.6.
- 124. Qdl.4 q.24, OTh IX, p.413.15-17/452; cf. Qdl.4 q.35 a.2, p.472.70-2/512 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.389); "If one thing is sufficient... it is superfluous to posit two", Qdl.7 q.2, OTh IX, p.707.23-4/746; "If two or three are sufficient... then a fourth thing is superfluous", Qdl.7 a.1, OTh IX, p.704.17-19/744. On the other hand: "If two things are not sufficient... it is necessary to posit a third", Qdl.1 q.5, OTh IX, p.31.40-2/70; "When a proposition is true for things, if permanent things are not sufficient for its truth it is necessary to add something further," Qq. Phys. q.13, OPh VI, p.425.4-6/472. Walter Chatton weakened the requirement: "So great a necessity to plurify things is not required that it be evident that a contradiction follows if they be not plurified... It is enough that all be saved more suitably by many than by few"; quoted Tachau, "The problem of the species in medio", pp.394-443, n.64, p.412 (my translation). See Maurer, "Ockham's Razor

and Chatton's Anti-Razor"; Keele, "Walter Chatton". \*Subtle discussion: Qdl.1 q.5 ad 1m, OTh IX, pp.32-3/72 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.30-1).\* \*not Antirazor: Keele, Res, n.21\*

- 125. "But setting aside everything but matter, form, an agent and other permanent things, if the matter first does not have the form and afterwards has it, and not part before part, the matter truly is changed; therefore, to *save* change, it is vain to posit anything besides matter, form, an agent and other permanent things"; Expos Phys. 3 c.2 §5, OPh IV, p.423/436. "Save" is used in the same way in the phrase (from Simplicius) "saving the phenomena".
- <sup>126</sup>. Ockham, 1 Dial. 4.10.
- <sup>127</sup>. Ord.1 d.14 q.2, OTh III, p.432/454. Cf. d.17 q.3, p.478.18-20/500. "Sometimes several miracles should be posited in relation to something that could be done by fewer, and this pleases God"; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490.
- 128. \*What is nominalism?\*
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/
- 129. Maurer, *The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles*, pp. 7-8, puts forware several principles he believes shape Ockham's philosophy.
- <sup>130</sup>. For a philosophical account of Ockham's philosophy as a nominalism, see Panaccio.
- <sup>131</sup>, Thorndike, *University Records*, p.355-60. In the text Thorndike quotes, "nominalism" covers more than would now come under the term, especially technicalities of Logic: "Those doctors are called nominalists who do not muliply things that are principally signified by terms according to the multiplication of terms. Realists, on the other hand, are those who contend that things are muliplied with the multiplication of terms. For instance, nominalists say that deity and [divine] wisdom are one and the same, but realists say that divine wisdom is divided from deity. Also nominalists are called those who apply diligence and study to know all the properties of terms from which depend the truth and falsity of speech, and without which there can be no perfect judgment of the truth and falsity of

propositions. These properties are *suppositio*, *appellatio*, *ampliatio*, *restrictio*, *distributio exponibilis*. In addition they know obligations and insolubles, the true foundations of argumentation and dialectic, and all their defects. Instructed in which matters, they readily recognize what is good and bad in any argument. But the realists neglect and despise all these things, saying, 'We attend to things; we don't care about terms'. Among the nominalists the first to be condemned is said to have been William Ockham, whom John XXII persecuted..."; pp.355-6. (Latin text in Du Plessis d'Argentré, *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus*, 1755, I, ii, 286-88, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210010976288&seq=700). \*Courtenay on history of the term\*

- 132. Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.72.21-73.9/100. \*Cf Descartes on automata\*
- distinct from it begins to exist; Sum. phil. nat. 2 c.3, OPh VI, p.218/266. When the cause, apart from anything else, is posited, something else can be posited, and when it is not posited the other cannot (naturally) be posited; Ord.1 d.45 q.1, OTh IV, p.664-5/688; Rep.2 q.12-13, OTh V, pp.269.10-13/296, 276.19-21/304.
- $^{134}$ . Expos. Phys. 7 c.1 §1, OPh V, p.598-600/608. This is a rejection of Thomas Aquinas's dictum that whatever moves is moved by another, ST 1 q.2 a.3.
- <sup>135</sup>. Qdl.4 q.1, 2, OTh IX, 293/332-309/348 (translated, *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.245-56.) For more on Ockham's treatment of causation see Moody, "William of Ockham"; Adams, "Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?"; Courtenay, "The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism".
- 136. God's existence is one of the "truths naturally known or knowable", Ord.1 prol. q.1, OTh I, p.7. "The argument proving the primacy of the efficient is sufficient, and is the argument of practically all philosophers", \*check\* Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.354/388. "God's existence can be demonstrated", Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.
- 137. Qdl.1, q.1, OTh IX, p.2/42 (translated Quodlibetal Questions, p.6).
- <sup>138</sup>. Plato, Laws X 893b-899d.

<sup>139</sup>. Ord. 1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.3-11/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.765/812.

- <sup>140</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.355.12ff/388; Qq. Phys. q.135, OPh VI, p.767ff/814.
- <sup>141</sup>. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.93-4). \*check: Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2.
- <sup>142</sup>. "There is only one simply first being, though against *protervientes* [last-ditch objectors] it is difficult to prove this." In an addition he remarks: "This argument seems probable, though it does not demonstrate sufficiently"; Ord.1 d.2 q.10, OTh II, p.356-7/390.
- <sup>143</sup>. Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.109ff/148, line 61ff (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.94-5); Qdl.4 q.2 OTh IX, p.306-8/346, line 138, line 175 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.254-5).
- <sup>144</sup>. Qdl.1 q.1, OTh IX, p.3.43/42 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.6).
- <sup>145</sup>. E.g. Thomas Aquinas's "fifth way", ST 1 q.2 a.3: "For we see that some things that lack cognition... operate for an end, which appears from the fact that they always or most often operate in the same way so as to seek what is best."
- 146. See above, note . \*XR\*
- $^{147}.$  Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636.10-14/660; Rep.2 q.3-4, OTh V, p.55.16-18/82; Qdl.2 q.2 OTh IX, p.116/156 (translated  $\it Quodlibetal\ Questions$ , p.99).
- <sup>148</sup>. Ord.1 d.42 q.un, OTh IV, p.617-21/640; Qdl.2 q.1, OTh IX, p.107-8/146 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.93-4).
- $^{149}$ . Ord.1 d.35 q.2, OTh IV, p.441.12-18/464; Qdl.2 q.2 ad 1, OTh IX, p.115/154 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.98).
- <sup>150</sup>. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, Q.46 De ideis (translation https://academic.mu.edu/taylorr/Reading Groups/Translations.html). Cf.

Plato, *Timaeus* 29. See Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God"; Dillon, "The Ideas as thoughts of God".

