# WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS

## 1 Dial. 6.51-67
Text by George Knysh,
translation by John Kilcullen,
as at March, 2025

Capitulum 51 | Chapter 51
Discipulus: Puto quod si omnes rationes pro assertione predicta quantum possemus profundius discutere moliremur, librum maximum faceremus, et forte omnes difficultates tactas a iuristis de appellationibus, recusationibus, denuntiationibus, inquisitionibus, testificationibus, exceptionibus, accusationibus, detractionibus, diffamationibus, calumpniis, probationibus, presumptionibus, et purgationibus disserere cogeremur. Ideo absque perscrutatione subtili aliqua alia media brevissime tange quibus videatur ostendi assertio memorata, nam illis omnibus intellectis, melius sciam dominum summum pontificem ab oppositionibus emulorum defendere. | Student: I think that if we tried to discuss all the reasons for the aforementioned assertion as deeply as we could, we would make a very large book, and we would perhaps be forced to discuss all the difficulties touched upon by the jurists about appeals, recusations, denunciations, investigations, testimonies, exceptions, accusations, detractions, defamations, calumniations, proofs, presumptions, and purgations. Therefore, without subtle examination, touch very briefly on some other means by which the above-mentioned assertion may seem to be shown, because if I understand them all I may know better how to defend the lord supreme pontiff from the oppositions of his enemies.
Magister: Secunda ratio ad probandum quod omnes catholici, qui congrue possunt, tenentur defendere impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate (antequam constiterit quod malo zelo procedunt), si fuerint in periculo constituti, talis est. Unusquisque tenetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri, teste Veritate que Matth. ait: "Omnia ergo quecunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite eis. Hec est enim lex et prophete." Et Luc. 6 ait: "Prout vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite illis similiter." Sed unusquisque, propter zelum bonum periculis mortis vel aliis quibuscunque expositus, rationabiliter vellet ab aliis defendi, foveri, et iuvari. Ergo quicunque videt alium in mortis periculis vel aliis constitutum propter impugnationem pape de heretica pravitate, quam presumit vel presumere debet ex bono zelo procedere, tenetur eum, si potest, defendere, fovere, et iuvare. | Master: A second argument [the first is here] to prove that all Catholics who are fittingly able are bound to defend those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity (before it is certain that they proceed from bad zeal), if they are endangered, is as follows. Everyone is bound to do for others what they wish done for themselves, as Truth testifies, who says (Matt. 7): "Therefore, all things whatever that you want men to do for you, do you also for them. For this is the law and the prophets." And in Luke 6 he says: "As you want people to do for you, do you also likewise for them." But everyone exposed because of good zeal to the danger of death or other dangers would reasonably want to be defended, supported, and helped by others. Therefore whoever sees someone in danger of death or other dangers because of attacking the pope concerning heretical perversity, which he presumes, or should presume, to proceed from good zeal, is obliged, if he can, to defend, support, and help him.
Tertia ratio est hec. Qui sunt audiendi in aliqua causa sunt etiam defendendi, si querantur ad mortem pro tali causa. Sed volentes impugnare papam de heretica pravitate sunt in favorem fidei audiendi. Ergo sunt etiam defendendi. | A third argument is this. Those who should be heard in some case should also be defended if they are pursued to death for such a cause. But those who want to attack the pope concerning heretical perversity should be heard in favour of the faith. Therefore they should also be defended.
Quarta ratio est hec. Sicut ad legislatorem pertinet providere subiectis ne criminentur iniuste, ita ad ipsum spectat cavere ne delinquere valeant insolenter. Sed Deus est perfectissimus legislator, cuius subiecti sunt summus pontifex et universi catholici. Ergo sicut ad legem divinam omnibus datam catholicis spectat providere summo pontifice ne a subditis suis criminetur iniuste, ita ad legem divinam spectat cavere ne summus pontifex in suorum subditorum perniciem et periculum fidei christiane delinquere valeat insolenter. Sed si impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate non essent a catholicis defendendi, papa libere absque metu legis cuiuscunque posset predicare, docere, et tenere pravitatem hereticam insolenter in perniciem catholicorum et periculum fidei orthodoxe. Ergo taliter impugnantes papam sunt a catholicis defendendi. | A fourth argument is this. As it pertains to the lawgiver to provide for his subjects that they may not be unjustly accused, so it pertains to him to take care that they may not commit crimes insolently. But God is the most perfect lawgiver, to whom the supreme pontiff and all Catholics are subject. Therefore, just as it concerns the divine law given to all Catholics to provide for the supreme pontiff not to be unjustly accused by his subjects, so it concerns the divine law to take care that the supreme pontiff should not be able to transgress insolently to the ruin of his subjects and danger to the Christian faith. But if those attacking the pope concerning heretical perversity were not to be defended by Catholics, the pope could freely preach, teach, and hold heretical perversity without fear of any law to the ruin of Catholics and danger to the orthodox faith. Therefore those who attack the pope in this way are to be defended by Catholics.
Quinta ratio est hec. Ad caritatem fraternam spectat proximis in cunctis suis necessitatibus subvenire, iuxta illud beati Iohannis Apostoli in canonica prima c. 3: "Qui habuerit substantiam mundi et videret fratrem suum necesse habere et clauserit viscera sua ab eo quomodo caritas Dei manet in eo", quasi diceret "nullo modo", et ideo subdit: "Non diligamus verbo nec lingua sed opere et veritate." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod omnes tenemur proximis cum indigent, si possumus, non solum verbo aut lingua sed etiam veritate et opere subvenire. Quod maxime continet veritatem quando presumimus vel presumere debemus proximos nostros absque culpa sua et ex bonitate sua in necessitatem vel indigentiam quam sustinent incidisse. Sed si videmus impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate in gravibus periculis constitutos, si non constet nobis legitime quod ex malo zelo procedunt, debemus presumere ipsos ex zelo bono et bonitate sua in talia pericula incidisse. Ergo tunc eis maxime subvenire tenemur, et per consequens eos, si possumus, defendere et liberare tenemur. | A fifth argument is this. It pertains to brotherly charity to assist neighbors in all their needs, according to a text of the blessed John in his first canonical letter, chapter 3: "He who has worldly substance and sees his brother in need and has closed his bowels against him, how does the love of God remain in him?", as if to say "In no way"; and therefore he adds: "Let us not love in word or tongue, but in deed and truth." From these words it is gathered that we are all bound to assist our neighbors when they are in need, if we can, not only in word or tongue, but also in truth and deed. This is especially true when we presume, or ought to presume, that our neighbors have fallen into the need or want they are in through no fault of their own and because of their goodness. But if we see those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity to be placed in grave dangers, if we are not legitimately certain that they proceed from bad zeal, we should presume that they have fallen into such dangers because of good zeal and their goodness. Therefore we are then most of all bound to help them, and consequently we are bound, if we can, to defend and free them.
Sexta ratio est hec. Magis tenetur catholicus catholicum defendere ne pro fide catholica patiatur iniuste, quam teneatur servus defendere dominum suum ne sibi pro causa temporali iniuria inferatur. Sed servus, quamvis iurisdictionem non habeat, debet defendere dominum suum ne pro causa temporali sibi iniuria inferatur. Ergo multo magis catholicus, etiam non prelatus, catholicum debet defendere ne pro fide catholica contra iustitiam patiatur. | A sixth argument is this. A Catholic is more bound to defend a Catholic lest he suffer unjustly for the Catholic faith than a servant is bound to defend his master lest injury be done to him for a temporal cause. But a servant, although he has no jurisdiction, should defend his master lest injury be done to him for a temporal cause. Therefore, much more, a Catholic, even if not a prelate, should defend a Catholic lest he suffer unjustly for the sake of the Catholic faith.
Septima ratio talis est. Illum debet unusquisque, si potest, defendere qui patitur pro causa quam quilibet tenetur vite corporali preponere. Sed causam fidei catholice quilibet debet corporali vite preponere. Ergo omnem patientem pro fide catholica quilibet debet defendere, si potest. Sed qui cernit impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate (antequam convincantur de malo zelo) periculis propter huiusmodi impugnationem expositos, presumere debet quod pro fide catholica patiantur. Ergo tunc eos, si potest, tenetur defendere. | A seventh argument is as follows. Everyone must, if he can, defend anyone who suffers for a cause that everyone is bound to value above his bodily life. But everyone should value the cause of the Catholic faith above bodily life. Therefore everyone should defend, if he can, everyone who suffers for the Catholic faith. But anyone who sees those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity (before they are convicted of bad zeal) to be exposed to danger because of this attack should presume that they suffer for the Catholic faith. Therefore he is then bound, if he can, to defend them.
Octava ratio est hec. Qui tenetur bonum alterius procurare, debet malum eiusdem removere, si potuerit. Sed quilibet catholicus tenetur, si potest, bonum impugnantium papam de heretica pravitate procurare. Aliter enim non diligeret ipsos sicut seipsum. Ergo si viderit eos in periculo constitutos, debet eos a periculo liberare, si potest. | An eighth argument is this. Anyone who is bound to procure the good of another should remove an evil from that person, if he can. But every Catholic is bound, if he can, to secure the good of those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity, for otherwise he would not love them as himself. Therefore, if he sees them in danger, he should deliver them from danger, if he can.
Nona ratio talis est. Quilibet catholicus magis tenetur liberare personam proximi propter impugnationem pape heretici de heretica pravitate in periculo constitutam, quam teneatur asinum vel iumentum inimici sui, si prostratum viderit, sublevare. Sed quilibet tenetur asinum inimici sui, si prostratum viderit, sublevare, teste lege divina que, ut habetur Exod. 23, ait: "Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere non pertransibis sed sublevabis cum eo." Ergo multo fortius, si viderit catholicum quem nescit errare pati iniuriam vel in periculo constitutum propter zelum fidei orthodoxe, ipsum liberare tenetur, si potest. | A ninth argument is as follows. Every Catholic is more bound to deliver the person of his neighbor put in danger because of an attack on a heretic pope concerning heretical perversity than he is bound to lift up the ass or cattle of his enemy if he sees it fallen. But every one is bound to lift up the ass of his enemy if he sees it fallen, according to the divine law, which says (Exod. 23): "If you see that the ass of one who hates you has fallen under a load, you will not pass by, but you will lift it with him." Therefore, much more, if he sees a Catholic whom he does not know to be in error suffering injury or put in danger because of zeal for the orthodox faith, he is bound to rescue him, if he can.
Decima ratio est hec. Unusquisque proximum suum sicut seipsum debet diligere (Matth. 22), ergo quilibet debet facere alii in extremo periculo constituto quod vult facere pro seipso. Sed quilibet vult seipsum defendere. Ergo quilibet tenetur defendere proximum suum in periculo constitutum, maxime si propter iustitiam periculum sustinere videtur. Quilibet ergo, si viderit proximum suum in periculo constitutum propter hoc quod impugnat papam de heretica pravitate, et non constat sibi quod malo zelo movetur, ipsum defendere tenetur. | A tenth argument is this. Everyone should love his neighbor as himself (Mat. 22); therefore everyone should do for others placed in extreme risk what he wants to do for himself. But everyone wants to defend himself. Therefore every one is obliged to defend his neighbor who is placed in danger, especially if he seems to bear the danger for the sake of justice. Anyone, therefore, if he sees his neighbor in danger because he attacks the pope concerning heretical perversity, and he is not certain that the attacker is motivated by bad zeal, is bound to defend him.
Undecima ratio est hec. Illud quod extra tempus necessitatis est licitum, tempore necessitatis extreme est debitum, cum videamus multa que extra tempus necessitatis extreme sunt illicita tempore necessitatis extreme esse non solum licita sed etiam debita. Dare enim rem alienam pauperi pro sustentatione sua extra tempus necessitatis est illicitum, secundum quod sacri canones testantur aperte, et ratio manifestat. Dare tamen rem alienam pauperi pro sustentatione nature tempore necessitatis extreme, quando scilicet aliter pro illo tempore sustentari non potest, est debitum. Qui enim viderit pauperem mori fame, et non posset sustentare ipsum nisi dando sibi panem alienum, si non appareret alius qui vellet aut posset pauperi subvenire, peccaret mortaliter nisi panem alterius sibi preberet. Illud igitur quod extra tempus necessitatis extreme est licitum, pro tempore necessitatis extreme est debitum. | An eleventh argument is this. What is permissible outside a time of necessity is obligatory in time of extreme necessity, since we see that [even] many things impermissible outside a time of extreme necessity are, in a time of extreme necessity, not only permissible but even obligatory. For to give someone else's property [e.g. for me to give your property] to a poor person for his support is impermissible outside a time of necessity, as the sacred canons clearly testify and reason makes clear; however, in a time of extreme need, to give someone else's property to support a poor person is an obligation, namely when support cannot be provided at that time in any other way. For anyone who saw a poor man dying of hunger and could not support him except by giving him someone else's bread (if no one else seemed willing or able to help the poor man) would sin mortally if he did not give him someone else's bread. Therefore what is permissible outside a time of extreme necessity is [may be?], in a time of extreme necessity, obligatory.
Sed defendere impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate extra tempus necessitatis extreme est licitum, saltem si papa non precipit contrarium. Ergo tempore necessitatis extreme defendere taliter impugnantes papam, sive papa precipiat contrarium sive non, est debitum. Papa enim non potest precipere contra illud quod homo debet alii tempore necessitatis extreme, nisi ipse per se vel per alium necessitatem extremam patienti voluerit ministrare. Non enim potest papa precipere cuicumque non pascere de alieno pauperem constitutum in extrema necessitate, si aliter non posset pascere ipsum, nec papa per se nec per alium vellet pascere eum, nec appareret alius qui posset eius indigentie subvenire. Nichil enim potest papa precipere quod obviat caritati fraterne, ergo consimiliter non potest papa precipere alicui quod non defendat modo sibi congruenti impugnantem papam de heretica pravitate, si est in ultimo periculo constitutus, et non constat sibi quod talis impugnans nequaquam [nequaquam omitted Ly] malo zelo movetur. Et si papa daret tale preceptum, sibi non esset obediendum quoquo modo, quia preciperet contra legem divinam. | But it is permissible outside a time of extreme necessity to defend those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity, at least if the pope does not command the contrary. Therefore, in a time of extreme necessity, it is obligatory to defend those who thus attack the pope, whether the pope commands the contrary or not: for the pope cannot command against what someone owes another in a time of extreme necessity, unless he wishes to minister (himself or through another) to the person suffering extreme need. For the pope cannot command anyone not to feed a poor person in extreme need with someone else's bread, if he could not otherwise feed him and if neither the pope (himself or through another) would wish to feed him and noone else appeared who could help his need. For the pope cannot command anything that obstructs brotherly charity. Therefore similarly the pope cannot command someone not to defend (in a manner appropriate to him) someone attacking the pope concerning heretical perversity if the attacker is placed in ultimate danger and the defender is not certain that such an attacker is not at all [delete "not at all"?] motivated by bad zeal. And if the pope were to give such a command, he should not be obeyed in any way, because his command would be against divine law.
Capitulum 52 | Chapter 52
Discipulus: Desine allegare pro assertione predicta et dic quomodo potest ostendi quod prelati et iurisdictionem habentes debent defendere sibi subiectos si papam de pravitate heretica voluerint impugnare. | Student: Stop arguing for the aforesaid assertion and tell how it can be shown that prelates and those having jurisdiction should defend their subjects who want to attack the pope concerning heretical perversity.
Magister: Hoc videtur posse probari primo sic. Qui oves sue cure commissas quas reputat innocentes vel reputare debet non defendit, cum potest, mercenario comparatur, de quo dicit Christus Ioh. 10: "Videt lupum venientem et dimittit oves et fugit et lupus rapit et dispergit oves. Mercenarius autem fugit quia mercenarius est" etc. Sed prelati debent esse pastores, non mercenarii, ergo tenentur oves suas, precipue quas reputant innocentes vel reputare debent, ab invasoribus defendere. | Master: It seems that this can be proved at first like this. Whoever does not, when he can, defend sheep entrusted to his care whom he does, or should, consider innocent is like a hireling, of whom Christ says Jn. 10: "He sees a wolf coming and leaves the sheep and runs away, and the wolf snatches and scatters the sheep. The mercenary flees because he is a mercenary", etc. But prelates should be shepherds, not hirelings; therefore they are bound to defend their sheep from invaders, especially those they regard, or should regard, as innocent.
Discipulus: Prelati debent defendere oves contra lupos, non contra papam. Ideo si papa mandaverit impugnantes ipsum de heretica pravitate captivari, vel incarcerari, aut pena alia plecti, prelati eos non debent defendere. | Student: Prelates should defend the sheep against the wolves, not against the pope. Therefore, if the pope ordered those who attacked him concerning heretical perversity to be captured, or imprisoned, or given some other punishment, prelates should not defend them.
Magister: Ex ista responsione tua putant nonnulli demonstrative probare assertionem predictam. Quia prelati debent defendere oves suas contra omnes lupos, si possunt. Sed si papa mandaverit captivari et male tractari ipsum de pravitate heretica impugnare volentes absque cause cognitione, vel antequam de malo zelo fuerint aperte convicti, inter lupos gregem dominicum crudeliter invadentes est merito computandus, quia propter opus quod licitum invenitur nullus debet puniri priusquam convincatur tale opus non bene sed impie perpetrasse. Constat autem quod impugnare papam de heretica pravitate potest esse licitum, quia papa potest esse hereticus et de heresi licite impugnari. Ergo nullus qui impugnat papam de pravitate heretica antequam appareat quod talis impugnatio ex malitia et ex iniquitate procedit, puniri debet. Papa ergo, puniens et male tractans ipsum taliter impugnare volentes antequam ostenderit quod male moventur, contra ipsos potestatem tyrannicam exercere dinoscitur, et per consequens est inter lupos merito numerandus. Ex quo sequitur quod prelati contra ipsum tenentur oves suas in hoc casu defendere. | Master: From this answer of yours some think to prove the aforesaid assertion demonstratively. Because prelates ought to defend their sheep against all wolves, if they can. But if the pope orders to be captured and ill-treated those who want to attack him concerning heretical perversity, without cognizance of the case, or before they have been clearly convicted of bad zeal, he should rightly be counted among the wolves who cruelly attack the Lord's flock, because for a work that is permissible no one should be punished before he is convicted of having done that work not well but impiously. Now it is certain that it can be permissible to attack a pope concerning heretical perversity, because a pope can be a heretic and be lawfully attacked as being a heretic. Therefore, no one who attacks the pope concerning heretical perversity should be punished before it appears that such an attack proceeds from malice and iniquity. A pope, therefore, who punishes and ill-treats those who wish to attack him in such a way, before he shows that they are wrongly motivated, is known to exercise a tyrannical power against them, and consequently he is justly counted as a wolf. From this it follows that prelates are bound in this case to defend their sheep against him.
Discipulus: Prelati inferiores supponere debent quod papa iuste facit quicquid facit, et ideo presumere debent quod iuste mandat ipsum impugnare volentes pena debita plecti. | Student: Inferior prelates should assume that the pope does justly whatever he does, and therefore they should assume that he justly orders those who want to attack him to be punished with due punishment.
Magister: Sunt autem nonnulli dicentes quod hic incidis in heresim manifestam in quam, ut dicunt, plurimi modernis temporibus sunt prolapsi, quemadmodum fertur de multis qui asserunt papam deum reputandum in terris, et ideo nulli licet iudicare quod unquam aliquod peccatum committat. Dicunt igitur quod hec est manifesta heresis, scilicet quod prelati inferiores debent supponere quod papa iuste facit quicquid facit. Ex hoc enim sequeretur quod si prelati viderent papam demones invocare, Christum blasphemare, fidem negare, adulterium committere, furari, innocentem occidere, periurare, ecclesias vendere, ad usuras dare pecuniam, deberent ipsum de crimine excusare, et quod bene faceret iudicare, quod est heresis manifesta. Dicunt igitur quod, iuxta sententiam Bede, de criminibus manifestis quorumcunque, pape et aliorum, nobis permittitur iudicare. Quod etiam exemplo beati Pauli constat aperte, qui de facto beati Petri iudicavit aperte, et ideo ipsum malefecisse publice reprehendit. Si igitur papa mandaret ipsum impugnare volentes male tractari antequam eos indebite se impugnare monstraret, liceret cuilibet iudicare papam impie et iniuste procedere, imo de principali imposito, scilicet de pravitate heretica, suspectum habere deberetur, et prelati suas oves ab eo tanquam a lupo crudeli defendere tenerentur. | Master: But there are some who say that here you fall into a manifest heresy, into which, they say, many in modern times have fallen, as is said of many who assert that the pope should be regarded as a god on earth and therefore no one may judge that he ever commits any sin. They say, therefore, that this is manifest heresy, namely, that inferior prelates should suppose that the pope does justly whatever he does. For it would follow from this that if prelates saw the pope invoking demons, blaspheming Christ, denying the faith, committing adultery, stealing, killing the innocent, perjuring, selling churches, lending money at usury, they should excuse him of crime and judge that he did well, which is manifest heresy. They therefore say that, in accordance with the opinion of Bede [Brev. 1.11, Short Discourse, p.16], we are permitted to judge of the manifest crimes of any person, whether of the pope or of others. This is also evident from the example of blessed Paul, who openly judged the deed of blessed Peter and therefore publicly reproached him for having acted badly [Gal. 2:11-14]. If, therefore, the pope ordered those who wished to attack him to be ill-treated before he showed that they attacked him unduly, it would be permissible for anyone to judge that the pope had proceeded impiously and unjustly -- indeed, he should be held to be under suspicion of the principal charge, that is, of heretical perversity; and prelates would be bound to defend their sheep from him as from a cruel wolf.
Discipulus: Mirum est quod isti dicunt, cum asserunt cuilibet licere iudicare papam in hoc impie et iniuste procedere, et quod prelati debent taliter impugnantes contra papam defendere, cum papa sit magis immediatus prelatus taliter impugnantium quam quicunque alius prelatus inferior, quare qui eos defendit contra papam iniuriam pape noscitur irrogare, a iurisdictione pape suos subditos subtrahendo. | Student: What these people say is strange, when they assert that it is lawful for anyone to judge that in this the pope proceeds impiously and unjustly and that prelates should defend against the pope those who attack in this way, since the pope is the more immediate prelate of those who attack in this way than any other inferior prelate, therefore whoever defends them against the pope is known to inflict a wrong on the pope, by withdrawing his subjects from the pope's jurisdiction.
Magister: Respondetur ad hoc quod taliter impugnantes sunt pars contra papam, quare in hoc papa iudex eorum esse non debet, cum nullus debeat esse iudex in propria causa. | Master: Answer is made to this that those who attack in this way are a party against the pope [who is the other party to the case]. Therefore the pope should not be their judge in this matter, since no one should be a judge in his own case.
