# WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS

## 1 Dial. 6.79-90
Text by George Knysh,
translation by John Kilcullen,
as at March, 2025

Capitulum 79 | Chapter 79
Discipulus: Dic si papa hereticus et alii heretici alia pena plectuntur secundum ius divinum vel ius naturale vel etiam ius humanum. | Student: Tell me whether a heretic pope and other heretics are punished with any other punishment according to divine law or natural law or (also) human law.
Magister: Sunt nonnulli dicentes quod papa hereticus et generaliter omnes heretici hac pena plectuntur ipso iure quod sunt ab omni testimonio repellendi, nec eis in quocunque negotio est credendum. | Master: There are some who say that the heretic pope, and generally all heretics, are punished ipso iure [by the law itself, without needing judgment in a court] with the punishment that they are to be rejected from all [giving of] testimony, and they are not to be believed in any matter whatsoever.
Discipulus: Moliunturne hanc assertionem aliquibus rationibus vel auctoritatibus communire. | Student: Do they try to support this assertion with any arguments or authorities?
Magister: Hanc assertionem pluribus rationibus in scripturis fundatis auctenticis, et auctoritatibus multis, probare nituntur. Est autem prima ratio talis. Nullus criminosus est ad testimonium admittendus, nec ei in quocunque negotio est credendum. Omnes heretici sunt criminosi. Ergo nullus hereticus est ad testimonium admittendus, sed est ab omni testimonio repellendus, et ei in nullo negotio est credendum. | Master: They try to prove this assertion with many arguments based on authoritative writings and many authorities. The first argument is this. No criminal must be admitted to testify, nor is he to be believed in any matter whatsoever. All heretics are criminal. Therefore no heretic must be admitted to testify, but he must be rejected from all testimony, and he is not to be believed in any matter whatsoever.
Discipulus: Sola maior istius rationis probatione indigere videtur, quam sepe in scripturis legi auctenticis, nec tamen unde habeat firmitatem inveni, utrum scilicet ex iure divino vel naturali aut solummodo ex constitutione humana, quod tamen scire a multis temporibus affectavi. Et ideo circa istam maiorem primo eam auctoritatibus munire nitaris, secundo an ex sola constitutione humana dependeat, vel ex iure divino aut naturali capiat fulcimentum, velis disserere. Sic enim fortassis ad veritatem perveniam. | Student: Only the major of this argument seems to need proof, which I have often read in authoritative writings, and yet I have not found its basis, namely whether it is based on divine or natural law or solely on human legislation; this I have long desired to know. And therefore concerning this major, first try to defend it with authorities, and secondly discuss whether it depends on human constitution alone, or whether it receives support from divine or natural law. For in this way perhaps I will arrive at the truth.
Magister: Fateor quod, quia multos novi scelestes igne vel perpetuo carcere notorie dignos, qui de personis innocentibus gravia confinxerunt et mendaciter imposuerunt ex odio vel rancore, istam materiam libenter secundum hominum opiniones discutiam. Et quid ego sentiam toti mundo alias explicabo. De hac enim materia librum intendo facere specialem. | Master: I admit that, because I know many criminals notoriously worthy of fire or perpetual imprisonment, who have fabricated grave matters against innocent persons and falsely imposed them out of hatred or rancor, I will gladly discuss this matter according to human opinions. And what I think I will explain to the whole world elsewhere. For I intend to write a special book on this matter.
Discipulus: Et ego huiusmodi criminatores et detractores agnovi, de quibus in tertia parte huius operis, scilicet tractatu de gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam, in speciali plures questiones tibi proponam, quia impositores et relatores falsorum criminum in tantum odio habeo quod michi videtur eos esse dignos pena maiori quam illi qui essent impositis criminibus irretiti. Nunc vero circa maiorem prescriptam, sicut dixi, procede. | Student: And I have recognized such accusers and detractors, about whom in the third part of this Dialogus, namely the treatise [not extant] on the deeds of those disputing the orthodox faith, I will propose to you several questions in particular, because I have such hatred for the accusers and narrators of false accusations that it seems to me that they are worthy of a greater punishment than those who would be ensnared by the accusations they have imposed. But now, as I said, proceed concerning the aforesaid major premise.
All criminals are to be excluded from giving testimony
Magister: Quod omnes criminosi sint a testimonio repellendi multis auctoritatibus videtur posse probari. Ait enim Damasus papa, ut habetur 2 q. c. Testes: "Testes absque ulla infamia aut suspicione, vel manifesta macula, et vere fidei plenitudine instructi esse debent." | Master: That all criminals are to be excluded from giving testimony seems to be proved by many authorities. For pope Damasus says, as found in 2 q. c. Testes: "Witnesses should be free from any infamy or suspicion, or manifest stain, and must be truly instructed in the fullness of faith".
Item, Celestinus papa tertius, ut legitur Extra, De exceptionibus, c. 1, ait: "Cum, sicut canonica instituta declarant, testes absque ulla infamia, vel suspicione vel manifesta macula in ferendo testimonium requirantur." | Likewise, pope Celestine III, as read in Extra, De Exceptionibus, c. 1, says: "When, as canonical laws declare, witnesses without any infamy, suspicion, or manifest stain are required in giving testimony."
Item, Pontianus papa, ut habetur 3 q. 5 c. Suspectos, ait: "Suspectos, aut inimicos, aut facile litigantes, et eos, qui non sunt bone conversationis, aut quorum vita est accusabilis, et qui rectam non tenent et docent fidem, accusatores esse et testes antecessores nostri apostoli prohibuerunt et nos eorum auctoritate submovemus, atque temporibus futuris excludimus." | Likewise, pope Pontian, as found in 3 q. 5 c. Suspectos, says: "Our apostles have forbidden suspects, or enemies, or those who are readily quarrelsome, and those who are not of good conduct, or whose life is blameworthy, and who do not hold and teach the right faith, to be accusers and witnesses, and we, by their authority, remove them, and exclude them in future times."
Ex quibus patet aperte quod criminosi sunt a testimonio repellendi. | From these texts it is clear that criminals are to be excluded from giving testimony.
Discipulus: Scio quod sepe invenitur in iure quod criminosi sunt a testimonio repellendi, et quod etiam sunt ab accusatione penitus submovendi. Ad quod tamen probandum aliquas auctoritates adducas, et alia signa ubi debeant reperiri. | Student: I know that it is often found in law that criminals are to be excluded from testimony, and that they are also to be completely removed from accusation. However, to prove this, adduce some authorities and other *[signa] evidence where they should be found.
Magister: Quod criminosi sint ab accusatione penitus repellendi testatur Iulius papa qui, ut legitur 3 q. 5 c. Similiter, ait: "Similiter in prefixa sinodo est decretum, ne suspecti, aut infames, aut criminosi, aut gratiosi, aut calumpniatores, vel affines, aut scelerati, aut facile litigantes, suscipiantur accusatores, sed tales, qui careant omni vitio aut suspicione." | Master: That criminals are to be completely excluded from accusation is attested by pope Julius. As we read in 3 q. 5 c. Similiter, he says: "Likewise in the preceding synod it was decreed that suspects, or infamous, or criminals, or [*gratiosi] favoured, or calumniators, or relatives, or wicked people, or those who are easy to quarrel with, should not be accepted as accusers, but such as are free from all vice or suspicion."
Item, Eusebius papa, ut habetur eisdem causa et questione, c. Constituimus, ait: "Constituimus cum omnibus, qui nobiscum sunt episcopis, ut homicide, malefici, fures, sacrilegi, raptores, adulteri, incesi, venefici, suspecti, criminosi, domestici, periuri, et qui raptum fecerunt, vel qui falsum testimonium dixerunt, seu qui ad sortilegos divinosque concurrerint, similesque eorum, nullatenus ad accusationem vel ad testimonium sint admittendi, quia infames sunt et iuste repellendi, quia funesta est eorum vox." Ex quibus patet expresse quod criminosi tam ab accusatione quam a testimonio sunt penitus repellendi. | Likewise, pope Eusebius, as found in the same cause and question, c. Constituimus, says: " We have established, with all those who are bishops with us, that murderers, evildoers, thieves, sacrilegious, rapists, adulterers, incendiaries, poisoners, suspects, criminals, domestics, perjurers, and those who have committed rape, or who have given false testimony, or who have consorted with sorcerers and *diviners, and the like, are in no way to be admitted to accusation or to testimony, because they are infamous and should justly be rejected, because their voice is destructive." From this it is expressly clear that criminals are to be completely rejected both from accusation and from testimony.
Quod etiam asseritur manifeste 3 q. 4 c. Nulli, et c. Si quis, et c. Consanguineorum, et 3 q. 5 c. Canonica, et 6 q. 1 c. Omnes, et c. Quiescite, et Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Cum in tua, et 2 q. c. Prohibentur, et Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum oporteat, in textu et glossa, et Extra, De testibus, c. Veniens. | This is also clearly asserted in 3 q. 4 c. Nulli, and c. Si quis, and c. Consanguineorum, and 3 q. 5 c. Canonica, and 6 q. 1 c. Omnes, and c. Quiescite, and Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Cum in tua, and 2 q. c. Prohibentur, and Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum oporteat, in text and gloss, and Extra, De testibus, c. Veniens.
Quod etiam criminosi non sint in testimonium admittendi tali ratione probatur. Minus sunt admittendi criminosi convicti quam quibus crimina opponuntur. Sed illi quibus crimina opponuntur, sive in modum exceptionis sive in modum accusationis, non sunt ad testimonium admittendi (Extra, De testibus, c. Super eo, et c. Testimonium, et c. ultimo, et Extra, De exceptionibus, c. Denique). Ergo multo magis notorie criminosi et convicti vel confessi de crimine non sunt in testimonium admittendi. | That also criminals must not be admitted as witnesses is proved by the following argument. Criminals who have been convicted are less to be admitted than those against whom crimes are objected. But those against whom crimes are objected, whether in the manner of exception or in the manner of accusation *[while the case is pending], must not be admitted as witnesses (Extra, De testibus, c. Super eo, and c. Testimonium, and c. ult. [*non debet quis in criminibus (nisi forsan in exceptis) ad testificantum admitti, pendente accusatione de crimine contra ipsum: cum etiam accusati ab accusatione repellantur], and Extra, De exceptionibus, c. Denique)." Therefore, much more, notorious criminals and those who have been convicted or have confessed to a crime must not be admitted as witnesses.
Criminals should not be believed in any matter
Discipulus: Iste allegationes pro hac assertione sufficiant. Ideo ad secundum te converte, et, unde accipitur quod criminosis in nullo negotio fides debeat adhiberi, secundum literatorum sententias manifesta. | Student: These arguments are sufficient for this assertion [i.e. that no criminal must be admitted to testify]. Therefore turn to the second, and explain, according to the clear opinions of the learned, on what basis is it accepted that in no business should faith be given to criminals.
Magister: Circa hoc contingit diversimode opinari. Est enim una opinio quod non est ex constitutione humana, sed ex recta ratione et iure divino, quod nulli criminoso est credendum, quia de nullo criminoso est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri vel etiam periurare. Illi autem in preiudicium alterius nullatenus est credendum de quo non est presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri. Ergo nulli criminoso in quocunque negotio, precipue in alterius preiudicium, est credendum. | Master: There are different opinions about this. For there is one opinion, that it is not from human enactment, but from right reason and divine law, that no criminal must be believed, because it is firmly presumed that no criminal is truthful and that he does not wish to lie or even perjure. But no one is by any means to be believed to the prejudice of another, of whom it is not presumed that he is truthful and that he does not wish to lie. Therefore no criminal must be believed in any matter whatsoever, especially to the prejudice of another.
Discipulus: Ista opinio duo probare deberet. Quorum primum est quod de nullo criminoso est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri vel etiam periurare. Secundum est quod illi non est credendum de quo non est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri. | Student: This opinion should prove two things: [1] first that it must be firmly presumed that no criminal is truthful and does not want to lie or even perjure; [2] second that a person is not to be believed of whom it is not firmly presumed that he is truthful and does not want to lie.
Why it must be presumed that no criminal is truthful Kinds of virtue
Magister: Primum declaratur sic. Ille de quo constat quod caret aliqua vera virtute, non est presumendum quod careat vitio contrario, saltem secundum preparationem cordis, licet constare possit quod careat contrario vitio quantum ad opus exterius. Multi enim sunt de quibus constat quod non sunt vere iusti, quia constat quod exercent opera iusta ex timore vel cupiditate, de quibus tamen per consequens constat quod non sunt iniusti quantum ad opus exterius, quia nullum faciunt opus iniustum, sed non constat quod non sint iniusti secundum preparationem cordist. Criminosus autem caret illa veritate seu veracitate que est vera virtus. Ergo de criminoso est nullatenus presumendum quod non sit falsus et mendax et quod nolit mentiri. | Master: The first is explained thus. If it is established that someone lacks some true virtue, it must not be presumed that he lacks the opposite vice, at least according to the preparation of the heart, though it may be a fact that he lacks the opposite vice as regards external work. (For there are many of whom it is established that they are not truly just, because it is established that they perform just works out of fear or greed; it is, consequently, established of them that they are not unjust as regards external work, because they do no unjust work; but it is not established that they are not unjust according to the preparation of the heart.) But the criminal lacks the truth or veracity that is true virtue. Therefore it must in no way be presumed of the criminal that he is not false and a liar and that he does not want to lie.
Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur michi mirabilis. Sequitur enim ex ipsa quod nunquam de aliquo pagano vel infideli fuerit presumendum quod non fuerit falsus neque mendax et quod noluerit periurare, quia de quolibet pagano et infideli constat quod non vult veram virtutem que est veritas seu veracitas, quia nulla est vera virtus sine sana fide, sicut nec iustitia est sine sana fide, teste Augustino qui, ut habetur 24 q. 1 c. Ubi, ait: "Ubi sana fides non est, non potest esse iustitia." Ergo consimiliter ubi sana fides non est veritas seu veracitas esse non potest. Constat autem quod pagani veram fidem minime habuerunt, ergo de nullo eorum presumendum fuit quod non esset falsus neque mendax. Quare nullus eorum fuit unquam ad testimonium admittendus, quod constat esse falsum. | Student: To me this argument seems surprising. For it follows from it that it was never to be presumed of any pagan or unbeliever that he was not false or a liar and that he did not wish to perjure himself, because it is clear of any pagan or unbeliever that he does not wish for true virtue, which is truth or veracity, because there is no true virtue without sound faith, just as there is no justice without sound faith, as Augustine testifies. In 24 q. 1 c. Ubi he says: "Where sound faith does not exist, there cannot be justice." Therefore, similarly, where sound faith does not exist there is no truth or veracity. But it is a fact that the pagans did not have true faith at all, therefore it was not to be presumed of any of them that he was not false or a liar. Therefore none of them was ever to be admitted to testify, which is certainly false.
Magister: Ad istam instantiam respondetur distinguendo de vera virtute. Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod bonum actum exteriorem contingit tripliciter exercere. Sicut dicere veritatem, recte iudicare, pascere pauperem, et actus bonos alios exercere contingit vel propter Deum, vel quia dictantur a ratione recta, vel quia neque propter hoc quod Deo placent neque quia dictantur a ratione recta, sed propter aliquod bonum utile aut delectabile consequendum vel propter aliquod malum aut periculum evitandum. | Master: This objection is answered by making a distinction in true virtue. To make this clear, it is said that it must be known that a good external act can be performed in three ways. Thus speaking the truth, judging correctly, feeding the poor, and performing other good acts can be performed either [a] for the sake of God, or [b] because they are dictated by right reason, or neither because they please God nor because they are dictated by right reason but [c] because some useful or delightful good must be obtained or some evil or danger must be avoided.
Actibus bonis primo modo elicitis correspondent virtutes perfecte. Qui enim ex habitu veritatem loquitur propter Deum habet veritatem seu veracitatem que est virtus perfecta, quam habent soli fideles, quia illi soli propter Deum verum ex caritate veritatem loquuntur. Et ista virtus nullum vitium secum compatitur, quia habens talem virtutem secundum preparationem cordis habet omnes virtutes et actus earum et omni vitio caret, quemadmodum habens caritatem secundum preparationem cordis habet omnes virtutes et omni vitio caret. | Perfect virtues correspond to good acts elicited in [a] the first way. For a person who habitually speaks the truth for the sake of God has the truth or veracity that is a perfect virtue, This only the faithful have, because they alone speak the truth out of charity for the true God. And this virtue is incompatible with any vice, because anyone who has such a virtue has, according to the preparation of the heart, all the virtues and their acts and is free from all vice, just as he who has charity has, according to the preparation of the heart, all the virtues and is free from all vice.
Actibus bonis secundo modo elicitis correspondent virtutes vere sed imperfecte respectu primarum virtutum. Qui enim ex habitu loquitur veritatem propter hoc quod ratio recta dictat veritatem esse dicendam, licet de Deo non cogitet, habet veritatem seu veracitatem que est vera virtus, sed imperfectam. Que ideo est vera virtus quia habens taliter veritatem secundum preparationem cordis habet omnes virtutes morales et omni vitio caret. Et ideo, quia talis veritas omne vitium excludit, potest vera virtus vocari, sed est imperfecta sicut actus in tali dicente est imperfectus. Velle enim dicere veritatem propter Deum est multo perfectior actus quam tantummodo velle dicere quia recta ratio dictat veritatem esse dicendam, quemadmodum Deus est perfectior quam ratio recta. Et ideo ista veracitas est imperfectior alia. Virtutes autem isto modo dicte fuerunt, secundum aliquos, in philosophis multis et paganis quampluribus, quia plures eorum ideo fecerunt actus bonos ex genere quia secundum rationem rectam vivere voluerunt. | True but (in comparison with the former) imperfect virtues correspond to good acts elicited in [b] the second way. For a person who habitually speaks the truth because right reason dictates that the truth should be spoken, though he does not think about God, has a truth or veracity that is a true virtue, but an imperfect one. It is a true virtue because if he has truth in this way he has, according to the preparation of the heart, all the moral virtues and is free from all vice. And therefore, because such truth excludes all vice, it can be called a true virtue, but it is imperfect, just as the act in such a speaker is imperfect. For wanting to speak the truth for the sake of God is a much more perfect act than merely wanting to speak because right reason dictates that the truth should be spoken, just as God is more perfect than right reason. And therefore this veracity is more imperfect than the other. Now virtues existed in this way, according to some, in many philosophers and many pagans, because many of them therefore did acts good according to their kind because they wanted to live according to right reason.
Actibus autem bonis exterioribus tertio modo elicitis non correspondent vere virtutes neque perfecte neque imperfecte, quia nec virtutes generantur ex eis, nec ipsi ex virtutibus generantur. Qui enim loquitur veritatem vel ut honoretur vel ut ditetur vel ut infamiam aut aliquod malum evitet (quemadmodum ambitiosi, hypocrite, avari et alii multis criminibus involuti veritatem dicunt et actus bonos alios operantur), non habent veritatem que est virtus vera neque perfectam neque imperfectam. Tales enim non sunt virtuosi sed sunt ambitiosi, timidi, vel avari. Omnia namque opera sua faciunt vel ut videantur ab hominibus et honorentur, laudentur et exaltentur ab eis, vel ut acquirant pecunias, aut ut infamiam et confusionem temporalem evadant. | But true virtues, either perfect or imperfect, do not correspond to good external acts elicited in [c] the third way, because virtues are not generated from them, and they are not generated from virtues. For he who speaks the truth either to be honored or to become rich or to avoid infamy or some evil (as the ambitious, hypocritical, greedy and others involved in many crimes speak the truth and perform other good deeds), does not have a truth which is true virtue, perfect or imperfect. For such people are not virtuous but are ambitious, timid or greedy. They do all their works either to be seen by men and to be honored, praised and exalted by them, or to acquire money, or to escape infamy and temporal trouble.
Discipulus: Antequam ista ad propositum applicentur, ad unam interrogationem meam respondeas: an scilicet sic dicentes teneant virtutes perfectas et imperfectas esse distinctas specie vel solo numero propter maiorem et minorem gradum eiusdem perfectionis secundum speciem. | Student: Before these are applied to the subject, answer one of my questions: namely, do those who speak thus hold that perfect and imperfect virtues are distinct in species or only in number because of the greater and lesser degree of the same perfection according to species?
Magister: Circa istam interrogationem sunt opiniones contrarie, quibusdam asserentibus quod non distinguuntur specie, aliis opinantibus quod specie distinguuntur, quemadmodum actus voluntatis quo elicitur vel imperatur bonus actus exterior propter Deum distinguitur specie ab actu voluntatis quo elicitur vel imperatur actus bonus exterior quia a recta ratione dictatur. Illi enim ponunt omnes veras virtutes esse in voluntate, et quod quibuslibet distinctis actibus bonis voluntatis distincti habitus correspondent. | Master: Regarding this question there are contrary opinions, some asserting that they are not distinguished in species, others believing that they are distinguished in species, just as the act of the will by which a good external act is elicited or commanded for the sake of God is distinguished in species from the act of the will by which a good external act is elicited or commanded because it is dictated by right reason. For they hold that all true virtues are in the will, and that distinct habits of the will correspond to any distinct good acts.
Discipulus: Opiniones predictas intelligo. Quarum discussionem curiosis reputo relinquendam, quia parum utilitatis habent. In hoc autem opere utilia tantum reputo pertractanda. Ideo dic quomodo per illa que predicta sunt de virtute perfecta et imperfecta ad factam instantiam respondetur. | Student: I understand the aforesaid opinions. I consider the discussion of them should be left to the curious, because they are of little use, but in this work I consider that only useful matters should be treated. Therefore tell me how by the foregoing about perfect and imperfect virtue answer is made to the objection raised.
Magister: Respondetur quod non solum qui habet virtutem perfectam que sine fide et caritate minime reperitur, sed etiam qui habet quamcumque virtutem veram moralem, licet imperfectam respectu virtutis que est in fidem et caritatem habentibus, habet secundum preparationem cordis omnes virtutes morales et omni morali vitio caret. Et ideo talis virtuosus secundum preparationem cordis est verax nec est falsus neque mendax. Tales autem virtutes morales, ut quidam putant, in multis fuere paganis. Multi enim eorum secundum rationem rectam vivere nitebantur, et vixerunt. Quare veraces fuerunt, et ideo in testimonium admittendi fuerunt. Quia igitur quilibet, etiam paganus, presumendum est virtuosus virtute morali imperfecta, nisi constet contrarium, pagani qui non fuerunt aliquo morali crimine involuti ad testimonium admittendi fuerunt. | Master: The answer made is that not only the person who has perfect virtue, which is not found without faith and charity, but also a person who has any true moral virtue, although imperfect in comparison with the virtue that is in those who have faith and charity, has according to the preparation of the heart all the moral virtues and is free from every moral vice. And therefore such a virtuous person is, according to the preparation of the heart, truthful and not false or a liar. But such moral virtues, as some think, were in many pagans. For many of them strove to live according to right reason, and did so live. Therefore they were truthful, and therefore they were to be admitted as witnesses. Since therefore anyone, even a pagan, must be presumed virtuous with imperfect moral virtue, unless the contrary is proved, pagans who were not involved in some moral crime were to be admitted as witnesses.
Cum autem dicit Augustinus ubi sana fides non est, non potest esse iustitia , ipse loquitur de iustitia perfecta cui correspondent actus iusti ex caritate Dei eliciti. Talis enim iustitia in paganis et in quibuscunque carentibus sana fide non fuit. Alia tamen iustitia, que vocatur iustitia politica vel civilis, fuit in pluribus. Multi enim eorum multa fecerunt non propter aliquod lucrum vel commodum aut honorem, vel propter aliquod exterius malum vel periculum evitandum, sed quia rectam rationem sequi volebant. | But when Augustine says Where sound faith is not, there can be no justice, he is speaking of perfect justice, to which correspond just acts elicited from the love of God. For such justice did not exist in pagans and in anyone who lacked sound faith. Another justice, however, which is called political or civil justice, existed in many. For many of them did many things not for the sake of any gain or advantage or honor, or for the sake of avoiding some external evil or danger, but because they wished to follow right reason.
The virtues of pagans
Discipulus: Licet prescripta apparentia et subtilia videantur, contra ipsa tamen alique michi obiectiones occurrunt, quarum prima est quod secundum assertiones sanctorum patrum pagani non sunt ad testimonium admittendi (2 q. c. Pagani). | Student: Although the above statements may seem apparent and subtle, nevertheless some objections occur to me against them. The first is that according to the assertions of the holy fathers, pagans should not be admitted as witnesses (2 q. c. Pagani).
Secunda est quia omnes pagani sunt et fuerunt criminosi, quia infidelitas species criminis esse dinoscitur. Et tamen secundum predicta aliqui pagani fuerunt in testimonium admittendi, ergo criminosus est ad testimonium admittendus. | The second is that all pagans are and were criminals, because unbelief is known to be a species of crime. And yet according to the aforesaid, some pagans were to be admitted as witnesses, therefore a criminal should be admitted as a witness.
Tertia est quia, si ideo pagani aliqui fuerunt reputandi veraces et non falsi neque mendaces quia secundum rationem vivere nitebantur, et constat quod multi criminosi secundum rectam rationem vivere moliuntur [qui enim ex sola ignorantia peccant secundum rationem vivere conari videntur, multi autem criminosi ex sola ignorantia peccant], ergo multi criminosi, omnes scilicet ex ignorantia delinquentes, sunt in testimonium admittendi. | The third is that, if some pagans were to be considered truthful and not false or lying because they strove to live according to reason, and it is clear that many criminals strive to live according to right reason (for those who sin from ignorance alone seem to try to live according to reason, while many criminals sin from ignorance alone), therefore many criminals, namely all those who commit crimes from ignorance, are to be admitted as witnesses.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod pagani quos a testimonio decreta sanctorum patrum excludunt fuerunt ex malitia christianis infesti, et ideo tanquam inimici et suspecti non fuerunt contra christianos in testimonium admittendi coram iudice christiano. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that the pagans whom the decrees of the holy fathers exclude from testimony were out of malice hostile to Christians, and therefore, as enemies and suspects, they were not to be admitted as witnesses against Christians before a Christian judge.
