# WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS

## 1 Dial. 6.91-100
Text by George Knysh,
translation by John Kilcullen,
as at March, 2025

Capitulum 91 | Chapter 91
Discipulus: Hec de potestate diocesani super papam hereticum manifestum ad presens sufficiant. Ideo ad principes seculares et laicos me converto, de quibus festina disserere an potestatem habeant papam hereticum cohercendi. | Student: These things about the power of a diocesan bishop over a manifestly heretic pope suffice for the present. Therefore I turn to secular and lay rulers; hasten to discuss about them whether they have power to coerce a heretic pope.
Magister: De hoc opiniones reperiuntur contrarie. Una est quod cohertio pape heretici ad principes seculares et laicos minime spectat, quod multis modis ostenditur. | Master: On this contrary opinions are found. One is that the coercion of a heretic pope does not concern secular and lay rulers at all, which is shown in many ways.
Primo sic. Cohertio pape heretici non spectat ad illos de quorum foro non est papa hereticus. Sed papa hereticus non est de foro secularium potestatum. Ergo cohertio eius ad principes seculares et laicos minime spectat. Maior videtur nota. Minor sic probatur. Clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis (2 q. 1 fere per totum), et Celestinus papa, ut habetur Extra, De iudiciis, c. Cum non ab homine, ait: "Si clericus in quocunque ordine constitutus in furto, vel homicidio, vel periurio, seu aliquo alio mortali crimine fuerit deprehensus legitimeque convictus, ab ecclesiastico iudice deponendus est." Et per consequens clericus pro nullo crimine est apud secularem iudicem iudicandus. Papa autem hereticus est clericus, ergo non est de foro iudicis secularis. | First, thus. The coercion of a heretic pope does not concern those to whose forum the heretic pope does not belong. But a heretic pope does not belong to the forum of secular powers. Therefore his coercion does not concern secular and lay rulers at all. The major seems known. The minor is thus proved. Clerics are not of the forum of a secular judge (2 q. 1 almost throughout), and Pope Celestine, as is found in Extra, De iudiciis, c. Cum non ab homine, says: "If a cleric established in any order has been caught and lawfully convicted of theft, or homicide, or perjury, or any other mortal crime, he must be deposed by an ecclesiastical judge." And consequently a cleric is not to be tried for any crime before a secular judge. But a heretic pope is a cleric, therefore he is not of the forum of a secular judge.
Secundo sic. Papa hereticus non est de foro illius iudicis ad quem non spectat de causa heretice pravitatis cognoscere. Sed ad iudicem secularem non spectat cognoscere de causa heretice pravitatis, sicut nec ad ipsum pertinet causa fidei vel Dei. Ergo papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. Maior est nota. Minor auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum probatur aperte. | Secondly, thus. A heretic pope is not of the forum of a judge to whom it does not pertain to know about a cause [legal case] of heretical wickedness. But it does not pertain to a secular judge to know about a cause of heretical wickedness, just as it does not pertain to him to know about a cause of faith or God. Therefore a heretic pope is not of the forum of a secular judge. The major is known. The minor is clearly proved by texts of the holy fathers.
Ait enim Felix papa, ut allegatum est supra, prout legitur 10 dis., c. Certum est: "Certum est, hoc rebus vestris esse salutare, ut cum de causis agitur Dei, iuxta Ipsius constitutum regiam voluntatem sacerdotibus Christi studeatis subdere non preferre." | For Pope Felix says, as was quoted above, as is read in dist. 10, c. Certum est: "It is certain that this is salutary for your affairs, that when the causes of God are at issue, according to His own determination, you should strive to submit, not prefer, the royal will to the priests of Christ."
Item, Nicholaus papa, ut legitur dist. 96, c. Denique, ait: "Hi, quibus tantum humanis rebus, et non divinis preesse permissum est, quomodo de hiis, per quos divina ministrantur, iudicare presumant, penitus ignoramus." | Also, Pope Nicholas, as is read in dist. 96, c. Denique, says: "We are completely ignorant of how these, who are permitted to rule only over human matters and not over divine ones, presume to judge about those through whom divine things are administered."
Item, dist. 96, c. Satis evidenter, sic legitur: "Deputatus est igitur Candidianus, magnificentissimus comes strenuorum domesticorum, transire usque ad sanctissimam sinodum vestram, et in nullo quidem, que faciende sunt de piis dogmatibus questiones seu potius expositiones, communicare. Illicitum namque est eum, qui non sit in ordine sanctissimorum episcoporum, ecclesiasticis intermisceri tractatibus." | Also, in dist. 96, c.[7 col.619] Satis evidenter, it is read as follows: "Therefore, Candidianus, the most magnificent Count of the energetic bodyguards [comes strenuorum domesticorum], has been deputed to go to your most holy synod, and in no way to communicate questions, or rather explanations, about pious dogmas, which are to be made. For it is unlawful for anyone who is not in the order of the most holy bishops to be mixed up in ecclesiastical [*tractatibus] affairs."
Item, Nicholaus papa, ut habetur dist. 10, c. Imperium, ait: "Imperium vestrum suis publice rei cotidianis administrationibus debet esse contentum, non usurpare que sacerdotibus Domini solum conveniant." | Also, Pope Nicholas, in dist. 10, c. Imperium, says: "Your empire should be content with its day-to-day administration of public affairs, not to usurp what is appropriate only for the priests of the Lord."
Item, Iohannes papa, ut legitur dist. 96, c. Si imperator, ait: "Si imperator catholicus est, quod salva pace ipsius dixerimus, filius est, non presul ecclesie, quod ad religionem competit discere ei non docere, habet privilegia potestatis sue, que administrandis legibus publicis divinitus consecutus est, et eius beneficiis non ingratus circa dispositionem celestis ordinis nichil usurpet. Ad sacerdotes enim Deus voluit que ecclesie sunt disponenda convenit, non ad seculi potestates." Et infra: "Non a legibus publicis, non a potestatibus seculi, sed a pontificibus et sacerdotibus omnipotens Deus christiane religionis clericos et sacerdotes voluit ordinari, et discuti et recipi de errore remeantes." | Also, Pope John, as is read in dist. 96, c.[11 col.621] Si imperator, says: "If the emperor is a Catholic (which we have said saving his peace), he is a son, not a [presul] leader, of the Church, and what pertains to religion is for him to learn, not to teach; he has the privileges of his power, which he has obtained from God for administering public laws, and not being ungrateful for his benefits, he should usurp nothing regarding the disposition of the heavenly order. For God willed that things that are to be disposed of for the Church should pertain to priests, not to secular powers." And below: "Not by public laws, not by secular powers, but by pontiffs and priests, Almighty God willed that the clergy and priests of the Christian religion should be ordered, examined and accepted, departing from error."
Item, beatus Cyprianus, ut legitur dist. 10, c. Quoniam, scribens Iuliano, sic ait: "Quoniam idem mediator Dei et hominum homo Iesus Christus, sic actibus propriis et dignitatibus distinctis officia potestatis utriusque discrevit propria volens humilitate corda sursum efferri, non humana superbia rursum in inferna demergi: ut etiam christiani imperatores pro eterna vita pontificibus indigerent, et pontifices pro cursu temporalium tantummodo rerum imperialibus legibus uterentur, quatenus spiritualis actio a carnalibus incursibus distaret, et Deo militans minime se negotiis secularibus implicaret ac vicissim non ille rebus divinis presidere videretur, qui esset secularibus negotiis implicatus." | Also, blessed Cyprian, as we read in dist. 10, c. Quoniam, writing to Julian, says thus: "Since the same mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, thus distinguished the appropriate duties of the power of both by their own acts and distinct dignities, wishing that hearts should be lifted up humility, and that human pride should not sink again into hell: so that also Christian emperors would need the pontiffs for eternal life, and the pontiffs would use imperial laws for the course of temporal affairs only, in order that spiritual activity would be distanced from carnal interruptions, and that those on God's service would not at all involve themselves in secular affairs, and conversely someone involved in secular affairs would not seem to rule over divine things."
Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus videtur aperte probari quod principes seculares et laici de causis Dei, rebus divinis, piis dogmatibus, et religione christiana se intromittere minime debent. Ex quo patenter infertur quod causa fidei et heretice pravitatis ad ipsos non spectat. Quare papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. | From these and many other [texts] it seems clearly proved that secular rulers and laypersons should not interfere in causes of God, divine things, pious dogmas, and the Christian religion. From this it is clearly inferred that a cause of faith and heretical wickedness does not concern them. Therefore a heretic pope is not of the forum of a secular judge.
Tertio sic. Crimen ecclesiasticum ad iudicem secularem minime spectat. Sed crimen heresis est crimen ecclesiasticum, ergo ad iudicem secularem non pertinet, et per consequens nec papa hereticus nec aliquis alius hereticus est de foro iudicis secularis. Minor istius rationis est tam nota quod probatione non eget. Maior auctoritate et ratione probatur. | Thirdly, thus. An ecclesiastical crime does not at all pertain to a secular judge. But the crime of heresy is an ecclesiastical crime. Therefore it does not pertain to a secular judge, and consequently neither a heretic pope nor any other heretic belongs to the forum of a secular judge. The minor of this argument is so well known that it does not need proof. The major is proved by texts and argument:
Auctoritate quidem patet, quia 12 q. 1 c. Si quis cum clerico, sic legitur: "Si autem crimen eclesiasticum est, tunc secundum canones ab episcopo suo cause examinatio et pena procedat nullam communionem aliis iudicibus in huiusmodi causis habentibus." Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod crimen ecclesiasticum ad iudicem secularem minime spectat. | It is indeed clear from a text, because 11 q. 1 c.[45 col.1211] Si quis cum clerico, reads thus: "But if the crime is ecclesiastical, then according to the canons let the examination of the case and punishment proceed by his bishop, with other judges having no share in such cases." From these words it is evidently gathered that an ecclesiastical crime does not at all pertain to a secular judge.
Quod etiam ratione probatur. Quia causa quecumque solummodo ad iudicem peritum et exercitatum in huiusmodi pertinere dinoscitur. Unde secundum Alexandrum tertium, ut habetur Extra, De consanguinitate, c. 1: "Non sunt cause matrimonii tractande per quoslibet, sed per iudices discretos." Ubi dicit glossa quod: "Duo exiguuntur ad cognoscendum et iudicandum de causa matrimonii, scilicet scientia canonum, et quod habeat iurisdictionem." Et infra: "Argumentum quod causa non est deleganda nisi perito et exercitato ar. 2 q. 2, c. ultimo, De penitentia dist. 6, c. 1 in principio." | This is also proved by argument. Because any case is known to belong only to a judge who is experienced and trained in such cases. Hence according to Alexander III, as stated in Extra, De consanguinitate, c. 1: "Marriage cases are not to be handled by just anyone, but by judges who are discreet." Where the gloss [s.v. potestatem, col.1508] says: "To know and judge about a marriage case two things are required, namely knowledge of the canons, and that he have jurisdiction." And below: "An argument that the cause should not be delegated except to an expert and one who has practiced, arg. c.2 q.2, c. ult., De penitentia dist. 6, c.1 in prin."
Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod causa non debet committi nisi perito. Unde et glossa dist. 20, 1 notat quod *"Nullus potest esse iudex, maxime ecclesiasticus, nisi sit peritus." Sed iudex secularis in causa criminis ecclesiastici minime est peritus, cum notitiam scripturarum, per quam convincitur crimen ecclesiasticum, constet eum non habere. Ergo crimen ecclesiasticum ad iudicem secularem minime spectat, et per consequens crimen heresis quod per solam scripturam divinam cognoscitur, cuius non habet notitiam secularis iudex, ad ipsum non spectat. | From these words it is gathered that the cause should not be committed except to an expert. Hence the gloss on dist. 20, 1 notes that "No one can be a judge, especially an ecclesiastical one, unless he is an expert." But a secular judge is not at all an expert in a case of ecclesiastical crime, since it is clear that he does not have the knowledge of the scriptures by which an ecclesiastical crime is convicted. Therefore an ecclesiastical crime is of no concern to a secular judge, and consequently the crime of heresy, which is known through divine scripture alone, of which the secular judge has no knowledge, does not pertain to him.
Quarto sic. Maiores cause sunt ad maius iudicium deferende, quod tam ex scripturis divinis quam ex sacris canonibus colligitur evidenter. Nam, ut legitur Exodi 18, Jethro, cognatus Moysi, dedit eidem consilium, dicens: "Esto tu populo in hiis que ad Deum pertinent, ut referas que dicuntur ad eum." Et post: "Provide autem de omni plebe viros potentes, et timentes Deum, in quibus sit veritas, et qui oderint avaritiam, et constitue ex eis tribunos." Et post: "Quidquid autem maius fuerit, referant ad te, et ipsi minora tantummodo iudicent." | Fourthly, thus. Greater causes should be referred to a higher court, which is evidently gathered both from the divine scriptures and from the sacred canons. For, as we read in Exodus 18, Jethro, Moses kinsman, gave him advice, saying: "Be thou with the people in those things which pertain to God, to bring their words to him." And after: "And provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, in whom there is truth, and that hate avarice, and appoint them as rulers." And after: " But whatsoever is greater, let them bring to thee, and they shall judge only the lesser cases."
Cuius consilio Moyses acquievit dum sic legitur ibidem: "Quibus auditis Moyses fecit omnia que ille suggesserat et electis viris strenuis de cuncto Israel, constituit eos principes populi, tribunos, et centuriones, et quinquagenarios, et decanos. Qui iudicabant plebem omni tempore. Quidquid autem gravius erat, referebant ad eum, faciliora tantummodo iudicantes." Et Deuteronomi primo dixit Moyses iudicibus constitutis ab ipso: "Ita parvum audietis ut magnum: nec accipietis cuiusquam personam, quia Dei iudicium est. Quod si difficile vobis visum aliquid fuerit, referte ad me, et ego audiam." Et 17 c. sic scribitur: "Si difficile et ambiguum apud te iudicium esse perspexeris inter sanguinem et sanguinem, causam et causam, lepram et lepram, et iudicum intra portas tuas videris verba variari, surge, et ascende ad locum, quem elegerit Dominus Deus tuus, veniesque ad sacerdotes Levitici generis, et ad iudicem, qui fuerit illo tempore, queresque ab eis, qui indicabunt tibi iudicii veritatem." Ex quibus aliisque auctoritatibus scripture divine patenter colligitur quod maiores cause sunt ad superiores iudices deferende. | Moses acquiesced in this advice, as we read in the same place: "And when Moses heard these things, he did all that he [Jethro] had suggested, and having chosen able men out of all Israel, he made them rulers of the people, tribunes, and captains of hundreds, and captains of fifties, and captains of tens, who judged the people at all times. But whatsoever was more grievous, they brought to him, judging only the easier cases." And in the first chapter of Deuteronomy Moses said to the judges appointed by him: " You shall hear the small as well as the great: neither shall you respect the person of any man, for it is the judgment of God. But if any thing seem hard to you, bring it to me, and I will hear it." And in the 17th chapter it is written thus: "If you see that the judgment is hard and doubtful between blood and blood, cause and cause, leprosy and leprosy, and you see that the words of the judges within your gates vary, arise, and go up to the place which the Lord your God shall choose, and come to the priests of the Levitical family, and to the judge who shall be in those days, and inquire of them, who shall declare to you the truth of the judgment." From these and other texts it is clearly gathered in divine Scripture that greater causes are to be brought to higher judges.
Quod etiam sacri canones protestantur. Anacletus enim papa, ut habetur 2 q. 6, c. Omnis oppressus, ait: "Si autem difficiles cause aut maiora negotia orta fuerint, ad maiorem sedem referantur." | The sacred canons also testify to this. For Pope Anacletus, as found in 2 q. 6, c. Omnis oppressus, says: " But if difficult causes or greater matters arise, let them be referred to the greater see."
Item, Pelagius papa, ut habetur dist. 17, c. Multis, ait: "Si vero in qualibet provincia orte fuerint questiones, et inter ipsius provincie episcopos discrepare ceperit ratio, atque inter ipsos dissidentes non conveniant, ad maiorem tunc sedem referantur." Et infra: "Maiores vero et difficiliores questiones, ut sancta sinodus statuit, et beata consuetudo exigit, ad sedem apostolicam semper reservantur." | Likewise, Pope Pelagius, as found in dist. 17, c. Multis, says: "But if questions arise in any province, and reason begins to differ among the bishops of that province, and the dissentients do not agree among themselves, let them [the questions] then be referred to the greater see." And below: "But greater and more difficult questions, as the holy synod has established and blessed custom demands, are always reserved to the Apostolic See."
Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus patet aperte quod maiores cause sunt ad maius iudicium deferende. Sed causa heresis est inter causas maximas computanda. Ergo causa heresis est ad maius iudicium deferenda. Iudicium autem ecclesiasticum est maius iudicio seculari, teste Gregorio Nazianzeno qui, ut habetur dist. 10, c. Suscipitis, scribens imperatoribus Constantinopolitanis, ait: "Libenter accipitis, quod lex Christi sacerdotali vos subiecit potestati atque istis tribunalibus subdit? Dedit enim et nobis potestatem, dedit principatum multo perfectiorem principatibus vestris." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod iudicium ecclesiasticum est maius iudicio seculari. Ergo causa heresis non ad iudicem secularem sed ad iudicem ecclesiasticum debet referri. | From these and many other [texts] it is clear that greater causes should be referred to a higher court. But a cause of heresy must be counted among the greatest causes. Therefore the cause of heresy must be referred to a higher court. But an ecclesiastical court is higer than a secular court, as Gregory Nazianzen testifies who, as is stated in dist. 10, c. Suscipitis, writing to the emperors of Constantinople, says: "Do you willingly accept that the law of Christ has subjected you to the priestly power and subjects you to these tribunals? For He has given us power as well, He has given us a principality much more perfect than your principalities." From these words it is given to understand that an ecclesiastical court is higher than a secular court. Therefore a cause of heresy should not be referred to a secular judge but to an ecclesiastical judge.
Quinto sic. Potestas iudiciaria regalis seu secularis et potestas iudiciaria sacerdotalis sunt potestates distincte, secundum quod testatur beatus Cyprianus, ut habetur dist. 10, c. Quoniam, prout allegatum extitit. Ad potestates autem iudiciarias distinctas spectant cause distincte. Ad iudiciariam autem potestatem sacerdotalem pertinet causa heresis. Ergo causa heresis non pertinet ad potestatem iudiciariam secularem, et per consequens papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. | Fifthly, thus. The royal or secular judicial power and the priestly judicial power are distinct powers, as blessed Cyprian testifies, in dist. 10, c. Quoniam, as has been quoted. But distinct causes pertain to distinct judicial powers. But a cause of heresy belongs to the priestly judicial power. Therefore a cause of heresy does not belong to the secular judicial power, and consequently a heretic pope does not belong to the forum of a secular judge.
Sexto sic. Non aliam potestatem iudiciariam habent seculares iudices christiani quam habuerunt iudices seculares pagani. Nam imperatores christiani successerunt imperatoribus paganis, et reges christiani successerunt regibus paganis. Successores autem eodem iure et potestate gaudent qua predecessores. Ergo iudices seculares christiani non habent aliam potestatem iudiciariam quam pagani habuerunt. Sed causa heresis ad iudices paganos minime pertinebat. Ergo nec causa heresis spectat ad seculares iudices christianos, et per consequens papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. | Sixthly, thus. Secular Christian judges have no other judicial power than pagan secular judges had. For Christian emperors succeeded pagan emperors, and Christian kings succeeded pagan kings. But successors enjoy the same right and power as their predecessors. Therefore secular Christian judges do not have any other judicial power than pagans had. But the cause of heresy did not belong to pagan judges at all. Therefore, the cause of heresy does not concern secular Christian judges, and consequently a heretic pope is not of the forum of a secular judge.
Septimo sic. In illa causa que spectat ad imperatores, reges, et iudices seculares, imperialibus vel secularibus legibus est utendum, quia unaqueque causa terminanda est per leges illius fori ad quem noscitur pertinere. Sed in causa heresis imperialibus seu secularibus legibus minime est utendum, teste Nicholao papa qui, ut habetur dist. 10, c. 1, ait: "Lege imperatorum non in omnibus ecclesiasticis controversiis utendum est." Et infra: "Iimperiali iudicio non possunt iura ecclesiastica dissolvi". Ergo causa heresis ad iudicem secularem minime spectat, et per consequens papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. | Seventhly, thus. In a cause that concerns emperors, kings, and secular judges, imperial or secular laws should be used, because each cause should be determined by the laws of the forum to which it is known to belong. But in a cause of heresy imperial or secular laws must not be used at all, as Pope Nicholas testifies, who, as is stated in dist. 10, c. 1, says: "The law of the emperors must not be used in all ecclesiastical controversies." And below: "Ecclesiastical laws cannot be dissolved by imperial judgment." Therefore, a cause of heresy does not concern a secular judge at all, and consequently a heretic pope is not of the forum of a secular judge.
Octavo sic. Ad eundem spectat causa heresis ad quem pertinet causa fidei, cum eadem videatur esse causa heresis et causa fidei, quemadmodum eadem est scientia contrariorum. Sed causa fidei ad iudicem secularem minime spectat, cum videatur ad solum summum pontificem pertinere (24 q. 1, c. Quotiens, et Extra, De baptismo et eius effectu, c. Maiores). Ergo ad iudicem secularem causa heresis minime spectat, et per consequens papa hereticus non est de foro iudicis secularis. | Eighthly, thus. A cause of heresy concerns the same [judge] to whom a cause of faith pertains, since the cause of heresy and the cause of faith seem to be the same, just as the knowledge of contraries is the same. But a cause of faith does not at all pertain to a secular judge, since it seems to pertain to the Supreme Pontiff only (24 q. 1, c. Quotiens, and Extra, De baptismo et eius effectu, c. Maiores). Therefore a cause of heresy does not at all pertain to a secular judge, and consequently a heretic pope is not within the forum of a secular judge.
Capitulum 92 | Chapter 92
Discipulus: Dixisti quod de potestate principum secularium et laicorum super papam hereticum sunt opiniones contrarie. Recitasti autem unam, ideo nunc tracta contrariam. | Student: You said that there are contrary opinions about the power of secular and lay rulers over a heretic pope. You have recited one, so now treat the contrary one.
Magister: Circa opinionem contrariam sunt modi ponendi contrarii et diversi, quibusdam dicentibus quod cohertio pape heretici et aliorum hereticorum principaliter pertinet ad totam multitudinem christianorum, vel ad illos qui totius multitudinis curam gerunt, et ita, secundum istos, hereticorum cohertio principaliter spectat ad laicos qui communitatum curam gerunt, cuiusmodi sunt principes seculares et publice potestates; aliis dicentibus quod cohertio pape heretici principaliter spectat ad summum pontificem et prelatos, secundario autem spectat ad principes seculares et laicos, et hoc in duobus casibus: uno quidem si principes seculares et laici super hoc a prelatis ecclesie fuerint requisiti, et etiam in alio casu, si, videlicet, clerici fuerint pravitate heretica maculati, vel hereticorum fautores, aut in corrigendo papam hereticum dampnabiliter negligentes. | Master: Regarding the contrary opinion, there are contrary and diverse ways of stating it. [1] Some say that the coercion of a heretic pope and other heretics pertains primarily to the entire multitude of Christians, or to those who have the care of the entire multitude, and so, according to them, the coercion of heretics pertains primarily to lay people who have the care of communities, such as secular rulers and public authorities. [2] Others say that the coercion of a heretic pope pertains primarily to the Supreme Pontiff and prelates, but secondarily to secular and lay rulers, and this in two cases: [2a] in one case, if the secular and lay rulers have been called on about this by the prelates of the Church, and also [2b] in another case, if, namely, the clerics have been stained with heretical wickedness, or have been supporters of heretics, or have been blameably negligent in correcting the heretic pope.
Discipulus: Secundus modus dicendi videtur apparens. Primum autem hereticalem estimo, et tamen motiva ipsius audire desidero. | Student: The second way of speaking seems persuasive. But I consider the first heretical, and yet I desire to hear its motives.
Magister: Motiva istius modi dicendi virtualiter continentur in rationibus supra in principio huius sexti, c. 3o et 4o et 5o contentis, quibus ostenditur quod imperator est iudex ordinarius pape, et quod papa ex ordinatione Christi nullam iurisdictionem coactivam habet. Ad hoc etiam posset adduci ratio fundamentalis quorumdam, que facta est supra libro quinto capitulo 15o, per quam probatur quod ecclesia Romana non habet ex institutione Christi super alias ecclesias principatum. | Master: The motives of [1] this way of speaking [Marsilius of Padua] are virtually contained in the arguments contained above at the beginning of this sixth Book, chapters 3, 4 and 5, which show that the emperor is the ordinary judge of the pope, and that the pope has no coercive jurisdiction by the ordinance of Christ. To this could also be added the fundamental argument of some, which was made above in Book five, chapter 15, by which it is proved that the Roman Church does not by Christ's appointment have principality over other churches.
Discipulus: Ex quo ista est ratio fundamentalis quorundam, explana et applica eam ad conclusionem hic propositam. | Student: Because this it the fundamental argument of some, explain and apply it to the conclusion proposed here.
Magister: Ratio illa ad conclusionem hic propositam taliter applicatur. In tota scriptura novi testamenti non invenitur aliquid ordinatum de potestate cohercendi delinquentes nisi Matthei 18, cum Christus dixit: "Si autem peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade, et corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum. Si te audierit, lucratus eris fratrem tuum. Si autem te non audierit, adhibe tecum adhuc unum, vel duos, ut in ore duorum, vel trium testium stet omne verbum. Quod si non audierit eos, dic ecclesie. Si autem ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus." In quibus verbis Christus potestatem cohercendi delinquentes commisit ecclesie. | Master: That reasoning is applied to the conclusion proposed here as follows. In the entire New Testament scripture, there is nothing prescribed about the power to coerce offenders except Matthew 18, when Christ said: "If your brother sins against you, go and tell him his fault between you and him alone. If he listens to you, you have gained your brother. But if he does not listen to you, take with you one or two more, so that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. But if he does not listen to them, tell it to the Church. But if he does not listen to the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a tax collector." In these words, Christ committed the power of coercing offenders to the Church.
Per ecclesiam autem in scriptura divina ubique comprehenduntur laici et clerici, nec unquam in scriptura sacra laici a nomine ecclesie excluduntur. Si igitur potestas cohercendi hereticos commissa est ecclesie, non est commissa clericis in speciali. Ergo communitas fidelium habet primo et principaliter potestatem cohercendi hereticos sicut et alios delinquentes. Illa autem que competunt communitati principaliter et primo, non derivantur nisi in eum qui gerit vicem et causam communitatis. Talis autem est princeps secularis. Ergo principi seculari, non clericis, competit principaliter potestas cohercendi hereticos, et ita ad ipsum pertinet principaliter papam hereticum cohercere. | But by the Church in divine Scripture are everywhere included both laymen and clergy, and never in sacred Scripture are laymen excluded from the name of the Church. Therefore, if the power of coercing heretics was committed to the Church, it was not committed to clergy in particular. Therefore, the community of the faithful has first and foremost the power of coercing heretics as well as other offenders. But things that pertain principally and first to the community are not derived except to him who bears the place [*vicem] and cause of the community. Such is the secular ruler. Therefore the power of coercing heretics belongs principally to the secular ruler, not to clerics, and thus it pertains principally to him to coerce a heretic pope.
Discipulus: Ista ratio est omnino irrationabilis et militat contra seipsam, tum quia si potestas cohercendi hereticos et alios delinquentes tradita est primo a Christo communitati ecclesie, et communitas potest transferre potestatem suam in quem voluerit, ergo communitas ecclesie ita poterit transferre illam potestatem in clericum vel clericos sicut in laicum vel laicos. Cum ergo non legatur quod communitas fidelium talem potestatem cohercendi hereticos transtulerit in laicos, non est dicendum quod talem potestatem habeant laici a communitate fidelium, | Student: This argument is altogether irrational and militates against itself, both because if the power of coercing heretics and other offenders was first handed over by Christ to the community of the Church, and the community can transfer its power to whomever it wishes, therefore the community of the Church will be able to transfer that power to a cleric or clerics as well as to a layman or laymen. Since, therefore, there is no record that the community of the faithful transferred such power of coercing heretics to the laity, it should not be said that the laity have such power from the community of the faithful.
tum quia per verba Christi predicta non est commissa ecclesie potestas cohercendi delinquentes, sed tantummodo videtur iniungi quod delinquentes qui incorrigibiles apparuerint, evitentur, quia ultimo dicitur "Si autem ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus." Per que verba datur intelligi quod delinquentes incorrigibiles sicut ethnici et publicani sunt habendi. Communitas autem fidelium per verba prefata non recipit potestatem cohercendi ethnicos et publicanos a Christo. Ergo per eadem verba non recipit potestatem cohercendi delinquentes credentes, sed videtur per illa verba imponi fidelibus quod, sicut ethnici et publicani sunt vitandi, quantum ad hoc quod non sunt eis secreta fidei communicanda, iuxta illud Matthei 7o "Nolite dare sanctum canibus" etc., ita credentibus incorrigibilibus secreta fidei communicari non debent. | And because the aforementioned words of Christ did not entrust to the Church a power of coercing delinquents, but it only seems to be enjoined that delinquents who appear incorrigible should be avoided, because at the end it is said "But if he does not listen to the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a tax-collector." By these words it is given to be understood that incorrigible delinquents are to be regarded as heathen and tax-collectors. But from the aforementioned words the community of the faithful does not receive from Christ power to coerce heathen and tax-collectors. Therefore, by the same words it does not receive the power of coercing delinquent believers, but it seems to be imposed by those words on the faithful that, just as heathen and tax-collectors are to be avoided in this respect, that secrets of the faith are not to be communicated to them, according to Matthew 7: "Do not give what is holy to dogs" etc., so the secrets of the faith should not be communicated to incorrigible believers.
Magister: Istis non obstantibus, nonnulli putant quod ratio predicta concludat si perficiatur. Que secundum eos perfici debet sic. Contra rationem et utilitatem rei publice est quod diverse persone habentes potestates omnino distinctas, que nec integrant unam potestatem nec una dependet ab alia, habeant iurisdictionem coactivam super eandem communitatem, etiam pro diversis criminibus. Posset enim contingere quod se mutuo impedirent, et quod pax et concordia communitatis per tales distinctas potestates solveretur. Posset enim accidere quod eadem persona esset involuta diversis criminibus, quorum unum pertineret ad unam potestatem et aliud ad aliam. Quo posito, si utraque potestas vellet exercere iustitiam circa delinquentem eandem personam, oporteret quod una potestas raperet vel defenderet delinquentem contra aliam potestatem, et ita pax et concordia in communitate dissiparetur. | Master: Notwithstanding these [objections], some think that the aforesaid argument is conclusive if it is completed. According to them it should be completed thus. It is against reason and the public utility that diverse persons having entirely distinct powers, which do not integrate as one power and one does not depend on the other, should have coercive jurisdiction over the same community, even for diverse crimes. For it could happen that they would hinder one another, and that the peace and harmony of the community would be broken by such distinct powers. For it could happen that the one person was involved in diverse crimes, one of which would pertain to one power and the other to the other. In this case, if both powers wished to exercise justice regarding the same offender, it would be necessary for one power to seize or defend the offender against the other power, and thus peace and harmony in the community would be dissipated.
Si enim idem sit fur et hereticus, et ratione heresis pertineat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum et ratione furti ad iudicem secularem, si neuter iudex vult deferre alteri sed uterque vult trahere reum ad iudicium suum, unus propter heresim, alis propter furtum, inter ipsos orietur seditio. Cum ergo communitas occasiones seditionum et scissionum ac scismatum tollere teneatur, non licet eidem communitati concedere clericis potestatem cohercendi hereticos, et in principem secularem transferre potestatem malefactores alios castigandi. Sed constat quod principes seculares habent iurisdictionem coactivam super quam plurimos criminosos. Ergo clerici pro nullo crimine habent iurisdictionem coactivam super eosdem. Et ita si subditi alicuius regis vel principis fiant heretici, ab eodem rege vel principe puniri debent pro heresi sicut pro aliis criminibus. | For if the same person is a thief and a heretic, and by reason of heresy he belongs to an ecclesiastical judge and by reason of theft to a secular judge, if neither judge wishes to refer the case to the other but both wish to bring the accused to their own judgment, one for heresy, the other for theft, sedition will arise between them. Since, therefore, the community is bound to remove the occasions of seditions and divisions and schisms, it is not permissible for the same community to grant clerics the power of coercing heretics and to transfer to a secular ruler the power of punishing other malefactors. But it is clear that secular rulers have coercive jurisdiction over as many criminals as possible. Therefore clerics have no coercive jurisdiction over the same for any crime. And so if the subjects of some king or ruler become heretics, they should be punished by the same king or ruler for heresy as for other crimes.
Discipulus: Per plures leges cavetur aperte quod heretici non per reges et principes sed per clericos iudicari debent. | Student: It is clearly provided by several laws that heretics should not be judged by kings and rulers but by clerics.
Magister: Dicunt quidam quod tales leges sunt leges inique, iuri naturali, id est recto dictamini rationis, obviantes manifeste, et ideo pro non legibus sunt habende. | Master: Some say that such laws are unjust laws, clearly opposing natural law, that is, the right dictate of reason, and therefore they are to be considered as non-laws.
Capitulum 93 | Chapter 93
Discipulus: Quia de isto modo ponendi, quem reputo omnino erroneum, in aliis tractatibus sepe occasionem habebo loquendi, ideo, isto modo dimisso, nitere declarare alium modum ponendi, qui minus veritati repugnare videtur. | Student: Because I will often have occasion to speak about this way of putting things, which I consider to be completely erroneous, in other treatises, therefore, having dismissed this way, try to explain another way of putting things that seems less repugnant to the truth.
Magister: Dicunt quidam quod, si papa manifeste et publice incideret in hereticam pravitatem, puta si publice predicaret et doceret contra veritatem catholicam apud catholicos divulgatam, ut pote si doceret aut predicaret vel teneret verum corpus Christi in sacramento altaris minime contineri, aut resurrectionem non esse futuram, vel animas reproborum non affligi aut cruciari, vel non esse in inferno, aut aliquid huiusmodi, cuius contrarium tenetur explicite credere quia apud catholicos publice tanquam catholicum divulgatur, vel etiam diffinitive determinaret quemcunque errorem, quantumcunque parvum, divine scripture aut doctrine universalis ecclesie obviantem, si clerici crederent vel faverent eidem aut circa correctionem et cohibitionem ipsius essent dampnabiliter negligentes, princeps secularis in cuius dominio moraretur, et etiam populus qui sciret ipsum esse hereticum, cohercere deberet, si posset, invocato auxilio, si oporteret, vicinarum regionum. | Master: Some say that if the pope were to manifestly and publicly fall into heretical depravity -- for example if he were to publicly preach and teach against the Catholic truth disseminated among Catholics (as perhaps if he were to teach or preach or hold that the true body of Christ is not contained in the sacrament of the altar, or that there will be no resurrection, or that the souls of the reprobate are not afflicted or tortured, or that they are not in hell, or anything of the kind, the contrary of which one is bound to believe explicitly because it is disseminated publicly among Catholics as Catholic), or also if he were to definitively determine any error, however small, that is contrary to divine scripture or the doctrine of the universal Church --, if the clerics believed or favoured him or were blameably negligent about correcting and restraining him, the secular ruler in whose dominion he resided, and also the people who knew that he was a heretic, should coerce him, if possible, by invoking the help, if necessary, of neighboring regions.
