CAP. XV.
Discipulus Quomodo {quoniam &Pe}
autem {*om. &MzNaRe} ad rationem istam ultimam
potest {*poterit &NaRe} responderi et qualiter
responsio valeat improbari {*patere add. &NaMzPeRe}
potest appetere {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ex his quae
tractata sunt superius 10 c. Ideo ad praesens nolo quod
de ista responsione {*ratione &NaPeRe} et opinione
pro qua adducitur hic amplius te {*trs. &MzNaPeRe}
intromittas, sed indica quomodo respondetur secundum
opinionem quae recitata {tractate &Pe} est supra c.
8 ad rationes pro opinionibus aliis recitatis capitulo
{in &Re} praecedenti et allegationes {*et
allegationes om. &NaMzPeRe} adducas {*adductas
&MzPe}.
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Chapter 15
Student How one can reply to that
final argument and how that reply can be rejected can be
clear from those things that were dealt with in chapter
10 above. Therefore I do not want you to involve
yourself any further now with that argument and the
opinion on behalf of which it is brought forward. But
indicate how one replies, according to the opinion
recited in chapter 8 above, to the arguments brought
forward for the other opinions recited in the preceding
chapter.
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Magister Ad allegationes {*duas add.
&MzNaRe} pro secunda {*prima &MzNaPe} {qua
&Re} opinione adductas {*inductas &MzNa}
{inducas &Re} respondetur quod pro omni favore
haereticae pravitatis, quae {qui &Pe} non est in
{om. &Na} favente, absque haeretica pravitate {*trs.
&MzNaRe} essent cardinales privati iure eligendi
summum pontificem et reverteretur ius eligendi ad
Romanos. Pro alio favore non essent privati sed privandi
iure eligendi summum pontificem. An
autem possit {posset &Pe} esse aliquis favor
haereticae pravitatis absque haeretica pravitate in
favente ex his quae dicta sunt libro 7 primae partis
huius Dialogi advertere poterit studiosus {studiosius
&Re}.
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Master To the two arguments brought
forward for the first opinion it is replied that for any
support of heretical wickedness which is not [found] in
the supporter cardinals had been deprived without
heretical wickedness of the right to elect the highest
pontiff and the right to elect reverted to the Romans.
For any other support they had not been deprived of the
right to elect the highest pontiff, but should have
been. [[These last two sentences do not seem right.]]
Whether anyone can be a supporter of heretical
wickedness without there being heretical wickedness in
the supporter, however, whoever is keen can perceive
from what is said in book 7 of the first part of this Dialogue.
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Ad allegationem pro tertia
{*secunda &MzNaRe} opinione respondetur quod licet
papa si efficiatur haereticus sit ipso facto et ipso
iure depositus, sicut in prima parte Dialogi huius
{*trs. &MzNaRe} libro sexto per quamplurimas
rationes probatum existit, et ideo licet {*om.
&MzNaRe} pro favore haereticae pravitatis quae {?qui
MzNa} est absque haeresi in favente sit papa depositus
ipso facto, tamen pro solo favore haereticorum absque
favore errorum {*erroris &MzNaRe} ipsorum non est
papa ipso facto depositus, imo secundum aliquos nec
etiam deponendus nisi incorrigibilis appareat et de eo
scandalizetur ecclesia. Cum autem dicitur quod
Anastasius secundus non fuit depositus nisi pro favore
haereticorum, respondetur quod non est verum; imo fuit
depositus pro haeresi et fautoria haereticae pravitatis,
quod ex textu dist. 19 et glossa ut videtur colligitur
evidenter. Ait enim Gratianus eadem dist. para. Hoc
autem, "Anastasius enim secundus {episcopus add.
&MzNaRe} favore Anastasii imperatoris quos Achacius
post sententiam in se prolatam sacerdotes et {*vel
&Zn} levitas ordinaverat acceptis officiis rite
fungi debere decrevit" et {*om. &NaRe} erronee
{*erronea &NaRe} supple. Unde in {*om. &MzNaRe}
para. sequenti dicit Gratianus, "Quia ergo illicite et
non canonice, sed contra decreta {dei add. Zn}
praedecessorum et successorem suorum haec rescripta
dedit, ut probat Felix et Gelasius qui Achacium ante
{*Anastasium add. &MzNaReZn} excommunicaverunt et
Hormisda qui ab ipso Anastasio tertius eundem Achacium
postea damnavit, ideo a Romana ecclesia repudiatur et a
Deo percussus fuisse legitur."
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To the argument for the second opinion it is replied
that although a pope is deposed in fact and in law if he
becomes a heretic, as is proved by very many arguments
in book 6 of the first part of this Dialogue,
and therefore is in fact deposed for support of
heretical wickedness which exists without heresy in the
supporter, yet the pope is not in fact deposed solely
because of support for heretics unless he supports their
error; indeed according to some he should not even be
deposed unless he seems to be incorrigible and the
church is caused to stumble because of it. When it is
said, however, that Anastasius II was deposed only for
the support of heretics, it is said that this is not
true; rather he was deposed for heresy and for promoting
heretical wickedness which seems to be clearly gathered
from the text and gloss of dist. 19. For in the
paragraph Hoc autem [c.7, col.62] of that
distinction Gratian says, "For Anastasius II with the
support of the emperor Anastasius decreed that the
bishops or levites whom Achatius had ordained after the
sentence published against him should duly discharge the
offices they had received." Make good the errors: [[is
this right?]] Whence Gratian says in the following
paragraph [Quia ergo c.8, col.645], "Therefore
because he issued these rescripts illicitly and not
canonically, but contrary to the decrees of his
predecessors and successors, as Felix and Gelasius, who
excommunicated Achatius before Anastasius, and Hormisda,
third in line after Anastasius who later condemned
Achatius, prove, he is as a result repudiated by the
Roman church and was, we read, struck by God."
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Item glossa super c. Anastasius super verbo
abegerunt ait, "Hi non recesserunt, scilicet
clerici, ab Anastasio ante sententiam, quia inciderat
{*inciderunt Zn} in haeresim iam damnatam." Tunc {*Item
&NaRe} super verbo communicaverat dicit
glossa, "Hic communicavit, scilicet Anastasius, cum
{*ei, scilicet &MzNaRe} Achacio haeretico, in
maleficio. Unde potuit transire, scilicet
excommunicatio, ad tertiam personam." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod Anastasius fuit haereticus et fautor
haereticae pravitatis. Et ideo fuit depositus ipso iure
et fuit excommunicationis sententia innodatus.
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Again the gloss on the words "drove out" in [dist. 19]
c. Anastasius [col. 87] says, "They, that is
the clerics, did not withdraw from Anastasius before the
sentence because they had fallen into a heresy that was
already condemned." Again on the words "had
participated" the gloss says, "He, that is Anastasius,
participated in wickedness with that one, namely the
heretic Achatius. Whence it, that is the
excommunication, could pass over to a third person." We
gather from these words that Anastasius was a heretic
and a supporter of heretical wickedness. And he was,
therefore, deposed by that law and was bound by a
sentence of excommunication.
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Ad allegationem {*allegationes &MzNaRe} pro quarta
{*tertia &MzNaRe} opinione respondetur quod {licet
papa si efficiatur ... quod om. &Pe} non omnes
schismatici sunt omni iure privati. {*Sed omnes
schismatici qui sunt heretici quales ut saepe sunt
schismatici sunt omni iure privati add. &NaRe} et de
illis loquitur beatus Cyprianus. Omnes enim {*etiam
&NaMzPeRe} schismatici quamdiu sunt schismatici non
sunt capaces ecclesiasticarum {?ecclesiarum &Mz}
{aut add. &Mz} dignitatum. Et ideo Novatianus
secundum Cyprianum non {om. MzPe} potuit esse papa.
Schismatici autem {*etiam &NaRe} non possunt habere
executionem alicuius iuris ecclesiastici licet aliqua
iura ecclesiastica possunt {*possint &NaRe} habere
dummodo non sunt {*sint &NaRe} haeretici. Et ideo
cardinales propter solum schisma absque heresi non
perdunt ius eligendi summum pontificem quamvis non
debeant {debent &Mz} {deberent &Pe} eligere
quamdiu in schismate perseverant {perseverarent
&Pe}.
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To the arguments for the third opinion the reply is
that all schismatics are deprived of every right. But
all schismatics who are heretics, as schismatics often
are, are deprived of every right, and it is about these
that blessed Cyprian is speaking. In addition, no
schismatics are fit for ecclesiastical dignities as long
as they are schismatic. And therefore according to
Cyprian, Novatian could not be pope. Schismatics also
can not have [the right] to execute any ecclesiastical
right, although they can have some ecclesiastical rights
as long as they are not heretics. And cardinals do not
lose the right to elect the highest pontiff, therefore,
although they should not elect as long as they persist
in schism.
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Et per idem breviter respondetur ad allegationem pro
quarta opinione adductam. Quamdiu enim in tali malitia
et negligentia perstiterint constat quod de facto sunt
tali iure privati. Si autem resipiscant idem ius eis
debetur {*et per idem ... debetur om. &NaMzPeRe}.
CAP. XVI.
Discipulus Quamvis in prima parte nostri
Dialogi li. 6 tractaverimus an imperator sit iudex
ordinarius summi pontificis, et cum {*tu &NaMzPeRe}
ibidem circa hoc {posuisti add. &Pe} opiniones
contrarias allegationibus pluribus conatus fueris
confirmare, hic tamen de hac materia conferamus ut {et
&Pe} excitemus {exitemus &NaRe} [[correct
interlinear Re]] alios tractatulum {tractatum &Pe}
hunc visuros qui primam partem huius operis forsitan
{*trs.312 &NaRe} non habebunt ad solicite
perscrutandum {prescrutandum &Re} an {aut &Mz}
imperator supra papam iam in summo pontificio
constitutum aliquam habeat vel habere valeat potestatem.