- <sup>151</sup>. Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.480/504.
- 152. See above, note . \*XR\*
- <sup>153</sup>. "God has an infinity of ideas, because infinite things are producible by him"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.493/516.
- 154 "God foreknows the very things that he afterwards produces... He knows what he does perfectly, not only in a universal but also in particular and most distinctly"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.504/528. "God not only has knowledge of universals, as a created craftsman has of things he will make, but has also distinct and particular knowledge of whatever particular is to be made. Therefore for him the very particular is the idea", ibid. p.505/528. Cf. Rep.3, q.3, OTh VI, p.121-2/143.
- <sup>155</sup>. "God foreknows something that does not actually exist to make what he makes in accordance with it. However *he intuits something that is not himself, nor anything real,* but which can be real, to make in accordance with it that very thing"; Ord.1 d.35 q.5, OTh IV, p.506/530. A human maker thinks of a thing of a certain *kind* or description, without intuitive knowledge of the very thing.
- <sup>156</sup>. Above, n.. \*XR\*
- 157. On the formal distincition see above, note . \*XR\* "Because a formal distinction or formal non-identity is very difficult to posit anywhere,... it should not be posited except where it evidently follows from beliefs handed down in sacred Scripture or the determination of the Church and the sayings of the Saints,... [and since these] can be saved without positing it [i.e. a formal distinction] between the [divine] essence and the [divine] wisdom, therefore I simply deny that such a distinction is possible there, and I deny it universally in creatures... Because one [viz. a formal distinction in God] is expressed in Scripture and the other [a formal distinction in creatures] is not, and it seems repugnant to reason, therefore the one is to be posited and the other denied"; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17-18/50. Ockham believed that the formal distinction was expressed in Scripture in the sense that it was needed to make

sense of Scripture teaching on the Trinity. See below, n.. \*XR\*

- <sup>158</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17/50.
- 159. Ockham answers Yes to the question: Whether the identity of the divine essence (and in every manner of identity *ex natura rei*) with the attributal perfections, and of those perfections with one another, is as great as the identity of the divine essence with the divine essence (Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.3/36). God is identical with God, any thing is identical with itself: God's wisdom is *just as identical as that*, with God's goodness and with God himself.
- \*Ord 1 d.2 q 1, p.25/58 respondeo ad formam quaestionis quod perfectiones attributales nullo modo distinguuntur ex natura rei ab essentia divina. Qualiter autem distinuantur patebit in sequenti quaestione [pp.61-74/94]
- <sup>160</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.73/106; d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.329/350. Scotus sometimes represents God's activities in terms of "instants of nature", as if God first does this and then does that (cf. Ockham, Ord.1 d.35 q.4, OTh IV, p.467-8/490). Ockham rejects these "instants", Ord.1 d.9 q.3, OTh III, p.311-2/332; Expos. Praed. c.18, OPh II, p.327-8/358. Whatever God is *or does* is identically and simply himself. Cf. Adams, *William Ockham*, p.237-9.
- <sup>161</sup>. "All attributes either connote some things really distinct or are common to things really distinct", Ord.1 d.2 q.2, OTh II, p.70/104. "From created wisdom and from deity one concept can be abstracted which is predicable *in quid* of both, and it will be a quidditative concept... And thus there can be many quidditative and simple concepts because of the diversity of extrinsec things, but they will not be convertible because always something is contained under one that is not under the other"; Ord.1 d.3 q.3, OTh II, p.425/458.
- <sup>162</sup>. Ord.1 d.43 q.1, OTh IV, p.636-7/660; Cf. WND 95.112ff, pp.643-55.
- <sup>163</sup>. "The omnipotent cannot effect *everything* that does not include a contradiction, because he cannot effect God. However the omnipotent can effect every *makeable* that does not include a contradiction", Ord.1 d.20 q.un., OTh IV, p.36/60. The editors quote a formulation from *De principiis theologiae* that makes the point more explicitly: "God can make everything the making of which (*quod fieri*) does not include a contradiction. Note that I do not say that God can make everything that

does not include a contradiction, because then he could make himself, since he does not include a contradiction; but he can make everything the making of which does not include a contradiction, that is, everything of which a contradiction does not follow upon the proposition 'He makes it'"; OPh VII, p.507/540. *De principiis* is not by Ockham, but the editors consider it a faithful compilation of Ockham's thought, p.26\*. See also Adams, *William Ockham*, p.1152ff.

- $^{164}.$  Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.604-5/644. Cf. 1277 condemnations art. 63, CUP I, p.547. See above, n.. \*XR\*
- <sup>165</sup>. Ord.1 prol. 1, OTh I, p.38/80; Qdl.6 q.6, OTh IX, p.605/644.
- 166. See above, note . \*XR\*
- $^{167}.$  Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence". Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1 q.25 a.5.
- 168. See above, note . \*XR\*
- <sup>169</sup>. It is not clear whether this means general laws or a plan that includes some singular events; Adams, *William Ockham*, p.1198-1207. Miracles are part of the divine plan and likewise the supersession of the Old Law and occasional divine commands that override the moral law.
- $^{170}.$  Qdl.6 q.1, OTh IX, p.585-6/624 (translated  $\it Quodlibetal\ Questions,$  p.491-2). See also CB 4.3, p.230ff.
- <sup>171</sup>. Ockham refers to "laws of God *commonly* ordained" in contrast with events that happen "by special miracle and divine dispensation"; QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.444/470.
- <sup>172</sup>. See Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism*, pp.58-9; Courtenay, "John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undo the Past", p.147ff.
- <sup>173</sup>. "It is commonly conceded by philosophers and theologians that God cannot make the past not be past so that it is not forever afterwards true to say that it

happened", Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.578-9/602; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.507-8/538.

- <sup>174</sup>. I find this puzzling. \*check this\* Present and past contingent events remain contingent, even though they cannot be undone: "It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true"; Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.587/610. And, if it had not been done, God would never have known that it was done (since it wasn't): "He [God] knows contingently and can [potest] not know and could [potuit] never have known"; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. "The proposition 'Everything that is, when it is, must be [necesse est esse]' is literally [de virtute sermonis] simply false", Expos. Perih. 1 c.6, OPh II, p.420/452. See Qdl.4 q.4, OTh IX, p.315-6/354, line 31ff (translated Quodlibetal Questions, p.261).
- 175. Some historians have used the language of contract, agreement, or pact to refer to divine ordinances insofar as they promise benefits. Ockham does use this language, but not often: "foedus" (Rep.4 q.1, OTh VII, p.6/36), "ex pactione" (Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.215.15/244). Later theologians often used the language of covenant. However, "Nominalist covenants... were in no sense made by man as an equal or participating partner" (Courtenay, "Covenant and causality in Pierre d'Ailly", p.118). If God's will alone counts, without requiring any volition from human beings, then it seems to me that the language of pact or covenant is inappropriate.
- <sup>176</sup>. See the discussion between E. Sylla, H. Oberman and J. Murdoch in Sylla, "Autonomous and Handmaiden Science", pp.394-5.
- <sup>177</sup>. See below, note . \*XR\* See Courtenay, "Covenant and causality in Pierre d'Ailly", pp.116-119 (referring to the "Nominalists" generally). According to McGrath ("The anti-Pelagian structure of 'Nominalist' doctrines of justification", pp.111-2), God's "ordained power refers to that subset of possibilities which he chose to actualise and having actualised them, abides by them. Thus there was no absolute necessity for God to choose any course of action; however, having finally chosen a particular course of action, there is now a self-imposed conditional necessity in respect to it, in that God has freely chosen to be faithful to a certain ordering of his creation". I have not found any place where Ockham speaks of a self-imposed necessity. It seems to me that what God has freely chosen he can freely unchoose.