Si autem princeps vel populus in cuius dominio papa hereticus moraretur crederet vel faveret eidem, aut ipsum dampnabiliter negligeret cohercere, alii principes et laici qui scirent papam esse hereticum, in quantum eis potentia et vires suppeterent, ad ipsum cohercendum essent astricti. | But if the ruler or people in whose dominion the heretic pope resided believed or favoured him, or were blameably to neglect to coerce him, other rulers and laymen who knew that the pope was a heretic, insofar as they had the power and strength, would be bound to coerce him.
Unde circa istum modum tria probare et declarare nituntur. Primo enim nituntur ostendere quod causa fidei aliquo modo spectat ad laicos. Secundo, satagunt explanare quomodo questio fidei spectat ad laicos. Tertio, moliuntur ostendere quod cohertio pape heretici in aliquo casu spectat ad laicos, etiam a prelatis ecclesie minime requisitos. | Hence they endeavor to prove and declare three things about this way. First, they endeavor to show [A] that the cause of faith in some way pertains to the laity. Second, they endeavor to explain [B] how the question of faith pertains to the laity. Third, they endeavor to show [C] that the coercion of a heretic pope in some case pertains to the laity, even if not called on by the prelates of the Church.
Primum probatur primo sic. Ad illum spectat aliquo modo questio fidei vel causa qui potest concilio generali, in quo tractatur de causa fidei, interesse. Imperatores autem, et, per rationem consimilem, reges et laici aliqui, possunt generali concilio, in quo tractatur de fide, interesse, sicut ostensum est prius c.85. Ergo ad imperatores, reges, et laicos, aliquo modo causa fidei noscitur pertinere. | [A] The first is first proved thus. A question or cause of faith pertains in some way to anyone who can attend a general council in which a cause of faith is treated. But emperors, and, by a similar reason, kings and some laymen, can attend a general council in which the faith is treated, as was shown above in chapter 85. Therefore, a cause of faith is known to pertain in some way to emperors, kings, and laymen.
Secundo sic. Ad illum aliquo modo spectat questio cause fidei qui fidem defensare tenetur. Quia nullus rem ad ipsum impertinentem omnino tenetur defensare, teste Sapiente qui, Ecclesiastico 11o, ait: "De ea re que te non molestat ne certaveris", qualis est omnis res que ad te omnino non pertinet. Sed laici fidem suam tenentur defendere, alioquin proditores veritatis sunt censendi, q. 3, c. Nolite, ubi Iohannes Chrisostomus ait: "Sicut sacerdos debitor est, ut veritatem, quam audivit a Deo, libere predicet, sic laicus debitor est, ut veritatem, quam audivit a sacerdotibus probatam quidem in scripturis, defendat fiducialiter. Quod si non fecerit, prodidit veritatem." Ergo questio fidei aliquo modo spectat ad laicos. | Secondly thus. A question of a cause of faith pertains in some way to anyone who is bound to defend the faith. Because no one is bound to defend a thing that does not pertain to him at all, as the Wise Man testifies, who, in Ecclesiasticus 11[:9], says: "Do not contend about a thing that does not trouble you", such as every thing that does not pertain to you at all. But laymen are bound to defend their faith, otherwise they are to be considered betrayers of the truth, 11 q. 3, c. Nolite, where John Chrysostom says: "Just as a priest ought to freely preach the truth he has heard from God, so a layman ought to defend faithfully the truth he has heard from priests, which is indeed proved in the scriptures. But if he does not do so, he has betrayed the truth." Therefore, a question of faith in some way pertains to the laity.
Tertio sic. Ad ipsum spectat aliquo modo questio fidei qui pro veritate fidei defendenda leges potest statuere. Sed populus et laici leges possunt statuere pro veritate fidei defendenda. Ergo ad populum et laicos aliquo modo questio fidei noscitur pertinere. Maior videtur evidens, quia nemo de re que ad eum omnino non pertinet valet legem statuere. Minor auctoritatibus, exemplis, et rationibus videtur posse probari. | Thirdly, thus. A question of faith in some way pertains to anyone who can establish laws for the defense of the truth of faith. But the people and the laity can establish laws for the defense of the truth of faith. Therefore, a question of faith is known to pertain to the people and the laity in some way. The major seems obvious, because no one can establish a law about a matter that does not concern him at all. The minor seems to be able to be proved by authorities, examples, and arguments.
Augustinus enim, ut habetur 11 q. 3, c. Imperatores, ait: "Imperatores si in errore essent (quod absit) pro errore suo contra veritatem leges darent, per quas iusti et probarentur, et coronarentur, non tamen faciendum est quod illi iuberent." Et infra: "Quando autem imperatores veritatem tenent pro ipsa contra errorem iubent. Quod quisquis contempserit ipse sibi iudicium acquirit." | Augustine, as found in 11 q. 3, c. Imperatores [col.1263, Letter 105.2.7], says: "If the emperors were in error (let that never happen!), they would give laws in favour of their error against the truth, by which the just would both be tested and crowned [with martyrdom], but we must not do what they command." And below: "But when the emperors hold the truth, the command for it against error. Whoever despises these orders, brings judgment upon himself."
Item, idem ad Vincentium, ut habetur 23 q. 4, c. Non invenitur, ait: "Quis enim nostrum vel quis vestrum non laudat leges ab imperatoribus datas adversus sacrificia paganorum", que per consequentiam pro fide date videntur. | Likewise, Augustine to Vincentius, as is found in 23 q. 4, c. Non invenitur, [c.41 col.1755, Letter 93.2.10] says: "For which of us, or which of you, does not praise the laws given by the emperors against the sacrifices of the pagans?", laws which by consequence seem to have been given in favour of the faith.
Item, ad Bonifatium, ut habetur dist. 9, c. 1, loquens de imperatoribus, ait: "Quando autem pro veritate contra falsitatem constituunt bonas leges, terrentur sevientes et corriguntur intelligentes." Et alibi ait: "Quicunque vero legibus imperatorum, que pro Dei veritate feruntur, obtemperare non vult, acquirit grande supplicium." | Likewise, to Boniface, as is found in dist. 9, c. 1, speaking of emperors, he says: "But when they establish good laws for the truth against falsehood, the violent are terrified and the intelligent are corrected." And elsewhere he says: "Whoever does not want to obey the emperors laws made in favour of God's truth acquires great punishment."
Et, ut habetur 23 q. 4, c. Si ecclesia, ait: "Qui autem dicunt", scilicet heretici, "qui contra suas impietates leges iustas institui nolunt, aliud temporis tunc fuisse, et omnia suis convenire temporibus. Quis enim tunc in Christum crediderat imperator, quis ei pro pietate contra impietatem leges ferendo seviret. Quando adhuc illum propheticum complebatur: 'Quare fremuerunt gentes et populi meditati sunt inania. Astiterunt reges terre, et principes convenerunt in unum adversus dominum, et adversus christum eius', nondum enim agebatur quod paulo post in eodem Psalmo dicebatur: 'Et nunc reges intelligite, erudimini, qui iudicatis terram servite Domino in timore, et exultate ei cum tremore.' Quomodo ergo reges Domino serviunt in timore, nisi ea, que contra Deum iussa fiunt, religiosa severitate prohibendo atque plectendo? Aliter enim servit, quia homo est, aliter etiam quia rex est. Quia homo est, servit vivendo fideliter; quia rex est, servat leges iusta precipientes et contraria prohibentes convenienti vigore sancciendo." Ex quibus patet aperte quod imperatores et publice potestates licite pro fide possunt leges statuere. | And, as is found in 23 q. 4, c. Si ecclesia [c.42 col.1757], he says: "But what they say", namely heretics "who do not want just laws to be established against their impiety, that the time was different then, and all things befit their times. For which emperor then believed in Christ, who would serve him by passing laws favouring piety against impiety? For at that time the prophecy was still being fulfilled: 'Why did the nations rage and the peoples meditate vain things. The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers gathered together against the Lord, and against his anointed.' For what was said a little later in the same Psalm was not yet done: 'And now understand, kings, be instructed, you who judge the earth, serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice in him with trembling.' How then do kings serve the Lord with fear, except by forbidding and punishing with religious severity things commanded against God? For he serves one way because he is a man, and another way because he is a king. Because he is a man, he serves by living faithfully; because he is a king, he keeps the laws that command just things and forbid the contrary by sanctioning them with appropriate force.' From this it is clear that emperors and public powers can lawfully establish laws favouring the faith.
Quod etiam exemplis ostenditur. Nam tam reges infideles quam fideles leges pro fide laudabiliter ediderunt. Nam Nabuchodonosor legem edidit pro fidei veritate, qui, ut legitur Danielis 3o, ait: "A me ergo positum est hoc decretum, ut omnis populus, tribus, et lingua, quecunque locuta fuerit blasphemiam contra Deum Sidrach, Misach, et Abdenago, dispereat et domus eius vastetur, neque enim est alius Deus qui possit ita salvare." | This is also shown by examples. For both unfaithful and faithful kings have laudably issued laws favouring the faith. For Nebuchadnezzar issued a law favouring the truth of the faith, who, as we read in Daniel 3[:96], says: "Therefore I have made a decree, that every people, tribe, and language, which shall speak any blasphemy against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, shall perish, and their houses shall be laid waste; for there is no other God who is able to save in this way."
Rex etiam magnus Artaxerxes, ut legitur Hester ultimo, legem edidit, dicens: "Hoc autem edictum, quod nunc mittimus, in cunctis urbibus proponatur, ut liceat Iudeis uti legibus suis." | The great king Artaxerxes, also, as we read in the last chapter of Esther, issued a law, saying: This edict, which we now send, shall be published in all cities, that the Jews may keep their own laws.
Reges etiam fideles leges pro veritate fidei condiderunt. Quod testatur aperte Augustinus qui, in epistola ad Vincentium, ut habetur 23 q. 6, c. Videns, ait: "Civitas mea, que, cum tota esset in partes Donati, ad unitatem catholicam legum imperialium timore conversa est." Ergo imperatores leges pro fide catholica ediderunt. | Faithful kings also established laws favouring the truth of the faith. This is clearly testified by Augustine, who, in his letter to Vincent, as found in 23 q. 6, c. Videns, says: "My city, which, when it was entirely in the party of Donatus, was converted to Catholic unity through fear of the imperial laws." Therefore the emperors issued laws favouring the Catholic faith.
Quod etiam ratione videtur posse probari. Nam ille potest leges pro fide statuere qui non solum contemplatione hominum sed etiam contemplatione Dei potest ius condere. Laici autem non solum contemplatione hominum sed etiam contemplatione Dei possunt ius statuere, dist. 1, c. Ius civile, ubi dicitur sic: "Ius civile est, quod quisque populus vel queque civitas sibi proprium divina humanaque causa constituit," id est, "contemplatione Dei et hominum", secundum glossam ibidem. Ergo laici in favorem fidei leges condere valent. | This also seems to be able to be proved by argument. For whoever can establish law not only in contemplation of men but also in contemplation of God can establish laws favouring the faith. But the laity can establish law not only in contemplation of men but also in contemplation of God, dist. 1, c. Ius civile, where it is said thus: "Civil law is what each people or each city establishes for itself as its own for a divine and human reason", that is, "in contemplation of God and men", according to the gloss there [s.v. Divina humanaque, col.6]. Therefore the laity are able to establish laws in favour of faith.
Discipulus: Ista sententia, quod laici possunt aliquas leges pro fide statuere que aliquam obtineant firmitatem nisi a summo pontifice vel prelatis ecclesie fuerint confirmate, sacris canonibus obviare videtur. Unde Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Ecclesia, ait: "Nos attendentes, quod laicis etiam religiosis, super ecclesiis et personis ecclesiasticis nulla sit attributa facultas, quos obsequendi manet necessitas, non auctoritas imperandi, a quibus, si quid motu proprio statutum fuerit, quod ecclesiarum etiam respiciat commodum et favorem, nullius firmitatis existat, nisi ab ecclesia fuerit approbatum." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod super hiis que ad ecclesiam spectant statutum laicorum nullam obtinet firmitatem nisi ab ecclesia fuerit approbatum. Questio autem fidei ad ecclesiam spectat. Ergo statutum laicorum in favorem fidei editum nullius est momenti nisi ab ecclesia fuerit approbatum. | Student: This opinion, that laymen can establish some laws in favour of the faith that obtain some firmness seems (unless they have been confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff or the prelates of the Church) to contradict the sacred canons. Hence Innocent III, as found in Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Ecclesia, says: "We consider that laymen, even [if they are] religious, have no faculty attributed to them over churches and ecclesiastical persons, whom [i.e. ecclesiastical persons] the necessity of obeying remains, not the authority to command, by whom [i.e. laymen], if anything is established by their own motion that also concerns the convenience and favour of the churches, it has no firmness unless it has been approved by the Church." From these words it is given to understand that over things that concern the Church a statute made by laymen obtains no firmness unless it has been approved by the Church. But a question of faith concerns the Church. Therefore a statute made by laymen in favour of the faith is of no moment unless it has been approved by the Church.
Item, in synodo Symachi pape, ut habetur 16 q. ultima, c. Non placuit, sic legitur: "Non placuit, laicum statuendi in ecclesia habere aliquam potestatem, cui subsequendi manet necessitas, non auctoritas imperandi." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod laicus nichil potest statuere de hiis que ad ecclesiam spectant. Questio autem fidei ad ecclesiam spectat, ergo laicus in favorem fidei nichil potest statuere. | Likewise, in the synod of Pope Symmachus, as found in 16 q. ult., c. Non placuit, it is read: "It was not approved that a layman should have any power of making decisions in the Church, to whom the necessity of following remains, not the authority to command." From these words it is given to understand that a layman can make no decision about things that pertain to the Church. But a question of faith pertains to the Church, therefore a layman can make no decision in favour of the faith.
Item, in synodo Eugenii pape, prout legitur Extra, De iudiciis, c. Decernimus, sic habetur: "Decernimus etiam ut laici ecclesiastica tractare negotia non presumant. Sed episcopi, abbates, archiepiscopi et alii ecclesiarum prelatis de negotiis ecclesiasticis, maxime de illis, que spiritualia esse noscuntur, laicorum iudicio non disponant." Ex quibus colligitur quod nec etiam laicorum iudicio sunt spiritualia disponenda. Cum ergo inter negotia spiritualia sit questio fidei potissime computanda, videtur quod laici de hiis que ad fidem spectant se intromittere minime debent, et per consequens pro fide nichil statuere possunt. | Likewise, in the synod of Pope Eugene, as is read in Extra, De iudiciis, c. Decernimus, it is stated thus: "We also decree that laymen should not presume to handle ecclesiastical matters. But let not bishops, abbots, archbishops and other prelates of the churches assign ecclesiastical matters, especially those known to be spiritual, to the judgment of laymen." From this we gather also that spiritual matters should not be assigned to the judgment of laymen. Therefore, since a question of faith must be counted most strongly among spiritual matters, it seems that laymen should not intervene at all in things pertaining to the faith, and consequently they cannot decide anything in favour of the faith.
Item, minus est disponere de ecclesiasticis dignitatibus et rebus ecclesiarum quam de fide. Qui autem non potest minus, nec maius potest. Laici vero de dignitatibus ecclesiasticis et rebus ecclesiarum nichil possunt disponere. Ergo multo fortius nec de fide poterunt aliquid ordinare. Quod autem de dignitatibus ecclesiasticis et rebus ecclesiarum laici nichil disponere valeant, sacris canonibus affirmatur. Nam 16 q. ultima, c. Laicis, sic legitur: "Laicis quamvis religiosis nulla de ecclesiasticis dignitatibus aliquid disponendi legitur facultas attribuita." | Likewise, it is less to make dispositions concerning ecclesiastical dignities and Church affairs than about faith. But anyone who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. But laymen cannot make dispositions concerning ecclesiastical dignities and Church affairs. Therefore, much more so, they cannot order anything about faith. But that laymen cannot make dispositions concerning ecclesiastical dignities and Church affairs is affirmed by the sacred canons. For 16 q. ult., c. Laicis, reads thus: "Laymen, although religious, are not read to have the faculty of disposing of anything about ecclesiastical dignities."
Item, Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, De arbitris, c. Contingit, ait: "Ad hoc generaliter prohibemus, ne super rebus spiritualibus compromittatur in laicum, quia non decet, ut laicus in talibus arbitretur." Ergo multo magis non decet ut laicus de fide, dignitatibus ecclesiasticis, et rebus ecclesiarum aliquid legem statuendo decernat. | Likewise, Innocent III, as found in Extra, De arbitris, c. Contingit, [1.43.8 col. 512] says: "To this end we generally forbid that over spiritual matters compromittatur in laicum [i.e. that a layman take part in an arbitration agreement], because it is not fitting that a layman should arbitrate in such matters." Therefore, much more, it is not fitting that a layman should decide anything about faith, ecclesiastical dignities, and Church affairs by establishing a law.
Item, dist. 96, c. Bene, de statuto Basilii in favorem ecclesie edito sic legitur: "Scripturam, que in sacerdotali concilio recitata est, evidentissimis documentis constat esse invalidam: primum quia contra Patrum regulas a laicis, quamvis religiosis, quibus nulla de ecclesiasticis facultatibus aliquid disponendi legitur umquam attributa facultas, facta videtur." | Likewise, dist. 96, c. Bene, concerning the statute of Basil issued in favour of the Church, it is thus read: "The writing, which was recited in the priestly council, is established by the most evident proofs to be invalid: first because it seems to have been made, contrary to the rules of the Fathers, by laymen (although religious), to whom no faculty of disposing of ecclesiastical powers is ever attributed."
Item, Innocentius tertius, ut legitur Extra, De rebus ecclesie alienandis vel non, ait: "Cum laicis, quamvis religiosis, disponendi de rebus ecclesie nulla sit attributa potestas, quos obsequendi manet necessitas, non auctoritas imperandi", etc. | Likewise, Innocent III, as is read Extra, De rebus ecclesie alienandis vel non [3.13.12.col.1115], says: "Since to laymen, although religious, no power is attributed for disposing of Church affairs, whom the necessity of obeying remains, not the authority of commanding," etc.
Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus colligitur evidenter quod non solum de fide, sed nec etiam de dignitatibus et rebus ecclesie, laici leges condendi nullam habent penitus potestatem. Et quamvis hoc conclusio michi videtur certa secundum canonicas sanctiones, tamen quomodo ad allegationes prescriptas respondere contingat non differas recitare. | From these and many other [texts] it is evidently gathered that not only concerning faith, but also concerning the dignities and affairs of the Church, laymen have absolutely no power to make laws. And although this conclusion seems to me certain according to canonical laws, nevertheless do not delay in reciting how it may be possible to answer the above allegations.
Magister: Allegationes tue predicte a nonnullis pueriles et frivole reputantur, quia videtur eis quod sacrorum canonum non habeas intellectum. Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod rem aliquam ad alium pertinere dupliciter potest contingere. Res enim aliqua ad aliquem pertinet tanquam in potestate eius aliquo modo existens, ut scilicet de ea sicut sibi placuerit, dummodo non contra Deum vel rationem rectam aut leges iustas seu consuetudines rationabiles, valeat ordinare, et isto modo dignitates ecclesiastice et res ecclesiarum ad prelatos ecclesie pertinere noscuntur. Alio modo pertinet res aliqua ad aliquem tanquam defendenda ab eo, et isto modo res ecclesiarum pertinent ad laicos, quia laici defendere debent res ecclesiarum. Sic etiam fides spectat ad laicos, quia eam viriliter et potenter defendere astringuuntur. | Master: Your arguments are considered childish and frivolous by some, because it seems to them that you have no understanding of the sacred canons. To make this clear, it is said that it should be known that a thing may belong to another in two ways. For a thing belongs to someone as being in some way in his power, so that he can order it as he pleases, provided it is not against God or right reason or just laws or reasonable customs; and in this way ecclesiastical dignities and Church affairs are known to belong to the prelates of the Church. In another way a thing belongs to someone as being to be defended by him, and in this way Church affairs belong to the laity, because the laity must defend Church affairs. So also faith belongs to the laity, because they are bound to defend it manfully and powerfully.
Ex hiis respondetur ad omnes allegationes tuas, quia, sicut laici leges statuere possunt suos subditos artius obligando ne personas ecclesiasticas vel res earum offendant vel molestent iniuste, quos in contrarium facientes penis possunt debitis cohercere, quamvis huiusmodi penis personas exemptas ab eorum potestate nequeant castigare, sic laici, scilicet reges, principes, ac publice potestates et etiam communitates, leges possunt statuere pro fide salubrius defendenda, possuntque punire suos subditos fidem nequiter impugnantes, quamvis punire non valeant eos qui a sua iurisdictione sunt exempti. | From these points answer is made to all your arguments, because, just as laymen can establish laws, obliging their subjects more closely not to offend or wrongfully molest ecclesiastical persons or their property, whom [i.e. their subjects] they can coerce with due penalties for doing the opposite (although they cannot punish with such penalties persons exempt from their power), so laymen, namely kings, rulers, and public powers and also communities, can establish laws for the more wholesome defense of the faith, and they can punish their subjects if they wickedly attack the faith (although they cannot punish those who are exempt from their jurisdiction).
Discipulus: Nitere allegare pro assertione predicta. | Student: Try to argue in favour of the aforementioned assertion.
Magister: Quod reges et principes, ac publice potestates et civitates alieque communitates que potestatem habent condendi leges de temporalibus, leges statuere queant pro veritate fidei tenenda et defendenda et nullatenus impugnanda vel reiicienda, eisdemque legibus suos subditos obligare, sic videtur posse probari. | Master: That kings and rulers, and public powers and cities and other communities that have the power to make laws about temporal matters, can establish laws in favour of the truth of the faith, to be held and defended and in no way attacked or rejected, and to oblige their subjects to the same laws, seems provable as follows.
Omnis persona et universitas iurisdictionem habens coactivam de hiis que per se et subditos facere obligatur legem potest statuere, et ad ea facienda subditos sub pena rationabili obligare. Sed omnis persona fidelis, et etiam universitas, iurisdictionem habens coactivam, per se et subditos tenetur fidem catholicam defendere. Ergo de fide defendenda potest legem statuere, et subditos ad fidem defendendam sub pena rationabili obligare. | Every person and community having coercive jurisdiction can establish a law about things he is obliged to do for himself and his subjects, and to oblige his subjects to do them under reasonable penalty. But every faithful person, and also community, having coercive jurisdiction, is bound for himself and his subjects to defend the Catholic faith. Therefore he can establish a law about defending the faith, and oblige his subjects to defend the faith under reasonable penalty.
Secundo probatur idem sic. Quilibet habens iurisdictionem coactivam ad ea per leges suos potest suos subditos obligare que pacem et tranquillitatem eorum procurant et conservant, et quorum contraria pacem et tranquillitatem civium dissipant et conturbant. Sed fidem negare et impugnare et abicere pacem et tranquillitatem civium dissipat et conturbat, quia homines diversarum sectarum minime pacifice insimul vivunt. Ergo omnis persona et communitas habens iurisdictionem coactivam potest per leges subditos obligare ne fidem catholicam impugnare aut abicere quoquo modo presumant. | Secondly, the same is proved thus. Anyone having coercive jurisdiction can oblige his subjects by his laws to things that procure and preserve their peace and tranquility, and the contrary of which disperse and disturb the peace and tranquility of the citizens. But to deny and attack and reject the faith disperses and disturbs the peace and tranquility of the citizens, because men of diverse sects do not live together peacefully. Therefore every person and community having coercive jurisdiction can oblige their subjects by laws not to presume in any way to attack or reject the Catholic faith.
Tertio sic. Non minorem potestatem habet rex vel princeps super subditos suos in hiis que sunt contra fidem et bonos mores quam habet maritus super uxorem suam, vel pater super prolem suam. Sed maritus coniugem suam errantem contra fidem vel bonos mores potest et debet corrigere, et pater prolem suam errantem contra fidem et bonos mores habet corrigere. Ergo rex et princeps subditos suos errantes contra fidem et bonos mores potest corrigere. Rex autem et princeps de hiis que in subditis suis potest corrigere valet legem statuere. Ergo rex et princeps pro fide tenenda a subditis suis legem potest eis imponere. | Thirdly, thus. A king or ruler has no less power over his subjects in matters that are against faith and good morals than a husband has over his wife, or a father over his children. But a husband can and must correct his wife who errs against faith or good morals, and a father must correct his children who err against faith and good morals. Therefore a king or ruler can correct his subjects who err against faith and good morals. But a king or ruler can establish a law about matters that he can correct in his subjects. Therefore a king or ruler can impose a law on them in favour of the faith to be kept by his subjects.
Discipulus: Predicta assertio non ita michi videtur irrationabilis sicut antea videbatur, et ideo cupio ipsius intellectum pleniorem habere, quia per hoc manifestius animadvertam an sit consona vel dissona veritati. Magis autem explicabis eam si indicaveris quomodo ad singulas allegationes contra eam adductas responderi contingat. Ideo per omnes discurre. | Student: The aforementioned assertion does not seem to me as unreasonable as it seemed before, and therefore I desire to have a fuller understanding of it, because by this I will more clearly see whether it is consonant or dissonant with the truth. But you will explain it more if you indicate how it is possible to respond to the individual arguments brought against it. Therefore, go through them all.
Magister: Ad auctoritatem Innocentii tertii respondetur quod ecclesie et persone ecclesiastice a iurisdictione laicorum sunt exempte, et ideo super ecclesiis ordinandis vel conferendis, vel super aliqua immutatione circa ecclesias facienda, seu etiam super personis ecclesiasticis puniendis vel quomodolibet gubernandis aut ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum artandis, laicis nichil in earum commodum respiciens et favorem possunt statuere quod firmitatem optineat, nisi ab ecclesia fuerit approbatum. | Master: The answer made to the text of Innocent III is that churches and ecclesiastical persons are exempt from the jurisdiction of laymen, and therefore regarding the ordering or conferring of churches, or regarding any change to be made concerning churches, or also regarding the punishment or any sort of governing of ecclesiastical persons, or regarding a compulsion to do or not to do something, laymen cannot establish anything in their interest and favour that obtains firmness, unless it has been approved by the Church.
Quin tamen aliqua possint statuere in ecclesiarum et personarum ecclesiasticarum commodum et favorem, sub certis penis suos subditos prohibendo ne ecclesiis vel personis ecclesiasticis molestiam inferant vel gravamen, Innocentius minime denegat. Nonne potest rex, absque requisitione cuiuscunque prelati ecclesie, statuere quod quicunque clericum occiderit pena capitali plectatur? Nunquid non potest statuere, absque requisitione ecclesie, quod qui res ecclesiasticas furatus fuerit pena mortis vel alia puniatur? Si igitur laici possunt statuere leges pro rebus temporalibus ecclesie et personis ecclesiasticis a suis subditis nullatenus molestandis, multo fortius pro fide catholica, quam multo magis defendere et tueri tenentur quam res ecclesiarum et personas ecclesiasticas, quascumque possunt leges statuere, ne aliquis subditus eorum fidem negare vel impugnare audeat quoquo modo. | But Innocent in no way denies that they can establish some things for the convenience and favour of churches and ecclesiastical persons, by prohibiting their subjects under certain penalties from causing trouble or harm to churches or ecclesiastical persons. Can not a king, without a request from any prelate of the Church, establish that whoever kills a cleric shall be punished with capital punishment? Can he not establish, without a request from the Church, that whoever steals ecclesiastical property shall be punished with death or some other penalty? If therefore laymen can establish laws for the temporal property of the Church and ecclesiastical persons not to be molested in any way by their subjects, much more they can enact whatever laws in favour of the Catholic faith, which they are bound to defend and protect much more than in favour of the property of churches and ecclesiastical persons, lest any subject of theirs dare to deny or attack the faith in any way.
Quod etiam tali ratione probatur. Magis spectat ad principem constitutum a Deo, qualis est omnis princeps utens legitima potestate, ulcisci iniuriam Dei quam civium suorum (23 q. 4, c. Si ea). Sed rex et princeps potest et debet statuere legem ne unus subditorum peccet in alium. Ergo multo magis potest condere leges ne quis subditorum suorum fidem impugnet, exemplo Nabuchodonosor regis, qui legem edidit ne quis verum Deum presumeret blasphemare. | This is also proved by argument as follows. It is more fitting for a ruler appointed by God, such as every ruler exercising legitimate power is, to avenge an injury to God than to his citizens (23 q. 4, c. Si ea). But a king and ruler can and must establish a law so that one of his subjects may not sin against another. Therefore, much more, can he establish laws so that no one may impugn the faith of his subjects, following the example of King Nebuchadnezzar, who issued a law that no one might presume to blaspheme the true God.
Ad auctoritatem sumptam ex synodo Symachi pape, respondetur per idem, quod laici non habent potestatem aliquid in ecclesia statuendi quod immutationem circa ipsas ecclesias inducat. Habent tamen potestatem statuendi ne quis subditorum suorum ecclesiam audeat molestare, et ita habent potestatem statuendi ne quis eis subditus fidem catholicam impugnet, neget, aut blasphemet, vel fidem quoquo modo subvertat. | To the text taken from the synod of Pope Symmachus, answer is made though the same [argument], that the laity do not have the power to establish anything in the Church that would bring about a change in the churches themselves, but they do have power to establish that none of their subjects dare to molest the Church; and thus they have power to establish that none of their subjects may impugn, deny, or blaspheme the Catholic faith, or in any way subvert the faith.
Ad auctoritatem acceptam ex synodo Eugenii pape consimiliter respondetur, quod laici ecclesiastica negotia de rebus aut personis ecclesiasticis ordinandis vel regendis vel aliter immutandis se intromittendo tractare non debent, nec clerici talia negotia laicorum iudicio, hoc est auctoritate eorum, disponere debent. Possunt tamen laici ordinare ut clerici in ecclesiasticis disponendis negotiis minime infestentur, possuntque eis aliquas libertates conferre, exemplo principum antiquorum qui, ut testatur Innocentius tertius Extra, De rebus ecclesie alienandis vel non, c. Cum laicis, ecclesiasticam libertatem privilegiis multis munierunt. Sic etiam possunt laici in favorem fidei christiane plura ordinare, ad que servanda suos subditos possunt legibus coartare. Si enim laici, ex devotione quam habent ad fidem catholicam, possunt in favorem clericorum nonnulla statuere et eis libertates plures tribuere, multo fortius possunt in favorem fidei quamplura statuere, et ad ea constringere sibi subiectos. | To the text taken from the synod of Pope Eugene, the response is similar, that laymen should not interfere in ecclesiastical affairs concerning the ordering, governing, or otherwise changing of ecclesiastical things or persons, nor should clerics assign such matters by the judgment of laymen, that is, to their authority. However, laymen can order so that clerics are least bothered in the disposition of ecclesiastical affairs, and they can confer on them certain liberties, following the example of ancient rulers who, as Innocent III attests, Extra, De rebus ecclesie alienandis vel non, c. Cum laicis, fortified ecclesiastical liberty with many privileges. So also laymen can order many things in favour of the Christian faith, and they can constrain their subjects to observe them by laws. For if laymen, out of their devotion to the Catholic faith, can establish some things in favour of clerics and grant them many liberties, much more can they establish many things in favour of the faith and constrain their subjects to them.
Ad auctoritatem que ponitur 16 q. ultima, c. Laicis, respondetur quod laici non possunt statuere aliquid circa dignitates ecclesiasticas immutandas. Possunt tamen statuere plura pro dignitatibus ecclesiasticis defendendis, ad que subditos suos, et non alios a potestate eorum exemptos, possunt constringere, nisi in casu. Cum vero dicitur qui non potest minus nec maius potest , dicitur quod ista fallit, quia sepe maiora aliqua spectant ad iurisdictionem vel potestatem aliquorum ad quorum iurisdictionem vel potestatem quedam minora non pertinent. In proposito tamen non fallit, quia, sicut possunt laici quedam statuere pro defensione ecclesiasticarum dignitatum, ita possunt nonnulla statuere pro defensione fidei orthodoxe. | To the text given in 16 q. ult., c. Laicis, the answer is made that laymen cannot enact anything about changing ecclesiastical dignities. They can, however, enact many things for the defense of ecclesiastical dignities, to which they can bind their subjects (and not others exempt from their power, except occasionally). But when it is said anyone who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more, it is said that this is misleading, because often some greater things pertain to the jurisdiction or power of some to whose jurisdiction or power certain lesser things do not pertain. In the present case, however, it is not misleading, because, just as laymen can enact some things for the defense of ecclesiastical dignities, so they can enact some things for the defense of the orthodox faith.
Ad auctoritatem Innocentii tertii Extra, De arbitris, respondetur quod arbiter recipit potestatem ordinandi aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et ideo in rebus spiritualibus laicus arbiter esse non potest. Cum hoc tamen stat quod laicus valeat ordinare ne subditi sui res spirituales invadant vel impugnent. | To the text of Innocent III Extra, De arbitris, the answer made is that an arbitrator receives the power to order that something be done or not done, and therefore in spiritual matters a layman cannot be an arbitrator. It is consistent with this, however, that a layman can order that his subjects do not invade or impugn spiritual things.
Ad auctoritatem sumptam de dist. 96, c. Bene, consimiliter dicitur quod ideo statutum extitit reprobatum quia plura agenda circa electionem summi pontificis et res ecclesiasticas ordinavit. Si autem solummodo statuisset quod nullus sibi subiectus de rebus ecclesie se intromittere, vel electionem smmi pontificis impedire presumeret, statutum suum non fuisset ullatenus reprobatum. | To the text taken from dist. 96, c. Bene, it is said in a similar way that the statute was therefore rejected because it arranged several things to be done about the election of the Supreme Pontiff and ecclesiastical matters. But if it had only enacted that no one subject to it should presume to interfere in the affairs of the Church or to impede the election of the Supreme Pontiff, its enactment would not have been rejected in any way.
Ad ultimam auctoritatem Innocentii tertii, consimiliter dicitur quod laici de rebus ecclesie distribuendis vel expendendis nichil possunt penitus ordinare, non tamen negat quin potestatem habeant statuendi ne res ecclesie a suis subditis invadantur. | Regarding the last text, of Innocent III, it is said in a similar way that the laity cannot order anything at all about the distribution or expenditure of Church property, but it does not deny that they have the power to enact that the affairs of the Church not be invaded by their subjects.
Capitulum 94 | Chapter 94
Discipulus: Satis disseruisti an questio fidei spectet ad laicos. Ideo nunc dic, secundum quod promisisti, per quem modum videlicet questio fidei spectat ad laicos. Per hoc enim de predictis magis advertam an aliquid contineant veritatis. | [B] Student: You have sufficiently discussed whether a question of faith concerns the laity. Therefore, now tell me, as you promised, in what way a question of faith concerns the laity. For by this I will better see whether the above position contains any truth.
Magister: Dicitur quod questionem ventilari de fide multis modis potest accidere. | Master: It is said that a discussion of a question of faith can happen in many ways.