Investigemus autem primo an imperator ratione {romani
imperii aut add. &Pe} imperatoriae dignitatis
{*maiestatis &NaRe} sit in aliquo casu iudex
ordinarius papae.
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[Answer to argument for fourth opinion not given.]
Chapter 16
Student Although we considered
whether the emperor is the regular judge of the highest
pontiff in book six of the first part of our Dialogue,
and in that place you tried with many arguments to
establish the opposed opinions about this, let us
nevertheless confer here about this matter in order to
stimulate others, who will see this tract but perhaps
will not have the first part of this work, to
investigate carefully whether the emperor has or can
have any power over a pope already established in his
pontificate. Let us first investigate, however, whether
by reason of his imperial dignity the emperor is the
regular judge of the pope on any occasion.
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Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae
assertiones {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} et adversae. {opinio
add. &Mz} Una est quod imperator ratione
imperatoriae dignitatis non est iudex ordinarius in
quocunque casu summi pontificis.
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Master There are differing and
opposed assertions about this. One is that on no
occasion is the emperor the regular judge of the highest
pontiff by reason of his imperial dignity.
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Discipulus Pro ista assertione
allega.
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Student Argue for that assertion.
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Magister Pro ista assertione potest
taliter allegari. Si imperator inquantum imperator
{inquantum imperator om. &Pe} esset iudex ordinarius
papae aut esset suus iudex {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} in
causa ecclesiastica aut in causa seculari. Non in
{*causa add. &NaMzPeRe} ecclesiastica, quia {*causa
ecclesiastica add. &NaMzPeRe} solum {*om.
&MzNaRe} ad iudicem ecclesiasticum {*solummodo add.
&MzNaRe} spectat. Ideo enim dicitur causa
ecclesiastica [[quia ... ecclesiastica: margin Pe]]
{?nisi add. &Mz} quia debet coram ecclesiastico
iudice agitari. Nec in causa seculari quia nec in causa
{*om. &NaRe} criminali nec {*in causa add.
&NaMzPeRe} civili. Quod non {om. &Mz} in
criminali {om. &Na} causa seculari {*om. &NaPe}
{causa seculari om. &Re} probatur, quia, sicut
legitur dist. 40, c. Si papa, ex gestis
Bonifatii papae martyris habetur {*trs.231
&MzNaPeRe}, "huiusmodi {*om. &NaMzPeReZn}
{*Huius add. &Zn} culpam {*culpas &Zn} istic
{istinc &NaMzPeRe} idem {*om. &PeReZn} {et /est
Na\ /om. MzPe\ in hac vita add. &NaMzPeRe}
redarguere nullus {om. &Pe} mortalium praesumit
{praesumat &NaMzPeRe} {*trs.321 &MzNaReZn}, quia
cunctos {est add. &MzNaRe} ipse {in ipsa &Pe}
iudicaturus a nemine est {ipse add. &MzPe}
[[interlinear Pe]] iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide
devians {*devius &NaMzPeReZn}." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod papa pro sola deviatione a fide est ab
aliquo iudicandus; deviatio autem {*a fide add.
&NaMzPeRe} non est culpa secularis. Ergo pro nulla
culpa seculari est papa ab imperatore vel ab {*om.
&NaPeRe} alio iudicandus. Nec imperator est iudex
ordinarius papae in causa seculari civili cum etiam in
tali causa sicut neque in causa criminali sit iudex
ordinarius cuiuscunque episcopi, teste Bonifacio qui, ut
habetur 11, q. 1, c. {11, q. 1, c.: dist. 11, c. 1,
&Pe} Nullus, ait, "Nullus episcopus neque
pro civili neque pro criminali causa apud iudicem
quemlibet {*iudicem quemlibet: quemvis iudicem sive
&NaMzPeReZn} civilem sive militarem producatur
{perducatur &Mz}." Relinquitur ergo {*igitur
&MzNaRe} ex praedictis quod imperator inquantum
imperator in nulla causa est iudex ordinarius papae.
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Master It can be argued as follows
for that assertion. If the emperor were the regular
judge of the pope as emperor he would be his judge
either in an ecclesiastical case or in a secular case.
[He is judge] not in an ecclesiastical case because an
ecclesiastical case belongs only to an ecclesiastical
judge. For it is called an ecclesiastical case because
it should be treated before an ecclesiastical judge. Nor
[is he judge] in a secular case because he is not one in
either in a criminal or a civil case: that he is not one
in a criminal case is proved because, as we read in
dist. 40, c. Si papa [c.6, col.146], we find
in the deeds of Pope Boniface the martyr, "No mortal
presumes to contradict his faults because he who is to
judge the rest should be judged by no one unless he is
detected as being inconsistent with faith." We gather
from these words that the pope should be judged by
someone only for an inconsistency with faith;
inconsistency with faith, however, is not a secular
fault. Therefore for no secular fault should the pope be
judged by the emperor or by another person. Nor is the
emperor the regular judge of the pope in a civil secular
case since even in such a case, as in a criminal case,
he is not the regular judge of any bishop, as Boniface
attests who says, as we find in 11, q. 1, c. Nullus
[episcopus] [c.8, col.628], "No bishop is to be
brought before any civil or military judge either in a
civil or a criminal case." From the above we are left
with the conclusion that as emperor, the emperor is in
no case the regular judge of the pope.
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Discipulus Ut
mihi {*detur add. &NaRe} occasio sit {*om.
&NaRe} intelligendi profundius istam materiam pro
ista assertione multas auctoritates {*trs. &MzNaRe}
adducas, etiam illas quas in prima parte {*istius add.
&MzNaRe} dialogi tetigisti, quia nolo {*volo
&NaRe} {om. &Mz} ut {*quod &MzNaRe} postea
mihi {multipliciter &Mz} referas exquisite qualiter
assertio contraria ad ipsas nititur respondere. Per hunc
enim modum incitabimus alios ad veritatem acutius
indagandam et nobis ipsis intellectus auctoritatem
{*auctoritatum &MzNaRe} adducendarum clarius
{intellectus ... clarius om. &Pe} apparebit.
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Student To give me an opportunity to
understand that matter more deeply would you bring
forward many authorities for that assertion, even those
that you cited in the first part of this Dialogue,
because I want you afterwards to set forth for me
carefully how the opposite assertion tries to reply to
them. For in this way we will incite others to explore
the truth more intelligently and our own understanding
of the authorities brought forward will appear clearer.
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Magister Pro ista opinione
auctoritates quamplurimae adducuntur {*inducuntur
&NaRe}. Gelasius enim papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta
{per mundum add. &Pe}, ait, "Cuncta per mundum novit
{in omni &Pe} ecclesia quoniam {quam &Mz}
quorumlibet sententiis ligata pontificum sedes {fide
&Pe} beati Petri apostoli ius habeat resolvendi
{solvendi &NaRe} {absolvendi &Pe} utpote quae de
{om. &Pe} omni ecclesia fas habeat iudicandi."
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Master Very many authorities are
brought forward for that opinion. For as we find in 9,
q. 3, c. [18] Cuncta [c.18, col.611] Pope
Gelasius say, "The whole church throughout the world has
known that, bound by the sentences of every pontiff, the
seat of the blessed apostle Peter has the right to
loose, that is, that it has the right to judge every
church."
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Item Melchiades {*papa add. &MzNaRe} ut habetur
12, q. 1, c. futura {*Futuram &NaRe} ait,
"Idem praefatus princeps," scilicet Constantinus,
"donaria immensa contulit et fabricam templi primae
sedis beati Petri instituit, adeo ut sedem imperialem
relinqueret et {etiam &Mz} beato Petro suisque
successoribus profuturis {*profuturam &NaMzPeReZn}
concederet. Idem {item &Na} vero praesidens sanctae
{sancto &Mz} synodo, quae apud Nicenam congregata
est, cum {et &Pe} querelam {cum querelam:
conquerelam &Mz} quorundam coram se conspiceret
{trs.312 &MzNaRe} deferendam ait, `Vos a nemine
iudicari {*diiudicari &MzNaReZn} potestis, quia Dei
solius iudicio reservamini. Dii etenim vocati estis et
idcirco non potestis ab hominbus iudicari.'"
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Again, as we find in 12, q. 1, c. Futuram
[c.15, cols 682], Pope Melchiades says, "That same
prince," namely Constantine, "bestowed immense gifts and
constructed the fabric of the temple of the first seat
of blessed Peter; moreover, he abandoned his imperial
seat and resigned it to the use of blessed Peter and his
successors. And presiding over the holy synod that
gathered at Nicena and perceiving that the complaint to
him of certain people should be deferred the same man
said, `You can be judged by no one because you are
reserved for the judgement of God alone. For you are
called gods and therefore you can not be judged by
men.'"
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Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta,
ait, "Cuncta per mundum novit ecclesia quod {quia
&Mz} sacrosancta Romana ecclesia {trs. &Na} fas
habeat de omnibus {*trs.231 &MzNaReZn} iudicandi
neque cuiquam {quicquam &Mz} de eius liceat {trs.312
&MzNaRe} iudicare iudicio. Siquidem ad illam de
qualibet mundi parte appellandum est; ab illa autem nemo
est appellare permissus. Sed nec illa praeterimus
{praetermittimus &NaRe}, quod apostolica sedes sine
ulla synodo praecedente et solvendi quod {*quos
&MzNaReZn} synodus inique {*iniqua &Zn}
damnaverat {trs. &MzNaRe} et damnandi, nulla
existente synodo, actus {*om. &MzNaReZn} quos
oportuit habuit {*habuerit &MzNaReZn} facultatem."
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Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta
[c.17, col.611], Pope Gelasius says, "The whole church
throughout the world has known that the most holy Roman
church has the right to judge everyone and that no one
is permitted to judge its judgement. Moreover, an appeal
can be made to it from any part of the world; however,
no one is permitted to appeal from it. But let us not
omit the fact that without any preceding synod the
apostolic see had the power both of releasing those whom
an unjust synod had condemned and of condemning those
whom it ought, without there being a synod."