<sup>178</sup>. Qdl.2 q.10-11, OTh IX, p.156-1644/196 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.132-39). \*Also also Rep.4 q.7F = q.9, p.161/190\* See above, \*p.. \*XR\*

- <sup>179</sup>. Ockham says that it is difficult to prove this, but it is persuadable. Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.161/190; Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.157ff/196 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.132); Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX, p.369/408 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.305).
- <sup>180</sup>. Ord.1 d.1 q.2, OTh I, p.396/438, 402/444; Rep.2 q.20, OTh V, p.435/462, 441/468.
- <sup>181</sup>. Rep.3 q. 4, OTh VI, p.136-7/158; Qdl.2 q.11, OTh IX, p.164/204 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.138). \*\*Qdl irrelevant\*
- <sup>182</sup>. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2m, OTh IX, p.63/102 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.56); Qdl.2 q.10, OTh IX, p.159/198 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.134).
- <sup>183</sup>. Qdl.1 q.10 ad 2, OTh IX, p.63-4/102 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.56-7); Qdl.1 q.12 OTh IX, p.68/108 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.61).
- <sup>184</sup>. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, pp.148-50); the same distinction is implied in 3.1 Dial. 2.24.106-116, p.219. \*What does Adams say on this? See also Osbourne\*
- <sup>185</sup>. Examples: "Every *honestum* is to be done", Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177/216 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.149); there are "many" such principles, line 39. "Everything dictated by right reason on account of a due end (and likewise concerning other circumstances) is to be done", "Everything dictated by right reason is to be loved", Rep.3 q.12, OTh VI, p.425/446. "Every indigent person in extreme necessity is to be helped lest he perish", QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.423.310/448. "Every benefactor is to be benefited", QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281.223/306. "By a natural law which is immutable, when something does me good and you no harm, it is fair that you should not prohibit me", WND 66.47-9, p.449. Not to kill a person who never did harm is a principle *per se nota*, 3.2 Dial. 1.15. There are also many natural laws "on supposition", 3.2 Dial., 3.6 (translated in LFMOW, pp.286-93).

That these examples are known per se is not clear to me.

- <sup>186</sup>. Qdl.2 q.14, OTh IX, p.177-8/216, lines 26 and 42 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.149); QV q.6 art.10, OTh VIII, p.281-2/306. I do not know of any examples.
- <sup>187</sup>. Ord.1 d.1 q.4, OTh I, p.447.5-6/488 ("Only God is to be loved above all, because he is the highest good"); Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.257.87/296, translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.214, ("This is to love God above all: to love whatever God wills to be loved"); QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.358-9/384, lines 413, 416 ("Who rightly loves God, loves God above all"... "Who rightly loves God, loves everything that God wills to be loved"). The principle "No one should be led to act against the precept of his God" is known *per se*, QV q.7 a.3, OTh VIII, p.366.583/392.
- <sup>188</sup>. Ockham does not seem to explain the moral authority of human law in OPh or OTh, but he does in WND 65.55-75, p.437.
- <sup>189</sup>. Above, note 186. \*XR\*
- <sup>190</sup>. If the error is invincible: QV q.8, OTh VIII, p.411/436.
- <sup>191</sup>. It seems that the principle "No one should be led to act against the precept of his God" (above, note ) overrides every other principle. \*XR\*
- <sup>192</sup>. Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352/380. Cf. 3.1 Dial. 2.24.110, p.219.
- <sup>193</sup>. Rep.4 q.16, OTh VII, p.352/382.
- <sup>194</sup>. Rep.4 q.10-11, OTh VII, p.195-7/224, 223/252.
- $^{195}.\ Rep.4\ q.10\mbox{-}11,\ OTh\ VII,\ p.198/228,\ 225\mbox{-}6/254.$
- <sup>196</sup>. Qdl.1 q.20, OTh IX, pp.99ff/138 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.85-90). See Adams and Wood, "Is To Will It As Bad As To Do It?", pp.12-14. \*Abelard, Kilcullen, "Bayle on the Rights of Conscience"\* For more on Ockham's moral

philosophy see King\*

- <sup>197</sup>. Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.352.10/380.
- <sup>198</sup>. Are things wrong because forbidden, or forbidden because wrong? The question has often been discussed. See Augustine, \*in Aristotle; see Suarez vi.11, III, pp.92-4. See also Plato, *Euthyphro* 10a; Aristotle, EN V.7, 1134b 18-22; Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-2 q.57 a.2 ad 3; Ockham, \*3.1 Dial., 2.20.) On the question whether there really is room in Ockham's thinking for a "non-positive" morality see Freppert *Basis of morality*, p.171-81; Adams "Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality", p.265-6. \*OT/ NT not in point, because this is positive morality \*Osbourne argues that O has a divine command theory\* \*By God's absolute power, he could do something inconsistent with his ordinances: But also, he could *ordinately* change the ordinances.\* \*Kilcullen "Natural Law and Will in Ockham" King ethical theory McGrade\*
- <sup>199</sup>. \*List; references to Augustine, Thomas, Scotus\*
- <sup>200</sup>. (Wolter, p.275\*)
- <sup>201</sup>. Gregory of Rimini, *Lectura*, p.235. Cf. St Leger, *The "etiamsi daremus" of Hugo Grotius*. See Kilcullen, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law".
- <sup>202</sup>. McGrade, "Natural Law and Divine Omnipotence", pp.282-3. (For an account of the role of reason in Ockham's moral theory see McGrade, "Right(s) in Ockham", pp.66-70) \*But why does that dictate override others?\* Gregory of Rimini and Suarez argued that acts contrary to natural law are also forbidden by God, so that there is a *double* obligation not to do such an act. See Kilcullen, "Medieval Theories of Natural Law". On such a view it might be said that, while murder is (1) contrary to natural law and also (2) contrary to the current divine precept, if God in some case commanded murder, murder would in that case not be wrong, because the principle that God must be obeyed (above n.) is overriding. \*XR\*
- <sup>203</sup>. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8, OPh IV, p.321/334; Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §11, 12, 15, OPh II, pp.418-9/450, 422-3/454.

<sup>204</sup>. "It cannot be proved by any reason... But it can be known evidently through experience, by the fact that a man experiences that however much reason dictates something, nevertheless the will can will it or not will it or nill it"; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87-8/126 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.75).

<sup>205</sup>. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.580-1/604. "I call freedom the power by which I can... cause and not cause the same effect, without there being any diversity elsewhere outside that power"; Qdl.1 q.16, OTh IX, p.87/126 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.75). Cf. Expos. Phys. 2 c.8 §1, OPh IV, p.319-20/332; Praedest. q.3, OPh II, p.536.92ff/568. Scotus seems to have been the first to maintain that freedom is a power for opposites undetermined by any cause but the will. This idea was rejected by Hume and Mill and many modern philosophers. See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk.2 pt.3 sec.1, 2 (p.399); Hume, *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Section 8; Mill, "Of Liberty and Necessity"; Kilcullen, "Freewill and determinism".

<sup>206</sup>. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.578/602. My comment: If we say that a person is sitting but can stand up, we obviously don't mean that he can stand up precisely while he is sitting, doing both simultaneously. We mean that although he *is actually* sitting at this moment, he is at this moment *able* to stand up. The power to sit and the power to stand can coexist, the acts of these opposite powers cannot coexist, but the act of one power can coexist with the opposite power. We don't have a power only when we exercise it. We can't stand while we are sitting, but not because when we are sitting we don't have the power to stand.