Aut enim ventilatur questio de aliquo pertinente ad fidem quod apud omnes catholicos tanquam catholicum hactenus extitit divulgatum, puta si aliqui inciperent vertere in questionem an Christus sit verus Deus et verus homo, vel an Christus fuerit natus de virgine, vel an beata vita sit futura, vel aliud consimile de quo notum fuit apud omnes catholicos, literatos et illiteratos, quod ad fidem pertinet orthodoxam. | For either [1] a question is discussed about something pertaining to the faith that has hitherto been widely known disseminated among all Catholics as Catholic, for example if some were to begin to bring into question whether Christ is true God and true man, or whether Christ was born of a virgin, or whether a blessed life is to come, or something similar that was known among all Catholics, literate and illiterate, that pertains to the orthodox faith.
Aut ventilatur questio de aliquo quod est a catholica ecclesia explicite approbatum, licet talis approbatio non sit apud omnes catholicos divulgata, puta si aliqui inciperent vertere in questionem an Salomon fuerit filius Bersabee vel vir eius. Audivi enim a quodam fide digno qui asseruit se fuisse presentem quando quidam magister theologie Parisiensis in scolis publice tenuit quod Bersabee erat uxor Salomonis, dicens illud quod legitur in genealogia Salvatoris: "David autem rex genuit Salomonem" etc. debet sic punctari: "David autem rex genuit Salomonem", ut ubi sit finis versus, et alius versus sic incipiat: "Ex ea que fuit Urie Salomon autem genuit Roboam." Quamvis ergo hec veritas "Salomon fuit filius Bersabee" sit ab ecclesia explicite approbata, quemadmodum tota scriptura divina est explicite approbata, tamen posset ab insipientibus et iniquis verti in questionem. Sic posset verti in questionem quelibet veritas scripture divine que non est apud omnes catholicos tanquam catholica divulgata. Sicut etiam posset verti in questionem an in Christo fuerunt due voluntates quamvis in Christo non esse duas voluntates sit heresis explicite condempnata. | Or [2] a question is discussed about something that has been explicitly approved by the Catholic Church, although such approval has not been widely known among all Catholics: for example if some were to begin to bring into question whether Solomon was the son of Bathsheba or her husband. For I heard a certain trustworthy person who said he was present when a certain master of theology of Paris publicly held in the schools that Bathsheba was the wife of Solomon, saying that what is read in the genealogy of the Savior: " And David the king begat Solomon", etc. should be punctuated thus: "David the king begat Solomon", so that the verse ends there, and another verse begins thus: "Of her who was the wife of Uriah [Bathsheba] Solomon begot Roboam." [see Note]. Although therefore this truth, "Solomon was the son of Bathsheba", is explicitly approved by the Church, as all divine Scripture is explicitly approved, yet it could be brought into question by the foolish and wicked. Thus could any truth of divine Scripture be brought into question that is not disseminated among all Catholics as Catholic. Just as it could also be brought into question whether there were two wills in Christ, although the fact that there are not two wills in Christ is a heresy explicitly condemned. [Note: Vulgate: David autem rex genuit Salomonem ex ea quae fuit Uríae. Salomon autem genuit Roboam. Repunctuated: David autem rex genuit Salomonem. Ex ea quæ fuit Uriae, Salomon autem genuit Roboam. Vulgate translated: King David begot Solomon, of her [i.e. Bathsheba ] that had been the wife of Urias. And Solomon begot Roboam. Repunctuated: King David begot Solomon. Of her that had been the wife of Urias, Solomon begot Roboam. Ki]
Aut ventilatur questio de aliquo quod non est ab ecclesia explicite approbatum, nec heresis contraria est explicite condempnata. Sic questio fidei inter theologos sepissime ventilatur. Sic ante determinationem ecclesie de processione Spiritus Sancti a Filio inter Grecos et Latinos questio vertebatur. | Or [3] a question is discussed about something that has not been explicitly approved by the Church, nor has the contrary heresy been explicitly condemned. In this way a question of faith is very often discussed among theologians. Thus before the determination of the Church about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son the question was discussed among the Greeks and Latins.
Loquendo de questione fidei primo modo dicta, dicitur quod talis questio multipliciter spectat ad laicos. Uno modo, ut laici veritatem fidei in tali questione apud catholicos divulgatam pro loco et tempore fateantur, quia, secundum Apostolum ad Romanos 10: "Corde enim creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem", et ipsa Veritas, Lucae 9 ait: "Qui me erubuerit, et meos sermones, hunc filius hominis erubescet cum venerit in maiestate sua, et Patris et sanctorum angelorum." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod quilibet fidelis astringitur veritatem fidei sibi notam sollempniter confiteri. Quare laici in tali questione fidei veritatem sibi notam confiteri tenentur, | [1] Speaking of a question of faith said in the first way, it is said that such a question regards the laity in many ways. [a] In one way, that the laity may confess, according to place and time, the truth of faith in such a question as has been disseminated among Catholics, because, according to the Apostle to the Romans 10: "For with the heart man believes unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation", and the Truth itself, Luke 9 says: "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and my words, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in his majesty, and of the Father, and of the holy angels." From these words it is gathered that every believer is bound to confess solemnly the truth of faith known to him. Why are the laity bound to confess the truth of faith known to them in such a question of faith,
Discipulus: Dic michi in quibus casibus laici tenentur veritatem fidei in tali questione simpliciter confiteri. | Student: Tell me in what cases are the laity bound to confess simply the truth of faith in such a question.
Magister: Respondetur quod in duobus casibus laici, sicut et ceteri christiani, ad talem confessionem de necessitate salutis sunt astricti. Primus est quando per omissionem huiusmodi confessionis subtraheretur honor Dei: quando, videlicet, per omissionem huiusmodi confessionis alii averterentur a fide, vel converterentur ad hereticam pravitatem. | Master: The answer made is that in two cases laymen, like other Christians, are bound to such a confession of necessity for salvation. The first is when by omitting such a confession the honor of God would be taken away: when, namely, by omitting such a confession others would be turned away from the faith, or converted to heretical wickedness.
Secundo sunt laici ad talem confessionem astricti quando per omissionem huiusmodi confessionis fideles aliquod detrimentum incurrerent, aut subtraheretur fidelibus aliquod subsidium impendendum eisdem. Utpote, si defendentes catholicam veritatem in tali questione mota per confessionem principis ab omni molestia per subditos principis inferenda forent securi, et per confessionem principis subditi sui provocarentur ad defendendum, iuvandum, et favendum confitentibus catholicam veritatem et impugnantibus hereticam pravitatem, per omissionem autem talis confessionis seu per taciturnitatem subditi principis provocarentur ad impugnandum defendentes catholicam veritatem, et ad subtrahendum eisdem favorem, auxilium, et consilium opportunum. In hoc casu princeps de necessitate salutis deberet catholicam veritatem circa talem questionem publice confiteri, et consimiliter de aliis laicis est dicendum. | Secondly, laymen are bound to make such a confession when by its omission the faithful would incur some harm, or some support to be given to the faithful would be taken away. For example, if those defending the Catholic truth when such a question was raised would by the ruler's confession be safe from all trouble by the ruler's subjects, and by the ruler's confession his subjects would be called forth to defend, help, and favour those confessing the Catholic truth and attacking heretical wickedness, but by omitting such a confession or by maintaining silence the ruler's subjects would be provoked to attack those defending the Catholic truth and deprive them of favour, help, and opportune counsel. In this case, the ruler should, of necessity for salvation, publicly confess the Catholic truth about such a question, and the same applies to other lay people.
Discipulus: Vellem scire an aliquis doctor modernus, preter doctores auctenticos, concordet cum ista sententia. | Student: I would like to know whether any modern doctor, apart from authoritative doctors, agrees with this opinion.
Magister: Ista videtur esse sententia Thome, 2 a 2 e , q. 3a, articulo 2o, qui ait: "Confiteri fidem non semper nec in quolibet loco est de necessitate salutis; sed in aliquo loco et tempore, quando scilicet per dimissionem huius confessionis subtraheretur honor debitus Deo et etiam utilitas proximis impendenda; puta si aliquis interrogatus de fide taceret, et ex hoc crederetur vel quod non haberet fidem vel quod fides non esset vera, vel alii per eius taciturnitatem averterentur a fide. In huiusmodi enim casibus confessio fidei est de necessitate salutis." | Master: This seems to be the opinion of Thomas, [Summa theologiae] 2-2, q.3 art.2, who says: "Confessing faith is not always or in every place necessary for salvation; but in some place and time, namely, when by omitting this confession the honor due to God and also the utility to be bestowed on our neighbors would be withdrawn; for example, if someone, when questioned about faith, were silent, and from this it would be believed either that he did not have faith or that the faith was not true, or others would be turned away by his silence from the faith. For in such cases, the confession of faith is necessary for salvation."
Et post dicit sic: "Quando honor Dei vel utilitas proximi hoc exposcit, non debet esse contentus homo ut per fidem suam ipsi veritati divine coniungatur, sed debet fidem exterius confiteri". | And later he says: "When God's honour or our neighbours utility demands it, a man should not be content to be united to divine truth through his faith, but he should confess the faith externally."
Et post: "Dicendum quod in casu necessitatis, ubi fides periclitatur, quilibet tenetur fidem suam aliis propalare, vel ad instructionem aliorum fidelium sive confirmationem, vel ad reprimendum infidelium insultationem." | And after: " It must be said that in a case of necessity, where faith is in danger, everyone is bound to manifest his faith to others, either for the instruction of other believers, or confirmation, or to repress the insult of unbelievers."
Et post: "Si utilitas fidei aliqua preparetur aut necessitas adsit, contempta turbatione infidelium, debet homo publice fidem confiteri. Unde Matth. 15 dicitur quod, cum discipuli dixissent Domino quod pharisei audito eius verbo scandalizati sunt, Dominus respondit 'Sinite illos', scilicet turbari, 'ceci sunt et duces cecorum'." | And after: " If some benefit of faith is prepared or there is necessity, a person should publicly confess the faith, disregarding the disturbance of unbelievers. Hence Matt. 15 says that, when the disciples had said to the Lord that the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard his word, the Lord replied 'Let them', namely, be disturbed, 'they are blind and leaders of the blind'."
Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod principes et alii laici, sive interrogentur sive non interrogentur, si per omissionem confessionis veritatis eis note circa questionem motam de fide alii a fide vel a defensione necessaria fidei avertantur, vel fideles aliqua dispendia patiuntur, de necessitate salutis veritatem eis notam publice confiteri tenentur. Et non solum viri ad confessionem publicam veritatis eis note, sed etiam mulieres, in supradictis casibus obligantur. | From these words it is evidently gathered that rulers and other laymen, whether questioned or not, if by omitting to confess the truth known to them concerning a question raised about faith others are turned away from the faith or from the necessary defense of the faith, or the faithful suffer some loss, they are bound to publicly confess the truth known to them of necessity for salvation. And not only men, but also women, are obliged to publicly confess the truth known to them in the aforementioned cases.
Discipulus: Quid si prelati ecclesie mandarent laicis quod a tali confessione cessarent? | Student: What if the prelates of the Church were to command the laity to cease from such a confession?
Magister: Respondetur quod si papa et omnes clerici mundi mandarent laicis quod a tale confessione cessarent, respondere deberent verbum Petri dicentis Act. 5: "Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus." | Master: The answer made is that if the pope and all the clergy of the world were to command the laity to cease from such a confession, they should respond to the word of Peter who says in Acts 5: "We must obey God rather than men."
Discipulus: Nonne laici debent sequi doctrinam prelatorum ecclesie cum dicat Celestinus papa, ut legitur dist. 62, c. 2: "Docendus est populus, non sequendus"? | Student: Shouldn't the laity follow the teaching of the prelates of the Church, since Pope Celestine says, as we read in dist. 62, c. 2, "The people must be taught, not followed"?
Magister: Respondetur quod docendus est populus in hiis que ignorat, sed quantum ad ea que didicit a fideli ecclesia non est ullatenus avertendus. | Master: The answer made is that the people are to be taught in things they are ignorant of, but as for things they have learned from the faithful Church they are not to be turned away in any way.
Discipulus: Et quibus credet populus nisi prelatis ecclesie? | Student: And whom will the people believe but the prelates of the Church?
Magister: Respondetur quod populus magis credet scripture divine quam omnibus clericis mundi, quia illa scriptura est omnibus mortalibus preferenda. Item, magis credet populus toti communitati fidelium precedentium quam multitudini existentium in vita presenti, et ideo si multitudo clericorum recederet ab illis que priores nunc regnantes cum Christo concorditer tenuerunt, non essent ullatenus audiendi, sed essent penis debitis cohercendi. | Master: The answer made is that the people will believe divine scripture more than all the clergy of the world, because that scripture must be preferred to all mortals. Likewise, the people will believe more in the entire community of the faithful preceding them than in the multitude of those existing in the present life; and therefore if the multitude of clerics were to withdraw from things predecessors now reigning with Christ held in agreement, they would not be in any way to be heard, but would be to be coerced by due penalty.
Discipulus: Dixisti unum modum per quem questio fidei mota de aliquo apud omnes orthodoxos tanquam catholico divulgato spectat ad laicos. Ideo nunc dic alium modum secundum opinionem superius recitatam. | Student: You have spoken of one way in which a question of faith raised about something disseminated among all the orthodox as Catholic pertains to the laity. Therefore now tell me [b] another way according to the opinion recited above.
Magister: Dicitur quod questio talis sic secundo spectat ad laicos quod pro ipsa questione laici omnes astringuntur tenentes, predicantes, docentes, asserentes, seu etiam dubitantes assertionem que est contraria veritati esse veram, et omnes negantes vel dubitantes catholicam veritatem taliter divulgatam esse de substantia fidei, tanquam excommunicatos et hereticos vitare, et pro non prelatis habere, et eis nullatenus obedire tenentur. | Master: It is said that, second, such a question thus pertains to the laity that for that question all laymen are bound to avoid as excommunicated and heretics, and to regard them as non-prelates, and are bound not to obey in any way, those who hold, preach, teach, assert, or even doubt [i.e. regard as a possibility] that an assertion contrary to the truth is true, and all those who deny or doubt that a Catholic truth disseminated in such a way belongs to the substance of the faith.
Verbi gratia: si aliqui predicarent, docerent, vel assererent quoquo modo, aut etiam dubitarent, Christum non fuisse natum de virgine, vel non fuisse passum, aut non resurexisse a mortuis, laici omnes tales, etiam si aliquis eorum papali fuisset preditus dignitate, tanquam hereticos et excommunicatos vitare, et eis nullatenus obedire, tenentur. Quod enim tales sint heretici reputandi ex hiis que dicta sunt supra libro quarto c. 11 colligitur evidenter. Quod autem sint excommunicati ex c. 81 huius sexti apparet. Ex quibus sequitur luculenter quod laici, scientes papam vel alios clericos predicare, docere, vel qualitercunque tenere aliquam assertionem que catholice veritati apud omnes orthodoxos vulgate contradicit, ei non debent aliqualiter obedire. | For example, if some preach, teach, or assert in any way, or even doubt, that Christ was not born of a virgin, or did not suffer, or did not rise from the dead, then all laymen are bound to avoid them as heretics and excommunicated and not to obey them in any way, even if one of them had been gifted with the papal dignity. For that such are to be considered heretics is evidently gathered from what was said above in Book IV, Chapter 11. That they are excommunicated is evident from chapter 81 of this Book VI. From this it follows clearly that laymen, knowing that the pope or other clerics preach, teach, or in any way hold any assertion that contradicts the Catholic truth commonly held among all orthodox, should not obey him in any way.
Discipulus: Quid si principes et alii laici nesciunt per scientiam certam papam tenere vel docere contra talem catholicam veritatem, sciunt tamen papam esse de tali doctrina pestifera publice diffamatum, nunquid ipsum vitare tenentur? | Student: What if rulers and other laymen do not know by certain knowledge that a pope holds or teaches against such Catholic truth, yet they know that the pope has been publicly defamed for such a pestilent doctrine, are they bound to avoid him?
Magister: Respondetur quod non propter verba paucorum, sed propter publicam famam laici ad quos talis fama pervenerit papam talia predicantem vitare tenentur, quia ad hoc quod aliquis excommunicatus vitetur sufficit publica fama, Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum desideres, Secunde questioni, ubi Clemens tertius dicit in hec verba: "Secunde questioni hunc finem duximus imponendum, quod, si publica fama est, aliquem verberasse clericum, nec episcopus, nec alius communicare sibi debet, nisi ad arbitrium episcopi de hoc se purgaverit, vel ad cautelam absolutionis benefitium consequatur." Ergo a simili, si publica fama est papam vel alium predicare, docere, vel tenere contra veritatem apud omnes catholicos divulgatam, nec laici nec clerici sibi communicare debent, nisi se purgaverit vel absolutionis beneficium rite et debite consequatur. | Master: The answer made is that not because of the words of a few, but because of public fame, lay people to whom such fame has reached are bound to avoid the pope preaching such things, because public fame is sufficient for someone who has been excommunicated to be avoided, Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum desideres, Secunde questioni [5.39.15 col.1886], where Clement III says in these words: "To the second question we have decided to impose this conclusion, that if there is public fame that someone has beaten a cleric, neither the bishop nor anyone should communicate with him, unless he has purged himself of this at the bishop's satisfaction, or he has obtained as a precaution [*ad cautelam] the benefit of absolution." Therefore, by the like reasoning, if there is public fame that the pope or another preaches, teaches, or holds something contrary to a truth disseminated among all Catholics, neither lay people nor clerics should communicate with him, unless he has purged himself or has rightly and duly obtained the benefit of absolution.
Discipulus: Mirum videtur quod propter famam papa debeat evitari, presertim cum fama probationem non faciat, et per consequens nec certitudinem facit. Antequam autem aliquis sit certus papam ab homine vel a iure esse depositum, eum vitare non debet, quia in dubiis via tutior est tenenda. Tutius autem est obedire quam non obedire quando dubitatur an aliquis sit verus papa. Licet ergo propter famam de papa quod predicet contra talem veritatem catholicam possit quis dubitare an sit verus papa, tamen propter tale dubium non debet ab obedientia eius recedere. | Student: It seems strange that the pope should be avoided because of fame, especially since fame does not constitute proof, and consequently does not constitute certainty. But before someone is certain that the pope has been deposed by man or by law, he should not avoid him, because in doubtful cases the safer way must be taken. But it is safer to obey than not to obey when there is doubt whether someone is the true pope. Therefore, although because of the reputation concerning the pope that he preaches against such Catholic truth, someone may doubt whether he is the true pope, nevertheless he should not withdraw from obedience to him because of such doubt.
Magister: Respondetur ad hoc quod, quamvis per solam famam, quantumcunque publicam, nemo de crimine convincatur, propter famam tamen sunt nonnunquam quedam agenda et aliqua obmittenda. Nam fama impedit matrimonium contrahendum (Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate, c. Super eo), et propter famam est diffamato purgatio indicenda (2 q. 5, c. Si mala fama). Sic etiam propter famam est obedientia deneganda. Cum autem dicitur quod in dubiis via tutior est tenenda, respondetur quod ex hoc aperte concluditur quod papa hereticus propter solam famam publicam est vitandus, et ei est nullatenus obediendum. Nam si in dubiis via tutior est tenenda, illa autem via in qua minus est periculum est tutior reputanda. Ergo via que maiori caret periculo est tenenda. Obedire autem pape heretico et communicare eidem maius habet periculum quam eum vitare et ei minime obedire, quia ex obedientia et communione cum papa heretico immineret periculum fidei orthodoxe. Tale autem periculum maius est omni periculo quod potest persone pape etiam catholici imminere. Ergo periculum fidei orthodoxe est summe vitandum. Ergo cum propter famam publicam dubitatur an papa inciderit in hereticam pravitatem, vitandus est ne ex communione cum ipso periculum fidei immineat orthodoxe. | Master: The answer made to this is that, although no one is convicted of a crime solely by fame, no matter how public, nevertheless some things are sometimes done and some things are omitted because of fame. For fame prevents marriage from being contracted (Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate, c. Super eo), and because of fame purgation must be ordered to the defamed (2 q. 5, c. Si mala fama). So also because of reputation obedience must be denied. But when it is said that in doubtful matters the safer way must be taken, it is answered that from this it is clearly concluded that a heretic pope must be avoided because of public fame alone, and he is not to be obeyed at all. For if in doubtful matters the safer way must be taken, then that way in which there is less danger must be considered safer. Therefore the way that is free from greater danger must be taken. But to obey a heretic pope and to communicate with him involves a greater danger than to avoid him and not to obey him at all, because from obedience and communion with a heretic pope danger would threaten to the orthodox faith. But such a danger is greater than any danger that can threaten the person of a pope, even a Catholic one. Therefore danger to the orthodox faith must be avoided above all. Therefore when it is doubted because of public fame whether the pope has fallen into heretical depravity, he must be avoided lest from communion with him danger threaten to the orthodox faith.
Discipulus: Nunquid propter omnem publicam famam laici tenentur papam hereticum devitare? | Student: Are laymen bound to avoid a heretic pope because of all public fame?
Magister: Videtur nonnullis probabile quod, quia papa tanquam signum est positus ad sagittam et multos habet offendere, ideo est cautela diligens adhibenda ne criminetur inique, ita tamen ut caveatur ne delinquere valeat insolenter. Propter quod apparet quod propter famam ab incerto auctore vel certis auctoribus malivolis et maledicis ortam non est papa hereticus a nescientibus ipsum esse hereticum evitandus. Sed propter famam ortam a certis auctoribus bone fame hactenus, presertim qui sint in sacra pagina eruditi, volentibus papam de pravitate heretica accusare, et seipsos ad penam talionis, si in probatione defecerint, obligare, est papa hereticus devitandus, etiam antequam in iudicio de heresi convincatur. | Master: It seems probable to some that because the pope is like a target placed for an arrow and must offend many, therefore diligent caution should be exercised lest he be accused unjustly, yet so as to take care that he be not able to offend insolently. Because of this it appears that a heretic pope is not to be avoided by those who do not know that he is a heretic [merely] because of fame that has arisen from an uncertain source or from malicious and slanderous sources. But because of the reputation that has arisen from sources so far of good fame [themselves], especially those who are learned in the sacred scriptures, who wish to accuse the pope of heretical wickedness and to subject themselves to the penalty of retaliation if they fail in the proof, a heretic pope must be avoided, even before he is convicted of heresy in court.
Discipulus: Dic secundum priorem assertionem an questio fidei de qua nunc est sermo alio modo spectet ad laicos. | Student: According to the previous assertion, tell me whether the question of faith about which we are now speaking pertains [c] in another way to the laity.
Magister: Dicitur quod questio fidei de qua sermo habitus est prius sic spectat ad laicos quod principes seculares et alii laici debent defendere catholicos pravitatem hereticam impugnantes, in tantum quod scientes papam esse hereticum, vel ad quos pervenit fama publica modo prefato quod papa est hereticus, tenentur de necessitate salutis in favorem fidei christiane omnes accusantes papam hereticum et ab ipso pro causa heresis appellantes ac ipsum de heresi impugnantes, si possunt, ab omni molestia eis per papam hereticum vel eius complices inferenda et illata defendere. | Master: It is said that the question of faith about which we were speaking before pertains to the laity in such a way that secular rulers and other lay people must defend Catholics who are attacking heretical wickedness, inasmuch as those who know that the pope is a heretic, or those to whom public fame has reached in the aforementioned way that the pope is a heretic, are bound by necessity of salvation in favour of the Christian faith to defend, if they can, all those accusing the pope of heresy and appealing from him on grounds of heresy and attacking him for heresy, from all trouble that is being and has been inflicted on them by the heretic pope or his accomplices.
Discipulus: Illa que tractavimus supra in isto sexto a capitulo 16 usque ad c. ad istum modum poterunt applicari, ut videtur. Ideo dic alium modum quomodo questio fidei spectat ad laicos. | Student: The things that we have discussed above in this Book VI from chapter 16 to chapter 52 can be applied to this mode, as it seems. Therefore tell me [d] another way in which a question of faith pertains to the laity.
Magister: Dicitur quod questio fidei, talis de qua sermo habitus est prius, sic spectat ad laicos quod tractatibus de tali questione, maxime si clericos suspectos habuerint, possunt, si voluerint, interesse, quia, sicut tactum est prius, quod omnes tangit ab omnibus debet tractari. Talis autem questio fidei tangit omnes, etiam laicos. Ergo laici, maxime curam aliorum gerentes, possunt tractatibus de tali questione fidei interesse. | Master: It is said that a question of faith, such as the one discussed earlier, concerns the laity in such a way that they can, if they wish, take part in treatments [discussions] of such a question, especially if they regard clerics as suspect, because, as was touched upon earlier, what affects everyone should be treated by everyone. But such a question of faith affects everyone, even the laity. Therefore, the laity, especially those who have care of others, can take part in treatments concerning such a question of faith.
Discipulus: Quamvis de hoc videatur dictum supra cum de generali concilio ageretur, ubi allegationes adduxisti quod laici, si voluerint, possunt generali concilio in quo tractatur de fide catholica interesse, tamen adhuc ad assertionem propositam allegare conare. | Student: Although this seems to have been said above when discussing the general council, where you brought arguments that the laity, if they wish, can take part in a general council in which the Catholic faith is treated, nevertheless try to argue again for the proposed assertion.
Magister: Quod laici tractatibus de huiusmodi questione fidei valeant interesse videtur posse probari tali ratione. Illi possunt tractatibus de questione fidei interesse qui loqui de hiis que spectant ad questionem fidei sunt minime prohibendi, quia tales, si non sunt prohibendi, sunt audiendi si loqui voluerint. Sed laici non sunt prohibendi loqui in questione fidei, teste glossa que, super illud ad Thessalonicenses ultimo "Nolite spiritum extinguere", ait: "Id est, sicut Spiritus Sanctus ad horam quid revelat, nolite prohibere loqui quod sentit quia Deus qui os asine aperuit, revelat sepe minori quod melius est." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod ille in questione fidei loqui prohiberi non debet cui Deus quandoque meliora revelat. Sed Deus quandoque revelat laicis meliora. Unde et David regi, quamvis non esset sacerdos, Spiritus Sanctus quamplurima revelavit. Laicis etiam aliis tam in veteri quam in novo testamento plura ad fidem spectantia catholicam revelata fuerunt. Unde et Christus dicit Matthei undecimo: "Confiteor tibi, Pater, Domine celi et terre, quia abscondisti hec a sapientibus, et prudentibus, et revelasti ea parvulis." Ergo laici, maxime in sacra pagina eruditi, a tractatibus de questione fidei que ad omnibus pertinet christianos excludi non debent. | Master: That the laity can take part in treatments of such a question of faith seems to be provable by an argument as follows. Those can take part in treatments of a question of faith who should not at all be prevented from speaking about things that concern the question of faith, because such people, if they should not be prevented, should be heard if they wish to speak. But laymen should not be forbidden to speak on a question of faith, as is witnessed by a gloss which, on the words "Do not quench the spirit", Thessalonians, last chapter [1 Thess. 5:19], says: "That is, as the Holy Spirit at the hour reveals something, do not forbid him to speak what he feels, because God, who opened the mouth of an ass, reveals to the least what is better." From these words it is given to be understood that he should not be forbidden to speak on a question of faith to whom God sometimes reveals better things. But God sometimes reveals better things to laymen. Hence also the Holy Spirit revealed a great many things to King David, although he was not a priest. Many things pertaining to the Catholic faith were revealed to laymen also in both the Old and New Testaments. Hence also Christ says in Matthew 11: "I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and have revealed them to babes." Therefore laymen, especially those learned in the sacred scriptures, should not be excluded from treatments of a question of faith, which concerns all Christians.
Discipulus: Ista assertio consuetudini ecclesie repugnare videtur, tum quia ex consuetudine ecclesie ad tractatus fidei solummodo prelati et clerici admittuntur, tum quia secundum rationem precedentem etiam mulieres non essent a tractatibus fidei excludende, cum nonnunquam abscondantur a viris que mulieribus revelantur, et tamen mulieres ad tractatus fidei sunt nullatenus admittende, cum etiam mulieres in ecclesia loqui non debeant sed solummodo domi interrogare viros suos de ignotis, teste Apostolo qui, primo Corinth. 14 ait: "Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant, non enim permittitur eis loqui, sed subditas esse sicut et lex dicit. Si quid autem volunt discere, domi viros suos interrogent. Turpe est enim mulieri loqui in ecclesia." Ergo mulieres tractatibus de questione fidei interesse non debent. | Student: This assertion seems to be contrary to the custom of the Church, both because by the custom of the Church only prelates and clerics are admitted to treatments of the faith, and because according to the preceding argument even women should not be excluded from treatments of the faith, since sometimes things revealed to women are hidden from men, and yet women are by no means to be admitted to treatments of the faith, since even women should not speak in church but only at home to ask their husbands about unknown matters, as the Apostle testifies, who, in 1 Corinthians 14 says: "Let women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted to them to speak, but to be subject, as also the law says. But if they wish to learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home. For it is shameful for a woman to speak in church." Therefore women should not take part in treatments of a question of faith.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod non est ex consuetudine ecclesie quod ad tractatus fidei nunquam laici recipiantur, quia, sicut probatum est prius, sepe conciliis generalibus in quibus tractabatur de questionibus fidei imperatores fuere presentes. Sepe tamen questiones fidei per solos clericos tractabantur, quia tunc temporis clerici de fide non fuerunt suspecti, qui etiam tunc temporis vita, scientia, et zelo fidei catholice prefuserunt, et laici interesse non curabant, scientes quod questiones fidei sufficienter per clericos ad honorem Dei et exaltationem fidei tractabantur. Si tamen principes ex zelo fidei se tractatibus huiusmodi ingessissent, clerici tunc temporis fidei zelatores eos nullatenus repulissent, sed libenti animo audivissent. | Master: To the first of these, the answer is made that it is not by the custom of the Church that laymen should never be admitted to treatments of the faith, because, as has been proved before, emperors were often present at general councils in which questions of faith were discussed. Often, however, questions of faith were treated by clerics alone, because at that time clerics were not under suspicion concerning faith, and they also at that time poured forth life, knowledge, and zeal for the Catholic faith, and laymen did not care to take part, knowing that questions of faith were treated sufficiently by clerics for the honor of God and the exaltation of the faith. However, if rulers had obtrudent themselves into such treatments out of zeal for the faith, the clerics of that time, zealous for the faith, would not have rejected them at all, but would have listened to them with a willing heart.
Ad secundum respondetur quod mulieres non sunt passim ad tractatus fidei admittende. Si tamen sunt alique mulieres sapientia, sanctitate, potentia, et virtutibus precellentes, petentes ex zelo fidei audientiam cum questio fidei pertractatur, non sunt ullatenus repellende. Si enim Judith vidua, petens audientiam a presbyteris cum de liberatione patrie tractaretur, non fuit repulsa sed audita, multo magis quanto maior debet esse sollicitudo de salvatione fidei quam de liberatione patrie. Si mulier potentia, sapientia, et sanctitate precellens, ex zelo fidei petierit audientiam cum de questio fidei tractatur, repelli non debet sed audiri. Imo nonnunquam, cum questio fidei agitatur, pro consilio et auxilio optinendo ad mulieres sapientia, sanctitate, et potentia precellentes expedit recursum habere pro questione fidei laudabiliter terminanda, exemplo Mardochei, qui, pro salvatione populi Dei, auxilium ab Hester regina suppliciter postulavit. Quamvis igitur mulieres non sint passim ad tractatus fidei admittende, non sunt tamen omni tempore repellende, cum questio fidei ad eas pertinere noscatur. In tantum quod, si omnes viri diffinirent et assererent esse tenendum quod Christus non fuit natus de virgine, aut quod anime reproborum non cruciantur in inferno, vel aliquid huiusmodi, mulieres deberent resistere, et illa tenere que ab orthodoxis ante didicerant. | To the second, it is answered that women are not everywhere to be admitted to treatments of faith. However, if there are women preeminent in wisdom, holiness, power, and virtues, who seek an audience out of zeal for the faith when a question of faith is being treated, they are not to be rejected at all. For if the widow Judith, seeking an audience from the elders when the liberation of her country was being treated, was not rejected but heard, much more so, since concern for the salvation of the faith should be greater than for the liberation of her country, if a woman, distinguished by power, wisdom, and holiness, out of zeal for the faith, asks for an audience when a question of faith is being discussed, she should not be rejected but heard. Indeed, sometimes, when a question of faith is being discussed, it is expedient to have recourse to women distinguished by wisdom, holiness, and power for advice and help in order to resolve the question of faith laudably, on the example of Mordecai, who, for the salvation of the people of God, humbly requested help from Queen Esther. Therefore, although women are not everywhere to be admitted to treatments of the faith, they are not always to be rejected, since a question of faith is known to concern them, in so far that, if all men were to define and assert that it should be held that Christ was not born of a virgin, or that the souls of the reprobate are not tormented in hell, or anything of the kind, women should resist and hold to what they had previously learned from the orthodox.
Cum vero dicit Apostolus "Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant" etc., respondetur quod Apostolus loquitur cum ad audiendum verbum Dei conveniant, volens quod mulieres sic in ecclesiis taceant quod officium docendi non habeant. Et ideo, ubi verbum Dei proponitur a catholico et fideli, licet mulieres ignorent aliqua que proponuntur a predicante, non debent in ecclesiis interrogare que ignorant, sed domi viros suos et alios doctores aut doctos interrogent. Aliter autem est ubi tractatur quomodo fides est servanda et defendenda. Tunc enim possunt nonnulli mulieres esse utiles et causam fidei multipliciter promovere, et ideo a talibus tractatibus non sunt omnes et omni tempore excludende. | But when the Apostle says, "Let women keep silence in the churches," etc., it is answered that the Apostle speaks about when they gather to hear the word of God, meaning that women should be silent in churches because they do not have the office of teaching. And therefore, where the word of God is proposed by a Catholic and faithful man, although women are ignorant of some of the things proposed by the preacher, they should not ask questions in churches about what they do not know, but at home they should ask their husbands and other teachers or scholars. But it is different where it is treated how the faith must be preserved and defended, for then some women can be useful and promote the cause of faith in many ways, and therefore they should not all and at every time be excluded from such treatments.
Discipulus: Spectatne questio fidei alio modo ad laicos. | Student: Does a question of faith pertain to the laity [e] in another way?
Magister: Questio fidei, cum aliquid apud omnes catholicos tanquam catholicum divulgatum in questione vertitur, sic spectat ad laicos quod prohibere possunt et leges statuere ne aliquis in terris eorum subiectis dominiis contra veritatem taliter divulgatam predicare, docere, vel tenere presumat, exemplo Nabuchodonosor regis qui, quamvis non esset clericus nec prelatus ecclesie, precepit et legem statuit ne quis Deum Sidrach, Misach, et Abdenago presumeret blasphemare. Hoc ex hiis que dicta sunt prius, ubi ostensum est quod laici possunt pro fide leges statuere, colligitur evidenter. | Master: A question of faith, when something that is disseminated among all Catholics as Catholic is brought into question, pertains to the laity in this way, that they can prohibit and establish laws so that no one in the lands under their dominions may presume to preach, teach, or hold against the truth thus disseminated, as in the example of King Nebuchadnezzar, who, although he was neither a cleric nor a prelate of the Church, commanded and established a law that no one should presume to blaspheme the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego. This is evidently gathered from what has been said above, where it has been shown that the laity can establish laws for the faith.