Discipulus: Hoc non videtur verum de papa, quia papa potest esse iudex in propria causa, teste Innocentio tertio qui, ut habetur Extra, De iudiciis, Cum venisset, ait: "Cum super privilegiis sedis apostolice causa vertitur, nolumus de ipsis per alios iudicari." Ergo papa potest esse iudex in propria causa, et per consequens si aliqui volunt impugnare papam, ipse papa potest esse iudex, et ita, si dat sententiam contra eos mandando quod detineantur, vel incarcerentur, vel alias puniantur, standum est sententie eius. | Student: This does not seem to be true of the pope, because the pope can be the judge in his own case, as witnessed by Innocent III, who, as we find in Extra, De iudiciis, Cum venisset, says: "When the case turns on the privileges of the Apostolic See, we are not willing to be judged about them by others." Therefore, the pope can be judge in his own case; and consequently if some people want to attack the pope, the pope himself can be the judge, and so if he gives a sentence against them, ordering that they be detained, or imprisoned, or otherwise punished, his sentence should be respected.
Magister: Hoc quibusdam apparet contra rationem omnino. Nam licet papa debeat iudicare inter litigantes super interpretandis privilegiis, quia eius est interpretari cuius est condere, licet etiam posset esse iudex in propria causa que de rebus temporalibus verteretur, nullo tamen modo est consentaneum rationi quod sit iudex in propria causa cum de crimine impugnatur, et ita papa nullo modo debet esse iudex quando apparent ipsum de heresi impugnare volentes. Quare si ipsos propter hoc punit, licet cuilibet iudicare quod iniuste et impie agit, et quod iudicium subterfugere querit. Quare etiam de heresi esset merito suspectus habendus. | Master: To some this seems completely against reason. For although the pope ought to judge between litigants over privileges that need to be interpreted, because interpretation [of a privilege] belongs to the person to whom it belongs to establish it, although he could also be a judge in his own cause if it concerned temporal matters, it is in no way consistent with reason that he should be the judge in his own cause when he is attacked concerning a crime. And thus the pope should in no way to be the judge when some appear who want to attack him as a heretic. Therefore, if he punishes them for this, it is lawful for any one to judge that he acts unjustly and impiously and that he seeks to evade judgment. Therefore he should also be justly suspected of being a heretic.
Discipulus: Alias rationes allega. | Student: Bring forward other arguments.
Magister: Secunda ratio pro eadem assertione talis est. Magis tenentur prelati defendere impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate antequam sibi constiterit ipsos ex malo zelo procedere quam teneantur defendere viduas et pupillos. Sed prelati viduas et pupillos tenentur defendere (dist. 87 c. 1, et c. Defensionis). Ergo multo magis tenentur defendere papam de heresi impugnantes antequam sibi constiterit quod sint nocentes. | Master: A second argument for the same assertion is as follows. Prelates are more bound to defend those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity, before it is certain to them that the attackers proceed from bad zeal, than they are bound to defend widows and orphans. But prelates are bound to defend widows and orphans (dist. 87 c. 1, and c. Defensionis). Therefore, much more, they are obliged to defend those who attack the pope concerning heresy before they are certain that the attackers are not innocent.
Tertia ratio est hec. Prelati tenentur defendere sibi subiectos etiam contra papam, contra quos nulla causa iniquitatis obicitur. Si enim papa aliquos vellet confundere absque omni causa, prelati eorum, si possent, eos defendere tenerentur. Ergo multo magis tenentur prelati defendere sibi subiectos si pro causa que presumenda est iusta a papa ad mortem vel ad aliam confusionem queruntur iniuste. Sed qui impugnare desiderant papam de heretica pravitate antequam constiterit quod malo zelo moventur, presumendi sunt iustam causam habere. Ergo tunc a prelatis sunt potissime defendendi. | A third argument is this. Prelates are bound to defend their subjects even against the pope, if no case of iniquity is charged against them. For if the pope wished to confound some without any case, their prelates would be bound to defend them, if they could. Therefore, much more, prelates are bound to defend their subjects if, for a cause that should be presumed to be just, they are unjustly pursued by the pope seeking their death or some other confusion. But those who desire to attack the pope concerning heretical perversity, before it is certain that they are motivated by bad zeal, are to be presumed to have a just cause. Therefore they should then be most powerfully defended by prelates.
Quarta ratio est hec. Illi qui tenentur papam de crimine corrigere, tenentur volentes papam de eodem crimine impugnare defendere, nisi constiterit eis quod malo zelo moveantur. Sed prelati tenentur papam de heresi corrigere si eum sciverint hereticam pravitatem incurrisse, quia aliter papa de heresi accusari non potest. Ergo tenentur volentes eum de heresi impugnare defendere. | A fourth argument is this. Those who are bound to correct the pope concerning a crime are bound to defend those who wish to attack the pope concerning that crime, unless they are certain that the attackers are motivated by bad zeal. But prelates are obliged to correct a pope concerning heresy if they know that he has incurred heretical perversity, because otherwise a pope cannot be accused of heresy. Therefore they are obliged to defend those who wish to attack him concerning heresy.
Capitulum 53 | Chapter 53
Discipulus: Nunquid reges et principes ac alie publice potestates tenentur volentes papam de heresi impugnare defendere? | Student: Are kings and rulers and other public authorities bound to defend those who wish to attack the pope concerning heresy?
Magister: Dicunt quidam quod sic, fundantes se in hoc quod causa fidei per sacros canones est causa universorum fidelium, et ideo omnes fideles tenentur causam fidei defendere et fovere. Quare etiam debent defendere causam fidei prosequentes si non constat quod eandem causam falso prosequuntur et inique. Qui autem impugnant papam de heretica pravitate causam fidei ostendunt se prosequi. Ergo reges et alie publice potestates tenentur eos defendere, si non constiterit eis quod fovent iniustam causam. Hoc etiam probant plures rationes supra inducte. | Master: Some say Yes, basing themselves on the fact that according to the sacred canons the cause of faith is the cause of all the faithful, and therefore all the faithful are bound to defend and support the cause of faith; therefore they should also defend those who pursue the cause of faith, unless it is certain that they are pursuing the same cause falsely and unjustly. But those who attack the pope for heretical perversion show that they are pursuing the cause of the faith. Therefore, kings and other public authorities are bound to defend them, if they are not certain that they are fostering an unjust cause. A number of the arguments advanced above prove this also.
Capitulum 54 | Chapter 54
Discipulus: Nunquid reges et principes debent arma movere pro defensione illorum qui volunt papam de heresi impugnare? | Student: Should kings and rulers take up arms in defense of those who want to attack the pope concerning heresy?
Magister: Respondent quidam quod sic, dicentes quod si apparuerint dicentes se velle papam de heresi legitime impugnare, qui sint tales quod ab accusatione seu impugnatione pape sint nullatenus repellendi, reges et principes ac alie publice potestates in quorum dominio seu iurisdictione morantur, pro eorum defensione res et personas, si oportuerit, tenentur exponere, quod tali ratione nituntur ostendere. | Master: Some answer Yes, saying that, if some appear saying that they wish to attack the pope legitimately concerning heresy who are such that they are not to be repelled from the accusation or attack on the pope, kings and rulers and other public authorities in whose dominion or jurisdiction they reside are bound to risk their possessions and persons in the attackers' defense, if necessary. They try to show this by the following argument.
Pro defensione illorum debent reges et principes arma movere, si oportuerit, et etiam res et personas suas exponere, qui, cum sint a regibus et principibus defendendi, prosequuntur causam pro qua reges et principes debent, si oportuerit, arma movere ac etiam res et personas suas exponere. Quia cum tales ex tali causa defenduntur, magis defenditur causa quam ipsi. Sed reges et principes debent arma movere ac res et personas suas exponere pro causa quam taliter impugnantes papam prosequuntur, quia pro causa fidei ad talia facienda tenentur. Ergo pro defensione ipsorum consimilia facere astringuuntur. | Kings and rulers should take up arms, if necessary, and also risk their possessions and persons, in defense of those who pursue a cause for which kings and rulers [themselves] must, if necessary, take up arms and also risk their possessions and persons; for when such people are defended for such a cause, the cause is defended rather than those people. But kings and rulers should take up arms and risk their possessions and persons for the cause that people pursue who thus attack the pope, because they are bound to do such things for the cause of faith. Therefore, for the attackers' defense they are constrained to do the like.
Item, reges pro iustitia usque ad mortem certare tenentur, iuxta illud Ecclesiastici 4: "Usque ad mortem certa pro iustitia." Sed sicut iustum est reges et principes defendere fidem catholicam, ita iustum est eos defendere illos qui causam fidei prosequuntur, cuiusmodi sunt inter alios illi qui papam volunt de heresi impugnare. Ergo pro defensione eorum reges et principes usque ad mortem certare tenentur, et per consequens pro eis arma movere ac res et personas suas exponere, si oportuerit, de necessitate iustitie compelluntur. | Likewise, kings are bound to fight for justice to the death, according to a text in Ecclesiasticus 4: "Fight to death for justice." But just as it is right for kings and rulers to defend the Catholic faith, so it is right to defend those who prosecute the cause of the faith, such as (among others) those who want to attack the pope concerning heresy. For their defense, kings and rulers are therefore bound to fight to the death, and consequently they are compelled by necessity of justice to take up arms on their behalf and risk their possessions and persons, if necessary.
Amplius, non minus tenentur reges et principes repellere a subditis suis violentiam inferendam, quam teneantur vindicare iniuriam illatam. Sed reges et principes, ad vindicandam iniuriam illatam volentibus papam de pravitate heretica impugnare, arma movere tenentur. Ergo, etiam ad repellendam violentiam inferendam taliter impugnantibus papam, debent arma movere, et ita pro defensione eorundem arma movere tenentur. Maior videtur aperta. Minor ostenditur sic. Non minus tenentur reges et principes arma movere pro vindicanda iniuria illata subditis in contemptum fidei christiane, quam pro iniuria illata in contemptum regie maiestatis. Sed pro iniuria illata subditis in contemptum regie maiestatis reges arma movere tenentur, exemplo David regis qui, ut legitur 2 Reg. 10, Amonitas potenter invasit propter iniuriam factam nuntiis eius. Ergo reges et principes pro vindicanda iniuria illata in contemptum fidei christiane arma movere tenentur. | Moreover, kings and rulers are no less bound to repulse the infliction of violence on their subjects than they are bound to avenge an injury inflicted. But kings and rulers are bound to take up arms to avenge a wrong inflicted upon those who wish to attack the pope concerning heretical perversity. Therefore, they should take up arms also to repulse the infliction of violence on those who attack the pope in this way, and thus they are bound to take up arms in their defense. The major seems obvious. The minor is shown as follows. Kings and rulers are no less obliged to take up arms to avenge an injury inflicted on their subjects in contempt of the Christian faith, than for an injury inflicted on their subjects in contempt of the royal majesty. But for an injury inflicted upon subjects in contempt of the royal majesty kings are bound to take up arms, according to the example of King David, who, as it is read in 2 Kings 10, powerfully invaded the Ammonites because of an injury done to his messengers. Therefore, kings and rulers are bound to take up arms in order to avenge an injury inflicted in contempt of the Christian faith.
Capitulum 55 | Chapter 55
Discipulus: Multa scrutati sumus de appellationibus a summo pontifice et de impugnantibus ipsum, motivaque quedam illorum qui asserunt quod sepe expedit a papa heretico appellare, licet, quantum est de iure divino et humano, non oporteat appellare sed sufficit impugnare, et quod impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate antequam constiterit eos malo zelo moveri sunt a catholicis defendendi, iuvandi, et fovendi. Que omnia, et eis annexa, tecum post completionem istius operis iterum pertractabo, et quid tu de omnibus sentias indagabo. Ideo finem isti materie faciendo, dic quomodo respondetur ad allegationes quibus ostenditur quod a papa appellare non liceat. | Student: We have examined many things about appeals from the supreme pontiff and about those who attack him, and the arguments of some of those who assert that it is expedient to appeal from a heretic pope (although, as far as divine and human law is concerned, it is not necessary to appeal, but it is sufficient to attack), and assert that those who attack the pope concerning heretical perversity (before it is certain that they are motivated by bad zeal) should be defended, aided and supported by Catholics. All these things, and things connected with them, I will thoroughly discuss with you after the completion of this work and inquire what you think about them all. Therefore, concluding this matter, say how answer is made the arguments to show that it is not permissible to appeal from the pope.
Magister: Ille allegationes posite sunt supra capitulo 16, ubi per auctoritates et rationes ostenditur quod in nullo casu licet a summo pontifice appellare. Ad intelligentiam autem auctoritatum dicunt quidam esse notandum quod non semper verbum generale est generaliter intelligendum, quod per infinita exempla scripture divine dicunt posse probari, de quibus adducam pauca. Legitur enim 4 Reg. 8: "Ivit igitur Asahel in occursum eius", scilicet Helysei, "habens secum munera et omnia bona Damasci." De quo tamen constat quod in Damasco multa bona reliquit. Nec etiam de omni genere bonorum Damasci habuit secum. Non enim portavit secum aliqua de omni specie lapidum, vasorum, instrumentorum, lignorum, animalium, ciborum, metallorum, et ceterarum rerum que erant in Damasco. Legitur etiam Marci 1 : " Egrediebatur ad illum", scilicet Iohannem Baptistam, "omnis Iudee regio et Hierosolimite universi et baptizabantur ab illo." Et tamen multi Hierosolimite a Iohanne minime baptizati fuerunt. Multi enim principum, sacerdotum, et seniorum qui erant Hierosolimis ab ipso baptizari nolebant, quia sibi nullatenus crediderunt, teste Salvatore qui, ut habetur Matth. 21, dixit eis: "Venit enim ad vos Iohannes in via iustitie et non credidistis ei." Et ita verba Marci predicta non sunt generaliter intelligenda. Sic etiam sepe mandata generali iussione nonnulla intelliguntur excepta (Extra, De officio legati, Quod translationem). Verba ergo generalia non debent semper generaliter intelligi. | Master: Those arguments are set forth above in chapter 16, where it is shown by authorities and arguments that in no case is it permissible to appeal from the supreme pontiff. But to understand the texts, some say that it should be noted that a general word is not always to be understood in a general way, which they say can be proved by divine scripture by infinite examples, of which I will add a few. For we read 4 Kings 8: "So Hazael went to meet him", namely Eliseus, "having with him gifts and all the goods of Damascus", of whom, however, it is clear that in Damascus he left many goods. He did not even have with him some of every kind of the goods of Damascus, for he did not carry with him instances of all kinds of stones, vessels, tools, wood, animals, food, metals, and other things that were in Damascus. It is also read in Mark 1: "There went out to him", i.e. John the Baptist, "everyone of the region of Judea and Jerusalem and they were baptized by him." And yet many in Jerusalem were not at all baptized by John: for many of the rulers, priests, and elders who were in Jerusalem did not want to be baptized by him, because they did not believe in him at all, witness the Savior who, according to Matt. 21, said to them: "For John came to you in the way of righteousness, and you did not believe him." And so those words of Mark are not to be understood generally. Thus also often the commands with a general instruction should be understood with some things excepted (Extra, De officio legati, Quod translationem). Therefore, general words should not always be understood in a general way. [Cf. Brev. 2.14, Short Discourse, pp.45-7]
Per hoc ad auctoritatem Gelasii respondent quidam, dicentes quod ab apostolica sede, hoc est a papa, nunquam prorsus est appellandum, nisi inveniatur contra fidem errare vel in aliquo crimine de quo scandalizetur ecclesia incorrigibilem se ostendat. Aliter dicunt aliqui, quod Gelasius loquitur de appellationibus absque quibus sententia iudicis transit in rem iudicatam. Tali enim appellatione non est appellandum a papa licet contra fidem erraverit orthodoxam, quia sententia contra fidem sive appelletur sive non appelletur non potest transire in rem iudicatam, et ideo dicunt quod quamvis liceat tamen non est necesse a tali sententia appellare, et quamvis a tali sententia aliquis non appellaverit quantumcunque tempus transierit, licebit tamen sententiam impugnare. Aliter dicunt nonnulli quod Gelasius loquitur de appellationibus interiectis pro causis particularibus, non pro causis que tangunt totam christianitatem. Non enim licet appellare, ut dicunt, nisi papa erraverit contra fidem, vel nisi sit incorrigibilis de aliquo crimine, de quo omnes christiani leduntur. Pro aliis autem causis appellare non licet, quamvis quidam dicant quod si ecclesia universalis conveniret in unum ipsa haberet papam de omni crimine iudicare. | By this some respond to the text of Gelasius, saying that from the Apostolic See (that is, from the pope) one should never appeal at all, [i] unless he is found to be erring against the faith, or he shows himself incorrigible in some crime about which the Church is scandalized. In another way, some say [ii] that Gelasius speaks of appeals without which the decision of the judge passes into res judicata. For there is no need to appeal from the pope with such an appeal even if he errs against the orthodox faith, because a decision against the faith, whether appealed or not, cannot pass into res judicata; and therefore they say that although it is permissible, it is not necessary to appeal from such a decision, and even if no one has appealed from such a decision, it is still possible, no matter how much time has passed, to attack the decision. In another way, some say [iii] that Gelasius speaks of appeals made in regard to particular matters, not for matters that affect the whole of Christianity. For it is not permissible to appeal, as they say, unless the pope has erred against the faith, or unless he is incorrigible in some crime by which all Christians are injured; but it is not permissible to appeal for other causes, although some say [iiia] that if the universal Church were to meet as a whole, it would have power to judge the pope concerning every crime.
Discipulus: Quamvis non audierim quod frater M. et adherentes sibi istud ultimum opinentur, tamen alias super isto volo tecum diligentius disputare et motiva eorum ad reprobandum sollicite perscrutari. Nunc vero dic quomodo ad aliam auctoritatem Gelasii respondetur. | Student: Although I have not heard that Brother M. and those who adhere to him think this last, yet at another time I want to discuss this with you more carefully and carefully examine their arguments to disprove them. But now tell me how Gelasius' other text is answered.
Magister: Ad illam respondetur sicut ad precedentem, quod loquitur in aliis causis quam in causis fidei, vel de appellationibus absque quibus sententia transit in rem iudicatam. Sunt enim nonnulli qui horrent audire quod, quamvis papa assereret legem christianam esse falsam et Christum fuisse pseudo-prophetam, non liceret appellare ab ipso. | Master: The answer made to that is the same as to the previous one, that it speaks of cases other than cases of faith, or of appeals without which the sentence passes into res judicata. For there are some who are horrified to hear that even if a pope asserted that the Christian law was false and that Christ was a pseudo-prophet it would not be permissible to appeal from him.
Discipulus: Iste sunt hereses tam patentes et totam fidem catholicam enervantes, quod non est negandum quin pro talibus a summo pontifice appellare liceret. Tamen, ut videtur, pro aliis appellare non licet. | Student: These are hereses so obvious and destructive of the whole Catholic faith that it cannot be denied that it would be lawful to appeal from the supreme pontiff on account of such. However, it seems that it is not allowed to appeal on account of others.
Magister: Dicunt nonnulli quod hic erras aperte, quia si pro maxima heresi licet appellare a summo pontifice, etiam pro minima heresi appellare licebit, quia idem iuris est in magnis et in parvis. Quod Alexander tertius, ut habetur Extra, De appellationibus, c. De appellationibus, aperte testari videtur, dicens: "De appellationibus pro causis minimis interpositis volumus te tenere, quod eis, pro quacunque levi causa fiant, non minus est, quam si pro maioribus fierent, deferendum", ubi dicit glossa: "pro quolibet causa appellatur, quia ita potest quis gravari in parvo sicut in magno, quantitas cause non facit quare introducta sit appellatio, sed iniquum gravamen, supra eodem c. Ad nostram et infra eodem c. Cum speciali § Porro. Si c etiam in minima re furtum committitur, 14 q. ult. c. ult." | Master: Some say that here you are clearly mistaken, because if it is permissible to appeal from the supreme pontiff on account of the greatest heresy, it will also be permissible to appeal on account of the least, because the law is the same for great and small. Alexander III seems to have testified clearly to this effect, saying (Extra, De appellationibus, c. De appellationibus): "Regarding appeals made for the smallest causes, we want you to hold that, no matter how minor the cause, they must be treated no less favorably than if they were made for major causes", where the gloss says: "An appeal is made for any reason, because one can be oppressed in a small matter just as in a great one. The quantity of the cause does not determine why the appeal is introduced, but the unjust oppression, (above, the same, c. Ad Nostram, and below, the same, c. Cum speciali § Porro ). Thus a theft is committed even in the least thing (14 q. ult. c. ult.)"
Ex hiis colligitur quod si licet a summo pontifice appellare pro maxima heresi, puta si pronuntiaret vel assereret legem christianam esse falsam et malam vel Christum fuisse pseudo-prophetam, licebit pro minima heresi appellare ab ipso. Et consimili ratione si licet impugnare et accusare papam si diceret legem christianam esse falsam et fidem sarracenorum esse tenendam, licebit etiam impugnare et accusare papam si minimam heresim qualitercunque sacris literis obviantem presumpserit affirmare. Et per eandem rationem dicunt aperte patere quod si impugnantes et accusantes papam asserentem quod fides christiana est mala et falsa sunt a catholicis defendendi, etiam impugnantes et accusantes papam de minima heresi quantumcunque latenti sunt a catholicis defendendi. | From these passages it is gathered that if it is permissible to appeal from the supreme pontiff concerning the greatest heresy (for example if he were to pronounce or assert that the Christian law is false and evil or that Christ was a pseudo-prophet), it will be permissible to appeal from him concerning the least heresy. And by a similar reason, if it is permissible to attack and accuse the pope if he said that the Christian law is false and that the faith of the Muslims should be held, it will also be permissible to attack and accuse the pope if he presumes to assert the least heresy in any way contrary to sacred letters. And by the same reason they say that it is plainly obvious that if those who attack and accuse a pope who asserts that the Christian faith is bad and false should be defended by Catholics, also those who attack and accuse the pope of the slightest heresy, no matter how obscure, should be defended by Catholics.
Discipulus: Ista nimis me urgent, de quibus post opus istud mentem tuam exquiram. Nunc vero dic quomodo ad rationes quibus ostenditur quod a papa appellare non licet respondetur. | Student: These things press upon me too much; after this work I will search your mind about them. But now tell me how answer is made to the arguments to show that appeal from the pope is not permitted.
Magister: Ad primam respondetur quod si papa fiat hereticus, superiorem habet in terris, et ideo ab eo appellare licet, et ita licet impugnare et accusare ipsum. | Master: The answer made to the first is that if the pope becomes a heretic, he has a superior on earth, and therefore it is permissible to appeal from him, and thus it is permissible to attack and accuse him.
Ad secundam respondetur quod a iurisdictione pape heretici sunt omnes catholici absoluti, et ideo a papa heretico licet cuilibet appellare, non ut eximatur a iurisdictione pape heretici, quia non per appellationem sed per apostasiam pape quilibet a iurisdictione sua est exemptus. Licet tamen catholico appellare a papa heretico quia forte videt quod per appellationem utilius et efficacius papam hereticum poterit impugnare. Si autem papa non errat contra fidem, appellans ab illo falso et inique non est a iurisdictione pape simpliciter et absolute exemptus, sed ad tempus, ut pape innocentia declaretur et calumpniator evidentius convincatur et acerrime puniatur, est habendus pro exempto. Alii autem, nescientes ipsum inique procedere, in favorem fidei christiane et ut vel pape innocentia declaretur vel eius malitia confundatur debent talem appellantem defendere, qui, postquam fuerit de iniquitate convictus, debent ut puniatur acerrime fideliter laborare. | To the second it is answered that all Catholics are absolved from the jurisdiction of an heretic pope, and therefore anyone is permitted to appeal from an heretic pope -- not so that he be exempted from the jurisdiction of the heretic pope, because everyone is exempted from his jurisdiction not by appeal but by the pope's apostasy. It is, however, permissible for a Catholic to appeal from a heretic pope, because perhaps he sees that by means of an appeal he will be able to attack the heretic pope more usefully and effectively. But if the pope does not err against the faith, someone who falsely and unjustly appeals is not exempt from the pope's jurisdiction simply and absolutely, but he should temporarily be considered exempt, so that the pope's innocence may be declared and the accuser more clearly convicted and most severely punished. Others, however, not knowing that he proceeds unjustly, should defend such an appellant in favour of the Christian faith, so that either the pope's innocence may be declared or his [the accuser's] malice confounded, and when he has been convicted of wickedness they should work faithfully for him to be punished most severely.
Discipulus: Quid si papa tenuerit aliquam assertionem contrariam veritati catholice quam non tenetur explicite credere, et alius ipsum de tali errore impugnaverit, nunquid talis impugnans a iurisdictione pape est exemptus? | Student: What if the pope holds some assertion contrary to a Catholic truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly and someone else attacks him concerning such an error, is such an attacker exempt from the pope's jurisdiction?
Magister: Respondetur quod in hoc casu talis impugnans non est a tota iurisdictione pape exemptus etiam ad tempus, quia in omnibus que non sunt in derogationem impugnationis sue, pape sicut prius obedire tenetur. Quantum vero ad illa que suam impugnationem impedire valerent, pape deberet minime obedire, quia fides catholica est summo pontifici preferenda, imo etiam quelibet minima veritas catholica est summo pontifici etiam catholico preponenda. Et ideo impugnans assertionem pape hereticam contrariam veritati quam papa explicite credere non tenetur (et propter hoc papa in tali casu non esset hereticus sed catholicus reputandus), in nullo deberet obedire pape in preiudicium impugnationis sue legitime, licet sibi teneatur in aliis obedire. | Master: It is answered that in this case such an attacker is not exempted from the entire jurisdiction of the pope, even temporarily, because in everything that is not in derogation of his attack he is bound to obey the pope as before. But in respect of things that could impede his attack, he should by no means obey the pope, because the Catholic faith should be preferred to the supreme pontiff -- indeed, even the smallest Catholic truth should be preferred even to a Catholic [i.e. not heretical] supreme pontiff. And therefore, one attacking an heretical assertion of the pope contrary to a truth that the pope is not bound to believe explicitly (and for this reason the pope in such a case would not be considered a heretic but a Catholic) should in no way obey the pope to the prejudice of his legitimate attack, although he is bound to obey him in other ways.
Discipulus: Dic qualiter ad tertiam rationem respondetur. | Student: Tell how the third argument is answered.
Magister: Dicitur quod ab obedientia pape heretici licet recedere, exemplo illorum qui ab obedientia Anastasii secundi laudabiliter recesserunt. Ab obedientia autem pape catholici errantis contra fidem quantum ad aliquid quod non tenetur credere explicite non licet absolute recedere, quamvis assertionem suam liceat impugnare. Et si aliquid preciperet quod esset in preiudicium impugnationis sue, quantum ad hoc non esset obediendum eidem. Capitulum autem dist.12 Preceptis loquitur de papa catholico nichil precipiente quod sit in derogationem divini honoris et fidei orthodoxe. | Master: It is said that it is permissible to withdraw from obedience to a heretic pope, following the example of those who laudably withdrew from obedience to Anastasius II. But it is not permitted to withdraw absolutely from obedience to a Catholic pope erring against the faith in something that he is not bound to believe explicitly, although it is permitted to attack his assertion. And if he commanded anything that would be to the prejudice of the attack on him, on that point he should not be obeyed. Dist.12 c. Preceptis speaks of of a Catholic pope commanding nothing that derogates from divine honor and orthodox faith.
Ad quartam rationem dicitur quod non licet eidem pro eadem causa, eodem tempore, absolute appellare ab aliquo et ad ipsum, et ideo, qui appellaret a papa pro heresi, non liceret sibi tunc pro heresi appellare ad ipsum, et si de facto attemptaret esset tanquam sibimetipsi contrarius repellendus. Pro diverso autem tempore licet eidem pro eadem causa appellare ab aliquo et ad ipsum et econverso. Unde sepe quis appellat ad suum episcopum vel metropolitanum, qui tamen postea, si senserit se gravatum indebite vel reputaverit sententiam datam iniquam, appellat ab ipso. Sic aliquis reputans papam catholicum poterit ad ipsum pro causa heresis appellare, a quo tamen si aliquid diffinierit vel asseruerit fidei contrarium orthodoxe sibi appellare licebit. | To the fourth argument it is said that it is not permissible for the same person to appeal for the same cause, at the same time, absolutely from someone and to him; and therefore someone who appealed on account of heresy from the pope would not then be permitted to appeal on account of heresy to him, and if he actually attempted to do so, he should be repulsed as being contrary to himself. But it is permissible for the one person at different times to appeal on account of the same reason from someone and to him and vice versa. Whence often a person appeals to his bishop or metropolitan and, however, appeals from him afterwards, if he feels that he has been unduly burdened, or considers that the decision given to him is unjust. Thus someone considering the pope to be a Catholic may appeal on account of heresy to him, but appeal from him if he defines or asserts something contrary to orthodox faith.
Ad quintam rationem respondetur quod pro aliqua causa temporali appellare ab imperatore liceret, sicut etiam de aliqua posset coram populo accusari. Nam et populus posset ex causa imperatorem deponere, quemadmodum diversa regna suos reges deposuisse leguntur. | To the fifth argument it is answered that it would be permissible to appeal on account of some temporal cause from the emperor, just as he could also be accused concerning something before the people. For the people could also depose the emperor for a reason, just as we read that various kingdoms deposed their kings.
Ad sextam respondetur quod ab illo ad quem sunt omnes cause fidei deferende non est appellandum, si non erraverit contra fidem orthodoxam. Si autem erraverit, licet appellare ab ipso et etiam licet eum fortiter impugnare, et tali impugnationi est ab omnibus catholicis deferendum, et tales impugnantes sunt ab omnibus catholicis, quantum congruit cuilibet, defendendi. | To the sixth, it is answered that one should not appeal from him to whom all causes of faith are referred, if he does not err against the orthodox faith. But if he does err, it is permissible to appeal from him, and it is also permissible to attack him strongly, and all Catholics should defer to such an attack, and all Catholics (as it befits each one) should defend such attackers.
Discipulus: Nunquid secundum illos tenentur catholici talibus impugnationibus summi pontificis adherere? | Student: According to them, are Catholics bound to adhere to such attacks on the supreme pontiff?
Magister: Respondetur quod multi tenentur taliter impugnantes papam defendere et impugnationibus eorum deferre, qui tamen non tenentur eorum impugnationibus adherere, quia ad hoc quod aliquis teneatur taliter impugnantes papam defendere et impugnationibus eorum deferre sufficit quod nesciat eos malo zelo papam de heresi impugnari, cum etiam iudex quandoque sciens appellationem iniquam et falsam debet eidem deferre. Ad hoc autem quod teneatur quis impugnationibus adherere, requiritur quod sciat quod talis impugnatio continet equitatem et veritatem. | Master: It is answered that many are bound to defend such attackers of the pope and to defer to such attacks who are nevertheless not bound to adhere to their attacks. Because for a person to be bound to defend those who attack the pope and to defer to their attacks it is enough that he does not know that their attack on the pope concerning heresy is motivated by bad zeal, since sometimes a judge even knowing that an appeal is wicked and false ought to defer to it; but to be bound to adhere to an attack, a person should know that such an attack contains equity and truth.
Et ideo qui sciunt aliquos papam de heresi impugnare, quamvis non debeant eorum impugnationibus adherere, debent tamen eos defendere quousque causa fuerit terminata, et interim querere sollicite veritatem, iuxta legem divinam que, ut habetur Deuter. 13, sic precipit: "Si audieris in una urbium tuarum quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi ad habitandum dicentes aliquos egressi sunt filii Belial de medio tuo et averterunt habitatores urbis tue atque dixerunt 'Eamus et serviamus diis alienis' quos ignoratis, quere sollicite" etc. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod si aliqui asserunt papam vel alium velle fidem corrumpere orthodoxam, non sunt statim repellendi, nec continuo cruciandi, vel alias male tractandi, sed prius est veritas sollicite indaganda, et per consequens ipsi sunt interim defendendi. | And therefore those who know that certain people are attacking the pope concerning heresy, although they are not obliged to adhere to their attacks, should nevertheless defend them until the cause is finished, and meanwhile seek the truth carefully, as divine law (Deuteronomy 13) prescribes: "If you hear in one of your cities the Lord your God will give you to live in some saying that some of the sons of Belial have gone out from your midst and turned away the inhabitants of your city and said, 'Let us go and serve foreign gods', whom you know not, seek carefully", etc. By these words it is given to be understood that if some assert that the pope or another wishes to corrupt the orthodox faith, they should not be repulsed immediately, nor immediately tortured, nor treated badly, but first the truth should be carefully sought, and consequently they themselves should meanwhile be defended.
Capitulum 56 | Chapter 56
Discipulus: Non modicam apparentiam habere videtur, et ex auctoritate Deuter. 13 suprascripta videtur trahere fulcimentum, quod si aliqui, maxime viri literati et hactenus bone opinionis et fame, constanter affirmant et se offerunt probaturos papam esse pravitate heretica viciatum vel irretitum, alii catholici debent in favorem fidei sollicite querere veritatem. Ideo ad materiam a qua, ex quo de appellationibus a summo pontifice et impugnantibus ipsum tractavimus, aliqualiter disgressi videmur, volo reverti, et diligenter discutere qualiter si papa fuerit de heresi diffamatus debent catholici procedere inquirendo veritatem, quia sic limpidius inspiciam veritatem. | Student: It seems very plausible, and seems to be supported by a text of Deuter. 13 quoted above, that if some, especially men of letters and hitherto of good opinion and repute, steadily affirm and offer themselves to prove that the pope is tainted or ensnared by heretical perversity, other Catholics should diligently seek the truth in favour of the faith. Therefore, I want to return to the matter from which, when we discussed appeals from the supreme pontiff and those who attack him, we seem to have digressed somewhat, and carefully discuss how, if the pope has been defamed [see Note] of heresy, Catholics should proceed in seeking the truth, because in this way I will see the truth more clearly. [Note: "Fame" means either a person's reputation, good or bad (usually good), or widespread reports concerning their moral character. To be "defamed" is to be accused of something bad; the accusation may be true or it may be false. To be "infamous" is to be a person of bad repute. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infamia. See also Chapter 78. Ki]
In primis autem cupio scire quid secundum istos assertores catholicis sit agendum si, postquam catholici zelo fidei christiani accensi inquirere ceperint de papa super crimine heresis diffamato, papa taliter diffamatus eos totis viribus molitus fuerit impedire. | But first I wish to know what Catholics should do, according to these assertors, if, after Catholics fired with zeal for the Christian faith began to inquire about the pope defamed on a charge of heresy, the pope thus defamed had endeavored with all his might to prevent them.
Magister: Respondent quod eo ipso quod papa in hoc casu niteretur catholicos impedire ne de ipso inquirerent veritatem, deberent ipsum magis suspectum habere, eo quod ostenderet se lucem odire, et quod nollet ad lucem stricti iudicii venire ne arguerentur ipsius errores, et propter hoc deberent magis sollicite querere veritatem, et auxilium brachii secularis requirere pro inquisitione securius facienda. | Master: They answer that from the very fact that the pope in this case tried to prevent Catholics from inquiring into the truth about him, they ought to hold him in more suspicion, because he showed that he hated the light [Jn. 3:20-1] , and that he would not come to the light of a strict judgment lest his errors should be disclosed; and for this reason they should seek the truth more earnestly and call on the aid of the secular arm to make inquiry more securely.
Discipulus: Quid si papa nullo modo vellet desistere ab impediendo eos ne ad inquisitionem procederent? | Student: What if the pope would in no way desist from preventing them from proceeding to the inquiry?
Magister: Respondent quod si non possent catholici aliter ad inquisitionem procedere nisi prius summum pontificem captivarent, ipsum deberent capere et tenere, si potentiam talem possent habere, invocato auxilio brachii secularis. | Master: They answer that if Catholics could not proceed to the inquiry except by first capturing the supreme pontiff, they should arrest and hold him, if they could have such a power, having invoked the help of the secular arm.
Discipulus: Hic isti videntur contradicere assertioni priori. Nam prius dixerunt quod nulla persona aut collegium habet iurisdictionem super papam de heresi mendaciter diffamatum, licet debeant catholici dubitare an habeant iurisdictionem super ipsum, et ideo teneantur ad inquisitionem procedere faciendam. Nunc autem dicunt quod habent potestatem ipsum capiendi. Potestas autem capiendi nunquam est sine iurisdictione coactiva, ergo sibiipsis contradicunt aperte. | Student: Here these seem to contradict a previous assertion. For they said before that no person or college has jurisdiction over a pope falsely defamed concerning heresy, although Catholics ought to consider whether they have jurisdiction over him, and therefore they are bound to proceed with an inquiry. But now they say that they have the power to arrest him; but the power of arrest never exists without coercive jurisdiction. Therefore they contradict themselves openly.
Magister: Dicunt quod hic ostendis te scripturarum et rationis naturalis intellectum nequaquam habere. Nam potestas capiendi, detinendi, et ligandi nonnunquam ab omni iurisdictione separatur. Nam non solum medicus sed etiam socius, imo etiam subditus et servus, habet potestatem capiendi et ligandi freneticum etiam dominum suum se precipitare volentem, vel in aqua submergere, vel alio modo occidere semetipsum, secundum quod ex verbis beati Augustini que ponuntur 5 q. 5 Non omnis, et 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas, et c. Minimum, colligitur evidenter. | Master: They say that here you show that you do not understand the scriptures and natural reason. For the power to arrest, detain, and bind is sometimes separated from all jurisdiction. For not only a physician but also a companion, indeed even a subject and slave, has power to seize and bind a madman, even his master, who wishes to throw himself down, or to drown himself in water, or to kill himself in some other way, as we can gather evidently from blessed Augustine's words quoted 5 q. 5 Non omnis, 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas and c. Minimum. [https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102185.htm VIII.33]
Discipulus: Istud exemplum non est ad propositum, quia secus est de aliquo subdito se volente occidere quia perdidit usum rationis, et de papa qui est caput omnium, in quem in nullo casu licet manus iniicere violentas. | Student: This example is not relevant, because there is a difference between a subject wishing to kill himself because he has lost the use of reason and a pope, who is head of all, on whom it is never permissible to lay violent hands.
Magister: Male dicis, ut dicunt, cum asseris quod in nullo casu licet in papam manus iniicere violentas, quamvis non liceat in ipsum manus iniuriosas iniicere. Nam si papa, sive effectus freneticus aut aliter alienatus a sensu, vel, habens usum rationis, ex desperatione vel tristitia vel alia causa quacunque vellet seipsum occidere, semetipsum de muro precipitando vel aliter, violenter esset tenendus. Si etiam esset in aliqua domo quam quis sciret certissime ruituram, et ille sibi prenunciaret domum ruituram, sed papa nollet credere nec exire, papa in hoc casu esset extrahendus invitus, et ita manus violenta esset iniicienda in papam. In pluribus etiam aliis casibus licite posset quicumque servus manus iniicere violentas in papam, ipsumque ligare et fortiter detinere. Et ita manifeste potestas capiendi, ligandi, et detinendi ab omni iurisdictione poterit separari. Non enim per frenesim pape vel alterius, vel voluntatem occidendi seipsum, tribuitur alicui iurisdictio super volentem seipsum occidere, et tamen tunc habet etiam servus potestatem capiendi, ligandi, et detinendi etiam papam. | Master: You speak badly, they say, when you assert that it is never permissible to lay violent hands on a pope -- though it is not permissible to lay hands on him unjustly. For if a pope, either made mad or otherwise alienated from his senses, or, having the use of reason, from despair or sadness or any other cause whatsoever, wished to kill himself by throwing himself from a wall or otherwise, he should be violently restrained. If also he were in a house that someone knew certainly was about to fall down, who told him that the house was going to fall down, but the pope would not believe him or go out, the pope should in this case be dragged out against his will, and so violent hands should be laid upon the pope. In many other cases, also, any slave might permissibly lay violent hands on the pope and bind him and detain him forcibly. And thus clearly the power to arrest, bind, and detain may be separated from all jurisdiction. For the madness of a pope or of another, or his will to kill himself, does not give anyone jurisdiction over someone who wishes to kill himself, and yet even a slave then has power to seize, bind, and detain even a pope.
Discipulus: Cogor concedere quod potestas capiendi, detinendi, et ligandi ab omni iurisdictione poterit separari, sed hoc non accidit nisi quis velit seipsum occidere. | Student: I am compelled to grant that the power of arresting, detaining, and binding may be separated from all jurisdiction, but this does not happen unless someone wants to kill himself.
Magister: Quid si papa vellet absque nece in seipsum manus iniicere, oculosque proprios eruere, aut manus vel pedes abscidere? | Master: What if the pope wanted to lay hands on himself without killing, and to pluck out his own eyes, or to cut off his hands or feet?
Discipulus: Etiam tunc posset licite ab alio absque iurisdictione ligari. | Student: Then also he could permissibly be bound by another without jurisdiction.
Magister: Si papa vellet alium occidere sine causa, nunquid illi liceret vim vi repellere absque iurisdictione? | Master: If the pope wished to kill another without cause, would it be permissible for that person to repel force by force without jurisdiction?
Discipulus: De hoc vellem scire quid predicti assertores dicant. | Student: I would like to know what the aforementioned assertors say about this.
Magister: Dicunt quod liceret saltem regi vel laico vim vi repellere, et tamen per talem repulsam iurisdictionem super papam repellens vim vi minime obtineret. | Master: They say that it would be permissible for at least a king or a layman to repel force by force, and yet by such a repulse the one repelling force by force would by no means obtain jurisdiction over the pope.
Discipulus: Non adducunt exempla nisi ubi imminet mors corporalis vel saltem lesio gravis. | Student: They do not bring examples except where physical death or at least serious injury is imminent.
Magister: Si licet pro morte corporali (imo pro gravi iniuria corporali) propria et aliena vitanda manus iniicere violentas in papam absque iurisdictione, multo magis pro morte spirituali multitudinis fidelium evitanda licebit in casu manus iniicere violentas in papam. | Master: If it is permissible for avoiding one's own or another's physical death (indeed, serious bodily injury) to lay violent hands on the pope without jurisdiction, much more for avoiding the spiritual death of the multitude of the faithful it will be permissible on occasion to lay violent hands on a pope.
Consimili enim modo arguendi arguit beatus Augustinus ad probandum quod licet in hereticos exercere vindictam, ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas fundans se in isto medio: "Omne quod debemus impendere hominibus pro morte eorum temporali vitanda, debemus eisdem impendere pro morte eterna vitanda", dicens in hec verba: "Quid igitur de opere misericordie, quod pro vita eterna adipiscenda et pena eterna vitanda hominibus deberemus impendere, iudicandum est, si pro salute ista non solum temporali, sed etiam brevi et ad tempus exiguum liberanda, sic nos subvenire hominibus ratio vera et benigna compellit." Ex quibus verbis et Augustini processu ibidem, ubi per multa exempla probat quod debemus etiam illos qui minime sunt de iurisdictione nostra liberare a morte invitos et in eos manus iniicere violentas pro morte vitanda, colligunt isti quod si pro vitanda morte pape et alterius licet manus iniicere violentas in papam, ipsumque captivare, tenere, et ligare, multo fortius licebit in casu pro morte spirituali vitanda ipsius pape et aliorum, et pro vita eterna adipiscenda salvandoque grege dominico manus iniicere violentas in papam ipsumque fortiter ligare et tenere. | For the blessed Augustine argues in a similar way to prove that it is permissible to punish heretics, as we read 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas, basing himself on this premise: "All that we should expend on men to avoid their temporal death, we should expend on them to avoid eternal death." He says: "What, then, should we judge concerning the work of mercy we ought to expend for men to gain eternal life and avoid eternal punishment, if true and kind reason compels us to help men for a salvation not only temporal, but also brief and for a narrow time?" From these words and Augustine's reasoning there, where he proves by many examples that we ought to deliver against their will even those over whom we have no jurisdiction from death and to lay violent hands on them in order to avoid death, these [assertors] conclude that if to avoid the bodily death of a pope or another it is permissible to lay violent hands on a pope, and to arrest, hold, and bind him, much more strongly will it be permitted, on occasion, for avoiding the spiritual death of the pope himself and others and for obtaining eternal life and saving the Lord's flock, to lay violent hands on the pope and to bind and hold him strongly.
Discipulus: Videtur apparens, si constaret papam velle spiritualiter corrumpere orthodoxos, quod captivari posset et teneri, sed propter infamiam facti, de qua non constaret quod non esset falsa, non esset hoc agendum. | Student: It seems plausible that, if it was evident that the pope wanted to spiritually corrupt the orthodox, he could be arrested and held. But this should not be done on account of infamy of a deed not certain not to be false.
Magister: Non dicunt isti quod propter infamiam papa captivari deberet, sed asserunt quod si patenter impediret inquisitionem debitam fieri de ipso, pro salute totius christianitatis deberet detineri per illos qui tantam haberent potentiam temporalem, nec essent detinentes excommunicati. Sicut nec illi sententiam excommunicationis incurrerent qui detinerent papam volentem seipsum vel alium innocentem absque causa occidere. Absque enim temeritate vel dolo, non incidit quis in canonem propter iniectionem manuum in papam vel alium clericum. | Master: These [assertors] do not say that the pope ought to be arrested because of infamy, but they assert that if he clearly prevented a due inquiry from being made about him, for the safety of all Christianity he ought to be detained by those who had enough temporal power, and the detainers should not be excommunicated, just those who detained a pope wishing to kill himself or another innocent person without cause would not incur a sentence of excommunication. Apart from temerity or deceit, a person does not violate the canon by laying hands on a pope or any other cleric.
Discipulus: Violentia non videtur esse sine temeritate vel dolo. | Student: Violence does not seem to exist without temerity or deceit.
Magister: Respondent quod potes equivocare de vocabulo violentie , et aliter uti vocabulo quam ipsi accipiant. Ipsi enim accipiunt iniectionem manuum violentam pro omni iniectione manuum in invitum, et sic constat quod iniectio manuum violenta in aliquem potest esse caritativa, absque omni temeritate et dolo. | Master: They answer that you can equivocate concerning the word "violence" and use the word differently than they use it. For they use " violent laying of hands" for every laying of hands on an unwilling person, and in that sense it is clear that a violent laying of hands on someone can be charitable, without any temerity and deceit.
Capitulum 57 | Chapter 57
Discipulus: Ex quo, secundum istos, de papa super crimine heresis diffamato catholici habent inquirere, et ipsum etiam captivare si propter resistentiam eius aliter non possunt procedere ad inquisitionem faciendam, peto ut dicas ad quos, secundum istos assertores, spectat inquisitio supradicta. | Student: Since, according to these, Catholics should inquire about a pope defamed on a charge of heresy, and even to arrest him if, because of his resistance, they cannot otherwise proceed to make the inquiry, I ask you to say to whom, according to these assertors, the aforementioned inquiry pertains.
Magister: Dicunt quod spectat ad illos catholicos ad quos spectaret pape punitio, si esset in heresi manifesta deprehensus. | Master: They say that it pertains to those Catholics to whom punishment of the pope would pertain if he were caught in manifest heresy.
Unde, ut dicunt, predicta inquisitio primo et principaliter spectaret ad universalem ecclesiam, si essent ita pauci catholici quod omnes convenirent in unum vel possent leviter convenire. | Hence, they say, the aforesaid inquiry would pertain first and principally to the universal Church, if there were so few Catholics that they could all came together in one body, or could easily come together.
Secundo, pertineret ad concilium generale quod vices gerit universalis ecclesie. | Secondly, it would belong to a general council, which represents the universal Church.
Tertio, si nec universalis ecclesia conveniret in unum, nec generale convocaretur concilium, spectaret ad diocesanum in cuius diocesi papa moraretur, cum consilio vicinorum episcoporum si esset necesse. | Thirdly, if neither the universal Church met together, nor a general council were convened, it would pertain to the diocesean [i.e. bishop] in whose diocese the pope was staying, with the advice of neighboring bishops if necessary.
Si autem diocesanus negligeret, pertineret ad sedem vel clerum ubi papa moraretur. | But if the diocesean were to neglect it, it would belong to the see or the clergy where the pope was staying.
Si vero omnes clerici essent dampnabiliter negligentes, talis inquisitio spectaret ad laicos. | If, however, all the clergy were reprehensibly negligent, such an inquiry would pertain to the laity.
Capitulum 58 | Chapter 58
Discipulus: Video quod isti proportionabiliter dicunt de inquisitione facienda de papa super heresi diffamato sicut dicunt de punitione pape in manifesta heresi deprehensi. Ideo istam materiam censeo differendam quousque investigavero quis debet punire papam qui manifeste deprehenditur in heresi. Nunc autem dicas propter quam infamiam, secundum istos, est de papa inquisitio facienda. | Student: I see that what they say about the inquiry to be made about a pope defamed over heresy is parallel to what they say about the punishment of a pope caught in a manifest heresy. I think therefore that this matter should be postponed until I investigate who should punish a pope who is manifestly caught in heresy. But now tell me for what infamy, according to these, the pope should be investigated.
Magister: Ut ad tuam interrogationem perfecte respondeant, distinguunt, quia aut fama est orta a certis personis, providis et discretis, integre opinionis et fame, ante infamiam pape nolentibus papam accusare de heresi, aut est orta ab incerto auctore, vel a certo auctore nolente contra papam inscribere sed denuntiare volente. Si primo modo, dicunt quod est omnino procedendum ad inquisitionem nisi papa sponte se velit iudicio bonorum virorum submittere. Si autem orta est fama ab incerto auctore, vel auctore certo denuntiare volente, et non est tanta infamia quin absque scandalo ecclesie et periculo fidei valeat tolerari aut etiam dissimulari, non videtur quod sit ad inquisitionem procedendum. Aliter de necessitate salutis tenetur ille cuius interest, et potest, diligenter inquirere veritatem. | Master: In order to fully answer your question, they distinguish. Because either [1] the fame originated from certain persons, prudent and discreet, of irreproachable opinion and fame, unwilling to accuse the pope of heresy before the infamy, or else [2] it originated from an uncertain author, or [3] from a certain author unwilling to accuse the pope in writing but willing to denounce him. If in the first way, they say that it is absolutely necessary to proceed to the inquiry unless the pope voluntarily submits himself to the judgment of good men. But if the fame has arisen from an uncertain author, or from a certain author who wishes to denounce him, and the infamy is not so great that it cannot be tolerated or even concealed without scandal to the Church and danger to the faith, it does not seem necessary to proceed to an inquiry; otherwise, anyone whom it concerns, and is able, is bound of necessity for salvation [i.e. otherwise he will be damned] to diligently search for the truth.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo, secundum istos, procedere debet iudex iuxta primum membrum. | Student: Tell me how, according to these, the judge should proceed according to [1] the first member [of the distinction].
Magister: Dicunt quod cum aliquis papam vult de heresi accusare, illi qui esset iudex pape in heresi deprehensi debet suam intentionem exprimere, quam iudex, quicunque sit ille, sive ecclesiasticus sive laicus, debet diligenter examinare. Et si invenerit ipsum ad accusandum idoneum, denuntiet pape quod de heretica impetitur pravitate, rogando eundem quod iudicio eligendorum iudicum se submittat, exemplo sanctorum patrum qui pro minoribus criminibus se aliorum iudicio subiecerunt. Quod si papa de sua confidens innocentia pro omni scandalo amovendo consenserit facere, eligantur iudices a papa et accusare volente, qui secundum iustitiam sine personarum acceptione procedant. Si autem papa noluerit quoquo modo se submittere iudicio, ille qui esset iudex pape manifeste in heresi deprehensi, si habet tantam potentiam temporalem vel habere potuerit, ratione dubii, quia dubitatur an sit de iurisdictione iudicis supradicti, citet eundem et tandem, si potuerit, compellat papam sibi respondere. | Master: They say that when someone wants to accuse the pope of heresy, he should express his intention [i.e. to accuse] to the person who is the judge of a pope caught in heresy. The judge, whoever he is, whether ecclesiastic or layman, should carefully examine that intention. And if he finds the accusation suitable to be made, let him declare to the pope that he is accused of heretical perversity, asking him to submit to the judgment of judges to be selected, following the example of the holy fathers who submitted themselves to the judgment of others for lesser crimes [perhaps a reference to Marcellinus]. If the pope, confident of his own innocence, in order to remove all scandal, consents to do this, let judges be chosen by the pope and the person wanting to accuse him, who would proceed according to justice without acceptation of persons [i.e. favouritism, Gal. 2:6]. But if the pope refuses in any way to submit himself to judgment, he who would be judge of a pope clearly caught in heresy, if he has enough a temporal power or is able to have it, by reason of doubt (because it is doubtful whether the pope is subject to the jurisdiction of the aforesaid judge), let him summon the pope, and finally, if he can, let him compel the pope to answer him.
Discipulus: Ista narratio multos includere videtur errores. Talis enim processus non est circa aliquem alium a papa habendus, ergo nec circa papam. Item, quomodo potest quis citare papam qui non est iudex pape? Amplius, non videtur quod papa teneatur iudicio cuiuscunque se submittere. Rursus, talis processus non videtur in legibus prefinitus. Quare temere isti talem modum procedendi prefigunt. | Student: That narrative seems to include many errors. For such a process is not to be used about anyone other than the pope, therefore not about the pope either. Likewise, how can anyone summon the pope who is not the pope's judge? Moreover, it does not seem that the pope is obliged to submit to anyone's judgment. Again, such a process does not seem to be determined in the laws. Why do these people rashly prescribe such a process?
Magister: Istas obiectiones et multas alias isti assertores faciunt contra seipsos, respondentque ad ipsas, dicentes primo ad ultimam, quod non intendunt alicui formam procedendi circa papam prefigere, sed quia papa superiorem in causa heresis, quamdiu manet papa, non habet, et qualiter sic proceditur circa papam contra quem apparet legitimus accusator de heresi in legibus minime invenitur, ne papa contra fidem errare possit insolenter et catholicos secum trahere in errorem, oportet modum aliquem specialem, rationi consonum, non verbis legum totaliter innitentem nec ab intellectu legum penitus discrepantem, circa accusationem summi pontificis invenire. Quemadmodum, si regnum aliquod ex causa rationabili regem suum vellet compellere in iudicio coram populo respondere, cum in legibus regnorum de hoc casu nichil penitus caveatur, oporteret modum aliquem specialem excogitare qui esset in tali casu servandus. | Master: These assertors make these objections, and many others, against themselves, and answer them. First, they say to the last, that they do not intend to prescribe any form of proceeding concerning a pope: but because a pope, as long as he remains pope, has no superior in a case of heresy, and nothing is found in the laws about how to proceed against a pope when a legitimate accuser of heresy appears against him, therefore, so that a pope may not insolently err against the faith and lead Catholics into error with him, there should be found some special method, consonant with reason, not resting entirely on the words of the laws nor completely at odds with the meaning of the laws, concerning the accusation of a supreme pontiff. In the same way, if any kingdom wished, for reasonable cause, to compel its king to answer in court before the people, since in the laws of kingdoms there nothing at all is stipulated about this case, it would be necessary to work out some special method to be observed in such a case.
Modus autem superius recitatus de papa quem cupit aliquis idoneus accusare rationabilis istis apparet, quare videtur illis quod modus predictus circa papam congrue poterit observari. Nec tamen invident cuicunque qui modum magis rationabilem cogitare valebit, et forte in aliquo casu, propter aliquas circumstantias, non esset predictus modus usquequaque servandus, nec forte propter potentiam et auctoritatem pape poterit dari certus modus in omni casu servandus. | But the manner recited above concerning a pope one wishes to accuse seems reasonable to them [i.e. these assertors], and therefore it seems to them that the manner aforesaid may be suitably observed in regard to a pope. And yet they have no ill-will against anyone who can think of a more reasonable method, and perhaps in some case, because of some circumstances, the aforesaid method should not be wholly observed, nor perhaps, because of the power and authority of the pope, can a sure method be given that should be observed in every case.
Per hoc dicunt quod male arguis cum dicis talis processus non est tenendus circa alium a papa ergo nec circa papam. Nam circa papam, quia non constat quod habet superiorem in hac causa, eo quod non constat ipsum esse hereticum, necesse est aliquid speciale servare et modo speciali procedere. | Through this they say that you argue wrongly when you say that such a process is not to be used about anyone other than a pope therefore not about a pope either. For in regard to a pope, since it is not certain that he has a superior in this matter (because it is not certain that he is a heretic), it is necessary to observe something special and to proceed in a special way.
Cum vero dicis quod nullus potest citare papam qui non est iudex pape, respondent quod, quia non solum qui est in rei veritate iudex alicuius, sed etiam qui dubitatur esse iudex potest ipsum citare, ideo potest quis citare papam quando probabiliter dubitatur an sit iudex eius. | But when you say that no one can summon the pope who is not the pope's judge, they answer that because not only someone who is in truth another's judge, but also someone who is doubted to be the judge can summons him, therefore anyone can summons a pope when it is doubtful with probability whether he is his judge.
Discipulus: Nemo debet dubitare se esse iudicem pape, quia debet esse certus quod non est iudex pape antequam de heresi convincatur. | Student: No one should doubt whether he is a judge of the pope, because he should be certain that he is not a judge of the pope before he [i.e. the pope] is convicted of heresy.
Magister: Respondetur quod quamdiu non apparet quis idoneus qui vellet accusare papam, nec est graviter diffamatus, debet quilibet esse certus se non esse iudicem pape. Quam cito autem apparet accusator idoneus de quo presumitur quod bono zelo papam accusare proponit, vel papa est de heresi graviter diffamatus ita ut talis diffamatio convenienter dissimulari non possit, quicumque esset iudex pape (si papa esset manifeste in heresi deprehensus) posset probabiliter dubitare se esse iudicem pape. Postquam autem papa esset aperte in heresi deprehensus talis non debet dubitare sed debet esse certus se esse iudicem olim pape. Non ergo in hoc casu quilibet debet esse certus se non esse iudicem pape, imo potest probabiliter dubitare papam ex suo delicto esse effectum de iurisdictione sua, et propter dubitationem probabilem habet potestatem in iure citandi ipsum. | Master: The answer made is that as long as no suitable person appears who wishes to accuse the pope, and the pope is not seriously defamed, everyone should be certain that he is not a judge of the pope. But as soon as a suitable accuser appears of whom it is presumed that he proposes to accuse the pope out of good zeal, or as soon as the pope has been seriously defamed concerning heresy, so that such defamation cannot fittingly be ignored, then whoever would be the pope's judge if he were manifestly caught in heresy might doubt with probability whether he was the pope's judge. (But after a pope has been manifestly found in heresy, such a person should not doubt but should be certain that he was previously the pope's judge.) Therefore, in this case no one should be certain that he is not the pope's judge; indeed, he can doubt with probability that by his offence the pope comes within his jurisdiction, and because of the probable doubt he has the power to summons him to court.
Discipulus: Quid si non audet citare ipsum, scilicet papam? | Student: What if he does not dare to summons him, that is, the pope?
Magister: Respondetur quod si principes et potestates ac clerici et laici causam Dei negligerent et favor pape indebitus ita multitudinem occuparet quod papa nec ad submittendum se iudicio nec ad respondendum quomodolibet induci vel cogi valeret, non restaret illis qui eum de iure citare deberent nisi dolor et gemitus, essetque eis servandum consilium beati Augustini quod dat catholicis quando peccans habet multitudinem sociam, qui, libro secundo Contra epistolam Parmeniani, ut recitatur 23 q. 4 c. Non potest, ait: "Non potest esse a multis salubris correctio, nisi cum ipse corripitur, qui non habet sociam multitudinem. Cum vero idem morbus plurimos occupaverit, nichil aliud restat bonis quam dolor et gemitus." Et infra: "Revera cum contagio peccandi multitudinem invaserit, divine discipline severa misericordia necessaria est. Nam consilia separationis et inania sunt, et perniciosa atque sacrilega, quia impia et superba sunt, et plus perturbant infirmos bonos quam corrigant animosos malos." Et infra: "Turba autem iniquorum, cum facultas est in populis promendi sermonem, generali obiurgatione ferienda est et maxime, si occasionem atque opportunitatem prebuerit aliquod flagellum desuper Domini, quo eos appareat pro suis meritis vapulare." | Master: It is answered that if the rulers and powers, and the clergy and laity, neglected the cause of God, and undue partiality toward the pope so captured the multitude that the pope could not be induced or compelled to submit himself to judgment nor to respond in any way, there would be nothing left for those who should summons him to court except grief and sighs, and they should follow blessed Augustine's advice to Catholics when a sinner has a multitude of companions. In 2 [rather III.14, 16, PL vol. 43 col. 93-95] Contra epistolam Parmeniani, quoted 23 q. 4 c. Non potest, he says: "Correction by the multitude can not be salutary unless the person corrected does not have the multitude as his ally. But when the same disease has attacked very many, nothing remains for the good but grief and sighs." And below: "Indeed, when the contagion of sin has spread to the multitude, the severe mercy of divine discipline is needed. For the plans of separation [i.e. for the good to separate themselves from the wicked] are vain, pernicious, and sacrilegious, because they are impious and proud, and they disturb the weak good more than they correct the strong-willed evil." And below: "But when there is the opportunity to speak out among the people, the multitude of the wicked should be struck with a general rebuke, especially if some scourge of the Lord falling on them from above provides an occasion and opportunity by which it may appear that they are beaten for their sins."
Sic, si contra papam appareat idoneus accusator vel ipse fuerit de heresi graviter diffamatus, si multitudo sibi favet ut nec induci vel cogi possit in iudicio comparere, nichil aliud accusatori illique qui esset iudex suus si esset manifeste in heresi deprehensus et aliis bonis catholicis restaret quam dolor et gemitus.Tunc enim citatio et accusatio essent inanes, et tamen non solum occulte sed etiam publice cum facultas haberetur absque perturbatione bonorum, essent fautores pape graviter increpandi et modis omnibus inducendi ut laborarent fideliter quantum liceret pro officio cuiuscunque quatenus in favorem fidei christiane papa iudicio se submitteret, vel illi qui esset iudex suus si esset manifeste in heresi deprehensus respondere cogeretur. | Thus, if a suitable accuser appears against the pope, or if he himself has been seriously defamed as a heretic, if the multitude favours him so that he cannot be brought or compelled to appear in court, nothing else remains for the accuser, or for him who would be his judge if he had been clearly caught in heresy, and other good Catholics, but grief and sighs. For then a summons and an accusation would be in vain. And yet, not only secretly but also publicly, when there was an opportunity without disturbing the good, the supporters of the pope should be severely rebuked, and in every way induced to work faithfully (as much as was permitted for the person's office) so that, in favor of the Christian faith, the Pope would submit himself to judgment, or would be forced to answer to the person who would be his judge if he had been found manifestly in heresy.
Cum autem dicis quod papa non tenetur se submittere iudicio cuiuscunque, respondent quod in casu, pro scandalo evitando et veritate catholica declaranda et exaltanda ac pro communi utilitate procuranda, tenetur papa de necessitate salutis se iudicio inferiorum submittere. | But when you say that the pope is not bound to submit to the judgment of anyone, they answer that, on occasion, to avoid scandal and to declare and exalt Catholic truth and to further the common good, the pope is bound, of necessity for salvation, to submit to the judgment of inferiors.
Capitulum 59 | Chapter 59
Discipulus: Pande rationem eorum quare, si apparet accusator idoneus, papa tenetur de necessitate salutis se iudicio inferioris vel inferiorum suorum submittere. | Student: Explain their reason why, if a suitable accuser appears, the pope is bound of necessity for salvation to submit himself to the judgment of his inferior or inferiors.
Magister: Non putes quod ipsi intendant dicere papam in omni casu ad voluntatem cuiuslibet se debere submittere iudicio aliorum, sed volunt quod absque causa rationabili papa non debet iudicium recusare quando ex submissione sua declararetur veritas et iustitia. Et talis submissio nullum sibi spirituale preiudicium generaret, and accusantis zelus vel malitia panderetur. | Master: Do not think they mean to say that the pope should in every case, at the will of [just] any one, submit himself to the judgment of others, but they mean that without a reasonable cause the pope should not refuse judgment when truth and justice would be declared by his submission, and such submission would not generate any spiritual prejudice to himself, and the accuser's zeal or malice would be exposed.
Ad hoc autem dicendum tali ratione moventur. Utilitas propria et communis sunt preferende malitie proprie et aliene omnique utilitati proprie temporali. Nam multorum utilitas preferenda est utilitati unius, ut habetur 7 q. 1 Scias, et 8 q. 1 In scripturis, et 25 q. 1 Que ad perpetuam. Ergo multo fortius utilitas propria et communis preferende sunt utilitate proprie, et multo magis preferende sunt malitie proprie et aliene. Sed papa quem accusator idoneus vult de heresi accusare, submittendo se iudicio catholicorum, procurat utilitatem propriam et communem, quia procurat declarationem veritatis et iustitie que est utilitas propria et communis, et hec utilitas propriam utilitatem non impedit. Ergo papa ad hoc tenetur in hoc casu de necessitate salutis. Hoc enim faciendo, si est innocens, ab omni impetitione super crimine falso liberat semetipsum accusantisque malitiam vel innocentiam manifestat, et veritatem exaltat ac bono exemplo sibi subiectos edificat universos, dum ex zelo veritatis et iustitie suorum inferiorum iudicium non recusat. Si autem papa est reus, multo magis tenetur se submittere aliorum iudicio vel sponte renuntiare papatui, quia absque periculo anime non potest papatui presidere eo quod omnis hereticus publicus et occultus est omni ecclesiastica dignitate privatus. | But they are moved to say this by the following reason. One's own and the common utility are to be preferred to one's own and another's evils and to all temporal utility of one's own (for the utility of many should be preferred to the utility of one, as is stated in 7 q. 1 Scias, and 8 q. 1 In scripturis, and 25 q. 1 Que ad perpetuam). Therefore, much more, one's own and the common utility should be preferred to one's own utility, and much more to one's own and another's evils. But the pope whom a suitable accuser wishes to accuse of heresy, by submitting himself to the judgment of Catholics, furthers his own and the common utility, because he futhers the declaration of truth and justice, which is his own and the common utility, and this utility does not hinder his own utility. Therefore in this case the pope is bound to do this of necessity for salvation. For by doing this, if he is innocent, he frees himself from all attack on a false charge, and reveals the malice or innocence of the accuser, and exalts the truth, and edifies all those subject to him by a good example, when out of zeal for truth and justice he does not refuse to be judged by his inferiors. But if the pope is guilty, much more is he bound to submit himself to the judgment of others, or to voluntariply resign the apacy, because he cannot preside over the papacy without danger to his soul, because every heretic, public or hidden, is deprived of all ecclesiastical dignity.
Discipulus: Ista assertio videtur probabilitate carere quia per predictam rationem papa pro omni iniuria quam faceret alicui et pro omni excessu teneretur se subdere aliorum iudicio. Si enim pro crimine falso teneretur se subdere iudicio aliorum, multo fortius pro vera iniuria et vero excessu se subdere iudicio teneretur. Sed hoc constat esse falsum et per verba Augustini evidenter convincitur, qui in libro De vita clericorum, ut recitatur dist. 86 c. Quando, asserit manifeste quod cum prelatus corrigendo subditos suos modum excedit, ab eo nequaquam exigitur ut veniam a subditis expostulet. Ergo multo magis si papa de crimine falso impetitur non est necesse quod inferiorum suorum iudicio se submittat. | Student: This assertion seems implausible, because by that argument the pope would be bound to submit himself to the judgment of others for every injury he did to anyone and for every excess. For if he were bound to submit himself to the judgment of others for a false crime, much more would he be bound to submit himself to the judgment of others for a true injury and a true excess. But this is certainly false and is clearly refuted by the words of Augustine, who in the book On the Life of Clerics, as recited dist. 86 c. Quando, clearly asserts that when a prelate goes too far in correcting his subjects, he is not required to ask for forgiveness from his subjects. Therefore, much more, if the pope is falsely accused of a crime, he need not submit himself to the judgment of his inferiors.
Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod non est simile de iniuriis, et nonnullis aliis criminibus, et de heresi, quia iniurie et alia crimina multa papam reum non deponunt, potestque papa aliter satisfacere passis iniuriam et de suis scandalizatis excessibus quam se alicuius iudicio submittendo, et ideo, quando hoc potest, non tenetur se submittere iudicio alicuius. Sed crimen heresis papam de papatu deponit ipso facto, et ideo si non potest aliter satisfacere accusare volenti et scandalizatis de ipso nisi se submittendo iudicio, ad hoc de necessitate salutis astringitur. Et consimiliter dicunt quod si papa de aliqua iniuria vel alio excessu non aliter posset satisfacere illi vel illis cui vel quibus tenetur quam se submittendo iudicio, ad hoc esset de necessitate salutis astrictus. Si vero papa se nullius subdendo iudicio possit satisfacere ipsum de heresi accusare volenti et aliis scandalizatis de ipso, poterit alium modum tenere. Ad Augustinum dicitur quod prelatus qui in corrigendo modum excedit aliter potest satisfacere subditis quam ab eis veniam postulando, et ideo non exigitur de ipso ut veniam postulet ab eis. | Master: To this the answer made is that it is not the same with injustices, and some other crimes, and with heresy, because injustices and many other crimes do not depose a pope guilty of them, and the pope can satisfy those who have suffered an injustice and those scandalised by his excesses in a different way than by submitting himself to someone's judgment, and therefore, when he can do this, he is not bound to submit himself to someone's judgment. But the crime of heresy deposes the pope from the papacy ipso facto [i.e. by the fact itself, without need of judgment by any court], and therefore if he cannot otherwise satisfy the one who wants to accuse him and those who are scandalized about him except by submitting himself to judgment, he is bound to this of necessity for salvation. And similarly they say that if the pope could not, concerning some injustice or excess, satisfy the person or persons to whom he is bound except by by submitting himself to judgment, he would be bound to do so of necessity for salvation. But if without submitting himself to anyone's judgment the pope can satisfy someone who wants to accuse him of heresy and others who are scandalized about him, he can take the other method. To Augustine it is said that a prelate who goes too far in correcting can satisfy his subjects in another way than by asking forgiveness from them, and therefore it is not required of him that he ask their forgiveness.
Discipulus: Quomodo secundum istos posset papa satisfacere accusari volenti nisi subderet se alicuius iudicio? | Student: How, according to these, could the pope satisfy someone who wants to accuse without submitting himself to someone's judgment?
Magister: Respondetur quod sepe potest negativa probari, et ideo si esset talis casus quod contrarium illius quod accusare volens intendit posset papa probare, sufficeret pape talem negativam probare, nec tunc teneretur se subdere alicuius iudicio | Master: The answer made is that often a negative can be proved, and therefore if there were a case such that the pope could prove the opposite of what the person wishing to accuse intends, it would be enough for the pope to prove such a negative, and he would not then be bound to submit himself to anyone's judgment.
Capitulum 60 | Chapter 60
Discipulus: Puto quod intelligam istorum in hac parte sententiam, sed queso, indica michi quid isti dicant agendum si papa se sponte iudicio arbitrorum submiserit, et accusator in probatione defecerit, an scilicet papa teneatur se purgare. | Student: I think I understand their opinion on this point, but please tell me what they say should be done if the pope voluntarily submits himself to the judgment of the arbitrators, and the accuser fails in his proof -- namely, whether the pope is bound to purge himself. [Note: To purge means to take an oath asserting innocence, supported by compurgators who vouch for the innocence of the purgator. This was accepted as proof, on the assumption that the purgator and compurgators would not risk eternal damnation by swearing a falsehood.]
Magister: Dicunt quod si papa apud bonos et graves est enormiter de heresi diffamatus, ita quod grave scandalum apud catholicos est exortum, ipse de necessitate salutis se purgare tenetur si aliter famam suam recuperare non potest. Si autem taliter non est diffamatus ad purgationem minime obligatur. | Master: They say that [1] if the pope is enormously defamed for heresy among good and serious people, so that a grave scandal has arisen among Catholics, he is bound of necessity for salvation to purge himself if he cannot otherwise recover his reputation. But [2] if he has not been defamed in such a way, he is not bound to purge himself.
Discipulus: Pro primo membro si habent aliqua motiva profer in medium. | Student: If you have any motives for the first member, bring them forward.
Magister: Dicta assertio pluribus rationibus videtur posse probari, quarum prima talis est. Qui famam suam integram et illesam servare tenetur, si potest, etiam ipsam famam, si absque culpa sua vel etiam ex negligentia lesa est vel perdita, de necessitate salutis recuperare et restaurare, si potest, astringitur. Sed papa de necessitate salutis, si absque crimine potest, tenetur famam suam illesam et integram custodire. Igitur si fama pape ex aliquo casu lesa est vel perdita et ipse est immunis, de necessitate salutis, si potest, famam suam recuperare vel restaurare et reintegrare tenetur, et per consequens, si non potest hoc facere aliter quam se purgando, se purgare legitime de necessitate tenetur. | Master: The said assertion seems to be able to be proved by several arguments, the first of which is this. Whoever is bound, if he can, to keep his reputation intact and unharmed is also bound, of necessity for salvation, to recover and restore that reputation, if he can, if it has been damaged or lost through no fault of his own or even through negligence. But the pope is bound, of necessity for salvation, if he can without crime, to keep his reputation unharmed and intact. Therefore, if the pope's reputation has been damaged or lost by some accident and he himself is immune, he is bound, of necessity for salvation, if he can, to recover or restore and reinstate his reputation, and consequently, if he cannot do this otherwise than by purging himself, he is bound of necessity to lawfully purge himself.
Maior videtur evidens. Minor probatur auctoritate Augustini qui, ut legitur q. 1 c. Nolo, ait: "Nolo ut aliquis de nobis inveniat male vivendi occasionem. Providemus enim bona, ut ait Apostolus, non solum coram Deo, sed etiam coram omnibus hominibus. Propter nos conscientia nostra sufficit nobis, propter vos fama nostra non pollui, sed pollere debet in vobis. Tenete quod dixi atque distinguite. Due sunt res conscientia et fama. Conscientia necessaria est tibi, fama proximo tuo. Qui fidens conscientie sue negligit famam suam, crudelis est". | The major seems evident. The minor is proved by a text of Augustine who, as we read in 12 q. 1 c. Nolo, says: "I do not want any of us to find an occasion for living badly. For, as the Apostle says, we take care for good things not only before God, but also before all men. For our sake, our conscience is enough for us: for your sake, our fame should not be defiled, but should be strong in you. Hold fast to what I have said and distinguish. Conscience and fame are two things. Conscience is necessary for you, reputation [is necessary] for your neighbor. He who trusts in his conscience and neglects his reputation is cruel." [Augustine, Sermon 355.]
Item, Gregorius [rather, Augustine], ut habetur 11 q. 3 c. Non sunt audiendi, ait: "Non sunt audiendi, sive viri sancti sive femine, qui quando reprehensa in aliquo negligentia sua, per quam fit ut in malam veniant suspicionem, unde suam vitam longe abesse sciunt, dicunt sibi coram Deo sufficere conscientiam, existimationem hominum non solum impudenter, verum etiam crudeliter contempnentes, cum occidant animas aliorum". Et infra: "Proinde quisquis a criminibus flagitiorum atque facinorum vitam suam custodit, sibi benefacit, quisquis autem etiam famam, et in alios est misericors. Nobis enim necessaria vita nostra est, aliis fama nostra". | Likewise, Augustine, as we read in 11 q. 3 c. Non sunt audiendi, says: "They are not to be listened to, whether holy men or women, who, when they are caught in some negligence, because of which they come under bad suspicion, from which they know their life is far removed, say that their conscience is enough for them before God, contemptuous of the esteem of men, not only shamelessly but also cruelly, since they kill the souls of others". And below: "Hence whoever guards his life from the crimes of flagrant and heinous deeds does himself good, but whoever also protects his reputation is merciful also to others. For our life is necessary to us, our fame to others." [Augustine, De bono viduitatis 22.27.]
Ex hiis aliisque quam pluribus colligitur evidenter quod quilibet christianus quantum in ipso est famam suam servare debet illesam. Ergo potissime ad hoc summus pontifex obligatur, quia ad illa que sunt de iure nature et ad utilitatem proficiunt aliorum non minus quam alii est astrictus. Et ex hoc evidenter infertur quod famam suam si lesa est vel perdita, si non potest aliter, per purgationem restaurare debet. | From these and many other texts it is evidently gathered that every Christian should keep his reputation unharmed as far as he can. Therefore the supreme pontiff is most especially bound to this, because he, no less than others are, is bound to whatever belongs to the law of nature and further the well-being of others. And from this it is evidently inferred that if his reputation has been damaged or lost, if he cannot do so otherwise, he should restore it by purgation.
Secunda ratio est hec. Non minus debet papa satisfacere bonis et modestis apud quos de heresi graviter infamatur quam detractoribus malivolis et malignis, teste beato Gregorio qui, ut habetur q. 3 c. Inter verba, ait: "Quid enim, si homines non [omit non Gratian] laudant [laudent Gratian] et conscientia nos accuset? Aut que debet esse tristitia si omnes accusent et sola conscientia liberos nos esse demonstraret?" Et infra: "Quid enim aliud detrahentes faciunt, nisi in pulverem sufflant, et in oculos suos in [omit in Gratian] terram excitant, ut unde plus detractionis perflant, inde magis veritatis nichil videant? Vocandi tamen sunt etiam ipsi et tranquille admonendi, eisque satisfieri omnibus modis debet, scientes quod de iudeis Veritas dicit: ne forte scandalizemus eos." Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod innocens, a detractoribus malivolis et malignis mendaciter diffamatus, ipsis modis omnibus satisfacere debet. Ergo multo magis sive fortius si papa apud bonos et honestos est de heresi graviter, licet mendaciter, diffamatus, eis modis omnibus, et per consequens si non potest aliter, se purgando, satisfacere debet. | A second argument is this. The pope should make satisfaction no less to the good and modest among whom he is gravely defamed for heresy than to malicious and malignant detractors, as is witnessed by blessed Gregory who, as is found in 11 q. 3 c. Inter verba, says: "For what if men praise us and conscience accuses us? Or what sorrow should there be if all accuse us and conscience alone shows us to be free?" And below: "For what else do those who criticize do but blow into the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that when they blow more criticism, they see even less truth? Yet they themselves must be called and calmly admonished, and they must be satisfied in every way, knowing that Truth says of the Jews: 'Lest perhaps we should offend them'."From these words it is clearly seen that an innocent man, falsely defamed by malicious and malignant detractors, should make satisfaction in every way. Therefore, much more or more strongly, if the pope is gravely, though falsely, defamed for heresy among good and honest people, he should make satisfaction in every way, and consequently, if he cannot do otherwise, by purging himself.
Tertia ratio est hec. Papa non minus quam alii peccatum mortale vitare tenetur. Sed qui diffamatus de crimine recusat se purgare, cum non potest suam innocentiam aliter declarare incurrit peccatum mortale, cum hoc sit scandalizare pusillos et infirmos, et etiam magnis et perfectis occasionem scandali dare. Tale autem scandalum est peccatum mortale, quod ex gravitate pene que sibi debetur constate aperte, cum Salvator dicat Matth. 18: "Qui autem scandalizaverit unum de pusillis qui in me credunt expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius et demergatur in profundum maris." Ergo papa tale scandalum de necessitate salutis vitare tenetur, et ita debet se purgare, si non potest aliter suam innocentiam declarare et infamiam exortam sedare. | A third argument is this. The pope is bound no less than others to avoid mortal sin. But if someone defamed of a crime refuses to clear himself, when he cannot otherwise declare his innocence, incurs mortal sin, since this is to scandalize the little and weak, and even to give occasion for scandal to the great and perfect. Such scandal, however, is a mortal sin. This is clearly certain from the seriousness of the punishment that it is due for it, since the Savior says in Matthew 18: "But whoever scandalizes one of these little ones who believe in me, it would be better for him to have a millstone hung around his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea." Therefore the pope is bound, of necessity for salvation, to avoid such scandal, and thus he should purge himself, if he cannot otherwise declare his innocence and quell the infamy that has arisen.
Discipulus: Dicerent forte aliqui quod si papa diffamatus nolit se purgare et alii scandalizantur de hoc, scandalum tale non est datum sed acceptum, et ideo propter tale scandalum non tenetur papa se purgare. | Student: Perhaps some would say that if the pope, having been defamed, refuses to purge himself, and others are scandalized by this, such scandal is not given but taken, and therefore the pope is not bound because of such scandal to purge himself.
Magister: Hanc responsionem alii impugnare nituntur, probantes quod tale scandalum est datum, non acceptum, quia ille qui ex forma facti reddit se suspectum de crimine scandalizat infirmos active quantum est in se. Qui autem renuit se purgare quando est graviter diffamatus de crimine reddit se suspectum, imo videtur quod facto fatetur se convictum, quia non minus reddit se convictum de crimine qui, diffamatus, renuit se purgare, quam qui vocatus in ius iudicium nititur subterfugere, cum gravius et periculosius sit subire iudicium quam purgationem prestare. Sed qui iudicium subterfugit ostendit se convictum (Extra, De presumptionibus, Nullus et 11 q. 1 Christianis et 3 q. 9 Decernimus et dist. 74 Honoratus). Ergo multo fortius qui diffamatus se purgare recusat, ostendit se convictum et per consequens scandalum exhibet manifestum. | Master: Others try to attack this response, proving that such scandal is given, not taken. Because someone who by the form of a deed makes himself suspected of a crime actively scandalizes the weak, so far as he can. But whoever refuses to purge himself when he is gravely defamed of a crime makes himself suspected -- indeed, it seems that by the fact he admits that he has been convicted, because anyone who has been defamed and refuses to purge himself makes himself convicted of a crime, no less than someone who, having been called to court, tries to evade judgment, since it is more serious and dangerous to undergo judgment than to provide purgation.But someone who evades judgment shows himself convicted (Extra, De presumptionibus, Nullus and 11 q. 1 Christianis and 3 q. 9 Decernimus et dist. 74 Honoratus). Therefore, much more strongly, someone who is defamed and refuses to purge himself shows himself convicted and consequently gives manifest scandal.
Quarta ratio est hec. Illa oportet papam facere que sunt facilia ad agendum et sibi nec temporaliter nec spiritualiter obsunt sed spiritualiter prosunt, et quorum obmissio est periculosa subditis et nociva. Sed quod papa diffamatus de heretica pravitate se purget, saltem per proprium iuramentum, est facile, et si est innocens sibi nec temporaliter nec spiritualiter obest, imo spiritualiter prodest. Talis autem purgationis omissio est subditis periculosa pariter et nociva. Ergo talem purgationem papa exhibere tenetur. Maior videtur manifesta, quia qui talia subditis negligit exhibere ostendit aperte se utilitatem subditorum non amare, cum sine dampno proprio temporali et spirituali et labore gravi utilitatem eorum despiciat procurare. Minor quo ad omnes suas partes veritatem continere videtur. Nam purgatio, presertim per proprium iuramentum, nulli debet videri difficilis. Talis etiam purgatio exhibenti nec temporaliter nec spiritualiter obest sed spiritualiter prodest, cum sit actus meritorius subiectos edificans et ab infamia liberans exhibentem. Quod autem talis purgationis omissio sit periculosa subditis et nociva patet de se, quia offendiculum prebet infirmis et conscientias percutit subditorum. | A fourth argument is this. The pope should do things that are easy to do and which neither temporally nor spiritually hinder him but spiritually benefit him, and the omission of which is dangerous to his subjects and harmful. But for a pope defamed to purge himself concerning heretical wickedness, at least by his own oath [i.e. without compurgators], is easy, and if he is innocent, it neither temporally nor spiritually hinders him, but rather spiritually benefits him. But such omission of purgation is both dangerous and harmful to his subjects. Therefore the pope is bound to perform such purgation. The major seems clear, because anyone who neglects to perform such things for his subjects shows openly that he does not love the well-being of his subjects, since (without his own temporal and spiritual damage and heavy labor) he despises to procure their well-being.The minor in all its parts seems to contain the truth. For purgation, especially by one's own oath, should not seem difficult to anyone. Such purgation also does not harm the one who offers it either temporally or spiritually, but spiritually benefits him, since it is a meritorious act that edifies the subjects and frees the one who offers it from infamy. It is self-evident that omission of such purgation is dangerous to subjects and harmful, because it provides a stumbling block to the weak and affronts the consciences of subjects.
Quinta ratio est hec. Qui ex debito caritatis tenetur proximo exhibere illud quod minus est utile sibi, tenetur etiam illud quod magis est utile exhibere proximo, si est eque facile et nec sibi nec alicui alii preiudiciale in aliquo magis quam illud quod minus est utile. Si enim ex debito caritatis tenetur aliquis proximum suum vestire, ex eiusdem debito caritatis tenetur eundem pascere et potum dare si eque faciliter potest et non maius dampnum aut periculum sibi vel alii imminet ex uno quam ex alio. Sed magis utile est fidelibus quod papa de heresi diffamatus suam innocentiam, se purgando, declaret, quam sit vestiri, pasci, et potari ab ipso. Sed papa tenetur ad opera misericordie corporalis, si potest. Ergo magis tenetur ad purgationem que non immerito spiritualis misericordia est censenda, si eque faciliter, absque dampno et periculo aliorum et proprio, eam valeat exhibere. | A fifth argument is this. Anyone who is bound by the duty of charity to offer to a neighbor something that is less useful to him, is also bound to offer to his neighbor something that is more useful, if it is equally easy and in no way more prejudicial to himself or anyone else than what is less useful. For if someone is bound by the duty of charity to clothe his neighbor, he is bound by the same duty of charity to feed him and give him drink, if he can do that just as easily and no greater harm or danger threatens him or someone else from the one than from the other. But it is more useful to the faithful that the pope, when defamed for heresy, declare his innocence by purging himself, than to be clothed, fed, and given drink by him. But the pope is bound to perform works of corporal mercy, if he can. Therefore he is more bound to purging, which is rightly considered a spiritual mercy, if he is able to perform it just as easily, without harm and danger to others and himself.
Sexta ratio est hec. Qui tenetur scandala evitare et minime suscitare, tenetur scandala suscitata tollere et sedare, si potest. Sed papa tenetur scandala evitare et minime suscitare, quia non erit aliter imitator Christi dicentis: ut autem non scandalizemus eos etc. (Matth. 17), neque Apostoli Pauli dicentis 1 ad Cor. 8: si esca mea scandalizat fratrem meum non manducabo carnem in eternum, ne fratrem meum scandalizem , neque illud Apostoli ad Rom. 14 adimplebit: "Iudicate magis ne ponatis offendiculum fratri vel scandalum." Ergo papa tenetur scandala suscitata a subditis removere, si potest, et maxime que de persona sua sunt exorta. Sed si est de heresi diffamatus, grave scandalum de ipso est exortum. Ergo hoc scandalum removere debet, si potest, et ita si non potest aliter removere nisi seipsum purgaverit, se purgare tenetur. | A sixth argument is this. Anyone who is bound to avoid scandals and not arouse them is bound to remove and calm scandals that have arisen, if he can. But the pope is bound to avoid scandals and not arouse them, because otherwise he will not be an imitator of Christ who says: "but that we may not scandalize them" etc. (Matt. 17), nor of the Apostle Paul who says in 1 Cor. 8: "If my food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh for ever, lest I scandalize my brother", nor will he fulfill the text of the Apostle in Rom. 14: "But judge this rather, that you put not a stumblingblock or a scandal in your brother's way". Therefore the pope is bound to remove from his subjects scandals that have arisen, if he can, and especially those that have arisen concerning his own person. But if he is defamed for heresy, a grave scandal has arisen about him. Therefore he should remove this scandal, if he can, and so if he cannot remove it in any other way except by purging himself, he is bound to purge himself.
Septima ratio est hec. Ille qui propter scandala evitanda debet spiritualia bona omittere, multo magis propter idem debet spiritualia bona perficere. Papa autem propter scandala evitanda debet nonnulla spiritualia bona omittere saltem ad tempus, sicut predicationem verbi Dei, punitionem malorum, et nonnulla alia. Ergo multo magis propter scandala evitanda debet spiritualia bona perficere. Sed quod diffamatus se purget est bonum spirituale. Ergo propter scandala evitanda pariter et sedanda debet papa, si est diffamatus, se purgare. | A seventh argument is this. Anyone who, to avoid scandals, ought to omit spiritual goods, much more ought to perfect spiritual goods for the same reason. But the pope, to avoid scandals, ought to omit some spiritual goods, at least for a time, such as the preaching of the word of God, the punishment of the wicked, and some others. Therefore, much more, to avoid scandals he ought to perfect spiritual goods. But that he purges himself when defamed is a spiritual good. Therefore, to avoid and appease scandals, the pope, if he has been defamed, ought to purge himself.
Discipulus: Ista ratio dupliciter peccare videtur. Primo, quia si concluderet, sequeretur quod propter scandalum evitandum aliquis teneretur religionem intrare et proprietatem omnium temporalium in perpetuum abdicare, quod non videtur verum. Secundo deficit quia quod papa se purget non videtur bonum spirituale, quia talis purgatio posset esse sibi nociva. Nullum autem bonum spirituale est alicui nocivum. | Student: This argument seems to be wrong in two ways. First, because if it were conclusive, it would follow that to avoid scandal someone would be obliged to enter religion and to renounce property in all temporal things forever, which does not seem true. Second, it fails because it does not seem to be a spiritual good for the pope to purge himself, because such a purge could be harmful to him. But no spiritual good is harmful to anyone.
Magister: Primam tuam instantiam isti nituntur excludere, dicentes quod ratio illa concludit de bonis spiritualibus que non sunt supererogationis. Huiusmodi autem est purgatio canonica quando aliquis est de crimine diffamatus. Et ideo quando papa est de heresi diffamatus, debet se purgare propter scandalum evitandum. Non tamen tenetur proprietatem omnium abdicare, quia hoc est supererogationis et ideo ad hoc non tenetur. | Master: They try to exclude your first objection, saying that that argument concludes about spiritual goods that are not of supererogation, which is true of canonical purgation when someone is defamed for a crime. And therefore when the pope is defamed for heresy, he should purge himself in order to avoid scandal. However, he is not obliged to renounce property in all things, because this is of supererogation, and therefore he is not bound to this.
Secundam instantiam excludunt, dicentes quod purgatio non potest esse nociva pape nisi propter malam voluntatem pape quemadmodum omnia bona spiritualia preter caritatem possunt esse occasio nocumenti. Est tamen inter bona spiritualia computanda. | They exclude the second objection, saying that purgation cannot be harmful to the pope except because of the pope's bad will, just as all spiritual goods except charity can be an occasion for harm. However, it should be counted among spiritual goods.
Octava ratio est hec. Prelatus qui tenetur subditos suos a minori dampno vel periculo liberare debet eos a maiori dampno vel periculo, si potest, eripere. Sed papa tenetur subditos suos a dampno ac periculo corporali et temporali, si potuerit, liberare, sicut et quilibet christianus, iuxta illud Exo. 23: "Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere non pertransibis sed sublevabis cum eo", et iuxta illud Prov. 24: "Erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem et qui trahuntur ad interitum liberare ne cesses", et iuxta illud Psalm.: "Eripite pauperem et egenum de manu peccatorum liberate." Ergo multo magis debet papa subditos suos scandalizatos de ipso a dampno et periculo spirituali, si potuerit, liberare. Hoc autem potest se purgando, ergo tenetur seipsum purgare. | An eighth argument is this. A prelate who is bound to free his subjects from minor harm or danger, should rescue them from major harm or danger, if he can. But the pope is bound to free his subjects from bodily and temporal harm and danger, if he can, just as any Christian is, according to Ex. 23: "If you see the donkey of one who hates you lying under a burden, you shall not pass by, but you shall lift it up with him", and according to Prov. 24: "Rescue those who are led to death and do not cease to rescue those who are dragged to destruction", and according to Ps. 24: "Rescue the poor and needy from the hand of sinners." Therefore, much more, the pope should free his subjects who have been scandalized concerning him from spiritual harm and danger, if he could. But he can do this by purging himself, therefore he is bound to purge himself.
Dicunt igitur isti, propter istas rationes et alias quarum multiplicitate te nolo gravare, quod papa de heresi graviter diffamatus, propter famam propriam restaurandam, et propter scandalum evitandum pariter et sedandum, et propter exaltationem et declarationem fidei christiane, ac etiam propter subditos ab omni spirituali periculo preservandos, debet se purgare. Quomodo enim, ut dicunt, papa pro fide catholica dilatanda et pro ovibus suis animam suam morti exponeret, si non curat pro eis a crimine se purgare? Aut quomodo cum Apostolo carnem non manducaret in eternum ne fratrem suum scandalizaret, sive subditos suos scandalizaret, si non curat famam propriam declarare? Aut quomodo curam debitam subditorum suorum censendus est habere si, negligendo se purgare, animas occidit eorum? | Therefore, for these reasons, and others, the multiplicity of which I do not wish to burden you with, they say that a pope who has been seriously defamed for heresy, for the sake of restoring his own reputation, and for the sake of avoiding and calming scandal, and for the sake of exalting and declaring the Christian faith, and also for the sake of preserving his subjects from all spiritual danger, should purge himself. For how, they say, would a pope expose his soul to death for the sake of spreading the Catholic faith and for his sheep if he does not care to purge himself of an accusation for them? Or how could he, with the Apostle, "not eat flesh for ever" lest he scandalize his brother, or scandalize his subjects if he does not care to clear his own reputation? Or how is he to be considered to have due care for his subjects if, by neglecting to purge himself, he kills their souls?
Capitulum 61 | Chapter 61
Discipulus: Ista sententia decretis sanctorum patrum summorum pontificum obviare videtur. Nam Sixtus papa et Leo papa, licet se purgaverint, ad hoc tamen minime tenebantur. | Student: This opinion seems to contradict decrees of holy fathers and supreme pontiffs. For pope Sixtus and pope Leo, although they purged themselves, were nevertheless not bound to do so.
Unde Sixtus papa, scribens omnibus episcopis, ut recitatur 2 q. 5 c. Mandastis, ait: "Mandastis, ut scriberem vobis, qualiter instans iurgium contra me suscitatum sit, vel a quo, ut vestro aminiculo pelleretur, et causa mea firmaretur. Scitote me criminari a quodam Basso, et iniuste persequi. Quod audiens Valentinianus Augustus nostra auctoritate sinodum congregari iussit. Et facto concilio, cum magna examinatione satisfaciens omnibus, licet evadere aliter satis potuissem, suspicionem tamen fugiens, coram omnibus me purgavi, me scilicet a suspicione et emulatione liberans, sed non aliis, qui noluerint aut sponte hoc non elegerint, faciendi formam exemplumque dans." | Hence pope Sixtus, writing to all bishops, as reported in 2 q. 5 c. Mandastis, says: "You commanded me to write to you how the urgent quarrel was raised against me, or by whom, so that with your support it might be driven off and my cause strengthened. Know that I am accused by a certain Bassus and unjustly persecuted. Hearing this, Valentinian Augustus, by our authority, ordered a synod to be convened. And when the council was held, and after a great examination, satisfying all, although I could have escaped quite otherwise, yet fleeing suspicion, I purged myself before all, namely, freeing myself from suspicion and rivalry, but not giving others who do not wish, or do not voluntarily choose this, a form and example of doing so."
Item, Leo papa, ut habetur eisdem causa et questione, c. Auditum, ait: "Auditum est, fratres carissimi, qualiter mali homines gravia crimina in me confinxerunt. Quamobrem ego Leo pontifex sancte romane ecclesie purifico me in conspectu vestro coram Deo et angelis eius, quia criminosas istas et sceleratas res, quas illi michi obiciunt, nec perpetravi nec perpetrari iussi. Hoc autem faciens non legem prescribo ceteris, qua id facere cogantur." | Likewise, pope Leo, as is stated in the same cause and question, c. Auditum, said: "It has been heard, dearest brothers, how evil men have fabricated grave accusations against me. Wherefore I, Leo, pontiff of the holy Roman Church, purify myself in your sight before God and his angels, because I have neither committed, nor ordered to be committed, those criminal and wicked things they accuse me of. But in doing this I do not prescribe a law for others by which they may be compelled to do this."
Ex quibus auctoritatibus videtur manifeste probari quod summus pontifex diffamatus ad purgationem nequaquam astringitur, licet sponte, si voluerit, valeat se purgare. Qualiter tamen ad ista predicti assertores respondeant manifesta. | From these texts it seems to be clearly proved that the supreme pontiff who has been defamed is in no way bound to purge, although he can purge himself voluntarily, if he wishes. However, make clear how the aforementioned assertors respond to these.
Magister: Predictas instantias multis modis refellere moliuntur, primo dicentes quod predicti summi pontifices Sixtus et Leo sponte, non de necessitate, se purgare volebant, et ideo in tali casu in quo erant Sixtus et Leo formam faciendi consimilem aliis minime prefixerunt. | Master: They try to refute the aforementioned objections in many ways, first saying that the aforementioned supreme pontiffs Sixtus and Leo voluntarily, not out of necessity, wanted to purge themselves, and therefore in such a case as Sixtus and Leo were in they did not prescribe to others a similar form of doing so.
Ad cuius evidentiam dicunt esse sciendum quod, sicut notat glossa 11 q. 3 c. In cunctis: "Infamia orta ab inimicis non inducit purgationem, Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. Cum in iuventute, et 2 q. 5 c. Omnibus, nec etiam a levibus personis, nec ab illis qui de facili credunt." Quod etiam Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando, testari videtur, dicens: "Cum prelatus excedit, si per clamorem et famam ad aures superioris pervenerit, non quidem a malivolis et maledicis, sed a providis et honestis, nec semel tantum, sed sepe, quod clamor innuit et diffamatio manifestat, debet coram ecclesie senioribus veritatem diligentius perscrutari." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod propter infamiam ortam ab inimicis, maledicis, et levibus personis, non est necesse purgationem prestare. | To make this clear, they say that it should be known that, as the gloss notes on 11 q. 3 c. In cunctis: "Infamy arising from enemies does not induce purgation, Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. Cum in iuventute, and 2 q. 5 c. Omnibus, nor also from frivolous persons, nor from the credulous." Innocent III, as is found in Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando, also seems to testify to this, saying: "When a prelate goes too far, if by outcry and rumor it has reached the ears of the superior, not indeed from malicious and slanderous people, but from the prudent and honest, and not only once, but often, which the outcry indicates and the defamation reveals, the truth should be more diligently investigated before the elders of the Church." From these words it is given to understand that because of the infamy arising from enemies, slanderers, and frivolous persons, it is not necessary to perform purgation.
Ex quo isti respondent ad prescriptas instantias dicentes quod si prefati pontifices Sixtus et Leo diffamati fuerint, illa infamia orta fuit ab inimicis et maledicis et detractoribus. Quod evidenter Sixtus de se insinuat dicens: "Scitote me criminari a quodam Basso et iniuste persequi." Hoc etiam Leo de se aperte demonstrat dicens: "Mali homines in me gravia crimina confinxerunt." Ex quibus verbis apparet quod, si isti pontifices diffamati fuerint, illa infamia a malis processit, quare propter talem infamiam non fuit necesse ut se purgarent. | From this they answer the above objections, saying that if the aforementioned pontiffs Sixtus and Leo were defamed, that infamy arose from enemies, slanderers, and detractors. This is clearly implied by Sixtus himself, saying: "Know that I am being accused and unjustly persecuted by a certain Bassus." Leo also clearly demonstrates this about himself, saying: "Evil men have fabricated grave accusations against me." From these words it appears that, if these pontiffs were defamed, that infamy proceeded from evil men. And therefore it was not necessary for them to purge themselves because of such infamy.
Secundo dicunt quod sepedicti pontifices non erant diffamati sed solummodo accusati, et ideo non fuit necesse quod purgationem prestarent, quia accusatore deficiente non cogitur reus se purgare nisi fuerit diffamatus. | Secondly, they say that the said pontiffs were not defamed but only accused, and therefore they did not need to offer purgation, because if the accuser fails an accused is not compelled to purge himself unless he has been defamed.
Tertio dicunt quod predicti summi pontifices se purgando legem simile faciendi aliis summis pontificibus minime prebuerunt, quia nec potuerunt eis legem imponere cum non habeat imperium par in parem. Prebuerunt eis tamen simile exemplum faciendi, et summi pontifices in tali casu ad hoc ex lege divina et iure nature ac debito caritatis necessario sunt adstricti. | Thirdly, they say that by purging themselves the aforesaid supreme pontiffs did not at all provide a similar law of action for other supreme pontiffs, because they could not impose a law on them, since "equal does not have authority over equal" [legal maxim]. However, they provided them with a similar example of action, and supreme pontiffs in such a case are necessarily bound to do this by divine law and the law of nature and the duty of charity.
Discipulus: Nulla istarum responsionum videtur sufficere. Prima non, quia videtur quod undecunque infamia sit exorta debet diffamatus purgationem exhibere, unde et rationes quas induxisti, de laborante infamia undecunque suborta eque videntur concludere. Quod etiam glossa Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando, insinuare videtur, dicens: "Satis potest dici, quod indicenda est purgatio, undecunque procedat infamia saltem propter scandalum: argumentum infra De purgatione canonica c. Accedens." | Student: None of these answers seems sufficient. The first is not, because it seems that no matter where the infamy has arisen from, the defamed person should perform purgation. Hence the arguments you brought forward [above] seem conclusive about anyone labouring under infamy, wherever it has arisen from. The gloss Extra, De accusationibus, Qualiter et quando, also seems to suggest this, saying: "Suffice to say, a purgation should be proclaimed wherever the infamy proceeds from, at least because of scandal: an argument, below, De purgatione canonica c. Accedens."
Secunda autem responsio videtur deficere, quia secundum beatum Gregorium, sicut superius allegasti, detractoribus modis omnibus satisfieri debet. Ergo pape prefati suis detractoribus et criminatoribus satisfacere debuerunt, et per consequens saltem propter eos debuerunt se purgare. | And the second response seems to fail, because according to blessed Gregory, as you have brought forward above, one should satisfy one's detractors "in every way". Therefore the aforementioned popes should have satisfied their detractors and accusers, and consequently, for their sake at least, they should have purged themselves.
Tertia etiam non procedit, quia Sixtus non solum asserit se aliis simile faciendi formam minime dare, sed etiam dicit quod aliter evadere potuisset. | The third also does not proceed, because Sixtus not only asserts that he does not give others a similar form of acting, but also says that he could have escaped otherwise.
Magister: Ista et plura alia allegant contra seipsos, que etiam conantur dissolvere. Ad evidentiam prime obiectionis dicunt esse notandum quod infamia aliquando usque ad bonos et honestos procedit. Interdum vero providi et discreti ex infamia suscitata nichil mali suspicantur contra taliter diffamatum. In primo casu, sive infamia orta sit ab incerto auctore, sive a certo auctore provido et honesto, sive a certo auctore malivolo, inimico, maledicto, vili persona, vel a personis suspiciosis et qui facile credunt, sive undecunque, purgatio est prestanda, et de taliter diffamato apud providos et honestos undecunque fama mala procedat loquitur glossa inducta, et de tali rationes inducte superius concludere videntur. In secundo casu, quando quis solummodo apud inimicos, detractores, malivolos, et suspiciosos, et qui facile credunt, aliquis diffamatus existit, purgationem prestare non oportet, et in hoc casu loquitur Innocentius tertius et glossa 11 q. 3 c. In cunctis. | Master: They object these and many other things against themselves, which they also attempt to resolve. To clarify the first objection, they say, it should be noted that infamy [a] sometimes extends even to good and honest people. But [b] sometimes prudent and discreet people do not suspect, from the infamy that has arisen, any evil against the person thus defamed. [a] In the first case, whether the infamy has arisen from an uncertain source, or from a certain provident and honest source, or from a certain malevolent, hostile, slanderous, vile person, or from suspicious and easily credulous persons, or from elsewhere, atonement should be made, and the gloss cited above speaks of someone defamed in this way among the provident and honest, wherever the bad fame comes from, and the arguments cited above seem to conclude about such a person. [b] In the second case, when someone has been defamed only among enemies, detractors, malevolent, suspicious, and credulous persons, purgation need not be made, and Innocent III speaks of this case and the gloss to 11 q. 3 c. In cunctis.
Ad secundam obiectionem respondetur quod detractoribus inimicis et malivolis satisfieri debet absque onere satisfacientis et periculo, quando de eorum correctione spes habetur. Si vero de eorum correctione spes nequaquam habetur, non oportet satisfacere ipsis. Et ideo predicti summi pontifices suis detractoribus debuerunt satisfacere absque onere purgationis, eis veritatem indicando et monendo ne ipsos mendaciter diffamarent, si habebatur spes de correctione ipsorum. | The answer made to the second objection is that satisfaction should be made, without burden on the person making the satisfaction and danger, to hostile and malevolent detractors when there is hope of their correction. But if there is no hope at all of their correction, it is not necessary to satisfy them. And therefore the aforementioned supreme pontiffs should have satisfied their detractors, without the burden of purification, by showing them the truth and warning them not to falsely defame them, if there was any hope of their correction.
Ad tertiam respondetur quod Sixtus aliter potuisset evadere quam se purgando, quia apud providos et honestos non extitit diffamatus et criminator ipsius incorrigibilis putabatur. | To the third, the answer made is that Sixtus could have escaped in some other way than by purifying himself, because among the prudent and honest he had not been defamed and his accuser was considered incorrigible.
Capitulum 62 | Chapter 62
Discipulus: Quid est agendum secundum istos si papa de heresi graviter diffamatus nullo modo voluerit se purgare? | Student: What should be done according to them if a pope, gravely defamed for heresy, in no way wishes to purge himself?
Magister: Dicunt quod pro convicto debet haberi, et ideo est papatu privandus. | Master: They say that he should be considered convicted, and therefore he should be deprived of the papacy.
Discipulus: Quomodo probant quod pro convicto debet haberi? | Student: How do they prove that he should be considered convicted?
Magister: Hoc probant sic. Magis debet haberi pro convicto papa diffamatus qui se purgare recusat quam ille qui, cupiens se purgare, conpurgatores habere non potest. Iste enim pretendit quod paratus est corrigi, nec in hoc peccat quod desiderat se purgare, presertim si est innocens, licet ex aliquo casu conpurgatores habere non possit. Ille vero incorrigibilem se ostendit, et novum scandalum ac peccatum committit cum se purgare recusat. Sed qui cupit se purgare et conpurgatores habere non potest, pro convicto haberi debet (Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. Cum Petrus, et c. Inter, et Extra, De simonia, c. Insinuatum, et c. De hoc). Ergo multo fortius si papa de heresi graviter diffamatur et se nullatenus vult purgare, pro convicto debet haberi. Per hoc enim est contra ipsum presumptio violenta propter quod poterit merito condempnari. | Master: They prove this thus. A defamed pope who refuses to purge himself should be considered convicted more than someone who, desiring to purge himself, cannot find compurgators. For the latter claims that he is ready to be corrected, and does not sin in this that he desires to purge himself, especially if he is innocent, although for some reason he cannot have compurgators. The former, however, shows himself incorrigible, and commits a new scandal and sin when he refuses to purge himself. But a person who desires to purge himself and cannot have compurgators should be considered convicted (Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. Cum Petrus, et c. Inter, and Extra, De simonia, c. Insinuatum, et c. De hoc). Therefore, much more strongly, if the pope is gravely defamed for heresy and does not in any way want to clear himself, he should be considered as convicted. For by this there is a violent presumption against him because of which he can be deservedly condemned. [Note: A "violent" presumption, stronger than a "probable" presumption, is one that is sufficient for a definitive judgment, even though it may be mistaken. See ABMA vol.43 p.190.]
Discipulus: Quis secundum istos debet papam se purgare nolentem dampnare? | Student: Who, according to these, should condemn a pope who refuses to clear himself?
Magister: De hoc sunt diverse opiniones. Una est quod papa, eo ipso quod diffamatus esset de heresi et requisitus nollet se purgare, esset ipso facto papatu privatus tanquam hereticus. Alia est quod non esset ipso facto depositus, sed esset per iudicem deponendus. | Master: There are various opinions on this. One is that the pope, by the very fact that he was defamed for heresy and, when called on, refused to clear himself, would be deprived of the papacy as a heretic. Another is that he would not be deposed by this very fact, but would have to be deposed by a judge.
Discipulus: Per quem? | Student: By whom?
Magister: Una est opinio quod per concilium generale, alia quod per diocesanum, vel per illud qui esset iudex pape si esset per evidentiam rei in heresi deprehensus. Unde quidam dicunt quod deponendus esset a Romanis. | Master: One opinion is that [he should be deposed] by a general council, another by a the diocesan [bishop], or by whoever would be the pope's judge if he were caught in heresy by evidence of the matter. Hence some say that he would be liable to be deposed by the Romans.
Capitulum 63 | Chapter 63
Discipulus: Dic quomodo ad obiectiones in contrarium primo capitulo huius sexti et decimo adductas prefati respondent assertores. | Student: Tell me how the aforesaid assertors respond to the objections to the contrary brought forward in chapters 1 and 10 of this Book VI.
Magister: Ad omnes auctoritates que contra prefatam assertionem sonare videntur unicam dant responsionem generalem, dicentes quod intelligi debent quando papa non est diffamatus de heresi nec in aliquo crimine de quo scandalizetur ecclesia incorrigibilis notorie reperitur. | Master: To all the texts that seem to tell against the aforesaid assertion they give a single general answer, saying that they should be understood of when the pope is not defamed for heresy and is not found notoriously incorrigible in any crime by which the Church is scandalized.
Discipulus: Ista generali responsione nonobstante, dic quomodo ad singulas auctoritates responsiones dant speciales et quomodo eas pertractare conantur. | Student: Notwithstanding this general answer, tell me how they give specific answers to each text and how they attempt to deal with them.
Magister: Dicunt quod prima auctoritas, sumpta ex primo capitulo (9 q. 3 c. Nemo), solvit seipsam cum dicit expresse: "Nemo iudicabit primam sedem iustitiam temperare desiderantem." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod illud capitulum loquitur de papa (manente papa) quando desiderat iustitiam temperare. Tunc autem non est papa incorrigibilis neque hereticus. Licet enim papa etiam notorie delinquerit, si tamen desiderat iustitiam temperare non est incorrigibilis reputandus. | Master: They say that the first text, taken from the first chapter (9 q. 3 c. Nemo), resolves itself when it says expressly: "No one shall judge the first see if it desires to mitigate justice." From these words it is gathered that that chapter speaks of the pope (while he remains pope) when he desires to mitigate justice. But then the pope is neither incorrigible nor a heretic. For even if the pope has notoriously sinned, if he nevertheless desires to mitigate justice he should not be considered incorrigible.
Discipulus: Secunda pars auctoritatis eiusdem expresse insinuat quod papa in nullo casu est iudicandus, cum dicit: "neque enim ab Augusto" etc. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod papa in nullo casu est iudicandus a quoquam. | Student: The second part of the same text expressly suggests that the pope is in no case to be judged, when it says: "for not by Augustus" etc. ["nor by all the clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people, will the judge be judged"]. From these words it is given to be understood that the pope should in no case be judged by anyone.
Magister: Isti respondent dicentes quod sane debes intelligere verba prefata, ut intelligas ea in illo casu in quo loquuntur precedentia verba, quando scilicet papa desiderat iustitiam temperare. Unde quod non sic generaliter, nullo casu excepto, debeant intelligi, glossa ibidem asserit manifeste, dicens: Nemo iudicabitur [iudicabit Pz] "nisi se alicuius iudicio submittat ut 2 q. 7 c. Nos si et in causa heresis 40 dist. c. Si papa. Et cum submittit se confessori suo tenetur ei parere." Hic exprimuntur tres casus in quibus potest papa ab alio iudicari. Quartum casum exprimit glossa dist. 40 c. Si papa, sicut dictum est, quando scilicet de crimine notorio pape scandalizatur ecclesia et ipse est incorrigibilis. Et ita patet quod verba predicta non debent sine exceptione intelligi. Quando tamen ipsemet papa vult et potest facere iustitiam, non esset ab aliquo iudicandus. | Master: They answer by saying that you should understand the aforementioned words sensibly, so that you understand them about that case of which the preceding words speak, namely when the pope desires to mitigate justice. Hence that they should not be understood thus generally, with no exception, the gloss in that place clearly asserts, saying: No one will judge "unless he [the pope] submits himself to the judgment of someone, as 2 q. 7 c. Nos si, and in a case of heresy, dist. 40 c. Si papa, and when he submits himself to his confessor he is bound to obey him." Here three cases are expressed in which the pope can be judged by another. The gloss expresses a fourth case, dist. 40 c. Si papa, as has been said, namely when the Church is scandalized by a notorious crime of the pope and he himself is incorrigible. And thus it is clear that the aforementioned words should not be understood without exception. When, however, the pope himself wants and can do justice, he would not be to be judged by anyone.