Ad secundum dicitur quod nonnulli fuerunt pagani qui nequaquam criminosi fuerunt. Nam et Job paganus fuit, et multi alii boni qui ad legem Mosaicam nequaquam astricti fuerunt, et ideo eis adhibenda fides fuit. Si etiam aliqui essent in puris naturalibus constituti secundum rationem vivere satagentes, non essent criminosi censendi, et ideo esset credendum eisdem, quia virtutes morales haberent imperfectas. Illi autem pagani qui crimine infidelitatis irretiti fuerunt, de stricto iure non fuerunt in testimonium a fidelibus admittendi, sed tamen infideles, qui infidelitatem crimen minime putaverunt, eos recipere debuerunt. | To the second, it is said that some were pagans who were not at all criminal. For Job also was a pagan, and many other good people who were not bound by the Mosaic law, and therefore faith was to be given to them. If there were also some who were established in a purely natural state and were striving to live according to reason, they were not to be considered criminal, and therefore they were to be believed, because they had imperfect moral virtues. But those pagans who were caught in the crime of infidelity were not, according to strict law, to be admitted as witnesses by the faithful, but nevertheless unbelievers, who did not consider infidelity a crime at all, should have admitted them.
Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istam opinionem aliqui philosophi vel imperatores aut alii pagani qui idola coluerunt habuerunt aliquam virtutem licet imperfectam. | Student: According to this opinion, did any philosophers or emperors or other pagans who worshipped idols have any virtue, though imperfect?
Magister: Respondetur quod nullus idolatra, sive paganus sive alius, dum erat idolatra, habuit veram virtutem, etiam imperfectam. Nam omnes tales criminosi fuerunt, et nullum vitium dampnabile stat cum quacunque vera virtute quia, sicut dictum est, quicunque habet unam veram virtutem habet secundum preparationem cordis omnem aliam virtutem, et ideo omni vitio caret. | Master: The answer made is that no idolater, whether pagan or otherwise, while he was an idolater, had true virtue, even imperfect virtue. For all such were criminals, and no blameworthy vice coexists with any true virtue because, as has been said, whoever has one true virtue has every other virtue according to the preparation of the heart and is therefore free from all vice.
Discipulus: Contra hoc est obiectio tertia quam feci. Ideo indica quomodo respondetur ad ipsam. | Student: Against this is the third objection I made. Therefore, indicate how answer is made to it.
Magister: Ad illam dicitur quod nullus criminosus vivere secundum rationem conatur. Cum vero dicis quod qui ex sola ignorantia peccant secundum rationem vivere conari videntur, respondetur quod quedam ignorantia excusat ut actum qui communiter est peccatum reddat ab omni peccato immunem, vel saltem faciat esse veniale peccatum. Et qui ex tali ignorantia peccat vel facit actum qui communiter est peccatum non est criminosus. Alia est ignorantia que non excusat, vel saltem non excusat a peccato mortali, et ex tali ignorantia multi criminosi peccant. Sed nullus peccans ex ignorantia tali nititur vivere secundum rationem. Si enim secundum rationem vivere conaretur, quomodo esset vivendum inquireret diligenter. Si autem inquireret, inveniret. Quod si invenire non posset, ipsum ignorantia invincibilis excusaret. | Master: To that it is said that no criminal tries to live according to reason. But when you say that those who sin solely from ignorance seem to try to live according to reason, it is answered that a certain ignorance excuses, so that it renders an act that is commonly a sin immune from all sin, or at least makes it a venial sin. And a person who sins, or does an act that is commonly a sin, out of such ignorance is not criminal. There is another kind of ignorance that does not excuse, or at least does not excuse from mortal sin, and many criminals sin from such ignorance. But no one who sins from such ignorance tries to live according to reason. For if he tried to live according to reason, he would diligently inquire how he should live. But if he inquired, he would find out. But if he could not find out, his invincible ignorance would excuse him.
Et propter hoc philosophi et alii idolatrantes non fuerunt a crimine excusati. Quia aut sciverunt idola non esse colenda, quemadmodum plures philosophi docuerunt in scholis nichil divinitatis esse in idolis, et quod eis non esset honor divinus aliqualiter exhibendus, et tamen simul cum aliis idola coluerunt, et de illis constat quod criminosi fuerunt et secundum rationem vivere nullatenus conabantur; aut huiusmodi idolatrantes ignoraverunt huiusmodi idola non esse colenda, et constat quod ignorantia invincibili minime laborabant, quia per rationem naturalem poterant invenire quod nichil divinitatis erat in idolis manufactis et quod eis honor divinus non debuit exhiberi. Ergo laborabant ignorantia affectata aut crassa et supina. Talis autem ignorantia non excusat, imo talis ignorantia est dampnabilis. Ergo criminosi fuerunt, et ideo secundum rationem vivere nullatenus nitebantur. Quare nullam veram virtutem, etiam imperfectam, que potest esse sine fide et caritate, penitus habuerunt. Et ideo de stricto iure in nullo negotio debuere fideles et virtuosi eis indubitatam credulitatem aliqualiter exhibere. | And for this reason philosophers and other idolaters were not excused from crime. Because either they knew that idols should not be worshipped, as many philosophers taught in the schools that there was no divinity in idols, and that no divine honor should be shown to them in any way, and yet alongside others they worshipped idols; and of them it is clear that they were criminal and did not at all try to live according to reason; or such idolaters did not know that such idols should not be worshipped, and it is clear that they did not suffer from invincible ignorance, because they could find by natural reason that there was no divinity in hand-made idols and that divine honor should not have been shown to them. Therefore they suffered from affected or gross and supine ignorance. But such ignorance does not excuse, indeed such ignorance is condemnable. Therefore they were criminal, and therefore they did not at all try to live according to reason. Therefore they had no true virtue at all, even the imperfect virtue that can exist without faith and charity. And therefore, in strict law, the faithful and virtuous should in no way show them undoubted credence.
Discipulus: Ista ultima dicta prioribus repugnare videtur. Nam dictum est prius quod multi philosophi et alii habuerunt veras virtutes, licet imperfectas. Nunc autem asseritur quod nullus idolatra habuerit veram virtutem. Constat autem quod omnes philosophi fuerunt idolatre. Ergo secundum ultimo dicta nullam habuerunt veram virtutem, et ita ultima prioribus contradicunt. | Student: These last statements seem to contradict the previous ones. For it was said before that many philosophers and others had true virtues, although imperfect. But now it is asserted that no idolater had true virtue. But it is well-known that all philosophers were idolaters. Therefore, according to the last statement, they had no true virtue, and thus the last contradicts the first.
Magister: Respondetur quod non constat omnes philosophos fuisse idolatras. Imo probabile est quod aliqui non fuerunt idolatras. Quicunque enim secundum rationem vivere nitebantur omnem idolatriam evitaverunt. Si ergo aliqui philosophi vel alii secundum rationem vivere conabantur, idolatre non fuerunt. | Master: The answer made is that it is not certain that all philosophers were idolaters. Indeed, it is probable that some were not idolaters. For whoever strove to live according to reason avoided all idolatry. Therefore, if some philosophers or others strove to live according to reason, they were not idolaters.
Vices dispose to other vices "according to the preparation of the heart"
Discipulus: Istam rationem, per quam probatur quod de nullo criminoso est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax, intelligo. Que in hoc michi fundari videtur quod omnis criminosus secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretitur, quemadmodum habens caritatem vel quamcunque veram virtutem secundum preparationem cordis habet omnem actum virtutis sibi possibilem. Quod tamen mirabile michi apparet, quia nullus intelligens hoc debeat opinari, cum quedam vitia sint omnino contraria. Qui autem habet unum contrariorum non habet etiam secundum preparationem cordis reliquum contrariorum. | Student: I understand the argument by which it is proved that no criminal must be firmly presumed to be truthful. It seems to me to be based on this, that every criminal is ensnared in every crime according to the preparation of his heart, just as he who has charity or any true virtue has, according to the preparation of his heart, every act of virtue possible for him. But this seems surprising to me, because no intelligent person should think this, since some vices are completely contrary [to one another]. But he who has one of the contraries does not also have, according to the preparation of his heart, the other contrary.
Rursus, quedam sunt vitia penitus disparata. Qui autem habet unum disparatorum non propter hoc reliquum habere dinoscitur, etiam secundum preparationem cordist. Ergo non omnis criminosus habet secundum preparationem cordis omnia vitia. | Again, some vices are completely disparate. But someont who has one of the disparates is not known for this reason to have the other, even according to the preparation of his heart. Therefore not every criminal has according to the preparation of his heart all the vices.
Item, sepe videmus aliquos uno crimine irretitos qui alia crimina in se et in aliis detestantur in tantum quod ante se morti exponerent quam crimina talia committerent quoquo modo. Ergo non sunt etiam secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretiti. | Likewise, we often see some who are ensnared by one crime who detest other crimes, in themselves and in others, to the extent that they would rather expose themselves to death than commit such crimes in any way. Therefore, they are not ensnared by every crime, even according to the preparation of their hearts.
Ista sunt per que patenter ostenditur, ut videtur, quod non omnis criminosus secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretitur. Que quamvis evidentia et insolubilia michi appareant, peto tamen ut gratia exercitii quomodo ad ipsa respondeatur enarres. | These are the things by which it is clearly shown, as it seems, that not every criminal is ensnared by every crime according to the preparation of his heart. Although they appear to me to be evident and insoluble, I nevertheless ask that you explain, for the sake of practice, how to respond to them.
Magister: Responsiones ad ista melius intelliges si fuerit tibi declaratum quid est secundum opinionem contrariam secundum preparationem cordis aliquo vitio irretiri. | Master: You will understand the answers to these better if it has been explained to you what it is, according to the contrary opinion, to be ensnared by some vice according to the preparation of the heart.
Discipulus: Rogo quod hoc declares. | Student: I beg you to explain this.
Magister: Dicunt quod irretiri aliquo vitio secundum preparationem cordis non est aliud quam habere aliquam dispositionem vel principium inclinans naturaliter ad vitium, et per nullam veram virtutem a tali vitio refrenari, sicut habere actus virtutis secundum preparationem cordis non est aliud quam habere dispositionem vel principium inclinans ad actus virtutum. Propter quod qui habet caritatem habet secundum preparationem cordis omnes actus virtutum sibi possibiles, in tantum quod qui habet caritatem exit in omnem actum virtutis quando tenetur. Quod si dimittit quemcunque actum virtutis, quando tenetur, caritatem amittit. Sic homo iracundus habet secundum preparationem cordis actus omnium vitiorum, que dicuntur filie esse ire, quia habet dispositionem inclinantem ad actus omnium vitiorum illorum, licet sepe per aliquam passionem predominantem ire ne in actus vitiorum illorum propumpat pro tempore retrahatur. | Master: They say that to be ensnared in some vice according to the preparation of the heart is nothing else than to have some disposition or principle naturally inclining to the vice, and to be restrained from such vice by no true virtue, just as to have acts of virtue according to the preparation of the heart is nothing else than to have a disposition or principle inclining to acts of the virtue. For this reason, he who has charity has, according to the preparation of the heart, all the acts of virtue possible to him, in so much that he who has charity performs every act of virtue when he is obliged to. But if he fails to perform any act of virtue when he is obliged to, he loses charity. Thus, a man who is angry has, according to the preparation of his heart, the acts of all the vices, which are said to be the daughters of anger, because he has a disposition inclining to the acts of all those vices, although often through some overriding passion he is restrained for the time being from the acts of those vices.
Discipulus: Intelligo quod isti vocant secundum preparationem cordis aliquo vitio irretiri. Ideo quomodo ad predictas instantias respondetur expone. | Student: I understand that these people call being ensnared in some vice according to the preparation of the heart. Therefore, explain how answer is made to the aforementioned objections.
Magister: Ad predictas instantias refellendas dicunt isti esse notandum quod, quemadmodum in speculabilibus sunt quedam principia universalia ex quibus conclusiones plurime demonstrantur (propter quod dicitur quod principia sunt minima in quantitate et maxima in virtute) quia ex uno principio cum aliis propositionibus assumptis immediate vel mediate conclusiones innumerabiles inferuntur, et sicut in naturalibus quedam sunt cause universales et quodammodo illimitate ex quibus diversi et innumeri causantur effectus (quandoque quidem ex illis solis, quandoque ex illis et aliis particularibus causis concurrentibus) ita ut eadem causa universalis vel propter diversitatem passivorum vel propter diversitatem particularium agentium sit causa contrariorum, ita in moralibus sunt quedam dispositiones ad plurimos actus virtutum vel vitiorum naturaliter inclinantes. Quemadmodum, caritas imperat et inclinat ad omnes actus omnium virtutum, et ira ad contumelias, rixas, contentiones, detractiones, percussiones, homicidia, et plures actus alios vitiosos inclinat. | Master: They say that to refute the aforementioned objections we must note that, just as in speculative matters there are certain universal principles from which conclusions are most often demonstrated (because it is said that principles are least in quantity and greatest in power, because from one principle taken with other propositions, innumerable conclusions are inferred immediately or mediately), and just as in natural matters there are certain universal and somehow unlimited causes from which diverse and innumerable effects are caused (sometimes from those alone, sometimes from those and other particular causes concurring), so that the same universal cause, either because of the diversity of patients or because of the diversity of particular agents, is the cause of contraries, so in moral matters there are certain dispositions naturally inclining to many acts of virtue or vice. Just as charity commands and inclines a person to all acts of all virtues, and anger inclines to insults, quarrels, contentions, detractions, blows, murders, and many other vicious acts.
Per hoc ad tuas instantias respondetur. Ad primam dicitur quod quamvis quedam vitia sint contraria, et ideo actus eorum simul esse non possunt, tamen habens unum vitium habet preter vitium illud unam dispositionem malam inclinantem ad actum vitii contrarii, nisi impediatur vel deficiat aliquid ad actum vitii contrarii requisitum. Verbi gratia: prodigalitas et tenacitas sunt vitia contraria, et tamen tenax potest habere actum prodigalitatis secundum preparationem cordis, quia in tenace propter ipsam tenacitatem est desiderium pecuniam acquirendi, et ideo si tenax videt quod per actum prodigalitatis potest multa acquirere, ex desiderio acquirendi plura exit in actum prodigalitatis. Sic etiam videmus quod vitia et virtutes contrariantur et tamen sepe vitiosus habet actus virtutis secundum preparationem cordist. Sepe enim mendax ut sibi credatur loquitur veritatem, et ambitiosus ut magnos honores acquirat parvos honores spernit et respuit. | Through this answer is given to your objections. To the first it is said that although some vices are contrary, and therefore their acts cannot exist together, nevertheless someone who has one vice has, in addition to that vice, a bad disposition inclining to the act of the contrary vice, unless something required for the act of the contrary vice is hindered or lacking. For example: prodigality and stinginess are contrary vices, and yet the stingy person can have the act of prodigality according to the preparation of the heart, because in the stingy, because of the stinginess itself, there is a desire to acquire money, and therefore if the stingy sees that through an act of prodigality he can acquire much, from the desire to acquire more he performs the act of prodigality. So also we see that vices and virtues are contrary and yet the vicious often has an act of virtue according to the preparation of the heart. For a liar often speaks the truth in order to be believed, and an ambitious person, to acquire great honors, despises and rejects small honors.
Discipulus: Clare video quod licet aliqua vitia sint contraria tamen habens unum vitium potest actum contrarii vitii habere secundum preparationem cordist. Imo etiam videtur quod, secundum predicta, qui habet unam virtutem habet actum vitii contrarii secundum preparationem cordis, si habens vitium habet actum virtutis secundum preparationem cordist. | Student: I see clearly that although some vices are contrary, nevertheless, a person who has one vice can have the act of the opposite vice according to the preparation of the heart. Indeed, it also seems that, according to the aforementioned, someone who has one virtue has the act of the opposite vice according to the preparation of the heart, if a person who has a vice has the act of virtue according to the preparation of the heart.
Magister: Respondetur quod falleris, quia non est simile de actibus vitiorum exterioribus et de actibus virtutum exterioribus. Nam multi sunt actus vitiorum exteriores qui nullo modo bene fieri possunt, sicut mentiri nullo modo potest fieri bene. Actus fornicandi et multi alii nequaquam bene fieri possunt. Nullus autem est actus virtutis exterior quin male fieri possit. Nam orationes, ieiunia, eleemosine, male fieri possunt, imo actus martirii male suscipi potest. Propter quod criminosus habet actus virtutum exteriores, sed non interiores, secundum preparationem cordist. | Master: The answer made is that you are mistaken, because it is not the same with exterior acts of vices and the exterior acts of virtues. For there are many exterior acts of vices that can in no way be done well, as lying can in no way be done well. The act of fornication and many others cannot at all be done well. But there is no exterior act of virtue that cannot be done badly. For prayers, fasting, almsgiving can be done badly, indeed the act of martyrdom can be undergone badly. Because of this, a criminal has exterior acts of virtue, but not interior acts, according to the preparation of the heart.
Unde hypocrite, ambitiosi, avari, superbi, et alii criminosi nonnunquam mirabiles actus virtutum exteriores exercent. Unde de hypocritis dicit Christus Matth. 6: "Exterminant enim facies suas, ut appareant hominibus ieiunantes." Et de ambitiosis dicit Innocentius tertius: "Humilitatem simulat, honestatem mentitur, affabilitatem exhibet, benignitatem ostendit." Ex quibus patet quod vitiosi possunt habere actus virtutum exteriores secundum preparationem cordist. Sed virtuosus actus vitiorum non habet secundum preparationem cordis, quia illi a virtuoso nequaquam fieri possunt. | Hence hypocrites, ambitious, greedy, proud, and other criminals sometimes perform wonderful exterior acts of virtue. Hence Christ says of hypocrites in Matt. 6: "For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast." And of the ambitious Innocent III says: "He feigns humility, he pretends honesty, he exhibits affability, he shows kindness." From this it is clear that the vicious can have external acts of virtue according to the preparation of the heart. But the virtuous does not have acts of vice according to the preparation of the heart, because such acts cannot possibly be done by a virtuous person.
Discipulus: Ista instantia non est ita fortis sicut ante putavi. Ideo dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam. | Student: The objection is not as strong as I thought before. Therefore tell me how answer is made to the second.
Magister: Respondetur ad illam quod nulli actus vitiorum sunt taliter disparati quin quocunque crimine irretitus habeat aliquam dispositionem malam inclinantem naturaliter, nisi impediatur, saltem alia causa concurrente, ad quemlibet actum vitiosum. Et ideo quilibet criminosus habet actum cuiuslibet vitii secundum preparationem cordist. | Master: The answer made to it is that no acts of vice are disparate in such a way that a person snared in any crime does not have an evil disposition naturally inclined to every vicious act if not hindered at least by another concurring cause. And therefore, according to the preparation of the heart, every criminal has the act of every vice.
Discipulus: Que est illa dispositio mala que inclinat ad omnem actum vitiosum. | Student: What is that evil disposition that inclines to every vicious act?
Magister: Respondetur quod tales dispositiones male sunt plures, scilicet contemptus rationis, amor sui, aversio a Deo et huiusmodi, que a nullo vitio separantur. Quemadmodum plures conditiones et dispositiones bone omni virtuti sunt annexe, propter quas quicunque habet unam veram virtutem habet actum omnis virtutis sibi possibilis secundum preparationem cordist. Qui enim ideo est castus quia vult vivere secundum rationem rectam, ipse etiam vult facere omnem actum virtutis cuiuslibet quandocumque ratio recta dictat quod actum virtutis facere debet. Et sine tali voluntate et dispositione inclinante ad omnem actum cuiuslibet virtutis secundum dictamen rationis recte, nullus habet castitatem que est virtus vera, quantumcunque ab omni actu venereo et impudico abstineat. Et ita, qui habet veram castitatem que est virtus, secundum preparationem cordis habet actum omnem cuiuslibet virtutis sibi possibilem. | Master: The answer made is that there are many such evil dispositions, namely contempt of reason, love of self, aversion from God and the like, which are not separated from any vice. Just as many conditions and dispositions are attached to every good virtue, because of which whoever has one true virtue has, according to the preparation of his heart, the act of every virtue possible to him. For if a person is chaste because he wants to live according to right reason, he also wants to do every act of whatever virtue whenever right reason dictates that he should do the act of virtue. And without such a will and disposition inclining to every act of every virtue according to the dictate of right reason, no one has the chastity that is a true virtue, however much he abstains from every venereal and immodest act. And so, whoever has the true chastity that is a virtue has every act of every virtue possible to him, according to the preparation of his heart.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad instantiam tertiam quam feci. | Student: Tell me how answer is given to the third objection I made.
Magister: Respondetur quod non ideo dicitur quis habere actum vitiosum secundum preparationem cordis quia est semper paratus in omnem eventum actum huiusmodi exercere. Sic enim mendax non haberet secundum preparationem cordis actum mendacii, quia sepe mendax nequaquam vult mentiri. Neque enim aliquis vitiosus haberet secundum preparationem cordis actus vitii quo noscitur irretiri. Neque enim luxuriosus, neque gulosus, neque iracundus, neque invidus, neque superbus semper vult actus vitiosos exteriores elicere, et tamen quilibet vitiosus habet secundum preparationem cordis actus vitii quo noscitur irretiri. | Master: The answer given is that a person is not said to have a vicious act according to the preparation of the heart for the reason that he is always ready to perform an act of this kind on every occasion -- for thus a liar would not have an act of lying according to the preparation of the heart, because a liar often does not want to lie. Neither would any vicious person have, according to the preparation of the heart, acts of the vice by which he is known to be ensnared. For no one who is lustful, nor gluttonous, nor angry, nor envious, nor proud always wants to elicit the external vicious acts, and yet every vicious person has, according to the preparation of the heart, acts of the vice by which he is known to be ensnared.
Dicitur ergo, sicut predictum est, quis habere actus vitiosos secundum preparationem cordis quia habet dispositionem malam inclinantem naturaliter ad actus vitiosos exteriores, et per nullam veram virtutem ab actu huiusmodi cohibetur. Non tamen semper exercet huiusmodi actus, quia sepe ab actibus exercendis huiusmodi prohibetur, vel propter absentiam cause particularis que ad actum talem requiritur, vel propter aliquam aliam causam predominantem impedientem talem actum. | Therefore, as was said before, someone is said to have vicious acts according to the preparation of the heart because he has an evil disposition naturally inclined to the external vicious acts, and is restrained from such acts by no true virtue. However, he does not always perform such acts, because he is often prevented from performing them either because of the absence of some particular cause that is required for such an act, or because of some other overriding cause that prevents such an act.
Verbi gratia: luxuriosus querens delectationem in actibus venereis, et in nullo propter rationem rectam a libidine se refrenans, habet dispositionem malam ad omnes actus venereos inclinantem, scilicet desiderium delectandi in actu venereo, qui tamen sepe ab actu venereo se restringit, vel quia deficit sibi obiectum quod concupiscit, vel quia timet confusionem. Propter timorem enim pene vel confusionis aut inhonorationis vel dampni temporalis multi abstinent a peccato luxurie qui aliter nullatenus abstinerent. Sic etiam multi mendaces sepe minime mentiuntur, vel quia non indignantur contra aliquem cui nocere desiderent, vel quia timent in mendacio deprehendi. Sic etiam fures sepe non furantur, vel quia nichil inveniunt quod furentur, vel quia penam furti formidant. Omnes tamen predicti habent actus huiusmodi vitiosos secundum preparationem cordist. | For example, a lustful person seeking pleasure in sexual acts, and in no way restraining himself from lust for right reason, has a bad disposition that inclines him to all sexual acts, namely, the desire to delight in a sexual act, nevertheless often restrains himself from a sexual act, either because he lacks the object he desires, or because he fears trouble. For it is out of fear of punishment, trouble, dishonor, or temporal loss that many abstain from the sin of lust who would otherwise not abstain at all. So also many liars often do not lie at all, either because they are not indignant against someone they wish to harm, or because they fear being caught lying. So also thieves often do not steal, either because they find nothing to steal, or because they fear the penalty for theft. However, all of the aforementioned have such vicious acts according to the preparation of their hearts.
Sic est de multis criminosis qui antea morerentur quam crimina quedam committerent, non ex amore virtutis sed quia habent aliquas passiones vel dispositiones etiam malas vel non virtuosas ad actum contrarium inclinantes, ut pote vel quia timent inhonorationem vel confusionem aut aliquid aliud quod, antequam incurrerrent, mortem susciperent. Et tamen cum hoc stat quod habent huiusmodi actus secundum preparationem cordis modo predicto. Quemadmodum multi hypocrite, occulti luxuriosi et mendaces, antequam deprehenderentur in actu luxurie vel mendacii, se morti exponerent. Et tamen habent huiusmodi actus secundum preparationem cordis, a quibus sepe strictissime se restringunt, quia timor in eis confusionis et verecundie predominatur passioni et vitio ad actum luxurie et mendacii inclinanti. | Thus it is with many criminals who would rather die than commit certain crimes, not from love of virtue but because they have some passions or dispositions, even evil or non-virtuous, that incline them to the contrary, as perhaps either because they fear dishonor or trouble or something else, that would make them rather suffer death than commit it. And yet with this it stands the fact that they have such acts according to the preparation of the heart in the aforesaid way. Just as many hypocrites, hidden lustful people and liars, rather than be caught in the act of lust or lying, would expose themselves to death. And yet they have such acts according to the preparation of the heart, from which they often restrain themselves most strictly, because their fear of trouble and shame overrides the passion and vice that inclines them to the act of lust and lying.
Discipulus: Ista opinio intellecta modo prescripto maiorem apparentiam habere videtur quam antea arbitrarer. Ideo pro ipsa nitere allegare. | Student: This opinion, understood in the way just described, seems to have a greater plausibility than I previously thought. So try to argue in its favour.
"Pride is the beginning of every sin"
Magister: Ista opinio multis rationibus communitur, quarum prima est hec. Omnis superbus habet secundum preparationem cordis omnes actus vitiorum. Omnis criminosus est superbus. Ergo omnis criminosus habet secundum preparationem cordis actus omnium vitiorum. Maior probatur sic. Qui habet initium omnis peccati habet secundum preparationem cordis omnes actus vitiorum et peccatorum quia, sicut dictum est, habere secundum preparationem cordis actum vitiosum est habere dispositionem inclinantem naturaliter ad actum vitiosum et per nichil quod virtutis est refrenari. Sed qui habet initium omnis peccati habet dispositionem inclinantem ad omnia peccata, et per nichil virtuosum retrahitur a peccato. Ergo qui habet initium omnis peccati habet omnia peccata secundum preparationem cordist. Omnis autem superbus habet initium omnis peccati, teste Sapiente qui Ecclesiastici 10 ait: "Initium omnis peccati est superbia." Ergo omnis superbus habet omnem actum peccati secundum preparationem cordist. | Master: This opinion is fortified by many arguments, the first of which is this. Every proud person has, according to the preparation of his heart, all the acts of vice. Every criminal is proud. Therefore, every criminal has, according to the preparation of his heart, the acts of all the vices. The major is proved thus. Anyone who has the beginning of every sin has, according to the preparation of his heart, all the acts of vice and sin because, as has been said, to have a vicious act according to the preparation of the heart is to have a disposition naturally inclined to a vicious act and to be restrained by nothing that is virtuous. But anyone who has the beginning of every sin has a disposition naturally inclined to all sins, and is withheld from sin by nothing virtuous. Therefore, anyone who has the beginning of every sin has all sins according to the preparation of his heart. But every proud person has the beginning of every sin, as the Wise Man testifies, who says in Ecclesiasticus 10: "Pride is the beginning of every sin." Therefore, every proud person has every act of sin according to the preparation of his heart.