Discipulus: Nunquid possunt laici cohercere transgressores preceptorum et legum suarum huiusmodi? | Student: Can the laity coerce transgressors of their precepts and laws of this kind?
Magister: Respondetur quod transgressores huiusmodi, qui a iurisdictione laicorum minime sunt exempti, possunt et debent cohercere. Illos autem qui a iurisdictione laicorum sunt exempti, puta clericos, non possunt regulariter cohercere, in casu tamen possunt. | Master: The answer made is that they can and should coerce transgressors of this kind, if they are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the laity. But those who are exempt from the jurisdiction of the laity, such as clerics, they cannot coerce as a rule, but on occasion they can.
Capitulum 95 | Chapter 95
Discipulus: De hac materia interrogabo te postea. Ideo, postquam disseruisti de questione fidei ubi aliquid apud omnes orthodoxos tanquam catholicum divulgatum in questionem vertitur, dic an questio fidei spectet ad laicos cum aliquod catholicum non taliter divulgatum, sed tamen ab ecclesia explicite approbatum in questionem vertitur. | Student: I will ask you about this matter later. Therefore, after you have discussed the question of faith where something that is widely disseminated among all Orthodox as Catholic is brought into question, tell me whether a question of faith pertains to the laity when [2] something that is not widely disseminated among all Orthodox as Catholic, but is nevertheless explicitly approved by the Church, is brought into question.
Magister: Respondetur quod talis questio fidei, postquam laicis constiterit veritas huiusmodi questionis, sic spectat ad eos quod pro loco et tempore veritatem tenentur simpliciter confiteri, scilicet cum honor Dei et utilitas proximi hoc exposcit. | Master: The answer made is that such a question of faith, after the truth of this kind of question has become clear to the laity, pertains to them in such a way that, according to place and time, they are bound to simply confess the truth, namely when the honor of God and the benefit of their neighbor demand it.
Secundo talis questio sic spectat ad laicos quod solos omnes predicantes, docentes, et tenentes pertinaciter contra veritatem huiusmodi questionis vitare tenentur, et eis nullatenus obedire. Unde quamvis audirent et scirent papam predicare et docere Pilatum non misisse Christum ad Herodem tempore passionis, aut apostolos et alios credentes de quibus fit mentio Act. 2 et 4 c. fuisse proprietarios et dominos portionum sibi assignatarum, aut Christum in quantum homo mortalis fuisse regem in temporalibus, non debent statim propter hoc papam tanquam hereticum evitare, quantumcunque constaret eis quod talia sunt inter hereses dampnatas explicite computanda. Si tamen scirent eum talia diffinitive docere, ipsum tanquam hereticum vitare deberent. | Secondly, such a question concerns the laity in such a way that they are bound to avoid alone [i.e. even if the clergy do not] all those who preach, teach, and hold pertinaciously against the truth of such a question, and not obey them in any way. Hence, although they heard and knew that the Pope preaches and teaches that Pilate did not send Christ to Herod at the time of his passion, or that the apostles and other believers mentioned in Acts 2 and 4 were the owners and masters of the portions assigned to them, or that Christ, as a mortal man, was king in temporal matters, they should not on this account immediately avoid the Pope as a heretic, however much it may be clear to them that such things are to be explicitly counted among the hereses that are condemned; but if they knew that he taught such things definitively, they should avoid him as a heretic.
Discipulus: Video quod opinio istorum in hac parte dependet ex illis que dicta sunt supra libro quarto, in quo tractatur quomodo de pertinacia debeat quis convinci. | Student: I see that the opinion of these people in this regard depends on what was said above in Book IV, in which it is treated how one should be convicted of pertinacity.
Magister: Verum dicis, quia quando constat laicis aliquam assertionem de qua est questio esse catholicam vel hereticam, et simul cum hoc constat quod docens, predicans, vel tenens contra catholicam veritatem est pertinax in sua assertione, per omnia dicunt de questione fidei secundo modo dicta sicut dictum est de questione fidei primo modo dicta. Quia illis duobus suppositis, eisdem modis pertinet questio fidei secundo modo dicta ad laicos quibus modis pertinet ad eos questio fidei primo modo dicta. Verumptamen, quamvis assertio fidei utroque modo dicta predictis modis spectat ad laicos, principalius tamen spectat ad prelatos ecclesie, quibus ex officio suscepto incumbit magis intelligere catholicas veritates et eas frequentius aliis propalare ac circa punitionem hereticorum magis diligenter insistere. | Master: You say what is true, because when it is clear to the laity that some assertion about which there is a question is Catholic or heretical, and at the same time it is clear that the one teaching, preaching, or holding against the Catholic truth is pertinacious in his assertion, in all respects they speak of a question of faith said in [2] the second way as was said about the question of faith said in [1] the first way. Because, with those two suppositions, the question of faith said in the second way pertains to the laity in the same ways as the question of faith said in the first way pertains to them. However, although the assertion of faith, expressed in both ways, pertains to the laity in the aforementioned ways, it still pertains more primarily to the prelates of the Church, upon whom, by virtue of the office they have assumed, it is incumbent to understand Catholic truths more fully and to proclaim them more frequently to others and to insist more diligently on the punishment of heretics.
Capitulum 96 | Chapter 96
Discipulus: Dic de questione fidei tertio modo dicta, an spectet ad laicos. | Student: Tell me about the question of faith in [3] the third way, whether it pertains to the laity.
Magister: Dicitur quod quando aliquid quod non est ab ecclesia explicite approbatum, nec per consequens eius contrarium est explicite condempnatum, vertitur in questionem, laici non tenentur publice confitendo, ordinando, statuendo, prohibendo, precipiendo, se de tali intromittere questione, nisi evidenter adverterent quod aliter grave periculum fidei vel rei publice immineret. Si vero aperte cognoscerent quod ex tali questione fidei seditiones, guerre, et schismata provenirent nisi laici per potentiam temporalem occurrerent, ad illos talis questio fidei pertineret. | Master: It is said that when something that is not explicitly approved by the Church, nor as a consequence its opposite explicitly condemned, is brought into question, the laity are not bound by publicly confessing, ordaining, establishing, prohibiting, or commanding to intervene in such a question, unless they clearly realize that otherwise a grave danger would threaten the faith or the commonwealth. But if they were openly aware that seditions, wars, and schisms would result from such a question of faith unless the laity intervened through temporal power, such a question of faith would pertain to them. *down to here
Quod sic ostenditur. Quando pax aliter haberi non potest, est ad regalem providentiam recurrendum. Ergo, si ex questione fidei modo predicto oriuntur secte, seditiones, et schismata in communis pacis dispendium, que absque laicorum potentia sedari non possunt, ad regalem seu laicalem providentiam oportet recurrere, et per consequens, in hoc casu saltem, talis questio spectat ad laicos. Antecedens istius rationis testimoniis et exemplis probatur apertis. Onias enim sacerdos, ut legitur Macchab. 2o c. 4 ad regem etiam infidelem se contulit, non ut civium accusator, sed communem utilitatem apud semetipsum universe multitudinis considerans. Videbat enim sine regali providentia impossibile pacem rebus dare. | This is shown as follows. When peace cannot be had otherwise, it is necessary to resort to royal providence. Therefore, if from the question of faith in the aforementioned way sects, seditions, and schisms arise to the detriment of the common peace, that cannot be pacified without the power of the laity, it is necessary to have recourse to royal or lay providence, and consequently, in this case at least, such a question pertains to the laity. The premise of this argument is proved by clear testimonies and examples. For Onias the priest, as we read in 2 Maccabees c. 4, approached the king even though he was an unbeliever, not as an accuser of the citizens, but as someone considering with himself the common good of the multitude. For he saw that it was impossible to give peace to things without royal providence.
Item, ut legitur dist. 17 Hinc etiam, "Theodoricus rex, advertens seditiones et dissensiones in clero propter Simachum papam, commisit potestati pontificum ut sive propositum vellent audire negotium, sive nollent, quod magis putarent utile, deliberarent, dummodo venerandi provisione concilii pax in civitate Romana daretur." Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus patet quod, quando ex questione fidei oriuntur divisiones, secte, et schismata que absque laicorum potentia sedari non possunt, necesse est pro pace recurrere ad providentiam laicalem. | Likewise, as we read in dist. 17 Hinc etiam, "King Theodoric, noticing the seditions and dissensions among the clergy because of Pope Symmachus, entrusted to the power of the pontiffs that whether they wished to hear the proposed matter or not, they should deliberate what they thought more useful, provided that by the venerable provision of the council peace would be given in the Roman city." From these and many others it is clear that, when divisions, sects, and schisms arise from a question of faith and cannot be pacified without the power of the laity, it is necessary for peace to have recourse to lay providence.
Capitulum 97 | Chapter 97
Discipulus: In capitulo 93o dixisti tria declaranda circa opinionem dicentem cohertionem pape heretici et aliorum hereticorum in casu speciali ad laicos pertinere. De duobus autem primis sumus, quamvis breviter, expediti. Ideo, modo tractemus de tertio, in quo scilicet casu spectet ad laicos cohertio pape heretice et aliorum hereticorum. | Student: In Chapter 93 you said that three things should be explained about the opinion that the coercion of a heretic pope and other heretics pertains, in a special case, to lay people. The first two have been dealt with, though briefly. So now let us treat of the third, namely, [C] in which case does the coercion of a heretic pope and other heretics pertain to lay people.
Magister: Sicut dictum est prius secundum quandam opinionem, non eodem modo est de omnibus hereticis sentiendum. Nam hereticorum quidam sunt laici et alii sunt clerici. Laici heretici, etiam quantum ad crimen heresis, sunt de foro iudicis secularis. Heretici autem clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis nisi in specialibus casibus. | Master: As was said before, according to a certain opinion, one should not think in the same way about all heretics. For some heretics are lay people and others are clerics. Lay heretics, even as regards the crime of heresy, are within the forum of the secular judge. But clerical heretics are not within the forum of the secular judge except in special cases.
Discipulus: Nitere ergo probare quod laici heretici sunt de foro iudicis secularis. | Disciple: Try therefore to prove that lay heretics are within the forum of the secular judge.
Magister: Ad hoc allegatum est supra c. 93o. | Master: This has been argued above in chapter 93.
Discipulus: Peto ut ad eandem assertionem aliquas alias allegationes cogitare nitaris. | Student: I ask you try to think of some other arguments to support that assertion.
Magister: Hoc videtur posse probari primo sic. Ille qui est minister regni Dei precipue habet iudicare peccata que subditi sui committunt in Deum. Reges autem sunt ministri regni Dei, quibus dicitur Sapient. 6: cum essetis ministri regni illius, non recte iudicastis etc. Ergo ad reges pertinet precipue punire peccata que subditi committunt in Deum. Heresis autem est peccatum in Deum, ergo ad reges spectat hereticos sibi subiectos debita animadversione ferire. | Master: It seems provable first as follows. A minister of God's kingdom especially has power to judge the sins that his subjects commit against God. But kings are ministers of God's kingdom, to whom it is said in Wisdom 6: Because being ministers of his kingdom, you have not judged rightly, etc. Therefore it belongs to kings especially to punish sins their subjects commit against God. But heresy is a sin against God, therefore it belongs to kings to strike with due censure heretics who are their subjects.
Secundo sic. Ille habet punire hereticos sibi subiectos cuius est omne malum iudicialiter dissipare. Sed hoc interest regis, teste Salomone, qui Prov. 20 ait: "Rex qui sedet in solio iudicii, dissipat omne malum intuitu suo." Ergo ad regem spectat omnes hereticos sibi subiectos debite subdere ultioni. | Secondly as follows. A person has power to punish heretics who are their subjects if it is his duty it is to judicially disperse all evil. But this concerns a king, as Solomon testifies, who says in Prov. 20: "The king who sits on the throne of judgment disperses all evil with his look." Therefore it belongs to a king to duly subject to retribution all heretics who are their subjects.
Tertio sic. Non minorem iurisdictionem optinent reges in novo testamento super sibi subiectos quam habuerunt reges in veteri testamento super sibi subiectos. Sed ad reges in veteri testamento spectabat hereticos, idolatras, et blasphemos condigna pena punire. Ergo et hoc spectat ad reges in novo testamento. Maior videtur apparens. Minor exemplis probatur apertis. Nam de rege Asa legitur 3o Regum 15 quod: "Fecit Asa rectum ante conspectum domini, sicut David pater eius, et abstulit effeminatos de terra, purgavitque universas sordes idolorum, que fecerant patres eius. Insuper et Maacham matrem suam amovit, ne esset princeps in sacris Priapi et in luco eius, quem consecraverat subvertitque specum eius, et confregit simulacrum turpissimum." Ex quibus verbis habetur aperte quod rex Asa de idolatris, qui erant inter hereticos computandi, zelo Dei fecit iustitiam. Item, ut patet 4o Regum 10, Jehu omnes prophetas Baal occidit. | Thirdly as follows. Kings in the New Testament have no less jurisdiction over their subjects than kings had over their subjects in the Old Testament. But it belonged to kings in the Old Testament to punish heretics, idolaters, and blasphemers with a fitting punishment. Therefore, this also pertains to kings in the New Testament. The major seems apparent. The minor is proved by clear examples. For of King Asa we read in 3 Kings 15 that: "Asa did what was right in the sight of the Lord, like David his father, and he removed the effeminate from the land, and purged all the filth of the idols that his fathers had made. Moreover, he removed Maacah his mother, so that she would not be queen in the sacrifices of Priapus and in his grove which she had consecrated, and overthrew her grotto, and broke in pieces the most shameful image." From these words it is clearly established that King Asa, with the zeal of God, did justice to the idolaters, who were to be counted among the heretics. Also, as is clear in 4 Kings 10, Jehu killed all the prophets of Baal.
Quarto sic. Si laici quoad crimen heresis a iurisdictione regum et principum sunt exempti, aut ista exemptio est a iure divino, aut a iure humano. Non a iure divino, quia de tali exemptione in scripturis sacris in quibus continetur ius divinum nichil penitus invenitur. Ergo talis exemptio non est a iure divino. Nec est a iure humano, quia si est a iure humano, aut ergo a iure humano canonico, aut a iure humano civili, iuri videlicet regum et principum, et secularium potestatum vel universitatum. Non est autem talis exemptio a iure canonico, quia conditores iuris canonici, sicut non debent minuere iurisdictionem secularium (Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit), ita non debent subiectos secularium ab eorum iurisdictione eximere. Nec talis exemptio est a iure civili secularium, quia in iure civili de tali exemptione non legitur. Et ita laici a iurisdictione regum et principum quoad crimen heresis minime sunt exempti. | Fourthly as follows. If laymen are exempt from the jurisdiction of kings and rulers in respect of the crime of heresy, either this exemption is from divine law, or from human law. Not from divine law, because nothing at all is found about such an exemption in the sacred writings in which divine law is contained. Therefore such an exemption is not from divine law. Nor is it from human law, because if it is from human law, either therefore from human canon law, or from human civil law, namely the law of kings and rulers, and secular powers or universities [i.e. bodies]. But such an exemption is not from canon law, because the founders of canon law, just as they should not diminish the jurisdiction of seculars (Extra, De iudiciis, c. Novit), so they should not exempt the subjects of seculars from their jurisdiction. Nor is such an exemption from the civil law of seculars, because in civil law we do not read of such an exemption. And thus laymen are in no way exempt from the jurisdiction of kings and rulers as regards the crime of heresy.
Quinto sic. Non minus est de foro iudicis secularis laicus hereticus quam clericus hereticus degradatus. Sed clericus hereticus, quam cito est degradatus, sic est de foro iudicis secularis quod est per eum debite puniendus. Ergo laicus hereticus simpliciter et semper est de foro iudicis secularis, et per consequens iudex laicus potest et debet punire laicos hereticos. | Fifthly, as follows. A lay heretic is no less from the forum of a secular judge than a degraded heretic cleric. But a heretic cleric, as soon as he is degraded, belongs to the forum of a secular judge, and he must be duly punished by him. Therefore, a lay heretic is simply and always within the forum of a secular judge, and consequently a lay judge can and must punish lay heretics.
Discipulus: Tenentne omnes quod laici quoad crimen heresis sunt de foro iudicis secularis. | Student: Do all hold that lay people are subject to the secular judge's jurisdiction for the crime of heresy?
Magister: Multi tenent quod laici heretici quo ad crimen heresis non sunt de foro iudicis secularis antequam a iudice ecclesiastico foro iudicis secularis relinquuntur. | Master: Many hold that lay heretics are not subject to the secular judge's jurisdiction for the crime of heresy before they are left to the secular judge's jurisdiction by an ecclesiastical judge.
Discipulus: Pro ista assertione aliquas allegationes adducas. | Student: Please bring forward some arguments for that assertion.
Magister: Ista assertio videtur expresse de intentione Lucii pape qui, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, ait: "Laicus autem, nisi, prout dictum est, abiurata heresi et satisfactione exhibita confestim ad fidem confugerit orthodoxam, secularis iudicis arbitrio relinquatur, debitam recepturus pro qualitate facinoris ultionem." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod laicus iudex laicum hereticum punire non debet antequam sibi ab ecclesiastico iudice relinquatur. Hinc etiam glossa ibi concordare videtur, dicens: "Laici enim per ecclesiam condempnandi sunt de heresi, sed iudex secularis illos punire debet." Laici ergo heretici, antequam per ecclesiam fuerint condempnati, non spectant ratione heresis ad forum iudicis secularis. | Master: This assertion seems to be expressly the thinking of Pope Lucius who, as is stated in Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, says: "A layman, unless, as has been said, having renounced heresy and made satisfaction, he has immediately fled to the orthodox faith, is left to the discretion of the secular judge, to receive the retribution due for the quality of the crime." From these words it is given to understand that a lay judge should not punish a lay heretic before he is left to him by an ecclesiastical judge. The gloss there seems to agree, saying: "For laymen are to be condemned by the Church for heresy, but a secular judge must punish them." Lay heretics, therefore, before they have been condemned by the Church, do not pertain by reason of heresy to the forum of a secular judge.
Item, sicut cause seculares non spectant ad iudices ecclesiasticos, ita cause ecclesiastice non spectant ad iudices seculares. Causa autem heresis est causa ecclesiastica, teste glossa que 11 q. 1 c.1 notat, dicens: "Causarum alia eclesiastica, alia secularis. Ecclesiasticarum alia spiritualis, alia criminalis, alia civilis. Spiritualis est ubi agitur de decimis, vel matrimoniis. Criminalis, ubi agitur de crimine ecclesiastico, scilicet heresis, vel usurarum cuius examinatio spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum, infra eadem c. Si quis cum clerico, et 6 q. 2 c. 1." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod causa ecclesiastica spectat ad iudicem ecclesiasticum, et per consequens non spectat ad iudicem secularem. Causa autem heresis est causa ecclesiastica, sicut in verbis predictis habetur expresse. Ergo causa heresis non spectat ad iudicem secularem, et ita iudex secularis laicos hereticos, antequam fuerint per ecclesiam condempnati, punire non debet. | Likewise, just as secular causes do not pertain to ecclesiastical judges, so ecclesiastical causes do not pertain to secular judges. But the cause of heresy is an ecclesiastical cause, as the gloss notes in 11 q. 1 c.1, saying: "Some causes are ecclesiastical, others secular. Of ecclesiastical, some are spiritual, others criminal, and others civil. Spiritual is where the action is about tithes or marriages. Criminal, where the action is about an ecclesiastical crime, namely heresy, or usury, the examination of which pertains to an ecclesiastical judge (below, this Causa, c Si quis cum clerico, and 6 q.2 c.1)." From these words it is given to be understood that an ecclesiastical cause pertains to an ecclesiastical judge, and consequently does not pertain to a secular judge. But the cause of heresy is an ecclesiastical cause, as is expressly stated in the above words. Therefore a cause of heresy does not pertain to a secular judge, and so a secular judge should not punish lay heretics before they have been condemned by the Church.
Discipulus: Quamvis istam assertionem secundam reputam consonam veritati, tamen qualiter contingat respondere ad motiva istius assertionis secunde libenter audirem. | Student: Although I consider this second assertion to be consonant with the truth, nevertheless I would gladly hear how the arguments for this second assertion can be answered.
Magister: Respondetur quod quia, secundum Gregorium, ut recitatur dist. c. Regule: "Regule sanctorum patrum pro tempore, loco, et persona negotio instante necessitate tradite sunt", cui concordat Isidorus, ut habetur dist. eadem, c. 1, dicens: "Sciendum est, quod pleraque capitula ex causa, ex persona, ex loco, ex tempore consideranda sunt, quorum modi, quia medullitus non indagantur, in erroris laborintum nonnulli intricando impinguntur, cum ante iudicant, quam intelligant", ideo auctoritas Lucii pape et aliorum dicta, ex qua causa et pro quo tempore intelligenda sunt videre oportet. Quo viso, patebit quod iudices seculares laicos hereticos sibi subiectos poterunt cohercere. | Master: The answer made is that because, according to Gregory, as recited in dist.29 c. Regule: "The rules of the holy fathers are handed down for time, place, person and business, at the urging of necessity." Isidore agrees with this, as reported in the same dist. [29], c. 1. He says: "It should be known that most canons are to be considered from cause, from person, from place, from time; and because the modes of these are not thoroughly investigated, some people, entangling themselves, stumble into a labyrinth of error, when they judge before they understand." Therefore [in respect of] the text of Pope Lucius and the sayings of others, one must see from what cause and for what time they are to be understood. When this is seen, it will be clear that secular judges will be able to coerce lay heretics who are subject to them.
Dicitur igitur quod ideo Lucius papa asserit laicum hereticum, nisi ad fidem confugerit orthodoxam, secularis iudicis arbitrio relinquendum, quia pro tempore illo, et forte semper fuit ita, iudices seculares de hereticis, antequam essent ab ecclesiastico iudice condempnati, se nullatenus intromiserunt. Propter negligentiam igitur secularium iudicum ecclesia de hereticis laicis se intromisit, inquirendo et convincendo ipsos, sed penam noluit eis inferre, sed voluit quod pena debita inferretur per iudicem secularem. Sicut igitur iudex ecclesiasticus sepe supplet negligentiam iudicis secularis, et nonnunquam compellit eundem iustitiam exercere, ita tunc et modo facit ecclesia circa laicos hereticos, quos tamen iudices seculares possent debite cohercere. | It is said, therefore, that Pope Lucius asserts that a lay heretic, unless he has fled to the orthodox faith, must be left to the judgment of a secular judge, because at that time, and perhaps it has always been so, secular judges did not intervene in any way with heretics before they had been condemned by an ecclesiastical judge. Therefore, because of the negligence of secular judges, the Church intervened with lay heretics, investigating and convicting them, but it did not wish to inflict punishment on them, but wanted the due punishment to be inflicted by a secular judge. Just as, therefore, an ecclesiastical judge often makes up for the negligence of a secular judge, and sometimes compels him to do justice, so then and now does the Church do concerning lay heretics, whom nevertheless secular judges could duly coerce.
Cum ergo dicit glossa quod laici per ecclesiam condempnandi sunt de heresi, verum dicit, quia iudices seculares de facto, quamvis de iure possent, inquirere et corrigere laicos hereticos sibi subiectos omittunt, et ideo ne heretici laici remaneant impuniti in perniciem fidelium et periculum fidei orthodoxe, iudex ecclesiasticus supplebit negligentiam iudicum secularium, de ipsis inquirit, ipsosque convincit et dampnat, iniungens iudici seculari quod eos debita pena precellat. Et ad hoc insinuandum glossa predicta post verba prescripta immediate subnectit hec verba: "Nec traditur laicus curie seculari sed clericus solummodo, infra De verborum significatione, c. Novimus, quia laicus semper est de foro seculari." | When, therefore, the gloss says that lay people should be condemned by the Church for heresy, it says what is true, because secular judges, although they could in law, fail in fact to investigate and correct lay heretics who are subject to them, and therefore, lest lay heretics remain unpunished to the destruction of the faithful and the danger of the orthodox faith, the ecclesiastical judge will make up for the negligence of secular judges, investigate them [i.e. lay heretics], convict and condemn them, enjoining the secular judge to punish them with the due punishment. And to suggest this, the aforementioned gloss immediately adds these words after the words written above: "Nor is a lay person delivered to a secular court, but only a cleric, (below De verborum significatione, c. Novimus), because a lay person always belongs to the secular forum."
Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod laicus non est exemptus a foro seculari etiam pro crimine heresis, sed cum iudex secularis laicos hereticos neglexerit cohercere, dampnandi sunt primo a iudice ecclesiastico, et postea compellendus est iudex secularis punire eosdem, et propter hoc subiungit glossa ibidem: sed in casu isto executio fit solummodo per secularem iudicem , hoc est, quamvis condempnatio valeat fieri per iudicem ecclesiasticum, supplendum in hoc negligentiam iudicis secularis, tamen executio punitionis fieri debet a seculari iudicio tantummodo. | From these words it is given to understand that a layman is not exempt from the secular court even for the crime of heresy, but when a secular judge has neglected to coerce lay heretics, they must first be condemned by an ecclesiastical judge, and afterwards the secular judge must be compelled to punish them, and for this reason the gloss there subjoins: but in this case the execution is carried out only by a secular judge , that is, although the condemnation can be done by an ecclesiastical judge, in this making up for the negligence of the secular judge, nevertheless the execution of the punishment must be carried out by a secular court only.
Cum vero alia glossa dicit quod causa heresis est causa ecclesiastica, conceditur quantum ad clericos, quia clerici heretici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis nisi in quibusdam casibus determinatis. Quantum ad laicos autem, causa heresis est causa secularis, et est causa ecclesiastica, quia iudex secularis habet punire laicos hereticos, et ideo est causa secularis. Est etiam aliquo modo causa ecclesiastica, quia iudex ecclesiasticus, supplendo negligentiam iudicis secularis, potest laicos hereticos condempnare. | But when the other gloss says that the cause of heresy is an ecclesiastical cause, it is granted as regards clerics, because heretic clerics are not within the forum of the secular judge except in certain specified cases. As regards laymen, however, the cause of heresy is a secular cause, and it is an ecclesiastical cause, because the secular judge has to punish lay heretics, and therefore it is a secular cause. It is also in some way an ecclesiastical cause, because an ecclesiastical judge, making up for the negligence of the secular judge, can condemn lay heretics.
Discipulus: Istud apparentia carere videtur. Nam crimen heresis nullo modo est crimen seculare, tum quia committitur directe in Deum, tum quia est peccatum in religione christiana solummodo, tum quia apud iudices secularos paganos non esset crimen, ergo nullo modo est crimen seculare. Ergo est solummodo crimen ecclesiasticum. Ex quo patenter infertur quod solummodo ad ecclesiasticum iudicem spectat. | Student: This seems to lack plausibility. For the crime of heresy is in no way a secular crime, both because it is committed directly against God, and because it is a sin only in the Christian religion, and because it would not be a crime with pagan secular judges, therefore it is in no way a secular crime. Therefore it is only an ecclesiastical crime. From this it is clearly inferred that it pertains only to an ecclesiastical judge.
Magister: Respondetur quod licet crimen heresis sit solummodo crimen ecclesiasticum et non seculare tamen spectat ad iudicem secularem, quia ad iudicem secularem non tantum spectat punire crimina secularia, sed etiam crimina commissa in Deum et in personas et res ecclesiasticas. Hoc enim habet omnis lex et secta, quod reges et principes dictincti a sacerdotibus non solum puniunt crimina secularia, sed etiam crimina que reputant in deum vel deos suos et in sectam suam commissa. Propter hoc etiam reges in veteri testamento idolatras punierunt. Imperatores etiam et iudices paganorum christianos tanquam contra deos suos et sectam graviter delinquentes acerbissime persecuti fuerunt. Sic etiam reges christiani homicidas sacerdotum et furantes res ecclesiasticas plectunt pena debita, et tamen homicidium sacerdotis et furtum rei ecclesiastice sunt crimina ecclesiastica. | Master: The answer made is that although the crime of heresy is an ecclesiastical crime only and not a secular one, it nevertheless pertains to a secular judge, because it pertains to a secular judge to punish not only secular crimes, but also crimes committed against God and against ecclesiastical persons and things. For it is true of every law and sect, that kings and rulers, distinct from priests, punish not only secular crimes, but also crimes they consider to have been committed against their god or gods and against their sect. For this reason also kings in the Old Testament punished idolaters. Pagan emperors and judges also persecuted Christians most bitterly, as being serious offenders against their gods and sect. In the same way, Christian kings also punish murderers of priests and thieves of ecclesiastical property with due punishment, and yet the murder of a priest and the theft of ecclesiastical property are ecclesiastical crimes.
Ergo multa crimina ecclesiastica ad secularem iudicem spectant, et ita per hoc quod crimen heresis est crimen ecclesiasticum et in Deum committitur probari non potest quod ad iudicem secularem minime spectat. Et huic Augustinus concordare videtur qui, ut legitur 23 q. 5, c. Si propterea, ait: "Si propterea persecutor non fuit Nabuchodonosor rex, quia scelus in sanctum Danielem commissum vindicavit iustissime, quomodo vindicandum est a regibus, quod Christi sacramenta exsufflantur, si prophete membra, quia in periculum missa sunt, sic vindicari meruerunt?" Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod multo magis vindicandum est a regibus peccatum quod in Deum committitur quam peccatum quod in prophetam vel sacerdotem committitur. Si ergo rex potest et debet absque requisitione prelatorum punire homicidam sacerdotis sibi subiectum, multo magis potest et debet debita animadversione ferire sibi subiectos, si per pravitatem hereticam divinam offenderint maiestatem. | Therefore, many ecclesiastical crimes pertain to a secular judge, and so the fact that the crime of heresy is an ecclesiastical crime and is committed against God cannot prove that it does not pertain to a secular judge. And Augustine seems to agree with this. As we read in 23 q. 5, c. Si propterea, [Augustine, Against Petilianus, II.93.212] he says: "If therefore King Nebuchadnezzar was not a persecutor because he most justly avenged the crime committed against holy Daniel, how should kings avenge scorn [by exsufflation ] of the sacraments of Christ, if, when the prophet's limbs were put in danger, they so deserved to be avenged?" From these words it is given to be understood that a sin committed against God is much more to be avenged by kings than than a sin committed against a prophet or priest. If, therefore, the king can and must punish the murderer of a priest subject to him without being called on [to do so] by prelates, much more can and must he strike his subjects with due punishment if they offend the divine majesty through heretical wickedness.
Capitulum 98 | Chapter 98
Discipulus:Postquam indagavimus de hereticis laicis an iudicio regum et secularium iudicum absque requisitione prelatorum ecclesie sint subiecti, vertamus stylum ad clericos hereticos, et specialiter ad papam hereticum, an in aliquo casu papa vel alius clericus hereticus per iudicem secularem debeat coherceri, licet iudex secularis super hoc a prelatis ecclesie minime fuerit requisitus. | Student: After we have inquired about lay heretics, whether they are subject to the judgment of kings and secular judges without the requisition of the prelates of the Church, let us turn our pen to heretic clerics, and especially to a heretic pope, whether there is any case in which a pope or other heretic cleric should be coerced by a secular judge, although the secular judge has not been requisitioned by the prelates of the Church.
Magister: Circa hoc sunt opiniones diverse, quarum una est quod de clericis hereticis quibuscunque, laici, nisi per prelatos ecclesie fuerint requisiti, in nullo casu se intromittere debent. Alia est opinio quod laici, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, de clericis, etiam de papa heretico, possunt diffinitivam proferre sententiam, et executioni eandem sententiam mandare. Tertia est quod, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, laici possunt et debent papam hereticum, et eadem ratione alios clericos hereticos, detinere, et, ne virus sue iniquitatis effundant in alios, prohibere, sed diffinitivam contra ipsum vel ipsos non debent nec possunt proferre sententiam, nec per consequens talem sententiam executioni mandare. | Master: There are different opinions about this. (1) One is that lay people should in no case interfere with any heretic clerics unless they have been called on by the prelates of the Church. (2) Another opinion is that lay people, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, can pronounce a definitive sentence on clerics, even on a heretic pope, and order the same sentence to be executed. (3) A third is that, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, the laity can and must detain a heretic pope, and for the same reason other heretical clerics, and they must prevent them from pouring out the poison of their iniquity on others, but they must not and cannot pronounce a definitive sentence against him or them, nor, consequently, order such a sentence to be executed.
Discipulus: Pro prima opinione, quam puto veram, allega. | Student: Argue for the first opinion, which I think is true.
Magister: Hec videtur esse sententia Lucii pape, qui, ut legitur Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, ait: statuimus insuper, ut comites, barones, rectores et consules civitatum et aliorum locorum, iuxta commonitionem archiepiscoporum et episcoporum, prestito corporaliter iuramento, promittant, quod in omnibus predictis fideliter et efficaciter, cum ab eis exinde fuerint requisiti, ecclesiam contra hereticos et eorum complices adiuvabunt et studebunt bona fide iuxta officium et posse suum ecclesiastica simul et imperiali statuta circa ea, que diximus, executioni mandare. Si vero id observare noluerint, honore, quem optinent, spolientur et ad alios nullatenus assumantur, eis nichilominus excommunicatione ligandis, et terris ipsorum interdicto ecclesie supponendist. Civitas autem, que his decretalibus institutis duxerit resistendum, vel contra commonitionem episcopi punire neglexerit resistentes, aliarum careat commercio civitatum, et episcopali se noverit dignitate privandam." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod laici et iudices seculares de punitione clericorum se intromittere non debent, nisi per prelatos ecclesie fuerint requisiti. | Master: This seems to be the opinion of Pope Lucius, who, as is read in Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam, [5.7.9 col.1674] says: " We have also decreed that the counts, barons, rectors and consuls of cities and other places, according to the admonition of the archbishops and bishops, having taken a bodily oath, should promise that in all the aforementioned matters they will faithfully and effectively assist the Church against heretics and their accomplices, when thereafter they are called on to do so by them [i.e. the archbishops and bishops], and will strive in good faith, according to their office and power, to enforce the ecclesiastical and imperial statutes concerning the things we have mentioned. But if they refuse to observe this, let them be stripped of the honor they hold and let it not be assumed by others, binding them nevertheless with excommunication and placing their lands under the interdict of the Church. However, a city that has deemed that these decretal enactments should be resisted, or has neglected to punish those who resist against the admonition of the bishop, let it be deprived of the commerce of other cities and will that it must be deprived of its episcopal dignity." From these words it is given to understand that laymen and secular judges should not interfere in the punishment of clerics, unless they have been called on by prelates of the Church.
Cui concilium generale sub Innocentio tertio celebratum, ut legitur supradicto c. Excommunicamus, concordare videtur, in quo sic scribitur: "Moneantur autem et inducantur, et, si necesse fuerit, per censuram ecclesiasticam compellantur seculi potestates, quibuscunque fungantur officiis, ut, sicut reputari cupiunt et haberi fideles, ita pro defensione fidei prestent publice iuramentum, quod de terris sue iurisdictioni subiectis universos hereticos, ab ecclesia denotatos, bona fide pro viribus exterminare studebunt, ita, quod amodo, quandocunque quis fuerit in potestatem sive perpetuam sive temporalem assumptus, hoc teneatur capitulum iuramento firmare. Si vero dominus temporalis, requisitus et monitus ab ecclesia, suam terram purgare neglexerit ab heretica feditate, per metropolitanum et ceteros comprovinciales episcopos excommunicationis vinculo innodetur", etc. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod punitio hereticorum non spectat ad laicos nisi fuerint per ecclesiam requisiti. | With this the general council celebrated under Innocent III, as is read in the above-mentioned c. Excommunicamus, seems to agree, in which it is written thus: "Let the secular powers, whatever offices they perform, be warned and induced, and, if necessary, compelled by ecclesiastical censure, so that, as they desire to be considered and held faithful, so for the defense of the faith they should publicly swear an oath that they will endeavor in good faith to the best of their ability to exterminate all heretics, designated by the Church, from the lands subject to their jurisdiction, so that from now on, whenever anyone is raised to power, whether perpetual or temporal, let him be bound to confirm this chapter by oath. But if a temporal lord, called on and warned by the Church, neglects to cleanse his land from heretical filth, let him be bound by the metropolitan and other provincial bishops with the bond of excommunication", etc. By these words it is given to understand that the punishment of heretics does not concern laymen unless they have been called upon by the Church.
Capitulum 99 | Chapter 99
Discipulus: Ista michi sufficiunt pro assertione predicta, presertim cum clerici a iurisdictione laicorum sint exempti. Sane, quia opinio secunda et tertia in hoc concordant quod laici, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, possint papam hereticum, et eadem ratione alios clericos hereticos, detinere, et etiam prohibere ne valeant in alios hereticam effundere pravitatem, de hoc solo, omissis aliis in quibus discrepant opiniones predicte, disserere non postponas. | Student: These things are enough for me for the aforementioned assertion (1), especially since clerics are exempt from the jurisdiction of laymen. Since, indeed, the second and third opinions agree in holding that, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, laymen can detain a heretic pope, and for the same reason other heretic clerics, and also prevent them from spreading heretical wickedness to others, do not delay to discuss this point alone, omitting the other matters in which the aforementioned opinions [2 and 3] differ.
Magister: Assertionem istam magis intelliges si tibi fuerit declaratum quomodo intelligitur ecclesiasticam posse deficere potestatem. | Master: You will understand this assertion better if it has been explained to you how it is understood that ecclesiastical power can be deficient.
Discipulus: Dic ergo quomodo hoc debet intelligi. | Student: Tell me, then, how this should be understood.
Magister: Quod papa existente heretico ecclesiastica potestas deficiat quattuor modis potest intelligi, videlicet per impotentiam, per malitiam, per dampnabilem negligentiam, et per ignorantiam. Per impotentiam quidem, si papa hereticus tanta uteretur potentia temporali quod nullus prelatus ecclesie, nec diocesis in qua papa hereticus moraretur nec alius, posset ad brachium recurrere seculare, utpote si omnes prelatos catholicos teneret in vinculis vel modis aliis impediret ne ad seculare volarent auxilium. Alio modo posset ecclesiastica potestas deficere per impotentiam, puta si aliqui prelati catholici impotentes et pauperes requirerent laicos aliquos pro papa heretico cohercendo, et illi nollent eos iuvare. | Master: In a time when the pope is a heretic, that ecclesiastical power is deficient can be understood in four ways, namely through impotence, through malice, through blameworthy negligence, and through ignorance. By impotence, indeed, if the heretic pope were to exercise such temporal power that no prelate of the Church, nor of the diocese in which the heretic pope resided, nor of any other, could have recourse to the secular arm, for example if he were to keep all the Catholic prelates in chains or in other ways prevent them from flying to secular help. Ecclesiastical power could fail through impotence in another way, for example if some powerless and poor Catholic prelates were to call on some laymen to coerce the heretic pope and they were unwilling to help them.
Secundo potest intelligi deficere potestas ecclesiastica per malitiam, puta si omnes prelati ecclesie et clerici pape heretico adhererent, eius errores vel personam pro viribus defendendo. | Secondly, ecclesiastical power could be understood to be deficient through malice, for example if all the prelates of the Church and clerics adhered to the heretic pope, defending his errors or person to the best of their ability.
Tertio posset deficere ecclesiastica potestas per dampnabilem negligentiam, utpote si prelati et clerici qui possent per se, vel invocato auxilio brachii secularis, papam hereticum cohercere, et tamen exaltationem fidei nullatenus attendentes, ipsum permitterent libere in suis erroribus remanere. | Thirdly, ecclesiastical power could be deficient through blameworthy negligence, for example if prelates and clerics who could, by themselves, or by invoking the help of the secular arm, coerce the heretic pope, and yet, not paying any attention to the exaltation of the faith, allowed him to remain freely in his errors.
Quarto potest deficere ecclesiastica potestas per ignorantiam, utpote si prelati ecclesie, saltem multi, qui possent papam hereticum cohercere, nescirent ipsum in pravitatem hereticam incidisse. | Fourthly, ecclesiastical power can be deficient through ignorance, for example if the prelates of the Church, at least many of those who could coerce a heretic pope, were unaware that he had fallen into heretical depravity.
Istis quattuor modis papa existente heretico potest intelligi ecclesiastica potestas deficere. | In these four ways it can be understood that, when a pope is a heretic, ecclesiastical power is deficient.
Discipulus: Intelligo quomodo dicunt ecclesiasticam potestatem posse deficere. Ideo nunc allega pro assertione prefata. | Student: I understand how they say that ecclesiastical power can be deficient. Therefore now argue for the aforementioned assertion.
Magister: Quod deficiente ecclesiastica potestate aliquo predictorum modorum laici valeant papam hereticum captivare et, ne pravitate heretica inficiat alios, prohibere, multis modis, tam scilicet aliorum testimoniis quam rationibus, videtur posse probari. Hoc enim glossa dist. 17 c. Nec licuit, sententialiter et verbaliter videtur asserere. Ait enim: "Ubicunque deficit ecclesiastica potestas semper recurritur ad brachium seculare." Sive ergo deficiat ecclesiastica potestas per impotentiam, sive per malitiam, sive per dampnabilem negligentiam, sive per ignorantiam, cohercio pape heretici, ne valeat fideles inficere, ad laicos catholicos pertinebit. | Master: That when ecclesiastical power is deficient, laymen are able in some of the aforementioned ways to capture a heretic pope and to prevent him from infecting others with heretical wickedness, seems provable in many ways, namely by the testimonies of others as well as by arguments. For the gloss on dist. 17 c. Nec licuit, seems to assert this in substance and verbally. For it says: "Wherever ecclesiastical power is deficient, recourse is always had to the secular arm." Therefore, whether ecclesiastical power is deficient through impotence, or through malice, or through blameworthy negligence, or through ignorance, the coercion of a heretic pope so that he may not be able to infect the faithful will pertain to lay Catholics.
Item, hec videtur esse sententia Isidoris, qui, ut legitur 23 q. 5 c. Principes, ait: "Principes seculi nonnunquam intra ecclesiam potestatis adepte culmina tenent, ut per eandem potestatem disciplinam ecclesiasticam muniant", ubi dicit glossa in hec verba: "Laici habent iurisdictionem multipliciter intra ecclesiam. Quandoque in personis ipsis, cum sunt incorrigibiles, ut 32 dist. c. Eos qui, et infra eadem qu. c. De Liguribus. Item, quandoque propter ambitionem alicuius, ut 79 dist. c. Si quis pecunia. Item, cum fidem volunt subvertere, ut dist. 8 c. Quo iure, et supra eadem c. 1 et dist. 17 c. Nec licuit , et infra: Item, cum falsarius est clericus ut Extra, De crimine falsi, c. Ad falsariorum. Item cum schisma faciunt clerici et cum contemnunt excommunicationem, ut infra eadem q. c. De Liguribus. Item, et ubicunque ecclesiastica potestas deficit, ut hic. Item cum tributum petunt ab ecclesia, ut infra q. 8 c. Convenior." | Likewise, this seems to be the opinion of Isidore, who, as is read in 23 q. 5 c. Principes, says: "Secular rulers sometimes hold the highest positions of power within the Church, so that by the same power they may strengthen ecclesiastical discipline", where the gloss on these words says: "Laymen have jurisdiction in many ways within the Church. Sometimes over persons, when they are incorrigible, as in 32 dist. c. Eos qui, and below in the same distinction c. De Liguribus. Again, sometimes because of someone's ambition, as in 79 dist. c. Si quis pecunia. Again, when they wish to subvert the faith, as in dist. 8 c. Quo iure, and above in the same distinction c. 1, and dist. 17 c. Nec licuit , and below: Again, when the forger is a cleric, as in Extra, De crimine falsi, c. Ad falsariorum. Again, when clerics create schism and when they despise excommunication, as in the same question, c. De Liguribus. Again, and wherever ecclesiastical power is deficient, as here. Again, when they demand tribute from the Church, as below, in q. 8 c. Convenior."
Ex quibus verbis non solum habetur vocaliter sed etiam sententialiter quod, ubicunque deficit ecclesiastica potestas, laici habent iurisdictionem intra ecclesiam, hoc est super clericos, et per consequens, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, sive per impotentiam, sive per malitiam, sive per dampnabilem negligentiam, sive per ignorantiam, laici super papam hereticum optinent potestatem. Sed etiam ex eisdem verbis colliguntur diverse rationes quare papa hereticus ad iurisdictionem pertinet laicorum, quod debet intelligi deficiente ecclesiastica potestate. | From these words it is understood not only vocally but also in substance that, wherever ecclesiastical power is deficient, the laity have jurisdiction within the Church, that is, over clerics, and consequently, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, whether through impotence, or malice, or through blameworthy negligence, or through ignorance, the laity obtain power over the heretic pope. But also from the same words are gathered diverse reasons why the heretic pope belongs to the jurisdiction of the laity, which must be understood as holding when ecclesiastical power is deficient.
Quarum prima est quia papa hereticus est incorrigibilis. Ex hoc enim quod est pertinax debet incorrigibilis reputari. Et ideo, cum omnis incorrigibilis debeat coherceri, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate est papa hereticus per laicos cohercendus. | The first of these reasons is that a heretic pope is incorrigible. For from this very fact that he is pertinacious he must be considered incorrigible. And therefore, since everyone incorrigible must be coerced, when ecclesiastical power is deficient a heretic pope must be coerced by the laity.
Secunda ratio assignatur ambitio. Nam papa hereticus per ambitionem occupans apostolicam sedem, ne totus ordo ecclesiasticus confundatur et fides catholica periclitetur, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, coherceri debet per providentiam laicorum. | The second reason assigned is ambition. For a heretic pope occupying the Apostolic See through ambition, lest the entire ecclesiastical order be confounded and the Catholic faith be endangered he must be coerced, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, by the providence of the laity.
Tertio, propter hoc quod papa hereticus fidem cupit subvertere, potestate ecclesiastica deficiente est per laicos prohibendus. | Third, because a heretic pope desires to subvert the faith, when ecclesiastical power is deficient he must be prevented by the laity.
Quarto, propter hoc quod excommunicationem contempnit, ne excommunicatione cum eo catholici maculentur, per principes seculi, quando ecclesiastica potestas deficit, coherceri debet. | Fourth, because he despises excommunication, lest Catholics be stained by excommunication with him, he must be coerced by secular rulers, when ecclesiastical power is deficient.
Item, Isidorus ubi prius dicit in hec verba: "Ceterum intra ecclesiam potestates necessarie non essent, nisi ut quod non prevalent sacerdotes efficere per doctrine sermonem potestas hoc imperet per discipline terrorem. Sepe per regnum terrenum celeste regnum proficit ut qui intra ecclesiam positi contra fidem et disciplinam agunt rigore principum conterantur, ipsamque disciplinam, quam ecclesie utilitas exercere non prevalet, cervicibus superborum potestas principalis imponat." | Likewise, Isidore, in the place quoted earlier [23 q. 5 c. Principes], says in these words: "Moreover, powers would not be needed within the Church, except that what priests do not succeed in doing by words of teaching, power would command through the terror of discipline. Often the heavenly kingdom advances by means of the earthly kingdom, so that those placed within the Church who act against faith and discipline are crushed by the rigor of the rulers, and the very discipline that the humility of the Church does not prevail in enforcing, the ruler's power imposes on the necks of the proud."
Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod, quandocunque circa correptionem eorum qui contra fidem et disciplinam agunt deficit ecclesiastica potestas, tales sunt per principes comprimendi. Si ergo papa est hereticus, et sacerdotes per doctrine sermonem eum non valent vel nolunt corrigere, per potestates publicas comprimi debet. | From these words it is evidently gathered that, whenever ecclesiastical power is deficient in correcting those who act against faith and discipline, those people are to be suppressed by the rulers. Therefore, if the pope is a heretic and the priests are unable or unwilling to correct him by the words of teaching, he must be suppressed by the public powers.
Item, Pelagius papa, ut habetur 23 q. 5 c. Quali, ait: "Hoc enim et divine et humane leges statuerunt, ut ab ecclesie unitate divisi, et eius pacem iniquissime perturbantes, a secularibus etiam potestatibus comprimantur. Nec quicquam maius est, unde Deo sacrificium possitis offerre, quam si id ordinetis, ut hii, qui in suam et aliorum perniciem debachantur, competenti debeant vigore compesci." Ex quibus verbis evidenter habetur quod, secundum leges divinas, ab ecclesie unitate divisi et eius pacem perturbantes per seculares debent comprimi potestates. Papa autem hereticus ab unitate ecclesie est divisus, eiusque pacem iniquissime nititur perturbare, quia, dum fides ecclesie corrumpitur et laceratur, vera pax ecclesie perturbatur. Ergo papa hereticus, ubi deficeret ecclesiastica potestas, esset per potestates publicas compescendus. | Likewise, Pope Pelagius, as is found in 23 q. 5 c. Quali, says: "For both divine and human laws have established that those who are divided from the unity of the Church and who most unjustly disturb its peace are to be suppressed even by secular powers. Nor is there anything greater from which you can offer a sacrifice to God than if you order that those who are rampaging to their own destruction and that of others should be restrained with appropriate force." From these words it is evident that, according to divine laws, those who are divided from the unity of the Church and disturb its peace should be suppressed by secular powers. But the heretic pope is divided from the unity of the Church and strives most wickedly to disturb its peace, because, while the faith of the Church is corrupted and torn, the true peace of the Church is disturbed. Therefore, the heretic pope, where ecclesiastical power is deficient, would have to be suppressed by public powers.
Discipulus: Que sunt ille leges divine quibus statuitur quod ab ecclesie unitate divisi et eius pacem iniquissime perturbantes sunt per potestates publicas comprimendi. | Student: What are those divine laws by which it is established that those who are divided from the unity of the Church and who most wickedly disturb its peace are to be suppressed by public powers?
Magister: Respondetur quod ille divine leges specialiter de hereticis perturbantibus ecclesiam habentur Deuteronomio 13 et 17. Nam Deuteronomio non solum sacerdotibus, sed generaliter omnibus, et specialiter in potestate constitutis sic precipitur: "Si surrexerit in medio tue prophetes aut qui sompnium vidisse se dicat et predixerit signum atque portentum et evenerit quod locutus est et dixerit tibi 'Eamus et sequamur deos alienos quos ignoras et serviamus eis', non audies verba prophete illius aut sompniatoris quia temptat vos Dominus Deus vester ut palam fiat utrum diligatis eum aut non in toto corde et in tota anima vestra." Et post: "Propheta autem ille aut fictor sompniorum interficietur quia locutus est ut vos averteret a Domino Deo vestro qui eduxit vos de terra Egypti et redemit de domo servitutis ut errare te faceret de via quam tibi precepit Dominus Deus tuus et auferes malum de medio tui." | Master: The answer made is that those divine laws specifically about heretics disturbing the Church are had in Deuteronomy 13 and 17. For in Deuteronomy 13 it is instructed, not only to priests, but to all in general, and especially to those in authority, as follows: "If there arise among you a prophet or a dreamer who says that he has seen a dream and foretells a sign or a portent, and what he spoke comes true, and he says to you, 'Let us go and follow other gods whom you do not know, and let us serve them', you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or dreamer, for the Lord your God is testing you, to make it clear whether you love him with all your heart and with all your soul or not." And after: "But that prophet or inventor of dreams shall be put to death, because he has spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt and redeemed you from the house of slavery, to make you wander from the way which the Lord your God commanded you, and you will remove the evil from your midst."
Et ibidem immediate subiungitur: "Si te voluerit persuadere frater tuus filius matris tue aut filius tuus vel filia sive uxor que est in sinu tuo aut amicus quem diligis ut animam tuam clam dicens 'Eamus et serviamus diis alienis quos ignoras tu et patres tui cunctarum in circuitu gentium que iuxta vel procul sunt ab initio usque ad finem terre', non acquiescas ei nec audias neque parcat ei oculus tuus ut miserearis et occultes eum sed statim interficies." | And there it is immediately added: "If your brother, the son of your mother, or your son or daughter or the wife who is in your bosom, or the friend whom you love as your own soul, wishes to persuade you secretly, saying, 'Let us go and serve foreign gods, which you and your fathers have not known, of all the nations around, near or far, from the beginning to the end of the earth', you shall not consent to him or listen to him, nor shall your eye spare him to have mercy on him and hide him, but you shall immediately put him to death."
Et post sic legitur: "Si audieris in una urbium tuarum quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi ad habitandum dicentes aliquos egressi sunt filii Belial de medio tuo et averterunt habitatores urbis tue atque dixerunt 'Eamus et serviamus diis alienis quos ignoratis', quere sollicite et diligenter rei veritate perspecta. Si inveneris certum esse quod dicitur et abhominationem hanc opere perpetratam statim percuties habitatores urbis eius in ore gladii." | And after this it is read: "If you hear in one of your cities which the Lord your God gives you to live in, saying, Some sons of Belial have gone out from among you and have turned away the inhabitants of your city, saying, 'Let us go and serve foreign gods', which you have not known, inquire carefully and diligently, having examined the truth of the matter. If you find that what is said is certain and that this abomination has been committed in fact, you shall immediately strike the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword."
Item, Deuteronomio 17 sic scribitur: "Cum reperti fuerint apud te intra unam portarum tuarum quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi vir aut mulier qui faciant malum in conspectu Domini Dei tui et transgrediantur pactum illius ut vadant et serviant diis alienis et adorent eos solem et lunam et omnem militiam celi que non precepi et hoc tibi fuerit nunciatum audiensque inquisieris diligenter et verum esse repereris et abhominatio facta esse in Israel educes virum ac mulierem qui rem sceleratissimam perpetrarunt ad portas civitatis tue et lapidibus obruentur." | Likewise, in Deuteronomy 17 is written thus: "If there be found among you within one of your gates which the Lord your God will give you a man or a woman, who do evil in the sight of the Lord your God, and transgress his covenant, to go and serve other gods, and to worship them, the sun, and the moon, and all the host of heaven, which I have not commanded, and it is told you, and you hear and inquire diligently, and find that it is true, and that an abomination is committed in Israel, you shall bring out the man and the woman who have committed this most wicked thing to the gates of your city, and they shall be stoned to death."
Hec sunt leges divine contra omnes avertentes et conantes advertere orthodoxos a veritate legis divine, inter quos constat hereticos computandos, indistincte statuente, cunctos constringentes catholicos ut universos hereticos a lege Dei apostatantes delere conentur. Que leges ordinem iuris in huiusmodi observandum aperte declarant, ut, scilicet cum quicunque, viri vel mulieres, sacerdotes vel non sacerdotes, prophete (id est doctores) vel alii, de pravitate heretica seu apostasia a fide accusantur vel etiam diffamantur, cum diligentia et sollicitudine veritas inquiratur per quoscunque fideles ad quos accusatio vel diffamatio talis pervenerit, si non sint alii superiores qui velint vel possint inquirere veritatem. Veritate autem inventa, iustitia minime differatur, sed tales malefici pro suis demeritis puniantur. | These are divine laws enacted [statuente > statutae with We] in general terms against all who turn away and attempt to turn away the orthodox from the truth of the divine law among whom it is certain that heretics are to be counted, laws binding all Catholics to try to destroy all heretics who apostatize from the law of God. These laws openly declare the order of the law to be observed in such matters, that, namely, when any, men or women, priests or non-priests, prophets (that is, teachers) or others, are accused or even defamed of heretical wickedness or apostasy from the faith, with diligence and solicitude the truth must be investigated by any faithful person whom such accusation or defamation has reached, if there are no other superiors who are willing or able to investigate the truth. But when the truth is found, justice is not to be delayed at all, but such evildoers are to be punished for their demerits.
Discipulus: Talis inquisitio et punitio non debent fieri per quoscunque, sed solummodo per iudices quibus talia ex officio suscepto incumbunt. | Student: Such investigation and punishment should not be carried out by just anyone, but only by judges on whom such things are incumbent by virtue of the office they have undertaken.
Magister: Conceditur quod talia primo spectant ad iudices. Si tamen iudices non potuerint vel noluerint in huiusmodi iustitiam exhibere, ad subditos spectat facere de huiusmodi iustitie complementum. Propter quod verba predicta legum non ad iudices tantummodo sed indistincte ad cunctos catholicos diriguntur, ut intelligant universi fideles quod huiusmodi iustitia in nullo casu omnino debet differri, sed quicunque fideles, subditi vel alii, de huiusmodi iustitiam facere debent, si tantam habuerint potestatem temporalem, ut queant leges divinas executioni mandare. | Master: It is granted that such things pertain first to judges. However, if the judges are unable or unwilling to exercise justice in such a matter, it pertains to subjects to carry out the completion of such justice. For this reason the aforementioned words of the laws are not addressed only to judges but generally to all Catholics, so that all the faithful may understand that this kind of justice should in no case be deferred at all, but that all the faithful, subjects or others, should carry out this kind of justice, if they have so much temporal power that they can command the execution of the divine laws.
Propter quod Helias propheta, quamvis non esset sacerdos nec iudex, iniunxit populo, non iudicibus, apprehendere prophetas Baal. Quos comprehensos duxit ad torrentem Cison et interfecit eos ibi, ut legitur tertio Regum 18. Ergo leges divine predicte non solum iudices sed subditos universos constringunt, ordine tamen quodam, ut primo ad talem iustitiam faciendam iudices obligantur, secundo autem subditi, si iudices non potuerint vel noluerint iustitiam exercere. | For this reason the prophet Elijah, although he was neither a priest nor a judge, commanded the people, not the judges, to apprehend the prophets of Baal. Having apprehended them, he led them to the torrent Cison and killed them there, as we read in 3 Kings 18. Therefore the divine laws aforesaid bind not only judges but all subjects, but in a certain order, so that first the judges are obliged to do such justice, and secondly the subjects, if the judges are unable or unwilling to exercise justice.
Discipulus: Iste leges divine, cum non pertineant ad moralia sed ad iudicialia legis antique, fideles sub lege libertatis constitutos nequaquam astringunt. | Student: These divine laws, since they do not pertain to the moral but to the judicial aspects of the ancient law, do not at all bind the faithful established under the law of liberty.
Magister: In legibus supradictis aliquid erat morale, aliquid iudiciale. Morale erat quod fideles hereticis et apostatis a fide cupientibus alios a lege divini avertere nullo modo consentire debebant, sed eis obviare et resistere modis sibi convenientibus, legemque divinam observare, defendere, et tueri tenebantur. Iudiciale autem erat quod occidi debebant. | Master: In the above-mentioned laws there was something moral, something judicial. The moral was that the faithful should in no way consent to heretics and apostates who desired to turn others away from the divine law, but they were bound to meet and resist them in ways suitable to them, and to observe, defend, and protect the divine law. The judicial was that they should be killed.
Licet ergo fideles sub lege libertatis constituti ad id quod erat iudiciale in legibus memoratis minime astringantur, quia ratione legum illarum non tenent hereticos et a fide apostatas neci tradere corporali, ad illa tamen que in illis legibus moralia sunt cuncti Christiani necessario sunt astricti. Et ideo nec hereticis consentire debent, nec favere, nec obedire, sed ipsis resistere pro viribus, et prohibere ne fidem corrumpere valeant orthodoxam, principes seculi, et, propter eorum negligentiam vel malitiam, omnes Christiani tenentur. | Therefore, although the faithful, living under the law of liberty, are not bound at all to what was judicial in the laws mentioned, because they are not bound by reason of those laws to hand over heretics and apostates to bodily death, nevertheless all Christians are necessarily bound to things that are moral in those laws. And therefore they must neither consent to heretics, nor favour, nor obey, but the secular rulers, and, because of their negligence or malice, all Christians are bound to resist them to the best of their ability, and prevent them from corrupting the orthodox faith.
Discipulus: Nunquid aliquis doctorum ab ecclesia receptorum tenet predictas leges Veteris Testamenti nunc a Catholicis universis esse servandas. | Student: Does any of the doctors received by the Church hold that the aforementioned laws of the Old Testament are now to be observed by all Catholics?
Magister: Beatus Cyprianus, ut legitur 23 q. 5 c. Si audieris, hoc videtur expresse sentire. Ait enim: "Si audieris in una ex civitatibus, quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi inhabitare illic dicentes: 'Eamus, et serviamus diis alienis', quos non nostis, interficies necabisque omnes qui sunt in civitate, cede gladii, et incendes civitatem igni, et erit sine habitaculo in eternum: non reedificabitur etiam nunc, ut avertatur Deus ab indignatione ire sue. Et dabit misericordiam tibi, et miserebitur tui, et observaberis precepta eius. Cuius precepti et vigoris memor Mathathias interfecit eum, qui ad aram sacrificaturus accesserat. Quod si ante adventum Christi circa Deum colendum et idola spernenda hec precepta sunt servata, quanto magis post adventum Christi circa Deum colendum servanda sunt, quando ille veniens non verbis nos hortatus sit, sed etiam factis." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod leges prescripte sunt magis servande post adventum Christi quam ante, quod intelligendum est de moralibus que in predictis legibus continentur. | Master: Blessed Cyprian, as we read in 23 q. 5 c. Si audieris, seems to think this expressly. For he says: "If you hear in one of the cities which the Lord your God will give you to dwell there, some saying: 'Let us go and serve other gods', which you have not known, you shall slay and kill all who are in the city, strike with the sword, and burn the city with fire, and it shall be without habitation forever. It shall not be rebuilt even now, so that God may turn away from the wrath of his anger. And he will show you mercy and have compassion on you, and you shall observe his precepts. Remembering this precept and his strength, Mathathias killed him who had approached the altar about to offer sacrifice. But if before the coming of Christ these precepts concerning the worship of God and the scorning of idols were kept, how much more after the coming of Christ must they be kept concerning the worship of God, when he, coming, exhorted us not with words, but also with deeds." From these words it is gathered that the laws prescribed are to be kept more after the coming of Christ than before, which must be understood of the morals contained in the aforementioned laws.
Discipulus: Quamvis illa moralia servanda sint a iudicibus, non tamen ab omnibus. | Student: Although those moral [elements] are to be observed by judges, yet not by all.
Magister: Contra hoc videtur glossa in preallegato capitulo que super verbo necabis ait: "Tu quicunque sis: et sic quandoque ille, qui non est iudex, potest punire maleficos ut infra eadem questione ultima c. Legi." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod non solum ad iudices, verum etiam ad alios, pertinet in hoc casu, scilicet cum heretici volunt subvertere fidem et non apparet qui eis resistat, punire maleficos. Et ita, si papa est hereticus et clerici non possunt vel nolunt eum debite cohercere, ipsius cohertio spectat ad laicos, quamvis non fuerint per clericos requisiti. | Master: Contrary to this seems the gloss in the pre-alleged chapter, which says on the word necabis : "You whosoever you are: and thus sometimes he who is not a judge, can punish evildoers as below in the same last question, c. Legi." From these words it is given to be understood that it pertains not only to judges to punish evildoers, but also to others, namely in the case when heretics wish to subvert the faith and no one appears to resist them. And so, if the pope is a heretic and the clerics cannot or do not wish to duly coerce him, his coercion pertains to the laity, even though they have not been called upon by the clerics.
Discipulus: Si plura testimonia maiorum sonant eandem assertionem, ipsa non differas allegare. | Student: If more testimonies of the elders express the same assertion, do not hesitate to bring them forward.
Magister: Hoc Pelagius papa, ut legitur 23 q. 5 c. Non vos, sentire videtur cum dicit: "Malum autem schisma esse, et per exteras etiam potestates huiusmodi opprimi homines deberet, et canonice scripture auctoritas, et paternarum nos regularum veritas docet." Ex quibus verbis patet aperte omnes schismaticos per exteras potestates opprimendos. Omnes autem heretici sunt schismatici. Ergo heretici, etiam clerici, sunt per potestates exteras comprimendi, et per consequens papa hereticus, si potestas deficit clericorum, per principes et laicos compesci debet. | Master: This is what Pope Pelagius, as we read in 23 q. 5 c. Non vos, seems to think when he says: "Both the authority of canonical Scripture and the truth of our paternal rules teach us that schism is evil, and men of this kind ought to be oppressed even by external powers." From these words it is clear that all schismatics are to be oppressed by external powers. But all heretics are schismatics. Therefore heretics, even clerics, are to be suppressed by external powers, and consequently a heretic pope, if the power of the clerics is deficient, must be restrained by rulers and laymen.
Item, idem papa Pelagius, causa et questione predicta capitulo De Liguribus, scribens Narse patricio ait: "Regule patrum hoc specialiter constituerunt, ut, si qua ecclesiastici officii persona cui subiectus est restiterit, vel seorsum collegerit, aut aliud altare erexerit, seu schisma fecerit, iste excommunicetur atque dampnetur. Quod si forte et hoc contempserit, et permanserit divisiones et schismata faciendo, per potestates publicas opprimatur. Ecce, Domine, quia animus vester forte timidus est, ne persequi videaris, de patrum vobis auctoritate hec breviter dirigenda curavi cum mille alia exempla et constitutiones sint, quibus evidenter agnoscitur, ut facientes scissuras in sancta ecclesia non solum exiliis, sed etiam proscriptione rerum et dura custodia per publicas potestates debeant coherceri." | Likewise, the same Pope Pelagius, in the aforementioned cause and question in the chapter De Liguribus, writing to the patrician Narse, says: "Rules of the Fathers have specially established that if any person with an ecclesiastical office resists someone to whom he is subject, or gathers separately, or erects another altar, or causes schism, he be excommunicated and condemned. But if perhaps he should despise this also, and persist in causing divisions and schisms, let him be oppressed by the public powers. Behold, Lord [Narse], because perhaps your mind fears to seem to persecute, I have taken care to briefly direct you concerning the authority of the Fathers, when there are a thousand other examples and ordinances from which it is clearly recognized that those who cause schisms in the Holy Church should be coerced by the public powers, not only by exile, but also by the confiscation of property and strict custody."
Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod episcopi, de quibus fit sermo in capitulo supradicto Pelagii, si excommunicationem et dampnationem contempnendo scissuras et schismata fecerint, quales sunt episcopi heretici, auctoritate canonum sanctorum patrum debent per potestates publicas coherceri. Ergo si papa fiat hereticus, quantumcunque prelati ecclesie noluerint vel non potuerint ad ipsum cohercendum auxilium invocare brachii secularis, publice potestates non solum auctoritate legis divine et rationis simul ex lege divina et naturali dictamine rationis accepte, sed etiam auctoritate constitutionum sanctorum patrum possunt et debent papam hereticum cohercere. | From these words it is given to understand that bishops, who are the subject of the above chapter of Pelagius, if they have caused divisions and schisms by disregarding excommunication and condemnation, as is true of heretic bishops, must, by the authority of the canons of the holy fathers, be coerced by public powers. Therefore, if the pope becomes a heretic, however much the prelates of the Church may be unwilling or unable to invoke the aid of the secular arm to coerce him, the public powers can and must coerce the heretic pope, not only by the authority of divine law and reason together, authority drawn from divine law and the natural dictate of reason, but also by the authority of the ordinances of the holy fathers.
Item, Augustinus, ut legitur 11 q. 3 c. Imperatores, scribens Donatistis qui erant clerici et quidam eorum episcopi, ait: "Ipse Nabuchodonosor, post miracula salutis trium puerorum commotus atque mutatus, pro veritate contra errorem edictum proposuit, ut quicunque blasphemarent Deum Sidrac, Misac et Abdenago, in interitum irent, et domus eorum in dispersionem. Et non vultis, ut aliquid tale contra vos iubeant imperatores christiani, cum sciant a vobis, quos rebaptizatis, Christum exsufflari." | Likewise, Augustine, as read in 11 q. 3 c. Imperatores, [col.1263, Letter 105.2.7] writing to the Donatists who were clerics and some of their bishops, said: "Nebuchadnezzar himself, moved and changed after the miracles of the salvation of the three young men, proposed an edict in favour of the truth, against error, that whoever blasphemed God of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego should be destroyed and their houses laid waste. And you do not want the Christian emperors to order anything like this against you, since they know that in those whom you rebaptize Christ is being scorned [by "exsufflation"] by you."
Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod quemadmodum Nabuchodonosor rex infidelis edictum proposuit contra blasphemantes Deum verum, sic possunt imperatores christiani punire clericos hereticos et episcopos Christum exsufflantes. Sed Nabuchodonosor tale poterat edictum proponere a sacerdotibus minime requisitis. Ergo imperatores possunt punire clericos hereticos quamvis prelati noluerint vel non potuerint eos contra clericos hereticos invocare. Et ita, si papa fuerit hereticus et prelati ecclesie ipsum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, est per laicos comprimendus. | From these words it is given to be understood that just as the unbelieving king Nebuchadnezzar proposed an edict against those who blaspheme the true God, so Christian emperors can punish heretical clerics and bishops who scorn Christ. But Nebuchadnezzar could propose such an edict without being called upon by priests. Therefore, emperors can punish heretic clerics even though the prelates were unwilling or unable to call upon them against the heretic clerics. And so, if the pope were a heretic and the prelates of the Church were unwilling or unable to coerce him, he must be controlled by the laity.
Item, glossa 23 q. 5 c. 1 dicit quod clerici propter heresim sunt facti de foro iudicis secularis. Ergo papa hereticus, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, factus est de foro iudicis secularis. | Likewise, the gloss on 23 q. 5 c. 1 says that clerics are made subject to the forum of the secular judge on account of heresy. Therefore a heretic pope, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, becomes subject to the forum of the secular judge.
Discipulus: Si pro assertione ista rationes aliquas cogitasti, ipsas adducas in medium. | Student: If you have thought of any arguments for this assertion, bring them forward.
Magister: Assertio supradicta multis videtur rationibus posse probari, quarum prima est hec. Contra crimen quod est gravius in se et toti communitati fidelium periculosius et perniciosius oportet Catholicos et fideles cum maiori vigore et sollicitudine et cautela resistere. Sed crimen heresis in papa est in se gravius, et toti communitati fidelium perniciosius et periculosius, si circa eius correctionem ecclesiastica potestas defecerit (sive per malitiam, sive per impotentiam, sive per dampnabilem negligentiam, sive per ignorantiam) quam sit crimen apostasie ab ordine etiam post trinam admonitionem. Ergo cum maiori vigore, sollicitudine et cautela debent Catholici universi resistere crimini heresis in papa quam crimini apostasie in clerico etiam post trinam admonitionem. Sed publice potestates punire possunt clericos apostatantes ab ordine post trinam admonitionem. Ergo multo fortius, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate, publice potestates papam hereticum compescere possunt. | Master: The above assertion seems to provable by many arguments, the first of which is this. Against a crime that is graver in itself and more dangerous and pernicious to the whole community of the faithful Catholics and the faithful must resist with greater vigor, solicitude, and caution. But the crime of heresy in a pope is graver in itself, and more pernicious and dangerous to the whole community of the faithful, if the ecclesiastical power has failed to correct it (whether through malice, or through impotence, or through blameworthy negligence, or through ignorance) than the crime of apostasy from [a religious] order even after three warnings. Therefore, Catholics in general must resist with greater vigor, solicitude, and caution the crime of heresy in the pope than the crime of apostasy in a cleric even after three warnings. But the public powers can punish clerics who apostatize from the order after three warnings. Therefore, much more strongly, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, the public powers can restrain a heretic pope.
Maior primi syllogismi patet aperte. Nam sepe videmus crimina leviora in se gravius puniri propter hoc quod sunt communitati periculiosora. Et ita magis resistitur crimini leviori propter hoc solum quod est communitati periculosius. Unde et in multis regionibus, regnis et terris furtum gravius punitur quam adulterium, quia furtum punitur pena capitali (non sic adulterium), et tamen furtum, licet sit communitati periculosius et perniciosius, tamen est levius, teste Salomone qui, Proverbiis 6 ait: "Non grandis est culpe cum quis furatus fuerit furatur enim ut esurientem impleat animam deprehensus quoque reddet septuplum et omnem substantiam domus sue tradet , et liberabit se, qui autem adulter est propter cordis inopiam perdet animam suam turpitudinem et ignominiam congregabit sibi et opprobrium illius non delebitur." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod crimen furti est minus grave quam adulterium, et tamen gravius quandoque punitur. | The major of the first syllogism is clearly evident. For we often see that lesser crimes are punished more severely in themselves because they are more dangerous to the community. And thus a lesser crime is more resisted simply because it is more dangerous to the community. Hence in many regions, kingdoms, and lands theft is punished more severely than adultery, because theft is punished with capital punishment (not so adultery), and yet theft, although it is more dangerous and destructive to the community, is nevertheless lighter, as Solomon testifies, who says in Proverbs 6: "It is not a great sin when someone steals; for he steals to fill his hungry soul; if he is caught, he will also restore sevenfold and give up the whole substance of his house, and he will be free, but he who is an adulterer will destroy his soul through poverty of heart; he will gather shame and disgrace to himself, and his reproach will not be wiped out." From these words it is given to understand that the crime of theft is less serious than adultery, and yet is sometimes punished more severely.
Sic etiam licet detractio levius puniatur quam furtum vel rapina, tamen gravius crimen est censendum, teste Anacleto papa qui, ut habetur 6 q. 1 c. Deteriores, ait: "Deteriores sunt, qui doctorum vitam moresque corrumpunt, his, qui substantias aliorum prediaque diripiunt. Ipsi enim ea, que extra nos, licet nostra sint, auferunt, nostri quoque detractores, et morum corruptores nostrorum, sive qui adversus nos armantur, proprie nos ipsos decipiunt." Et ita constat quod minora crimina sepe, quia magis nocent rei publice, gravius puniuntur. | So also, although detraction is punished less severely than theft or robbery, it is nevertheless to be considered a more serious crime, according to Pope Anacletus who, as is stated in 6 q. 1 c. Deteriores, says: "Those who corrupt the lives and morals of teachers are worse than those who plunder the substance and property of others. For the latter take away things that are outside us, although they are ours, and our detractors, and the corrupters of our morals, or those who arm themselves against us, properly deceive [*recte diripiunt plunder] us ourselves." And thus it is clear that lesser crimes are often punished more severely, because they are more harmful to the public interest.
Quod glossa Extra, De immunitate c. ultimo, insinuare videtur. Querit enim dicens: "Quare publicus latro et depopulator potius extrahuntur ab ecclesia quam alius malefactor qui forte deterior est." Et, respondens, ait: "Quia plurimum interest illos puniri quam alios malefactores: cum pluribus exitia cogitent quam alii 23 q. 4 c. Iniusta." Quod est capitulum Ambrosii, ubi ait: "Si quis latronem filiis deprecantibus motus, et lacrimis coniugis eius inflexus absolvendum putat, cui adhuc latrocinandi aspiret affectus, nonne innocentes tradet exitio qui liberat multorum exitia cogitantem?" Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ideo aliqua crimina gravius vindicantur quia magis sunt communitati nociva. Et ita patet maior syllogismi primi. | This the gloss on Extra, De immunitate c. ult., seems to suggests. For it asks, saying: "Why is it that a public robber and plunderer is rather expelled from the Church than another malefactor who is perhaps worse?" And, answering, it says: "Because it matters more that they be punished than other malefactors, since they intend destruction to more people than others, 23 q. 4 c. Est iniusta." This is a chapter of Ambrose, where he says: "If anyone, moved by the entreaties of his [the robber's] children and the tears of his wife, thinks that a robber should be absolved while he still has the desire to rob, will he not deliver the innocent to destruction when he frees one who intends the destruction of many?" From these words it is gathered that some crimes are punished more seriously for the reason that they are more harmful to the community. And thus the major of the first syllogism is clear.
Minor, scilicet quod crimen heresis in papa non solum est in se gravius quam etiam periculosius et perniciosius communitati etc., est de se manifesta, et ex verbis Augustini que ponuntur dist. 83 c. Nemo, patenter habentur. Ait enim: "Nemo quippe in ecclesia amplius nocet, quam qui perverse agens nomen vel ordinem sanctitatis et sacerdotis habet. Delinquentem namque hunc nullus redarguere presumit, et in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia peccator honoratur." Ex quibus verbis inferri potest quod nemo in ecclesia amplius nocet quam qui perverse docens nomen pape habet, quia eius doctrina pestifera vehementer diffunditur, si pro reverentia summi pontificii hereticus honoratur. | The minor, namely that the crime of heresy in a pope is not only more serious in itself but also more dangerous and pernicious to the community, etc., is self-evident, and is clearly established [*habentur > habetur] from Augustine's in dist. 83 c. Nemo. For he says: "For no one in the Church does more harm than he who, [though] acting perversely, has the name or order of holiness and priesthood. For no one presumes to reprove this offender, and the fault is greatly extended as an example when the sinner is honored out of reverence." From these words it can be inferred that no one in the Church does more harm than one who, teaching perversely, has the name of Pope, because his pestilential doctrine is greatly spread if a heretic is honored out of reverence for the supreme pontiff.
Quod autem publice potestates punire debeant apostasiam ab ordine in clerico post trinam admonitionem, que est minus periculosa et minus nociva quam crimen heretice pravitatis in papa, patet aperte, eo quod Extra, De sententia excommunicationis c. In audientia, sic legitur: "Huiusmodi clerici, si a prelatis suis commoniti, militaria noluerint arma deponere, de privilegio clericorum subsidium aliquod habere non debent." Ergo multo fortius, si papa a fide catholica apostataverit, pravitatem hereticam incurrendo et docendo, si prelati ecclesie eum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, compesci debet per publicas potestates. | But that the public powers should punish apostasy from order in a cleric after a threefold admonition, which is less dangerous and less harmful than the crime of heretical depravity in a pope, is clearly evident, because Extra, De sententia excommunicationis c. In audientia, reads thus: "Such clerics, if, admonished by their prelates the third time, refuse to lay down their military arms, should not have any support from the privilege of clerics." Therefore, much more strongly, if a pope has apostatised from the Catholic faith by incurring and teaching heretical wickedness, if the prelates of the Church are unwilling or unable to coerce him, he must be restrained by the public powers.
Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur falsum accipere, cum innuit quod peccatum levius aliquotiens gravius vindicatur, et quod peccatum periculosius est gravius puniendum. Utrumque enim istorum scripturis auctenticis repugnare videtur. Ait enim Hieronimus, ut legitur 24 q. 1 c. Non afferamus: "Quis iam dubitaverit, hoc esse sceleratius commissum, quod est gravius vindicatum." Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod gravius peccatum gravius vindicatur. Quod etiam secundum, scilicet quod peccatum magis nocivum debet gravius vindicari, scripture divine repugnat, patet. Nam furtum est peccatum magis nocivum communitati quam adulterium, et tamen adulterium pena capitis puniebatur, non autem furtum. | Student: This argument seems assume falsity, since it implies [a] that a lesser sin is sometimes punished more severely, and [b] that a more dangerous sin must be punished more severely. For both of these seem to be at odds with authoritative writings. For Jerome says, as we read in 24 q. 1 c. Non afferamus: "Who now doubts that something is committed more wickedly if it is punished more severely." From these words it is clearly seen that a more serious sin is punished more severely. It is clear also that the second, namely that a more harmful sin should be punished more severely, is at odds with divine scripture. For theft is a sin more harmful to the community than adultery, and yet adultery was punished with capital punishment, but not theft.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod regulare est illud quod est sceleratius commissum esse gravius vindicandum. Fallit tamen in casu, secundum quod notat glossa q. 1 c. Cito, nam interfector proprie uxoris gravius punitur quam matricida (33 q. 2 c. Admonere). In multis etiam aliis casibus fallere invenitur. Ad secundum autem dicitur quod accidit furto quod sit magis nocivum communitati quam adulterium, quia aliquando est magis nocivum et aliquando est minus nocivum, et ideo aliquando et in aliquibus regionibus gravius vindicatur et quandoque minus punitur. Sed crimen heresis in papa est periculosissimum. Ideo contra crimen heresis in papa semper est vigilantissime occurrendum, et ideo nullum crimen clericorum minus heresi in nullo casu magis debet spectare ad laicos quam crimen heresis in papa, quando clerici nolunt vel non possunt papam hereticum cohercere. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that, as a rule, what is committed more wickedly must be punished more severely. However, the rule fails on occasion, as the gloss on q. 1 c. Cito, notes, for the murderer of his own wife is punished more severely than the matricide (33 q. 2 c. Admonere). In many other cases it is also found to fail. To the second it is said that it is per accidens that theft is more harmful to the community than adultery, because sometimes it is more harmful, and sometimes it is less harmful, and therefore sometimes and in some regions it is more severely punished and sometimes punished less. But the crime of heresy in a pope is the most dangerous. Therefore the crime of heresy in the pope must always be met with the greatest vigilance, and therefore no crime of clerics less than heresy should in any case concern the laity more than the crime of heresy in a pope, when clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce a heretic pope.
Secunda ratio est hec. Qui ecclesiam Dei a Deo suscipiunt defendendam, nec propter clericorum impotentiam, nec propter eorum malitiam, nec propter eorum negligentiam, nec propter eorum ignorantiam debent circa defensionem ecclesie negligentes existere vel remissi. Principes autem seculi a Deo suscipiunt ecclesiam defendendam, teste Isidoro qui, ut legitur 23 q. 5 c. Principes, ait: "Cognoscant principes seculi Deo se debere esse rationem reddituros propter ecclesiam, quam a Christo tuendam suscipiunt. Nam sive augeatur pax et disciplina ecclesie per fideles principes, sive solvatur, ille ab eis rationem exigit, qui eorum potestati suam ecclesiam tradidit committendum." Ergo principes seculi, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate sive per impotentiam, sive per malitiam, sive per negligentiam, sive per ignorantiam, defensionem ecclesie negligere minime debent. Non autem defendunt ecclesiam nisi papam hereticum cupientem fidem et unitatem ecclesie dissipare a conatu maligno curaverint prohibere. Ergo, deficiente ecclesiastica potestate aliquo predictorum modorum, principes seculi papam hereticum, ne fidem corrumpat ecclesie, prohibere tenentur. | A second argument is this. Those who receive from God the defence of God's Church should not be negligent or remiss in defending the Church, either because of the powerlessness of the clerics, or because of their malice, or because of their negligence, or because of their ignorance. But the secular rulers receive from God the defence of the Church, as Isidore testifies, who, as we read in 23 q. 5 c. Principes, says: "Let the rulers of the world know that they must render an account to God for the sake of the Church, the protection of which they receive from Christ. For whether the peace and discipline of the Church are increased by faithful rulers, or are dissolved, He demands an account from them, who has entrusted His Church to their power." Therefore, secular rulers, when ecclesiastical power is deficient, whether through impotence, malice, negligence, or ignorance, must not neglect the defense of the Church. But they do not defend the Church if they have not taken care to restrain from his malignant attempt a heretic Pope who desires to destroy the faith and unity of the Church. Therefore, when ecclesiastical power is deficient in any of the aforementioned ways, the secular rulers are bound to prevent a heretic Pope from corrupting the faith of the Church.
Tertia ratio est hec. Non minorem potestatem habent laici super papam hereticum sedem apostolicam occupantem inique quam super papam intrusum sedem apostolicam invadentem, nam et uterque sedem apostolicam occupat iniuste. Sed papa hereticus, ultra occupationem sedis indignam, Catholicos trahere nititur ad hereticam pravitatem, ad quod non conatur papa intrusus. Laici autem habent potestatem papam intrusum de apostolica sede pellendi, teste Nicholao papa qui, ut legitur dist. 79 c. Si quis pecunia, ait: "Si quis pecunia vel gratia humana, aut populari seu tumultu militari, sine canonica et concordi electione cardinalium, et sequentium religiosorum clericorum fuerit apostolice sedi intronizatus, non apostolicus sed apostaticus habeatur, liceatque cardinalibus et aliis clericis timentibus Deum et laicis invasorem illum anathematizare et humano auxilio a sede apostolica pellere." Ergo multo magis laici potestatem habent pellendi a sede apostolica papam hereticum eandem sedem occupantem indignius, quam si solummodo absque heretica pravitate esset sedis invasor, presertim si prelati ecclesie noluerint vel non potuerint papam hereticum debite cohercere. | A third argument is this. The laity have no less power over a heretic pope who occupies the Apostolic See unjustly than over an intruding pope invading the Apostolic See, for both occupy the Apostolic See unjustly. But a heretic pope, beyond the unworthy occupation of the see, strives to draw Catholics to heretical depravity, which the intruding pope does not attempt. But the laity have the power to expel an intruding pope from the Apostolic See, as Pope Nicholas testifies who says, as we read in dist. 79 c. Si quis pecunia: "If anyone is enthroned in the Apostolic See by money or human grace, or by popular or military commotion, without the canonical and concordant election of the cardinals and the following religious clerics, he shall be considered not apostolic but apostate, and it shall be lawful for the cardinals and other clerics who fear God and the laity to anathematise that invader and to expel him from the Apostolic See with human help." Therefore, much more, the laity have power to expel from the Apostolic See a heretic pope occupying that See more unworthily than if he were only an invader of the See without heretical depravity, especially if the prelates of the Church are unwilling or unable to duly coerce the heretic pope.
Quarta ratio est hec. Teste Gregorio decimo in generali concilio Lugdunensi, ut habetur Extra, De electione et electi potestate c. Ubi periculum, libro sexto: "Ubi periculum maius intenditur, ibi procul dubio est plenius consulendum." Sed maius periculum imminet Christianitati si papa fuerit pravitate heretica maculatus et clerici ipsum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, quam si sacerdos enormitatibus se miscuerit. Sacerdos autem se enormitatibus immiscendo potest licite per principes seculi coherceri, Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Perpendimus, ubi sic dicitur: "Perpendimus ex litteris tuis, quod quidam sacerdos tue diocesis pro eo, quod se filium regis falso nominare presumpsit, et, armis acceptis seditionem fecit et guerram, a dilecto filio A. B. comite per vicos iussus est fustigari; qui postea eius traditus mandato patibulo expiravit. Quia igitur tam ipsum comitem quam alios huius facti participes velle super hoc satisfacere intimasti, presenti pagina Fraternitati tue duximus respondendum, quod, si memoratus sacerdos tali modo excessit, et arma ferens non propulsando, sed inferendo iniuriam fuit occisus, non videtur nobis, quod interfectores eius propter hoc ad optinendam absolutionem apostolicam sedem adire cogantur." Ubi dicit glossa quod "Clericus immiscendo se enormitatibus ammittit privilegium." Ergo multo magis, si papa est hereticus et clerici ipsum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, est per principes seculi comprimendus. | A fourth argument is this. As Gregory X testifies, in the general council of Lyons, Extra, Lib.VI, De electione et electi potestate c. Ubi periculum: "Where greater danger threatens, there doubtless fuller consultation is necessary." But a greater danger threatens Christianity if the pope is stained with heretical wickedness and the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him, than if a priest involves himself in enormities. But a priest can be coerced by secular rulers for mixing himself in enormities, Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Perpendimus, where it is said: "We have considered from your letters that a certain priest of your diocese, for having presumed to call himself falsely the son of the king, and, having taken up arms, made sedition and war, was ordered to be flogged through the villages by our beloved son Count A. B., and by his command was afterwards delivered up and expired on the gallows. Therefore, since you have intimated that both the Count himself and the other participants in this deed wish to make satisfaction for this, we have decided to reply to your Fraternity in this present page that, if the aforementioned priest went astray in such a way and was killed while carrying arms, not repelling but inflicting injury, it does not seem to us that his killers should for this reason be compelled to approach the Apostolic See to obtain absolution." Here the gloss says that "A cleric loses his privilege by involving himself in enormities." Therefore, much more, if a pope is a heretic and the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him, he must be restrained by secular rulers.
Quinta ratio est hec. Publice utilitatis interest ne crimina remaneant impunita (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Ut fame). Quod potissime de illis criminibus debet intelligi que in dispendium salutis omnium vergere dinoscuntur. Crimen autem heresis in papa precipue noscitur vergere in dispendium omnium Christianorum, cum fides catholica quam papa hereticus satagit extirpare sit fundamentum totius salutis omnium Christianorum. Ergo crimen heresis in papa impunitum debet nullatenus remanere, et per consequens, si clerici non potuerint vel noluerint papam hereticum cohercere, per fideles laicos comprimi debent. | A fifth argument is this. It is in the public interest that crimes should not remain unpunished (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Ut fame). This should be understood most of all of crimes known to tend to the detriment of the salvation of all. Now the crime of heresy in a pope is known to tend especially to the detriment of all Christians, since the Catholic faith, which the heretic pope is striving to eradicate, is the foundation of the entire salvation of all Christians. Therefore the crime of heresy in a pope should by no means remain unpunished, and consequently, if the clerics are unable or unwilling to coerce the heretic pope, they should [*debent > debet] be subdued by faithful laymen.
Sexta ratio est hec. Sicut secundum canonicas sanctiones potius consideranda est causa facti quam ipsum factum, ita in legibus statuendis, interpretandis et intelligendis causa statuendi considerari debet, teste Isidoro qui, sicut allegatum est superius, dist. 29 c. primo ait: "Sciendum est quod pleraque capitula ex causa, ex persona, ex loco, ex tempore consideranda sunt." In pluribus autem decretis generalium conciliorum et summorum pontificum cautum habetur, quod domini temporales terras sibi subiectas ab heretica pravitate studeant expurgare (Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam et c. Excommunicamus). Talia vero statuta non sunt in favorem alicuius persone, sed in favorem et defensionem ac salvationem fidei catholice ordinata. Ergo quandocunque imminet periculum fidei orthodoxe, domini temporales, sive requirantur per prelatos sive non requirantur, terras suas purgare tenentur de heretica pravitate. Ex quo patenter infertur quod, si clerici noluerint vel non potuerint papam hereticum cohercere, principes seculares et laici in favorem et salvationem fidei christiane papam hereticum debent cohercere. | A sixth argument is this. Just as according to canon laws the cause of the deed must be considered rather than the deed itself, so in enacting, interpreting and understanding laws the cause of enacting must be considered, as Isidore testifies. As was quoted above, dist.29 c. 1, he says: "It should be known that most canons must be considered from cause, from person, from place, from time." In many decrees of general councils and supreme pontiffs it is provided that temporal lords should strive to purge the lands subject to them of heretical corruption (Extra, De hereticis, c. Ad abolendam et c. Excommunicamus). Such statutes are not in favour of any person, but in favour, defense, and salvation of the Catholic faith. Therefore, whenever danger threatens the orthodox faith, temporal lords, whether called upon by prelates or not, are bound to purge their lands of heretical corruption. From this it is clearly inferred that, if the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce a heretic pope, secular rulers and laymen must coerce the heretic pope in favour and salvation of the Christian faith.
Confirmatur hec ratio, quia posita causa ponitur effectus, et ubi est eadem ratio debet esse idem ius. Sed causa et ratio quare principes seculi et publice potestates, cum fuerint requisiti a prelatis ecclesie, debent terras suas de heretica pravitate purgare, est ne fides periclitetur ecclesie. Sed si papa fuerit hereticus et clerici ipsum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, periclitabitur fides ecclesie nisi papa hereticus prohibitus fuerit alios heretica inficere pravitate per potentiam laicalem. Ergo in hoc casu, cum clerici noluerint vel non potuerint papam hereticum cohercere, ipsum comprimere debet potentia laicalis. | This argument is confirmed, because if the cause is given, the effect is given, and where there is the same reason, there must be the same right. But the cause and reason why secular rulers and public powers, when called upon by the prelates of the Church, must cleanse their lands of heretical wickedness is so that the faith of the Church may not be endangered. But if the pope is a heretic and the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him, the faith of the Church will be endangered unless the heretic pope is prevented by lay power from infecting others with heretical wickedness. Therefore in this case, when the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce the heretic pope, lay power must control him.
Septima ratio est hec. Magis defendenda est fides catholica, si eiusdem fidei periculum immineat, quam propria persona. Hoc patet, quia Catholici in multis casibus pro defensione fidei orthodoxe proprias personas tenentur morti exponere. Sed laicis catholicis licet clericos attemptantes eos occidere potenter repellere, et detinere eosdem, si alio modo eorum violentiam non possunt evadere, quia licitum est vim vi repellere (dist. 1 c. Ius naturale). Ergo multo magis, si papa hereticus fidem conatur subvertere, et clerici ipsum nolunt vel non possunt comprimere, est per laicos reprimendus, ac in firma custodia detinendus, si aliter nequit a sua insania prohiberi. | A seventh argument is this. If it is in danger, the Catholic faith must be defended more than one's own person. This is clear, because in many cases Catholics are obliged to expose their own persons to death for the defense of the orthodox faith. But lay Catholics are permitted to repel with force clerics who attempt to kill them, and to detain them [i.e. the clerics], if they cannot otherwise escape their violence, because it is permissible to repel force with force (dist. 1 c. Ius naturale). Therefore, much more, if a heretic pope attempts to subvert the faith and the clerics are unwilling or unable to suppress him, he must be controlled by the laity and detained in firm custody, if he cannot otherwise be prevented from his madness.
Octava ratio est hec. Sicut iuxta promissionem Salvatoris fides catholica usque ad consummationem seculi permanebit, ita in ecclesia Dei potestas de iure cohercendi hereticos usque ad finem seculi remanebit. Sed si papa cum omnibus clericis esset hereticus, potestas cohercendi de iure hereticos non esset in papa et clericis, quia illi omni potestati spirituali essent privati. Ego in hoc casu potestas cohercendi hereticos de iure esset ad laicos devoluta, et ita laici in hoc casu de iure haberent potestatem cohercendi papam hereticum et cunctos clericos sibi credentes. | An eighth argument is this. Just as, according to the Saviour's promise, the Catholic faith will remain until the end of the age, so in the Church of God the power de iure to coerce heretics will remain until the end of the age. But if the pope, along with all the clerics, were a heretic, the power de iure to coerce heretics would not be in the pope and the clerics, because they would be deprived of all spiritual power. In this case, the power de iure to coerce heretics would devolve to the laity, and thus the laity in this case would have de iure the power to coerce the heretic pope and all the clerics believing in him.
Nona ratio est hec. Principes seculares et laici arcius astringuntur fidem defendere orthodoxam quam propriam patriam. Hoc probatione non eget. Sed principes seculares propriam patriam, cum periculum imminet, tenentur defendere. Ergo multo magis, cum periculum fidei imminet propter impotentiam, vel malitiam, aut dampnabilem negligentiam vel ignorantiam clericorum ex perfidia et potentia pape heretici fidem subvertere molientes, principes seculares et laici, quamvis non fuerint per clericos requisiti, sibi debent resistere viriliter et potenter, et a sua vesania prohibere. | A ninth argument is this. Secular and lay rulers are more strictly bound to defend the orthodox faith than to defend their own country. This does not require proof. But secular rulers are bound to defend their own country when danger threatens. Therefore, much more, when danger to the faith threatens because of the impotence, or malice, or the blameworthy negligence or ignorance of clerics who, through the treachery and power of a heretic pope, are trying to subvert the faith, secular and lay rulers, although they have not been called upon by the clerics, must resist manfully and powerfully and prevent them from their madness.
Decima ratio est hec. Qui debitor est ut catholicam veritatem defendat, debitor est ut potenter resistat veritatem catholicam impugnanti. Laicus autem debitor est ut catholicam veritatem sibi notam defendat. Ergo debitor est ut resistat viriliter et potenter veritatem catholicam impugnanti, et per consequens laici, licet fuerint per clericos nullatenus requisiti, si ipsi clerici papam hereticum noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, debent ipsum comprimere. Maior patet aperte, quia secundum Innocentem, ut habetur dist. 83 c. Error: "Veritas cum minime defensatur, opprimitur. Negligere quippe, cum possis perturbare perversos, nichil est aliud quam fovere. Nec caret scrupulo societatis occulte, qui manifesto facinori desinit obviare." Et per consequens qui debent veritatem defendere debent impugnanti veritatem pro viribus obviare. Minor probatur auctoritate Iohannis Chrysostomi qui, ut legitur 11 q. 3 c. Nolite, ait, sicut superius allegatum extitit: "Nam sicut sacerdos debitor est, ut veritatem quam audivit a Deo, libere predicet, sic laicus debitor est, ut veritatem quam audivit a sacerdotibus probatam quidem in scripturis, defendat fiducialiter. Quod si non fecerit, prodidit veritatem." Ex quibus verbis patet aperte quod laicus debitor est ut defendat catholicam veritatem. | A tenth argument is this. Anyone who ought to defend Catholic truth ought to powerfully resist anyone who attacks Catholic truth. But the layman ought to defend the Catholic truth known to him. Therefore, he ought to manfully and powerfully resist anyone who attacks Catholic truth, and consequently laymen, though they have been in no way called on by clerics, should control the heretic pope if the clerics themselves are unwilling or unable to coerce him. The major is clear, because according to Innocent, as is stated in dist. 83 c. Error: "Truth not defended is oppressed; for to neglect to disturb the perverse when you can do so, is simply to foster. And whoever ceases to resist a manifest crime is not free from suspicion of secret confederacy." And consequently, those who ought to defend truth must oppose anyone who attacks the truth to the best of their ability. The minor is proved by a text of John Chrysostom who, as is read in 11 q. 3 c. Nolite, he says, as was quoted above: "Just as a priest ought to freely preach the truth he has heard from God, so a layman ought to defend faithfully the truth he has heard from priests, which is indeed proved in the scriptures. But if he does not do so, he has betrayed the truth." From these words it is clear that a layman ought to defend Catholic truth.
Discipulus: Ista ratio non probat quod laicus sit debitor ut defendat veritatem, nisi fuerit a sacerdotibus requisitus. Quod innuit Chrysostomus cum dicit laicus debitor est, ut veritatem, quam audivit a sacerdotibus probatam quidem in scripturis, defendat. Ergo solummodo debet veritatem defendere quando sacerdotes probant sibi veritatem per scripturas et ipsum, ut defendat, requirunt. | Student: This argument does not prove that a layman ought to defend the truth unless he has been called upon by priests. Chrysostom hints at this when he says a layman ought to defend faithfully the truth he has heard from priests, which is indeed proved in the scriptures. Therefore he must defend the truth only when the priests prove the truth to him through the scriptures and call on him to defend it.
Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod frivola est ista instantia seu responsio, tum quia, si laicus debitor est ut defendat veritatem quam audivit a sacerdotibus, multo fortius debitor est ut defendat veritatem quam legit in scripturis sacris, tum quia laicus potuit audire veritatem a sacerdotibus ante omnem impugnationem veritatis, igitur, etiam mortuis illis sacerdotibus, laicus debitor est ut veritatem quam audivit ab eis in scripturis quidem probatam defendat. Ad defendendum enim veritatem non debet movere laicum auctoritas sacerdotum, sed veritas et auctoritas scripturarum, et ita debet veritatem defendere quamvis minime a sacerdotibus requiratur. | Master: To some it seems that this objection or response is frivolous. First, because, if the layman is obliged to defend the truth he has heard from the priests, much more is he obliged to defend the truth he reads in the sacred scriptures. And second, because the layman was able to hear the truth from the priests before any attack on the truth, therefore, even after those priests are dead, the layman is obliged to defend the truth he has heard from them, which is indeed proved in the scriptures; for to defend the truth, the layman should not be moved by the authority of the priests, but by the truth and authority of the scriptures, and so he should defend the truth even though he is not called on by the priests at all.
Discipulus: Alias rationes ad assertionam predictam adducas. | Student: Bring forward other arguments for the aforementioned assertion.
Magister: Undecima ratio est hec. Ad illos spectat papam hereticum cohercere qui ipsum minime cohercendo a scelere nullatenus sunt immunes. Sed laici non sunt immunes a scelere si papam hereticum, cum clerici noluerint vel non potuerint, non cohercent. Ergo in hoc casu debent papam hereticum cohercere. Maior probatione non indiget. Minor probatur sic. Qui habent auctoritatem cohercendi summos sacerdotes occisores Christi, habent etiam auctoritatem cohercendi hereticos negantes fidem Christi. Populus autem habuit auctoritatem cohercendi summos sacerdotes occisores Christi, quia aliter non cohercendo a scelere fuissent immunes, cuius contrarium dicit Augustinus Psalmo 80, et ponitur 23 q. 3 c. ultimo, qui ait: "Ostendit Propheta nec illos immunes a scelere esse, qui permiserunt principibus Christum interficere, cum pro multitudine timerentur, et possent illos a facto, et se a consensu liberare. Qui desinit obviare, cum potest, consentit." Ergo consimiliter populus habet auctoritatem cohercendi papam hereticum et alios hereticos fidem catholicam destruentes si clerici eos noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere, nec est immunis a scelere si permittit pape heretico fidem corrumpere orthodoxam. | Master: An eleventh argument is this. It pertains to those to coerce a heretic pope who, by not coercing him, are in no way immune from crime. But laymen are not immune from crime if they do not coerce a heretic pope when clerics are unwilling or unable to do so. Therefore, in this case they should coerce a heretic pope. The major does not need proof. The minor is proved thus. Those who have the authority to coerce the high priests who killed Christ also have the authority to coerce heretics who deny the faith of Christ. But the people had the authority to coerce the high priests who killed Christ, because otherwise when they did not coerce they would have been immune from crime, the opposite of which is stated by Augustine on Psalm 80, quoted in 23 q. 3 c. ult. He says: "The Prophet shows that those are not immune from crime who allowed the rulers to kill Christ, when they were afraid of the multitude, and they were able to free them [i.e. the multitude] from the deed, and themselves from consent. He who ceases to oppose when he can do so, consents." Therefore similarly the people have the authority to coerce a heretic pope and other heretics who destroy the Catholic faith if the clerics are unwilling or unable to do so, nor is it [i.e. the people] immune from crime if it allows the heretic pope to corrupt the orthodox faith.
Duodecima ratio est hec. Non minus tenentur principes seculi fidem catholicam contra papam hereticum defensare quam teneantur socii socios et infirmos contra latrones defensare. Sed socii tenentur socios et infirmos contra latrones defensare, teste Ambrosio qui, ut legitur 23 q. 3 c. Fortitudo, ait: "Fortitudo, que bello tuetur a barbaris patriam, vel domi defendit infirmos, vel a latronibus socios, plena iustitia est." Ergo multo magis, principes fidem catholicam contra papam hereticum quem nolunt vel non possunt clerici comprimere, tenentur cohercere. | A twelfth argument is this. Secular rulers are no less bound to defend the Catholic faith against a heretic pope than allies are bound to defend their allies and the weak against robbers. But allies are bound to defend their allies and the weak against robbers, as Ambrose testifies, who, as we read in 23 q. 3 c. Fortitudo, says: "Fortitude, which in war protects the country from barbarians, or at home defends the weak or allies from robbers, is full justice." Therefore, much more, rulers are bound to enforce the Catholic faith against a heretic pope whom clerics are unwilling or unable to control.
Tertiadecima ratio est hec. Qui alium tanquam excommunicatum vitare tenentur, ipsum a se in firma custodia sequestrare debent, si aliter eius communionem vitare non possunt. Sed principes seculares et laici scientes papam esse hereticum ipsum tanquam excommunicatum vitare tenentur, quia omnis hereticus sententia excommunicationis involvitur. Ergo principes seculares et laici scientes papam esse hereticum, ipsum a se sub firma custodia sequestrare tenentur, si eius communionem aliter vitare non possunt, quantumcunque non fuerunt a clericis requisiti. | A thirteenth argument is this. Those who are bound to avoid another as being excommunicated must sequester him from themselves in firm custody, if they cannot otherwise avoid his communion. But secular and lay rulers who know that the pope is a heretic are bound to avoid him as being excommunicated, because every heretic is subject to the sentence of excommunication. Therefore secular and lay rulers who know that the pope is a heretic are bound to sequester him from themselves in firm custody, if they cannot otherwise avoid his communion, however much they have not been called upon by clerics.
Capitulum 100 | Chapter 100
Discipulus: De istis rationibus post completionem operis huius collationem habebo. Nunc autem peto ut indices quomodo ad rationes in contrarium respondere contingat, et primo dic ad que allegantur supra capitulo 98. | Student: I will have a discussion about these arguments after the completion of this work. Now, however, I ask you to indicate how it is possible to answer the arguments to the contrary, and first tell me what is said to what is argued above in chapter 98.
Magister: Ad illa unico verbo respondetur, quod auctoritates ibidem adducte sunt pure affirmative et ideo ex his ista negativa heretici non sunt puniendi per laicos nisi fuerint a prelatis ecclesie requisiti inferri non potest. | Master: The answer made to that is in one word, that the authorities cited there are purely affirmative, and therefore from them the negative heretics are not to be punished by laymen unless they have been called upon by the prelates of the Church cannot be inferred.
Discipulus: Ista est brevis responsio, de qua tecum alias conferam diligenter. Ideo ostende quomodo respondetur ad allegationes supra capitulo 91 adductas. | Student: That is a brief answer, about which I will at another time discuss with you carefully. Therefore, show how the arguments brought forward above in chapter 91 are answered.
Magister: Ad primam illarum respondetur quod papa hereticus in casu prescripto, quando scilicet clerici nollent vel non possent eum corrigere, est de foro iudicis secularis quantum ad hoc quod potest ipsum in firma custodia detinere et prohibere ne in alios virus pravitatis heretice effundat. Potest etiam de ipso inquirere, ipsumque examinare sollicite et audire, sed non potest ipsum degradare, neque diffinitivam contra ipsum proferre sententiam, et in hoc defferetur futuris prelatis catholicis zelum Dei et fidei catholice habituris, quia, secundum nonnullos, degradatio pape heretici et prolatio sententie diffinitive contra ipsum essent prelatis ecclesie quibus Deus spiritum rectum infunderet reservande. | Master: The answer made to the first of these is that a heretic pope in the specified case, namely when the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct him, is within the jurisdiction of a secular judge insofar as he can detain him in firm custody and prevent him from spreading the poison of heresy to others. He can also inquire about him, examine him carefully and listen. But he cannot degrade him, nor pronounce a definitive sentence against him, and this will be deferred to future Catholic prelates having zeal for God and the Catholic faith, because, according to some, the degradation of a heretic pope and the pronouncement of a definitive sentence against him should be reserved for the prelates of the Church to whom God would infuse the right spirit.
Cum vero accipitur quod clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis, respondetur quod hoc fallit in multis casibus (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis c. Cum non ab homine, et c. Perpendimus, et Extra, De apostatis et reiterantibus baptisma c. 1, et Extra, De vita et honestate clericorum c. ultimo). Unde, sicut allegatum est prius, glossa 23 q. 5 c. Principes plures casus notat in quibus laici iurisdictionem habent super clericos, inter quos unus est cum clerici fidem volunt subvertere. Si autem aliquis clericus cupiens fidem subvertere ad forum pertinet iudicis secularis, potissime papa hereticus quem clerici nolunt vel non possunt corrigere ad forum spectabit iudicis secularis. Quia, si periculis minoribus oportet ocurrere, multo fortius necesse est maioribus periculis obviare, ut colligi potest ex verbis Gregorii decimi in generali concilio Lugdunensi (Extra, De electione et electi potestate c. Ubi periculum, libro sexto). Sed minus periculum immineret fidei si clerici inferiores fuerint pravitate heretica irretiti quam si papa conatus fuerit totam ecclesiam labe heretica maculare. Ergo, si quicunque clerici inferiores in quocunque casu spectant ad forum iudicis secularis, potissime debent iudices seculares et laici resistere pape heretico quando eum clerici nolunt vel non possunt cohercere. | But when it is taken as premise that clerics are not of the forum of the secular judge, it is answered that this is false in many cases (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis c. Cum non ab homine, c. Perpendimus, Extra, De apostatis et reiterantibus baptisma c. 1, and Extra, De vita et honestate clericorum c. ult.). Hence, as has been alleged before, the gloss on 23 q. 5 c. Principes notes several cases in which laymen have jurisdiction over clerics. One is when clerics wish to subvert the faith. But if any cleric who desires to subvert the faith belongs to the forum of the secular judge, most of all a heretic pope whom the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct will pertain to the forum of the secular judge. For, if it is necessary to oppose lesser dangers, it is much more necessary to avoid greater dangers, as can be gathered from the words of Gregory X in the general council of Lyons (Extra, De electione et electi potestate c. Ubi periculum, lib. VI). But less danger would threaten the faith if the inferior clerics were ensnared by heretical wickedness than if a pope attempted to stain the whole Church with heretical taint. Therefore, if any inferior clerics in any case belong to the forum of the secular judge, most of all secular judges and laymen should resist a heretic pope when the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him.
Discipulus: Per istam rationem laici in hoc casu possent papam hereticum neci tradere corporali, quia in nonnullis casibus laici clericos hereticos licite possunt occidere. | Student: By this argument, the laity in this case could hand over the heretic pope to corporal death, because in some cases the laity can lawfully kill heretic clerics.
Magister: Respondetur quod in omnibus causa est consideranda. Causa autem quare clerici heretici in nonnullis casibus fiunt de foro iudicis secularis est ut ad terrorem aliorum debite comprimantur. Similiter causa quare papa hereticus, quem clerici nolunt vel non possunt corrigere, est per laicos comprimendus, est ne fides catholica per papam hereticum comprimatur. Et ideo, ubi fides salvaretur catholica per solam detentionem vel captivationem pape heretici, laici ad aliam penam procedere non deberent. Ubi autem, papa hereticus in sola captivitate detento, periculum fidei probabiliter timeretur et per eius mortem fides salvaretur, ad necem corporalem pape heretici possent procedere laici ex zelo fidei orthodoxe. | Master: The answer made is that in all matters the reason must be considered. Now the reason why heretic clerics in some cases are brought before the secular judge is that they may be duly controlled, to deter others. Similarly, the reason why a heretic pope whom the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct must be controlled by the laity is that the Catholic faith may not be suppressed by the heretic pope. And therefore, where the Catholic faith would be saved by the mere detention or captivity of the heretic pope, the laity should not proceed to any other punishment. But where, if the heretic pope were held in captivity alone, the danger to the faith was feared with probability and the faith would be saved by his death, the laity could proceed to corporal death for the heretic pope out of zeal for the orthodox faith.
Discipulus: Licet sepe reperiatur cautum in iure quod clerici non spectant ad forum iudicis secularis, tamen in multis casibus hoc fallit, quia per conditores legum quibus cavetur quod clerici non pertinent ad forum iudicis secularis plures casus excipiuntur, inter quos non invenitur casus de papa heretico, quia de illo casu in iure nunquam fit mentio. Ergo casus de papa heretico non debet inter casus alios computari, et ita papa hereticus nunquam spectabit ad forum iudicis secularis nisi per prelatos ecclesie fuerit traditus curie seculari. | Student: Although it is often found in law that clerics do not belong to the forum of a secular judge, yet in many cases this is false, because the framers of laws that provide that clerics do not belong to the forum of a secular judge make many exceptions, which do not include the case of a heretic pope, because that case is never mentioned in the law. Therefore the case of a heretic pope should not be counted among the other cases, and thus a heretic pope will never belong to the forum of a secular judge unless he has been delivered to the secular court by the prelates of the Church.
Confirmatur hec ratio, quia eius est interpretari legem cuius est condere. Cum ergo conditor legum quibus cavetur quod clerici non spectant ad forum iudicis secularis nunquam dictas leges taliter interpretetur ut casum de papa heretico excipiat, in nullo casu papa hereticus spectabit ad forum iudicis secularis nisi in quo, secundum exceptiones sacrarum canonum, aliquando clerici heretici fiunt de foro iudicis secularis, quin scilicet primo fuerint degradati et postea traditi curie seculari (Extra, De hereticis c. Ad abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus). Ergo consimiliter papa hereticus non spectabit ad forum iudicis secularis nisi antea fuerit degradatus et curie traditus seculari. | This argument is confirmed, because it is for the lawmaker to interpret the law. Since, therefore, the author of the laws which provide that clerics do not come before the forum of a secular judge never interprets the said laws so as to exclude the case of a heretic pope, in no case will a heretic pope belong to the forum of a secular judge, except in a case in which, according to the exceptions of the sacred canons, heretic clerics sometimes come to belong to the forum of a secular judge, namely, when they have first been degraded and afterwards delivered to the secular court (Extra, De hereticis c. Ad abolendam, and c. Excommunicamus). Therefore, similarly, a heretic pope will not belong to the forum of a secular judge unless he has previously been degraded and delivered to the secular court.
Magister: Respondetur quod non illius solius est interpretari legem cuius est condere, quod glossa (Extra, De postulatione prelatorum c. 1) insinuat manifeste. Nam diversas interpretationes legis enumerans, quarum prima est principis, legis videlicet conditoris, alia consuetudinis, alia iudicis, subiungit: "Alia est que nec generalis nec necessaria, nec redigenda in scriptis, ut magistrorum." Ex quibus verbis habetur quod non solius condentis legem est interpretari eandem. Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod interpretatio legis non videtur esse nisi quedam declaratio intellectus legis seu expositio aut apertio. Unde tunc solum videtur necessaria interpretatio legis quando ignoratur intellectus legis. Ex tribus autem causis potest ignorari intellectus legis. | Master: The answer made is that it is not for the lawmaker alone to interpret the law, as the gloss (Extra, De postulatione prelatorum c. 1) clearly suggests. For enumerating the diverse interpretations of the law, the first of which is that of the ruler, i.e. the creator of the law, another of custom, another of a judge, it adds: "Another is that which is neither general nor necessary, nor to be written down in writings, as of the masters." From these words it is established that it is not for the creator of the law alone to interpret it. To make this clear it is said that it should be known that the interpretation of a law seems to be nothing but a declaration of the understanding of the law, or its exposition or opening. Hence the interpretation of the law only seems necessary when the understanding of the law is unknown. Now the understanding of a law can be unknown for three reasons.
Quandoque enim verba legis propter aliqua verba equivoca vel multiplicia in ipsa contenta possunt habere diversos sensus, quorum nullus repugnat neque iuri divino, neque iuri naturali, neque iuri positivo minime abrogato, et in hoc casu interpretatio legis solummodo spectat ad conditorem legis vel superiorem qui eandem legem condere posset, quia, sicut aliorum non est condere legem ambiguam, sic non est aliorum condere legem eandem sub determinato sensu, et per consequens non est aliorum asserere talem sub tali sensu debere intelligi. | For sometimes, because of some equivocal or multiple words contained in them, the words of the law can have different meanings, none of which is repugnant to divine law, to natural law, or to a positive law that has not been abrogated; and in this case the interpretation of the law pertains only to the creator of the law, or to a superior who could establish the same law, because, just as it is not for others to make the ambiguous law, so it is not for others to make that law under a determined sense, and consequently it is not for others to assert that such a law should be understood under such a sense. [Note: Positive law is law that has been "laid down" by some legislator, in contrast to Natural Law, which exists by nature. Ki]
Quandoque autem ignoratur ultimus intellectus legis propter ignorantiam iurium positivorum: quando, scilicet, nesciuntur exceptiones legis qui ex iure positivo dependent, et ideo necesse est declarare et exponere sive interpretari quomodo lex debet intelligi. Et talis interpretatio seu expositio sive declaratio intellectus legis spectat ad consuetudinem, que est optima legum interpres, et ad iudicem cuius est legum et consuetudinum habere peritiam, et ad magistros, hoc est in iure peritos, ad quos spectat notitiam legum habere. | Sometimes, however, the ultimate understanding of the law is unknown because of ignorance of the positive laws, that is, when exceptions to the law that depend on positive law are not known, and therefore it is necessary to declare and expound or interpret how the law should be understood. And such an interpretation or exposition or declaration of the understanding of the law pertains to custom, which is the best interpreter of the laws, and to the judge whose duty it is to have expertise in laws and customs, and to the masters, that is, experts in law, to whom it pertains to have knowledge of the laws.
Interdum autem ignoratur intellectus legum propter ignorantiam iuris divini vel iuris naturalis, sive rationis naturalis, aut etiam rationis accepte simul ex iure divino et naturali dictamine rationis.Verbi gratia, ut habetur Extra, De sponsalibus c. Veniens, papa mandat, statuendo legem, quod si quis invenitur cognovisse mulierem cui fidem dedit de matrimonio contrahendo, remanere debet cum eadem. Si quis autem attendat verba legis et nescierit ius divinum quo conceditur quod licet causa fornicationis uxorem dimittere, ultimum intellectum legis predicte nequaquam habebit. | Sometimes, however, the understanding of laws is unknown because of ignorance of divine law or natural law, or natural reason, or also of reason taking it at the same time from the divine and the natural dictate of reason. For example, as stated in Extra, De sponsalibus c. Veniens, the pope commands, in establishing the law, that if anyone is found to have known the woman to whom he has given his faith concerning the contracting of marriage, he should remain with her. Now, if anyone attends to the words of the law and does not know the divine law by which it is granted that it is permissible to divorce his wife on the grounds of fornication, he will by no means have the ultimate understanding of the law aforesaid.
Item, ut habetur Extra, De deposito c. secundo, depositori licet pro voluntate sua depositum revocare, quod ignarus iuris naturalis quo cavetur ne ad patriam expugnandam depositum reposcatur nequaquam ultimate intelliget. | Likewise, as stated in Extra, De deposito c. 2, the depositor is permitted to revoke the deposit at his own will, which will not be ultimately understood by anyone who does not know the natural law that provides that a deposit not be reclaimed for the purpose of attacking the fatherland.
Cum ergo ex ignorantia iuris divini et iuris naturalis ignoratur intellectum legis, necessaria est interpretatio sive expositio et declaratio intellectus legis, et ista interpretatio seu declaratio legis principalissime spectat ad peritos iniure divino et philosophia morali, in tantum quod, si conditor legis non fuerit sufficienter instructus in scriptura divina et philosophia morali, interpretatio talis condite ab eo legis principalius spectat ad alios eruditos quam ad ipsum. Imo ipse posset et deberet in casu interpretationem legis sue ab eis recipere. Quemadmodum, secundum mundi sapientem, ad epikeiam spectat dicere in quo casu verba legis non sunt servanda, quod facit per agnitionem equitatis naturalis. Unde si rex illiteratus, experientia rerum et negotiorum peritia carens, statuat legem solum considerans ea que communiter accidunt, philosophus eruditus et expertus melius dicet in quibus casibus verba legis non sunt servanda, et profundiorem intellectum legis regalis habebit quam rex qui statuit eam. | When, therefore, the understanding of the law is unknown due to ignorance of divine law and natural law, an interpretation or exposition and clarification of the understanding of the law is necessary, and this interpretation or clarification of the law pertains most primarily to experts in divine law and moral philosophy, inasmuch as, if the maker of the law was not sufficiently instructed in divine scripture and moral philosophy, the interpretation of such a law made by him pertains more primarily to other learned men rather than to him. Indeed, he himself could and should on occasion accept the interpretation of his law from them. In the same way, according to the wise man of the world [Aristotle], it pertains to epikeia to say when the words of the law are not to be observed, which it does by acknowledging natural equity. Hence, if an illiterate king, lacking experience of things and expertise in business, enacts a law considering only things that commonly occur, a learned and experienced philosopher will say better in which cases the words of the law are not to be observed, and will have a deeper understanding of the royal law than the king who enacts it.
Discipulus: Narratio suprascripta plura dubia, imo falsa, continere videtur, de quibus duo tantum ad presens reprobare conabor. Quorum primum est quod dicit aliquam legem esse ambiguam duos sensus habentem, quod Isidoro repugnare videtur. Isidorus enim, ut legitur dist. 4 c. Erit, asserit quod *"Lex debet esse manifesta, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat." Lex autem ambigua diversos sensus habens est obscura. Ergo lex non debet esse ambigua. Secundum est quod dicit interpretationem legis ad peritos spectare. Hec enim Augustino, cuius verba ponuntur dist. supradicta 4a c. In istis, obviare videtur. Ait enim: "In istis temporalibus legibus, quanquam de his homines iudicent, cum has instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institute ac firmate, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas." Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod de legibus temporalibus iudicare non licet, et per consequens eas interpretari non licet. | Student: The above-written narrative seems to contain several dubious points, indeed falsehoods. I will attempt to refute only two at present. The first is that it says that some law is ambiguous, having two meanings, which seems to be repugnant to Isidore. For Isidore, as we read in dist. 4 c. Erit, asserts that "A law should be clear, lest it contain something leading to fraud through obscurity." But an ambiguous law having different meanings is obscure. Therefore a law should not be ambiguous. The second is that it says that the interpretation of a law pretains to experts. For this seems to contradict Augustine, whose words are given in dist. 4 c. In istis. For he says: "In these temporal laws, although men judge about them when they institute them, yet once they have been instituted and confirmed, the judge is not permitted to judge about them, but according to them." From these words it is clearly seen that it is not permissible to judge about temporal laws, and consequently it is not permissible to interpret them.
Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod, quamvis quantum convenienter fieri potest lex debeat esse manifesta ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem constituat, tamen non est dicendum quin leges multe sic sint ambigue quod in eis verba multiplicia diversos habentia sensus ponuntur, cum etiam in lege divina talis diversitas et multiplicitas reperiatur, teste glossa, que, ad Galatos 6, super illud Apostoli "Unusquisque onus suum portabit", ait contrarium: "Quod hic dicitur, contrarium videtur precedentibus, ubi ait alter alterius onus suum portabit", et declarans quod non est contrarium dicit "Quod non est", scilicet contrarium precedentibus, "quia nomen oneris diversis modis accipitur. Multa enim sunt verba que diversis locis congruenter posita varie intelliguntur, sicut hic: nisi enim oneris nomen sub diversis significationibus acceperis, procul dubio putabis eundem sibi in loquendo esse contrarium, et hoc tam vicine positis verbis: qui cum Paulo ante diceret 'Alterius onera portabit', hic dicit, 'Unusquisque onus suum portabit'." Ex quibus verbis patet aperte quod verba ambigua et multiplicia reperiuntur in lege divina, ergo nec ab humanis legibus est hoc negandum, et ita non est inconveniens quod lex humana possit diversis modis intelligi. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that, although the law should be as clear as possible lest it contain something leading to fraud through obscurity, yet it cannot be denied that many laws are ambiguous because multiple words with different meanings are used in them, since such diversity and multiplicity is also found in the divine law, as evidenced by the gloss on Galatians 6, which, on the Apostle's words "Each one shall bear his own burden", says the contrary: "What is said here seems contrary to what has gone before, where he says, 'one shall bear the burden of another'", and declaring that it is not contrary, it says, "which it is not", namely, contrary to what has gone before, "because the name of 'burden' is understood in different ways. For there are many words which, when put congruently in different places, are understood in different ways, as here: for unless you take the name of burden under different significations, you will undoubtedly think that the speaker is contrary to himself in speaking, and this with words placed so close together: who, when Paul previously said, 'One shall bear the burden of another', here he says, 'Each shall bear his own burden'." From these words it is clear that ambiguous and multiple words are found in the divine law, therefore this is not to be denied of human laws either, and so it is not inappropriate that human law can be understood in different ways.
Ad secundum dicitur quod quamvis secundum intentionem beati Augustini de temporalibus legibus que sunt pure positive, postquam fuerint institute ac firmate, nec iudex nec alius debeat iudicare an sint servande vel non sint servande, quia constat quod servande sunt, licebit tamen non solum iudici sed etiam eruditis et doctis iudicare et indagare secundum quem intellectum servande sunt et secundum quem intellectum servande non sunt, et que exceptiones circa leges institutas servande sunt et que servande non sunt, sive in quibus casibus leges institute servande sunt et in quibus casibus verba legis servanda non sunt. | To the second it is said that although according to the thinking of blessed Augustine concerning temporal laws that are purely positive, after they have been instituted and confirmed neither a judge nor anyone else should judge whether they are to be observed or not, because it is clear that they are to be observed, it will nevertheless be permissible not only for a judge, but also for the erudite and learned, to judge and investigate the meaning in which they are to be observed and the meaning in which they are not to be observed and what exceptions are to be observed concerning instituted laws and which are not to be observed, or in which cases the instituted laws are to be observed and in which cases the words of the law are not to be observed.
Sic, secundum mundi sapientem, epikeia iudicat in quo casu verba legis non sunt servanda, utens naturali dictamine rationis, hoc est, utens iure naturali. Quia ex quo nulla lex positiva iusta potest esse contraria iuri naturali, lex quecunque humana in illo casu in quo si servaretur sicut verba sonant esset contraria iuri naturali minime est servanda. Sicut enim supra dictum est, lex humana, imo videtur quod lex nature (ut innuit Isidorus, prout recitatur dist. 1 c. Ius naturale) statuit quod res deposita quando reposcitur, restituatur. Et tamen, si quis gladium depositum reposceret ad occidendum seipsum vel alium innocentem iniuste, gladius depositus sibi restitui non deberet, quia qui in hoc casu restitueret gladium depositum ageret contra ius naturale, quo quilibet obligatur tantum flagitium et dispendium proximi prohibere, si potest. | Thus, according to the wise man of the world [Aristotle], epikeia judges in which case the words of the law are not to be observed, using the natural dictate of reason, that is, using natural law. Because since no positive just law can be contrary to natural law, any human law in a case in which, if it were observed as the words suggest, it would be contrary to natural law is not to be observed at all. For as was said above, human law, indeed even, it seems, the law of nature (as Isidore hints, as is recited in dist. 1 ch. Ius naturale) has established that a thing deposited must be returned when it is demanded, and yet, if anyone were to demand a sword deposited in order to kill himself or another innocent person unjustly, the sword deposited should not be returned to him, because whoever in this case returned a deposited sword would be acting against natural law, by which everyone is obliged to prevent so great a crime and loss to his neighbor, if he can.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo per predicta contingat refellere rationem quam feci. | Student: Tell me how this can refute the argument I made.
Magister: Respondetur quod, licet in iure, cum contra regulam qua dicitur quod clerici non spectant ad forum iudicis secularis excipiuntur casus in quibus regula illa fallit, non fiat mentio de papa heretico, tamen casus de papa heretico debet inter alios computari. Cuius ratio est: quia, sicut licet de multis que spectant ad ius naturale non fiat mentio in iure scripto, tamen facienda sunt cum occurrerit necessitas faciendi, ita licet in iure scripto non fiat mentio de casu in quo papa esset hereticus, tamen casus ille excipi debet quando papa incurrit hereticam pravitatem, et clerici nollent vel non possent eum cohercere. | Master: The answer made is that, although in the law, when cases are excepted against the rule that says that clerics do not belong to the forum of the secular judge in which that rule is mistaken, there is no mention of a heretic pope, nevertheless the case of the heretic pope should be included, among others. The reason for this is that, just as many things belonging to natural law are not mentioned in written law, yet they must be mentioned when the necessity of doing so arises, so, although no mention is made in written law of a case in which the pope is a heretic, yet that case must be excepted when the pope incurs heretical depravity and the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him.
Discipulus: Quare non excipitur casus de papa heretico si clerici nollent vel non possent eum cohercere, quando a conditoribus canonum, glossatoribus, et doctoribus excipiuntur casus in quibus illa regula fallit: clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis. | Student: Why is the case of the heretic pope, if the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him, not excepted, when the founders of the canons, glossators, and doctors except cases in which the rule that clerics are not of the forum of the secular judge is mistaken?
Magister: Respondetur quod, sicut leges non feruntur nisi de his que sepe accidunt, et non de illis que accidunt raro vel nunquam, ita sepe a conditoribus legum et glossatoribus earundem ac doctoribus non excipiuntur casus in quibus regule generales fallunt, nisi illi qui sepe accidunt et non illi qui accidunt raro vel nunquam. Casus autem de papa heretico quem clerici nolunt vel non possunt corrigere raro vel nunquam accidit. De nullo enim papa heretico ante tempora nostra legitur quod clerici, saltem omnes, in cohercendo ipsum fuerint negligentes. Nam et Liberio pape heretico multi restiterunt viriliter, et Anastasium secundum hereticum multi clerici fortiter impugnaverunt et a communione eius se laudabiliter abegerunt. Et ita iste casus ante tempora nostra non videtur accidisse, et propter hoc conditores legum et glossatores earum aliique doctores, excipiendo casus in quibus regula fallit qua dicitur quod clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis, de papa heretico quem clerici nollent vel non possent corrigere non fecerunt mentionem. Et tamen iste casus multo magis excipiendus est quam alii casus quos conditores canonum et glossatores excipiunt. | Master: The answer made is that, just as laws are not passed except about things that happen often, and not about those that happen rarely or never, so often the framers of laws and the glossators and the doctors do not make exceptions for cases in which the general rules are wrong except for those that happen often, and not those that happen rarely or never. But the case of a heretic pope whom the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct rarely or never occurs. For it is not read of any heretic pope before our times that the clerics, at least all of them, were negligent in coercing him. For many manfully resisted the heretic pope Liberius, and many clerics strongly attacked the heretic Anastasius II and commendably removed themselves from communion with him. And so this case does not seem to have occurred before our times, and for this reason the founders of the laws and their glossators and other doctors, in making exceptions for cases in which the rule that says that clerics are not of the forum of the secular judge is mistaken, did not make mention of a heretic pope whom clerics would not or could not correct. And yet this case is much more to be excepted than other cases that the founders of the canons and glossators do except.
Discipulus: Quare debet excipi casus iste. | Student: Why should this case be excepted?
Magister: Respondetur quod ideo debet excipi casus iste quia exceptio istius casus ex ratione evidenti, cui nulla lex humana preiudicari potest quoquo modo, patenter infertur. | Master: The answer made is that this case should be excepted because its exception is clearly inferred from an evident reason, which no human law can in any way prejudice.
Discipulus: Que est illa ratio. | Student: What is that reason?
Magister: Ratio est hec. Ille casus a regula generali excipi debet quo non excepto detrahitur honori divino, fides periclitatur catholica, et detrimentum ac periculum et dispendium spirituale omnium fidelium procuratur. Hec est de se manifesta, quia contra honorem divinum nulla regula est servanda. Iterum, nulla lex humana que vergat in periculum fidei et dispendium salutis eterne ab homine statui potest. Si enim pacta, promissiones, vota et iuramenta que vergunt in interitum salutis eterne servanda non sunt secundum canonicas sanctiones, ratione consimili leges humane quecunque in eo casu in quo vergerent in\ periculum fidei catholice et dispendium spirituale fidelium non sunt servande. | Master: The reason is this. A case should be excepted from the general rule if, without the exception, divine honor is detracted from, the Catholic faith is endangered, and the spiritual loss and danger and loss of all the faithful is procured. This is self-evident, because no rule must be observed against divine honor. Again, no human law that tends to endanger faith and the loss of eternal salvation can be established by man. For if pacts, promises, vows and oaths that tend to the destruction of eternal salvation are not to be observed, according to the canonical laws, by a similar reason any human laws are not to be observed when they tend to endanger the Catholic faith and the spiritual loss of the faithful.
Sed casu predicto de papa heretico quem clerici nolunt vel non possunt cohercere non excepto a regula illa clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis , honori divini detrahitur, quia inferiores, cum facile sequantur exempla maiorum, a vero culto Dei papam hereticum imitando se subtraherent. Fides etiam periclitatur catholica, quia, si, teste beato Hieronimo, ut legitur 24 q. 3 c. Resecande, Arrius in Alexandria una scintilla fuit quia non statim oppressus est totum orbem populatus est , multo magis papa hereticus, si non fuerit statim extinctus, eius flamma heretice pravitatis totum populabitur orbem, inficiendo labe heretica Christianos. Et ita, si casus ille non excipitur a regula memorata, fides periclitatur ecclesie, et per consequens detrimentum et periculum ac dispendium spirituale omnium fidelium procuratur. | But in the aforementioned case of a heretic pope whom clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce, if an exception is not make from the rule clerics do not belong to the forum of a secular judge , divine honor is detracted from, because inferiors, since they easily follow the examples of their seniors, would, imitating the heretic pope, withdraw themselves from the true worship of God. The Catholic faith is also endangered, because, if, according to the testimony of blessed Jerome, as is read in 24 q. 3 c. Resecande, Arrius was a single spark in Alexandria, but because he was not immediately suppressed his flame spread through the whole world , much more, a heretic pope, if he is not immediately extinguished, his flame of heretical depravity will spread through the whole world, infecting Christians with the heretical stain. And so, if that case is not excepted from the mentioned rule, the faith of the Church is endangered, and as a result, the spiritual loss, danger and loss of all the faithful is procured.
Quare ille casus est excipiendus omnino, nec papa de plenitudine potestatis posset statuere quod casus ille non exciperetur, quemadmodum, ut notat glossa dist. 40 c. Si papa: "Nunquid posset papa statuere quod non posset accusari de heresi. Respondetur quod non, quia ex hoc periclitaretur tota ecclesia." Iterum, quod casus ille debeat excipi probatur ex hoc quod, teste Isidoro, ut habetur dist. c. Erit Lex: "Nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi utilitate civium debet conscribi lex." Lex ergo que esset contra utilitatem civium non esset lex. Sed si casus ille de papa heretico quem clerici nollent vel non possent corrigere ab illa lege qua cavetur quod clerici non sunt de foro iudicis secularis non exciperetur, esset contra utilitatem civium christianorum, ergo non esset vera lex sed falsa, iniqua, et iniusta, quare non esset servanda, quia Isaie 10 scribitur: " Ve qui condunt leges iniquas." | Wherefore that case must be excepted altogether, nor could the pope, from the plenitude of power, decree that that case should not be excepted, as the gloss notes, dist. 40 c. Si papa: "Could the pope decree that he could not be accused of heresy? The answer made is negative, because this would endanger the whole Church." Again, that this case should be excepted is proved from the fact that, according to Isidore, as is stated in dist. 4 c. Erit lex, "A law should be written for no private advantage, but for the common benefit of citizens." Therefore a law that would be against the benefit of citizens would not be a law. But if the case of a heretic pope whom the clerics would not or could not correct were not excepted from that law that provides that clerics are not subject to the forum of a secular judge, it would be against the benefit of Christian citizens, therefore it would not be a true law but a false law, wicked, and unjust, and therefore it should not be kept, because it is written in Isaiah 10: "Woe to those who make wicked laws."
Discipulus: Contra predicta impugnatio fortis occurrit, quia, si verba legum in quibusdam casibus qui non sunt excepte in legibus non essent servanda, posset ad libitum quilibet excipere casus a lege quos vellet, et dicere in istis casibus verba legis sicut sonant non sunt servanda, et ita ex lege nulla haberetur certitudo quando verba legis essent servanda et quando non essent servanda. | Student: A strong objection arises against the this. If in certain cases not excepted in the laws the words of the laws were not to be observed, anyone could at will exempt from the law the cases he wanted to exempt, and say in these cases the words of the law as they sound are not to be observed. Thus the law would give no certaintly as to when the words of the law were to be observed and when not.
Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod non licet cuilibet excipere casum ad libitum, et dicere verba legis in tali casu non sunt servanda, sed si dicit verba legis in tali casu non sunt servanda, oportet quod hoc ostendat per legem superiorem, vel per rationem evidentem. Et si altero istorum modorum patenter ostendit verba legis in tali casu non esse servanda, standum est dicto suo, non quia ipse dicit, sed quia lex superior vel ratio evidens hoc ostendit. Et ratio huius est quia nulla potest esse lex que legi superiori vel aperte rationi repugnat. Unde, quecunque lex civilis vel canonica repugnat legi divini vel rationi aperte, non est lex. Eodem modo, verba legis canonice vel civilis in illo casu in quo repugnarent legi divine, scilicet scripture sacre, vel rationi recte, non essent servande. | Master: The answer made to this is that it is not permissible for anyone to take exception to a case at will and say that the words of the law are not to be observed in such a case, but if he says that the words of the law are not to be observed in such a case, he must show this by a higher law or by evident reason. And if in either of these ways he openly shows that the words of the law should not be observed in such a case, his statement must stand, not because he himself says so, but because the higher law or evident reason shows this. And the reason for this is that there can be no law that is contrary to a higher law or to reason. Hence, whatever civil or canonical law is contrary to divine law or to reason, is not law. In the same way, the words of a canon or civil law are not to be observed when they are contrary to divine law, i.e., sacred scripture, or to right reason.
Discipulus: Ad quem pertinet iudicare verba legis canonice vel civilis repugnare scripture divine vel rationi recte. | Student: To whom does it pertain to judge whether the words of the canon or civil law are contrary to divine scripture or right reason?
Magister: Respondetur quod hoc iudicare per modum doctrine et simplicis assertionis spectat ad eruditum in scriptura divina, et ratione naturali ac philosophia morali pollentem. Hoc autem iudicare ex auctoritate officii, alios obligando ad hoc servandum et tenendum, spectat ad conditorem legis de consilio peritorum in scripturis sacris et naturali precellentium ratione. | Master: The answer made is that to judge this by way of doctrine and simple assertion pertains to one who is learned in divine Scripture and stong in natural reason and moral philosophy. But to judge this by the authority of office, obliging others to observe and hold to it, pertains to the founder of the law with the advice of people who are experts in sacred Scripture and outstanding in natural reason.
Discipulus: Ergo secundum predicta theologi et philosophi haberent iudicare de intellectu legum civilium et canonicarum. | Student: Therefore, according to the aforesaid, theologians and philosophers should judge about the understanding of civil and canonical laws.
Magister: Conceditur quod ultimum iudicium de intellectu legum civilium et canonicarum est reservandum theologis et philosophis, quemadmodum ultimum iudicium de aliquo dubio in scientia inferiori reservandum est scientie superiori, eo modo quod per principia iudicandum est de conclusione que sequitur ex principiis. | Master: It is granted that the ultimate judgment about the understanding of civil and canonical laws must be reserved for theologians and philosophers, just as the ultimate judgment about any doubt in a lower science must be reserved for a higher science, in the way judgment about a conclusion that follows from the principles must be made by the principles.
Discipulus: De hac materia tactum est supra libro primo. Ideo transi, et narra quomodo respondetur ad secundam rationem supra 91o capitulo adductam. | Student: This matter has been touched upon above in Book I. Therefore, go on and tell how the second argument brought forward above in Chapter 91 is answered.
Magister: Respondetur quod nonnunquam ad iudicium secularem spectat cognoscere de causa heretice pravitatis, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo per seipsum, quia ipse tenetur multa scire per que potest in causa heretice pravitatis in multis casibus iudicare, etiam absque aliorum consilio peritorum. Si enim aliquis Christianus dixerit fidem christianam esse falsam et malam, iudex secularis non debet indigere consilio ut sciat an talis sit tanquam hereticus condempnandus, sed ipsemet tenetur scire quod talis est hereticus reputandus et pro heresi condempnandus. Similiter, si quis docuerit quod Christus non fuit natus de virgine, vel quod non fuit passus, vel quod non resurrexerit, vel quod non est unus Deus, vel quod non sunt tres persone in Deo, iudex secularis tenetur scire quod talis est hereticus. Et ita, sicut iudex secularis multa ad fidem spectantia orthodoxam credere tenetur explicite, ita in multis casibus per seipsum potest cognoscere quid est tenendum in causa heretice pravitatis. | Master: The answer made is that sometimes it belongs to the secular court to know about the cause of heretical wickedness, and this in two ways. In one way, indeed, by himself [i.e. the secular judge], because he is bound to know many things by which he can judge in the cause of heretical wickedness in many cases, even without the advice of other experts. For if any Christian says that the Christian faith is false and bad, a secular judge should not need advice to know whether such a person must be condemned as a heretic, but he himself is bound to know that such a person must be considered a heretic and to be condemned for heresy. Similarly, if anyone teaches that Christ was not born of a virgin, or that he did not suffer, or that he did not rise again, or that there is not one God, or that there are not three persons in God, the secular judge is bound to know that such a person is a heretic. And so, just as a secular judge is bound to believe explicitly many things pertaining to the orthodox faith, so in many cases he can know by himself what must be held in the cause of heretical wickedness.
Alio modo potest cognoscere de causa heretice pravitatis requirendo consilium peritorum, quemadmodum de multis casibus civilibus cognoscit, nesciendo in eis per seipsum quid rectum, quid obliquum, nisi per informationem aliorum decernere. Cum enim coram iudice aliquis accusatur de falsa moneta, sepe iudex nescit discernere per seipsum an moneta de qua est questio sit falsa vel vera, et ideo antequam sententiam proferat requirit monetarios, quos iuramento vel alio modo licito astringit ut sibi de dicta moneta indicent veritatem. Et ita in quam plurimis casibus iudex secularis, qui non habet omnes artes et omnes naturas rerum scire, de consilio aliorum profert sententiam, quia in talibus causis quampluribus per seipsum non posset cognoscere quomodo eum oporteat iudicare. | In another way he can learn about the cause of heretical wickedness by calling on the advice of experts, just as he learns about many civil cases, not knowing by himself how to decide what is right and what is wrong in them except through information from others. For when someone is accused before a judge of counterfeiting money, the judge often does not know how to discern for himself whether the money in question is counterfeit or genuine, and therefore before he pronounces a sentence he calls upon the moneyers, whom he binds by oath or in some other lawful way to tell him the truth about the said money. And so in many cases a secular judge, who does not have to know all the arts and all the natures of things, pronounces a sentence on the advice of others, because in many such cases he would not be able to know for himself how he ought to judge.
Sic dicunt de iudice seculari in multis casibus respectu cause pravitatis heretice, quia in multis casibus indigeret consilio in sacris literis peritorum. Si enim aliquis Christianus accusaretur coram iudice seculari in biblia minime erudito quod pertinaciter asseverit beatum Paulum fuisse conversum ante passionem Christi, quemadmodum quidam magnus canonista dixit, et in scripturis suis reliquit, quod beatus Paulus fuit unus de duodecim apostolis qui sequebantur Christum antequam pateretur, iudex secularis nesciret per seipsum dare sententiam, sed requisito consilio peritorum in scripturis sacris ex quibus penderet questio supradicta, posset secure dare sententiam. Ubi autem iudex secularis nec per se nec per consilium suum posset scire aperte que esset veritas in aliqua questione mota de fide, in tali casu se intromittere non deberet. | Thus they say concerning a secular judge in many cases relating to the cause of heretical wickedness, because in many cases he would need the advice of experts in the sacred writings. For if any Christian were accused before a secular judge not at all learned in the Bible of having stubbornly asserted that blessed Paul was converted before the Passion of Christ (as a certain great canonist said, and left in his writings, that blessed Paul was one of the twelve apostles who followed Christ before he suffered), the secular judge would not know how to give a verdict by himself, but having sought the advice of experts in the sacred scriptures on which the above-mentioned question would depend, he could safely give a verdict. But where a secular judge could neither by himself nor by his advice know clearly what the truth was in any question raised about faith, he should not intervene in the case.
Ad propositionem igitur applicando dicitur quod, si papa hereticus teneret fidem christianam esse falsam, vel non esse tres personas distinctas in divinis aut aliquid huiusmodi, quod iudex secularis per seipsum vel per consilium et informationem peritorum posset aperte cognoscere esse hereticum, secure posset papam hereticum iudicare, si clerici nollent vel non possent ipsum debite cohercere. | Applying this to the present matter, therefore, it is said that, if a heretic pope held that the Christian faith was false, or that there are not three distinct persons in the Godhead, or something of the kind, which a secular judge could clearly know by himself or by the advice and information of experts to be heretical, he could safely judge that the pope was a heretic, if the clerics were unwilling or unable to duly coerce him.
Cum vero dicitur quod ad iudicem secularem non pertinet causa fidei vel Dei, respondetur quod dicere causam fidei vel Dei nullo modo spectare ad iudicem secularem et laicos est omnino insanum, et est verbum clericorum avarorum et superborum, qui omnino ab ecclesia Dei laicos conantur excludere, ut, ipsis laicis exclusis ab ecclesia, clerici laicorum domini reputentur, cum tamen, sicut sepe allegatum est prius, in scriptura sacra nunquam laici ab ecclesie nomine excludantur, sed ubicunque in scripturis sacris nomen ecclesie viros et mulieres clericos et laicos comprehendat. Causa igitur fidei et Dei secundum istos spectat ad laicos, quemadmodum fides spectat ad laicos, et sicut Deus ita est Deus laicorum sicut clericorum, sic causa fidei spectat ad clericos et etiam ad laicos. Si enim causa fidei et Dei nullo modo spectaret ad laicos, laici nec fidem deberent defendere, nec hereticos evitare, nec in prosecutione cause fidei prelatis assistere, nec in aliquo se intromittere de hereticis etiam per ecclesiam condempnatis, que sunt insana censenda. Causa igitur fidei, que est causa Dei, aliquo modo spectat ad laicos. | When it is said that the cause of faith or God does not pertain to a secular judge, the answer given is that to say that the cause of faith or God in no way pertains to a secular judge and lay people is completely insane, and is the saying of greedy and proud clerics, who try to exclude lay people from the Church of God altogether, so that, having excluded lay people from the Church, the clerics may be considered the masters of the lay people -- when, however, as has been argued often before, in Sacred Scripture the lay people are never excluded from the name of the Church, but everywhere in Sacred Scripture the name Church includes men and women, clerics and lay people. Therefore, according to these [the people who hold the opinion being presented], the cause of faith and God pertains to lay people, just as faith pertains to lay people, and just as God is the God of lay people as well as of clerics, so the cause of faith pertains to clerics and also to lay people. For if the cause of faith and God did not concern the laity in any way, the laity should neither defend the faith, nor avoid heretics, nor assist prelates in the prosecution of the cause of faith, nor intervene in anything concerning heretics, even those condemned by the Church -- assertions that must be considered insane. Therefore the cause of faith, which is the cause of God, concerns the laity in some way.
Principalius tamen spectat ad prelatos ecclesie, quia prelati ecclesie non solum hereticos laicos, quando per alios laicos minime cohercentur, sed etiam hereticos clericos possunt debite cohercere, de quibus laici iudicare non possunt nisi clerici eos noluerint vel non potuerint castigare. Secundario autem causa fidei spectat ad laicos, quia laici etiam clericos, imo etiam papam hereticum, possunt et debent, ne virus sue perfidie transfundat in alios, prohibere, si eum clerici noluerint vel non potuerint cohercere. | However, it does concern the prelates of the Church more primarily, because the prelates of the Church can duly coerce not only lay heretics, when they are not at all coerced by other laymen, but also clerical heretics, about whom the laity cannot judge unless clerics are unwilling or unable to chastise them. But the cause of faith concerns the laity secondarily, because the laity can and must prohibit even clerics, nay even a heretic pope, lest the poison of his perfidy be transmitted to others, if the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritates ubi prius adductas. | Student: Tell me how the texts cited earlier are answered.
Magister: Ad primam respondetur quod cum de causis Dei agitur, et sacerdotes Christi suum officium digne et sollicite exequuntur, imperatores et reges debent voluntatem suam sacerdotibus Christi, recipiendo eorum informationem et consilia ac stando eorum iudicio in hiis que ad ipsos pertinent iudicare, subdire, non preferre. Ubi autem sacerdotes averterentur a fide, vel in causis Dei essent dampnabiliter negligentes, imperatores et reges deberent voluntatem suam sacerdotibus non subdere sed preferre. Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Felicis pape, qui per verba sua honorem Dei intendebat. Et ideo, quia esset contra honorem Dei quod reges voluntatem suam subderent sacerdotibus hereticis et negligentibus seu laborantibus ad subversionem fidei orthodoxe, noluit Felix papa quod reges in hoc casu suam subderent sacerdotibus voluntatem. | Master: To the first, the answer made is that when the causes of God are at stake, and the priests of Christ are worthily and diligently carrying out their office, emperors and kings should submit their will, and not prefer it, to the priests of Christ, receiving their information and advice and standing by their judgment in those things that concern them to judge. But where the priests were turned away from the faith, or were blameably negligent in the causes of God, emperors and kings should not submit their will to the priests but prefer it. And thus are the words of Pope Felix to be understood, who by his words intended the honor of God. And therefore, because it would be against the honor of God for kings to submit their will to heretical and negligent priests or to those who labour to subvert the orthodox faith, Pope Felix did not in this case want kings to submit their will to the priests.
Ad auctoritatem Nicholai pape respondetur quod verba eius non possunt nec debent sine omni exceptione intelligi. Tunc enim clerici incorrigibiles, falsarii, et heretici per ecclesiam condempnati et curie traditi seculari per iudices seculares nullo modo iudicari deberent, que tamen constat esse falsa. Verba igitur Nicholai pape cum exceptionibus suis debent intelligi. Potissima autem exceptio est quando papa est hereticus et clerici eum nolunt vel non possunt corrigere. Ergo cum ista exceptione potissime verba Nicholai debent intelligi. | To the text from Pope Nicholas, the answer made is that his words cannot and should not be understood without any exception. For then incorrigible clerics, forgers, and heretics condemned by the Church and handed over to the secular court should in no way be judged by secular judges, which, however, is known to be false. Therefore, the words of Pope Nicholas should be understood with their exceptions. The strongest exception is when the Pope is a heretic and the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct him. Therefore, the words of Nicholas should be understood with this exception.
Ad tertiam autem auctoritatem respondetur quod Theodosius Iunior, scribens synodo Ephesine, noluit quod Candidianus comes se de piis dogmatibus que in eadem synodo tractabantur intromittere attemptaret, quia illa pia dogmata de quibus tractabatur sufficienter poterant terminari per sacerdotes qui convenerant. Cum vero dicit illicitum namque est eum, qui non sit in ordine sanctissimorum episcoporum, ecclesiasticis intermisceri tractatibus , respondetur quod hec verba non possunt nec debent intelligi sicut prima facie sonant. Tum quia tunc nunquam magistri theologie aut alii literati in decretis et scripturis divinis qui non essent episcopi deberent ecclesiasticis tractatibus interesse, tum quia tunc imperatores nunquam deberent concilio generali in quo tractaretur de questione fidei interesse, que falsa sunt et absurda. Debent ergo verba predicta sic intelligi: quod illicitum est eum qui non sit in ordine episcoporum, tanquam sit presidens episcopis, ecclesiasticis intermisceri tractatibus, quando per episcopos rite et ordinate tractantur. Ubi autem episcopi convenirent in subversionem fidei catholice, deberet laicus catholicus non solum eis preesse, sed eos debite cohercere quando per alios clericos coherceri non possent. | To the third text, it is answered that Theodosius the Younger, writing to the Synod of Ephesus, did not want Count Candidianus to attempt to interfere with the pious dogmas that were being discussed in that Synod, because the pious dogmas being discussed could have been sufficiently determined by the priests who had gathered. But when he says For it is unlawful for anyone who is not in the order of the most holy bishops to be mixed up in ecclesiastical [*tractatibus] affairs , it is answered that these words cannot and should not be understood as they sound on first appearance. Both because then masters of theology or other people literate in divine decrees and scriptures who were not bishops should never be involved in ecclesiastical affairs, and also because then emperors should never be involved in a general council in which a question of faith would be discussed, implications that are false and absurd. Therefore the aforesaid words should be understood thus: that it is unlawful for someone who is not in the order of bishops, as if he were presiding over bishops, to interfere in ecclesiastical affairs, when they are being dealt with by bishops in a proper and orderly manner. But where bishops come together to subvert the Catholic faith, a lay Catholic should not only rule over them, but should duly coerce them when they could not be coerced by other clerics.
Ad quartam auctoritatem similiter repondetur quod imperatores non debent indebite usurpare que solis sacerdotibus conveniunt. Sed detinere papam hereticum quando clerici nollent vel non possent eum corrigere non convenit solis sacerdotibus, sed competit laicis orthodoxis, ideo etc. | To the fourth text it will be similarly answered that emperors should not unduly usurp what belongs to priests alone. But to detain a heretic pope when the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct him does not belong to priests alone, but belongs to orthodox laymen; therefore etc.
Ad quintam auctoritatem dicitur quod si imperator est Catholicus, filius est secundum Iohannem papam ecclesie catholice, non heretice, non presul ecclesie catholice, sed presul (hoc est superior) est et iudex ecclesie heretice, quando clerici ecclesiam hereticam nolunt vel non possunt corrigere. Et ideo quod ad religionem competit discere a Catholicis ei convenit, non docere , tanquam habens predicandi officium, quia habet privilegia potestatis sue, que administrandis legibus publicis divinitus consecutus est inquantum solummodo imperator. Sed inquantum imperator christianus non solum ad ministrandum legibus secularibus debet intendere, sed ei incumbit hereticos clericos, etiam papam hereticum, quando ecclesiastica potestas deficit, cohercere. Et ideo imperator circa dispositionem celestis ordinis nichil usurpet indebite, quia ad sacerdotes catholicos non hereticos Deus voluit que ecclesie dispensanda sunt pertinere principaliter, non ad seculi potestates principaliter, nec etiam non principaliter quantum ad sacramenta ecclesie dispensanda. Quantum vero ad clericos ordinandos et recipiendos si remeaverint de errore, non debent se imperatores intromittere, nisi supplendo malitiam vel negligentiam aut impotentiam vel ignorantiam sacerdotum. Verba igitur Iohannis pape sane debent intelligi, ut in detrimentum fidei orthodoxe nullo modo redundent. | To the fifth text it is said that if the emperor is Catholic, he is, according to Pope John, the son of the Catholic Church, not of a heretical Church, not the presul (that is, the superior) of the Catholic Church, but he is the presul and judge of an heretical Church, when the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct the heretical Church. And therefore what pertains to religion is for him to learn from Catholics, not to teach , as if having the office of preaching, because he has the privileges of his power, which he has obtained from God for administering public laws insofar as he is precisely an emperor; but insofar as he is a Christian emperor he must not only attend to administering secular laws, but it is incumbent upon him to coerce heretic clerics, even a heretic pope, when ecclesiastical power is deficient. And therefore the emperor should usurp nothing unduly regarding the disposition of the heavenly order, because God willed that things that are to be disposed of for the Church should pertain principally to Catholic priests who are not heretics, not principally to secular powers , also not principally as regards dispensing the sacraments of the Church. But as for the ordination and reception of clerics if they return from error, the emperors should not intervene, except in making up for the malice or negligence or impotence or ignorance of the priests. The words of Pope John must therefore be understood so that they in no way result in detriment to the orthodox faith.
Discipulus: Quomodo possent in detrimentum fidei redundare. | Student: How could they result in the detriment of the faith?
Magister: Respondetur quod verba Iohannis pape in detrimentum fidei orthodoxe redundarent si in nullo casu imperator vel iudex secularis posset papam hereticum cohercere, quia, si papa esset hereticus et omnes clerici una cum papa, excepti duobus vel tribus episcopis quos papa hereticus in vinculis detineret, in multitudine populi christiani periclitaretur fides, nisi laici possent compescere hereticos et catholicos liberare. | Master: The answer made is that the words of Pope John would be detrimental to the orthodox faith if in no case an emperor or secular judge could coerce a heretic pope, because if the pope were a heretic and all the clerics together with the pope, except for two or three bishops whom the heretic pope kept in chains, the faith of the multitude of the Christian people would be endangered, unless the laity could restrain heretics and free Catholics.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritatem Cypriani. | Student: Tell me how Cyprian's text is answered.
Magister: Respondetur quod beatus Cyprianus loquitur in casu in quo pontifices non sunt heretici, nec sunt in suo officio negligentes. | Master: The answer made is that blessed Cyprian is speaking in a case in which the pontiffs are not heretics and are not negligent in their office.
Discipulus: Video quod omnes auctoritates de hac materia uno modo exponuntur, quod videlicet intelligendi sunt quando non deficit potestas ecclesiastica. Quando autem defecerit potestas ecclesiastica, locum non habent. Ideo dic quomodo ad tertiam rationem respondetur. | Student: I see that all the authorities on this matter are expounded in one way, namely that they are to be understood [to refer to cases] in which ecclesiastical power is not deficient. But when ecclesiastical power is deficient, they have no place. Therefore tell me how an answer is made to the third argument.
Magister: Respondetur quod omne crimen ecclesiasticum spectat in aliquo casu ad iudicem secularem. Aliter enim pater filium pro crimine heresis cohercere non posset. Aliter etiam iudex laicus clericum dampnatum pro heresi et curie traditum seculari iudicare non posset. | Master: The answer made is that every ecclesiastical crime in some case pertains to a secular judge. For otherwise a father could not coerce his son for the crime of heresy. Otherwise, a lay judge could not judge a cleric condemned for heresy and handed over to a secular court.
Discipulus: Executio sententie late contra clericum pro crimine ecclesiastico, puta pro crimine heresis vel alio crimine ecclesiastico, spectat ad laicum, sed examinatio cause et pronuntiatio sententie non spectat ad laicum. Unde illa punitio hereticorum fit auctoritate ecclesie, et ita magis eam facit ecclesia quam iudex secularis. | Student: The implementation of a sentence handed down against a cleric for an ecclesiastical crime, for example for the crime of heresy or another ecclesiastical crime, pertains to a layman, but the examination of the case and the pronouncement of the sentence do not pertain to a layman. Hence that punishment of heretics is done by the authority of the Church, and so the Church does it rather than the secular judge.
Magister: Videtur nonnullis quod minime habeas sacrorum canonum intellectum, quia iudex secularis, puniendo clericos hereticos ab ecclesia condempnatos et curie traditos seculari, non est merus executor sententie per ecclesiasticum iudicem late. Tunc enim nullam penam posset infligere nisi per ecclesiasticum iudicem taxatam, quod falsum est. Iudex ergo secularis non est in hoc casu merus executor, et per consequens habet in hoc casu de clerico heretico iudicare. Ad convincendum tamen ipsum de heretica pravitate sufficit sibi quod convictus fuerit in alio iudicio, et ideo solum sibi iudicialiter debitam penam imponit. Et ita videtur quod crimen ecclesiasticum in aliquo casu spectat ad iudicem secularem. Quare tunc potissime spectat cum papa est hereticus et clerici nolunt vel non possunt cohercere eundem. | Master: It seems to some that you have no understanding of the sacred canons, because a secular judge, in punishing heretical clerics condemned by the Church and handed over to a secular court, is not merely implementing a sentence passed by an ecclesiastical judge. For then he could inflict no punishment except that assessed by an ecclesiastical judge, which is false. Therefore a secular judge is not in this case a mere executor, and consequently has to judge in this case about a heretical cleric. However, to convict him of heretical wickedness, it is sufficient for him [the judge] that he [the heretic] has been convicted in another court, and therefore he only imposes on him judicially the due punishment. And so it seems that an ecclesiastical crime in some case pertains to a secular judge. Therefore it most of all pertains when the pope is a heretic and the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce him.
Ad decretum autem 11 q. 1 c. Si quis cum clerico, respondetur quod decretum illud loquitur in casu quando tota potestas ecclesiastica non deficit. Quando autem tota potestas ecclesiastica deficeret, aliter esset tenendum. | But to the decree 11 q. 1 c. Si quis cum clerico, the response is that that decree speaks in a case when the whole ecclesiastical power is not deficient. But when the whole ecclesiastical power is deficient, something else should be held.
Discipulus: Hoc videtur contra iura. Dicit enim glossa 11 q. 1 c. 1 quod propter negligentiam iudicis ecclesiastici clericus non potest conveniri coram laico, licet econverso propter desidiam iudicis secularis causa secularis coram iudice ecclesiastico sit tractanda. | Student: This seems contrary to the law. For the gloss on 11 q. 1 c. 1 says that a cleric cannot be summoned before a layman because of the negligence of an ecclesiastical judge, though conversely because of the laziness of a secular judge, a secular case must be handled before an ecclesiastical judge.
Magister: Respondetur quod glossa loquitur in casu in quo non tota ecclesiastica potestas deficeret. Licet enim episcopus negligeret facere iustitiam de clerico, non esset ad secularem iudicem recurrendum, quia ad papam posset haberi recursus. Sed si nullus esset papa et nullus esset clericus qui posset et vellet de clerico, qui fidem esse falsam publice predicaret, iustitiam adhibere, ne tantum fidei periculum immineret, esset clericus per laicos saltem detinendus. | Master: The answer made is that the gloss speaks of a case in which the whole ecclesiastical power is not deficient. For even if a bishop were to neglect to do justice to a cleric, there would be no recourse to a secular judge, because recourse could be had to the pope. But if there were no pope and no cleric who could and would do justice to a cleric who publicly preached that the faith was false, lest so great a danger threaten the faith, the cleric would have to be at least detained by laymen.
Ad rationem vero qua probatur quod crimen ecclesiasticum ad iudicem secularem non spectat, respondetur quod ad decentiam iudicis qui per seipsum ex consuetudine audit, examinat, et diffinit causas, spectat quod habeat notitiam illarum legum et iurium secundum que est in causis huiusmodi iudicandum. Et ideo qui ex consuetudine per seipsum audit, examinat, et diffinit in causis de criminibus ecclesiasticis, et maxime de crimine heresis, decet ut non solum in notitia canonum, sed etiam in scripturis divinis sit peritus et etiam exercitatus. Sed non est simpliciter necessarium quod ille qui non ex consuetudine per seipsum huiusmodi causas examinat, sed aliis committit, notitiam habeat, presertim excellentem, legum et iurium secundum que oportet iudicem in causis huiusmodi iudicare, sed sufficit quod habeat peritiam iudicandi. | As to the argument by which it is proved that an ecclesiastical crime does not pertain to a secular judge, the answer made is that it is fitting for a judge who customarily hears, examines, and decides cases by himself to have knowledge of the laws and rights according to which he should judge in such cases. And therefore, he who customarily hears, examines, and decides by himself in cases concerning ecclesiastical crimes, and especially concerning the crime of heresy, should be skilled, and also exercised, not only in the knowledge of the canons, but also in the divine scriptures. But it is not simply necessary that a judge who does not customarily examine such cases by himself, but entrusts them to others, should have a knowledge, especially excellent knowledge, of the laws and rights according to which a judge in such cases must judge, but it is sufficient that he has the skill to judge.
Aliter enim nullus posset eligi in summum pontificem nisi esset in scripturis divinis excellens, cum tamen constat sepe in sacra pagina simplices fuisse ad papatum assumptos. Constat enim quod ad summum pontificem sunt cause fidei deferende (24 q. 1 c. Quotiens). In causis autem fidei potissime et principalissime oportet secundum sacras litteras iudicare. Ergo, si iudex in talibus causis debet habere notitiam precellentem iuris secundum quod oportet iudicare, nullus posset eligi in summum pontificem nisi esset excellens in sanctarum notitiam scripturarum. Iterum, nullus posset eligi in episcopum nisi haberet notitiam decretorum et decretalium, quia secundum decreta et decretalia oportet in causis ecclesiasticis iudicare. | For otherwise no one could be elected supreme pontiff unless he were excellent in the divine scriptures, though it is certain that men not knowledgable in the sacred page have often been promoted to the papacy. For it is established that causes of faith are to be brought to the supreme pontiff (24 q. 1 c. Quotiens). But in causes of faith it is most especially and principally necessary to judge according to the sacred writings. Therefore, if a judge in such cases must have an excellent knowledge of the law according to which he must judge, no one could be elected supreme pontiff unless he were excellent in the knowledge of the holy scriptures. Again, no one could be elected bishop unless he had a knowledge of decrees and decretals, because in ecclesiastical cases it is necessary to judge according to decrees and decretals.
Videtur ergo dicendum quod cum aliquis tractat causas aliquas, eas aliis committendo et de consilio aliorum, non est necesse quod habeat legum secundum quas iudicare debet notitiam precellentem. Ergo quando cause alique non spectant ad iudicem nisi in casu speciali et qui raro accidit, non est necesse quod iudex iuris secundum quod iudicare debet notitiam habeat precellentem. Cause autem fidei in casu speciali et qui raro accidit spectant ad iudicem secularem, ut scilicet iudex secularis per seipsum causam fidei examinet et in ea diffiniat absque consilio aliorum in sacra pagina peritorum. Hoc enim nunquam debet facere nisi quando omnes in sacris literis eruditi quorum posset habere consilium aperte contra fidem errarent, et ideo non est necesse quod iudex secularis notitiam habeat precellentem scripture divine, sed sufficit sibi pro multis casibus, qui tamen raro vel nunquam accidunt, quod aliqualem notitiam explicitam fidei habeat orthodoxe, quam habere tenetur, quemadmodum omnes Christiani aliqua tenentur credere explicite, que debent tam firmiter credere quod si omnes clerici mundi et in sacra pagina eruditi contraria affirmarent, docerent, predicarent, assererent, et tenerent, laici eis credere non deberent, sed eos redarguere, reprobare, et acriter reprehendere tenerentur. Et ideo in talibus casibus, quando scilicet clerici errarent contra illa que laici credere tenentur explicite, omnes laici christiani ratione utentes et discreti, quales debent esse iudices in quibuscunque causis, habent sufficientem peritiam ad iudicandum in talibus causis de clericis quibuscunque. | It seems therefore it must be said that when someone handles some cases, entrusting them to others and with the advice of others, he need not have outstanding knowledge of the laws according to which he must judge. Therefore, when some cases do not pertain to a judge except in a special case which rarely occurs, the judge need not havqe outstanding knowledge of the law according to which he must judge. But cases of faith in a special case which rarely occurs pertain to the secular judge, namely, in such a way that the secular judge may examine the case of faith by himself and define it without the advice of others who are experts in the sacred law. For he should never do this except when all the scholars of the sacred writings from whom he could get advice err openly against the faith. And therefore a secular judge need not have preeminent knowledge of divine scripture, but it is sufficient for him for many cases, which nevertheless rarely or never occur, that he should have some explicit knowledge of the orthodox faith, which he is bound to have, as all Christians are bound to believe certain things explicitly, which they must believe so firmly that, if all the clerics of the world and those learned in the sacred scriptures affirmed, taught, preached, asserted, and held contrary things, the laity should not believe them, but would be bound to refute, reprove, and sharply rebuke them. And therefore in such cases, namely when clerics err against things the laity are bound to believe explicitly, all lay Christians with discretion and the use of reason, as judges in any cases should be, have enough expertise to judge in such cases about any clerics.
Discipulus: Mirabile est quod idiota de clerico, imperitus de perito, illiteratus de literato in his que ad sacras literas spectant debeat vel valeat iudicare, et tamen si ad hoc aliqua exempla possunt adduci libenter scirem. | Student: It is surprising that an ignorant person should or can judge a cleric, an unskilled person a skilled person, an illiterate person a literate person in matters that concern sacred writings. And yet if any examples can be adduced for this I would gladly know.
Magister: Ad hoc probandum exempla plurima allegantur. Si enim omnes in sacra pagina eruditi una cum papa et cardinalibus omnibus predicarent, assererent, et docerent fidem christianam esse falsam et malam, et legem Iudeorum vel Sarracenorum esse servandam, laici illiterati per notitiam fidei quam in ecclesia didicerunt essent iudices eorum idonei quantum est ex parte scientie vel peritie seu notitie, licet aliqui non essent iudices eorum idonei propter carentiam iurisdictionis et potestatis. | Master: Many examples are cited to prove this. For if all those learned in the sacred scriptures, together with the pope and all the cardinals, preached, asserted, and taught that the Christian faith is false and evil, and that the law of the Jews or the Saracens must be observed, unlettered laymen, through the knowledge of the faith which they have learned in church, would be suitable judges of them, so far as science or expertise or knowledge is concerned, although some would not be suitable judges of them because of a lack of jurisdiction and power.
Item, si omnes clerici mundi assererent Christum non fuisse crucifixum, vel non esse venturum ad iudicium, vel animas reproborum non esse in inferno, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quod omnes Christiani laici et clerici credere tenentur explicite, pure laici illiterati quantum est ex parte notitie seu peritie essent iudices eorum idonei. | Likewise, if all the clerics of the world asserted that Christ was not crucified, or that he will not come to judge, or that the souls of the reprobate are not in hell, or anything of the kind, which all Christians, lay persons and clerics, are bound to believe explicitly, purely unlettered laymen would be their suitable judges so far as knowledge or expertise is concerned.
Discipulus: Tu ponis exempla que nunquam acciderunt. | Student: You put examples that have never happened.
Magister: Respondetur quod propter duo talia ponuntur exempla. Primo, quia talia, licet nunquam acciderint, possent accidere. Secundo, quia per exempla tam aperta manuducitur intellectus ad discernendum quid in aliis est tenendum. | Master: It is answered that there are two reasons for putting such examples. First, because although such things have never happened, they could happen. Secondly, because by such clear examples the intellect is led to discern what must be held in others cases.
Discipulus: Puto me intelligere responsionem datam ad rationem illam. Ideo dic quomodo respondetur ad rationem quartam. | Student: I think I understand the answer given to that argument. Therefore tell me how an answer is given to the fourth argument.
Magister: Respondetur quod maiores cause sunt ad maius iudicium deferende quando iustitia et veritas in maiori iudicio poterit inveniri, et iudicium maius non deficit. Quando autem non inveniretur maius iudicium, tunc nonnunquam maiores cause essent ad inferius iudicium referende. Et ideo, si papa et omnes clerici ad quos posset haberi recursus contra fidem errarent aperte, tenentes vel docentes aliquid contra catholicam veritatem quam omnes, etiam laici, tenentur credere explicite, huiusmodi causa non ad papam hereticum sed ad laicos catholicos esset omnino deferenda. | Master: The answer made is that greater causes should be referred to a higher court, when justice and truth can be found in the higher court and the higher court is not deficient. But when a higher court is not found, then some greater causes should be referred to a lower court. And therefore, if the pope and all the clerics to whom recourse could be had were to err openly against the faith, holding or teaching something against a Catholic truth that all, even the laity, are bound to believe explicitly, such a cause should certainly be referred not to the heretic pope but to the Catholic laity.
Cum vero accipitur quod causa heresis est inter causas maximas computanda, respondetur quod causa heresis duplex est, sicut causa fidei duplex est. Quandoque enim vocatur causa heresis quando questio agitatur de aliquo quod manifestum esse heresim, quia est heresis explicite condempnata, et hec causa heresis, vel causa fidei, inter causas maximas minime computatur, quia hec causa ad episcopos spectat et inquisitores heretice pravitatis. Et ideo hec causa in casu speciali potest competere laicis etiam super papam hereticum quem clerici nollent vel non possent cohercere. | When it is taken [as premise] that a cause of heresy must be counted among the greatest causes, the answer made is that a cause of heresy is twofold, just as a cause of faith is twofold. For sometimes it is called a cause of heresy when the question is raised about something that is clearly heresy, because it is an explicitly condemned heresy, and this cause of heresy, or cause of faith, is not counted among the greatest causes at all, because this cause concerns bishops and inquisitors of heretical depravity. And therefore this cause in a special case can also be within the competence of the laity against a heretic pope whom the clerics are unwilling or unable to coerce.
Alia est causa heresis sive fidei quando de aliquo questio agitatur quod non est certum esse heresim, quia nec est heresis explicite condempnata, nec eius contrarium est veritas catholica explicite approbata. Et talis causa heresis vel fidei inter causas maximas computatur, nec diffinitio seu determinatio talis cause unquam spectat ad laicos illiteratos, sed solummodo spectat ad universalem ecclesiam et concilium generale, vel ad Romanum pontificem. Et ita talis causa nunquam deferenda est ad iudicium seculare, et ideo quantum ad talem causam iudicium ecclesiasticum maius est iudicio seculari, sicut scribit Gregorius Nazianzenus. Si tamen iudicium ecclesiasticum propter infidelitatem clericorum defecerit, talis causa tunc minime est tractanda. | Another is a cause of heresy or faith when the question is raised about something that is not certain to be heresy, because it is neither an explicitly condemned heresy, nor is its opposite a Catholic truth explicitly approved. And such a cause of heresy or faith is counted among the greatest causes, nor does the definition or determination of such a cause ever pertain to illiterate laymen, but it pertains only to the universal Church and a general council, or to the Roman Pontiff. And so such a case should never be referred to a secular court, and therefore, as regards such a case, an ecclesiastical court is superior to a secular court, as Gregory Nazianzen writes. However, if the ecclesiastical court has failed because of the infidelity of the clergy, then such a case should not be treated at all.
Ad quintam rationem respondetur quod licet potestas iudiciaria secularis et potestas iudiciaria sacerdotalis sint potestates distincte, non tamen taliter sunt distincte quod nunquam habeat una iudicare de alia, et quod nulla causa que spectat ad unam potestatem in nullo casu spectet ad aliam potestatem, quia hoc est expresse contra canonicas sanctiones quibus asseritur manifeste quod potestas ecclesiastica nonnunquam habet iudicare de causis spectantibus ad iudicem secularem. Ergo per distinctionem istarum potestatum non potest probari quod in nullo casu spectet ad iudicem secularem de papa heretico iudicare. | To the fifth argument the answer made is that although the secular judicial power and the priestly judicial power are distinct powers, they are not so distinct that one never has the right to judge the other, and that no case that pertains to the one power in any case pertains to the other power, because this is expressly against the canonical laws by which it is clearly asserted that ecclesiastical power sometimes has the right to judge cases that pertain to a secular judge. Therefore, it cannot be proved by the distinction of these powers that in no case does it pertain to a secular judge to judge a heretic pope.
Ad sextam rationem respondetur quod, sicut ad imperatores qui erant pagani spectabat non in quantum erant pagani sed in quantum erant homines Deum colere et idola relinquere, ita ad imperatores et reges qui erant pagani non in quantum erant pagani sed in quantum erant imperatores et reges spectabat Catholicos defensare. Propter quod ad imperatores et reges christianos, qui succedunt imperatoribus et regibus paganis non in paganismo sed in imperiali et regia potestate, spectat etiam papam hereticum, quem clerici nolunt vel non possunt corrigere, cohercere. | To the sixth argument the answer made is that, just as it pertained to emperors who were pagans, not insofar as they were pagans but insofar as they were men, to worship God and abandon idols, so it pertained to emperors and kings who were pagans, not insofar as they were pagans but insofar as they were emperors and kings, to defend Catholics. Because of this, it pertains to Christian emperors and kings, who succeed pagan emperors and kings not in paganism but in imperial and royal power, to coerce even a heretic pope whom the clerics are unwilling or unable to correct.
Ad rationem septimam respondetur quod in eadem causa contingit uti diversis legibus et in causa consimili unus iudex tenetur uti aliquibus legibus quibus alius uti non tenetur. In eadem ergo causa seculari aliis legibus utitur iudex in Italia et aliis legibus utitur iudex in Francia. Et ideo licet papa vel iudices ecclesiastici non teneantur uti legibus imperialibus seu secularibus in causa heresis, tamen iudices seculares in huiusmodi causa, quando spectat ad eos, uti possunt et legibus divinis et ecclesiasticis et etiam secularibus que non sunt contrarie legi divine vel legibus ecclesiasticis ad quas omnes Catholici astringuntur. | To the seventh argument the answer made is that different laws can be used in the same case, and one judge is bound in a similar case to use some laws that another is not bound to use. Therefore in the same secular case a judge in Italy uses some laws and a judge in France uses other laws. And therefore, although the Pope or ecclesiastical judges are not bound to use imperial or secular laws in a case of heresy, nevertheless secular judges in a case of this kind, when it pertains to them, can use both divine and ecclesiastical laws and even secular laws that are not contrary to divine law or to ecclesiastical laws to which all Catholics are bound.
Ad octavam rationem respondetur per ea que dicta sunt in responsione ad rationem quintam, quia una causa fidei in aliquo casu spectat ad iudicem secularem et alia causa fidei que est de aliquo quod nec est explicite condempnatum nec explicite approbatum nunquam pertinet ad diffinitionem iudicis secularis. | The eighth argument is answered by what was said in the response to the fifth argument, because one cause of faith in a certain case pertains to a secular judge and another cause of faith that is about something that is neither explicitly condemned nor explicitly approved never pertains to the definition of a secular judge.

Go to 1 Dial. 7 Chapter 1.