Discipulus: Quid si papa esset hereticus et vellet se corrigere iustitiam temperando, essetne ab alio iudicandus? | Student: What if the pope were a heretic and wanted to correct himself by mitigating justice, would he be to be judged by someone else?
Magister: Respondent dicentes quod papa, si efficiatur hereticus, eo ipso non est papa, et ideo quantumcunque tunc cuperet facere iustitiam, esset ab alio iudicandus. Sed si manet verus papa et vult facere iustitiam, non debet ab alio iudicari. | Master: They answer, saying that if the pope becomes a heretic, by that very fact he is not pope, and therefore, no matter how much he then desires to do justice, he would be to be judged by someone else. But if he remains true pope and wants to do justice, he should not be judged by someone else.
Discipulus: Si papa manens papa, quocunque crimine involutus, volens facere iustitiam non est ab alio iudicandus, ergo nullus alius haberet super ipsum iurisdictionem coactivam, quia incorrigibilitas pape non tribuit alicui iurisdictionem. | Student: If the pope, remaining pope, involved in any crime, wanting to do justice, is not to be judged by someone else, therefore no one else would have coercive jurisdiction over him, because the incorrigibility of the pope does not confer jurisdiction on anyone.
Magister: Dicunt quod sicut ratione delicti fit aliquis prius non subditus alicuius de iurisdictione eius, ita papa, ratione incorrigibilitatis in crimine de quo scandalizatur ecclesia, fit de iurisdictione illorum qui prius fuerunt sibi subiecti. | Master: They say that just as by reason of a crime someone who was previously not subject to another comes to belong to that person's jurisdiction, so the pope, by reason of his incorrigibility in a crime by which the Church is scandalized, comes to belong to the jurisdiction of those who were previously subject to him.
Discipulus: Quid si papa primo incorrigibilis apparet, et postea, cum causa sua inciperet ventilari, correctionem promitteret et corrigi vellet: nunquid qui inciperunt discutere causam pape ipsum iudicare deberent? | Student: What if the pope at first appears incorrigible, and later, when his cause began to be discussed, promised correction and wished to be corrected: should those who began to discuss the pope's cause judge him?
Magister: Circa hoc sunt assertiones diverse. Una est quod ex quo isti qui cepissent ventilare causam pape habuissent iurisdictionem super papam, propter promissionem pape nequaquam dictam iurisdictionem amitterent et ideo ipsum iudicare valerent. Alia est quod sicut per incorrigibilitatem pape acquiritur iurisdictio super ipsum, ita per corrigibilitatem amittitur. | Master: About this there are various assertions. One is that since those who had begun to discuss the pope's cause had jurisdiction over the pope, they would not lose that jurisdiction because of the pope's promise, and therefore they would be able to judge him. Another is that just as jurisdiction over the pope is acquired through the pope's incorrigibility, so it is lost through corrigibility.
Discipulus: Quomodo secundum istam assertionem erit nota incorrigibilitas pape? | Student: How will the incorrigibility of the pope be known, according to this assertion?
Magister: Respondetur quod erit nota cum per presumptionem violentam constat quod habet propositum se nullatenus corrigendi, puta quia asserit quod non vult se corrigere, vel quia sepe monitus se non corrigit. Sic enim imperator et Romani papam Iohannem 12um incorrigibilem iudicaverunt, quia sepe monitus nullatenus se correxit. | Master: The answer made is that it will be known when it is established by violent presumption that he has the intention of not correcting himself in any way, for example because he asserts that he does not wish to correct himself, or because he does not correct himself when he has been repeatedly warned. For thus the emperor and the Romans judged pope John XII to be incorrigible, because he did not correct himself in any way when he was repeatedly warned.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritatem Symachi pape. | Student: Say how answer is made to the text of pope Symmachus.
Magister: Dicitur quod intelligenda est quando papa non est de heresi graviter diffamatus, nec in aliquo crimine de quo scandalizatur ecclesia incorrigibilis invenitur. Cum vero dicitur quod ubi canon non excipit nec nos debemus excipere, respondetur quod ista regula est regulariter vera, fallit tamen ubi alius canon excipit, et ubi scriptura divina excipit, vel etiam ubi ius naturale vel ratio naturalis evidens dictat excipiendum. Sic est autem in proposito, quia ratio naturalis et ius naturale dictat quod ubi papa esset notorie hereticus vel criminosus et scandalizaret ecclesiam, et se nollet corrigere, abiiciendus esset. Que ratio scripture divine concordat approbanti assertionem Caiphe principis sacerdotum dicentis: "Expedit ut unus moriatur homo pro populo et non tota gens pereat." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod si fuit expediens quod Christus innocens pro populo moreretur ne tota gens periret, etiam expedit quod papa hereticus et criminosus et incorrigibilis moriatur civiliter, de papatu proiectus, et non tota gens pereat. | Master: It is said that it should be understood of when the pope is not gravely defamed for heresy or found incorrigible in any crime by which the Church is scandalized. When it is said that "where a canon makes no exception neither must we", it is answered that this rule is regularly true, but it fails where another canon excepts, and where divine scripture excepts, or also where natural law or evident natural reason dictates that an exception should be made. But this is so in the present case, because natural reason and natural law dictate that if a pope were notoriously heretical or criminal and scandalized the Church, and refused to correct himself, he should be cast out. This reason agrees with divine scripture when it approves the assertion of Caiaphas the high priest who said: "It is expedient that one man should die for the people, and the whole people not perish." From these words it is gathered that if it was expedient that Christ the innocent should die for the people so that the whole people should not perish, it is also expedient that a heretic and criminal and incorrigible pope should die civilly, expelled from the papacy, and the whole people not perish.
Discipulus: Que est ista ratio naturalis que dictat papam criminosum et incorrigibilem abiciendum? | Student: What is this natural reason that dictates that a criminal and incorrigible pope should be cast out?
Magister: Dicitur quod ratio est tacta prius, ista, videlicet, quod membrum incurabile totius corporis infectivum est pro salute corporis amputandum. | Master: It is said that the reason was touched on before, namely, that an incurable member that is incurable and likely to infect the whole body should be amputated for the health of the body.
Discipulus: Salus christianorum a Deo dependet. Deus autem potest conservare salutem eorum absque amputatione membri incurabilis. | Student: The health of Christians depends on God. But God can preserve their health without the amputation of an incurable member.
Magister: Respondetur quod ubi fideles possunt humanum auxilium invenire, non debent ad potentiam divinam recurrere. Hoc enim esset Deum temptare. Quare si aliquod membrum apparet incurabile debet humanitus amputari. | Master: It is answered that where the faithful can find human help, they should not have recourse to divine power, for this would be to tempt God. Therefore if any member appears incurable it should be amputated by humans.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritatem Antheri pape. | Student: Tell me how one responds to the text of pope Antherus.
Magister: Respondetur quod Antherus papa loquitur quando papa vult seipsum corrigere. Unde hec est differentia inter papam et alios corrigendos, quia alii, licet non sint incorrigibiles, iudicantur a papa, papa autem qui non est incorrigibilis a Domino solo iudicatur. | Master: It is answered that pope Antherus speaks of when the pope wishes to correct himself. Hence this is a difference between the pope and others who should be corrected, because others, even if they are not incorrigible, are judged by the pope, but a pope who is not incorrigible is judged by the Lord alone.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo dicunt quod papa in causa heresis, licet non probetur incorrigibilis, ab alio iudicatur. | Student: Tell me how they say that in a case of heresy, although the pope is not incorrigible, he is judged by another.
Magister: Videtur quod non bene intelligis assertionem predictam. Tenet enim assertio sepedicta quod nunquam est papa iudicandus ab homine nisi submittat se iudicio vel nisi incorrigibilis ostendatur. Et ideo papa existens papa non est pro causa heresis alicuius subiectus iudicio, licet si papa de heresi fuerit diffamatus, et recusaverit se subdere iudicio aut purgare, alii potestatem habeant inquirendi de ipso, imo etiam citandi ipsum, sed antequam apparuerit incorrigibilis vel hereticus ipsum iudicare non possunt. | Master: It seems that you do not well understand the above assertion. For it holds that the pope is never to be judged by man unless he either submits himself to judgment or is shown to be incorrigible. And therefore the pope, while he is pope, is not subject to anyone's judgment in a case of heresy, although if the pope has been defamed for heresy, and has refused to submit himself to judgment or to purge, others have the power to inquire about him, indeed even to summons him, but before he appears incorrigible or a heretic they cannot judge him.
Discipulus: Istud est omnino irrationabile reputandum quod aliquis habeat potestatem inquirendi de aliquo et citandi ipsum et tamen non habeat potestatem iudicandi eundem, cum inquirere et citare non pertineat nisi ad iurisdictionem habentem. Qui autem habet iurisdictionem super aliquem ratione alicuius crimini, habet potestatem iudicandi et cohercendi eundem. Aliter enim talis iurisdictio esset omnino inutilis iudicanda. | Student: It should be considered absolutely unreasonable that someone should have power to investigate and summons someone and yet not have power to judge that person, since to investigate and summons belongs only to someone who has jurisdiction. But someone who has jurisdiction over someone on the grounds of some accusation has power to judge and coerce that person. For otherwise such jurisdiction should be judged to be completely useless.
Magister: Ad hanc obiectionem responsum est prius, ubi ostensum est quod quando dubitatur de iurisdictione, ratione illius dubitationis potest quis habere potestatem inquirendi et citandi alium, licet in rei veritate iurisdictionem non habeat super ipsum. | Master: This objection was answered before, where it was shown that when there is doubt about jurisdiction, by reason of that doubt someone can have the power to investigate and summons another, even if in reality he does not have jurisdiction over him.
Discipulus: Ista responsio videtur contraria veritati, quia quando dubitatur de iurisdictione alicuius eo ipso non est iudex, sicut quando dubitatur de tutela duorum neuter est tutor. | Student: This answer seems contrary to the truth, because when there is doubt about someone's jurisdiction, by that very fact he is not a judge, just as when there is doubt about two people's guardianship, neither is the guardian. [Digest, 26.2.30]
Magister: Dicunt te aperte errare contra iura, quia sepe ratione dubitationis fit quod alias non fieret, et precipue ratione dubitationis de iurisdictione alicuius. Si enim aliquis, qui in rei veritate non est subditus alicuius episcopi, graviter licet mendaciter diffamatur deliquisse in diocesi episcopi non sui, talis episcopus super diffamatum iurisdictionem minime habet, quia falsa infamia iurisdictionem nequaquam confert. Et tamen episcopus propter infamiam habet potestatem inquirendi et citandi diffamatum si fuerit in diocesi sua. | Master: They say that you are clearly in error against the law, because often because of doubt what would otherwise not be done is done, and especially because of doubt about someone's jurisdiction. For if someone who in reality is not a subject of some bishop is seriously, though falsely, defamed of having committed an offense in the diocese of the m bishop who is not his own, that bishop has no jurisdiction over the defamed person, because false defamation does not confer jurisdiction at all. And yet because of the defamation the bishop has power to investigate and summons the defamed person, if he is in his diocese.
Discipulus: Istus exemplum est ad oppositum, quia talis episcopus habet iurisdictionem super taliter diffamatum eo quod, si crimen fuerit probatum contra ipsum, poterit eum condempnare. Si autem non fuerit probatum legitime, poterit eum absolvere. Non solum autem sententia condempnationis sed etiam sententia absolutionis spectat ad iurisdictionem habentem. | Student: This example is to the contrary, because the bishop has jurisdiction over the defamed person, since if the accusation is proved against him, he can condemn him, but if it has not been lawfully proved, he can absolve him. Not only a sentence of condemnation but also a sentence of absolution pertains to someone who has jurisdiction.
Magister: Respondetur tibi quod in hoc casu episcopus pro diffamato non profert sententiam absolutionis tanquam habens iurisdictionem super ipsum, sed pronuntiabit diffamatum (eo quod nullum crimen est probatum contra ipsum) ad suam iurisdictionem minime pertinere. | Master: You are answered that in this case the bishop does not pronounce a sentence of absolution regarding the defamed person as someone having jurisdiction over him, but he will pronounce that the defamed person (because no accusation has been proved against him) does not pertain to his jurisdiction at all.
Discipulus: Hec responsio non videtur sufficiens, quia talis episcopus potest indicere purgationem taliter diffamato. Indicere autem purgationem pertinet ad iurisdictionem habentem, ergo etc. | Student: This answer does not seem sufficient, because the bishop can order the defamed person to purge. But to order purgation belongs to someone who has jurisdiction. Therefore etc.
Magister: Ad hoc dupliciter respondetur. Uno modo quod episcopus non potest tanquam iurisdictionem habens super diffamatum eidem purgationem indicere, sed potest eum rogare quod propter scandalum vitandum vel sedandum se purget, quod si ipse noluerit, ratione scandali quod prestat nolendo se purgare fit de iurisdictione episcopi, quia illud scandalum non est sine delicto. Aliter dicitur quod debet diffamatum ad suum superiorem remittere et ille sibi purgationem indicere. | Master: There is a twofold answer made to this. In one way, that the bishop cannot, as someone having jurisdiction over the defamed person, order that person to purge, but he can ask him to purge himself in order to avoid or calm scandal, and if he is unwilling, he comes within the jurisdiction of the bishop because of the scandal he presents by refusing to purge, because that scandal is not without fault. In another way, it is said that he should send the defamed person to that person's superior, who should order the purgation.
Discipulus: Satis tractavimus istud exemplum, et ideo pone aliud quod ratione dubitationis de iurisdictione potest quis inquirere vel citare aliquem super quem tamen iurisdictionem minime habet. | Student: We have dealt with this example sufficiently, and therefore give another example, that because of doubt about jurisdiction someone can investigate or summons someone over whom he has no jurisdiction at all.
Magister: Aliud exemplum ponitur Extra, De rescriptis, c. Pastoralis, ubi asseritur quod quando de revocatione literarum ambigitur, tam priores iudices quam posteriores, si neuter velit deferre aliis, de huiusmodi revocatione possunt cognoscere, et tamen alteri nullam habent iurisdictionem omnino. | Master: Another example is given in Extra, De rescriptis, c. Pastoralis, where it is asserted that when the revocation of letters is in dispute, both the former and the latter judges, if neither wishes to refer it to others, can take cognizance of such revocation, and yet they have no jurisdiction over the other at all.
Aliud exemplum est de legatis ad quos litere, tacita veritate vel suggesta falsitate, per fraudem et malitiam impetrantur, qui antequam de hoc eis fuerit facta fides, per tales literas possunt citare partem adversam, eo quod dubitant an litere sint legitime impetrate, qui tamen postquam sciverint quod non sunt legitime impetrate, eis uti non debent ( Extra, De rescriptis, c. Super literis). | Another example is when letters to legates have been obtained through fraud and malice, by surpressing truth or suggesting falsehood. Before they know about this, through such letters they can summons the opposing party, because they doubt whether the letters were legitimately obtained; but after they know that they were not legitimately obtained, they should not use them. (Extra, De rescriptis, c. Super literis).
Sic dicunt esse de papa, quod papa propter nullam infamiam de heresi est alicuius subiectus iudicio, de quo tamen catholici, eo quod dubitatur an sit hereticus (et per consequens an sit effectus de iurisdictione catholicorum), possunt et debent inquirere possuntque citare ipsum. Quod si nec vult se iudicio submittere nec purgare eum pro convicto interpretatione iuris debent habere, et ideo tunc poterunt eum legitime cohercere. | They say that it is thus about the pope -- that the pope is not because of infamy of heresy subject to anyone's judgment, but yet, because it is doubtful whether he is a heretic and consequently whether he is subject to the jurisdiction of Catholics, Catholics can and should investigate and can cite him. If if he will not submit himself to judgment or purge himself, they should consider him as convicted by the interpretation of the law, and therefore they can then legitimately coerce him.
Discipulus: Sufficiant ad presens ista de auctoritate Antheri pape, et dic ad illam de Constantino. | Student: Let this suffice for the present about the text of pope Antherus, and speak to that of Constantine.
Magister: Respondetur quod Constantinus non loquitur specialiter de summo pontifice, sed generaliter de omnibus clericis, qui tamen possunt ab homine iudicari. | Master: It is answered that Constantine does not speak specifically about the supreme pontiff but generally about all clerics who can nevertheless be judged by man.
Discipulus: De illa materia, an scilicet clerici debeant a laicis iudicari, alias disputabo. Ideo dic quomodo respondetur ad auctoritatem Gelasii pape. | Student: I will discuss that matter, namely whether clerics should be judged by laymen, elsewhere, so tell me how one responds to the text of pope Gelasius.
Magister: Respondetur quod illa verba Gelasii intellecta de summo pontifice non possunt generaliter absque omni exceptione intelligi. Tunc enim papa non posset alterius iudicio se submittere. Tunc etiam si papa iudicaret fidem christianam esse falsam et fictam, vel publice idolis immolaret, nulli liceret iudicare de ipso. Debent ergo intelligi si manens papa incorrigibilis minime reperitur. | Master: It is answered that those words of Gelasius understood about the supreme pontiff cannot be understood generally without any exception. For then the pope could not submit himself to the judgment of another. Then even if the pope were to judge that the Christian faith was false and fabricated, or he publicly sacrificed to idols, no one would be permitted to judge him. Therefore these words should be understood: if, while remaining pope he is not found to be incorrigible.
Et eodem modo respondetur ad auctoritatem Nicolai pape, et similiter respondetur ad alias auctoritates que idem sonare videntur. | And the text of pope Nicholas is answered in the same way, and similarly other authorities that seem to sound the same.
Capitulum 64 | Chapter 64
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad rationes que in eodem capitulo primo huius sexti sunt adducte. | Student: Tell me how answer is made to the arguments adduced in Book VI Chapter 1.
Magister: Ad primam dicitur quod in casu heresis licet appellare a summo pontifice. Iura autem adducta loquuntur in alio casu quam in casu heresis. | Master: To the first it is said that in a case of heresy it is permissible to appeal from the supreme pontiff. But the laws adduced speak about a different case than in a case of heresy.
Discipulus: De hac materia transi, quia dudum contuli tecum de ipsa. Ideo ad secundam rationem te converte. | Student: Pass over this matter, because I have discussed it with you already. Therefore turn to the second argument.
Magister: Ad secundam rationem respondetur quod idem respectu eiusdem et eorumdem potest esse superior et inferior in diversis causis. Sic enim delegatus quandoque est inferior ordinario iudice in multis causis, et in aliqua causa est eo superior. Sic papa de heresi diffamatus et notorie criminosus, de quo scandalizatur ecclesia, si incorrigibilis fuerit in causa sua est inferior catholicis aliis. In aliis tamen causis ante pronuntiationem sententie in causa sua omnibus est superior. | Master: To the second argument it is answered that the same person can be superior and inferior in different cases with respect to the same person (or persons). For in this way a delegate is sometimes inferior to an ordinary judge in many cases, and in some case superior. Thus a pope defamed for heresy and notoriously criminal, by whom the Church is scandalized, if he is incorrigible, is in his own case inferior to other Catholics. However, in other cases, before the sentence is pronounced in his own case, he is everyone's superior.
Ad tertiam rationem dicitur quod papa potest accusari, nec obstat quod quedam decreta dicunt quod oves pastorem accusare non possunt, quia illa capitula sane intelligenda sunt et in multis casibus capiunt instantias, sicut per sacros canones claret aperte. | To the third argument it is said that the pope can be accused, and it is no objection that certain decrees say that the sheep cannot accuse the shepherd, because those decrees are to be understood sensibly, and in many cases they do take exceptions, as is quite clear from the sacred canons.
Capitulum 65 | Chapter 65
Discipulus: Quomodo secundum predictam assertionem ad rationes adductas in contrarium in decimo capitulo huius sexti respondetur, non differas explicare. | Student: How answer is made, according to the aforesaid assertion, to the arguments adduced to the contrary in this Book VI, Chapter 10, do not delay to explain.
Magister: Ad primam illarum rationum dicitur quod falsa infamia non tribuit alicui super alium iurisdictionem coactivam. Nonnunquam tamen movet rationabiliter iurisdictionem habentem ad inquirendum de aliquo an ad eius iurisdictionem pertineat. Sicut si aliquis exemptus a iurisdictione episcopi falso fuerit diffamatus de crimine ratione cuius esset de iurisdictione ipsius episcopi, talis infamia non tribuit iurisdictionem episcopo super exemptum, et tamen rationabiliter movebit episcopum ad inquirendum de taliter diffamato. | Master: To the first of those arguments it is said that false infamy does not give anyone coercive jurisdiction over another, but sometimes it reasonably moves someone who has jurisdiction to inquire about someone whether he pertains to his jurisdiction. Thus if someone exempt from the jurisdiction of a bishop were falsely defamed for a crime by reason of which he would be within that bishop's jurisdiction, such infamy does not give the bishop jurisdiction over the exempted person, and yet it will reasonably move the bishop to inquire about the person so defamed.
Sic dicunt in proposito quod nulla infamia falsa tribuit alicui iurisdictionem super papam, tamen debet movere catholicos fidei zelatores ad inquirendum an talis infamia contineat veritatem. Non enim videtur eis quod aliquis christianitatis amator deberet asserere quod, si papa esset publice et graviter diffamatus quod vellet sarracenos super christianos inducere et per eos christianos cogere universos ad recipiendam sectam sarracenorum et negandum Christum, non deberent christiani veritatem inquirere nec periculo futuro occurrere. | Thus they say in the present case that no false infamy gives anyone jurisdiction over the pope, yet it should move Catholics zealous for the faith to inquire whether such infamy contains the truth. For it does not seem to them that any lover of Christianity should assert that, if the pope were publicly and gravely defamed of wanting to bring the Saracens in over the Christians and through them force all Christians to accept the Saracen sect and deny Christ, Christians should not investigate the truth or resist the coming danger.
Discipulus: Propter solam infamiam non deberent catholici procedere ad talem inquisitionem de summo pontifice faciendam nisi apparerent presumptiones alique violente quod papa vellet modo predicto vel alio consimili Christianitatem destruere. | Student: Catholics should not because of infamy alone proceed to make such an inquiry about the supreme pontiff unless some violent presumptions appear that the pope wanted to destroy Christianity in the aforementioned way, or in some other similar way.
Magister: Si concedis quod propter infamiam et presumptiones violentas in quocunque casu sit de summo pontifice inquirendum, putant isti habere propositum quod licet in casu de summo pontifice inquisitionem facere diligentem antequam sit ipso iure papatu privatus. Quia propter solam heresim est papa ipso facto papatu privatus. Ergo propter infamiam et presumptiones violentas non est ipso iure summo sacerdotio destitutus. Ergo adhuc manet verus papa, et tamen concedis quod propter infamiam et presumptiones huiusmodi de ipso licet inquirere veritatem. Ergo licet in casu de papa inquirere, licet in rei veritate non sit alicuius iurisdictioni subiectus. In quibus autem causis specialibus, et propter quam infamiam, et propter cuiusmodi presumptiones hoc liceat isti nequaquam specificant nisi duos casus generaliter assignando, scilicet si est de heresi graviter diffamatus et si incorrigibilem de aliquo crimine se ostendit. | Master: If you grant that the supreme pontiff should in any case be investigated because of infamy and violent presumptions, they think that they have established the proposition that it is permissible, on occasion, to make a diligent inquiry concerning the supreme pontiff before he is deprived of the papacy ipso iure [i.e. by the law itself, without judgment by a court]. Because it is on account of heresy alone that a pope is deprived ipso facto [i.e. by the fact itself, i.e. of being a heretic] of the papacy: therefore he is not deprived of the supreme priesthood ipso iure on account of infamy and violent presumptions. Therefore, he still remains true pope; and yet you grant that on account of infamy and presumptions of this kind it is permissible to inquire into the truth about him. Therefore, it is permissible, on occasion, to inquire concerning the pope, even if in reality he is not subject to anyone's jurisdiction. But in which special cases, and because of what infamy, and because of what kind of presumptions this is permissible, they do not specify, except by assigning two cases in general, namely, if he is gravely defamed for heresy and if he shows himself incorrigible in some crime.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad rationem secundam. | Student: Tell me how the second argument is answered.
Magister: Respondetur quod in una et eadem causa numero et eodem tempore, idem respectu eiusdem vel eorundem non est superior et inferior. Idem tamen respectu alicuius vel aliquorum in una causa et in uno tempore est superior et in alia causa eiusdem speciei et alio tempore respectu eiusdem vel eorundem est inferior. Rex enim alicuius regni quod alteri quam regi non est subiectum, et quando rex non habet superiorem personam, potest in aliqua causa esse inferior regno. Unde et regnum in casu iuste posset regem incorrigibilem deponere, et tamen quando rex inveniretur immunis a tali delicto et omnes de regno suo culpabiles in delicto consimili probarentur, rex esset omnibus superior et omnes posset de iure iuste punire si tantam haberet potentiam temporalem. | Master: It is answered that the same person is not superior and inferior with respect to the same person (or persons) in numerically one and the same cause and at the same time. However, the same person with respect to some person (or persons) in one cause and at one time is superior, and in another cause of the same species and at another time is inferior with respect to the same person (or persons). For when a kingdom is not subject to any other than its king, and when the king has no superior person, the king may in some cause be inferior to the kingdom. Hence the kingdom could, on occasion, justly depose an incorrigible king; and yet if the king were found to be immune from such an offense and all in his kingdom were proved guilty of a similar offense, the king would be superior to all and could by law justly punish them all, if he had enough temporal power.
Sic etiam dicitur esse in ordinibus mendicantium, quod capitulum generale pro aliquo delicto potest prelatum suum supremum deponere, et tamen si ipse immunis esset a delicto tali et omnes in generali capitulo congregati essent culpabiles, ipse in omnes et singulos posset iustitiam exercere. | Thus also it is said to be in mendicant orders, that the general chapter can depose its supreme prelate for some offense, and yet if he were itself immune from such an offense and all gathered in the general chapter were guilty, he could exercise justice against each and every one.
Discipulus: Istud secundum exemplum non videtur conveniens, quia quod generalia capitula ordinum mendicantium possint pro aliquo delicto prelatos suos supremos deponere habent ex privilegio speciali Romani pontificis. | Student: This second example does not seem appropriate, because the fact that the general chapters of mendicant orders can depose their supreme prelates for some offense is due to a special privilege from the Roman pontiff.
Magister: Hoc, dicunt isti, non impedit dictum eorum, quia, undecunque habeant, concedendum est quod idem respectu eiusdem vel eorumdem in una causa uno tempore est superior, et in alia causa eiusdem speciei alio tempore est inferior. Ex quo concludunt quod non est inconveniens quod idem respectu eorumdem in una causa sit superior et tamen alias in causa alia eiusdem speciei illi qui sunt inferiores habeant potestatem inquirendi de superiore suo. | Master: This, they say, does not hinder their statement, because, from whatever source they may have it, it should be conceded that the same person with respect to the same person (or persons) in one cause is superior at one time, and at another time in another cause of the same species is inferior. From this they conclude that it is not inappropriate that the same person with respect to the same person is superior in one cause, and yet in another cause of the same species those who are inferior should have the power to inquire about their superior.
Et ita dicunt esse de papa, quod si omnes christiani preter papam errarent in fide, ipse omnes de iure punire deberet, et tamen in alio casu si christiani in fide catholica perseverarent et papa de heresi esset graviter diffamatus, catholici haberent potestatem inquirendi de ipso. Si tamen ipsum invenirent innoxium, nullam iurisdictionem super ipsum haberent. | And they say that it is so about the pope, that if all Christians except the pope erred in the faith, he would have by law power to punish them all, and yet in another case if Christians persevered in the Catholic faith and the pope were gravely defamed of heresy, Catholics would have the power to inquire about him. If, however, they found him innocent, they would have no jurisdiction over him.
Discipulus: Video intentionem istorum ad rationem secundam, ideo dic quomodo respondetur ad tertiam. | Student: I see their thinking with regard to the second argument, therefore tell me how answer is made to the third.
Magister: Ad tertiam dicitur quod non solum ecclesia universalis habet potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine heresis graviter diffamato, sed etiam alii qui haberent iudicare papam si esset manifeste in heresi deprehensus habent potestatem inquirendi de ipso, quemadmodum absque universali ecclesia et concilio generali episcopi convenerunt ad inquirendum de facto beati Marcellini qui idolatriam commiserat. | Master: To the third it is said that not only does the universal Church have power to investigate a pope gravely defamed by an accusation of heresy, but others who would have power to judge the pope if he were clearly caught in heresy also have power to investigate him, just as without the universal Church and a general council the bishops met to inquire into the deed of blessed Marcellinus, who had committed idolatry.
Discipulus: Istud peccatum fuit ita horrendum quod dissimulari non poterat. | Student: This sin was so horrible that it could not be concealed.
Magister: Si concedis quod pro quocunque peccato sit inquirendum de papa, totam illam assertionem enervas que dicit quod papa in nullo casu habet superiorem in terris. Quia si conceditur quod papa pro publica idolatria, vel si publice et manifeste predicaret Christum fuisse mendacem et falsum prophetam, aut fidem christianam esse falsam, aut sectam sarracenorum esse tenendam, aut si se circumcideret et iudeum efficeret, vel corpus Christi in lucum proiiceret, vel resurrectionem futuram negaret, aut aliquod tale omnibus fidelibus detestandum presumeret perpetrare, esset catholicorum subiectus iudicio. Oportet consequenter concedere quod papa potest in casu habere superiorem in terris, ex quo sequitur quod posset accidere casus quod de papa diffamato haberent fideles inquirere veritatem. | Master: If you grant that the pope should be investigated for any sin, you undermine the entire assertion that in no case does a pope have a superior on earth. For if it is granted that the pope is guilty of public idolatry, or if he publicly and openly preached that Christ was a liar and a false prophet, or that the Christian faith was false, or that the sect of the Saracens was to be held, or if he circumcised himself and made himself a Jew, or threw the body of Christ into the bush, or denied the future resurrection, or presumed to commit any such act that should be detested by all the faithful, he would be subject to the judgment of Catholics. It should therefore be granted that the pope can, on occasion, have a superior on earth, from which it follows that a case could happen that the faithful would have power to inquire into the truth about a defamed pope.
Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istos est concedendum quod aliqua persona habet potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine heresis diffamato? | Student: Is it true, according to these, that it should be conceded that some person has power to inquire into a pope defamed by an accusation of heresy?
Magister: Isti concedunt quod sic, sicut concedunt quod si papa esset in heresi notorie deprehensus aliqua persona haberet iurisdictionem super ipsum. | Master: They concede the affirmative, just as they concede that if a pope were notoriously caught in heresy, some person would have jurisdiction over him.
Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad exempla de Marcellino et Symacho. | Student: Tell me how answer is made to the examples of Marcellinus and Symmachus. down to here
Magister: Respondetur quod per utrumque exemplum habent isti propositum. Nam beato Marcellino de heresi diffamato, inquisitionem fecerunt episcopi, et ipsi propter talem infamiam reputaverunt se habere potestatem inquirendi de papa. Sed postquam inquisierunt et invenerunt veritatem, scilicet quod beatus Marcellinus non erat hereticus et quod idolatraverit timore mortis, tantummodo constabat eis quod licet antea habuissent potestatem inquirendi de papa veritatem propter dubitationem in cordibus eorum exortam ex infamia precedenti, tamen post inquisitionem non habuerunt potestatem iudicandi ipsum nec sibi de iure debebant aliquam penitentiam pro commisso infligere. | Master: It is answered that they have their purpose through both examples. For when Blessed Marcellinus was defamed for heresy, the bishops held an inquiry, and they themselves, because of such infamy, considered that they had the power to inquire into the pope. But after they had inquired and found the truth, namely, that Blessed Marcellinus was not a heretic and that he had idolized for fear of death, it was only clear to them that although they had previously had the power to inquire into the truth about the pope because of the doubt in their hearts that had arisen from the previous infamy, nevertheless after the inquiry they did not have the power to judge him, nor did they by right have to inflict any penance on themselves for what they had committed.
Consimiliter dicunt de Symacho pape, quod quia in generali concilio congregati non invenerunt ipsum hereticum, non habuerunt potestatem iudicandi ipsum. Prius tamen, propter infamiam suscitatam de ipso, habuerunt potestatem inquirendi et etiam cogendi ipsum oppositionibus respondere, quod ex verbis superius allegatis, ut istis videtur, evidenter apparet. | Similarly, they say of pope Symmachus that because they gathered in a general council and did not find him a heretic, they did not have the power to judge him. However, before that, because of the infamy raised against him, they had the power to investigate and even force him to answer the objections, which, as it seems to these, is clearly evident from the words cited above.
Capitulum 66 | Chapter 66
Discipulus: De istis responsionibus sollicite cogitabo, et post istud opus de ipsis tecum conferam diligenter. Nunc autem queso ut dicas quomodo isti assertores respondent ad rationes adductas supra duodecimo capitulo huius sexti quibus ostenditur quod concilium generale non habet iurisdictionem super papam de crimine heresis diffamatum. | Student: I will think carefully about these responses, and after this work I will discuss them with you carefully. Now, however, I ask you to tell me how these assertors respond to the arguments brought forward above in chapter 12 of this Book VI, which show that a general council does not have jurisdiction over the pope defamed for the crime of heresy.
Magister: Ad primam istarum respondetur quod ecclesia universalis si esset simul congregata (sicut aliquando potuit congregari et nescitur an ad tantam paucitatem deveniet quod posset insimul convenire), potestatem haberet inquirendi de papa super heresi diffamato, et si probaretur hereticus ipsum punire deberet. Ad rationes autem in contrarium responsum est prius. | Master: To the first of these, it is answered that if the universal Church were gathered together (as it could sometimes [in early times] be gathered, and it is not known whether it will ever [again] reach such a small number that it could meet together), it would have the power to investigate the pope for the defamation of heresy, and if he were proved a heretic, it would have to punish him. (Answers to arguments to the contrary have been given before.)
Ad secundam dicitur quod, in casu, non solum congregatio particularis sed etiam aliqua persona potestatem haberet super papam. Si enim, ut dicunt, papa publice predicaret et assereret fidem christianam esse falsam, fictam, et iniquam, diocesanus catholicus cui hoc constaret haberet potestatem de iure capiendi et detinendi ipsum. Si etiam papa efficeretur iudeus vel sarracenus, deficientibus prelatis ecclesiasticis potestas secularis ipsum captivare deberet. Si autem papa de tali flagitio esset graviter diffamatus, non solum concilium generale sed etiam prelatus specialis haberet potestatem inquirendi de papa, non capiendi nec puniendi. | To the second, it is said that, in this case, not only a particular congregation but also some person would have power over the pope. For if, as they say, the pope were to publicly preach and assert that the Christian faith is false, fictitious, and unjust, the Catholic diocesan to whom this was evident would have the power of right to seize and detain him. If the pope also became a Jew or a Saracen, the secular power should capture him, if the ecclesiastical prelates were deficient. But if the pope were seriously defamed for such a crime, not only the general council but also an individual prelate would have the power to investigate the pope, not to arrest or punish.
Ad tertiam respondetur quod etiam persona que potest contra fidem errare, dum tamen non erret de facto, posset in casu habere iurisdictionem super papam. | To the third it is answered that even a person who can err against the faith, while yet does not actually err, could in some case have jurisdiction over the pope.
Ad quartam patet, ut dicunt, per illa que dicta sunt in capitulo precedenti. Quia, sicut si papa esset in heresi notorie deprehensus, concilium generale haberet iurisdictionem super ipsum, et tamen si papa esset fortis in fide et omnes alii de concilio generali errarent, essent sibi subiecti, ita si papa esset de heresi diffamatus, concilium generale haberet potestatem inquirendi de ipso, et tamen si papa non erraret et omnes alii errarent, papa de iure ipsos iudicare deberet, et hoc quia, sicut dictum est, in diversis causis eiusdem speciei diversis temporibus idem respectu eiusdem vel eorundem potest esse superior et inferior. | To the fourth it is clear, as they say, from what was said in the preceding chapter. For, just as if the pope were notoriously caught in heresy, the general council would have jurisdiction over him, and yet if the pope were strong in the faith and all others erred in the general council, they would be subject to it, so if the pope were defamed for heresy, the general council would have the power to investigate him, and yet if the pope were not in error and all others erred, the pope would rightly have to judge them, and this because, as has been said, in different causes of the same kind at different times the same person can be superior and inferior with respect to the same or the same thing.
Ad quintam dicitur quod concilium generale habet auctoritatem principaliter ab ecclesia universali cuius vicem gerit et cuius auctoritate principaliter convocatur, licet immediate per papam, si est catholicus et desideret sequi iustitiam, congregetur. Unde et absque papa congregari posset in casu. | To the fifth, it is said that the general council has authority principally from the universal Church, whose representative it is and by whose authority it is principally convened, although it may be convened directly by the pope, if he is a Catholic and desires to follow justice. Hence it could be convened without the pope in some case.
Capitulum 67 | Chapter 67
Discipulus: Recitasti nonnulla de quibus investigationem specialem habebo. Verumptamen antequam illa proponam numera modos in quibus catholici et fideles habent potestatem super papam. | Student: You have recited some things about which I will have a special investigation. But before I propose them, enumerate the ways in which Catholics and the faithful have power over the pope.
Magister: Intendis solummodo loqui de papa qui est verus papa, vel generalius de illo qui fuit verus papa et gerit se pro papa, sive de iure fuerit papa sive non. | Master: You intend to speak only of the pope who is a true pope, or more generally of one who was a true pope and presents himself as pope, whether he is pope by right or not.
Discipulus: Loquor de omni illo qui postquam fuisset verus papa gereret vel niteretur gerere se pro papa. | Student: I am speaking of every one who, having been a true pope, would present himself, or attempt to present himself, as pope.
Magister: Adhuc volo scire de qua potestate intendis, an de potestate que est iurisdictio, an de omni alia quam potest quis licite in alium exercere. Minister enim iudicis potest exercere potestatem in dampnatum per iudicem, et tamen iurisdictionem minime habet super eum. Potest etiam quis licite insidiantem occidere, et eum qui vult eum occidere, et tamen ex hoc iurisdictionem super insidiantem minime habet. Contingit etiam quandoque licite absque iudicis auctoritate latrones occidere super quos occidens iurisdictionem minime habet. Licet enim non habenti iurisdictionem vim vi repellere. | Master: I still want to know what power you mean, whether of the power that is jurisdiction, or of any other power that one can lawfully exercise over another. For a judge's minister [e.g jailer] can exercise power over a person condemned by a judge, and yet he has no jurisdiction over him. One can also lawfully kill an assailant, and someone who wants to kill one, and yet one has no jurisdiction over the assailant. It also sometimes happens that robbers are killed lawfully without the authority of a judge, and the killer has no jurisdiction over them. For it is permissible from a person who does not have jurisdiction to repel force by force.
Discipulus: Aperte conspicio quod contingit non habentem iurisdictionem licite potestatem in aliquem exercere, et ideo loquor de potestate communiter dicta. | Student: I clearly see that it happens that someone who does not have jurisdiction can lawfully exercise power over someone, and therefore I speak of power commonly so called.
Magister: Nunc video intentionem tuam, et ideo ad mentem tuam respondebo. Dico quod assertores predicti asserunt manifeste quod contingit licite exercere potestatem simpliciter vel secundum quid in papam. | Master: Now I see your intention, and therefore I will answer in accordance with your meaning. I say that the aforementioned assertors clearly assert that it happens that someone can lawfully exercise power simply, or power secundum quid, over a pope.
Discipulus: Expone quam potestatem vocant potestatem simpliciter et quam vocant potestatem secundum quid. | Student: Explain what power they call power simply and what they call power secundum quid.
Magister: Potestatem simpliciter vocant quam quis vel ordinarie vel in aliquo casu pro determinato tempore contingit in alium exercere ipso nolente et a principio renitente. Potestatem secundum quid vocant quam potest quis in alium exercere ipso volente. | Master: They call "power simply" the power that someone can exercise over another either ordinarily or in some case for a determined time against him who is unwilling and who is resisting from the beginning. They call "power secundum quid" that power that someone can exercise over another who is willing.
Discipulus: Intelligo distinctionem eorum, et ideo explica in quibus casibus contingit fideles licite exercere potestatem in papam verum vel in eum qui fuit et gerit se pro papa. | Student: I understand their distinction, and therefore explain in which cases it happens that the faithful can lawfully exercise power over the true pope or over him who was, and [still] acts as, pope.
Magister: Dicunt quod potestatem secundum quid possunt catholici exercere in papam si eorum iudicio vel potestati inquirendi se submittat. Sic enim Leo papa iudicio imperatoris et suorum se submisit. Unde, et legitur 2 q. 7 c. Nos si, scribens Ludovico imperatori, ait: "Nos, si incompetenter aliquid egimus et in subditis iuste legis tramitem non conservavimus, vestro ac missorum vestrorum cuncta volumus emendare iudicio." Hinc etiam Gregorius cupiebat se subdere aliorum iudicio qui, ut habetur causa et questione predictis, c. Si quis, ait: "Si quis super hiis nos redarguere voluerit, vel extra auctoritatem nos facere contenderit veniat ad sedem apostolicam, ut ibi ante confessionem beati Petri mecum iuste decertet, quatinus ibi ex nobis sententiam suscipiat suam." Ex hiis datur intelligi quod cum papa iudicio se submittit, alius in ipsum suscipit potestatem. Sicut autem papa potest submittere se iudicio aliorum, ita valet committere aliis potestatem inquirendi de ipso. | Master: They say that Catholics can exercise "power secundum quid" over a pope if he submits to their judgment or to the power of investigation. For thus pope Leo submitted himself to the judgment of the Emperor and his followers. Hence, and we read 2 q. 7 c. Nos si, writing to the Emperor Louis, he says: "If we have acted incompetently and have not observed the just course of the law in our subjects, we wish to amend everything by your judgment and that of your envoys." Hence also Gregory desired to submit himself to the judgment of others who, as is stated in the aforementioned case and question, c. Si quis, says: " If anyone wishes to refute us on these matters, or contends that we are beyond our authority, let him come to the Apostolic See, so that there he may justly dispute with me before the confession of blessed Peter, and there he may receive his opinion from us." From these it is given to be understood that when the pope submits himself to judgment, another assumes power over him. But just as the pope can submit himself to the judgment of others, so he can entrust others with the power to inquire about him.
Discipulus: Refer casus in quibus aliquis haberet potestatem simpliciter in papam. | Student: Mention the cases in which someone would have power "simply" over the pope.
Magister: Ponunt quatuor casus nec tamen alios negant. Primus est si papa in se vel in alium manus crudeles cupit iniicere, puta si seipsum vult occidere aut graviter vulnerare vel mutilare, vel alium sine omni causa vult occidere. In hoc enim casu licet papam, sive fuerit alienatus a sensu sive non, compescere et modo debito cohercere. | Master: They posit four cases (and yet they do not deny others). The first is if the pope desires to lay cruel hands on himself or on another, for example if he desires to kill himself or to seriously wound or mutilate himself, or to kill another without any cause. For in this case it is permissible to restrain the pope, whether he is insane or not, and to coerce him in the due manner.
Secundus casus est si papa, hoc est qui fuit verus papa et cupit se gerere pro papa, in heresi manifeste deprehenditur. Tunc enim licet ipsum de sede eiicere violenter et debite subdere ultioni. | The second case is if a pope, that is, one who was a true pope and desires to present himself as pope, is clearly caught in heresy. For then it is permissible to expel him from his see by force and to subject him to due punishment.
Tertius est si papa in aliquo crimine fuerit deprehensus de quo scandalizatur ecclesia, et ipse incorrigibilem se ostenderet. | The third is if the pope is caught in some crime by which the Church is scandalized, and he shows himself to be incorrigible.
Quartus est si fuerit de heresi diffamatus etiam mendaciter. Tunc enim catholici habent potestatem inquirendi de ipso, licet non habeant potestatem iudicandi ipsum nisi cum scandalo ecclesie irrevocabiliter sive pertinaciter se submittere vel purgare renueret. Preter istos casus forte ponerent alios, sed ad istos vel ad aliquem eorum potuerunt forte reduci. | The fourth is if he is defamed for heresy, even falsely. For then Catholics have the power to investigate him, although they do not have the power to judge him unless he irrevocably or obstinately refuses to submit or purge himself with the scandal of the Church. They might perhaps cite others besides these cases, but they [i.e. other cases] could perhaps be reduced to these or to one of them.

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