Item, qui habet matrem omnium vitiorum habet omnem actum vitiosum secundum preparationem cordis, quia ex matre omnium vitiorum omnes actus vitiosi oriuntur vel oriri possunt. Omnis autem superbus habet matrem omnium vitiorum quia, secundum beatum Gregorium, superbia est mater omnium vitiorum. Ergo omnis superbus habet omnem actum vitiosum secundum preparationem cordist. | Likewise, he who has the mother of all vices has every vicious act according to the preparation of the heart, because from the mother of all vices all vicious acts arise or can arise. But every proud person has the mother of all vices because, according to Blessed Gregory, pride is the mother of all vices. Therefore every proud person has every vicious act according to the preparation of the heart.
Minor autem, scilicet quod omnis criminosus est superbus, probatur primo ex precedentibus. Quia omnis criminosus habet initium peccati, quia sine initio neque est medium neque finis. Superbia autem est initium omnis peccati, ergo omnis criminosus habet superbiam. | But the minor, namely that every criminal is proud, is proved first from the preceding. Because every criminal has the beginning of a sin, because without a beginning there is neither a middle nor an end. Now pride is the beginning of every sin, therefore every criminal has pride.
Secundo hoc ostenditur auctoritate Innocentii qui, loquens de superbia, ait: "Importabilis, superbia omnibus odiosa, inter omnia vitia, tu semper es prima, tu semper es ultima. Nam omne peccatum te accedente committitur, et te recedente dimittitur. Scriptum est enim initium omnis peccati est superbia , primogenita mors." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod nullum peccatum absque superbia reperitur, et ita omnis criminosus est superbus. | Secondly, this is shown by a text of Innocent who, speaking of pride, says: "O unbearable pride, hateful to all, among all vices you are always the first, you are always the last. For every sin is committed when you approach, and is forgiven when you depart. For it is written, The beginning of all sin is pride , the firstborn is death." From these words it is gathered that no sin is found without pride, and thus every criminal is proud.
Quod tertio ratione probatur sic. Omnis criminosus a Deo avertitur. Quicunque autem a Deo avertitur, eo quod Deum contempnit et contra Deum erigitur, superbia elevatur. Ergo omnis criminosus est inter superbos merito computandus, quod veritatem habet secundum quosdam, prout omnis aversio a Deo vocatur superbia, non prout solus appetitus proprie excellentie superbia appellatur. | This is proved by a third reason as follows. Every criminal is turned away from God. But whoever turns away from God because he despises God and is raised up against God, is exalted in pride. Therefore every criminal is deservedly to be counted among the proud. This is true according to some, inasmuch as every aversion from God is called pride, not inasmuch as only the desire for one's own superiority is called pride.
Discipulus: Puto quod ad probandum tam maiorem quam minorem rationis istius multas scires tam rationes quam auctoritates adducere, sed nolo pro nunc plures audire. Cupio tamen scire an aliquis doctorum, qui sequelam habent et tamen a pluribus improbantur, sentiant quod omnis superbus secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretitur. | Student: I think that to prove both the major and minor of this argument you would be able to adduce many arguments and authorities, but I do not wish to hear more for now. I desire, however, to know whether any of the doctors who have a following, and yet are disapproved of by many, hold that every proud person is ensnared by every crime according to the preparation of his heart.
Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod hoc est de intentione Thome de Aquino. Nam 2 a2e , qu. 162, articulo 2o ait sic: "Superbia potest considerari secundum redundantiam quamdam in alia peccata. Et secundum hoc habet quandam generalitatem, inquantum scilicet ex superbia oriri possunt omnia peccata, duplici ratione. Uno modo, per se, inquantum scilicet alia peccata ordinantur ad finem superbie, que est propria excellentia, ad quam potest ordinari omne id quod quis inordinate appetit. Alio modo, indirecte, et quasi per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, in quantum scilicet homo per superbiam contempnit divinam legem, per quam prohibetur a peccando, secundum illud Ieremie: 'Confregisti iugum..., rupisti vincula..., dixisti: non serviam'." | Master: It appears to some that this is the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. In [Summa theologiae] 2-2 q.162 a.2 he says: "Pride can be considered according to a certain overflow into other sins, and according to this it has a certain generality, in that all sins can arise from pride, for a twofold reason. In one way, per se, insofar as other sins are ordered to the end of pride, which is one's own superiority, to which one can order everything one desires inordinately. In another way, indirectly, and as if per accidens, namely by removing the hindering factor, namely insofar as through pride a person despises the divine law, by which he is forbidden to sin, according to a text of Jeremias: 'Thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve'."
Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ex superbia possunt oriri omnia peccata. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis superbus secundum preparationem cordis omnibus criminibus irretitur, licet a quibusdam criminibus aliquando per alias passiones, non per virtutem veram, prohibeatur. | From these words [of Thomas Aquinas] we gather that all sins can arise from pride. From this it follows that every proud person, according to the preparation of his heart, is ensnared by all crimes, although he is sometimes prevented from certain crimes by other passions, not by true virtue.
Discipulus: Sufficiant ista pro ratione predicta, et si alie tibi occurrunt, de illis breviter te expedias. | Student: Let these words suffice for the aforementioned argument, and if others occur to you, briefly expound them.
"T he desire of money is the root of all evils"
Magister: Secunda ratio ad probandum quod omnis criminosus secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretitur talis est. Non est maior ratio de uno crimine quam de alio quod criminosus aliquo speciali crimine irretitus sit secundum preparationem cordis omni alio crimine involutus. Sed criminosus cupiditate, que est speciale peccatum, implicitus, omni alio crimine secundum preparationem cordis involvitur, teste Apostolo (1 Tim. 6) qui ait: "Radix enim omnium malorum cupiditas," ubi glossa, obiciens, ait: "Alibi dicit scriptura quod superbia est initium omnis peccati. Hic vero dicitur quod avaritia sive cupiditas est radix omnium malorum, que non videntur convenire." Et, respondens, ait: "Sciendum vero utrumque vere dictum esse, si peccatorum genera attendandur. Nullum enim genus peccati est quod aliquando non proveniat ex superbia, nullum quod aliquando non proveniat ex cupiditate. Et est utique aliquis homo qui ex cupiditate sit superbus, et aliquis est qui ex superbia sit cupidus. Est enim homo qui non esset amator pecunie, nisi per hoc putaret se excellentiorem esse, et est qui non amaret excellere, nisi putaret per hoc maiores divitias habere." | Master: A second argument to prove that every criminal is entangled in every crime according to the preparation of his heart is as follows. There is no more reason concerning one crime rather than another that a criminal entangled in some special crime is entangled in every other crime according to the preparation of his heart. But a criminal involved in covetousness, which is a special sin, is involved in every other crime according to the preparation of his heart, as the Apostle testifies (1 Tim. 6) who says: "For the desire of money is the root of all evils", where the gloss, objecting, says: "In another place the Scripture says that pride is the beginning of every sin. Here, however, it is said that avarice or covetousness is the root of all evils, which do not seem to agree". And, answering, says: "But it must be known that both are truly said, if the kinds of sins are considered. For there is no kind of sin that does not sometimes come from pride, none that does not come sometimes from covetousness. And there is certainly a man proud from covetousness, and a man covetous from pride. For there is a one who would not love money unless he thought it made him superior, and there is one another would not love to be superio unless he thought that it made him richer."
Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnia peccata ex cupiditate seu avaritia oriri possunt. Quare omnis cupidus seu avarus secundum preparationem cordis est omni crimine irretitus. Hoc est, nullum crimen est quod avarus seu cupidus propter habendam pecuniam non committeret si nulla passio timoris, aut erubescentie, aut aliqua alia nequaquam rationis iudicio regulata, eum a committendo crimen prohiberet, ita quod per nullam veram virtutem a quocunque crimine committendo retrahitur. | From these words we gather that all sins can arise from either greed or avarice. Therefore, every greedy or avaricious person is, according to the preparation of his heart, ensnared by every crime. That is, there is no crime that a greedy or avaricious person would not commit for the sake of having money if no passion of fear, or embarassment, or something not regulated by the judgment of reason, prevented him from committing the crime, so that he is not restrained by any true virtue from committing any crime.
"Anger is the door of all vices"
Tertia ratio est hec. Homo iracundus secundum preparationem cordis est omni crimine irretitus. Ergo, per rationem consimilem, omnis criminosus secundum preparationem cordis est omni crimine irretitus. Antecedens probatur. Quia qui est in ianua omnium vitiorum omnibus criminibus secundum preparationem cordis involvitur. Homo autem iracundus est in ianua omnium vitiorum, teste glossa que super illo Prov. 29 "Vir iracundus provocat rixas" ait: "Ianua omnium vitiorum iracundia, qua clausa, virtutibus intrinsecus dabitur quies, aperta, ad omne facinus armabitur animus." Ergo homo iracundus in ianua vitiorum existens ad omnia genera peccatorum armatur. Et per consequens secundum preparationem cordis omni crimine irretitur. | A third argument is this. An angry person is, according to the preparation of his heart, ensnared by every crime. Therefore, by a similar reason, every criminal person is, according to the preparation of his heart, ensnared by every crime. The premise is proved. Because he who is at the door of all vices is involved in all crimes according to the preparation of his heart. Now an angry person is in the door to all vices, as the gloss on Prov. 29, "An angry man provokes quarrels" says: "Anger is the door of all vices; when closed, the virtues will be given rest indoors, when opened, the mind will be armed for every crime." Therefore, an angry man, being in the door of vices, is armed for all kinds of sins. And consequently, according to the preparation of the heart, he is ensnared by every crime.
Discipulus: Mirum est quod dicit glossa, scilicet quod clausa iracundia virtutibus intrinsecus dabitur quies, cum multos videamus mansuetos qui tamen multis aliis criminibus involvuntur. | Student: What the gloss says is strange, namely that when anger is closed, it will give rest indoors to the virtues, since we see many meek persons who are nevertheless involved in many other crimes.
Magister: Respondetur quod nunquam iracundia, que est ianua omnium vitiorum, vere est clausa nisi per mansuetudinem que est vera virtus. Mansuetudo autem que est vera virtus nullum vitium secum compatitur, quia nullus est vere mansuetus nisi mansuetudinem propter Deum vel propter rationem rectam conservet. Qui autem est mansuetus propter Deum omni vitio criminali caret, et consimiliter qui est mansuetus ut rationi recte se conformet nulli vitio subiacet criminali. | Master: The answer made is that anger, which is the door to all vices, is never truly closed except by the meekness that is a true virtue. But the meekness that is a true virtue is not compatible with any vice, because no one is truly meek unless he preserves meekness for the sake of God or for the sake of right reason. But someone who is meek for God's sake is free from all criminal vice, and similarly someone who is meek in order to conform himself rightly to reason is not subject to any criminal vice.
Multi autem videntur mansueti qui ab omni iracundia exteriori se cohibent ut aliquod malum aut periculum devitent, vel ut honorem aut aliquod aliud bonum utile vel delectabile consequantur. Sed omnes tales non sunt mansueti mansuetudine que est virtus vera. Quemadmodum multi actum exteriorem fortitudinis efficiunt, vel quia magnitudinem periculi non perpendunt, vel propter alicuius passionis impulsum, vel propter aliquod temporale commodum acquirendum aut incommodum evitandum, qui in rei veritate vera fortitudine que est virtus carent, licet fortes plerumque putentur. | But many seem to be meek who restrain themselves from all external anger in order to avoid some evil or danger, or to obtain honor or some other useful or delightful good. But all such are not meek by the meekness that is a true virtue. Just as many perform an outward act of bravery, either because they do not weigh the magnitude of the danger, or because of the impulse of some passion, or because of some temporal advantage to be gained or disadvantage to be avoided, who in reality lack the true bravery that is a virtue, although they are often thought to be brave.
Discipulus: Per istam rationem de nullo potest sciri quod habeat veram virtutem et quod non sit criminosus. Et ita, si nullo criminoso est credendum, nulli homini certa fides est adhibenda. | Student: By this argument it cannot be known of anyone that he has true virtue and that he is not criminal. And so, if no criminal must be believed, certain faith must be given to no one.
Magister: Dicitur quod absque operatione miraculi facti in testimonium sanctitatis alicuius, de nullo potest per certitudinem sciri quod non sit criminosus. Quia tamen ea que possunt fieri bene et male in meliorem partem interpretari debemus (Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote), ideo multi sunt virtuosi censendi, quia omnes quos nullum actum qui non possit bono animo fieri facere ignoramus, et ideo tales sunt ad testimonium admittendi. | Master: It is said that without the working of a miracle done in testimony of someone's holiness, it cannot be known with certainty that a person is not criminal. However, since we must interpret those things that can be done well and badly in the best way (Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote), therefore many must be considered virtuous (because [we must believe that of] all whom we do not know that they do any act that cannot be done with a good intention), and therefore such are to be admitted as witnesses.
Discipulus: Compleas alias rationes. | Student: Complete the other arguments.
Magister: Quarta ratio pro assertione predicta est hec. Ille qui in minori crimine involutus est, eo ipso secundum preparationem cordis maiori crimine irretitur. Igitur et omnibus criminibus secundum preparationem cordis noscitur irretitus, quia omnia crimina vel sunt maiora, vel minora, vel equalia. Si igitur minori crimine involutus maioribus criminibus secundum preparationem cordis noscitur involutus, multo magis secundum preparationem cordis minoribus et equalibus involutus est putandus, et ita secundum preparationem cordis omnibus criminibus irretitur. | Master: A fourth argument for the aforementioned assertion is this. Someone who is involved in a lesser crime is thereby ensnared by a greater crime according to the preparation of his heart. Therefore, he is known to be ensnared by all crimes according to the preparation of his heart, because all crimes are either greater, or lesser, or equal. If, therefore, a man involved in a lesser crime is known to be involved in greater crimes according to the preparation of his heart, much more so according to the preparation of his heart he must be thought to be involved in lesser and equal crimes, and thus according to the preparation of his heart he is ensnared by all crimes.
"He that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater"
Sed qui minori crimine irretitur eo ipso secundum preparationem cordis maiori crimine irretitur, ipsa Veritate testante, que Luce ait: "Qui in modico iniquus est, et in maiori iniquus est." Que verba secundum actum nequaquam possunt intelligi, quia multi crimina minora committunt qui tamen non faciunt actu maiora. Ergo verba illa quantum ad preparationem cordis debent intelligi, ut iste sit sensus: qui in modico iniquus est secundum preparationem cordis etiam in maiori iniquus est, hoc est, per nullam virtutem a maiori crimine cohercetur, et quicunque minori crimine irretitur, si possit et temptatus fuerit et non timeat confundi nec aliquod utile vel delectabile amittere, a crimine maximo et enormissimo se nullatenus continebit. | But he who is ensnared by a lesser crime is thereby ensnared by a greater crime according to the preparation of his heart, as the Truth itself testifies, who says, Luke 16[:10]: "He that is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in that which is greater." These words cannot be understood in terms of action, because many commit lesser crimes who nevertheless do not actually commit greater ones. Therefore, those words should be understood with regard to the preparation of the heart, so that this is the sense: he who is unjust in a small matter is also unjust in a greater matter according to the preparation of the heart, that is, he will not be restrained by any virtue from a greater crime, and whoever is ensnared by a lesser crime, if he can and has been tempted and does not fear being troubled or losing something useful or pleasurable, will in no way restrain himself from the greatest and most enormous crime.
Quia si criminosus a crimine quocunque de quo temptatur se cohibet, propter aliquem finem vel aliquod motivum se cohibet ab eodem, et non propter finem virtutis nec propter motivum dictatum a ratione recta, ergo propter aliquem alium finem vel aliud motivum se cohibet. Illo ergo fine vel motivo remoto, se minime cohibebit. | For if a criminal restrains himself from any crime to which he is tempted, he restrains himself from it for the sake of some end or some motive, and not for the sake of the end of virtue nor for the sake of a motive dictated by right reason, therefore he restrains himself for the sake of some other end or other motive. Therefore, if that end or motive is removed, he will not restrain himself at all.
Et ita criminosus secundum preparationem cordis omni alio crimine irretitur, licet ab actu pro tempore refrenetur. Quia tamen non refrenatur propter Deum nec propter bonum virtutis sive propter rationem rectam sive aliunde, dicitur habere talem actum secundum preparationem cordis, quemadmodum, sicut dictum est prius, luxuriosus habet actum luxurie secundum preparationem cordis, licet interdum ex aliqua alia causa quam ex ratione recta ab actu luxurie se refrenet. | And thus a criminal is ensnared according to the preparation of the heart by every other crime, though he is restrained from the act for the time being. However, because he is not restrained for the sake of God or for the good of virtue or for the sake of right reason or from some other source, he is said to have such an act according to the preparation of the heart, just as, as was said before, a lustful man has an act of lust according to the preparation of his heart, though sometimes he restrains himself from the act of lust for some other reason than from right reason.
From self-love other evils follow
Quinta ratio est hec. Qui habet radicem omnium criminum habet omnia crimina secundum preparationem cordist. Omnis autem criminosus habet radicem omnium criminum, quia amorem sui, non Dei, qui est radix omnium criminum. Quod expresse insinuat beatus Paulus 2o Tim. 3 dicens: "Erunt homines seipsos amantes, cupidi, elati, superbi, blasphemi, parentibus non obedientes, ingrati, scelesti, sine affectione, sine pace, criminatores, incontinentes, immites, sine benignitate, proditores, protervi, tumidi, et voluptatum amatores magis quam Dei." Ubi dicit glossa: "Ex eo autem quod seipsos, non Deum amant, quasi ex radice hec que sequuntur mala oriuntur." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnia mala que enumerat Apostolus ex amore sui oriuntur. Cum ergo omnia peccata spiritualia et corporalia valeant ad illa reduci, sequitur quod ex amore sui omnia peccata oriri possunt. Ergo amans seipsum, non Deum, habet omnia peccata secundum preparationem cordis, licet quandoque ab aliquibus non propter bonum virtutis se abstineat. | A fifth argument is this. He who has the root of all crimes has all crimes according to the preparation of the heart. But every criminal has the root of all crimes, because they have love of self, not of God, which is the root of all crimes. The blessed Paul expressly suggests this in 2 Tim. 3, saying: "Men shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked, without affection, without peace, slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful, without kindness, traitors, stubborn, puffed up, and lovers of pleasures more than of God." Here the gloss says: "But from the fact that they love themselves, not God, from a root, as it were, the evils that follow [*i.e. the above list] arise." From these words we gather that all the evils that the apostle enumerates arise from love of self. Therefore, since all spiritual and bodily sins can be reduced to them [*items in that list], it follows that all sins can arise from the love of self. Therefore, anyone who loves himself, not God, has all sins according to the preparation of his heart, though sometimes he abstains from some (not because of the good of virtue).
Sexta ratio est hec. Qui est reus omnium criminum habet omnia crimina secundum actum vel secundum preparationem cordist. Sed omnis criminosus est reus omnium criminum, teste beato Iacobo qui ait: "Offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus." Ergo omnis criminosus habet omnia crimina secundum actum vel secundum preparationem cordist. Et constat quod non secundum actum, ergo habet omnia crimina secundum preparationem cordist. | A sixth argument is this. Anyone who is guilty of all crimes has all crimes according to the act or according to the preparation of his heart. But every criminal is guilty of all crimes, as blessed James [2:10] testifies; he says: "But whoever offends in one point is guilty of all." Therefore, every criminal has all crimes according to the act or according to the preparation of his heart. And it is clear that it is not according to the act, therefore he has all crimes according to the preparation of his heart.
Discipulus: Cessa allegare pro ista assertione que tenet quod omnis criminosus est secundum preparationem cordis omni actu criminis irretitus. Ex quo sequitur primum circa rationem qua probatur quod non ex constitutione sola humana sed ex ratione recta et iure divino accipitur quod nulli criminoso in quocunque negotio est credendum. Quia ex illa assertione sequitur quod de nullo criminoso est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri. Ideo nunc proba secundum, secundum istam opinionem, scilicet quod illi non est credendum de quo non est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax et quod nolit mentiri. | Student: Stop arguing for the assertion that holds that every criminal is, according to the preparation of his heart, ensnared by every act of crime. From this follows the [1] the first thing concerning the argument to prove that it is not from human enactment alone but from right reason and divine law that no criminal must be believed in any matter whatsoever, because it follows from that assertion that it must not be firmly presumed of any criminal that he is truthful and that he does not want to lie. Therefore, now prove [2] the second, according to this opinion, namely that a person is not to be believed of whom it is not to be presumed firmly that he is truthful and that he does not wish to lie.
Magister: Hoc probatur sic. Nulli nisi qui reputatur verax est credendum. Illi ergo de quo non est firmiter presumendum quod sit verax non est credendum. | Master: This is proved thus. No one except a person who is considered truthful should be believed. Therefore, anyone of whom it must not be firmly presumed that he is truthful must not be believed.
Discipulus: Ista assertio evidens michi videtur. Ideo, pertractata assertione qua dicitur quod ex ratione recta et iure divino accipitur quod nulli criminoso est credendum, dissere opinionem contrariam. | Student: This assertion seems evident to me. Therefore, having discussed the assertion that it is accepted from right reason and divine law that no criminal must be believed, discuss the contrary opinion.
Another opinion: By divine and natural law, some criminals not to be believed; some others by human law
Magister: Circa opinionem contrariam sunt duo modi ponendi. Unus modus ponendi est quod ex ratione recta et iure divino absque omni constitutione humana accipitur quod aliquibus criminosis in nullo negotio est credendum. Ex constitutione autem humana sola habetur quod quibusdam criminosis non est credendum. | Master: There are two ways of stating the contrary opinion. One way is that it is accepted from right reason and divine law, without any human enactment, that some criminals must not be believed in any matter, but it is held from human enactment alone that certain [other] criminals must not be believed.
Discipulus: Istam opinionem expone. | Student: Explain this opinion.
Magister: Opinio ista ponit quod ex recta ratione accipitur, absque omni constitutione humana, quod illis criminosis qui involvuntur criminibus que ad falsitatem vel mendacium (quod committitur factis vel verbis) pertinent quoquo modo, non est credendum in quocunque negotio. Huiusmodi criminosi sunt periuri, mendaces, hypocrite, simulatores, ficti, qui libellos famosos componunt vel retinent aut divulgant, et qui falsum testimonium dixerunt vel ad dicendum falsum testimonium alios induxerunt, et qui sic aliis sunt subiecti ut probabile sit quod de facili possunt induci ut falsum testimonium dicant, et omnes qui cupiunt placere hominibus, quales sunt ambitiosi, dolosi, bilingues, proditores, criminatores, calumpniatores, diffamatores, falsorum criminum impositores, detractores, libenter audientes susurrationes, murmuratores, adulatores, conspiratores, contentiosi, contumeliosi, suspiciosi, temere iudicantes, interpretantes in deteriorem partem que bono animo fieri possunt, qui secreta revelant, et consimiles. Isti sunt ab omni testimonio repellendi. Et quecunque constitutio humana constitueret quod aliquis istorum vel consimilium esset ad testimonium admittendus esset constitutio iniqua nec esset servanda. | Master: This opinion states that it is accepted from right reason, without any human enactment, that those criminals who are in any way involved in crimes that relate to falsehood or lying (which is committed by deeds or words) are not to be trusted in any matter. Criminals of this kind are perjurers, liars, hypocrites, pretenders, fakes, those who compose, keep or disseminate notorious pamphlets, those who have given false testimony or have induced others to give false testimony, those who are so subject to others that it is probable they can easily be induced to give false testimony, and all who desire to please men, such as the ambitious, the deceitful, the double-tongued, traitors, accusers, calumniators, defamers, accusers of false charges, detractors, willing listeners to whispers, murmurers, flatterers, conspirators, the contentious, the insulting, the suspicious, those who judge rashly, those who interpreting for the worse what can be done with a good intention, those who reveal secrets, and the like. These are to be rejected from all testimony. And any human enactment that established that any of these or similar persons should be admitted to testify would be an unjust enactment and should not be observed.
Alii criminosi a ferendo testimonio per rationem rectam vel per ius divinum nullatenus prohibentur, licet prohibeantur per constitutionem humanam. Tales sunt gulosi et luxuriosi et alii pauci. Ista opinio fundatur in hoc quod propter illa crimina que veritati repugnant et non propter alia est quis per ius naturale et divinum a testimonio repellendus. Sed sola crimina que ad mendacium (quod verbis vel factis committitur) spectant veritati repugnant. Igitur de iure nature et divino propter sola crimina talia est quis a testimonio repellendus. | Other criminals are in no way prohibited from giving testimony by right reason or by divine law, though they may be prohibited by human enactment. Such are the gluttonous and the lustful and a few others. This opinion is founded on the fact that for those crimes that are repugnant to truth, and not for others, a person must be rejected from testimony by natural and divine law. But only crimes that relate to lying (which is committed by words or deeds) are repugnant to truth. Therefore, for such crimes alone a person must be rejected from testimony by natural and divine law.
Discipulus: Ob prolixitatem vitandam dimitte opinionem istam et transi ad aliam. | Student: To avoid prolixity, leave this opinion and move on to another.
Another opinion: by human law only Which provides that in some cases criminals may accuse and testify.
Magister: Alia est opinio quod propter nullum crimen ex iure nature vel divino est quis a testimonio repellendus, sed quod aliqui criminosi repelluntur est solummodo ex iure humano. | Master: Another opinion is that for no crime must a person be rejected from testimony by natural or divine law, but that some criminals are rejected only by human law.
Discipulus: Pro ista opinione nitere allegare. | Student: Try to argue in favour of this opinion.