<sup>207</sup>. Apart from the motion that defines time: this is implied by "later".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup>. Rep.3 q.7, OTh VI, p.211/232.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup>. Rep.3 q.11, OTh VI, p.357-8/378.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup>. Ord.1 d.1 q.6, OTh I, pp.503-507/544; Rep.4, q.16, VII, p.350ff/380; Adams, "The Structure of Ockham's Moral Theory", pp.13-14. For more on Ockham on free will see https://johnkilcullen.net/z3607.html.

 $<sup>^{211}.\ \</sup>mathrm{Ord.1}\ d.38\ q.un,\ \mathrm{OTh\ IV},\ p.583\text{-}5/606;\ \mathrm{Praedest.}\ q.1,\ \mathrm{OPh\ II},\ p.517\text{-}8/548.$ 

<sup>212</sup>. See Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 18a 28ff, and Ockham's commentary, Expos. Perih. 1 c.6 §15, OPh II, p.421-2/452.

- <sup>213</sup>. Praedest. q.2 art.4, OPh II, p.529ff/560. For more see Adams and Kretzman: William Ockham, *Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents*; Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*, p.146-168. \*Scotus on contingency: Stanford, Medieval modal\*
- <sup>214</sup>. Ord.1 d.38 q.un, OTh IV, p.586/610. "Though the proposition 'Peter is predestinate' is now true and could be false, because, however, when it will be false [i.e. if it is in future false \*check transl at the time when] it is true to say that it was never true, therefore it is not changeable from truth into falsity"; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.512/544. "He [God] knows contingently and can [potest] not know and could [potuit] never have known"; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.521/552. "It is contingently true and therefore is true in such a way that it can be false and can never have been true"; p.587/610. "There is some proposition that cannot be first true and then false or vice versa, and yet it is not necessary but contingent. The reason is that, however much it is or was true, it is possible that it is not true and never was true"; Ord.1 d.40 q.un., OTh IV, p.594-5/618.
- <sup>215</sup>. Ord.1 d.38 q.un., OTh IV, p.583/606; Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.518/550. \*Repeats note 181; check appropriateness of references in this section\*
- <sup>216</sup>. Praedest. q.1, OPh II, p.513/544. In the late 15th century there was controversy in Louvain concerning the obligation to believe as being true prophecies about future contingent events; see Baudry, *La querelle des futurs contingents*.
- <sup>217</sup>. Ord.1 d.17 q.1, OTh III, p.454-5/476; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.587/624 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.492). On this point Ockham agrees with Scotus.
- $^{218}$ . Grace and charity are the same thing: Rep.4 q.3-5, OTh VII p.47.5-7/76.
- <sup>219</sup>. Not the Pope Pelagius often quoted in the *Dialogus*. \*\*
- <sup>220</sup>. Information about these controversies can be searched for under the terms:

Congregatio de auxiliis, Molinism, Jansenism, Synod of Dort, Arminianism.\*

- <sup>221</sup>. For the *facientibus* maxim see Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, IV, p.993-6; Thomas Aquinas *De Veritate* q.24 a.1 ad 2; McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, pp.83-91. I have not found it in Ockham. Oberman, who believes that Ockham does subscribe to *facientibus*, judges that this doctrine is "essentially Pelagian": God's ordinances establish a "dome" under which we can live as if Pelagius were right, while Augustine's doctrine holds *de potentia absoluta*. See Oberman, *Harvest*, pp.176-8, 186, 214. See also Oberman, "Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology", section II. Also McSorley, "Was Gabriel Biel a Semi-Pelagian?"
- <sup>222</sup>. For more on this topic see Wood, "Ockham's Repudiation of Pelagianism". Ockham seems to differ from Augustine (or at least from followers of Augustine in his time) on two points: Ockham holds that a person without grace can do morally good acts, and that the reason for predestination is (in most cases) that God foresees that the person will die in a state of grace. \*What did the Avignon masters say on these points\*
- <sup>223</sup>. Cf. Job 41:11, Romans 9:14-24.
- 224. God owes nothing to anyone and can do no wrong: Ord.1 d.17 g.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; Rep.2 q.15, OTh V, p.343.20-3/370; Rep.4 qq.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; ibid. p.55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198.7-9/228, ibid., pp.225-6/254. SOME OF THESE TEXTS QUOTED BELOW god owes nothing: "eo ipso quodipse vult, bene et iuste factum est", Ord.1 d.17 g.3, OTh III, p.478.19-20/500; " Deus autem nulli tenetur nec obligatur tanguam debitor, et ideo non potest facereauod non debet facere nec non facere auod debet facere". Rep.2 a.15. OTh V. p.343/370; Rep.4 q.3-4, "Et ideo potest Deus de potentia sua absoluta non remittereculpam, sine omni iniustitia, sicut potest aliquem punire sine omni demerito absquehoc quod dicatur iniustus... Unde sicut Deus potest semper continuare et detinere unum brutum in poenis sine omni peccato vel iniustitia a parte sui, ita eodem modoposset facere cum homine. Si dicatur quod Deus est debitor praemii pro meritis. respondeo dico quod Deus nullius est debitor nisi quia sic ordinavit; de potentiatamen absoluta potest facere contrarium cum creatura sua sine omni iniuria", Rep.4gg.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74; "sicut Deus creat creaturam quamlibet ex mera voluntatesua, ita ex mera voluntate sua potest facere de creatura sua quidquid sibi placet. Sicut enim si aliquis semper diligeret Deum et faceret omnia opera Deo accepta,

posset eum Deus adnihilare sine aliqua iniuria, ita sibi post talia opera potest nondare vitam aeternam sed poenam aeternam sine iniuria. Et ratio est quia Deus nullius est debitor, sed quidquid nobis facit, ex mera gratia facit. Et ideo eo ipso quod Deusaliquid facit, iuste factum est." ibid. p,55/84; Rep.4 qq.10-11, OTh VII, p.198/228, "Nec deus peccare dicitur propter illum actum, quia nullus dicitur peccare nisi quiafacit aliquid ad cuius oppositum obligatur vel quia non [facit] illud ad quodobligatur. Deus autem ad nihil faciendum vel non faciendum obligatur... potest Deusaliquem obligare ad poenam aeternam sine omni peccato"; ibid., pp.225-6/254.

- <sup>225</sup>. Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, pp.591.37-42/630 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.495).
- <sup>226</sup>. God could ordain that "whoever lives according to right reason so that he does not believe anything except what natural reason concludes he should believe" is worthy of eternal life, Rep.3 q.9, OTh VI, p.280-1/302. Such naturally-good acts would not merit eternal life except by God's free acceptance, Ord.1 d.17 q.2, OTh III, p.470-472/492. Also Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, pp.587-9/626 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.493).
- <sup>227</sup>. Of his absolute power he could send someone having charity to hell but accept another not having charity to eternal life, and he would not from this be an "acceptor of persons" because he is no one's debtor; QV q.1 a.3 OTh VIII, p.22/48. ("Acceptor personarum" in Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:11 is sometimes translated as "partial": God is not an acceptor of persons means that he treats all persons impartially.) "Of his absolute power God... could punish someone without any demerit without being said to be unjust (though the punishment would not be properly a penalty...); just as God could always continue and detain a brute in pain without any sin or injustice on his part, he could do the same with man"; Rep.4, q.3-5, OTh VII, p.45/74. "Just as God creates any creature of his mere will, so of his mere will he can do with his creature whatever pleases him. For just as, if someone always loved God and did everything acceptable to God, God could annihilate him without any injustice, so he could after such acts not give him life eternal but eternal pain, without injustice. And the reason is because God is no one's debtor, but whatever he does to us he does of mere grace, and therefore, by the very fact that God does something, it is done justly"; ibid. p.55/84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup>. QV q.1 a.3, OTh VIII, p.25-6/50.