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Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur dist. 96. {*c. Duo
add. &MzNaRe}, scribens Anastasio imperatori ait,
"Nosti itaque inter haec ex illorum te pendere iudicio,
non illos ad tuam posse regi {*redigi &MzNaReZn}
voluntatem."
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Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo [c.10,
col.340], Pope Gelasius writing to the emperor
Anastasius says, "And so know that, as it concerns
these, you depend upon their [priests'] judgement; it is
not the case that they can be brought under your will."
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Item Innocentius papa, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Nemo,
ait, "Nemo iudicabit apostolicam {*primam &NaReZn}
sedem iusticiam temperare desiderantem. Neque enim ab
Augusto, neque ab omni clero, neque a regibus {neque a
regibus om. &NaRe}, neque a populo iudex
iudicabitur."
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Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Nemo [c.13,
col.610], Pope Innocent says, "No one will judge the
first see when it wants to temper justice. For that
judge will be judged neither by Augustus, nor by any
clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people."
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Item Iohannes papa, ut habetur dist. 96. c. Si
{sed &NaRe} imperator, ait, "Si imperator
catholicus est, quod salva pace ipsius dicimus, filius
est non praesul ecclesiae." Lex autem erubescit filios
castigatores esse parentum. Ergo nullo modo imperator
{*trs.312 &NaRe} potest esse iudex papae qui pater
est omnium.
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Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Si imperator
[c.11, col.341], Pope John says, "If the emperor is a
catholic, which we say saving his peace, his son is not
a priest of the church." The law, however, is ashamed if
sons are reprovers of their parents. Therefore the
emperor can in no way be the judge of the pope who is
the father of all.
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Item Symachus papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum,
ait, "Aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit per homines
{hominem &Mz} terminare, {terrarum &Na} sed
{*om. &Zn} sedis {sedes &Mz} istius praesulem
{praesulis &Zn} suo sine quaestione reservavit
{reservabit &Mz} arbitrio. Voluit {etiam id est add.
&Mz} beati Petri apostoli successores coelo tantum
debere innocentiam, et subtilissimi {om. &Mz} [[gap
left in ms]] discussoris indagini inviolatam habere
conscientiam. Nolite {noli &MzNaRe} aestimare
{*existimare &Zn} eas animas inquisitoris
{inquisitorum &Mz} non habere formidinem, quas Deus
prae caeteris suo reservavit examini." Et infra:
"Sanctorum voce {*patet add. &MzNaRe}, pontificum
dignitatem sedis eius {cuius &Mz} factam toto orbe
venerabilem, esse {*om. &MzNaReZn} dum illi {ibi
&MzNaRe} quicquid fidelium est ubique submittitur,
dum totius corporis caput esse designatur."
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Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum
[c.14, col.610], Pope Symachus says, "God wanted men to
determine the cases of other men; without question he
reserved to his own authority the bishop of that see. He
wanted the successors of the blessed apostle Peter to
owe their innocence only to heaven and to have by the
most subtle investigation of the examiner an inviolate
conscience. Do not consider that those souls which above
all God reserved for his own examination do not have
fear of an examiner ... It is clear from the voice of
the saints that the dignity of that see of the pontiffs
became venerable in all the world, while anything of the
faithful is everywhere submitted to it, while it is
designated as the head of the whole body."
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Item Nicolaus papa, {*ut legitur add. &MzNaRe}
dist. 21. c. Nunc {om. &Mz} [[gap left in
ms]] autem, ait, quoniam {*om. &MzNaRe}
"Prima {primas &Na} sedes non iudicabitur a
quoquam." {Item Gelasius papa ... quoquam om. &Pe}
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Again, as we read in dist. 21, c. Nunc autem
[c.7, col.71], Pope Nicholas says, "The first see will
not be judged by anyone."
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Item Anterius papa, ut habetur 9, {23 &Pe} q. 3,
c. Facta, ait, "Facta subditorum iudicantur a
nobis, nostra vero a Domino {divino &Mz} iudicantur
{a nobis nostra vero a domino iudicantur add. &Re}.
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Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Facta
[c.15, col.610], Pope Anterus says, "The deeds of
subjects are judged by us; truly, ours are judged by the
Lord."
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Item Sixtus {om. &Mz} papa, ut habetur 2, q. 5, {6
&Pe} c. Mandastis, cum fuisset {fuisse
&Pe} accusatus {*criminatus &NaMzPeRe} a quodam
scriba {*scribens &NaRe} {scribere &Pe}
episcopis {episcopo &Mz} ait, "Facto consilio, cum
magna examinatione satisfaciens omnibus, licet evadere
aliter satis potuissem, suspicionem tamen fugiens, coram
omnibus me purgavi, et me {*et me om. &MzNaRe}
scilicet {me scilicet om. &Pe} a suspicione a {*et
&NaMzPeReZn} aemulatione {*me add. &NaMzPeRe}
liberans, sed non aliis qui noluerint {voluerint
&MzPe} aut sponte hoc {haec &NaRe} non {om.
&Pe} elegerint faciendi formam dans." Ex quibus
verbis colligitur quod papa in nullo casu tenetur se
purgare si fuerit diffamatus. Ex quo infertur quod
nullius {nullus PeRe} [[corrected interlinear Re]]
tenetur {infertur &Na} subire iudicium. Unde glossa
ibidem {om. &Na} super verbo potuissem ait, "Papa
autem {*a &NaRe} nullo modo {*om. &NaRe} potest
iudicari."
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Again, as we find in 2, q. 5, c. Mandastis
[c.10, col.458], when Pope Sixtus had been calumniated
by a certain person he wrote to the bishops saying,
"When the council had met, although I could sufficiently
have avoided suspicion in another way, I nevertheless
satisfied everyone by a full examination, and took haste
to purge myself before everyone, that is freeing myself
from suspicion and envy; but not providing a model of
acting to others who do not want to do so or who have
not chosen it of their own free will." We gather from
these words that on no occasion is the pope bound to
purge himself if he has been defamed. We infer from this
that he is not bound to submit to anyone's judgement.
Whence the gloss on that text on the words "could have"
says [col.644], "The pope can be judged by no one."
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Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur {*legitur
&NaMzPeRe} 9, {14 &Pe} q. 3, c. Ipsi
{isti &NaRe}, ait {*om. &NaRe} loquens de sede
Romana {*ait add. &NaRe}, "Ab ipsa vero nunquam
{nusquam &NaMzPeRe} prorsus appellare debere
sanxerunt {sanxerint &Pe}," sancti {*scilicet
&NaMzPeRe} canones, "ac per hoc illam {nulla
&Na} de tota ecclesia iudicare, ipsam ad nullius
commeare {remeare &NaMzPeRe} iudicium; nec de eius
{numquam add. &Na} unquam praeceperunt {perceperunt
&Mz} iudicio iudicari {iudicare &NaMzPeRe}
sententiamque eius constituerunt non oportere dissolvi,
cuius potius sequenda {sequentia &Pe} decreta
mandaverunt {mandaverint &Pe}."
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Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Ipsi [c.16,
col.611], Pope Gelasius speaking about the Roman see
says, "They," that is the canons, "have decreed that on
no occasion at all ought there be an appeal from it, and
as a result that it is the judge of the whole church and
does not come under anyone's judgement; and they have
commanded that there be no judgement of its judgement
and they have determined that it is not appropriate that
its sentence be dissolved, rather they have ordered that
its decrees should be followed."
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{*Item add. &NaMzPeRe} dist. 27 {*17 &MzNaRe}
para. Hinc etiam {et &Mz} {*sic add.
&NaRe} legitur {sequitur &Pe}, "Nec antedictae
sedis," scilicet Romanae, "antistitem [[Pe concludes
here, omitting the rest of book.]] minorum subiacuisse
iudicio." Et infra: "Episcopi vero in synodo residentes
{trs.312 &Na} congregata auctoritate eiusdem Simachi
dixerunt, `Simachus papa sedis apostolicae praesul ab
huiusmodi {huius &Re} opinionibus {*oppositionibus
&Zn} impetitus {impeditus &NaRe} quantum ad
homines respicit, {respicitit &Na} {om. &Mz}
[[gap left in Mz]] sit immunis et liber cuius causam
totam Dei iudicio reservamus."
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Again, we read the following in dist. 17, para. Hinc
etiam [c.6, col.52], "Nor has the bishop of the
afore-mentioned see," that is the Roman see, "lain under
the judgement of inferiors. ... Indeed bishops sitting
in a synod gathered on the authority of that Symachus
said, `Pope Symachus, bishop of the apostolic see, who
has been assailed by opposition of this kind, is exempt
and free in respect of men because we reserve all his
cause to the judgement of God."
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Item Nicolaus papa, ut habetur {*legitur &MzNaRe}
9, q. 3, c. Patet, ait, "Patet profecto sedis
apostolicae, cuius auctoritate maius non est, iudicium a
nemine fore retractandum neque cuiquam de eius liceat
iudicare iudicio, iuxta quod Innocentius papa Rufo et
caeteris {et ceteris: ceterisque &MzNaRe} episcopis
per Thessaliam constitutis scribens ait, `Nemo unquam
apostolico culmini, de cuius iudicio non licet
retractari manus obvias audacter intulit nemo in hoc
rebellis extitit nisi qui de se voluit iudicari.' Et
beatus Gelasius papa {*trs. MzReZn}, `Nec de eius {cuius
&Mz}, id est Romanae ecclesiae, iudicio {*om.
&MzNaReZn} canones unquam praeceperunt iudicari
iudicio sententiamque illius constituerunt non oportere
dissolvi, cuius potius sequenda decreta {secreta
&NaRe} mandaverunt." Ex praedictis {*quibus
&NaRe} omnibus {omnibus add. &Na} videtur
colligi quod nec imperator nec alius iudex {*om.
&MzNaRe} est iudex Romani pontificis.