Magister: Pro ista assertione arguitur sic. Nichil a principe aut prelato rite statui potest quod iuri naturali aut divino repugnat. Sed cautum in legibus civilibus et canonicis invenitur quod in aliquo casu quicunque criminosi heretici et alii ad accusandum et testificandum debent admitti. ergo non est contra ius naturale nec contra divinum quod criminosi ad accusationem et testimonium admittantur. Maior videtur certa. Minor per plura iura probatur. | Master: For this assertion it is argued thus. Nothing can be rightly established by a ruler or prelate that is repugnant to natural or divine law. But a provision is found in civil and canon laws that in some cases any criminal heretics and others should be admitted to accuse and testify. Therefore, it is not against natural law or against divine law that criminals are admitted to accuse and testify. The major seems certain. The minor is proved by several laws.
Nam papa Deusdedit, ut habetur Extra, De simonia, c. Tanta, ait: "Tanta est labes huius criminis", scilicet simonie, "quod etiam servi adversus dominos, et quilibet criminosi admittuntur." Et infra: "quem", scilicet simoniacum, "ut ab ordine male accepto removeatur, accusare potest, vel etiam meretrix." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod interdum criminosi debent ad accusandum admitti. | For pope Deusdedit, as is found in Extra, De simonia, c. Tanta, says: "So great is the stain of this crime", namely simony, "that even slaves against their masters, and any criminals are admitted." And below: "whom", namely the simoniac, "anyone can accuse, so that he may be removed from an order badly received, or even a prostitute." From these words it is gathered that sometimes criminals must be admitted to accusation.
Item, Iulius papa, ut habetur 15 q. 3 c. Nemini, ait: "Nemini (preterquam de crimine lese maiestatis) de se confesso super alienum crimen credi oportet." Ubi dicit glossa: "et preterquam de crimine simonie." Et infra: "Item falsarius contra socium suum auditur." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod nonnunquam criminosis est credendum, et per consequens sunt ad testimonium admittendi, quia illi recipiendi sunt quibus est credendum. | Likewise, pope Julius, as found in 15 q. 3 c. Nemini, says: "No one (except for the crime of lese maiestatis) who confesses concerning himself about another's crime should be believed." Where the gloss says: "and except for the crime of simony." And below: "Also a forger is heard against his partner." By these words it is given to understand that sometimes criminals are to be believed, and consequently they are to be admitted as testimony, because those are to be received who are to be believed.
Item, 2 q. 7 c. Si hereticus sic legitur: "Si hereticus contra hereticum litiget, liceat cuivis eorum hereticum testem adducere. Sin autem orthodoxus contra hereticum litiget, pro orthodoxo quidem etiam heretici testimonium valeat, contra orthodoxum autem solius orthodoxi testimonium valeat." Ex quibus verbis habetur quod testimonium heretici non solum valet pro heretico contra hereticum, imo etiam pro orthodoxo valet. Ergo interdum admittendum est testimonium criminosi. | Likewise, in 2 q. 7 c. Si hereticus, we read: "If a heretic litigates against a heretic, let either of them bring a heretic as a witness. But if an orthodox litigates against a heretic, the testimony of the heretic is indeed valid in favour of the orthodox, but against the orthodox only the testimony of the orthodox is valid." These words establish that the testimony of a heretic is valid not only for a heretic against a heretic, but it is also valid in favour of the orthodox. Therefore, sometimes the testimony of a criminal should be admitted.
Item, socii criminis quandoque ad testimonium admittuntur (Extra, De testibus, c. Quoniam aliqua, et 6 q. 1 c. Si quis cum militibus , et Extra, De testibus cogendis, c. ultimo). Dicitur igitur, sicut notat glossa Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum P., quod in criminibus exceptis, scilicet in crimine lese maiestatis, simonie, et heresis, viles persone recipiuntur. Quod etiam Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Heli et c. Per tuas innuitur, ut videtur. Et ita habetur quod non est ex iure naturali vel divino quod criminosis fides non debet adhiberi. | Likewise, accomplices to crime are sometimes admitted to testify (Extra, De testibus, c. Quoniam aliqua, and 6 q. 1 c. Si quis cum militibus, and Extra, De testibus cogendis, c. ult.). It is said, therefore, as the gloss notes, Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum P., that in excepted crimes (namely the crime of lese maiestatis, simony, and heresy), vile persons are admitted. This is also hinted at, as it seems, in Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Heli and c. Per tuas. And so it is established that it is not by natural or divine law that faith should not be given to criminals.
Discipulus: Quamvis michi ista appareant consona veritati, peto tamen ut indices quomodo ad ipsa secundum opinionem contrariam respondetur. | Student: Although these appear to me to be in harmony with the truth, I ask you to indicate how they are answered according to the contrary opinion.
Magister: Ad intelligentiam predictorum, dicuntur alique distinctiones esse notande, quarum prima est quod aliqui audiuntur ad accusandum vel denunciandum aut ad inquisitionem aliquam prosequendam, aliqui tamen audiuntur ad testificandum. Secunda distinctio est quod criminosi aut sunt emendati de crimine aut non sunt emendati de crimine. Tertia est quod ille contra quem debet aliquis audiri aut est bone fame aut est apud viros providos et honestos graviter diffamatus. Quarta est quod aliquis auditur vel de rigore iuris vel de temperantia equitatis. Per predictas igitur distinctiones respondetur ad instantias suprascriptas. | Master: For the understanding of the foregoing, it is said that there are certain distinctions to be noted. The first is that some are heard to accuse, to denounce or to pursue some investigation, while others are heard to testify. The second distinction is that criminals are either reformed from their crime, or have not reformed from their crime. The third is that the person against whom someone should be heard is either of good repute, or is seriously defamed by prudent and honest men. The fourth is that someone is heard either from the rigor of law or from the moderation of equity. The aforementioned distinctions are therefore used to answer the above-mentioned objections.
Ad primam enim dicitur quod propter immanitatem quorundam criminum, scilicet heresis, lese maiestatis, simonie et etaim aliorum ex quibus immineret periculum, congrue criminosi etiam de crimine minime emendati, quantum est de iure naturali et divino, possent audiri, precipue contra graviter infamatum, ad accusandum et denunciandum et etiam inquisitionem prosequendam, sed non ad testificandum. Cuius ratio assignatur, quia qui ad accusandum admittitur non ideo admittitur ut sibi credatur, sed ut per informationem ipsius ad veritatem perveniatur. Sepe enim per informationes malorum veritatem invenire contingit. Et ideo nonnunquam sunt criminosi propter bonum commune et malum ac periculum communis boni vitandum ad accusandum admittendi. Sed aliter est de teste, quia semper fides adhibetur testi admisso. Criminoso autem nunquam est credendum, et ideo criminosus ad testimonium admitti non debet. Et huic concordare videtur glossa 6 q. 1 I Pars que ait: tota vis negotii pendet in testimonio, sed non in accusatione , quia, scilicet, testi adhibetur fides, accusatori autem fides minime adhibetur. | To the first it is said that because of the enormity of certain crimes, namely heresy, lese maiestatis, simony and even others from which danger threatens, criminals who were not at all reformed in their crime, as far as natural and divine law is concerned, could fittingly be heard, especially against a seriously infamed person, to accuse and denounce and also to pursue an investigation, but not to testify. A reason for this is given, because he who is admitted to accuse is not admitted so that he may be believed, but so that through his information the truth may be reached. For it is often possible to find the truth through the information of bad people. And therefore criminals are sometimes admitted to accuse for the sake of the common good and to avoid danger to the common good. But it is different with a witness, because faith is always given to an admitted witness. But a criminal is never to be believed, and therefore a criminal should not be admitted to testify. And this seems to be in agreement with the gloss on 6 q. 1 pars 1 [s.v. quod autem] which says: The whole force of the matter depends on the testimony, but not on the accusation , because, namely, faith is given to the witness, but faith is not given at all to the accuser.
Discipulus: Si accusatori fides nullatenus adhibetur, quare non indifferenter criminosus accusator admittitur contra quemcunque de crimine qualicunque. | Student: If faith is not given to the accuser at all, why is a criminal accuser not admitted indifferently against anyone for any crime whatsoever.
Magister: Ideo non est criminosus ad accusandum admittendus quia omnis accusatus multipliciter fatigatur ac gravatur ac impeditur dum oportet ipsum coram iudice comparere et accusanti respondere. Non debet autem quis absque causa antequam de crimine convincatur propter verbum illius cui non est credendum taliter fatigari. Et ideo criminosus non est indifferenter ad accusandum admittendus. | Master: A criminal should not be admitted to accusation because every accused person is in many ways wearied and burdened and hindered when he must appear before a judge and answer an accuser. But no one should be so burdened without reason before he is convicted of a crime because of the word of someone who is not to be believed. And therefore a criminal should not be admitted indifferently to accusation.
Discipulus: Per istam rationem probaretur quod in nullo casu esset criminosus admittendus, quia nunquam debet aliquis puniri vel aliqualiter fatigari propter verbum illius cui non est credendum. Imo per istam rationem videtur posse probari quod nullus esset ad accusandum admittendus, quia nullus debet puniri aut gravari antequam constet ipsum esse dignum pena. Sed omnis accusatus punitur et gravatur multis laboribus eundo ad iudicem et respondendo accusanti. Cum ergo secundum predicta fides non adhibeatur accusanti, et non est propter verbum ipsius accusatus quoquo modo vexandus. Et ideo nullus esset ad accusandum admittendus. | Student: By this argument it would be proved that in no case should a criminal be admitted, because no one should ever be punished or in any way burdened because of the word of someone who is not to be believed. Indeed, by this argument it seems possible to prove that no one should be admitted to accusation, because no one should be punished or burdened before it is established that he is worthy of punishment. But every accused person is punished and burdened with many labours in going to the judge and answering an accuser. Since, therefore, according to the aforesaid, faith is not given to the accuser, and the accused is not to be harassed in any way because of his word, therefore no one should be admitted to accusation.
Magister: Ad ista respondetur quod sepe ex iusta causa et ratione recta, imo ex iure nature pro statu nature corrupte, aliqui fatigantur et vexantur absque omni culpa, quia aliter res publica et bonum commune conservari non posset. Propter quod rationabile est ut interdum propter verbum illius cui non est credendum aliquis fatigetur, ut per talem modum precaveatur periculo communis boni. Per hoc dicitur quod rationabile est ut propter solum verbum ipsius cui est credendum aliquis qui nescitur esse innocens fatigetur. Et ideo ille cui est credendum ad accusandum debet admitti, quia aliter pax communis conservari non posset. | Master: To this it is answered that often for a just cause and right reason, nay, by the law of nature as it applies in the state of corrupted nature, some are wearied and harassed without any fault, because otherwise the commonwealth and the common good could not be preserved. For this reason it is reasonable that sometimes because of the word of a person who should not be believed someone should be wearied, so that in this way danger to the common good may be guarded against. From this it is said that it is reasonable that, because of the mere word of a person who is to be believed, someone not known to be innocent should be wearied. And therefore someone who should be believed should be admitted to accuse, because otherwise the common peace could not be preserved.
Discipulus: Istud ultimum videtur prioribus repugnare. Nam prius dictum est quod accusatori fides minime adhibetur. Hic autem dicitur quod ille cui credendum est ad accusandum debet admitti. Ergo aliquando est accusatori credendum. | Student: This last seems to contradict the former. For it was said before that faith is not given to the accuser, but here it is said that he who is to be believed should be admitted to accuse. Therefore sometimes the accuser should be believed.
Magister: Respondetur quod multi sunt fide digni quibus est credendum, quibus tamen non debet fides in omni casu, maxime in preiudicium alterius, adhiberi. Nullus enim est ad testimonium admittendus nisi fuerit fide dignus, et tamen si unus solus, quantumcunque fuerit fide dignus, contra aliquem testificetur, non est sibi credendum in preiudicium alterius ut propter testimonium eius reus culpabilis reputetur. Sic quantumcunque accusator fuerit fide dignus, non est sibi credendum ut propter accusationem ipsius accusatus culpabilis iudicetur. | Master: The answer made is that there are many trustworthy people who should be believed, but nevertheless they should not be trusted in every case, especially to the prejudice of another. For no one should be admitted as a witness unless he is trustworthy, and yet if only one person, however trustworthy he may be, testifies against someone, he is not to be believed to the prejudice of the other to the extent that the accused is considered guilty because of his testimony. So, however trustworthy the accuser may be, he is not to be believed to the extent that the accused is judged guilty [solely] because of his accusation.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo ad secundam instantiam respondetur. | Student: Tell me how answer is made to the second.
Magister: Respondetur quod Iulius papa in illo decreto non accipit credi stricte sed communiter pro audiri, quia etiam in crimine lese maiestatis, quando socius accusatus a socio, non est accusanti credendum ut propter accusationem talem debeat pro convicto haberi, cum etiam quantumcunque accusans esset bone fame et immunis a crimine, non deberet accusatus haberi pro convicto. Socius ergo in crimine lese maiestatis auditur non ut sibi credatur, sed ut vias ostendat per quas posset veritas inveniri. Socii enim criminis, scientes secreta sociorum suorum, sepe sciunt ostendere quomodo socii per evidentiam rei poterunt deprehendi etiam in facto, vel quomodo aliter eorum nequitia probari possit legitimis documentis. | Master: The answer made is that pope Julius in that decree does not take to be believed strictly but more generally for to be heard , because even in the crime of lese maiestatis, when an accomplice is accused by an accomplice, the accuser is not to be believed to the extent that the latter should be held guilty because of the accusation, since even however much the accuser may be of good fame and free from crime, the accused should not be held to have been convicted. Therefore, an accomplice in the crime of lese maiestatis is heard, not so that he may be believed, but so that he may show the ways through which the truth may be found. For accomplices in crime, knowing the secrets of their accomplices, often know how to show how by the evidence of the thing the accomplices can be caught even in the act, or how their wickedness can otherwise be proved by legitimate evidence.
Discipulus: Per hoc videtur quod quilibet criminosus esset audiendus contra quemcunque, quia crimina propter bonum commune sunt sollicite indaganda. Ergo quilibet, ut corrigantur, debet audiri. | Student: By this it seems that any criminal should be heard against anyone, because crimes for the common good must be diligently investigated. To correct them, therefore, anyone should be heard.
Magister: Respondetur quod dupliciter potest quis audiri. Uno modo in iudicio, et tali modo non est quilibet criminosus audiendus contra omnem quem accusare voluerit, quia talis audientia nunquam est sine fatigatione et gravamine ac aliquali infamia illius contra quem datur. Nunquam autem sine manifesta et patenti causa est aliquis bone fame gravandus propter verbum cuiuscunque cui non est credendum, cuiusmodi est omnis criminosus. Aliter potest quis audiri extra iudicium in secreto, et sic potest omnis criminosus audiri contra quemcunque, quia per talem auditionem nec opinio alterius aggravatur nec in aliquo fatigatur, quia nec est citandus nec ad rationem ponendus. Sed ideo prelatus audire potest tales ut sit magis sollicitus ad informandum et instruendum illum cuius crimen sibi refertur. | Master: The answer made is that someone can be heard in two ways. In one way, in a trial, and in this way not every criminal must be heard against everyone he wishes to accuse, because such a hearing is never without fatigue and burden and some infamy of the person against whom it is given. But without a clear and patent cause no person of good fame should ever be burdened because of the word of anyone who is not to be believed, as every criminal is. In another way, someone can be heard outside a trial in secret, and in this way every criminal can be heard against anyone, because by such a hearing the reputation of the other is not worsened nor is he wearied in any way, because he is neither to be cited nor held to account. But for this reason a prelate can hear such people so as to be more active in informing and instructing the person whose crime is reported to him.
Discipulus: Videtur quod si audientia datur extra iudicium in secreto quod opinio alterius est gravata saltem apud illum qui audit. | Student: It seems that if a hearing is given outside the court in secret, the reputation of the other person is worsened, at least with the one who does the hearing.
Magister: Respondetur quod sicut apud audientem confessionem alicuius non debet opinio confitentis esse gravata, ita etiam multo fortius apud audientem in secreto narrationem alicuius criminosi de aliquo crimine non debet opinio eius esse gravata, licet possit esse magis cautus observando secrete vias eius, maxime si narrans sibi crimen aliquam apparentiam veritatis videatur habere. | Master: The answer made is that just as in a person hearing someone's confession the reputation of the confessor should not be worsened, so much more so in a person hearing in secret the narration of a criminal about some crime, his reputation should not be worsened, although he may be more cautious by secretly observing his ways, especially if the person telling him the crime seems to have some appearance of truth.
Discipulus: Nunquid debet scribere talem accusationem secretam. | Student: Should he make such a secret accusation in writing?
Magister: Dicitur quod non, quia talis scriptura posset aliquo casu ad aliorum notitiam, etiam emulorum, in accusati infamiam devenire. | Master: It is said that he should not, because such a writing could in some case come to the knowledge of others, even rivals, to the infamy of the accused.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad illa que dicit glossa super preallegatum capitulum Iulii pape. | Student: Tell how one responds to what the gloss on the previously mentioned chapter of pope Julius.
Magister: Respondetur quod in crimine simonie auditur socius criminis ad accusandum, si socius fuerit diffamatus, sed non auditur ad testificandum. Similiter, confessio unius latronis auditur contra alios non ut sibi credatur sicut testi, sed ut detegat quomodo possunt alii deprehendi. Consimiliter, falsarius contra socium auditur non ad testificandum, sed ad accusandum secrete vel publice. Cum autem dicitur quod illi recipiendi sunt quibus est credendum, verum est, sed non illi soli sunt recipiendi ad accusandum, quia in quibusdam criminibus recipi possunt ad accusandum illi quibus non est credendum, quia tales interdum manifestant vias quibus veritas reperitur. | Master: The answer made is that in the crime of simony an accomplice in the crime is given a hearing to accuse, if the accomplice has been defamed, but not to testify. Similarly, the confession of one thief is heard against the others, not so that he may be believed as a witness, but so that he may disclose how the others may be caught. Similarly, a forger is heard against his partner, not to testify, but to accuse secretly or publicly. Now when it is said that those should be received who should be believed, it is true, but not only those should be received to accuse, because in certain crimes those who should not be believed can be received to accuse, because such sometimes reveal the ways by which the truth is discovered.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo ad tertiam instantiam respondetur. | Student: Tell me how answer is made to the third.
Magister: Respondetur uno modo secundum glossam ibidem, quod illa auctoritas est falsa, quia hereticus nunquam admittitur ad accusandum. | Master: The answer made is in one way, according to the gloss in that place, that that statement is false, because a heretic is never admitted to accuse.
Aliter potest dici quod in casu criminosus potest admitti, quando scilicet adversarius non potest eum repellere. Et ideo hereticus contra hereticum potest admitti, quia hereticus propter crimen heresis non potest contra ipsum excipere. Sed contra orthodoxum nequaquam recipi debet, quia orthodoxus propter crimen heresis contra ipsum excipere potest. | In another way, it can be said that in a criminal case he can be admitted, namely when the adversary cannot repel him. And therefore a heretic can be admitted against a heretic, because a heretic cannot object against him on grounds of the crime of heresy. But he should not be admitted against an orthodox, because an orthodox can object against him on grounds of the crime of heresy.
Aliter dicitur quod lex illa iniqua est simpliciter, cum heretici testimonium pro nullo valeat in preiudicium cuiuscunque, licet possit valere pro aliquo ubi nulli neque bono neque malo per testimonium eius preiudicium generatur. | In another way, it is said that that law is simply unjust, since the testimony of a heretic is of no value to the prejudice of anyone, though it can be valid in favour of someone where no person, either good or bad, is prejudiced by his testimony.
Ad quartam instantiam respondetur quod socii criminis qui non sunt de crimine emendati contra socium qui non est apud honestos et providos diffamatus non sunt umquam ad testimonium admittendi, licet in quibusdam casibus debeant ad accusandum admitti. Socii autem criminis qui sunt de crimine emendati de rigore iuris non sunt ad testimonium recipiendi, licet de temperantia equitatis possint admitti, presertim si accusatus per modum exceptionis contra eos nequaquam crimen opponat. | To the fourth objection it is answered that accomplices in crime who have not been reformed for the crime are never admitted to testimony against an accomplice who is not defamed by honest and prudent people, though in some cases they should be admitted to accuse. But accomplices of crime who are amended from the crime are not to be received as witnesses by the rigor of the law, though they may be admitted by the temperance of equity, especially if the accused *does not bring their crime as a reason against them.
Ad capitulum autem Extra, De testibus, respondetur quod mulieres cum quibus dicitur quis peccasse non sunt ad testimonium admittende, nec hoc in capitulo illo innuitur, sed insinuatur quod mulieres tales sunt audiende, ut, scilicet, dent aliqua indicia quibus possit veritas declarari, et ideo assertionibus mulierum huiusmodi non est adhibenda fides, licet quandoque viam apperire valeant veritati. | To the chapter Extra, De testibus, the response is that women with whom someone is said to have sinned are not to be admitted as witnesses, nor is this implied in that chapter, but it is suggested that such women should be heard, namely, so that they may give some indications by which the truth can be declared; and therefore the assertions of such women are not to be given credence, though sometimes they may be able to show the way to the truth.
Ad illud 6 q. 1 Si quis cum mulieribus, respondetur quod talis socius criminis audiri debet sed ad testificandum admitti non debet. | To 6 q. 1 c. Si quis cum militibus, the response is that such an accomplice of crime should be heard, but should not be admitted to testify.
Et per idem respondetur ad capitulum ultimum Extra, De testibus cogendis. | And through the same an answer is made to the last chapter, Extra, De testibus cogendis.
Does excluding criminals from testimony endanger the common good?
Discipulus: Si nec socii criminis nec quicunque alii criminosi essent ad testimonium admittendi, raro possent convinci de crimine criminosi. Hoc autem in communis boni periculum redundaret. Ergo et socii criminis et etiam alii criminosi sunt ad testimonium admittendi. Aliter enim multi criminosi evaderent impuniti. Hoc etiam, scilicet quod socii criminis et alii criminosi in testimonium admittuntur, quedam religiones, ut fertur, observant. Non est autem presumendum quod religiones aliquid observent iniquum. Ergo etc. | Student: If neither accomplices of crime nor any other criminals were to be admitted as witnesses, criminals could rarely be convicted of the crime. But this would be a danger to the common good. Therefore, both accomplices in crime and other criminals must be admitted as witnesses. For otherwise many criminals would escape unpunished. This also, namely, that accomplices in crime and other criminals are admitted as witnesses, is observed by certain religions [*i.e. religious orders], it is reported. But it is not to be presumed that religions observe anything unjust. Therefore, etc.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod melius est multos crimonosos occultos absque pena transire quam unum innocentem iniuste dampnari. Et ideo cum constet multos sepe dicere testimonium falsum, cum maxima diligentia examinari testes oportet ut, quantum possibile est, sit omnino probabile quod nullo modo velint asserere falsitatem. De criminoso autem talis probabilitas haberi non potest quod, videlicet, nullo modo velit asserere falsitatem. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that it is better for many hidden criminals to go unpunished than for one innocent person to be unjustly condemned. And therefore, since it is certain that many often give false testimony, witnesses must be examined with the greatest diligence so that, as far as possible, it is entirely probable that they in no way wish to assert falsehood. But such a probability cannot be had of a criminal, namely that he in no way wishes to assert falsehood.
Cuius ratio inter alias assignatur talis. Tanta est nequitia et superbia criminosi quod cum semel confusus fuerit et infamis, omnes alios vellet in aliquam revelationem sue confusionis et infamie consimili confusioni et infamie subiacere. Quare non solum propter hoc quod criminosus secundum preparationem cordis est omnibus vitiis irretitus, et per consequens pronus est ad testificandum falsum, sed etiam propter hoc quod, ut communiter, socios in confusione et infamia cupit habere, non est probabile quod criminosus nullo modo velit asserere falsitatem. | One reason (among others) for this is assigned as follows. So great is the wickedness and pride of the criminal that, once confounded and infamous, he would wish that in some revelation of his own trouble and infamy all others should be subjected to similar trouble and infamy. Therefore, not only because the criminal is entangled in all vices according to the preparation of his heart, and is consequently prone to testifying falsely, but also because, as is common, he desires to have partners in trouble and infamy, it is not probable that the criminal does not in any way wishe to assert falsehood.
Criminosus ergo ad testimonium dicendum nullo modo debet admitti, quod maxime veritatem habet quando criminosus contra aliquem habet inimitiam vel causam aliquam aut qualemcunque discordiam. Si enim, ut communiter, criminosus socios in confusione et infamia cupit habere, non est dubium quin desideret illos quibus inimicatur, aut quibus contrariatur etiam in speculabilibus solis, confusioni simili subiacere. Quare contra tales ad testificandum nullo modo debet admitti. | A criminal, therefore, should in no way be admitted to testify, which is especially true when the criminal has enmity or some issue or some kind of discord against someone. For if, as is common, a criminal desires to have partners in trouble and infamy, there is no doubt that he desires those with whom he is at enmity, or with whom he is opposed, even in matters of mere speculation, to be subject to a similar trouble. Therefore, he should in no way be admitted to testify against such people.
Discipulus: Non videtur quod criminosi communiter desiderent etiam contra quos causam vel inimicitiam habent notari de crimine, cum multos criminosos cernamus qui alios etiam quibus inimicantur non diffamant. | Student: It does not seem that criminals commonly desire even those against whom they have an issue or enmity to be stigmatised of crime, since we see many criminals who do not defame others, even those with whom they are at enmity.
Magister: Respondetur quod licet communiter criminosi vellent alios notari infamia, tamen ab infamatione et detractione ac mendaciis sepe retrahuntur, vel quia timent in mendaciis deprehendi, vel quia timent illos vel amicos eorum quos infamari desiderant, vel quia dubitant quos eis non credetur, vel propter aliam causam qure ad timorem aut amorem sui noscitur pertinere. Qui etiam propter aliquam causam talem malam unum diffamant et de alio nichil mali loquuntur, quare non est eis adhibenda fides. Nec posset quicunque imperator vel rex aut papa statuere quod criminosus ad testimonium, precipue contra illum cuius est inimicus vel contra quem causam habet vel rancorem, reciperetur quoquo modo. | Master: It is answered that although criminals commonly wish to have others stigmatised as infamous, yet they often shrink from defamation and detraction and lies, either because they fear being caught in lies, or because they fear those, or the friends of those, whom they wish to stigmatise, or because they suspect that they will not be believed, or for some other reason that is known to pertain to fear or self-love. They also for some such bad reason defame one person and say nothing bad about another. Therefore they should not be trusted. Nor could any emperor, king or pope decree that a criminal should be in any way accepted as a witness, especially against someone whose enemy he is or against whom he has an issue or grudge.