<sup>229</sup>. See above, note . \*XR\*

- <sup>230</sup>. Ord.1 d.17 q.3, OTh III, pp.477-8/498; Qdl.6 q.1 a.2, OTh IX, p.588-9/624 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.493); Qdl.6 q.2 a.2, OTh IX, p.591/630 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.496).
- <sup>231</sup>. Qdl.3 q.14, OTh IX, p.255-6/294 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.213); De connex. virt, OTh VIII, pp. 335-6/360.
- $^{232}$ . Rep.3 q.9 a.1, OTh VI, p.279.18-20/300, 281.14-17/302. See also 1 Dial. 6.79 on the morality of pagans.
- <sup>233</sup>. Ord.1 d.41 q.un., OTh IV, p.600/624; Qdl.6 q.2, OTh IX, p.592/632 (translated *Quodlibetal Questions*, p.496). Other medieval theologians also held that we must prepare for grace by doing good works (e.g. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1-2 q.112 a.2, 3), but also did not hold that good works earn grace. See Wood, "Ockham's Repudiation of Pelagianism", pp.361-2.
- <sup>234</sup>. Ord.1 d.41 q.un, OTh IV, p.606-7/630. In most cases. Some, e.g. the Blessed Virgin, are given a special grace to prevent them from ever falling out of charity.
- <sup>235</sup>. In CI Ockham says clearly that the rule of faith is Scripture and the teaching of the Church, and in *Dialogus* there is a clear discussion of the sources of faith. (See Ockham, *On Heretics and Against John*, pp.113, 466-7.) In his pre-Avignon writings he often speaks more vaguely, e.g. invoking the writings of "The Saints".
- <sup>236</sup>. Cf. n.. \*XR\*
- <sup>237</sup>. Sylla p.372, n.115; Freddoso, "Ockham on Faith and Reason"; Adams, William Ockham, pp. 1007-10.".
- <sup>238</sup>. \*give references to church councils\*
- <sup>239</sup>. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, pp.370-1. \*insert some translation\*

- <sup>240</sup>. "The difficulty in this question [whether the divine unity is consistent with a plurality of persons] arises from the identity of the divine Essence with the Relation and with the Person, because, if the Essence, Relation and Person are simply one thing not distinct in number, it is difficult to see how there are several Relations and several Persons and not several Essences"; Ord. 1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, pp.358-99/392. For Ockham's treatment of the logic of the Trinity see: Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the 'Centiloquium' Attributed to Ockham"; Gelber, *Logic and the Trinity*, pp.177-185, 216-226; Shank, *Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand*, pp.65-71; Adams, *William Ockham*. pp.996-1007; Thom, *The Logic of the Trinity*, pp,161-180; Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, ch.3. \*Ouote Friedman on the increasing concern with unity\*
- <sup>241</sup>. See above, n.. \*XR\*
- <sup>242</sup>. See above, n., \*XR\*
- <sup>243</sup>. On the expository syllogism see SL 3-1 c.16, OPh I, p.403/480f.
- <sup>244</sup>. A formal distinction can be posited "when there is *some circumlocution* that enables one of two contradictories to be verified of a thing of which the other is negated", as for example "paternity is *that thing which is* communicable" is true although "paternity *is not* communicable" is also true; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II p.374-5/408. See Boehner, "Medieval Crisis of Logic", p.157-167. \*SL II c.27; III-1 c.4-5\*
- <sup>245</sup>. "Some things are distinguished formally and yet there are not several formalities, just as there are not several realities... The Essence and the Relation are distinguished formally, but they do not bespeak several realities or several formalities"; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, p.368-9/402.
- <sup>246</sup>. A formal distinction can be posited only when there is one simple thing that is several things, SL 2 c.2.124ff, OPh I, p.253/330. Cf. S.L 3-1 c.16, OPh I, pp.403.13-17, 404.32-37/480f; Ord.1 Prol. q.7, OTh I, p.202.1-6/244. This is true only of God: "Just as it is singular in God that three things are one thing in number, and therefore that thing one in number is each of those three things and yet one of those three

things is not another, so it is singular and beyond all understanding that this [inference] does not follow: 'the Essence, one in number, is the Son, the Father is not the Son, therefore the Father is not the Essence'. And therefore that singular should not be posited except with the authority of sacred Scripture compels. And therefore such a consequence [i.e. inference] should never be denied in creatures, because no authority of sacred Scripture compels, since in creatures no one thing [singular subject] are [plural verb] several things and each of them"; Ord.1 d.2 q.6, OTh II p.175/208.

- <sup>247</sup>. Above, text at n.. \*XR\*
- $^{248}$ . "Thence I say universally that it is never verified of any things that they are distinguished formally *except on account of a real distinction*, when, that is, of one of them it is truly said that it is one thing and of the other is truly said that it is not that thing"; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.19/52. "Real distinction is twofold: one is a distinction of things, the other is a distinction by which one, say b, is not formally a, and it is said to be a real distinction because it is *ex natura rei*, but it is not real in the first way"; Ord.1 d.2 q.11, OTh II, p.370/404. Compare n. above. \*XR\*
- <sup>249</sup>. Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.17.16-18/50.
- <sup>250</sup>. Ord.1 d.26 q.1, OTh IV, p.142ff/166. The question here is how the divine Persons are constituted and distinguised. Ockham reports 4 opinions: (1) the Persons are distinguished through themselves; (2) through real relations; (3) firstly by absolute properties and quasi-secondarily by relations; (4) by absolute properties. He says that the common element in opinions (3) and (4), viz that the Persons are distinguised by absolutes, is more easily held, but opinion (2) must be held because of the authorities of the Saints (i.e. the teaching of the Church).
- <sup>251</sup>. See above, n.. \*XR\*
- <sup>252</sup>. "I say that taking liberty properly and strictly, according as it is distinguished against a natural active or productive principle, it is not to be conceded that one emanation is through the mode of intellect or of nature, and the other through the mode of will or freedom, because |§ this would be to say that one person was produced naturally and the other was not produced naturally but freely. But this is impossible, because properly speaking nothing is produced freely and not naturally

except what is produced contingently, and can be produced and not produced. But every person is necessarily and naturally produced, because the Father has to produce the Holy Spirit by nature, just as [he has to produce] the Son, and thus the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily, just as the Son. But speaking metaphorically and largely §|, it can in a way be conceded that one person is produced through the mode of nature or intellect, and the other through the mode of will or liberty -- and this understanding that the intellect and the will in one way, as they are used by the saints, connote the act of generating and the act of spiration, so that the intellect bespeaks the divine essence itself eliciting the act of generating and the will bespeaks the divine essence itself eliciting the act of spiration. And in this way it can be conceded that the Son is produced through the mode of intellect and the Holy Spirit through the mode of will"; Ord.1 d.2 q.1, OTh II, p.34/68. (The passage marked out by "§ ... §" is an addition Ockham made to his original text.) Cf. Ord.1 d.10 q.1, OTh III, p.326-30/348. See Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought*, pp.\*