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Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Patet
[c.10, col.609], Pope Nicholas says, "It is certainly
true that the judgement of the apostolic see, than whose
authority there is none greater, should not be revised
by anyone, and no one is permittted to judge its
judgement. This is according to what Pope Innocent,
writing to Rufus and the rest of the bishops appointed
throughout Thessalia, says, `No one has ever rashly
raised hostile hands against the apostolic crown, whose
judgement one is not permitted to revise;' and blessed
Pope Gelasius, `The canons have never ordered that its,
that is the Roman church's, judgement be judged and they
have determined that it is not appropriate that its
sentence be dissolved, but rather have ordered that its
decrees be complied with.'" We seem to gather from all
these that neither the emperor nor anyone else is the
judge of the Roman pontiff.
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Discipulus Post auctoritates aliquas
rationes ad eandem assertionem probandam allega.
{Discipulus ... allega om. &Re}
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Student Following these authorities,
bring forward some arguments to prove the same
assertion.
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Magister Haec assertio ratione
probatur. Nam minor non est iudex maioris, dist. 21. c.
Inferior {*et add. &MzNaRe} c. Denique.
Imperator {*autem add. &MzNaRe} et quilibet alius
est minor Romano pontifice, teste Nicolao papa qui hoc
asserit, ut habetur dist. 116. {*96 &MzNaRe} c.
Duo, ubi ad idem beatum Ambrosium allegat dicens, "Qui
{*etiam add. &MzNaReZn}," scilicet Ambrosius, "in
scriptis suis {*trs. &MzNaReZn} ostendit quod
aurum non tam preciosius est {*sit &MzNaReZn}
plumbo quam regia potestate sit altior ordo
sacerdotalis, hoc modo circa principium sui pastoralis
scribens, "Honor, fratres, et sublimitas {sublimans
&Mz} episcopalis nullis {nullus &Mz} poterit
comparationibus adaequari. Si regum fulgori compares
et principum {principium &Mz} diademati {diademate
&Re} longe erit inferius quam si plumbi metallum
ad auri fulgorem conferas {*compares &MzNaReZn}.
Quippe cum videas regum colla et principum submitti
genibus sacerdotum et osculata eorum dextera
orationibus eorum credant se excommunicari
{*communicari &NaReZn} vel muniri {*vel muniri om.
&MzNaReZn}." Hoc etiam testatur Innocentius
tertius qui, ut legi {*legitur &MzNaRe} Extra, De
maioritate et obedientia, c. {om. &MzNaRe}
Solitae, loquens de pontificali dignitate seu
{*dignitate seu om. &NaRe} auctoritate et
potestate regali ait, "Illa quae praeest diebus, id
est {id est: in &Re} spiritualibus, maior est;
quae vero carnalibus {cardinalibus &Na} minor; est
{*om. &MzNaRe} ut quanta est inter solem et lunam
{trs.321 &MzNaRe} tanta inter pontifices et reges
differentia cognoscatur." Ex his aliisque quampluribus
{*Ex his aliisque quampluribus: Ex quibus /his Mz\
/verbis add. Na\ et aliis pluribus &MzNaRe}
colligitur quod imperator est minor papa. Ergo non est
iudex eius.
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Master This assertion is proved by
argument. For an inferior is not the judge of his
superior (dist 21, c. Inferior [c.4, col.70]
and c. Denique [c.6, col.71]). The emperor and
anyone else at all are inferior to the Roman pontiff, as
Pope Nicholas attests, who asserts this, as we find in
dist. 96, c. Duo [sunt] [c.10, col.340], when
he brings forward blessed Ambrose to this effect,
saying, "He," that is Ambrose, "also shows in his
writings that as gold is more precious than lead, so
much more is the priestly order loftier than royal
power, writing in this way about the origin of his
pastorship, `The episcopal honour and loftiness,
brothers, can not be equalled by any comparisons. If you
compare [to them] the splendour of kings and the diadem
of princes they will be just as inferior as if you
compare the stuff of lead to the splendour of gold.
Indeed when you see the necks of kings and princes
lowered before the knees of priests and the right hands
of the latter kissed, they [the rulers] believe that
they are joined to their [the priests'] prayers.'"
Innocent III also attests to this, as we read in Extra,
De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae
[c.6, col.196], when he says, speaking about priestly
authority and royal power, "That which rules over the
days, that is over spiritual matters, is greater; that
is lesser [which rules over] carnal matters; as great as
is the difference between the sun and the moon, so great
is the difference known to be between bishops and
kings." We gather from these and many other [texts] that
the emperor is inferior to the pope. Therefore he is not
the latter's judge.
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Amplius nemo est iudex iudicis sui. Sed papa est iudex
imperatoris cum ipsum valeat excommunicare et imperator
ei subsit et sibi debeat obedire, teste beato Clemente
qui, ut legitur 2 {*11 &NaRe} {9 &Mz} q. 3, c. Si
autem nobis {*vobis &Zn} {*ait, "Si autem
vobis add. &MzNaRe} episcopis non obedierint omnes
presbyteri et reliqui clerici omnesque principes, tam
maioris ordinis quam inferioris, atque reliqui populi
non tantum {*solum &MzNaReZn} infames sed etiam {et
&Mz} extorres a regno Dei et {*a add. &MzNaReZn}
consortio fidelium et a liminibus {a liminibus: alii
&Mz} [[gap in ms after alii]] sanctae Dei ecclesiae
alieni erunt." Hoc {*etiam add. &NaRe} asserit
Gelasius papa {trs.231 &Na} {*qui add. &MzNaRe},
ut habetur dist. 96, c. Duo ait, "Talibus
igitur {ergo &NaRe} institutis talibusque {et
talibus &MzNaRe} fulti {suffulti &MzNaRe}
auctoritatibus plures {*plerique &Zn} {plurium
&MzNaRe} namque {*om. &MzNaReZn} pontificum alii
reges alii imperatores excommunicaverunt. Nam si {om.
&Mz} speciale aliquid {*aliquod &Zn} de personis
principum requiritur {*requiratur &NaReZn} exemplum,
beatus Innocentius papa Archadium imperatorem, quia
consensit {consenserit &NaRe} ut sanctus Iohannes
Chrysostomus a sua sede {trs. &NaRe} pelleretur,
{depelleretur PeRe} {depelletur &Na}
excommunicavit." Ergo nunc {*om. &NaRe} {tunc
&Mz} imperator non est iudex papae cum papa sit
iudex ipsius. Quod etiam papa sit iudex imperatoris
ostenditur. Nam sicut se habet corpus ad animam humanam
sic princeps corporis ad principem animarum. Sed corpus
animae subest quantum ad regimen. Ergo {et add. &Mz}
princeps corporum, scilicet imperator, subest regimini
principis animarum, scilicet papae. {Quod etiam papa ...
papae om. &NaRe}
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Further, no one is the judge of his own judge. But the
pope is the emperor's judge, since he can excommunicate
him and the emperor is under him and ought to obey him,
as blessed Clement attests when he says, as we read in
11, q. 3, c. Si autem vobis [c.11, col.646],
"However if all priests, the rest of the clergy, all
princes, both of the greater and lesser order, and the
rest of the people do not obey you bishops, they are not
only of ill repute but are also banished from the
kingdom of God and from the fellowship of the faithful
and will be inimical to the threshold of the holy church
of God." Pope Gelasius asserts this too, as we find in
dist. 96, c. Duo [sunt] [c.10, col.340], when
he says, "Upheld by such regulations and such
authorities many bishops have pronounced
excommunications, some against kings, some against
emperors. For if some particular example concerning the
persons of the emperors is required, blessed Pope
Innocent excommunicated the emperor Achadius because he
agreed in the expulsion of Saint John Chrisostom from
his see." The emperor is not the judge of the pope,
therefore, since the pope is his judge. That the pope is
the emperor's judge is shown again. For as the body is
in relation to the human soul, so is the ruler of the
body in relation to the ruler of souls. But with respect
to rule the body is beneath the soul. Therefore the
ruler of bodies, that is the emperor, is beneath the
rule of the ruler of souls, that is the pope.
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Rursus imperator non est iudex illius qui legibus
imperialibus est solutus et qui mundanis legibus
nequaquam astringitur; {*sed papa mundanis legibus non
astringitur add. &MzNaRe}, teste beato {*om.
&MzNaRe} Nicolao papa qui, ut habetur 23 {*33
&MzNaRe} q. 2, c. Inter haec, ait, beata
{*"Sancta &MzNaReZn} dei ecclesia mundanis numquam
{non &MzNaRe} constringitur legibus." Et idem, ut
habetur dist. 10. c. Lege, ait, "Lege
imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaReZn} non {est add.
&MzNaRe} in ecclesiasticis omnibus controversiis
utendum est {om. &MzNaRe}." Et infra: "Imperiali
iudicio non possunt iura ecclesiastica dissolvi." Ex
quibus patet quod papa legibus imperialibus nequaquam
astringitur. Quod et {*etiam &NaRe} patet ex hoc
quod papa non astringitur canonibus papalibus nec etiam
canonibus generalium conciliorum. Ergo nec {*non
&NaRe} astringitur legibus imperialibus quae sunt
sacris canonibus postponendae, teste Gratiano qui 10.
dist. {*trs. &MzNaRe} para. 1, ait, "Constitutiones
vero principum ecclesiasticis constitutionibus non
praeeminent sed obsequuntur." Et eadem dist. para. Ecce
ait, "Ecce {ait ecce om. &Re} {*quod add.
&MzNaReZn} constitutiones principum ecclesiasticis
legibus postponendae sunt." Et idem, ut legitur 2, q.
3, para. Hinc autem {*om. &MzNaRe} colligitur,
dicit quod seculi leges non dedignantur sacros canones
imitari. Ergo papa legibus imperialibus est solutus.
Et per consequens imperator non est iudex papae.