Quod adhuc tali ratione probatur. Maxima debet esse sollicitudo in superioribus ne succumbant per falsum testimonium innocentes. Cuius ratio est quia nemo, neque per bonitatem aut sanctitatem vite, neque per honestam conversationem, neque per sapientiam, neque per testimonium multorum laudabile, neque quocunque alio modo preter divinum miraculum potest contra infamationes, criminationes, falsorum criminum impositiones, et detractiones, mendacia, et falsa testimonia se munire, testante sapiente qui ait: "Arbitrii non est nostri quod quicunque loquatur." Imo sanctitas, bonitas, sapientia, iustitia et virtutes, sicut summe ad invidiam provocant criminosos, ita ex eis scelerati viri ad mentiendum de virtuosis et innocentibus incitantur. | This is further proved by the following argument. There should be the greatest solicitude on the part of superiors lest innocent people succumb to false testimony. The reason is that no one, whether by goodness or holiness of life, or by honest behaviour, or by wisdom, or by the favourable testimony of many, or in any other way except by divine miracle, can protect himself against slander, accusations, false accusations, and detractions, lies, and false testimonies, as a wise man testifies. He says: "We cannot choose what someone may say." Indeed, just as holiness, goodness, wisdom, justice, and virtues greatly provoke criminals to envy, so from them wicked men are incited to lie about the virtuous and innocent.
Et ita sancti viri per virtutes contra criminosorum diffamationes et mendacia minime muniuntur. De quo tam in veteri testamento quam in scripturis sanctorum auctenticis manifesta habemus exempla. Joseph enim sanctus et sapiens se ab infamia et falso testimonio non potuit custodire. Nec Susanna per castitatem contra infamiam et falsa testimonia valuit se munire. Sanctus etiam Athanasius neque per sanctitatem neque per fidei sinceritatem hereticos refrenavit ne mulierem inducerent que eum de fornicatione publice accusaret, et se ab eo impregnatam assereret. Nullo igitur modo humane fragilitati possibili potest se quis contra mendacia et falsa testimonia communire. Quia, sicut secundum mundi sapientem honor est in potestate honorantis et non in potestate honorati , ita vituperium est in potestate vituperantis et non in potestate vituperati. | And so holy men are not at all protected by virtues against the defamations and lies of criminals. Of this we have clear examples both in the Old Testament and in the authentic writings of the saints. For the holy and wise Joseph could not protect himself from infamy and false testimony. Nor was Susanna able to protect herself by chastity against infamy and false testimonies. Saint Athanasius also, neither by holiness nor by sincerity of faith, restrained heretics from bringing in a woman who would publicly accuse him of fornication and assert that she had been impregnated by him. Therefore, in no way possible to human frailty can anyone protect themselves against lies and false testimony. For, as according to the wise man of the world [Aristotle], Honor is in the power of the one who honors, and not in the power of the one who is honored, so reproach is in the power of the one who reproaches and not in the power of the one reproached.
Et ideo in nullius potestate est quod non de crimine infametur, vel contra ipsum falsum testimonium proferatur. Quare superiores qui debent innocentiam defendere et tueri summe cavere tenentur ne innocentia per infamiam aut falsum testimonium maculetur. Hoc autem non facerent nisi omnes criminosos, et precipue de inimicitia aut discordia vel contrarietate suspectos, repellerent. Ergo tales ad testimonium non debent admittere. | And therefore it is in no one's power not to be defamed for a crime or to have false testimony brought against him. Therefore superiors who must defend and protect innocence are bound to take the utmost care lest innocence be stained by defamation or false testimony. But they would not do this, unless they repelled all criminals, and especially those suspected of enmity or discord or opposition. Therefore they should not admit such persons to testify.
Quod adhuc auctoritatibus confirmatur. Constantinus imperator, ut legitur q. 1 c. Iudex, ait: "Iudex criminosum discutiens non ante sententiam proferat, quam aut reum ipse se confiteatur, aut per innocentes testes convincatur." Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod nunquam debet quis per criminosos testes convinci. | This is further confirmed by authorities. The Emperor Constantine, as we read in q. 1 c. Iudex, said: "A judge considering a criminal case shall not pronounce sentence before the accused confesses himself that he is guilty or is convicted by witnesses who are innocent." From these words it is clearly seen that no one should ever be convicted by witnesses who are criminals.
Huic concordat Felix papa qui, ut habetur causa et questione predictis, c. Primates, ait: "Primates accusatum discutientes episcopum non ante sententiam proferant dampnationis, quam aut reum se ipse confiteatur, aut per innocentes et canonice examinatos regulariter testes convincatur." | Pope Felix agrees with this; as is stated in the aforementioned cause and question, c. Primates, he says: "The primates considering an accused bishop shall not pronounce sentence of condemnation before he himself confesses that he is guilty, or is properly convicted by innocent and canonically examined witnesses."
Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus patet aperte quod testes debent esse innocentes, omni infamia et suspicione carentes. | From these and many other [texts] it is clearly seen that witnesses should be innocent, devoid of all infamy and suspicion.
Cum autem dicis quod si nec socii criminis nec alii criminosi essent ad testimonium admittendi raro possent convinci de crimine criminosi, respondetur quod hoc non continet veritatem, quia multi criminosi per evidentiam rei, multi per testes idoneos, multi per indicia et documenta legitima convinci possunt de crimine. Nec aliter sunt quicunque de crimine publice accusandi, secundum quod legitur C. libro quarto, titulo De probationibus, et recitatur 2 q. 8 c. Sciant, ubi sic dicitur: "Sciant cuncti accusatores, eam rem se deferre debere in publicam notionem, que munita sit testibus idoneis, vel instructa apertissimis documentis, vel indiciis ad probationem indubitatis et luce clarioribus expedita." Nullus ergo criminosus ad testificandum est idoneus reputandus. | But when you say that if neither accomplices to the crime nor other criminals were admitted to testify, criminals could rarely be convicted of a crime, it is answered that this does not contain the truth, because many criminals can be convicted of a crime by evidence of the fact, many by suitable witnesses, many by indications and legitimate evidence. No one should be publicly accused of crime in any other way, according to what we read in C. IV, tit. [19 c.25] De Probationibus, which is quoted 2 q. 8 c. Sciant, thus: "Let all accusers know that they should bring that matter to public notice that is supported by suitable witnesses, or furnished with the most open evidence, or [*expedita] furthered by indications for proof that are beyond doubt and clearer than light." Therefore no criminal should be considered suitable to testify.
Quod etiam tali ratione probatur. Crimen magis repugnat idoneitati testis quam conditio, consanguineitas, et familiaritas, que possunt in viris optimis et veracissimis inveniri. Sed conditio, puta servitus, consanguineitas, et familiaritas idoneitati testis obviant et repugnant, quia servi, consanguinei, et familiares ac domestici accusatoris ad testificandum contra accusatum admitti non debent (3 q. 5 c. 1, et c. De accusationibus, et c. Nullus, et c. Accusatores). Ergo multo magis criminosi ad testificandum non debent admitti. Admittuntur tamen sepe de facto, quia multotiens debitus ordo iuris circa innocentes et criminosos non servatur. | This is also proved by the following argument. Crime is more in conflict with the suitability of a witness than condition, consanguinity, and familiarity , which can be found in the best and most truthful men. But condition, for example servitude, consanguinity, and familiarity, oppose and conflict with the suitability of a witness, because the slaves, relatives, and household members [*digest 50.16.195 https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/d-50.htm#16] and domestics of the accuser should not be admitted to testify against the accused (3 q. 5 c. 1, and c.5 De Accusationibus, and c.11 Nullus, and c.8 Accusatores). Therefore, criminals should not be admitted to testify. But in fact they are often admitted, because the due order of law regarding innocent and criminal persons is often not observed.
Cum vero dicis quod quedam religiones criminosos et socios criminis ad testificandum admittunt, respondetur a nonnullis quos tales consuetudines et statuta sunt iniqua, ex zelo indiscreto vel hypocrisi ortum habentia. Multi enim sceleratissimi religiosi et alii crimina, non servato recto ordine iudiciario, prosequuntur, detestantur, et execrantur, ut sancti et zelatores sanctitatis et honestatis ab hominibus reputentur. Et ideo facta et statuta eorum ad exemplum minime sunt trahenda, quia non exemplis sed legibus consonis rationi recte iudicare oportet. Ratio enim recta, maxime in divina scriptura fundata, omnibus exemplis, legibus, et statutis humanis est omnimode preferenda. Cum ergo ratio recta dictet quod criminoso in nullo negotio est credendum, propter nulla exempla debet quis in preiudicium alterius credere criminoso, maxime periuro, mendaci, detractori, criminatori, falsorum criminum impositori, calumpniatori, proditori, famosorum libellorum compositori, et similibus, qui factis vel verbis mentiri noscuntur. Novi enim nonnullos qui hac arte utuntur quod, quando contra aliquem offenduntur, statim ipsum de aliquo crimine per infamiam maculare nituntur. Et si non audent in publico, ad detractiones occultas se convertunt. | When you say that certain religions [i.e. religious orders] admit criminals and accomplices to crime to testify, some respond that such customs and statutes are unjust, arising from indiscreet zeal or hypocrisy. For many very wicked religious people and others, without observing the correct judicial order, prosecute, detest, and execrate crimes, so that they may be considered by men to be saints and zealots of holiness and honesty. And therefore their deeds and statutes are by no means to be taken as an example, because it is not by examples but by laws in harmony with reason that one must judge correctly. For right reason, especially founded on divine Scripture, must be preferred in every way to all examples, laws, and human statutes. Since, therefore, right reason dictates that a criminal is not to be trusted in any matter, no one should, for any reason, to the detriment of another, trust a criminal, especially a perjurer, a liar, a detractor, an incriminator, an accuser of false charges, a slanderer, a traitor, a composer of defamatory pamphlets, and the like, who are known to lie in deeds or words. For I know some who use this art that, when they are offended against someone, they immediately try to stain him with some crime through infamy. And if they dare not in public, they turn to secret detractions.
Discipulus: Nunquid tales postquam fuerint de crimine emendati ad testificandum debent admitti, et eis in aliquo negotio est credendum. | Student: Should such people, after they have been corrected from their crime, be admitted to testify, and should they be believed in any matter?
Magister: Una est assertio quod talibus, et universaliter illis qui de quocunque periurio vel mendacio pernicioso semel fuerint legitime deprehensi, nunquam in perpetuum est credendum, nisi per apertam operationem miraculi facti in testimonium sanctitatis eorum ostensi fuerint de tali crimine emendati. Cuius assertionis ratio tacta est supra, quia, scilicet, nullus potest se contra mendacia custodire, maxime qui habet inimicos, emulos, contrarios, et adversarios etiam in opinionibus, vel qui aliquos quocunque modo offendit. Et ideo vix aut nunquam potest sufficiens adhiberi cautela ne mendaciter, occulte vel publice, diffametur. Propter quod videmus quod fere omnes magne persone et in quacunque gratia excellentes, maxime qui malos offendunt infamia facti, de aliquo crimine infamantur, licet sepe talis infamia facti nichil aut parum nocere queat. | Master: One assertion is that such people, and in general those who have once been lawfully caught in any perjury or pernicious lie, should never be believed forever, unless they have been shown to have been corrected from such crime by an open miracle performed in testimony to their holiness. The reason for this assertion was touched upon above, namely, because no one can guard himself against lies, especially anyone who has enemies, rivals, opponents, and adversaries (even in opinions), or who offends others in any way. And therefore, sufficient caution can hardly or never be taken against being falsely defamed, secretly or publicly. Because of this, we see that almost all great people and people excellent in any virtue, especially those who offend evil people *by infamy of fact, are defamed for some crime, although often such infamy of fact can do little or no harm.
Alia est assertio quod mendaces et periurii, detractores, falsorum criminum impositores, libellorum famosorum compositores, et alii qui factis vel verbis mentiti fuerint deprehensi, postquam diu et viis exquisitis fuerint de veracitate probati, possunt ad testificandum assumi. | Another assertion is that liars and perjurers, detractors, false accusers, writers of defamatory pamphlets, and others who have been caught lying in deeds or words, after their veracity has been proved over a long time and by thorough means, can be taken to testify.
Alia est assertio quod omnes huiusmodi possunt ad famam restitui auctoritate principis, et ex tunc eis sicut aliis est credendum. | Another assertion is that all such people can be restored to [good] fame by the authority of a ruler, and from then on they are to be believed like others.
Capitulum 80 | Chapter 80
Discipulus: Aperte conspicio quod ista assertio criminoso in nullo negotio est credendum , in qua est fundata ratio prima qua ostenditur quod pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum, difficultates habet quamplurimas, quas nolo hic amplius pertractare, sed ad librum quem de hac materia et ei connexis es facturus censeo differendas. Ideo assertionem predictam aliis rationibus et auctoritatibus fulcire nitaris, non specificando an ex iure naturali et divino aut humano procedat quod pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum. | Student: I clearly see that this assertion "a criminal is to be believed in no matter", on which the first argument is based to show that a heretic pope must be believed in no matter, has many difficulties, which I do not wish to discuss further here, but I think should be deferred to the book that you are going to write on this matter and those connected with it. Try, therefore, to support the aforementioned assertion with other arguments and authorities, not specifying whether it proceeds from natural and divine or human law that a heretic pope must be believed in no matter.
Magister: Secunda ratio qua specialiter ostenditur quod pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum in preiudicium catholici est talis. Inimico in nullo negotio est credendum contra aliquem (3 q. 5 c. Accusatores, et c. Accusatoribus, et c. Suspectos, et c. Canonica, et Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum P., et c. Meminimus). Papa autem hereticus omnium orthodoxorum inimicus extitit, quia heretici catholicos graviter persequuntur. Ergo pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum. | Master: A second argument to show that specifically a heretic pope should not be believed in any matter to the prejudice of a Catholic is as follows. An enemy should not be believed in any matter against someone (3 q. 5 c. Accusatores, and c. Accusatoribus, and c. Suspectos, and c. Canonica, and Extra, De accusationibus, c. Cum P., and c. Meminimus). But an heretic pope has become the enemy of all orthodox people, because heretics severely persecute Catholics. Therefore, a heretic pope is not to be believed in any matter.
Tertia ratio talis est. Mendaci in nullo negotio est credendum. Papa hereticus, sicut et quilibet alius hereticus, periculosissimum et pessimo genere mendacii noscitur laborare, mendacio videlicet in doctrina religionis, de quo Augustinus in libro De mendacio, et ponitur 22 q. 2 c. Primum, ait: "Primum capitale est mendacium et longe fugiendum, quod fit in doctrina religionis, ad quod mendacium nulla conditione quivis debeat adduci." Ergo pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum. | A third argument is as follows. A liar must be believed in no matter. A heretic pope, like any other heretic, is known to work with the most dangerous and worst kind of lie, namely, a lie in the doctrine of religion, of which Augustine speaks in the book On Lying [c.25], quoted in 22 q. 2 c. Primum. He says: "The first and capital lie, one to be avoided a long way, is that which is made in the teaching of religion; to this lie no one should be led under any circumstances." Therefore a heretic pope must be believed in no matter.
Quarta ratio est hec. Apostatis est minime credendum (3 q. 4 c. Beatus). Papa autem hereticus est apostata a fide. Ergo sibi minime est credendum. | A fourth argument is this. Apostates should not be believed in any way (3 q. 4 c. Beatus). But a heretic pope is an apostate from the faith. Therefore he should not be believed in any way.
Quinta ratio est hec. Nullo excommunicato est credendum, teste Stephano papa qui, ut legitur 3 q. 4 c. Nullus, ait: "Nullus anathematizatorum suscipiatur, nec a quoquam credantur que ab eis dicuntur vel conscribuntur." Papa autem hereticus est excommunicatus. Ergo ei in nullo negotio est credendum. | A fifth argument is this. No excommunicated person should be believed, as pope Stephen testifies. As we read in 3 q. 4 c. Nullus, he says: "Let none of the anathematized be received, and let no one believe anything said or written by them." But a heretic pope is excommunicated. Therefore he should not be believed in any matter.
Sexta ratio est hec. Illi in nullo negotio est credendum qui non est ad accusandum admittendus, quia minus est aliquem recipere ad accusandum quam credere ei. In plerisque enim negotiis multi non fide digni accusare possunt, sed soli fide digno est credendum. Illi enim qui non est fide dignus credi non debet. Papa autem hereticus ad accusandum nullatenus debet admitti, quia nullus hereticus aut in fide suspectus debet ad accusandum admitti (3 q. 4 c. Si quis, et q. 5 c. Suspectos, et c. Nullus). Ergo pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum. | A sixth argument is this. A person should not be believed in any matter if he should not be admitted to accuse, because it is less to receive someone to accuse than to believe him. For in most matters many untrustworthy people can accuse, but only a trustworthy person must be believed. For a person who is not trustworthy should not be believed. But a heretic pope should not at all be admitted to accuse, because no heretic or one suspect in faith should be admitted to accuse (3 q. 4 c. Si quis, and q. 5 c. Suspectos, and c. Nullus). Therefore a heretic pope should not be believed in any matter.
Septima ratio est hec. Non magis est credendum hereticis quam fautoribus et defensoribus eorumdem. Sed fautoribus et defensoribus hereticorum minime est credendum, nec sunt ad testimonium admittendi (Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus). Ergo multo fortius hereticis minime est credendum, ex quo sequitur quod pape heretico fides debet nullatenus adhiberi. | A seventh argument is this. Heretics should not be believed any more than their supporters and defenders. But the supporters and defenders of heretics should not be believed at all, nor are they to be admitted as witnesses (Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus). Therefore, much more, heretics should not be believed in any matter, from which it follows that faith should not be given to a heretic pope in any way.
Quod etiam auctoritatibus videtur posse probari. Ait enim Stephanus papa, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. 1: "Nec eis omnino credendum est, qui fidem veritatis ignorant." Papa autem hereticus fidem veritatis ignorat, imo fidem veritatis impugnat. Ergo ei in nullo negotio est credendum. | It seems this can also be proved by authorities. For pope Stephen says, as found in Extra, De hereticis, c. 1: "Nor are they to be believed at all who are ignorant of the faith of truth." But a heretic pope is ignorant of the faith of truth, nay, he attacks the faith of truth. Therefore he should not be believed in any matter.
Item, Augustinus ad Bonifatium scribens, ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas, ait: "Quos enim divina testimonia non sequuntur, pondus humani testimonii perdiderunt." Papam autem hereticum divina testimonia non sequuntur, cum divina testimonia destruere et impugnare nitatur. Ergo ad testimonium perhibendum admitti non debet, et per consequens sibi credi non debet. | Likewise, Augustine, writing to Boniface, 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas, says: "For those who do not follow divine testimonies have lost the weight of human testimony." But a heretic pope does not follow divine testimonies, since he tries to destroy and attack divine testimonies. Therefore he should not be admitted to give testimony, and consequently he should not be believed.
Item, in concilio Toletano quarto, ut habetur 2 q. 7 c. Non potest, sic legitur: "Non potest erga homines esse fidelis qui Deo extiterit infidelis." Sed papa hereticus Deo infidelis existit. Igitur erga homines fidelis esse non potest. Illi autem non est credendum qui erga homines fidelis esse non potest. Ergo pape heretico in nullo negotio, maxime contra catholicum, est credendum. | Likewise, in the Fourth Council of Toledo, 2 q. 7 c. [24] Non potest: "No one can be faithful to men who has been unfaithful to God." But a heretic pope is unfaithful to God. Therefore he cannot be faithful to men. But a person should not be believed if he cannot be faithful to men. Therefore a heretic pope should not be believed, especially against a Catholic, in any matter.
Item, ibidem subiungitur: "Sicut in fide Christi suspecti sunt, ita in testimonio humano dubii habentur." Ergo multo magis de quibus certum est quod ex pertinacia contra fidem errant, certi in testimonio humano reputari non debent. Certum est autem quod papa hereticus ex pertinacia errat contra fidem. Ergo in testimonio humano non debet certus haberi, et per consequens pape heretico minime est credendum. | Likewise, in the same place [2 q. 7 c. 24] it is added: "Just as they are suspect in the faith of Christ, so they are considered doubtful in human testimony." Therefore, much more so, those of whom it is certain that they err from stubbornness against the faith should not be considered certain in human testimony. But it is certain that a heretic pope errs from stubbornness against the faith. Therefore, one should not be considered certain in human testimony, and consequently a heretic pope is not to be believed at all.
Item, ubi prius subditur: "Infirmari oportet eorum testimonium, qui in fide falsi docentur." Papa autem hereticus est falsus in fide, ergo infirmari oportet testimonium eius, et per consequens ei nullatenus est credendum. | Likewise, at the above place [2 q. 7 c. 24] it is added: "The testimony of those who are taught false in faith must be invalidated." But a heretic pope is false in faith, therefore his testimony must be invalidated, and consequently he is not to be believed at all.
Item, ubi prius legitur: "Nec eis est credendum qui veritatis a se fidem abiecerunt." Papa autem hereticus a se fidem veritatis abiecerit. Ergo pape heretico nullatenus est credendum. | Likewise, at the above place [2 q. 7 c. 24] we read: "Nor are they to be believed who have cast off from themselves the faith of the truth." But a heretic pope has cast off the faith of the truth from himself. Therefore, a heretic pope is not to be believed at all.
Capitulum 81 | Chapter 81
Discipulus: De ista materia que allegasti ad presens sufficiant. Ideo dic si papa hereticus aliqua pena alia est punitus. | Student: On this matter the points you have brought forward are enough for now. Tell me, therefore, if a heretic pope is punished with any other penalty.
Magister: Una est assertio quod papa hereticus ipso facto sententiam excommunicationis incurrit, quemadmodum verberans clericum. Licet nequaquam nominatim excommunicetur de novo, vel etiam denunciatur, ipse excommunicationis sententia est ligatus. | Master: One assertion is that a heretic pope ipso facto incurs the sentence of excommunication, like someone who beats a cleric. Although he may not be newly excommunicated by name, or even denounced, he is bound by a sentence of excommunication.
Discipulus: Videtur secundum istam assertionem quod papa hereticus sententia excommunicationis lata a iure involvitur, sed minime explicatur a quo iure, scilicet divino vel humano, sit lata ista sententia. Ideo dic quo iure secundum istam assertionem papa hereticus excommunicationis sententia innodatur. | Student: It seems, according to this assertion, that a heretic pope is involved in a sentence of excommunication passed by law, but it is not explained by what law, namely divine or human, that sentence was passed. Therefore, tell me by what law, according to this assertion, a heretic pope is bound by a sentence of excommunication.
Magister: Respondetur distinguendo, quod cum excommunicatio sit separatio ab actu legitimo, quot sunt actus legitimi tot potuerunt esse excommunicationes. Est autem unus actus legitimus inter christianos, qui est participatio sacramentorum. Alius autem est instructio seu informatio in fide et moribus publica vel occulta. Alius est communio fidelium in comedendo et bibendo et convictu. Alius est testimonium perhibere. Plures etiam sunt alii actus legitimi, sed de predictis ad presens loqui sufficiat. | Master: The answer is made by distinguishing, that since excommunication is a separation by a lawful [*legitimo] act, there could be as many excommunications as there are lawful acts. One lawful act among Christians is participation in the sacraments. Another is instruction or information in faith and morals, public or secret. Another is the companionship of the faithful in eating and drinking and living together. Another is to give testimony. There are also many other lawful acts, but it will be enough to speak of the aforementioned for the present.
Dicitur igitur quod quedam est separatio sive excommunicatio a participatione sacramentorum ecclesie, quedam ab instructione publica et occulta christianorum in fide et moribus, quedam a testimonio perhibendo, quedam a communione fidelium. Primam excommunicationem et secundam incurrit papa hereticus ex iure divino, quia ex iure divino papa hereticus est extra ecclesiam, et a corpore ecclesie separatus tanquam destructor ecclesie catholice et subversor, et ideo nec suscipere nec administrare debet ecclesiastica sacramenta nisi in necessitate sacramentum baptismi, nec christianos docere debet publice vel occulte. | It is said, therefore, that there is a certain separation or excommunication from participation in the sacraments of the Church, another from public and secret instruction of Christians in faith and morals, another from giving testimony, and another from the companionship of the faithful. A heretic pope incurrs the first and second excommunications by divine law, because by divine law a heretic pope is outside the Church and separated from the body of the Church as being a destroyer and subverter of the Catholic Church, and therefore he must neither receive nor administer the sacraments of the Church (except in case of necessity [*he may administer] the sacrament of baptism), nor must he teach Christians publicly or secretly.
De tertia separatione sunt opiniones de quibus dictum est prius, quibusdam dicentibus quod papa hereticus ex iure divino et naturali a testimonio perhibendo excluditur, aliis asserentibus quod solummodo iure humano repellitur. Quartam separationem incurrit papa hereticus solummodo ex iure humano, quo omnes heretici a communione fidelium separantur. | Regarding the third separation, there are opinions as mentioned before, some saying that a heretic pope is excluded by divine and natural law from giving testimony, others asserting that he is repelled only by human law. The fourth separation is incurred by a heretic pope only by human law, by which all heretics are separated from the companionship of the faithful.
Discipulus: Istam sententiam plene intelligo, circa quam duo tantummodo probare nitaris, primo quod excommunicatio que est separatio a communione fidelium iure divino nequaquam infligitur, secundo quod hereticus hanc excommunicationem ipso facto incurrit. | Student: I fully understand that opinion, about which you are trying to prove only two things, first that the excommunication that is separation from the companionship of the faithful is never inflicted by divine law, second that a heretic incurs this excommunication ipso facto.
Magister: Primum videtur multis modis posse probari. Primo, exemplis sanctorum qui infidelibus et hereticis in temporalibus communicaverunt, sicut multi viri sancti cum Iuliano heretico, postquam fuit imperator, communicaverunt. | Master: The first seems provable in many ways. First, by the examples of saints who communicated with unbelievers and heretics in temporal matters, as many holy men communicated with the heretic Julian after he was emperor.
Discipulus: Istud exemplum sufficit michi pro nunc, ideo pro secundo allegare coneris. | Student: That example is enough for me for now, so try to argue for the second.