- <sup>253</sup>. The creed of the Council of Chalcedon: "one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons…"; https://www.ccel.org/creeds/chalcedonian-creed.html.
- <sup>254</sup>. See the Tome of Leo, c.3, c.4, https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3604028.htm. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, SCG IV c.39 [2]. On the *communicatio idiomatum* see Thomas Aquinas, ST III q.16.
- <sup>255</sup>. "Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia"; in Boethius, Liber de Persona Christi et Duabus Naturis Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, c. 3, PL 64, 1343c. Eutyches was said to have maintained that in Christ there was one nature and one person, Nestorius two natures and two persons orthodoxy says two natures and one person (above n.) \*XR\*
  \*See https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03555a.htm\*
- <sup>256</sup>. Ockham's position resembles that of earlier theologians, especially Scotus. See Cross, pp.134-8.
- <sup>257</sup>. Rather, according to a variant, "not making a *per se* unity with another", Ord.

1 d.23 q.un, OTh IV, p.61.15/84; also Ord.1 d.26 q.3, OTh IV, p.187.?/?. Compare Rep. 3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26: "A person is a complete intellectual nature that is not sustained by another and is not destined (*nata*) to make a *per se* one with another as a part... By 'not making a *per se* unity with another' is excluded the divine Essence and the Relation which make *per se* one." Qdl.4 q.7 OTh IX, p.328/368 has "*incommunicabile per identitatem*", which excludes the divine Essence, which is communicable to the divine Persons through identity.

\*\*suppositum est illud quod est ens completum, non constituens aliquod ens per se unum, nec natum alteri inhaerere, nec ab aliquo alio sustentificatum. Ord.1 d.26 q.3, OTh IV, p.187\*

<sup>258</sup>. Ord. 1 d.23 q.un, OTh IV, p.61-3/84. Cf. Qdl.4 q.7, OTh IX, p.328/368; Rep. 3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26. In short, not a constituent part of a *per se* unity, not inhering, not sustained. For Thomas Aquinas's discussion of these terms see ST I q.29 a.1, a.2.

<sup>259</sup>. Ord. 1 d.23 g.un, OTh IV, p.62/86.

<sup>260</sup>. Ord. 3 q.1, OTh VI p.5/26.

<sup>261</sup>. See Adams, William Ockham, pp.979-999.

<sup>262</sup>. "Union adds something beyond the extremes united. This is proved: because it is impossible to pass from contradictory to contradictory without the destruction or acquisition of something positive; but the nature now united can be not united without the destruction or acquisition of anything absolute; therefore the union bespeaks something beyond the absolutes, because this cannot be evaded by negations and connotations, as it can be in other relations"; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.5/26. \*See Etzkorn on Hypostatic Union "However, Ockham does believe that some relations do require a reality over and above the things related. The examples he generally gives are the relations of substance to accident, matter to form, the divine persons to one another and to the divine essence, and the union of the Son of God to human nature." p.187. "The union... which theologians call the hypostatic union, is a relation. The relation in question holds between 1) the 2nd person of the Trinity together with his divine nature and 2) a human nature to which there corresponds no human person. Now, according to Ockham, the Son of God can, without any change of time or place and without destroying or creating anything

(other than a human nautre which is already required as one term of the relation) assume or not assume human nature. However, this union does not add anything absolute -- in Ockham's perspective: either substance or quality -- to the two terms of the relation, namelyh the Son of God and a human nature. Therefore, Ockham concludes that the union itself (the relation) is in truth something real over and above the teo terms takenas non-related. Only if this is the case can statements 'The Son of God suffered, died and was buried' be understood correctly and be true." p.188. Continues with edition and translation of Rep.3 q.1, three articles.\*

<sup>263</sup>. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.8/30.

<sup>264</sup>. "I say that that union is a *real respect* really different from the extremes. And it is based in human nature and not divine, because only human nature is imperfect and capable of it, and not the divine. It is not to be imagined that the union is some bond linking human nature with the divine or the converse. But it is that by which the extremes are formally and denominatively said to be united. Just as something is called white from whiteness, so something is said to be united to another by union"; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.9/30. "I say that this union cannot be demonstrated, but is held solely by faith. Yet for understanding this union we are able to be led by other unions, e.g. of matter and form, substance and accidents. For in the union of matter with form, matter and form remain distinct according to their entities just as before, and this notwithstanding the fact that because of the union of one to the other the matter is denominated by the properties of the form and vice versa. Thus in the present case, divine and human nature remain distinct after the union just as before, and they do not make one per se as matter and form do, but rather one quasi per accidens like substance and accident – though not thus **truly** per accidens because they do not be peak things of diverse genera – and notwithstanding such a distinction between the natures, nevertheless they communicate with one another their properties by predication in the concrete, as 'the son of God was incarnate, dead, suffered', and similarly 'a man created the stars'. Therefore just as the union of matter and form, substance and accident, is possible, so also the union in the present case"; ibid. pp.10-11/32. \*Etzkorn, "William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union", p.188. Also Adams, William Ockham, pp.267-76. \*Repeated below n..\* \*XR\*

<sup>265</sup>. A possible confusion here: "supposition" is a property of terms, "a suppositum" is a substance; a "person" is an intellectual substance. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, pp.4-5/26; Ord. 1 d.23 q.unica, OTh IV, pp.61-2/84. Cf. Qdl.4 q.7, OTh IX, p.328/368. On

account of the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, several other particulars must be stipulated, \*\*notably that to be person or supposit the substance must not be "sustained" by anything. See above, text following n.. \*XR\*

- <sup>266</sup>. "For human nature to be assumed in the unity of a divine person can be understood in two ways. In one way that human nature becomes one person with the person of Christ and *becomes* the person of Christ: and that understanding is false, because it is more repugnant to it to become the person of Christ than that it become an ass. In another way it can be understood in the sense that human nature is *sustained by* a divine person. That understanding is true, because that nature does not subsist in its own supposit but it is sustained by the Word in the way an accident is sustained by a subject."; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.9/30.
- <sup>267</sup>. See Duns Scotus quoted by Cross, "Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham", p.135 n.24.
- <sup>268</sup>. SL pars 1 c.7, OPh I, p.25/102 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.62)
- <sup>269</sup>. It then becomes difficult to see what the distinction is between substance and accident, as Adams points out, *William Ockham*, pp.994-5. She suggests that perhaps the difference is that whereas a substance can sustain another substance, an accident cannot sustain anything else.
- <sup>270</sup>. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.22/44.
- <sup>271</sup>. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.21/42.
- <sup>272</sup>. Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.33/54
- <sup>273</sup>. "What he once assumed he has never laid aside"; Rep.3 q.1, OTh VI, p.22/44
- <sup>274</sup>. The eucharist is also called "the sacrament of the altar", "the Lord's supper", "holy communion". I am indebted to Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, for guidance through this topic.