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Again the emperor is not the judge of him who is free
of imperial laws and is not bound by the laws of the
world; but the pope is not bound by the laws of the
world, as Pope Nicholas attests when he says, as we find
in 33, q. 2, c. Inter haec [c.6, col.1152],
"The holy church of God is never bound by the laws of
the world." And as we find in dist. 10, c. Lege
[c.1, col.19], the same pope says, "Imperial law should
not be used in any ecclesiastical controversies. ...
Ecclesiastical laws can not be dissolved by imperial
judgement." It is clear from these that the pope is not
bound by imperial laws. This is also clear from the fact
that the pope is not bound by papal canons and not even
by the canons of general councils. He is not, therefore,
bound by imperial laws, which should be esteemed less
than sacred canons, as Gratian attests when he says in
dist. 10, para. 1 [col.19], "The constitutions of
princes do not surpass but yield to ecclesiastical
constitutions." And he says in the same distinction,
para. Ecce [col.20], "Note that the
constitutions of princes should be esteemed less than
ecclesiastical laws." And as we read in 2, q. 3, para. Hinc
colligitur [col.453], [[not a direct quote]] the
same man says that secular laws do not disdain to
imitate the sacred canons. Therefore the pope is free
from imperial laws. And consequently the emperor is not
the judge of the pope.
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Item imperator non est iudex episcoporum inferiorum et
clericorum, ut ex innumeris canonibus sacris {*trs.
&NaRe} colligitur. Ergo non est iudex papae.
CAP. XVII.
Discipulus Istae allegationes pro
assertione praedicta sufficiant. Ideo ad assertionem
contrariam te converte.
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Again, the emperor is not the judge of lesser bishops
and clerics, as is gathered from innumerable sacred
canons. Therefore he is not the judge of the pope.
Chapter 17
Student Those arguments are enough
in support of the above assertion. Therefore turn to the
opposite assertion.
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Magister Circa assertionem
contrariam varii sunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} modi ponendi.
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Master There are various ways of
putting the opposite assertion.
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Discipulus Recita illos modos {*trs.
&MzNaRe} varios.
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Student Record those various ways.
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Magister Unus modus ponendi est quod
imperator ratione imperatoriae maiestatis {*dignitatis
&NaRe} de omni crimine tam ecclesiastico quam
seculari habet iudicare et papam {*trs. &MzNaRe}
ipsum {primum &Mz} si est probatum contra ipsum
crimen dignum depositione deponere.
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Master One way of putting it is that
by reason of his imperial dignity the emperor has the
power to judge any crime, ecclesiastical as much as
secular, and to depose the pope himself, if a charge
worthy of deposition is proved against him.
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Discipulus Aliquas allegationes
adducas ad probandum quod imperator debet papam pro omni
crimine iudicare.
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Student Bring forward some arguments
to prove that the emperor ought to judge the pope for
any crime.
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Magister Ad
hoc plures rationes sunt inductae {*in add. &Re}
[[interlinear]] prima {qua &Re} [[corrected
interlinear]] parte huius dialogi libro 6 c. {*2 et add.
&NaRe} 3 {*et add. &NaRe} 4 et 5, quibus {*forte
add. &MzNaRe} non facile erit {*trs. &MzNaRe}
invenire fortiores. Ideo non videtur necesse quod circa
alias rationes adducendas me fatiges {fatigeres
&Mz}.
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Master Many arguments were brought
forward for this in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of book 6 of
the first part of this Dialogue, and it will
perhaps not be easy to find stronger ones than these. It
does not seem necessary, therefore, for you to importune
me about bringing forward other arguments.
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Discipulus Non est {*erit &NaRe}
inutile ut etiam rationes ibi factas aliter quam ibi
tractemus. Ideo alias {*illas &MzNaRe} tangas et
alias coneris inducere.
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Student It will not be useless to
consider arguments made there in addition to others.
Would you cite those, therefore, and try to bring
forward others.
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Magister Quod
imperator possit et debeat papam pro omni crimine
iudicare quampluribus viis ostenditur, quarum una, quae
etiam {*tacta add. &NaRe} {tanta add. &Mz} est
in prima parte tacta {*om. &MzNaRe} istius Dialogi,
sumitur ex unitate summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudicis
{*trs. &MzNaRe} quam {quem &NaRe} omnis
communitas bene ordinata habere debet {*trs. &NaRe}.
Nam omne regnum, omnis civitas, omne collegium et omnis
communitas debet habere unum solum iudicem simpliciter
supremum vel plures summos {*supremos &NaRe} idem
officium habentes {*trs. &MzNaRe} seu gerentes vicem
unius a {om. &Mz} quo vel a {*om. &MzNaRe}
quibus omnes alii debent iudicari. Ergo tota universitas
mortalium, si fuerit bene ordinata et {vel &Na}
gubernata, habet {*habebit &MzNaRe} unum simpliciter
summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel plures habentes
idem officium {*seu gerentes vicem unius add. &NaRe}
a quo vel quibus omnes alii debent {*debeant &NaRe}
iudicari. Religio autem Christiana non impedit aut {*nec
&MzNaRe} destruit {*trs.321 &NaRe} bonam
dispositionem communitatis mortalium. Ergo nihil
invenitur in ea repugnans optimae dispositioni
universitatis mortalium, {*sed quicquid invenitur in
ipsa est conveniens optimae dispositioni mortalium add.
&NaRe}. Ex quo concluditur quod in nullo obviat
religioni christianae quia quicquid invenitur in ea est
conveniens optimae dispositioni {*quia quicquid ...
dispositioni om. &NaRe} {*universitatem add.
&NaRe} mortalium et per consequens {*et per
consequens om. &NaRe} unum habere summum {*supremum
&NaRe} iudicem vel plures idem habentes officium
{*seu add. &MzNaRe} tenentes locum {*vicem
&NaRe} unius a quo vel a {*om. &NaRe} quibus
alii omnes {*trs. &MzNaRe} pro omni crimine debeant
iudicari non repugnat religioni Christianae {*non
repugnat religioni Christianae om. &NaRe}. Sed iste
{*ille unus &NaRe} summus {*supremus &NaRe}
iudex non est papa nec etiam papa habere potest tale
{*trs.321 &NaRe} officium. Ergo ipse papa debet ab
illo summo {*supremo &NaRe} iudicari. Ille autem
summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex {om. &NaRe} est
imperator qui de iure est princeps et dominus {*trs.321
&NaRe} totius mundi. Ergo imperator habet iudicare
papam pro omni crimine.
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Master That the emperor can and
ought to judge the pope for any crime is shown in very
many ways, one of which, cited also in the first part of
this Dialogue, is taken from the singleness of
the supreme judge which every well ordered community
should have. For every kingdom, every city, every
college and every community should have one single judge
who is plainly supreme, or many who are supreme and hold
or manage the same office in place of that one, and all
others should be judged by this one or by these. If the
whole totality of mortals, therefore, is well ordered
and governed it will have one plainly supreme judge, or
many holding the same office or acting in place of one,
and by this one or these all the others should be
judged. The christian religion, however, does not
destroy or prevent the good management of the community
of mortals. Nothing is found in it, therefore, which is
contrary to the best management of the totality of
mortals, but whatever is found in it is consistent with
the best management of the totality of mortals. We
conclude from this that it does not conflict with the
christian religion that the totality of mortals have one
supreme judge, or many holding or maintaining the same
office in place of that one, and that all others should
be judged for any crime by that one or by those. But
that one supreme judge is not the pope and the pope can
not even hold such an office. The pope himself,
therefore, should be judged by that supreme one. That
supreme judge, however, is the emperor who is by right
the prince and lord of the whole world. Therefore the
emperor has the right to judge the pope for any crime.
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Discipulus Ista {enim add. &Mz}
ratio mihi aliqualiter est obscura. Ideo antequam eam
{*ea que assumit &NaRe} [[gap in Mz after eam]]
probes unum declara. Per hoc enim melius intelligam an
aliquid probabilitatis contineat. Dic igitur quid
intelligis {*intelligitur &Re} {intelligit &Na}
per unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} vel plures
idem officium habentes {*trs. &NaRe}.
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Student That argument is somewhat
obscure to me. Before you demonstrate those things which
it assumes, therefore, make one thing clear. For in this
way I will better understand whether it contains any
probability. So tell me what is understood by "one
supreme judge or many holding the same office".
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Magister Hoc dicitur propter
diversum modum principandi, scilicet regalem,
aristocraticum et politicum, de quibus in morali
philosophia tractatur. Nam in principatu regali unus est
{om. &Mz} solus {*trs. &NaRe} iudex summus
{*supremus &NaRe}; in aliis autem {*vero
&MzNaRe} sunt plures summi {*supremi &NaRe}, a
quorum nullo seorsum est aliqua referenda {*ferenda
&MzNaRe} sententia sed ex deliberatione commune
{*communi &MzNaRe} et consensu ipsorum, vel saltem
valentioris partis secundum leges ipsorum et
consuetudines approbatas, est sententia proferenda. Et
ita tunc sunt iudices plures {*trs. &MzNaRe} summi
{*supremi &NaRe} idem tamen officium habentes {*trs.
&MzNaRe} et eandem penitus potestatem ita ut saepe
in omnibus sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} aequales. Et ideo
gerunt vicem unius et locum unius tenent.
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Master This is said because of the
different ways of governing which moral philosophy
considers, namely royal, aristocratic and democratic.
For in royal government there is one sole supreme judge;
in the others, in truth, there are many supreme
[judges], by none of whom on his own should any sentence
be pronounced, but it should be pronounced after their
common deliberation and consent, or at least of the more
active part of them according to their laws and approved
customs. And so then there are many supreme judges, yet
each holding the same office and having exactly the same
power, so that they are often equal in everything. And
therefore they act in place of one and hold the position
of one.
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Discipulus {*Nunc add. &NaRe}
rationem tactam perficias.
|
Student Would you now complete the
argument you touched on?