Magister: Secundum probatur sic. Omnes heretici qui sententiis generalium conciliorum et summorum pontificum sunt subiecti, ipso facto sententiam talis excommunicationis incurrunt, quia ipso facto incidunt in canonem late sententie contra omnes hereticos indistincte prolate (Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus 1o et 2o, et c. Sicut, et Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Noverit). Sed papa hereticus est subiectus sententiis generalium conciliorum et summorum pontificum, quemadmodum, ipso vivente, si esset generale concilium congregatum et summus pontifex novus esset creatus, iurisdictioni tam concilii generalis quam summi pontificis esset subiectus. Ergo papa hereticus ipso facto sententiam excommunicationis incurrit. | Master: The second is proved thus. All heretics who are subject to the sentences of general councils and supreme pontiffs, incur the sentence of such excommunication ipso facto [i.e. simply by becoming a heretic], because ipso facto they fall under the canon of sentence passed against all heretics indiscriminately (Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, and c. Excommunicamus i and ii, and c. Sicut, and Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Noverit). But a heretic pope is subject to the sentences of general councils and supreme pontiffs, just as, while he was living, if a general council had been convened and a new supreme pontiff had been created, he [i.e. the heretic former pope] would have been subject to the jurisdiction of both the general council and the supreme pontiff. Therefore, a heretic pope incurs the sentence of excommunication ipso facto.
Quod glossa 24 q. 1 c. 1 super illo verbo "Quicunque in heresim semel dampnatam labitur eius dampnatione seipsum involvit" insinuare videtur, dicens: "Hic est casus, in quo papa papam potest ligare, in quo papa in canonem late sententie incidit, nec huic obviat regula illa: quia par parem solvere vel ligare non potest... quia si papa hereticus est, in eo quod hereticus est, est minor quolibet catholico." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa effectus hereticus sententia predecessoris sui contra hereticos indistincte prolata ligatur. Et non est maior ratio quod ligetur una sententia sui predecessoris contra hereticos indistincte prolata quam alia. Ergo papa hereticus omni sententia romanorum pontificum contra hereticos indistincte prolata noscitur innodari. | The gloss on 24 q. 1 c. 1 on the words " Whoever falls into heresy once condemned involves himself in its condemnation" seems to suggest this, saying: "This is a case in which a pope can bind a pope, in which the pope falls into the canon of sentence passed, and this does not coflict with the rule equal cannot loose or bind equal ... because if the pope is a heretic, because he is a heretic he is less than any Catholic." From these words we gather that a pope who has become a heretic is bound by the sentence of his predecessor pronounced against heretics indiscriminately. And there is no reason why he is bound by one sentence of his predecessor pronounced indiscriminately against heretics more than another. Therefore a heretic pope is known to be bound by every sentence of the Roman pontiffs pronounced against heretics indiscriminately.
Inter alias autem sententias excommunicationis sententia contra omnes hereticos est indistincte prolata, ut probatum est supra. Ergo papa hereticus ipso facto sententiam excommunicationis incurrit, ex quo concluditur quod omnes qui scirent papam esse hereticum ipsum tanquam excommunicatum excommunicationi maiori vitare deberent, nec eis liceret sibi aliqualiter obedire. | But among other sentences, the sentence of excommunication is pronounced against all heretics indiscriminately, as has been proved above. Therefore, a heretic pope ipso facto incurs the sentence of excommunication, from which it is concluded that all who knew that the pope was a heretic should avoid him as having been excommunicated by a major excommunication, and they would not be permitted to obey him in any way.
Capitulum 82 | Chapter 82
Discipulus: Dic an, secundum dicentes papam hereticum ipso facto esse papatu privatum, papa hereticus aliqua pena alia sit plectendus. | Student: Tell me whether, according to those who say that a heretic pope is deprived of the papacy ipso facto, a heretic pope should be punished with some other penalty?
Magister: Dicunt quod multiplici pena, quam de facto nequaquam incurrit, per iudicem competentem puniri debet secundum canonicas sanctiones. | Master: They say that there are multiple penalties, which he does not incur de facto, by which he should be punished by a competent judge in accordance with canonical laws.
Discipulus: Numera penas aliquas graviores quibus est papa hereticus feriendus secundum assertores predictos. | Student: List some more serious penalties with which a heretic pope should be punished according to those who assert this.
Magister: Dicunt quod de sede apostolica est pellendus per potentiam temporalem, quia magis repugnat apostolice sedi et dignitati papali labes heretica quam intrusio cui heretica pravitas minime est annexa. Sed intrusus de eadem sede apostolica est pellendus (dist. 79 c. Si quis pecunia). Ergo multo magis papa hereticus de sede apostolica per temporalem potentiam est pellendus. | Master: They say that he must be expelled from the Apostolic See by temporal power, because heretical taint is more repugnant to the apostolic see and papal dignity than an intrusion to which heretical depravity is not at all attached. But an intruder must be expelled from the Apostolic See (dist. 79 c. Si quis pecunia). Therefore, much more, a heretic pope must be expelled from the Apostolic See by temporal power.
Secundo dicunt quod est ab omni ordine ecclesiastico degradandus, et, nisi ad fidei unitatem redierit, est curie seculari tradendus. Si autem redierit est perpetuo carceri mancipandus. Probantur hec Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus. | Secondly, they say that he must be degraded from all ecclesiastical order, and, unless he returns to the unity of the faith, he must be delivered to the secular court. But if he returns, he must be permanently imprisoned. These are proved by Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus.
Tertio dicunt quod bona eius, si qua habuerit propria, sunt penitus confiscanda (Extra, De hereticis, c. Vergentis). Omnia ista una ratione, que tacta est prius, fulcire nituntur, que est hec: papa hereticus nullo gaudet privilegio speciali ultra alios episcopos labem hereticam incurrentes, quia in nulla sententia canonis generalis concilii vel summi pontificis contra hereticos lata specialiter excipitur papa hereticus magis quam alii episcopi heretici. | Thirdly, they say that his goods, if he has any of his own, are to be completely confiscated (Extra, De Hereticis, c. Vergentis). All these things are supported by a reason that was touched upon before, which is this: a heretic pope enjoys no special privilege over other bishops who incur heretical taint, because in no sentence issued against heretics by a canon of a general council or of the supreme pontiff is a heretic pope specially excepted more than other heretic bishops.
Cum ergo papa hereticus sit subiectus sententii generalium conciliorum et summorum pontificum, omnis pena taxata in canonibus generalium conciliorum et summorum pontificum episcopis hereticis infligenda pape heretico debet infligi. Et ita, licet papa hereticus ipso facto nec de apostolica sede sit expulsus, nec omni prerogativa ordinis ecclesiastici degradetur, nec sit traditus curie seculari, nec sit perpetuo carceri mancipatus, nec bona ipsius propria confiscentur, tamen omnes pene predicte per iudicem competentem sibi debent infligi. | Since, therefore, a heretic pope is subject to the sentence of general councils and supreme pontiffs, every penalty imposed in the canons of general councils and supreme pontiffs to be inflicted on heretic bishops must be inflicted on a heretic pope. And so, although a heretic pope is not ipso facto expelled from the apostolic see, or degraded from all prerogatives of the ecclesiastical order, or delivered to a secular court, or perpetually imprisoned, or has his property confiscated, nevertheless all of the aforementioned penalties must be inflicted on him by a competent judge.
Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istos papa hereticus aliquas alias penas preter penas hereticis infligendas debet sustinere. | Student: According to these people, should a heretic pope suffer any other punishments than those to be inflicted on heretics?
Magister: Respondent quod si papa de nullo alio crimine quam de crimine pravitatis heretice potest convinci, penis est hereticorum solummodo percellendus. Si autem de aliquo alio crimine, puta homicidii, facto, consilio, precepto, vel defensione commisso, aut crimine lese maiestatis, aut simonia vel rapina, aut depredatione seu guerrarum concitatione, aut innocentium dampnatione sive persecutione, vel quocunque alio crimine potuerit convinci legitime, penis huiusmodi criminum est plectendus. | Master: They answer that if the pope can be convicted of no other crime than the crime of heretical depravity, the penalty for heretics alone must be inflicted. But if he can be lawfully convicted of any other crime, such as murder (committed in fact, or by counsel, command or defence), or the crime of lese maiestatis, or simony or robbery, or plunder or incitement to war, or the damnation or persecution of innocents, or any other crime whatsoever, he should be punished with the penalty for such crimes.
Capitulum 83 | Chapter 83
Discipulus: Adverto quod isti assertores inter papam hereticum puniendum et episcopos hereticos puniendos parvam aut nullam differentiam arbitrantur quantum ad penas hereticis et criminosis aliis infligendas. Ideo post predicta, ad interrogandum de iudice competenti pape heretici, per quem scilicet pene predicti sibi imponi debeant, me convertam. Quamvis enim in principio huius sexti multa disserueris de iudice veri pape super crimine heresis mendaciter diffamati, et supra capitulis 72, et 73, et 74, et 75 aliqua dixeris de habenti potestatem papam hereticum deponendi, volo tamen nunc de iudice qui penas hereticorum pape heretico debet imponere magis exquisite inquirere. | Student: I notice that these assertors think that there is little or no difference between punishing a heretic pope and punishing heretic bishops as regards the penalties to be inflicted on heretics and other criminals. Therefore, after the aforementioned, I will turn to ask about the competent judge of a heretic pope, that is, by whom should the aforementioned penalties be imposed on him? For although at the beginning of this sixth Book you discoursed much about the judge of a true pope falsely defamed of the crime of heresy, and above in chapters 72, 73, 74, and 75 you have said something about who has the power to depose a heretic pope, I nevertheless now want to inquire more closely about the judge who should impose the penalties of heretics on a pope who is a heretic.
Dic autem in primis an ad unum vel plures iudices de iure pertineat pape heretico predictas penas, scilicet, expulsionem de apostolica sede, degradationem, incarcerationem vel traditionem curie seculari, et bonorum proprium confiscationem, infligere. | But tell me first whether by law it belongs to one judge, or more, to inflict the aforementioned penalties on a heretic pope, namely, expulsion from the apostolic see, degradation, imprisonment or delivery to the secular court, and the confiscation of his property.
Magister: Una opinio tenet quod predictas penas infligere pape heretico de iure spectat ad generale concilium, si fuerit congregatum, et ad papam catholicum, si fuerit electus canonice. Si autem nec concilium generale fuerit congregatum nec electus fuerit papa catholicus, prefatis penis ferire papam hereticum spectat ad collegium cardinalium. Et si illi fuerint negligentes, pertinet ad episcopum in cuius diocesi papa hereticus commoratur. Si autem prelati et clerici papam hereticum dampnabiliter neglexerint cohercere, per principes seculares et laicos est debite percellendus. | Master: One opinion holds that to inflict the aforementioned penalties on a heretic pope belongs by law to a general council, if it has been convened, and to a Catholic pope, if one has been canonically elected. But if neither a general council has been convened nor a Catholic pope has been elected, to inflict the aforementioned penalties on a heretic pope belongs to the college of cardinals. And if they are negligent, it belongs to the bishop in whose diocese the heretic pope resides. But if prelates and clerics have shamefully neglected to coerce the heretic pope, he must be duly punished by secular and lay rulers.
Discipulus: Ista assertio multas habet particulas de quibus singulis te interrogare propono. Primo autem disseramus de concilio generali: ad quem, scilicet, si papa fuerit effectus hereticus, spectat generale concilium convocare. | Student: This assertion has many particulars about which I intend to question you in one by one. First, however, let us discuss the general council: to whom, if the pope has become a heretic, does it pertain to convening a general council?
Magister: Quod papa fiat hereticus multis modis potest contingere, quia aut est occultus hereticus, aut manifestus, aut notorius. Si est occultus hereticus, ita quod de heresi convinci non potest, dicunt quidam quod, si papa est de heresi diffamatus, exemplo Symachi pape, ipse, et non alius, debet generale concilium congregare ad se purgandum. Sed si noluerit se purgare, et de sua infamia scandalum intolerabile generatur, per alios debet generale concilium congregari. | Master: That the pope becomes a heretic can happen in many ways, because he is either a hidden heretic, or a manifest heretic, or a notorious one. If he is a hidden heretic, so that he cannot be convicted of heresy, some say that, if the pope is defamed for heresy, as was the case with pope Symmachus, he himself, and no one else, should convene a general council to purge himself. But if he refuses to purge himself, and an intolerable scandal is generated by his infamy, a general council should be convened by others.
Si autem papa est hereticus manifestus, ita quod probari potest per testes idoneos aut alia legitima documenta, non tamen est hereticus notorius, quia pauci sciunt ipsum esse hereticum, tot tamen sciunt quod ipsum possunt convincere, dicunt quidam quod papa hereticus debet concilium convocare, quod, si noluerit, est per alios congregandum. | But if the pope is a manifest heretic, so that it can be proved by suitable witnesses or other lawful evidence, but he is not a notorious heretic, because few know that he is a heretic, yet so many know that they can convict him, some say that the heretic pope ought to convene a council, but if he will not do so it must be convened by others.
Si vero papa est notorius hereticus per evidentiam rei vel confessionem, puta quia publice aliquam assertionem, que est heresis manifesta cuius contrarium tenetur credere explicite, tenet vel se fatetur tenere, ut puta si publice et notorie predicaret Christum non fuisse natum de virgine, aut legem christianam esse falsam, vel fateretur se publice aliquid huiusmodi tenuisse vel etiam de tali aliquo dubitasse, dicunt nonnulli quod papa hereticus in hoc casu non debet concilium generale convocare, sed illi qui sciunt ipsum esse notorium hereticum debent aliis catholicis intimare ut ipsi ad concilium generale conveniant, nisi prius electores summi pontificis alium in papam elegerint orthodoxum. Tunc enim ille electus in papam debet generale concilium, si necesse fuerit, convocare. Si autem electores pravitate heretica una cum papa fuerint involuti, vel sibi favorem prestiterint, alii fideles debent ad generale concilium pro facienda iustitia convenire, si propter malitiam hominum alio modo de ipso iustitia fieri nequit. | But if the pope is a notorious heretic by evidence of the matter or by confession (for example, because he publicly holds or admits to holding some assertion that is a manifest heresy the contrary of which is bound to be believed explicitly, as for example if he publicly and notoriously preached that Christ was not born of a virgin, or that the Christian law is false, or if he admitted publicly to having held something of the kind or even to having doubted something of such matters), some say that in this case the heretic pope should not convene a general council, but those who know that he is a notorious heretic should inform other Catholics that they should assemble for a general council, unless the electors of the supreme pontiff have first elected another orthodox pope. For then the person who has been elected pope must, if necessary, convene a general council. But if the electors have been involved in heretical wickedness together with the pope, or have supported him, other faithful must assemble at a general council for justice to be done, if, because of the wickedness of men, justice cannot be done about him in any other way.
Capitulum 84 | Chapter 84
Discipulus: Quia a manifestioribus expedit inchoare, ideo primo dicas de concilio convocando: si papa est notorie hereticus, et electores summi pontificis in heretica pravitate sibi consentiunt, vel eidem indebite favent, nec patet alia via per quam possit papa hereticus coherceri, per quem scilicet generale concilium debeat congregari. | Student: Since it is useful to begin with the more obvious, therefore speak first of convening a council. If the pope is a notorious heretic, and the electors of the supreme pontiff consent to his heretical depravity or unduly favour him, and there is no other way by which the heretic pope can be coerced, by whom should a general council be convened?
Magister: Dicunt quidam quod in hoc casu quilibet catholicus, qui scit papam esse hereticum notorium vel audit publice divulgari quod papa est notorie hereticus, debet esse paratus, si expedit, ad generale concilium convenire, debetque quilibet, quantum sibi competit pro gradu suo, alios exhortari catholicos ut ad concilium generale conveniant. Verumptamen ista spectant principalius ad prelatos et in divina lege peritos, secundo spectant ad reges et principes et alias publicas potestates, tertio autem spectant ad omnes catholicos viros et mulieres. Unde etiam mulieres catholice, scientes papam esse hereticum et electores et electores circa electionem summi pontificis negligentes, debent, si expedit, catholicos exhortari ut ad generale concilium pro ecclesia ordinanda concurrant, imo etiam ipsemet ire debent, si poterunt bono communi prodesse. | Master: Some say that in this case any Catholic who knows that the pope is a notorious heretic, or hears that it is publicly *divulged that the pope is a notorious heretic, should be prepared, if it is expedient, to convene a general council, and each should, as far as is appropriate for his rank, exhort other Catholics to convene a general council. However, these things concern primarily prelates and those skilled in divine law, secondly they concern kings and rulers and other public powers, and thirdly they concern all Catholics, men and women. Therefore Catholic women also, knowing that the pope is a heretic and that the electors are negligent about the election of a supreme pontiff, should, if expedient, exhort Catholics to come together in a general council for the ordering of the Church, indeed, they should even go themselves, if they can further the common good.
Discipulus: Ista assertio mirabilis michi videtur. Tria enim absurda continet, ut apparet. Quorum primum est quod generale concilium absque auctoritate pape debeat congregari, secundum est quod reges et principes ac alii laici ad generale concilium debeant convenire, tertium est quod mulieres debeant aut valeant generali concilio interesse. | Student: This assertion seems surprising to me. For it contains three absurdities, it seems. The first is that a general council should be convened without the authority of a pope, the second is that kings and rulers and other laymen should assemble at a general council, the third is that women should or are able to attend a general council.
Quod enim primum sit absurdum per sacros canones probatur aperte. Nam, sicut habetur dist. 17 per totum, concilium generale absque auctoritate summi pontificis congregari non potest. Ait enim Pelagius papa: "Multis denuo apostolicis et canonicis atque ecclesiasticis instruimur regulis, non debere absque sententia Romani pontificis concilia celebrari." Quibus verbis clare patet quod generale concilium absque papa convocari non debet. Quia tamen puto quod assertores predicti non sine motivo dicunt contrarium, dic motiva eorum. Ipsis enim auditis intelligam clarius veritatem. | That the first is absurd is clearly proved by the sacred canons. For, as is established in dist. 17 throughout, a general council cannot be convened without the authority of the supreme pontiff. For pope Pelagius says: "We are again instructed by many apostolic and canonical and ecclesiastical rules that a council should not be celebrated without a *decision of the Roman pontiff." From these words it is clear that a general council should not be convened without the pope. Since, however, I think that the aforementioned asserters do not say the contrary without a reason, tell me their motives. For by hearing them I will understand the truth more clearly.
Magister: Quod absque auctoritate pape possit concilium generale congregari nonnullis rationibus videtur posse probari, quarum prima est hec. Particulare concilium potest licite congregari absque auctoritate pape ad iudicandum de eodem vero papa. Ergo, multo magis, generale concilium poterit congregari ad iudicandum de pseudo-papa heretico absque eius auctoritate. Antecedens duobus manifestis exemplis videtur aperte probari. Primum est de episcopis qui convenerunt ad inquirendum de idolatria et facto beati Marcellini, quorum congregatio fuit particulare concilium, congregatum absque auctoritate eiusdem pape Marcellini. Secundum est de illorum congregatione qui convenerunt ad iudicandum et deponendum papam Iohannem duodecimum, que congregatio non fuit concilium generale sed particulare solummodo. Ergo multo magis posset fieri concilium generale ad iudicandum de papa heretico in heresi notorie deprehenso. | Master: That a general council can be convened without the authority of the pope seems provable by various arguments, the first of which is this. A particular council can lawfully be convened, without the authority of the pope, to judge the same true pope. Therefore, much more so, a general council can be convened without his authority to judge a heretic pseudo-pope. The premise seems clearly proved by two manifest examples. The first concerns the bishops who met to inquire into the idolatrous action of blessed Marcellinus; their meeting was a particular council convened without the authority of the same pope Marcellinus. The second is of the meeting of those who met to judge and depose pope John XII; this meeting was not a general council but only a particular one. Therefore, much more, so could a general council be held to judge a heretic pope notoriously caught in heresy.
Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur aperte probare quod absque auctoritate pseudo-pape heretici possit generale concilium congregari, sed non probat quod valeat congregari absque auctoritate veri pape. Unde videtur quod, si papa fiat hereticus, eligendus est papa catholicus antequam generale concilium convocetur. | Student: This argument seems to prove clearly that a general council can be convened without the authority of a heretic pseudo-pope, but it does not prove that it can be convened without the authority of a true pope. So it seems that, if the pope becomes a heretic, a Catholic pope must be elected before a general council is convened.
Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod ratio supra scripta patenter ostendit quod absque auctoritate cuiuscumque pape, veri vel falsi, potest generale concilium convocari. Nam, si est licitum concilium particulare fieri absque auctoritate pape ad inquirendum vel iudicandum de vero papa, multo magis licitum est generale concilium celebrari tempore vacationis apostolice sedis, absque auctoritate pape, ad pseudo-papam debite cohercendum, presertim si pseudo-papa aliter coherceri non potest. Sed primum licitum est, sicut per duo exempla probatum existit. Ergo et secundum debet licitum reputari. | Master: It seems to some that the argument just presented shows clearly that a general council can be convened without the authority of any pope, true or false. For if it is licit to hold a particular council without the authority of the pope to inquire or judge about the true pope, much more is it licit to hold a general council during a vacancy of the Apostolic See, without the authority of a pope, to duly coerce a pseudo-pope, especially if otherwise the pseudo-pope cannot be coerced. But the first is licit, as is proved by the two examples. Therefore the second must also be considered licit.
Secunda ratio est hec. Omnis populus et omnis communitas et omne corpus, quod absque consensu vel auctoritate cuiuscunque qui non est de corpore potest sibi ius statuere, potest aliquos eligere qui vicem gerant totius communitatis aut corporis absque alterius auctoritate. Sed omnes fideles sunt unum corpus, Paulo dicente ad Romanos 12: multi unum corpus sumus in Christo , et sunt unus populus et una communitas. Ergo possunt eligere aliquos qui vicem gerant totius corporis. Tales autem electi, si simul convenerint, concilium generale constituunt, quia concilium generale non videtur esse aliud quam congregatio aliquorum qui vicem gerant totius christianitatis. Potest ergo concilium generale congregari absque auctoritate cuiuslibet qui non est catholicus et fidelis, et per consequens absque auctoritate pape heretici. | A second argument is this. Every people and every community and every body that can, without the consent or authority of anyone not a member of the body, establish a law for itself, can, without the authority of another, elect some who will represent the whole community or body. But all the faithful are one body, as Paul says in Romans 12[:5]: We, being many, are one body in Christ, and they are one people and one community. Therefore they can elect some who will represent the whole body. Such elect persons, however, if they meet together, constitute a general council, because a general council does not seem to be anything other than a gathering of some who represent the whole of Christianity. Therefore a general council can be convened without the authority of anyone who is not Catholic and faithful, and consequently without the authority of a heretic pope.
Tertia ratio est hec. Universalis ecclesia in unum conveniens ad aliquid ordinandum potest concilium generale vocari. Sed universalis ecclesia posset ad tam parvum numerum devenire quod posset insimul convenire, nam in tam parvo numero fuit aliquando post ascensionem Christi. Ergo non est impossibile quod ad talem numerum ante iudicium generale perveniat, et per consequens non est impossibile quod universalis ecclesia ad concilium generale conveniat etiam si nullus esset verus papa, sicut non est impossibile quod, sede vacante, universalis eccclesia simul conveniat. Non minoris autem potestatis aut auctoritatis est universalis ecclesia quando non posset insimul convenire, propter magnam multitudinem, quam quando posset insimul convenire. Igitur, quicquid posset universalis ecclesia per se, si posset insimul convenire, potest per aliquos electos a diversis partibus ecclesie. Ergo, posito quod diverse partes universalis ecclesie eligerent aliquos qui convenirent in unum ad ordinandum de eccclesia Dei, illi sic electi convenientes in unum, non obstante quod nullus esset verus papa, possent generale concilium appellari. Et ita potest generale concilium, quando non esset verus papa, absque auctoritate pape congregari. | A third argument is this. The universal Church, meeting together to order something, can be called a general council. But it is possible that the universal Church could be reduced to such a small number that it could meet together, for at one time, after the ascension of Christ, it was in such a small number. Therefore it is not impossible that it should reach such a number before the general judgment [i.e. the end of history], and consequently it is not impossible that the universal Church should meet together -- even if there were no true pope, just as it is not impossible that, when the [Apostolic] See is vacant, the universal Church should meet together. But the universal Church is of no less power or authority when it cannot meet together because of a great multitude than when it could meet together. Therefore, whatever the universal Church could do by itself, if it could meet together, it can do through some persons chosen from different parts of the Church. Therefore, supposing the different parts of the universal Church chose some who would meet together to order the Church of God, those thus chosen, meeting together, notwithstanding that there was no true pope, could be called a general council. And thus a general council, when there was no true pope, could be assembled without the authority of a pope.
Discipulus: Aliqualiter modum ponendi predictum intelligo. Ut tamen magis eum intelligam, et sic clarius perveniam ad veritatem, declara per quem modum, secundum assertionem predictam, deberet generale concilium convocari. | Student: I understand the aforementioned way of putting it, to some extent. However, so that I may understand it better, and thus arrive more clearly at the truth, explain in what way, according to the aforementioned assertion, a general council should be convened.
Magister: Dicitur quod rationabile esset de qualibet parrochia vel alia communitate que posset faciliter insimul convenire mitti aliquem vel aliquos ad concilium episcopale, vel ad parliamentum regis aut principis vel alterius publice potestatis, qui eligeret vel eligerent aliquos mittendos ad concilium generale, qui, taliter electi a conciliis episcopalibus vel parliamentis secularium potestatum, in unum locum convenientes, possent generale concilium appellari. | Master: It is said that it would be reasonable for any parish or other community that could easily meet together to send some person or persons to an episcopal council, or to a parliament of the king or ruler or other public power, who would elect some to be sent to a general council, who, thus elected by episcopal councils or the parliaments of secular powers, meeting in one place, could be called a general council.
Discipulus: Quid si aliqua parrochia vel etiam diocesis nollet aliquos mittere ad concilium generale. | Student: What if some parish or diocese were unwilling to send some to a general council?
Magister: Respondetur quod propter contradictionem illorum non esset communis utilitas omittenda. Imo est assertio dicens quod, si multe dioceses vel regna contradicerent generali concilio congregando, potestas congregandi concilium generale esset de iure ad alia regna vel dioceses devoluta, quia impedientes communem utilitatem fidei christiane potestate conveniendi ad generale concilium merito privarentur. | Master: It is answered that the common interest should not be omitted because of their contradiction. Indeed, there is an assertion that says that, if many dioceses or kingdoms opposed the convening of a general council, the power to convene a general council would devolve by right to other kingdoms or dioceses, because those who impede the common good of the Christian faith would be deservedly deprived of the power to convene a general council.