<sup>276</sup>. Ockham's statement of the doctrine: "Catholic doctors approved by the Roman church who have written about the sacrament of the Eucharist intend to assert this: That the body of Christ — that was received from the Virgin Mary, that suffered and was buried, and also arose and ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father, and in which the son of God will come to judge the living and the dead — is truly and really contained under the appearance of bread. And although under the appearance of bread it [i.e. Christ's body] is really hidden (for it is not seen by us by our physical eye), the faithful mentally believe and hold that it is concealed by the appearance of bread; into which [i.e. Christ's body] the substance of the bread is transubstantiated, converted or changed, so that the substance of the bread does not remain, but the accidents alone remain, subsisting by themselves without a subject. And when transubstantion of the bread occurs, not only is Christ's body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man, is contained truly and really under the whole host [i.e. the bread] and every part of it at once (though taking "conversion" and "transubstantiation" properly, the substance of the bread is not converted into the deity nor into the rational soul nor into any accident). This is my faith, because it is the Catholic faith. For whatever the Roman Church believes explicitly, this alone, and nothing else, explicitly or implicitly, I believe"; De Corp. Christi c.2, OTh X p.91/122; translated Birch, The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham, p.82.

<sup>277</sup>. "Transubstantiation is the succession of one substance to another substance, which [i.e. the latter] ceases to exist simply in itself, under certain accidents proper to the preceding substance. The possibility of this is clear, because it is not repugnant to divine power to destroy a substance in itself and conserve its accidents, and that another substance immediately coexist with those accidents (not informing it)." Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.136-7/166. Though Ockham uses the terms "transubstantiation" and "conversion", in his theory there is no conversion or changing one thing into another but rather a substitution. See Beuscher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.45-51.

<sup>278</sup>. "The first terminus of transubstantiation is what the converter or transubstantiator primarily intends... And that is said to be the terminus *per accidens* that is intended by that agent secondarily, namely because he [the transubstantiator] cannot transubstantiate without the others (especially when they are united), or

because he does not wish to do so. Thus it is said that Christ's body – composed of matter and form preceding the intellective soul, whatever that may be (assuming several forms in a man, as we must because of the article [a reference to Kilwardby's condemnation] – is the first terminus of this transubstantiation. Because God, who is the principal agent in that conversion, intends primarily to convert the bread into Christ's body, so that if his soul were separate, as it was in the three days [i.e. between the crucifixion and the resurrection], then the conversion would be into Christ's body only. The intellective soul is a terminus accidentally, because God secondarily intends to convert the bread into the soul so far as it is united to the body"; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.142/172. See De Corp. Christi c.5, OTh X p.97/128, translated Birch pp.89-91 (where the distinction is made not in terms of primary and secondary objectives, but in terms of strict and broad senses of "transubstantiation").

- <sup>279</sup>. "Not only is Christ's body, which is one part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, but also the whole integral Christ, perfect God and true man"; above, n.. \*XR\*
- <sup>280</sup>. Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.65/94. Cf. Qdl.1 q.4, OTh IX, p.25/64; Qdl.4 q.21, OTh IX, p.400-1/440. Sometimes for "circumscriptively" Ockham puts "quantitatively", e.g. below at note . \*XR\*
- $^{281}$ . Cf. the doctrine that the intellective soul is present to the whole body and to each of its parts, above note . \*XR\*
- <sup>282</sup>. "There is no greater difficulty that two parts of the body exist together than that two bodies exist together; but one can happen by the power of God, therefore the other;" Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.79/108. p.79. "We hold by faith that bodies (the same in species or different) exist together in the same place: this is clear when Christ went in to the disciples with the doors closed [i.e. his body transiently occupied the same place as the wood of the doors], when he was born with the Virgin's womb closed, when he ascended into heaven without any division of the celestial body. Therefore in the same way it is not a contradiction that two parts of the same body exist in the same place; and, by the same argument, all parts of Christ's body can without contradiction be in the same place. From these two points I argue the point intended, because if it is possible that all parts of Christ's body are in the same place by divine power (just as it is possible for two bodies to be together in the same place), and if it is possible that every part of the body of Christ is in different places according to its whole self (just as the soul and an angel are together and at the same

time wholly in diverse places), it follows that it is possible for the whole body of Christ to coexist with the whole place of the host and the whole in each part; which is the point mainly intended, namely how Christ's body is definitively in place under the consecrated host"; \*\*Qdl.4 q.31, OTh IX, p.453/492. Cf. De Corp Christi c.7, OTh X, p.103-5/134, translated Birch pp.95-8.

<sup>283</sup>. "Though Christ's body is of itself limited, yet by God's power it can be unlimited to many places, as it can be on many altars"; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.104/134.

## <sup>284</sup>. [\*Cf. Thomas Aquinas ST 3 q.75 a.2]

"A body can be in a place where it was not before without being moved to that place or the place to it, because this can happen suddenly without any motion (though not without any change of that body [see above, note ]). \*XR\* For example: the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist is now present where previously it was not, and yet suddenly and in the same way it can be in different places circumscriptively, but without motion. And when you say 'if it is moved to another place, it leaves the first', I say that just as according to the faith Christ's body is now present where it was not present, and thus is changed, yet does not leave its place in heaven, so it can come to be circumscriptively where before it was not and yet not leave the first place"; Rep.4 q.6, OTh VII, p.102/132. Also: "Since therefore Christ's body passes from not being here to being here, because of which this is a true change, it follows that Christ's body is truly changed. Therefore I say that Christ's body is changed locally, because just as through its substance it is immediately here where it previously was not, not through the substance of the bread, so immediately it is changed. But that it is immediately in place, was proved before. Therefore I say that here there is a double mutation: one acquisitive, the other deprivative. The acquisitive is in Christ's body, because it receives existence here where previously it did not have it, but the deprivative is of the substance of the bread itself, which does not remain where it was previously"; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, p.145-6/174. "I say that extending 'to be changed locally' to mean existing somewhere really after being elsewhere and not there... so the body of Christ is changed locally when it begins to exist sacramentally under the host, and this mutation is acquisitive of a new place not had before but is not deprivative of a place had before. But taking 'to be changed locally' strictly, as the Philosopher speaks, for acquisition of one place and deprivation of another, thus I say that Christ's body is not locally changed by beginning to exist sacramentally under the host. I prove this, because if it were so, then it would cease to exist in heaven when it begins to exist on the altar, which is

heretical"; Qdl.6 q.3, OTh IX, p.595/634.

<sup>285</sup>. "The third opinion would be very reasonable if there were not a determination of the Church to the contrary, because that opinion saves and avoids all difficulties that follow from the separation of accidents from a subject, nor is its opposite found in the canon of the Bible. Nor does it include any contradiction for the body of Christ to coexist with the substance of the bread more than with its accidents; nor is it repugnant to reason, first because quantity is repugnant with quantity as much as substance with substance, but two quantities can exist together in the same place, as is clear of two bodies existing in the same place, second because Christ's substance can be in the same place with the quality of the host, therefore by the same argument with its substance. To the argument at the beginning, I say that sometimes more miracles are to be posited concerning something where it could be done by fewer, and this pleases God. And this is certain to the church through some revelation, I suppose"; Qdl.4 q.30, OTh IX, p.450/490. Cf. De Corp. Christi c.6, OTh X p99/130, translated Birch pp.92-4.