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Magister Circa eam non videtur
aliquid probandum nisi quod in nullo obviat religioni
Christianae unitate {*universitatem &NaRe} mortalium
unum habere summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel
plures summos {*supremos &NaRe} idem habentes
officium. Quod ex illis quae dicta sunt primo capitulo
huius {*trs. &MzNaRe} {*1 add. &MzNaRe} videtur
posse probari, quia universitas mortalium nequaquam
optime gubernatur nisi uni principi qui dominetur
omnibus sit subiecta. Ad quod probandum plures {*11
&NaRe} {enim &Mz} rationes sunt ibidem adductae.
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Master It does not seem that
anything needs to be proved about that, except that it
does not in any way conflict with the christian religion
for the totality of mortals to have one supreme judge or
many supreme [judges] holding the same office. This
seems provable from what was said in the first chapter
of the first [book] of this [tractate], because the
totality of mortals is only best governed if it is
subjected to one ruler who has dominion over everyone.
Eleven arguments were brought forward in that place to
prove this.
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Discipulus Dimittamus ad praesens
loqui de universitate mortalium, quorum aliqui sunt
fideles et aliqui infideles, et ideo forte nullo modo
concordarent in unum iudicem qui omnes alios de omni
crimine iudicaret, et loquamur de tota communitate
fidelium quorum aliqui sunt laici {*et aliqui clerici
add. &NaRe}. Et videamus an ista communitas non
possit esse optime ordinata, quantum permittit status
vitae praesentis, nisi tota habeat unum iudicem solum
{*trs. &NaRe} et {*om. &NaRe} summum {*supremum
&NaRe} a quo {*omnes add. &MzNaRe} alii pro
quocunque crimine debeant iudicari.
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Student Let us give up for the
moment talking about the totality of mortals, some of
whom are believers and some unbelievers, who would
therefore perhaps not agree at all about one judge who
would judge all others for any crime, and let us speak
about the whole community of believers, of whom some are
laymen and some clerics. And let us see whether it is
the case that that community can not be best regulated,
as much as the condition of this present life allows,
unless as a whole it has one sole supreme judge by whom
all others should be judged for any crime at all.
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Magister Quia {*Quod &MzNaRe}
tota communitas fidelium non habet {*habeat &MzNaRe}
talem unicum {om. &NaRe} iudicem summum {*supremum
&NaRe} potest poni pluribus modis.
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Master That the whole community of
believers does not have such a single supreme judge can
be put in many ways.
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Discipulus Explica modos illos ut de
aliquibus eorum vel de {*om. &NaRe} singulis
conferamus.
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Student Explain those ways so that
we can discuss some of them or each of them.
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Magister Unus modus ponendi potest
esse ut diversa regna vel provinciae habeant diversos
iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe} qui {que &NaRe}
uni superiori minime sint {sit &NaRe} {sunt &Mz}
subiecti {subiecta vel subiecte &NaRe}. Alius est ut
respectu eorundem sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi
&NaRe} non habentes idem officium secundum modum
expositum {*praeexpositum &NaRe} qui eosdem pro
eisdem delictis habeant iudicare. Alius est ut una pars
habeat unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem, a quo
etiam {*solo &MzNaRe} pro quocunque excessu
{*crimine &NaRe} debeat iudicari, et alia pars
habeat alium summum {*supremum &Na} iudicem {om.
&Na} a quo etiam {et add. &Na} pro quocunque
crimine habeat {*debeat &MzNa} iudicari {et alia
pars ... iudicari om. &Re}, sicut secundum quosdam
omnes clerici habent unum summum {*supremum &NaRe}
iudicem talem, scilicet papam, et omnes laici
imperatorem. Alius est ut {quod &Re} [[interlinear
addition]] una pars habeat unum summum {*supremum
&NaRe} iudicem a quo solo vel auctoritate ipsius pro
quocunque delicto debeat iudicari, alia autem pars pro
aliquibus delictis debeat iudicari ab uno summo
{*supremo &NaRe} iudice et pro aliis ab alio, sicut
secundum quosdam omnes clerici pro quocunque delicto
debent iudicari a papa, {*sed laici pro aliquibus
delictis debent iudicari a papa add. &NaRe} et pro
aliis a iudice seculari. Alius est ut sit unus summus
{*supremus &NaRe} {*iudex add. &NaRe} qui habeat
facere iudicium de omnibus, uno vel paucis exceptis,
sicut secundum unam assertionem ex lege humana
{*christiana &NaRe} solus papa {solus papa add.
&Mz} est exceptus {*exemptus &NaRe} a
iurisdictione iudicis secularis. Sed omnes alii clerici
sola libertate eis concessa {*trs. &MzNaRe} ab
imperatoribus et regibus a iudicio secularium iudicum
sunt exempti.
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Master One way of putting it can be
that different kingdoms or provinces have different
supreme judges, who are not subject to one superior.
Another way is that in regard to the same people there
are various supreme judges not holding the same office
in the way explained above, who have the right to judge
the same people for the same crimes. Another way is that
one part has one supreme judge, by whom alone it should
be judged for any crime at all, and another part has
another supreme judge by whom it too should be judged
for any crime at all, just as, according to some people,
all clerics have one such supreme judge, namely the
pope, and all laymen have the emperor. Another way is
that one part has one supreme judge by whom alone, or on
the authority of whom, it should be judged for every
crime, while another part should be judged by one
supreme judge for some crimes and by another [judge] for
other [crimes], just as, according to some people, all
clerics should be judged by the pope for any crime at
all, but laymen should be judged by the pope for some
crimes and by a secular judge for other crimes. Another
way is that there is one supreme judge who has the power
to pass judgement on all, with one or a few exceptions,
just as, according to one assertion, by christian law
only the pope is exempt from the jurisdiction of a
secular judge. But all other clerics are exempt from the
judgement of secular judges only because of a liberty
granted to them by emperors and kings.
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Discipulus Si sint alii modi ponendi
negativam praedictarum assertionum ad improbandum istos
{istas &Mz} {*praedictarum ... istos: praedictae
assertionis &NaRe} puto quod valeant reduci ad
istos. Ideo sufficit {*sufficiat &MzNaRe} adducere
motiva quae allegari possunt pro istis vel {*pro istis
vel om. &NaRe} ad improbandum istos. Dic ergo
quomodo improbatur prima {*primus &NaRe}.
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Student If there are other ways of
putting the negation of the earlier assertion, I think
that they can be reduced to these [just cited]. Let it
be enough, therefore, to adduce arguments that can be
brought forward to refute them. So tell me how the first
[way] is refuted.
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|
Magister Quomodo possit ostendi et
allegari {*trs.321 &NaRe} quod non sit expediens
diversa regna vel provincias habere diversos summos
{*supremos &NaRe} iudices qui nulli superiori sint
subiecti ex his quae allegata sunt primo huius cap. 1
potest advertere {*adducere &NaRe} studiosus.
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Master Anyone who is zealous can
adduce from what was brought forward in chapter one of
the first [book] of this [tractate] how it can be argued
and shown that it is not expedient for different
kingdoms and provinces to have different supreme judges
who are not subject to any superior.
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|
Discipulus Converte te ad secundum
et indica quomodo potest improbari ille modus dicendi
qui tenet quod non est contra dispositionem bonam {*trs.
&MzNaRe} communitatis fidelium ut respectu eorundem
sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} vel
{*om. &NaRe} non habentes idem officium, sicut
aliqui ponunt {*trs. &MzNaRe} de papa et imperatore
quia {*quod &NaRe} uterque seorsum sine requisitione
et consensu alterius potest eundem pro eodem delicto
percellere {procellere &Mz}.
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Student Turn to the second and
indicate how one can refute that way of speaking which
holds that it is not against good management of a
community of believers for there to be, with respect to
the same people, different supreme judges not holding
the same office, as some posit about the pope and the
emperor that each separately can, without the request or
agreement of the other, punish the same person for the
same crime.
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Magister Hoc multis rationibus
improbatur {probatur &NaRe}. Primo sic: delinquentes
non possunt debito modo puniri nisi citentur vel capti
ducantur ad iudicem; sed si sunt plures iudices quorum
quilibet seorsum absque alio potest iudicare reum
poterit contingere ut {*quod &NaRe} nec citatus
valeat comparere nec captus aut capiendus valeat iudici
praesentari. Nam poterit {poterat &Mz} contingere
quod uterque iudex suam iurisdictionem cupiens exercere
citet reum pro eodem tempore vel quod uterque ad ipsum
capiendum mittat familiam. Si autem uterque {*om.
&MzNaRe} citetur {*citatur &MzNaRe} ab utroque,
aut comparebit coram utroque et hoc est sibi
impossibile, aut comparebit coram uno solo et tunc
faciet {facit &Mz} alteri {alii &NaRe} iniuriam
coram quo non comparet cum non plus tenetur {*teneatur
&Re} comparere coram isto quam coram illo, et rursum
ab illo coram quo non compareret {*comparet &MzRe}
{cum non plus ... compareret om. &Na} absque culpa
illius {*ipsius &NaRe} de {*pro &NaRe} {quod
&Mz} contumacia punietur, aut coram neutro
comparebit et tunc delictum eius {om. &NaRe} erit
impunitum. Si etiam uterque illorum iudicum {*trs.
&NaRe} mittat familiam ad capiendum reum, aut altera
illarum familiarum aut utraque erit inobediens domino
suo, aut inter se pugnabunt ut reus per potentiam
perducatur ad iudicem. Quibus pugnantibus {*reus add.
&MzNaRe} evadet, et sic in populo seu communitate
periculosa orietur seditio et remanebunt crimina
impunita. Quare communitas in qua {quibus &MzNaRe}
talia ex potestate iudicum orirentur {*oriuntur
&NaRe} est pessime gubernata.
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Master This is refuted by many
arguments of which the first is as follows. Those
committing a crime can not be duly punished unless they
are summoned or led captive to a judge; but if there are
many judges, each of whom can separately judge a guilty
man without the other, it could happen that he who is
summoned can not appear and he who is or should be
captured can not be presented before a judge. For it
could happen that each judge, wishing to exercise his
own jurisdiction, summons the guilty man [to appear] at
the same time, or that each sends his retainers to
capture him. If he is summoned by both, however, either
he will appear before each of them - and this is
impossible for him - or he will appear before one only
and then will do a wrong to the other before whom he
does not appear, since he is not bound to appear before
the one more than before the other - and in return
without being at fault he will be punished for being
contumacious by the one before whom he does not appear -
or he will appear before neither and then his crime will
remain unpunished. Also if each of those judges sends
his retainers to capture the guilty man, either one or
the other group of those retainers will be disobedient
to their lord, or they will fight among themselves to
lead the guilty man back to the judge by force. While
they fight the guilty man will escape, and so a
dangerous sedition will arise among the people or in the
community and crimes will remain unpunished. A community
in which such [problems] arise because of the power of
judges, therefore, is very badly governed.
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Amplius ex huiusmodi {*hac &NaRe} pluralitate
iudicum omnis utilitas publica et reorum impeditur
punitio {*trs. &NaRe}, quia poterit contingere quod
isti iudices voluerint subditos ad diversa loca pro
eodem tempore pro criminosis plectendis vel pro {*om.
&NaRe} tractandis negociis quibus {*communibus
&NaRe} convocare. Non possunt {*autem add.
&NaRe} ad diversa loca aut {*om. &NaRe} eodem
tempore convenire. Ergo et punitio malefactorum et
communis utilitas impeditur {*impedietur &MzNaRe} et
de facili seditio orietur. Quare talis communitas est
{*esset &NaRe} pessime et periculosissime ordinata.
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Further, any public benefit and the punishment of the
guilty are hindered by this plurality of judges because
it could happen that those judges wanted to assemble
their subjects at different places at the same time to
punish criminals or to discuss common business. However,
they can not assemble in different places at the same
time. Therefore both the punishment of wrong-doers and
the common benefit will be hindered, and sedition will
easily arise. Therefore such a community would be very
badly and most dangerously regulated.
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Rursus absque necessitate et utilitate est pluralitas
fugienda quia frustra fit per plura {*plures &NaRe}
quod fieri potest {*trs. &NaRe} per pauciora
{*pauciores &NaRe}. Sed pluralitas huiusmodi iudicum
omni necessitate aut {*et &NaRe} utilitate caret
quia omnia melius disponerentur {*disponentur &NaRe}
per unum quam per plures. dicitur {*om. &NaRe} Ergo
quod {*quia &NaRe} ex tali pluralitate faciliter
orietur {*oritur &NaRe} {oriretur &Mz} guerra et
seditio ac discordia tam inter ipsos iudices sua
potestate uti volentes quam etiam inter ipsos subditos
quorum aliqui ex diversis causis imo innumerabilibus
possunt inclinari ut uni obediant et non {alicui add.
&Mz} alteri {*alii &NaRe}, alii autem poterunt
ad alium inclinari, ideo communitas quae habet diversos
iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe} quibus vel {quibus
vel om. &NaRe} quorum {trs.321 &Mz} uno {*om.
&MzNaRe} {*quilibet add. &NaRe} seorsum absque
alio valeat punire eosdem delinquentes pessima et
periculosissima est censenda. Quod veritas etiam {*trs.
&NaRe} {*ipsa add. &NaRe} apertissime testari
videtur quae Matthaei 6:[24] ait, "Nemo potest duobus
dominis servire; aut enim unum odio habebit et alterum
diliget, aut unum sustinebit et alterum contemnetur
{*contemnet &MzNaReVg}." Ex quibus verbis habetur
quod nemo debet habere duos dominos vel duos iudices
quorum unus non est sub alio.
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Again, if there is no necessity and benefit a
plurality should be avoided because what can be done by
fewer people is done to no purpose by many. But this
sort of plurality of judges lacks any necessity and
benefit because everything is better regulated by one
than by many. Because such a plurality easily gives
rise, therefore, to war, sedition and discord, both
among the judges themselves wanting to use their power
and among their subjects, some of whom can be inclined
for different, indeed for innumerable, reasons to obey
one and not another, while others could be inclined
towards another, a community which has different supreme
judges, any one of whom can without another punish the
same transgressors, should as a result be considered
very bad and most dangerous. The Truth himself seems
very clearly to testify to this when he says at Matthew
6:24, "No one can serve two masters; for he will either
hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the
one and despise the other." We find from these words
that no one ought to have two masters or two judges, one
of whom is not under the other.
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Discipulus Ista auctoritas non
videtur concludere opinioni {*propositum &NaRe} quia
Christus loquitur de dominis contrariis qui actu {*om.
&MzNaRe} contraria {communia &Mz} iubent.
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Student That text does not seem to
demonstrate the proposition because Christ is talking
about opposed lords who order opposed things.
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Magister Haec responsio ab {*om.
&MzNaRe} aliis minime satisfacit quia Deus {*Dominus
&NaRe} loquitur non solum de dominis contrariis actu
{*trs. &NaRe}, hoc est qui actu contraria {communia
&Mz} iubent, sed etiam de illis qui proni sunt ad
iubendum contraria et de quibus est probabiliter
formidandum quod inter se dissentientes iubebunt
contraria. Cum ergo nostra {*om. &NaRe} natura
humana sit prona ad dissentiendum non immerito est
timendum quod si eadem communitas habuerit duo capita,
{*capita add. &MzNaRe} ipsa {om. &Mz} {*illa
&NaRe} inter se erunt {*om. &MzNaRe}
dissentientia {*dissentient &NaRe}, quia quot capita
tot sententiae et opiniones dist. 19. {*dist. 19: De
consecratione &MzNaRe}, dist. 10. {*4
&MzNaRe}, Sicut in sacramentis. Quare
timendum est quod capita illa sive domini iubebunt
contraria {communia &Mz}. Ex quo infertur quod
nullus subditus poterit eis servire. Et per consequens
ista {*illa &NaRe} communitas quae habet plura
capita est pessime ordinata. Ex quo concluditur quod si
communitas fidelium habet duos summos {*supremos
&NaRe} iudices, scilicet imperatorem et papam, est
periculosa societas reputanda. Et consimili ratione
infertur quod absque periculis manifestis non possunt in
eodem regno vel provincia aut in {*aut in: ac etiam
&Re} [[Na illegible]] civitate esse duo iudices
supremi super eosdem, ecclesiasticus videlicet et
secularis, praesertim in illo regno, provincia vel
civitate quod vel quae superiorem de facto in
temporalibus non recognoscit. Ad haec {*etiam add.
&NaRe} roboranda adduci potest assertio veritatis
quae Matth. 12:[25] ait, "Omne regnum contra se divisum
{*trs.312 &NaReVg} desolabitur, et omnis domus vel
civitas {*trs.321 &NaReVg} contra se divisa
{*trs.312 &NaReVg} non stabit {sta &Mz}." Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod omnis communitas et
congregatio {est add. &Re} propinqua divisioni est
propinqua desolationi et ruinae. Cum ergo communitas seu
congregatio fidelium sit propinqua divisioni si habeat
{*habet &NaRe} duos {om. &NaRe} iudices
supremos, quia capita diversa sunt prona ad
dissentiendum, sequitur quod communitas seu congregatio
fidelium est propinqua desolationi et ruinae, et per
consequens contra bonum commune est ut supra se duos
habeat iudices {trs. &Na} supremos. Ad hoc etiam
adducitur auctoritas Hieronimi qui, ut legitur 7, q. 1,
c. In apibus, ad Rusticum monachum ait
{*trs.4123 &NaRe}, "In apibus princeps unus est;
grues unam sequuntur ordine {ordinem &Mz} literato;
imperator {imperatori &Mz} unus, iudex unus
provinciae. Roma autem condita duos fratres simul reges
habere non potuit et fratricidio {*patricidio &MzZn}
dedicatur. In Rebeccae utero Esau et Iacob bella
gesserunt; singuli {singularum &NaRe} ecclesiarum
episcopi, singuli {singuli add. &Re} archiepiscopi,
singuli archidiaconi; et omnis ordo ecclesiasticus suis
rectoribus nititur {innititur &Re}." In quibus
verbis Hieronymus probat aperte per plura exempla quod
in eadem ecclesia non debeant {*debent &MzNaRe} esse
plures praelati quorum unus non est sub alio. Per quem
{*quae &NaRe} aeque aperte {*om. &NaRe} vel
apertius potest ostendi quod in eadem communitate non
debent esse plures iudices supremi, quia si per
universitatem {*unitatem &NaRe} principis in apibus
potest ostendi unitas episcopi in una dioecesi et unitas
archiepicsopi in uno archiepiscopatu, eadem ratione per
unitatem principis in apibus potest ostendi unitas
iudicis supremi super {per &Na} unam communitatem
seu congregationem. Iterum si ex hoc quod grues unam
sequuntur ordine {*om. &NaRe} {ordinem &Mz}
ostenditur {ostendatur quod &Mz} unitas episcopi et
archiepiscopi, in dioecesi {*in dioecesi om.
&MzNaRe} consimili ratione ex hoc ostenditur unitas
iudicis supremi super unam communitatem. Consimiliter si
ex hoc quod Roma condita duos fratres simul reges habere
non potuit sed fratricidio {*patricidio &Mz} extitit
dedicata ostenditur unitas episcopi et archiepiscopi et
aliorum rectorum {romanorum &Re} ecclesiae, multo
fortius ex eodem {eadem &Na} potest probari unitas
iudicis supremi super eandem communitatem, ut scilicet
non sint duo, scilicet ecclesiasticus et {vel &Mz}
secularis, quia non minus praesumendum videtur quod
iudex secularis adversabitur ecclesiastico {*etiam add.
&NaRe} usque ad interfectionem {interitionem
&Mz}, quemadmodum unus fratrum conditorum Romae
alium interfecit, quam iudex ecclesiasticus alteri
iudici ecclesiastico vel unus episcopus alteri episcopo.
Si ergo per exemplum duorum fratrum quorum unus occidit
alterum {alium &NaRe} probari potest quod non debent
esse duo episcopi in eodem episcopatu, multo fortius per
idem exemplum potest ostendi quod super communitatem
fidelium non debent esse duo iudices {*supremi add.
&NaRe}, quorum unus sit secularis et alius
ecclesiasticus. Et propter illud {*idem &NaRe} patet
quod si per exemplum de Esau et Iacob qui in utero
matris bella gesserunt potest ostendi quod non debent
esse duo episcopi in una dioecesi, multo fortius probari
potest per idem exemplum quod super communitatem
fidelium non debent esse duo iudices summi {*supremi
&NaRe}, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis. Hoc
etiam verba Hieronimi sonare videntur qui vult quod
unius provinciae debet esse unus iudex. Non autem dicit
quod unius provinciae debet esse unus iudex {non autem
... iudex om. &Re} [[add. margin]] ecclesiasticus
vel unus iudex secularis, quasi {quia &Re} vellet
solummodo excludere pluralitatem iudicum
ecclesiasticorum et non {*om. &MzNaRe} pluralitatem
iudicum secularium, sed dicit indistincte quod unius
provinciae est unus iudex, volens per hoc pluralitatem
omnem {*trs. &MzNaRe} iudicum summorum {*supremorum
&NaRe} quorumcunque excludere. Et ita super
communitatem fidelium non expedit esse plures {trs.
&Na} iudices qualescunque summos {*supremos
&NaRe}.
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Master That reply does not satisfy
some people because the Lord is talking not only about
lords actually opposed, that is who actually order
opposed things, but also about those who are inclined to
the ordering of opposed things and of whom it is to be
feared with probability that, disagreeing among
themselves, they will order opposed things. Since
therefore our human nature is inclined to disagreement,
it should not without cause be feared that if the same
community had two heads, those heads will disagree with
each other because there will be as many opinions and
points of view as there are heads (De consecratione,
dist. 4, c. Sicut in sacramentis [c.151,
col.1411]). It should be feared, therefore, that those
heads or lords will order opposed things. From this we
infer that no subject could serve them. And consequently
that community which has many heads is very badly
regulated. We conclude from this that if a community of
believers has two supreme judges, namely the emperor and
the pope, it should be regarded as a dangerous society.
And by a similar argument we infer that in the same
kingdom or province and even city there can not be
without clear dangers two supreme judges, that is an
ecclesiastical and secular one, over the same people,
especially in that kingdom, province or city which does
not in fact recognise any superior in temporal affairs.
To strengthen this, an assertion of the Truth from
Matthew 12:25 can also be adduced, "Every kingdom
divided against itself is laid waste, and no city or
house divided against itself will stand." We gather from
these words that every community and congregation which
is near to division is near to desolation and ruin.
Therefore since a community or congregation of believers
is near to division if it has two supreme judges,
because different heads are inclined to disagreement, it
follows that a community or congregation of believers is
near to desolation and ruin, and consequently it is
against the common good that it have two supreme judges
over it. The authority of Jerome is also adduced to this
effect. As we read in 7, q. 1, c. In apibus [c.41,
col.582], he says to the monk Rusticus, "Among bees
there is one ruler; cranes follow one of their number
in learned order; there is one emperor and one judge
in a province. When Rome was founded it could not have
two brothers as kings at the same time and is destined
for parricide. [[This word to be broadly interpreted,
as the gloss says.]] In Rebecca's womb Esau and Jacob
waged war; single bishops of churches, single
archbishops, single archdeacons; and the whole
ecclesiastical order rests on its rulers." In these
words Jerome clearly proves by many examples that in
the same church there should not be many prelates, one
of whom is not under another. It can equally or more
clearly be shown by them that there should not be many
supreme judges in the same community because, if by
the singleness of the ruler of bees, the singleness of
a bishop in one diocese and the singleness of an
archbishop in one archdiocese can be shown, by the
same argument the singleness of a supreme judge over
one community or congregation can be shown from the
singleness of the ruler of bees. Again, if the
singleness of a bishop and archbishop is shown from
the fact that cranes follow one of their number, by a
similar argument the singleness of a supreme judge
over one community is shown from this. Similarly, if
the singleness of a bishop, an archbishop and other
rulers of the church is shown from the fact that once
Rome was founded it could not have two brothers as
kings at the same time but was destined for parricide,
the singleness of a supreme judge over the same
community can much more strongly be proved from this,
that is that there not be two, namely one
ecclesiastical and one secular, because it seems that
it should not be any the less presumed that a secular
judge will oppose an ecclesiastical one, even as far
as killing him, just as one of the founding brothers
of Rome killed the other, than that one ecclesiastical
judge [will oppose] the other or one bishop [oppose]
the other. If it can be proved, therefore, by the
example of the two brothers, one of whom killed the
other, that there should not be two bishops in the
same episcopate, it can much more strongly be shown by
the same example that there should not be two supreme
judges, one of whom is secular and the other
ecclesiastical, over a community of believers. And for
the same reason it is clear that if it can be shown
from the example of Esau and Jacob, who waged war in
their mother's womb, that there should not be two
bishops in one diocese, it can much more strongly be
proved by the same example that there should not be
two supreme judges, that is one ecclesiastical and one
secular, over a community of believers. Jerome's words
also seem to signify this since he thinks that there
should be one judge of one province. He does not say,
however, that there should be one ecclesiastical judge
of one province, or one secular judge, as if he was
wanting to exclude only a plurality of ecclesiastical
judges and of secular judges, but he says without
distinction that there is one judge of one province,
wanting by this to exclude every plurality of any
supreme judges at all. And so it is not appropriate
that there be many supreme judges of any kind over a
community of believers.
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Praeterea ista {*illa &NaRe} ordinatio
communitatis non est bona ex qua provenit quod potentior
eiusdem communitatis valentis {*valens &NaRe} magnam
sequelam habere ad impatientiam et iracundiam provocetur
contra alium potentiorem in eadem communitate qui etiam
poterit magnam habere {*trs. &NaRe} sequelam, quia
ex tali ordinatione sequuntur {sequitur &Mz}
{*faciliter add. &NaRe} {facit add. &Mz}
dissensiones, seditiones et guerrae. Sed si in
communitate fidelium ordinetur quod sint scilicet {*om.
&NaRe} duo iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe},
scilicet papa et alius, ex tali ordinatione sequitur
{*sequetur &NaRe} [[margin Na]] faciliter quod unus
contra alium ad impatientiam et iracundiam provocetur
quia, sicut dicit poeta, "Omnis potestas impatiens
consortis est." Cui satis videtur alludere Augustinus
{*qui add. &NaRe}, ut legitur 23, q. 7, c. Qui {*Quod
Zn} a {*autem &NaReZn} nobis,
ait, "Quis enim avarus quaerit compossessorem? Quis
dominandi cupiditate inflammatus vel fastu dominationis
elatus desiderat habere consortem?" quasi diceret,
nullis {*nullus &MzNaRe} talis. Ergo ordinatio
communitatis non est bona nec laudabilis ubi sunt plures
iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} nullum habentes
superiorem {*trs. &MzNaRe}. Ex quibus {*omnibus
&NaRe} supradictis concluditur quod si in
communitate fidelium fuerint plures iudices summi
{*supremi &NaRe} sive plura capita simpliciter
prima, qui vel {*seu &NaRe} quae eosdem pro eisdem
criminibus habeant {habent &Mz} coercere et eisdem
de eisdem praecipere, sequitur manifeste quod eadem
communitas fidelium semper {super &Mz} erit
disposita {*exposita &Na} discordiis,
dissensionibus, seditionibus, pugnis et guerris tam
inter capita ipsa contraria {*conantia &Na?Re}
[[corrected unclearly from contraria in Re]] {conativa
&Mz} invicem {*se praeferre add. &NaRe} {se
potest ferre add. &Mz} quam inter subditos
{*subiectos &MzNaRe}, quorum aliqui adhaerebunt uni
et alii alteri. Et ideo pauci erunt vel nulli quin unum
odio habebunt et alterum diligent. Et per consequens
unum sustinebunt et alium {alii &Mz} si poterunt
impugnabunt {*et add. &MzNaRe} ita semper erit
timendum quod non erit pax in communitate seu
congregatione {*fidelium add. &NaRe}.
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Moreover, that regulation of a community is not good
by which it comes to pass that a more powerful member of
that community who is able to have a large following is
provoked to impatience and anger against another of the
more powerful members in that same community who is also
able to have a large following, because dissension,
seditions and wars easily follow from such regulation.
But if a community of believers is regulated so that
there are two supreme judges, namely the pope and
another, it will easily follow from such regulation that
one will be provoked to impatience and anger against the
other, because, as the poet says, "All power is
impatient of a partner." [[Lucan 1, 92-3]] As we read in
23, q. 7, c. Quod autem nobis [c.3, col.951],
Augustine seems sufficiently to allude to this when he
says, "For what greedy man seeks a joint-possessor? What
man inflamed with a desire to rule or puffed up with the
arrogance of domination wants to have a partner?" as
though to say, there is no such person. The regulation
of a community, therefore, is neither good nor
praiseworthy when there are many supreme judges having
no superior. We conclude from all of the above that if
in a community of believers there are many supreme
judges or many plainly chief heads, who have the power
to coerce the same people for the same crimes and to
command the same things of the same people, it
manifestly follows that that same community of believers
will always be exposed to discords, dissension,
seditions, fighting and wars both between the heads
themselves, with each trying to put himself ahead of the
other, and among the subjects, some of whom will adhere
to one and some to the other. And so there will be few
people or none that will not hate one and love the
other. And consequently they will uphold one and, if
they can, attack the other and so it will always be
something to be feared that there will not be peace in
the community or congregation of believers.
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