Discipulus: Istam opinionem intelligo, et licet eam non reputem consonam veritati, tamen, qualiter respondeatur secundum eam ad auctoritates quibus asseritur manifeste quod absque auctoritate summi pontificis non debeat generale concilium congregari, aperias. | Student: I understand that opinion, and although I do not consider it to be consistent with truth, nevertheless please explain, according to it, how answer is made to the texts that clearly assert that a general council should not be convened without the authority of the supreme pontiff.
Magister: Respondetur quod regulare est concilium generale nequaquam congregari deberet absque auctoritate Romani pontificis. Fallit tamen in casu qui raro accidit, quando scilicet papa efficeretur hereticus, et electores summi pontificis negligerent papam eligere, nec posset aliter quam per generale concilium ecclesie provideri. Propter quod, ut dicitur, auctoritates summorum pontificum asserentium quod concilium generale absque auctoritate pape congregari non debet nequaquam sunt negande, sed sunt sane intelligende, ut nullo modo interpretentur in preiudicium fidei christiane, que summo pontifici etiam catholico est modis omnibus preferenda. | Master: The answer made is that as a rule a general council should not be convened without the authority of the Roman pontiff. However, that rule fails in a case that rarely occurs, namely when the pope becomes a heretic, and the electors of the supreme pontiff neglect to elect a pope, and the Church cannot be provided for otherwise than by a general council. For this reason, as is said, the texts of the supreme pontiffs asserting that a general council should not be convened without the authority of the pope are by no means to be denied, but are to be soundly understood, so that they are in no way interpreted to the prejudice of the Christian faith, which must be preferred in every way to a supreme pontiff, even one who is Catholic.
Capitulum 85 | Chapter 85
Discipulus: Adverto quomodo probari potest primum quod circa assertionem in precedenti capitulo recitatam michi irrationabile videbatur. Ideo dic an secundum possit aliquo modo probari, scilicet quod reges et principes ac alii laici ad generale concilium debeant, si voluerint, convenire. | Student: I notice how it is possible to prove the first of the points that seemed unreasonable to me about the assertion reported in the previous chapter [84]. Tell me, therefore whether the second can be proved in any way, namely that kings and rulers and other laymen should, if they wish, assemble for a general council.
Magister: Antequam motiva dicte assertionis adducam, ostendam tibi quare secundum quosdam una congregatio et non alia dicatur concilium generale. Quo declarato, motiva que proferam magis intelliges. | Master: Before I adduce arguments for the said assertion, I will show you why, according to some, one congregation and not another is called a general council. Having explained this, you will better understand the arguments I will give.
Dicitur ergo quod congregatio quecumque non ideo solummodo vocatur concilium generale quia auctoritate summi pontificis convocatur: tunc enim omne consistorium cum papa esset concilium generale. Illa ergo congregatio est generale concilium reputanda in qua diverse persone, gerentes auctoritatem et vicem diversarum partium totius christianitatis, ad tractandum de communi bono rite conveniunt, nisi aliqui noluerint vel non potuerint convenire. Unde si alique provincie nollent vel non possent personas habentes auctoritatem et vicem earum transmittere, non minus esset concilium generale censendum. | It is said, therefore, that any congregation is not called a general council merely because it is convened by the authority of the supreme pontiff, for then every consistory with the pope would be a general council. A congregation, therefore, must be considered a general council in which diverse persons, carrying the authority and standing in the place [*gerentes vicem] of diverse parts of the whole of Christianity, meet properly to discuss the common good (unless some are unwilling or unable to meet -- hence, if some provinces are unwilling or unable to send persons carrying their authority and standing in their place, it would no less be considered a general council).
Isto viso, videtur posse probari quod reges et principes ac nonnulli alii laici possunt, si voluerint, ad generale concilium convenire, et eiusdem concilii tractatibus interesse. Quod quidem probatur primo auctoritate Nicholai pape, que ponitur dist. 96, c. Ubinam. Primo ait enim: "Ubinam legistis, imperatores antecessores vestros sinodalibus conventibus interfuisse, nisi forsitan in quibusdam ubi de fide tractatum est, que universalis est, que omnium communis est, que non solum ad clericos, verum etiam ad laicos et ad omnes omnino pertinet christianos." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod conciliis in quibus de fide tractatur possunt laici interesse. | This being seen, it seems possible to prove that kings and rulers and some other laymen can, if they wish, meet at a general council and take part in the proceedings of the same council. This is proved first by a text of Pope Nicholas, which is given in dist. 96, c. Ubinam. For first he says: "Where have you read that your predecessor emperors attended synodal assemblies, except perhaps in some where faith was discussed, which is universal, which is common to all, which pertains not only to clerics, but also to laymen and to all Christians in general". From these words it is given to be understood that laymen can attend councils in which faith is discussed.
Quod etiam auctoritatibus simul et exemplis ostenditur. Gelasius enim papa, ut habetur dist. 15, c. Sancta Romana ecclesia, ait: "Sancta Romana ecclesia post illas Veteris et Novi testamenti scripturas, quas regulariter suscipimus, etiam has suscipi non prohibet: sanctam synodum Nicenam 318 patrum, mediante maximo Constantino Augusto, in qua Arrius hereticus condempnatus est; sanctam synodum Constantinopolitanam, mediante Theodosio seniore Augusto, in qua Macedonius hereticus debitam dampnationem excepit." Et infra: "Sanctam synodum Calcedonensem, mediante Martiano Augusto et Anatholio Constantinopolitano episcopo, in qua nestoriana et euticia hereses simul cum Dioscoro eiusque complicibus dampnate sunt." | This is also shown by texts and examples. For Pope Gelasius, as is found in dist. 15, c. Sancta Romana ecclesia, says: "The Holy Roman Church, after those Old and New Testament scriptures, which we regularly receive, does not forbid these also to be received: the holy Nicene synod of 318 fathers, by means of the great Constantine Augustus, in which the heretic Arius was condemned; the holy synod of Constantinople, by means of Theodosius the senior Augustus, in which the heretic Macedonius received due condemnation." And below: "The holy synod of Chalcedon, through the mediation of Martianus Augustus and Anatolius, bishop of Constantinople, in which the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies were condemned together with Dioscorus and his accomplices."
Item, Isidorus, sexto libro Ethimologiarum, c. 16, ut habetur dist. predicta, c. 1, ait: "Tertia, synodus Ephesina prima 200 episcoporum sub iuniore Theodosio Augusto edita est." Et infra: "Quarta, synodus Calcedonensis 630 sacerdotum sub Martiano principe habita est." | Likewise, Isidore, in the sixth book of Etymologies, c. 16, as found in the aforementioned distinction [dist.15] c. 1, says: "Third, the first synod of Ephesus was held under the younger Theodosius Augustus." And below: "Fourth, the synod of Chalcedon with 630 priests was held under the ruler Martianus."
Item, ut habetur dist. 96, in sexta actione Calcedonensis sinodi, Martianus imperator dixit: "Nos ad fidem confirmandam, non ad potentiam ostendendam exemplo religiosissimi principis Constantini sinodo interesse voluimus, ut inventa veritate non ultra multitudo pravis doctrinis attracta discordet." | Likewise, as found in dist. 96, in the sixth action of the synod of Chalcedon, the emperor Martianus said: "We wished to attend the synod to confirm the faith, not to show power, by the example of the most religious ruler Constantine, so that when the truth was discovered, the multitude would no longer be in discord, drawn to false doctrines."
Item, ut habetur 12 q. 1, c. Futuram, de Constantino sic legitur: idem vero presidens sancte sinodo que apud Nicenam congregata est, cum querelam quorundam coram se conspiceret deferendam, ait vos a nemine diiudicari potestis etc. | Likewise, as found in 12 q. 1, c. Futuram, we read of Constantine: The same [Constantine], presiding over the holy synod gathered at Nicaea, when he saw some bring a complaint before him, said You cannot be judged by anyone, etc.
Item, Nicholaus papa, ut habetur dist. 21, c. Nunc autem, ait: "Cum quidam tempore quodam contra Sixtum papam temptassent quedam mali rumoris obicere, et in concilio, cui Valentinianus Augustus intererat, dictum fuisset, non licere adversus pontificem sententiam dare, surrexit idem imperator protinus, et in arbitrio prefati pontificis tribuit iudicare iudicium suum." | Likewise, Pope Nicholas, as found in dist. 21, c. Nunc autem, says: "When at a certain time some had attempted to raise some evil rumours against Pope Sixtus, and in a council in which Valentinian Augustus was present it had been said that it was not lawful to give a verdict against the pontiff, the same emperor immediately rose and entrusted his judgment to the discretion of the aforementioned pontiff."
Ex quibus tam auctoritatibus quam exemplis videtur ostensum quod imperatores licite interfuerunt conciliis et per consequens licite possunt laici, si voluerint, conciliis generalibus interesse. | From these texts and examples it seems to be shown that emperors lawfully attended councils and consequently laymen can lawfully attend general councils if they wish.
Quod etiam ratione videtur posse probari, que talis est. Quod omnes tangit ab omnes tractari et approbari debet, ut notatur in glossa dist. 96, c. Ubinam. Et Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Inter quatuor notat glossa quod omnes quos negotium tangit vocandi sunt. Sed ea que tractantur in concilio generali omnes tangunt, quia in concilio generali tractari debet de fide et de aliis que ad omnes omnino pertinent christianos. Ergo laici quod tangunt concilia generalia licite, si voluerint, poterunt interesse. | This also seems provable by the argument that follows: What touches all must be treated and approved by all, as is noted in the gloss on dist. 96, c. Ubinam. And the gloss upon Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Inter quatuor notes that all whom the matter touches should be called. But matters treated in a general council touch all, because in a general council faith and other things that pertain to all Christians should be treated. Therefore laypersons, whom general councils touch, can lawfully attend, if they wish.
Discipulus: Per istam rationem quilibet laicus posset interesse concilio generali si vellet, si illa que tractantur in concilio generali ab omnibus tractari debent. | Student: By this argument any layman could attend a general council if he wished, if the things discussed in a general council should be discussed by all.
Magister: Ad istam instantiam respondetur quod hec regula ( quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari debet ) intelligenda est si ab omnibus tractari potest, et non apparet ratio manifesta quare aliquis debeat ab huiusmodi tractatu repelli. Nunc autem non possunt omnes, neque laici neque clerici, ad generale concilium convenire, et ideo non omnes debent interesse per seipsos. Debent tamen omnes, qui voluerint, nisi appareat ratio manifesta repellendi eos, per procuratores, vel alios gerentes immediate vel mediate in speciali (vel cum aliis) vices eorum, concilio interesse. | Master: To this objection it is answered that this rule ( what touches all must be discussed by all ) must be understood [to mean:] "if it can be discussed by all, and there is no apparent reason why anyone should be excluded from such discussion." Now, however, it is not possible for all, laymen and clerics, to assemble at a general council, and therefore not all should attend in person. However, all who wish, unless there is an apparent reason for excluding them, should attend a council through procurators, or through others [*gerentes vices eorum] who stand in their place, immediately or mediately, in particult or with others.
Et ideo, cum dicitur de regibus et principibus ac aliis magnis personis laicis, nisi appareat ratio quare debeant repelli, poterunt per seipsos, si voluerint, conciliis generalibus interesse. Unde, si reges voluerint, poterunt per seipsos conciliis generalibus interesse, nec est necesse quod procuratores vel alios habentes potestatem eorum mittant ad concilium generale. Regna autem et alie communitates que regibus non subsunt, que interesse per se non possunt, debent mittere procuratores, si volunt, aut sindicos vel alios quocunque nomine censeantur, qui eorum habeant potestatem quantum ad ea que tractanda sunt in concilio generali. | And therefore, when it is said [*what is said?] of kings and rulers and other great lay persons, they may, if they wish, attend general councils in person, unless there is an apparent reason why they should be excluded. Hence, if kings wish, they may attend general councils in person, and it is not necessary that they send procurators, or others having their power, to the general council. But kingdoms and other communities not subject to kings, if they cannot attend by themselves, must send procurators, if they wish, or syndics or others by whatever name they may be reckoned, who have their power with regard to the matters to be treated in the general council.
Discipulus: Ista opinio seipsum impugnat. Nam si illi non debent generali concilio interesse de quibus apparet ratio manifesta quare debent repelli, sequitur quod laici interesse non debent. Nam de illis est ratio evidens quare sunt a generali concilio excludendi, quia videlicet causa Dei ad laicos nequaquam spectat. | Student: This opinion contradicts itself. For if those should not attend general councils of whom there is a clear reason why they should be excluded, it follows that laypersons should not attend. For concerning them there is a clear reason why they should be excluded from general councils, namely, because the cause of God does not at all concern laypersons.
Unde Felix papa, ut legitur dist. 10, c. Certum est, ait: "Certum est hoc rebus vestris esse salutare, ut cum de causis Dei agitur, iuxta ipsius constitutum regiam voluntatem sacerdotibus Christi studeatis subdere non preferre." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod laici de causis Dei se intromittere non debent, et per consequens a generali concilio debent excludi. | Hence Pope Felix, as we read in dist. 10, c. Certum est, says: "It is certain that this is salutary for your affairs, that when the causes of God are at issue, according to His own determination, you should strive to submit, not prefer, the royal will to the priests of Christ." From these words it is given to be understood that laymen should not interfere in the causes of God, and consequently should be excluded from the general council.
Item, ex consuetudine hactenus observata hoc constat aperte. Nam ad generalia concilia soli clerici consueverunt venire, et soli clerici generalia concilia celebraverunt, sicut et ipsi soli vocantur. | Likewise, this is clearly established from the custom hitherto observed. For only clerics have been accustomed to come to general councils, and only clerics have celebrated general councils, just as they alone are summoned.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod cause Dei non solum ad clericos, sed etiam spectant ad laicos, sicut Deus non solum est Deus clericorum sed etiam laicorum. Verumptamen, cause Dei quodammodo principalius spectant ad clericos quam ad laicos, si clerici in causis Dei non errant, pro eo quod clerici divinis sunt specialiter deputati, et sic intelligenda sunt verba Felicis pape. Si autem clerici in causis Dei et precipue contra fidem errant catholicam, cause Dei ad laicos spectant, et non ad clericos contra fidem errantes. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that the causes of God concern not only clerics, but also laymen, just as God is not only the God of clerics but also of laymen. However, causes of God concern in a certain way clerics more principally than laymen, if the clerics do not err in the causes of God, because clerics are specially appointed to divine things; and the words of Pope Felix are to be understood in that way. But if clerics do err in the causes of God, and especially against the Catholic faith, the causes of God concern laymen, and not the clerics who err against the faith.
Discipulus: De hoc postea interrogabo plura. Ideo dic quomodo ad secundam obiectionem respondere contingit. | Student: I will ask more about this later. Therefore tell me how it is possible to answer the second objection.
Magister: Dicitur quod circa celebrationem generalium conciliorum multa sunt servata temporibus retroactis que non sunt de necessitate servanda, quamvis rationabiliter antea fuerint observata, et adhuc talia poterunt venire tempora quod congruum erit ut serventur. Et ideo conceditur quod temporibus preteritis, quibus prelati et clerici sanctitate vite et veritate doctrine ac zelo boni communis et etiam circa temporalia magna industria et experientia claruerunt, congruum fuit ut ipsi soli generalia concilia celebrarent, et ut laici, nisi in casibus specialibus, se subtraherent a tractatibus concilii generalis. Et tamen in potestate extitit laicorum generalibus conciliis interesse. Sed ipsi vices suas tacite vel expresse clericis commiserunt, ad quod tamen artari minime debuerunt. Et ideo, quantumcunque placeret rectoribus et communitatibus laicorum generalibus conciliis interesse, clerici eos de iure excludere non possent. | Master: It is said that in the past many things have been observed regarding the celebration of general councils that do not have to be observed, though they were reasonably observed previously, and such times may come again when it will be fitting observe them. And therefore it is granted that in times past, when prelates and clerics were distinguished by their holiness of life and truth in doctrine and zeal for the common good and also by their great industry and experience in temporal matters, it was fitting that they alone should celebrate general councils, and that the laity, except in special cases, should withdraw themselves from the activities of the general council. And yet it was within the power of the laity to attend general councils. But they themselves tacitly or expressly entrusted their [*vices] place to the clergy, which however, they should not at all have been constrained to do. And therefore, whenever it pleased the rulers and communities of the laity to attend general councils, the clergy could not exclude them by right.
Discipulus: Quomodo potest ostendi quod laici unquam commiserint potestatem et vices suas clericis ad generale concilium convocatis. | Student: How can it be shown that the laity ever did entrust their power and their place to the clergy summoned to a general council?
Magister: Videtur quod ex hoc clare potest ostendi quod in multis conciliis generalibus plura ordinata fuerunt que absque consensu laicorum tacito vel expresso non poterant ordinari. Cum ergo non sit aliqualiter presumendum quod generalia concilia presumpserint ordinare ea que potestatem excedebant eorum, videtur dicendum quod in generalibus conciliis congregati commissionem aliquam et potestatem a laicis habuerunt. | Master: It seems it can be shown clearly from this, that in many general councils many things were ordained that could not have been ordained without the tacit or express consent of the laity. Since, therefore, it should in any way be presumed that general councils presumed to ordain things that exceeded their power, it seems it should be said that those gathered in general councils had some commission and power from the laity.
Discipulus: Pone aliqua exempla de ordinatis in conciliis generalibus que absque consensu expresso vel tacito laicorum minime statui debuerunt. | Student: Give some examples of ordinances in general councils that should not have been ordained at all without the express or tacit consent of the laity.
Magister: Exemplum ponitur de pluribus libertatibus ecclesiasticis quibus clerici absque consensu laicorum gaudere non debent, cum sint in manifestum preiudicium laicorum. Clerici autem absque consensu laicorum nichil in preiudicium eorum possunt statuere, quia, teste Innocentio tertio, ut habetur Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit, sicut laici iurisdictionem clericorum perturbare non debent, ita clerici iurisdictionem laicorum non debent minuere. Quare clerici in preiudicium laicorum, absque eorum consensu, nichil possunt de rebus temporalibus et libertatibus eorum disponere. | Master: An example is given of several ecclesiastical liberties that clerics should not enjoy without the consent of the laity, since they are to the manifest prejudice of the laity. Clerics, however, cannot establish anything to the detriment of the laity without the consent of the laity, because, according to the testimony of Innocent III, as is stated in Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit, just as laymen should not disturb the jurisdiction of clerics, so clerics should not diminish the jurisdiction of the laity. Therefore clerics cannot dispose of anything concerning the temporal things and liberties of the laity to their detriment without their consent.
Discipulus: Quo iure clerici gaudeant libertatibus ecclesiasticis, an scilicet iure divino vel humano, et an iure solummodo canonico vel iure reum et principum secularium, in secundo tractatu istius operis diligenter inquiram. Ideo materiam istam dimitte, et dic breviter quare dicitur quod mulieres non sunt simpliciter contra voluntatem earum a generalibus conciliis excludende. | Student: By what law clerics enjoy ecclesiastical liberties, namely, by divine or human law, and whether by canon law alone or by the law of secular rulers and rulers, I will diligently investigate in the second treatise of this work. Therefore, leave this matter aside, and explain briefly why it is said that women are not to be excluded from general councils simply against their will.
Magister: Dicitur quod hoc est propter unitatem fidei virorum et mulierum, que omnes tangit et in qua non est masculus et femina, sicut, secundum Apostolum ad Galatas 3o, "In novo homine non est masculus et femina." Et ideo, ubi sapientia, bonitas, vel potentia mulieris esset tractatui fidei, de qua potissime tractandum est in concilio generali, necessaria, non esset mulier a generali concilio excludenda. | Master: It is said that this is because of the oneness of the faith of men and women, which touches all and in which there is no male and female, just as, according to the Apostle to Galatians 3[:28], "In the new man there is neither male nor female." And therefore, where the wisdom, goodness, or power of a woman were necessary for the treatment of faith, which is to be treated most especially in a general council, a woman should not be excluded from the general council.
Capitulum 86 | Chapter 86
Discipulus: Istam assertionem de mulieribus, que etiam secundum Apostolum docere non debent, tam irrationabilem estimo, quod nolo eam amplius pertractari. Ideo, ipsa dimissa, dic quam potestatem habeat concilium generale super papam in heresi deprehensum. | Student: I consider that assertion about women, who according to the Apostle also should not teach, so unreasonable that I do not wish to discuss it further. Therefore, putting it aside, tell me what power a general council has over a pope caught in heresy.
Magister: Ad hoc responsum est prius, quia concilium generale debet papam hereticum de apostolica sede expellere, si aliter non potuerit, per potentiam temporalem, et illam penam sibi non potest remittere; licet, secundum quosdam, si papa hereticus rediret ad catholicam veritatem, concilium generale, si non esset papa, posset de facto ipsum noviter in papam eligere et in sede apostolica collocare, aliis dicentibus quod ad concilium generale electio summi pontificis minime spectat, sed specialiter ad Romanos. | Master: The answer to this has been given before, that a general council must expel a heretic pope from the Apostolic See, by temporal power, if it cannot do so otherwise, and it cannot remit that penalty to him -- though, according to some, if a heretic pope were to return to Catholic truth, the general council, if he were not pope, could in fact elect him anew as pope and place him in the Apostolic See, while others say that the election of the supreme pontiff belongs not at all to a general council but specifically to the Romans.
Secundo potest concilium generale papam hereticum expulsum de apostolica sede, ab omni ecclesiastico ordine degradare, sed istam penam potest absolute sibi remittere, sicut et potest ipsum curie seculari tradere, vel perpetuo carceri mancipare, et omnia bona eius propria confiscare, quibus tamen penis non de necessitate tenetur hereticum papam percellere, quia iste sunt pene non a iure divino sed a iure positivo taxate. | Secondly, a general council can degrade from all ecclesiastical order a heretic pope who has been expelled from the Apostolic See, but it can absolutely remit this penalty to him, as it can also hand him over to a secular court, or commit him to perpetual imprisonment, and confiscate all his property; but the council is not necessarily bound to inflict these penalties on the heretic pope, because these are imposed not by divine law but by positive law.
Istud autem continet veritatem si papa interfuerit concilio generali. Sed si, sede vacante, fuerit celebratum concilium generale, videtur quod concilium generale predictas penas papa heretico non potest remittere, quia in huiusmodi penis hereticis infligendis concilium generale papam minime comprehendens est inferius et minoris iurisdictionis quam sit papa. Et ideo cum huiusmodi pene a papa, vel a conciliis generalibus presente papa, sint taxate, per generale concilium, sede vacante, remitti non possunt. | This is true if the pope is present at the general council; but if, when the [Apostolic] See is vacant, a general council is celebrated, it seems that the general council cannot remit the aforesaid penalties to the heretic pope, because in inflicting these kinds of heretical penalties a general council that does not include the pope is inferior and has less jurisdiction than a pope. And therefore, since such penalties are imposed by a pope, or by general councils at which a pope is present, they cannot be remitted by a general council when the See is vacant.
Discipulus: Secundum ista unum concilium generale haberet maiorem potestatem quam aliud, et per consequens aliud non esset generale. | Student: According to these [statements], one general council would have greater power than another, and consequently the latter would not be general.
Magister: Respondetur quod non est inconveniens unum concilium generale habere maiorem potestatem quam aliud, et tamen utrumque est generale. Quemadmodum, usque ad finem seculi erit ecclesia universalis, et tamen ecclesia universalis uno tempore habet maiorem potestatem et auctoritatem quam alio. Nam ecclesia universalis maiorem potestatem et auctoritatem habet apostolica sede vacante quam quando non vacat. | Master: The answer made is that it is not inappropriate for one general council to have greater power than another, and yet both are general, just as, until the end of the age there will be a universal Church, and yet the universal Church has greater power and authority at one time than at another. For the universal Church has greater power and authority when the Apostolic See is vacant than when it is not vacant.
Capitulum 87 | Chapter 87
Discipulus: Dic de summo pontifice, si fuerit electus, quam penam potest pape heretico infligere. | Student: Tell me about a Supreme Pontiff, if one is elected, what punishment he can inflict on a heretic pope.
Magister: Tenent nonnulli pro certissimo quod papa electus canonice, quamvis in sede apostolica intronizatus non fuerit, potest pape heretico omnes penas predictas et alias imponere, quas tamen omnes preter primam, scilicet expulsionem de apostolica sede, valet sibi remittere de plenitudine potestatis. Quem etiam papam hereticum, si ad fidei veritatem redierit, absque degradatione, et incarceratione, et bonorum suorum confiscatione, imo etiam absque abiuratione pravitatis heretice, licet non absque penitentia et abnegatione pravitatis heretice, potest recipere. | Master: Some hold it to be absolutely certain that a canonically elected pope, even if he has not [yet] been enthroned in the Apostolic See, can impose all the aforementioned and other punishments on a heretic pope, all of which, however, except the first, namely expulsion from the Apostolic See, he is able to remit to him by the plenitude of power. He can also receive the heretic pope, if he returns to the truth of the faith, without degradation, imprisonment, and confiscation of his goods, indeed even without denial under oath of heretical wickedness, although not without penance and denial of heretical wickedness.
Discipulus: De summo pontifice, si esset electus canonice, dubium non videtur quin potest papam hereticum debita animadversione punire. Sed non videtur quod ante iustitiam factam de papa heretico, vel ante mortem eiusdem, possit alius papa rite substitui. | Student: Regarding the Supreme Pontiff, if he were elected canonically, there seems to be no doubt that he can punish a heretic pope with due punishment. But it does not seem that before justice has been done to the heretic pope, or before his death, another pope can rightly be substituted.
Magister: Multi habent pro non dubio apud intelligentes quin possit eligi verus papa, papa heretico sedem apostolicam occupanti, quia, sede vacante notorie, potest eligi verus papa. Sed quam cito papa fit notorie hereticus, sedes apostolica notorie vacat. Ergo, quantumcunque papa hereticus de facto occuparet sedem apostolicam, est papa catholicus eligendus. | Master: Many among those who know about these matters hold it as beyond doubt that a true pope can be elected while a heretic pope occupies the Apostolic See, because, when it is well-known that the See is vacant, a true pope can be elected. But as soon as a pope becomes well-known to be a heretic, the Apostolic See is well-known to be vacant. Therefore, no matter how much a heretic pope de facto occupied the Apostolic See, a Catholic pope must be elected.
Capitulum 88 | Chapter 88
Discipulus: Hec materia locum habebit in tractatu De gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam. Ideo ad collegium cardinalium te converte, et quam potestatem habeat super papam hereticum manifestum expone. | Student: This matter will have a place in the treatise On the deeds of those who dispute the orthodox faith [not extant]. Therefore, turn to the college of cardinals, and explain what power it has over a manifestly heretic pope.
Magister: De hoc sunt assertiones contrarie. Una est quod collegium cardinalium super papam hereticum nullam potestatem specialem habet nisi sicut ceteri episcopi, presbiteri, et diaconi. Cuius ratio assignatur talis. | Master: There are contrary assertions about this. One is that the college of cardinals has no special power over a heretic pope except as do other bishops, priests, and deacons. A reason for this is assigned as follows.
Collegium cardinalium nullam potestatem aut iurisdictionem habet ex ordinatione divina vel iure divino, cum ex iure divino sit nullatenus institutum, imo nec in toto iure divino de ipso fit mentio. Omnem ergo potestatem vel iurisdictionem habet collegium cardinalium a summo pontifice. Sed non legitur quod summus pontifex aliquam potestatem vel iurisdictionem specialem dederit collegio cardinalium super papam hereticum. Ergo nullam specialem iurisdictionem habet super papam hereticum. | The college of cardinals has no power or jurisdiction by divine ordination or divine law, since it was not in any way established by divine law -- indeed, there is no mention of it in the whole of divine law. Therefore, the college of cardinals has all power or jurisdiction from the supreme pontiff. But we do not read [anywhere] that the supreme pontiff gave any special power or jurisdiction to the college of cardinals over a heretic pope. Therefore, it has no special jurisdiction over a heretic pope.
Item, consiliarii alicuius prelati vel principis, ex hoc quod consiliarii sunt, non habent specialem iurisdictionem super prelatum suum vel principem delinquentem. Sed cardinales sunt tantummodo consiliarii pape, et in hoc solummodo precellunt alios clericos et prelatos, saltem Romanos. Ergo collegium cardinalium non habet specialiter corrigere vel punire papam si hereticam incurrerit pravitatem. | Also, the councilors of a prelate or ruler, by virtue of being councilors, do not have special jurisdiction over their delinquent prelate or ruler. But the cardinals are only councilors of the pope, and in this alone they excel other clerics and prelates, at least the Romans. Therefore the college of cardinals does not have a special right to correct or punish a pope if he has fallen into heretical wickedness.
Discipulus: Ista ratio accipit manifeste falsum, scilicet, quod cardinales solummodo precellunt alios clericos in hoc quod sunt consiliarii pape, cum constat quod in hoc precellunt quod habent ius eligendi summum pontificem. Multa etiam privilegia alia habent ultra clericos alios et prelatos. | Student: This argument assumes a manifestly false premise, namely, that the cardinals excel other clerics only in that they are councilors of the pope, since it is clear that they excel in that they have the right to elect the supreme pontiff. They also have many other privileges beyond other clerics and prelates.
Magister: Respondetur quod per accidens est quod collegium cardinalium habet ius eligendi summum pontificem. Unde et aliquando ius illud nequaquam habuit, et adhuc posset illo iure privari. Posset enim ius eligendi summum pontificem concedi imperatori vel aliis episcopis aut clericis quam cardinalibus. Et ita per accidens est quod collegium cardinalium habet ius eligendi summum pontificem. Sic etiam est per accidens quod cardinales multa privilegia habent quibus alii clerici et prelati minime gaudent. Quare per hoc quod cardinales habent ius eligendi summum pontificem et alia privilegia multa concludi non potest quod habent specialem iurisdictionem super papam hereticum. Et ideo, cum non caveatur in iure quod cardinales super papam hereticum specialem iurisdictionem obtineant, non est eis talis specialis iurisdictio tribuenda. | Master: The answer made is that it is per accidens that the college of cardinals has the right to elect the supreme pontiff. Thus sometimes it did not have that right at all, and still it could be deprived of that right, for the right to elect the supreme pontiff could be granted to the emperor or to bishops or clerics other than cardinals. And so it is per accidens that the college of cardinals has the right to elect the supreme pontiff. So it is also per accidens that cardinals have many privileges that other clerics and prelates do not enjoy at all. From the fact, therefore, that cardinals have the right to elect the supreme pontiff and many other privileges, it cannot be concluded that they have special jurisdiction over a heretic pope. And therefore, since there is no provision in law for cardinals to obtain special jurisdiction over a heretic pope, such special jurisdiction is not to be attributed to them.
Discipulus: Prima ratio fortis michi videtur, nec scio respondere ad ipsam. Quid autem tu sentis de ipsa post hoc opus inquiram. Nunc vero dic quid haberet facere collegium cardinalium, secundum istam assertionem, si papa efficeretur hereticus. | Student: The first argument seems strong to me, and I do not know how to answer it. What you think about it I will inquire after [we complete] this work. Now tell me what the college of cardinals would have to do, according to this assertion, if the pope were to become a heretic.
Magister: Secundum istam assertionem, si papa efficeretur hereticus, ultra illa que clerici alii et prelati eorundem ordinum et graduum haberent facere circa papam hereticum cardinales nichil haberent facere, nisi illa que eis competunt quando sedes apostolica vacat per mortem naturalem veri summi pontificis. Et ideo, sicut moriente papa cardinales habent eligere summum pontificem, ita, si constaret collegio cardinalium papam esse hereticum manifestum, ad electionem veri summi pontificis deberent procedere. | Master: According to this assertion, if the pope became a heretic, the cardinals would have nothing to do beyond what other clerics and prelates of the same orders and degrees would have to do regarding a heretic pope, except what is appropriate to them when the Apostolic See is vacant through the natural death of a true supreme pontiff. Therefore, just as when a pope dies the cardinals have to elect a supreme pontiff, so if it were clear to the college of cardinals that the pope is a manifest heretic, they should proceed to elect a true supreme pontiff.
Discipulus: Ista opinio apparentiam videtur habere, et prima ratio est tam fortis quod ad ipsam nescio respondere, de qua quid sentias post completionem istius operis indagabo. Nunc autem narra assertionem contrariam. | Student: That opinion seems to have some plausibility, and the first argument is so strong that I do not know how to answer it -- I will inquire what you think about it after the completion of this work. Now tell me the contrary assertion.
Magister: Alia assertio est quod, si papa efficeretur hereticus, collegium cardinalium deberet specialiter ipsum debita pena punire. Cuius ratio assignatur talis. Ad quem spectat institutio alicuius, ad eundem pertinet destitutio eiusdem, si ille non habet superiorem. Ideo enim primas potest instituere episcopum, quem tamen non potest destituere, quia tam primas quam constitutus ab eo habet superiorem qui reservat sibi destitutionem taliter instituti. Sed si primas non haberet superiorem, quem instituit episcopum posset ex causa destituere. Institutio autem summi pontificis spectat ad collegium cardinalium, quod non habet superiorem qui sibi reservet destitutionem summi pontificis si efficiatur hereticus. Ergo ad collegium cardinalium specialiter spectat destitutio pape, si hereticam incurrerit pravitatem, et per consequens punitio pape heretici ad collegium cardinalium spectat. | Master: The other assertion is that, if the pope were to become a heretic, the college of cardinals especially should punish him with due penalty. A reason is assigned for this as follows. If the appointment of someone pertains to someone, their removal pertains to the same person -- if he has no superior: for the reason a primate can appoint a bishop but cannot dismiss him is that both the primate and the one appointed by him do have a superior who reserves for himself the removal of the person so appointed. But if the primate did not have a superior, he could for cause dismiss the bishop he appoints. But the appointment of a supreme pontiff pertains to the college of cardinals, which does not have a superior who reserves for himself the removal of the supreme pontiff if he becomes a heretic. Therefore, the removal of the pope pertains specially to the college of cardinals, if he has incurred heretical wickedness, and consequently the punishment of a heretic pope pertains to the college of cardinals.
Item, non minoris iurisdictionis est collegium cardinalium quam capitulum alicuius ecclesie cathedralis. Sed capitulum, sede vacante, potest punire hereticos qui in eadem diocesi sunt reperti (Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam), ubi habetur quod clerici, sede vacante, possunt hereticos iudicare. Ergo, multo magis, collegium cardinalium, sede vacante, potest papam hereticum iudicare. | Likewise, the college of cardinals has no less jurisdiction than the chapter of a cathedral Church. But a chapter, when the see [i.e. of that bishopric] is vacant, can punish heretics who are found in the same diocese. See Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, [X 5.7.9 col. 1672] where it is stated that clerics, when the See is vacant, can judge heretics. Therefore, much more so, the college of cardinals, when the See is vacant, can judge that the pope is a heretic.
Discipulus: Per istam rationem, capitulum, sede vacante per hoc quod episcopus in hereticam incideret pravitatem, posset suum episcopum hereticum iudicare. | Student: By this reasoning, a chapter, if a see is vacant because the bishop has fallen into heretical corruption, could judge that its bishop is a heretic.
Magister: Respondetur quod episcopi habent privilegium speciale quod non debent iudicari nisi per episcopos vel per papam, cum inquisitores heretice pravitatis non habeant potestatem inquirendi de ipsis. Et ideo, capitulum non habet potestatem iudicandi episcopum suum hereticum. Sed in collegio cardinalium sunt plures episcopi, et ideo poterit papam hereticum iudicare. | Master: The answer made is that bishops have a special privilege that they should not be judged except by bishops or by the pope, since the inquisitors of heretical corruption do not have power to investigate them. And therefore, a chapter does not have power to judge that its bishop is a heretic. But in the college of cardinals there are several bishops, and therefore it can judge that the pope is a heretic.
Discipulus: Nunquid capitulum, si episcopus efficiatur hereticus, obediet ei ex quo eum iudicare non potest. | Student: Will a chapter, if a bishop becomes a heretic, obey him, since it cannot judge him?
Magister: Respondetur quod capitulum, si constet sibi episcopum in labem hereticam incidisse, ei obedire non debet. Nec tamen iudicabit ipsum, sed vitabit, et accusabit eum superiori qui habet potestatem iudicandi ipsum. | Master: The answer made is that the chapter, if it is clear to it that a bishop has fallen into heretical corruption, should not obey him. Nor will it judge him, but it will avoid him, and will accuse him to a superior who has power to judge him.
Capitulum 89 | Chapter 89
Discipulus: Nunquid Romani, si papa efficiatur hereticus, possunt ipsum penis punire predictis. | Student: Can the Romans, if the Pope becomes a heretic, punish him with the aforementioned punishments?
Magister: De hoc possunt esse diversi modi dicendi. Unus quod, si papa efficiatur hereticus, Romani possunt et debent papam hereticum pellere de apostolica sede, eumque vitare tenentur, et alium papam sibi possunt eligere (illi scilicet de Romanis quibus ius competit eligendi). Sed alias penas, scilicet degradationem, incarcerationem, et bonorum suorum confiscationem, sibi non possunt infligere. | Master: There can be different ways of saying this. One is that if the Pope becomes a heretic, the Romans can and must expel the heretic Pope from the Apostolic See, and are bound to avoid him, and they can elect another Pope for themselves (namely those of the Romans who have the right to elect). But they cannot inflict other punishments on him, namely degradation, imprisonment, and confiscation of his goods.
Alius modus dicendi potest esse quod Romani omnibus predictis penis possunt papam hereticum cohercere. | Another way of saying this can be that the Romans can coerce the heretic Pope with all the aforementioned punishments.
Isti modi dicendi fulciri possunt consimilibus rationibus quibus assertiones contrarie de collegio cardinalium, recitate in precedenti capitulo, muniuntur. | These positions can be supported by arguments similar to those that defend the contrary assertions about the college of cardinals, reported in the previous chapter.
Capitulum 90 | Chapter 90
Discipulus: Istam materiam duxi ad alia tempora reservandam. Ideo, tracta de diocesano in cuius diocesi papa hereticus moraretur, si, scilicet, papa hereticus de facto teneret curiam in Pisis vel Florentia vel alia civitate habente episcopum, an episcopus civitatis posset de iure papam hereticum penis cohercere prefatis. | Student: I have thought that this matter should be reserved to some other time. Therefore, let us consider the case of a diocesan bishop in whose diocese a heretic pope resides, if, that is, a heretic pope de facto holds court in Pisa or Florence or another city that has a bishop, whether the bishop of the city could by law coerce the heretic pope with the above penalties.
Magister: Sunt nonnulli dicentes quod diocesanus episcopus, in cuius diocesi papa hereticus notorie moraretur, de iure valeret et deberet, invocato auxilio brachii secularis, si tantam posset habere potentiam, papam hereticum captivare, ipsumque denunciare ab omnibus catholicis devitandum. | Master: Some say that, by law, a diocesan bishop in whose diocese a heretic pope notoriously resides could, and should, having called on the help of the secular arm, capture the heretic pope, if he could have enough power, and denounce him as to be avoided by all Catholics.
Hoc probatur primo sic. Hereticus qui nullo gaudet privilegio speciali ultra episcopos hereticos, quantum ad predicta est subiectus diocesani iudicio, quia alii episcopi heretici in hiis subiecti sunt iudicio diocesani. Sed papa hereticus nullo gaudet privilegio speciali ultra alios episcopos, sicut ostensum est supra c. 71. Ergo papa hereticus quantum ad predicta subditur iudicio diocesani. | This is proved first as follows. A heretic who enjoys no special privilege beyond heretic bishops is, as regards the aforesaid [penalties], subject to the diocesan judgment, because in these matters other heretic bishops are subject to the diocesan judgment. But a heretic pope enjoys no special privilege beyond other bishops, as was shown above in c. 71. Therefore a heretic pope is subject to the diocesan judgment as regards the [penalties] abovementioned.
Item, quantum ad predicta est papa illius subiectus iudicio qui tenetur terram ad suam iurisdictionem spectantem de omni pravitate heretica expurgare, quia sine predictis, terra de heretica pravitate purgari non potest. Ad episcopum autem spectat totam suam diocesim de omne pravitate heretica expurgare, Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus, in fine, ubi sic legitur: "Si quis enim episcopus super expurgando de sua diocesi heretice pravitatis fermento negligens fuerit vel remissus, cum id certis indiciis apparuerit, et ab episcopali officio deponatur, et in locum ipsius alter substituatur idoneus qui velit et possit hereticam confundere pravitatem." Ergo papa hereticus, quantum ad predicta, iudicio episcopi est subiectus. | Likewise, as regards the abovementioned, the pope is subject to the judgment of the person who is bound to purge the land within his jurisdiction of all heretical wickedness, because without the abovementioned, the land cannot be purged of heretical wickedness. But it is the bishop's duty to purge his entire diocese of all heretical wickedness, Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus, at the end, where we read: "If any bishop has been negligent or remiss in purging the leaven of heretical wickedness from his diocese, when this appears by certain indications, let him also be deposed from the episcopal office, and in his place let another suitable person be substituted who is willing and able to confound heretical wickedness." Therefore, the heretic pope is in respect of the abovementioned subject to the judgment of the bishop.
Tertio probatur idem sic. Ratione delicti fit aliquis de foro alterius (Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1, et 3 q. 6, c.1, et Extra, De foro competenti, c. Postulasti, et q. 3, c. Placuit). Ergo, si papa hereticus in diocesi alicuius episcopi, male docendo vel parrochianos episcopi ad pravitatem hereticam inducendo, delinquit, fit de foro eiusdem episcopi et eidem est subiectus. Episcopus autem potest sibi subiectos hereticos captivare. Ergo de iure potest episcopus captivare papam hereticum in sua diocesi commorantem. | Thirdly, the same is proved thus. A person becomes subject to another's jurisdiction because of some offence (Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1 [X 5.17.1 col.1725, s.v. exommunicentur proceedings should commence in the place where the offence committed], and 3 q. 6, c.1 [col.975 s.v.ibi semper], and Extra, De foro competenti, c. Postulasti [X 2.2.14 col.552] and q. 3, c. Placuit [c.4 col.1069]). Therefore, if a heretic pope in the diocese of some bishop, by teaching wrongly or by inducing the bishop's parishioners to heretical wickedness, commits an offense, he becomes subject to the jurisdiction of that bishop and is subject to him. But a bishop can take captive his heretic subjects. Therefore, a bishop can by law take captive a heretic pope residing in his diocese.
Discipulus: Licet sit regula generalis quod ratione delicti fit quis de foro alterius, tamen, sicut dicit glossa Extra, De raptoribus, c.1: "Ab hac tamen generalitate excipitur quilibet superior qui ubicumque crimen committit, non potest iudicari nisi a papa, si agatur ad depositionem." Cum ergo nullus sit superior papa, nullus inferior poterit iudicare ipsum quantumcunque in diocesi delinquat alterius. | Student: Although it is a general rule that a person becomes subject to another's jurisdiction because of some offence, nevertheless, as the gloss Extra, De raptoribus, c.1 [s.v. exommunicentur] says: "However, from this generality is excepted any superior who, wherever he commits a crime, cannot be judged except by the pope, if it is a matter of deposition." Since therefore no one is superior to a pope, no inferior will be able to judge him no matter how much he offends in another's diocese.
Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod, licet de intellectu glosse, quantum prima facie sonat, inter iuristas fuerint opiniones diverse, secundum quod innuit glossa 3 q. 6, c. 1, unde et glossa ubi prius, scilicet Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1, dicit opinionem Huguccionis fuisse quod "Si archiepiscopus committat tale crimen in parrochia alterius archiepiscopi, vel episcopi suffraganei alterius archiepiscopi, quod possit tunc iudicari ab illo archiepiscopo, vel episcopo, argumentum ad hoc 96 dis., c. duo, ubi Ambrosius ratione criminis commissi in sua parrochia excommunicavit imperatorem, quod alias non auderet." | Master: The answer made to this is that, although there have been diverse opinions among jurists about the prima facie meaning of the gloss, as the gloss 3 q. 6, c. 1 suggests, whence also the gloss on Extra, De raptoribus, c. 1, says that Huguccio's opinion was this: "If an archbishop commits such a crime in the parish of another archbishop, or of a bishop suffragan of another archbishop, that he may then be judged by that archbishop or bishop; the argument for this is dist. 96 c.2, where Ambrose excommunicated the emperor on account of a crime committed in his parish, which elsewhere he would not dare."
tamen de illo qui non est maior, imo minor, omni episcopo, videtur tenendum quod ratione delicti fit de foro illius episcopi in cuius diocesi probatur delinquere. Cum ergo papa hereticus non sit maior sed minor omni episcopo vero, quia omnis hereticus est minor omni catholico (24 q. 1, Si autem), sequitur quod papa hereticus, ratione delicti, fit de foro diocesani in cuius diocesi commoratur. Glossa igitur que dicit quod a generalitate istius regule excipitur quilibet superior etc. intelligenda est de superiori qui non obstante delicto manet superior. De illo autem qui fuit superior, et per delictum ipso facto fit inferior et omni superioritate spirituali privatur, ipso iure non debet intelligi, ut videtur. | Nevertheless of one who is not greater, nay, less, than every bishop, it seems it should be held that because of an offense he falls within the forum of that bishop in whose diocese he is proved to have committed the offense. Since therefore a heretic pope is not greater but less than every true bishop, because every heretic is less than every Catholic (24 q. 1, Si autem), it follows that a heretic pope, by reason of an offense, falls within the forum of the diocesan in whose diocese he resides. Therefore the gloss that says that from the generality of this rule any superior is excepted etc. must be understood of a superior who remains superior despite the offense. But of one who was superior, and by offense becomes by the deed itself inferior and is deprived of all spiritual superiority, it should not be understood [to happen] by the law itself, it seems.
Quare, cum papa hereticus ipso facto est factus inferior omni catholico, in papa heretico non habet dictum glosse locum. Et ideo, episcopus in cuius diocesi papa hereticus moraretur posset ipsum detinere, non tamen solempniter degradare, sicut nec eum deponere posset. Quod ex hoc probatur quod depositiones episcoporum soli summo pontifici reservantur (Extra, De translatione, c. Inter corporalia, et 3 q. 6, c. Quamvis, et c. Dudum, et c. Discutere). Et propter hoc etiam episcopus non potest papam hereticum curie tradere seculari, quia nullus episcopus, antequam fuerit ab omni ordine ecclesiastico degradatus, seculari curie est tradendus. | Therefore, since a heretic pope is by the deed itself made inferior to every Catholic, the gloss has no place in regard to a heretic pope. And therefore, the bishop in whose diocese the heretic pope resided could detain him, but not solemnly degrade him, just as he could not depose him. This is proved from the fact that the depositions of bishops are reserved to the supreme pontiff alone (Extra, De translatione, c. Inter corporalia, and 3 q. 6, c. Quamvis, and c. Dudum, and c. Discutere). And for this reason also a bishop cannot hand over a heretic pope to a secular court, because no bishop, before he has been degraded from all ecclesiastical order, should be handed over to a secular court.
Discipulus: Narra assertionem contrariam. | Student: Recount the contrary assertion.
Magister: Assertio contraria tenet quod nullus episcopus potest papam hereticum detinere, nec aliquam in eum dictare sententiam. Que tali ratione probatur. | Master: The contrary assertion holds that no bishop can detain a heretic pope, nor dictate any sentence against him. This is prove by the following argument.
Ille non est iudex alterius, nec aliquam potestatem habet super ipsum, cuius sententia lata contra ipsum absque examinatione utrum sit iusta vel iniusta est penitus reprobanda, et nullo modo servanda. Sed sententia cuiuscunque episcopi lata contra ipsum qui habetur pro papa, sive sit hereticus sive catholicus, absque examinatione utrum sit iusta vel iniusta est penitus reprobanda. Ergo nullus episcopus est iudex pape etiam heretici. | A person is not another person's judge, and has no power over him, if his sentence against the latter must be utterly rejected and in no way to be observed, without [even] considering whether it is just or unjust. But the sentence of any bishop passed against someone held to be pope, whether he is a heretic or a Catholic, must be utterly rejected, without considering whether it is just or unjust. Therefore no bishop is a judge of the pope, even of a heretic pope.
Maior videtur manifesta, quia de sententia illius, qui se asserit iudicem alicuius alterius et allegat causam possibilem ex qua esset iudex eius, est inquisitio facienda an causa quam allegat sit vera. Et per consequens est inquisitio facienda an sententia eius sit iusta vel iniusta. | The major seems clear, because of the sentence of one who asserts himself to be the judge of someone else and alleges a possible cause from which he would be his judge, an inquiry must be made as to whether the cause he alleges is true, and consequently an inquiry must be made as to whether his sentence is just or unjust.
Minor vero exemplo probatur. Nam Dioscorus sententiam excommunicationis in papam Leonem dictavit, et videtur probabile quod contra eum allegaverit hereticam pravitatem, et tamen absque omni examinatione vel inquisitione an sententia Dioscori esset iusta vel iniusta fuit eiusdem sententia reprobata, teste Nicholao papa qui, ut legitur dist. 21, c. In tantum, referens verba concilii Calcedonensis, ait: "Quoniam secundis excessibus, priorem iniquitatem valde transcendit, presumpsit enim excommunicationem dictare adversus sanctissimum archiepiscopum magne Rome Leonem etc. Nunquid ibi legitur inquisitionem factam fuisse, utrum iuste Dioscorus ipsam excommunicationem dictasset? Non plane, sed absque omni controversia hoc in eo ulti sunt quia cum esset inferior, potiorem quibuslibet conatus est lacessere iniuriis." | The minor is proved by an example. For Dioscorus dictated a sentence of excommunication against Pope Leo, and it seems probable that he alleged heretical wickedness against him, and yet without any examination or inquiry as to whether Dioscorus sentence was just or unjust, the sentence was rejected, as Pope Nicholas testifies. As we read in dist. 21, c. In tantum, referring to the words of the Council of Chalcedon, Nicholas says: "Because by his second excesses he greatly surpasses his first iniquity, for he presumed to dictate an excommunication against the most holy archbishop of Rome, Leo the Great, etc. Does it read there that an inquiry was made as to whether Dioscorus had pronounced the excommunication justly? Clearly not, but without any controversy they punished this [judgment], in that, while he [Dioscorus] was inferior, he tried to harass the superior with any kind of injuries."
Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod, si aliquis episcopus ex quacunque causa papam presumpserit captivare vel excommunicare vel lacessere qualicunque iniuria, non est inquirendum an papa sit catholicus vel hereticus, quia de sententia talis episcopi vel alia iniuria seu molestia illata pape nulla est inquisitio penitus facienda. Ergo, sive papa sit hereticus sive catholicus, nullus episcopus debet ei molestiam inferre qualemcunque, et per consequens eum detinere non debet. | By these words it is given to be understood that, if any bishop for any reason presumes to imprison or excommunicate the pope or to harass him with any kind of injury, it is not necessary to inquire whether the pope is a Catholic or a heretic, because no inquiry at all must be made about the sentence of such a bishop or any other injury or annoyance inflicted on the pope. Therefore, whether the pope is a heretic or a Catholic, no bishop should inflict any kind of annoyance on him, and consequently he should not detain him.
Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur michi concludere, et tamen dic quomodo respondetur ad ipsam. | Student: This argument seems to me conclusive, and yet tell me how answer is made to it.
Magister: Respondetur quod notorium fuit Dioscorum esse hereticum, et ideo nullam penitus habuit iurisdictionem super papam, etiam si fuisset hereticus. Quare de sententia eius non fuit inquisitio facienda an esset iusta, hoc est an esset ex causa iusta, quamvis notorium fuerit quod non fuit iusta ex ordine. Secus autem esset de episcopo catholico, quia, si episcopus catholicus vel episcopus de quo non esset manifestum quod esset hereticus papam captivaret, vel denunciaret tanquam hereticum excommunicationis sententiam incurrisse, esset inquisitio facienda an iuste vel indebite procecisset. Et si inveniretur quod papa esset manifestus hereticus, factum episcopi esset a catholicis approbandum. | Master: The answer made is that it was notorious that Dioscorus was a heretic, and therefore he had absolutely no jurisdiction over the pope, even if he [the pope] had been a heretic. Therefore, no inquiry was to be made about whether his sentence was just, that is, whether it was from a just cause, although it was notorious that it was not just in order [*ex ordine]. But it would be different with a Catholic bishop, because if a Catholic bishop, or a bishop who was not clearly a heretic, were to capture the pope, or denounce him as a heretic who had incurred the sentence of excommunication, an inquiry would have to be made as to whether he had acted justly or unduly. And if it were found that the pope was clearly a heretic, the bishop's act would have to be approved by Catholics.
Discipulus: Nunquid papa hereticus posset appellare ab episcopo ipsum taliter detinente. | Student: Could a heretic pope appeal from a bishop who thus detains him?
Magister: Respondetur quod de iure non posset, nisi allegaret causam probabilem que, si esset probata, deberet sufficiens reputari. | Master: The answer made is that he could not by law, unless he alleges a probable cause that, if proved, ought to be considered sufficient.

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