<sup>286</sup>. "But because the determination of the Church is to the contrary (as is clear Extra, *De Summa Trinitate et fide catholica* and *De celebratione missarum*), and commonly all the doctors hold the opposite, therefore I hold that not the substance of the bread but the species remains there, and the body of Christ coexists with it. And that this is possible is clear, because this transubstantiation includes only that the species remain there really and the substance does not remain in itself really, and that the body of Christ is there really, not quantitatively [i.e. not circumscriptively]. But each of these [statements] is possible, therefore et cetera"; Rep.4 q.8, OTh VII, pp.139-40/168.

<sup>287</sup>. De Corp. Christi c.9, OTh X p.107-8/138, translated Birch p.102.

<sup>288</sup>. ST 3.77.2; In Sent IV d.11 q.1 a.1 qu.3 sol.1 https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4073.htm.

<sup>289</sup>. See above, note . \*XR\*

<sup>290</sup>. "Concerning the sacrament of the altar they say [and Ockham says] that after the consecration of Christ's body one quantity, which preceded, was the same really with the substance of the bread, and that [quantity] does not remain; but, besides

that, there remains a quantity which is the same as the quality, but in that quantity no quality exists subjectively [i.e. as in a subject], but all accidents remaining after consecration remain, together with Christ's body, without any subject, because they subsist per se"; SL 1 c.44, OPh I, p.137-8/214 (translated *Theory of Terms*, p.145-6); Rep.4 q.9, OTh VII, p.153-65/183ff \*See Adams p.194 n.56. De corp. Christi c.13, OTh X p.115/146, translated Birch p.110-1. \*More extensive reference to Adams?\*

<sup>291</sup>. "It cannot be proved by argument that it is not the case that every action and passion terminating at an absolute form a body can have existing in a place circumscriptively and quantitatively it can also have existing in a place definitively and not quantitatively. I prove this, because no less can a principle of action have an action wholly present to some patient, for example a warm-able, than through one part present to one and through another part present to another. But Christ's body in the host is wholly present to the whole host and to every part. Therefore the warmth of Christ's body can act upon the host and make it warm. And by the same argument it can be proved that Christ's body can be seen in the host by the bodily eye, because it is sufficiently active both on the medium and on the eye, because wholly present to every part of the eye and the medium"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.118/148. "But the experience we now in fact have of Christ's body is not conclusive [i.e. does not prove that Christ's body could not be seen], because God suspends the action of those qualities, not co-acting with them so that they act; and if he did co-act, they would be seen"; ibid., p.119. "I say that it is not from the nature of things repugnant to the intellect of the wayfarer to see Christ's body in the host, if it were permitted, for example if God co-acted with it, but that does not in fact happen because it is not permitted"; ibid. p.135/164.

<sup>292</sup>. "I say that Christ in the sacrament of the altar can naturally and intuitively understand everything else as if he were there quantitatively [= circumscriptively]. He can also be understood and seen naturally and intuitively, not only by the angelic intellect or the separated soul but also by the bodily eye (unless there were some special impediment, as explained above [note]). \*XR\* And this is true not only in respect of substantial things but also of accidental. These points are clear, because positing a sufficient active [principle] and a patient disposed and approximate, action follows — or this is not to be denied unless there appear some evident argument to the contrary, or certain experience, or certain authority, none of which appear in the present case, as was said above. This is confirmed, because it is not repugnant to the intellect to be affected by something that does *not* have a quantitative mode, nor by something that *does* have a quantitative mode: for intellect

to understand this or that, therefore, it is irrelevant whether it has a quantitative mode or not. For it would be remarkable if Christ existing in the host did not know where he was. Therefore I hold that every action and passion that he can have when he exists circumscriptively in place, he can have in the Eucharist (if nothing else impedes, such as the divine will, as explained above)"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.124-5/154.

<sup>293</sup>. "I say that Christ's body can be moved really and locally in the sacrament, because it is wherever the host is"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.120/150. Christ in heaven moves "organically" [i.e. by means of organs, e.g. legs] but in the eucharist "non organically": "To move organically is to move first one part and afterwards, by means of the part moved, to move another part distant in place and situation from the part first moved, so that to move organically necessarily requires these two: (1), that one part be moved locally first and, after that, by means of the first part, the second; (2) that between the parts of the body moved there be local distance"; Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.370/410.

<sup>294</sup>. Qdl.4 q.14, OTh IX p.371/410

<sup>295</sup>. "I say that Christ's intellective soul under the host can move Christ's body nonorganically. For it cannot move organically in the sacrament, because it cannot first move one part and afterwards another part by means of the first, because between the parts of [Christ's] body, as it is there, there is no local distance, because the whole is in the whole and the whole is in every part, and therefore it cannot move one part before another because each part is together with the other. But nonorganically it [Christ's intellective soul] can move [Christ's body] locally, because it can will. And I believe that it wills in fact that his body be moved with the motion of the host, and this on account of the conformity of his will to the divine will willing that host be moved in that way. And willing thus, if the host is moved, it [i.e. Christ's intellective soul] then moves his body non-organically, because [it moves] equally firstly the whole and every one of its parts, because the whole [i.e. of Christ's body] is with the whole and with every part, and there is no distance between parts, which is necessarily required for moving organically. And from this it is clear that when the host is moved, Christ's intellective soul by means of his will moves Christ's body under the host non-organically, as a partial cause concurrent with the divine will contingently causing and contingently disposing the body to be moved with the motion of the host. And this whole is because of the conformity of the human will in Christ to the divine will"; Rep.4 q.7, OTh VII p.123-4/152. Cf.

Qdl.4 q.15, OTh IX p.371ff/410.

- <sup>296</sup>. See above, note . \*XR\*
- <sup>297</sup>. For a discussion of the articles relating to the Eucharist drawn up against Ockham in the Avignon process, see Buescher, *The Eucharistic Teaching of William of Ockham*, pp.145-150.
- <sup>298</sup>. Ord.1 d.30 q.1 discusses this carefully-formulated question: "Whether aside from any authority of faith and of any philosophers it could more easily be denied than held that every relation is something real in some way distinguished from every absolute and absolutes?", OTh IV, pp.281-2/304. "More easily denied than held" does not imply "not possible to hold". Ockham does not say that philosophical arguments show that there cannot possibly be relative entities; only that there is a philosophical answer to every philosophical argument to prove that *all* relations are things. [\*Is this right? Is his position stronger than that?] This leaves room for arguments to prove that some relations are things.
- <sup>299</sup>. See above, n.. \*XR\*
- 300. See above, notes, \*XR\*. \*XR\*
- <sup>301</sup>. Ord.1 d.30 q.4, OTh IV, p.366-74/390. See \*Etzkorn, "William of Ockham and the Meaning of the Hypostatic Union", p.188. Also Adams, *William Ockham*, pp.267-76. As Adams remarks (pp.274-5), "On examination, Ockham's concessions to the thing-theory of real relation are quite substantial".
- <sup>302</sup>. Adams, William Ockham, pp.274-5.
- <sup>303</sup>. See King, "William of Ockham: Summa logicae"; Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham; Boehner, Medieval Logic; Novaes and Read, Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic.