CAP. XXII.
{XXIII &NaRe} Discipulus Cerno
quod ratio quam {allegasti add. &Mz} a 17 c. usque
hic {*usque hic: huc usque &NaRe} tractavimus
fundatur in duobus, quorum primum est quod nulla
communitas seu congregatio mortalium, nec universalis
nec particularis, est optime disposita nisi unum caput
seu rectorem summum {*supremum &NaRe} habeat, cui
omnes nullo excepto {*exempto NaRe} quo ad omnia quae
pro communi utilitate sunt necessario facienda sint
subiecti. et {*om. &NaRe} Quod multum apparentiae
videtur habere, quia ubi non est unitas non est facile
concordiam conservare. Non est autem una congregatio seu
multitudo, neque universalis neque particularis, quae
non habeat {*habet &MzNaRe} unum caput seu rectorem,
quia, ut testatur beatus Cyprianus, prout legitur 24, q.
1, c. Loquitur, ubi est unitas oportet quod
eius origo ab uno incipiat quia, ut dicit ibidem, "ab
unitate exordium proficiscitur." {*Ergo add. &NaRe}
in quacunque communitate seu congregatione est unitas,
illa unitas {illa unitas om. &Re} ab uno incipit.
Ille autem unus non est nisi caput et rector
communitatis. Ergo nulla communitas est vere una nisi
illa {*om. &NaRe} cuius caput et {caput et om.
&NaRe} rector est unus ita ut omnes alii sint membra
ipsius.
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Chapter 22
Student I see that the argument
which we have treated from chapter 17 up to here is
based on two [points], of which the first is that no
community or gathering of mortals, whether universal or
particular, is best regulated unless it has one supreme
head or ruler, to whom everyone else, with no exception,
is subject with respect to everything that has
necessarily to be done for the common benefit. This
seems to have much plausibility, because where there is
not unity it is not easy to preserve harmony. There is
not one gathering or multitude, however, whether
universal or particular, which does not have one head or
ruler, because as blessed Cyprian attests, as we read in
24, q. 1, c. Loquitur [c.18, col.971], where
there is a unity it is necessary that its beginning
springs from one thing, since, as he says there "its
beginning sets out from unity." In any community or
gathering in which there is unity, therefore, that unity
begins from one thing. That one thing, however, is
nothing but the head and ruler of the community. No
community is truly one, therefore, unless there is one
head and ruler of it, so that all the others are its
members.
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Item {iterum &Re} unitas communitatis seu
congregatio {*congregationis &NaRe} non est nisi
unitas ordinis secundum superioritatem et
inferioritatem, ut quilibet respectu alterius sit
inferior sive {*vel &NaRe} superior vel plures sint
inferiores respectu unius superioris, quia ubi essent
{sunt &Na} [[corrected to essent margin]] plures
superiores respectu unius inferioris non esset verissia
{*verissima &MzNaRe} unitas quae est optima
dispositio communitatis. Oportet igitur {*ergo
&NaRe} quod summus {*supremus &NaRe} {*superior
add. &NaRe} in communitate potissima {*una add.
&NaRe} sit unicus, et ita videtur multum {*trs.
&MzNaRe} apparens quod nulla communitas, nec
particularis nec universalis, est optime ordinata nisi
habeat unum caput vel {*seu &MzNaRe} rectorem, cui
{*cuius &NaRe} omnes alii sunt {*sint &MzNaRe}
subiecti. Unde et una domus non est optime disposita
nisi habeat unum patremfamilias, nec una villa nec una
civitas nec unum regnum optime gubernatur nisi ab uno
summo {*supremo &NaRe} regatur {fungatur &Mz}.
Et ideo omnes volentes secundum rationem politice vivere
unum caput summum {*supremum &NaRe} constituerent
super omnes.
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Again, the unity of a community or gathering is
nothing but a unity of order according to superiority
and inferiority, so that everyone is an inferior or a
superior with respect to another person or many are
inferior with respect to one superior, because where
there were many superiors with respect to one inferior
there would not be the most genuine unity which is the
best regulation of a community. It is necessary
therefore that the supreme superior in the one most
important community be single, and so it seems quite
clear that no community, whether particular or
universal, is best ordered unless it has one head or
ruler, whose subject everyone one else is. Whence one
home also is not best regulated unless it has one head
of the family, nor are one village, one town or one
kingdom best governed unless they are ruled by one who
is supreme. And therefore all who have wanted to live
politically according to reason have set up one supreme
head over themselves.
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Secundum in quo videtur fundari ista {*illa &NaRe}
ratio est quod imperator et alii laici non sunt, in
omnibus quae spectant ad gubernationem ipsorum et
correctionem si deliquerint {delinquerint &NaRe},
subditi summo pontifici. Quod {quia &Mz}, ut {om.
&Na} videtur, non habet tantam apparentiam sicut
primum. Ideo pro isto alias {*aliquas &NaRe}
allegationes {*trs. &Na} adducas.
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The second [point] on which that argument seems to be
based is that the emperor and other laymen are not
subject to the highest pontiff in all matters which
pertain to their governing and their correcting if they
transgress. It seems that this does not have as much
plausibility as the first [point]. Would you therefore
adduce some arguments for it?
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Magister Pro ista {*isto
&MzNaRe} poteris tu colligere allegationes
quamplures ex primo huius {huiusmodi &MzNa} ac {*om.
&NaRe} pluribus capitulis, specialiter. c. 28, et ex
{om. &NaRe} secundo huius {huiusmodi &Na} c. 1
et 12 et {om. &Na} 14 et 15.
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Master You will be able to assemble
very many arguments for that [point] from many chapters
in the first [book] of this [tractate], especially
chapter 28, and from chapters 1, 12, 14 and 15 of the
second [book] in this [tractate].
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Discipulus Pro isto secundo {om.
&Re} fundamento praescriptae rationis alias
{*aliquas &NaRe} speciales allegationes adducas vel
alias {*aliquas &NaRe} prius tactas magis exquisite
pertracta.
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Student Would you bring forward some
particular arguments for that second basis of the above
argument, or consider more carefully some already
touched on?
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Magister Primo huius {huiusmodi
&Na} c. 28 tacta est una allegatio quae nonnullis
apparet multum fortis, quae talis est. Ille non est
inferior alio quoad illa in quibus ab ipso ad istum
{*illum &NaRe} alium appellare {apparere &Mz}
non licet, quia in omnibus in quibus unus iudex est
inferior alio licet appellare {apparere &Mz} ad
illum superiorem vel saltem ad {in &Mz} superiorem
ipso. Sed in multis causis non licet appellare ab
imperatore ad papam. Ergo {*quo add. &MzNaRe} ad
multa imperator non est inferior papa. quod {*Maior
&NaRe} {quia &Mz} per sacros canones probatur
aperte. {*Nam add. &NaRe} Fabianus papa, ut habetur
2, q. 6, c. 1 ait, licet {"Liceat &NaReZn}
appellatori viciatam causam remedio appellationis
sublevare." {*Et add. &NaRe} idem eadem {*eisdem
&NaRe} causa et q. c. Liceat ait, "Liceat
etiam in criminalibus causis appellare, nec vox
appellandi negatur eo quod {*negatur eo quod: negetur ei
quem &NaRe} in supplicio sententia destinaverit." Ex
his {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod ubicunque
{ubique &Mz} habet iudex {*trs. &NaRe}
superiorem ad superiorem potest appellare {*appellari
&NaRe}. Minor, scilicet quod in multis causis non
est appellandum ab imperatore ad papam, multis modis
probatur. Hoc enim glossa 2, q. 6, c. {*Omnis
add. &Re} [[Na illegible]] super verbo "sacerdotum"
videtur asserere dicens, "Ergo a seculari iudice ad
papam potest appellari, quod verum est vacante imperio,
ut Extra, De foro competenti, {*c. add. Zn} Licet,
alias et {*non &MzNaReZn}, Extra, De
appellationibus {*c. add. Zn} sed {*Si
Zn} duobus."
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Master There is an argument touched
on in chapter 28 of the first [book] in this [tractate]
which seems very strong to some people, and this is it.
One person is not inferior to another with respect to
those matters in which it is not licit to appeal from
the former to the latter, because in all matters in
which one judge is inferior to another it is permitted
to appeal to that superior, or at least to that one's
superior. But in many matters it is not permitted to
appeal from the emperor to the pope. With respect to
many matters, therefore, the emperor is not inferior to
the pope. The major premise is clearly proved by sacred
canons. For as we find in 2, q. 6, c. 1, [Liceat
col.467] Pope Fabianus says, "An appellant is permitted
to alleviate a faulty case by the remedy of an appeal."
And in the same causa and quaestio
c, Liceat [c.20, col.472], the same pope says,
"Even in criminal cases it is permitted to appeal and
the voice of appeal is not denied to him for whom a
sentence has resolved on punishment." We gather from
these that wherever a judge has a superior, appeal can
be made to the superior. The minor premise, namely that
in many cases there ought not be appeal from the emperor
to the pope, is proved in many ways. For the gloss on
the word sacerdotum in 2, q. 6, c. Omnis
[c.3, col.656] seems to assert this when it says,
"Appeal can be made therefore from a secular judge to
the pope, which is true with the empire unoccupied, as
in Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet,
at other times not, Extra, De appellationibus, c.
Si duobus."
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Item glossa eodem capitulo super verbo "in commune"
ait, primo {idem &Re} {*"Id est &Na} publice",
ut secularis iudex audiat seculares causas,
ecclesiasticus ecclesiasticas audiat. Et sic planum est
quod dicitur in textu, sed {*scilicet &MzNaRe} cum
dicit Anacletus, "coram patriacha aut primate
ecclesiastico {*ecclesiastica &NaReZn} et coram
patricio secularia negotia iudicentur." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod in negotiis secularibus a iudice
seculari et per consequens ab imperatore non est
appellandum ad papam.
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Again, the gloss on the words in commune in
the same chapter says, "That is publicly", so that a
secular judge hears secular cases and an ecclesiastical
judge ecclesiastical cases. And so what is said in the
text is plain, when Anacletus says, that is, "Let
ecclesiastical business be judged before the patriarch
or primate and secular business before a nobleman." We
gather from these words that in secular business there
should be no appeal to the pope from a secular judge,
nor consequently from the emperor.
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Discipulus Si secundum glossam
primam vacante imperio licet appellare ad papam, ergo
papa habet disponere de imperio, et per consequens
imperator ratione imperii est inferior papa. Et ita
etiam non vacante imperio licet appellare ab imperatore
ad {om. &Mz} papam, etiam in secularibus causis.
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Student If in accordance with the
first gloss it is permitted to appeal to the pope when
the empire is unoccupied, the pope therefore has the
power to dispose of the empire, and consequently the
emperor, by reason of the empire, is inferior to the
pope. And so even when the empire is not unoccupied it
is permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope,
even in secular cases.
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Magister Respondetur tibi quod papa
vacante imperio nihil habet disponere de imperio nisi
auctoritate imperatoris instituentis eum vicarium suum
vel auctoritate aliorum, scilicet Romanorum vel
principum quibus concessa {*commissa &NaRe} est
potestas ordinandi quis debeat gerere vicem imperatoris
vacante imperio. Et ideo si vacante imperio contingit
appellare ad papam hoc est inquantum papa gerit vicem
imperatoris et locum imperatoris tenet. Qui autem gerit
vices {*vicem &NaRe} alterius et locum eius tenet
est inferior eo in hoc, quia semper vicarius est
inferior eo cuius est vicarius. Ergo papa est in hoc
{*trs.231 &NaRe} inferior et minor imperatore, et
per consequens ab ipso {*om. &NaRe} imperatore non
licet appellare ad papam.
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Master The reply to you is that with
the empire unoccupied the pope does not have the power
to dispose of the empire, except by the authority of the
emperor appointing him as his vicar or by the authority
of others, that is of the Romans or of princes to whom
the power of arranging who ought to act in place of the
emperor when the empire is unoccupied has been
committed. And therefore if it is possible to appeal to
the pope when the empire is unoccupied, this is in so
far as the pope acts in place of the emperor and
occupies the emperor's place. He who acts in the place
of another, however, and occupies his place is inferior
to him in this, because a vicar is always inferior to
him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope in this is
inferior to and less than the emperor, and consequently
it is not permitted to appeal from the emperor to the
pope.
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Discipulus Licet ista instantia
apparenter videatur {videtur &Mz} {inclusa vel add.
&Mz} exclusa, tamen adhuc videtur posse ostendi quod
pro negociis seu causis secularibus liceat ab imperatore
et aliis secularibus iudicibus appellare {*ad papam add.
&NaRe}. Nam ad illum licet appellare qui potest
causam viciatam sublevare. Sed si causa secularis in
foro seculari vel coram iudice seculari fuerit {causa
add. &Mz} viciata, quia imperator {*scilicet add.
&NaRe} vel alius iudex secularis non vult facere
iustitiae complementum, papa potest causam taliter
viciatam sublevare et ad ipsum vel alium iudicem
ecclesiasticum est recurrendum pro iustitia obtinenda, Extra,
De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa et
c. Verum et c. Licet et c. Ex
tenore. Ergo licet appellare ab imperatore et
aliis iudicibus secularibus ad papam.
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Student Even if that example seems
apparently to be excluded, it still seems showable
nevertheless that it is permitted to appeal from the
emperor and other secular judges to the pope for secular
business or cases. For it is permitted to appeal to him
who can alleviate a faulty case. But if a secular case
in a secular forum or before a secular judge is faulty,
because, that is, the emperor or another secular judge
does not want to execute justice, the pope can alleviate
a case made faulty like this, and recourse should be had
to him or to another ecclesiastical judge in order to
obtain justice (Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex
transmissa [c.6, col.249], c. Verum
[c.7, col.250], c. Licet [c.10, col.250], c, Ex
tenore [c.11, col.251]). Therefore it is
permitted to appeal from the emperor and other secular
judges to the pope.
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Magister Respondetur quod etiam in
decretalibus quae maiorem iurisdictionem et auctoritatem
papae et iudicibus ecclesiasticis tribuere videntur
{videtur &Na} {*trs. &NaRe} nunquam {*nusquam
&NaRe} invenitur quod si imperator neglexerit facere
iustitiam in causa seculari eo ipso possit papa {om.
&NaRe} auctoritate papalis officii et ex ordinatione
Christi in eadem causa facere iustitiae complementum,
licet ex consuetudine in quantum {*in quantum: quam
&NaRe} imperator scit et approbat, vel saltem scit
et non prohibet sed tolorans {*tolerat &NaRe}, hoc
faciat papa et iudices ecclesiastici in quibusdam
regionibus, {*sicut in quibusdam regionibus add.
&NaRe} iudicant de aliquibus criminibus pure
secularibus, irrequisito omni iudice seculari, quod
tamen eis ex {om. &Re} iure divino non competit. Et
hinc est quod ex consuetudine obtinent papa et
ecclesiastici iudices quod quando iudex secularis
negligit facere iustitiam ad ipsos recurritur. Quae
quidem consuetudo, si iudices seculares in illis
regionibus fuerint notabiliter negligentes, potest ex
causa {*ex causa: esse &NaRe} rationabili
{*rationabilis et &NaRe} praescribi, {et add.
&Mz} praesertim si imperator hoc sciens ipsam {om.
&Na} duxerit tolerandam. Cum ergo dicis quod ad
illum licet appellare qui potest causam viciatam
sublevare, respondetur quod hoc non est generaliter
verum, vocando causam viciatam omnem {*causam add.
&MzNaRe} quae iusta sententia minime terminatur,
quia appellatio semper debet fieri ad maiorem. et {*om.
&MzNaRe} Causam {*autem add. &NaRe} taliter
viciatam, quae scilicet iuste minime terminatur, potest
quandoque minor supplendo negligentiam maioris
sublevare, sicut etiam in conferendo beneficio
{*conferendo beneficio: conferendis beneficiis
&NaRe} et aliis disponendis potest minor supplere
negligentiam superioris, Extra, De electione,
Cum in cunctis, Extra, De concessione
praebendarum, c. Nulla et c. Quia
diversitatem, Extra, De institutionibus
Grave, et 9, q. 3, Cum simus et 89.
dist. Volumus, ubi dicit glossa, "Arg. quod si
praelatus non vult vel negligit facere {*ea add.
&MzNaReZn} quae debet, tunc {*om. &NaReZn} ea
debent supplere subditi {*supplere subditi:suppleri per
subditos &NaReZn}." Hoc etiam colligitur ex concilio
Sardicensis quod ponitur dist. 65 {trs. &NaRe} c.
ultimo ubi dicit glossa, "{*Arg. add. &NaRe} quod si
subditi negligunt facere quod {*quae &Zn} debent,
debeat {*ea debeant &Zn} {debeatur &MzNaRe}
suppleri a maiori, vel per se, vel per alium, et
econverso." Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus patet quod
inferiores possunt supplere negligentiam superioris
{*superiorum &Na} [[MzRe unclear]], cum etiam saepe
possunt {*possint &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} {*suos
add. &MzNaRe} superiores corrigere et {*etiam add.
&NaRe} cohercere, teste Egino {*Iginio &NaRe}
papa qui, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Salvo, ait,
"Salvo in omnibus Romanae ecclesiae privilegio nullus
metropolitanus absque ceterorum comprovincialium
episcoporum instantia aliquorum audiat causas, quia
irritae erunt aliter {*actae add. &Zn}, antequam
{*quam &Zn} in conspectu omnium eorum erunt {*om.
&MzNaReZn} ventilatae, et ipse, si fecerit,
coherceatur a fratribus." Cui {qui &Re} concordare
videtur Anitius {*Anterus &NaRe} {Altius &Mz}
papa qui eadem {*eisdem &MzNaRe} causa {capitulis
&Mz} 9 {*et q. &MzNaRe} c. Si autem
ait, c. {*om. &MzNaRe} "Si autem aliquis
metropolitanorum inflatus fuerit et sine omnium
comprovincialium {provincialium &Na} praesentia vel
consilio episcoporum vel causas eorum vel eas {*vel eas:
aut alias causas, nisi eas causas &MzNaReZn} tantum,
quae ad propriam suam pertinent parrochiam, agere aut
gravare eos voluerit, ab omnibus districte corrigatur ne
talia deinceps praesumere audeat. Si vero incorrigibilis
eisque inobediens apparuerit, ad hanc apostolicam sedem,
cui {dum &Mz} {omnium add. &NaRe} {*omnia add.
&Zn} episcoporum iudicia referri praecepta sunt,
eius contumacia referatur ut de eo vindicta fiat." Ex
praedictis {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod minor
potest supplere negligentiam maioris. Et ideo non semper
ille qui potest causam vitiatam sublevare est maior, et
per consequens non potest semper {super &Mz}
appellari ad ipsum. Quare licet papa suppleat
negligentiam iudicum secularium, et {*etiam &NaRe}
si suppleret negligentiam imperatoris terminando causam
quam imperator terminare negligeret {neglexerit
&Re}, non posset per hoc ostendi {*nec add.
&NaRe} quod ab imperatore liceat appellare ad papam
nec quod imperator in talibus sit minor papa.
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Master The reply is that even in the
decretals which seem to bestow greater jurisdiction and
authority on the pope and ecclesiastical judges we
nowhere find that if the emperor has neglected to do
justice in a secular case the pope can, by that very
fact, execute justice in that case on the authority of
his papal office and by the decree of Christ, even if by
a custom which the emperor knows and approves, or at
least knows and does not prohibit but supports, the pope
and ecclesiastical judges do this in certain regions,
just as in certain regions they judge purely secular
crimes, with no secular judge being sought; nevertheless
this does not belong to them by divine right. Hence it
is that by custom the pope and ecclesiastical judges
acquire [the right] that when a secular judge neglects
to do justice recourse is had to them. If the secular
judges in those regions are notably negligent, that
custom can indeed be reasonable and prescribed,
especially if the emperor knows this and incites support
of it. When you say therefore that it is permitted to
appeal to him who can alleviate a faulty case, the reply
is that this is not generally true, calling a faulty
case any case which is not concluded with a just
sentence, because an appeal should always be made to one
who is greater. Someone who is lesser, however, can
sometimes alleviate a case faulty in this way, that is
one not concluded justly, by making good the negligence
of the greater one, just as in conferring benefits and
disposing of other things a lesser can also make good
the negligence of his superior (Extra, De electione,
c. Cum in cunctis [c.7, col.51], Extra,
De concessione praebendarum, c. Nulla
[c.2, col.488] and c. Quia diversitatem [c.5,
col.489], Extra, De institutionibus, c. Grave,
[[wrong reference: possibly Extra, De praebendis,
c. Grave c.29, col.478]] 9, q. 3, c. Cum
simus [c.3, col.607], and dist. 89, c. Volumus
[col. 426], where the gloss says, "It is argued that if
a prelate does not want or neglects to do those things
that he ought to do, those things should be made good by
his subjects." We gather this also from the Council of
Sardinia, found in the last chapter of dist. 65 [Si
forte] where the gloss [col.340] says, "It is
argued that if subjects neglect to do what they should,
those things ought to be made good by one who is
greater, either himself or though someone else, and
conversely." It is clear from these and very many others
that inferiors can make good the negligence of their
superiors, especially since they can often correct their
superiors and even coerce them, as Pope Iginius attests
when he says, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Salvo
[c.4, col.607], "Saving the privilege of the Roman
church in all matters, let no archbishop, except at the
insistence of the rest of the bishops of his province,
hear the cases of some of them, because the ones dealt
with will be void unless they are discussed in the sight
of all of them, and let him be coerced by his brothers
if he does so." Pope Anterus seems to agree with this.
In the same causa and quaestio c. Si
autem he says, "However, if any metropolitan is
haughty and, without all his provincials present or
without the advice of his bishops, wants to treat either
their cases or other cases, with the exception only of
those cases which pertain to his own parish, or wants to
oppress them, let him be severely corrected by all of
them so that he will not dare to undertake such things
thereafter. Certainly if he appears incorrigible and
disobedient to them, let his contumacy be referred to
this apostolic see, to which all the judgements of
bishops have been ordered to be referred, so that
punishment may be inflicted on him." We gather from
these that a lesser can make good the negligence of a
greater. And it is not always the one who is greater,
therefore, who can alleviate a faulty case, and
consequently there can not always be appeal to him. Even
if the pope makes good the negligence of secular judges,
therefore, even if he were to make good the negligence
of the emperor by concluding a case which the emperor
neglected to conclude, it could not be shown by this
either that appeal is permitted from the emperor to the
pope or that the emperor is less than the pope in such
matters.
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Discipulus Quod minor valeat
supplere negligentiam superioris, hoc non est nisi
auctoritate canonis conditi a concilio quod est
superiius illo inferiori qui potest supplere
negligentiam superioris, Extra, De concessione
praebendarum, Quia diversitatem. Sed
papa auctoritate talis canonis vel legis non supplet
negligentiam iudicum secularium vel imperatorum
{*imperatoris Re} sed auctoritate propria. Ergo ex
officio maior est imperatore in talibus et etiam {*om.
&NaRe} omnibus aliis iudicibus secularibus.
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Student That a lesser can make good
the negligence of his superior is only by the authority
of a canon produced by a council which is superior to
that inferior who can make good the negligence of his
superior (Extra, De concessione praebendarum,
c. Quia diversitatem [c.5, col.489]). But it
is not by the authority of such a canon or law that the
pope makes good the negligence of secular judges or of
the emperor, but it is by his own authority. He is,
therefore, by virtue of his office greater than the
emperor in such things and than all other secular
judges.
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Magister {om. &Re} Respondetur
tibi quod sicut inferiores auctoritate legis supplent
negligentiam superioris, ita papa virtute consuetudinis
quae {qui &Mz} aequipollet {*aequivalet &NaRe}
legi supplet negligentiam iudicum secularium. Et ideo
{*et ideo: quare &NaRe} auctoritate officii sui non
supplet negligentiam talem. Et ideo non est maior in
huiusmodi {huius &Re} causis {*iudicibus add.
&MzNaRe} secularibus.
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Master The reply to you is that just
as inferiors make good the negligence of their superior
by the authority of law, so it is by virtue of custom,
which is equivalent to law, that the pope makes good the
negligence of secular judges. Therefore he does not make
good such negligence by the authority of his office. And
therefore he is not greater in cases of this kind than
secular judges.
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Discipulus Cuius auctoritate vel
consensu potest introduci talis consuetudo quae tribuat
papae huiusmodi {huius &Re} potestatem?
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Student By whose authority or
consent can such a custom, which bestows on the pope
power of this kind, be introduced?
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Magister Ad hoc tibi {*tripliciter
&NaRe} respondetur: uno modo quod potest introduci
huiusmodi {*om. &NaRe} consuetudo auctoritate vel
consensu tacito vel expresso imperatoris et iudicum
secularium quibus potest placere quod papa negligentiam
suppleat eorundem aut possunt scienter tolerare quod hoc
faciat papa. Aliter diciter quod potest introduci
auctoritate populi qui velint vel consentiant {*velint
vel consentiant: velit vel consentiat &NaRe} quod
papa huiusmodi habeat potestatem. Aliter dicitur quod
potest introduci auctoritate sive ratione {*sive ratione
om. &NaRe} naturalis rationis {*trs. &NaRe} quae
dictat quod iustitia est nullatenus negligenda quin
{quando &Mz} semper in communitate servetur.
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Master This is replied to in three
ways: in one way, that such a custom can be introduced
by the tacit or express authority or consent of the
emperor and the secular judges, to whom it can be
soothing that the pope makes good their negligence, or
they can knowingly tolerate the pope's doing this. In
another way it is said that it can be introduced by the
authority of the people who want the pope to have or
agree to his having power of this kind. In another way
it is said that it can be introduced on the authority of
natural reason which prescribes that justice should not
be neglected but rather is always preserved in a
community.
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Discipulus Nunquid possent imperator
et iudices seculares talem consuetudinem tollere?
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Student Could the emperor and
secular judges abolish such a custom?
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Magister Respondetur quod secundum
istam {*illam &NaRe} assertionem quae ponit quod
talis consuetudo potest introduci de consensu tacito vel
expresso imperatoris et iudicum secularium, imperator
posset eam tollere sed non alii iudices seculares. Quia
enim praescriptio est a iure imperiali et non {*est add.
&NaRe} ab inferioribus iudicibus, ideo enim {*in
&MzNaRe} hoc non potest papa praescribere contra
imperatorem si expresse et ex certa scientia tolerat
{*tollat &NaRe} huiusmodi consuetudinem. Sed contra
alios iudices seculares inferiores praescribere potest
{trs. &Na} papa. Si tamen imperator revocaret {trs.
&Na} huiusmodi consuetudinem aut {*et &MzNaRe}
aliquo modo {*aliquo modo om. &NaRe} {aliquo modo:
nullo modo &Mz} negligeret facere iustitiam vel {*ac
&MzNaRe} etiam permitteret alios iudices inferiores
negligere iustitiam et nullatenus sustineret quod papa
vel alius suppleret tam perniciosam negligentiam et
omnibus {*omnino &NaRe} verisimiliter huiusmodi
{omnibus verisimiliter huiusmodi om. &Mz} confusio
{*verisimiliter huiusmodi confusio om. &NaRe}
incorrigibilis appareret, esset tanquam destructor et
perversor iustitiae de dignitate imperiali deponendus.
CAP. XXIII.
{24 &NaRe} Discipulus Diffuse
tractata est ratio prima quam incepi {*incepimus
&NaRe} c. 1 {*om. &MzNaRe} 17 ad probandum quod
imperator est iudex papae et quod papa est inferior eo
quoad iurisdictionem coactivam. Ideo nunc {*aliquas add.
&NaRe} alias rationes adducas.
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Master The reply is that according
to that assertion which puts it that such a custom can
be introduced with the tacit or express agreement of the
emperor and secular judges, the emperor could remove it
but not the secular judges. For because the prescription
is by imperial law and is not from inferior judges, the
pope can not as a result prescribe against the emperor
in this matter, if the latter expressly and with sure
knowledge removes a custom of this kind. But the pope
can prescribe against other inferior secular judges.
Nevertheless if the emperor were to revoke a custom of
this kind and were to neglect to bring justice and were
even to permit other inferior judges to neglect justice
and were not to uphold [the right of] the pope or
someone else to make good so baleful a negligence and
were to appear wholly incorrigible, he should be deposed
from his imperial dignity as a destroyer and perverter
of justice.
Chapter 23
Student The first argument that we
began in chapter 17 to prove that the emperor is the
judge of the pope and that the pope is inferior to him
with respect to coercive jurisdiction has been
considered copiously. Would you therefore now bring
forward some other arguments?
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Magister Ista
{*Alia &NaRe} ratio comprehendit {*comprehendens
&NaRe} duas tactas in prima parte istius Dialogi li.
6 c. 4 et 5 talis est {*trs. &NaRe}. Papa non est
magis exemptus a iurisdictione coactiva imperatoris et
aliorum secularium iudicum quam fuerunt {*fuerint
&NaRe} Christus et apostoli. Sed Christus, inquantum
homo mortalis, et apostoli fuerunt ab {*sub &NaRe}
imperatore quantum ad iurisditionem coactivam iudicati
{*om. &NaRe}; ergo consimiliter {*om. &NaRe} et
papa. Maior est manifesta. Minor probatur quantum ad
utramque partem. Quod enim Christus fuerit inferior
imperatore et aliis iudicibus secularibus quantum ad
iurisditionem coactivam probatur, quia qui potest
accusari et contra quem possunt alii testificari
iudicari {preiudicari &Mz} potest {*trs. &NaRe}.
Sed Christus poterat {malo intellectus add. &Re}
accusari, quod ipsemet testatur cum Ioh. 8:[46] dicit,
"Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato?" Quibus verbis
concessit Christus {*trs. &NaRe} aliis potestatem
accusandi ipsum. Quod etiam testatur Innocentius III Extra,
De haereticis, Cum ex iniuncto dicens,
"Nec quisquam suae praesumptionis audacia {*audaciam
&NaReZn} illo defendat exemplo, quod asina legitur
reprehendisse prophetas {*prophetam &NaReZn}, vel
quod dominus ait, `Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato'"
et infra: "Rursus aliud est quod praelatus sponte de sua
confisus innocentia subditorum se accusationibus
supponit, in quo casu praemissum Domini verbum debet
intelligi." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus
poterat accusari. Ergo et poterat iudicari ab illo coram
quo poterat accusari.
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Master Another argument, which
comprises two [points] touched on in chapters 4 and 5 of
book 6 in the first part of this Dialogue, is
as follows. The pope is not more exempt from the
coercive jurisdiction of the emperor and other secular
judges than were Christ and the apostles; but Christ, as
a mortal man, and the apostles were under the emperor,
as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned;
therefore the pope is also. The major [premise] is
manifest; both parts of the minor [premise] are proved.
For it is proved that as far as coercive jurisdiction
was concerned Christ was inferior to the emperor and
other secular judges, because he who can be accused and
against whom others can testify can be judged. But
Christ was able to be accused, as he himself testifies
when he says in John 8:46, "Which of you convicts me of
sin?" By these words Christ granted to others the power
to accuse him. Innocent III also attests to this, saying
in Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum ex
iniuncto [c.12, col.784], "And let no one defend
the rashness of his presumption by that example in which
we read that an ass reproved the prophet or that in
which the Lord said, `Which of you convicts me of sin?'
... Another again is that a prelate relying willingly on
his innocence submits himself to the accusations of his
subjects; the above words of the Lord should be
understood as such a case." We understand from these
words that Christ was able to be accused. Therefore he
was also able to be judged by that one before whom he
could be accused.
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Discipulus Istud non concludit
{includit &Mz} intentum, imo contrarium ex ipso
colligitur quod {*quia &NaRe} Christus solummodo
sponte, sicut innuunt praemissa verba, se supposuit
accusationibus subditorum. Et ita Christus non potuit
iudicari nisi quia voluit. Et per consequens iudices non
erant superiores Christo. Ex quo infertur quod exemplo
Christi non potest concludi de papa quod teneatur subire
iudicium imperatoris. Sed quod papa sponte potest se
subiicere {*submittere &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe}
accusationibus aliorum, ut plures sacri canones {*trs.
&NaRe} testantur.
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Student That is not conclusive for
its purpose; indeed from it we gather the opposite,
because, as the above words imply it was only of his own
free will that Christ submitted himself to the
accusations of his subjects. And so Christ could be
judged only if he wanted to be. And consequently the
judges were not superior to Christ. From this we infer
that from the example of Christ it can not be concluded
of the pope that he is bound to submit to the judgement
of the emperor, but that the pope can submit of his own
free will to the accusations of others, as many sacred
canons attest.
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Magister Videtur aliis quod verba
praemissa probant intentum, scilicet quod Christus
poterat accusari, ita quod iudices, qui accusatores
audire debebant, non poterant repellere volentes
accusare Christum nisi ex causa, puta si non apparerent
{apparent &NaRe} legitimi accusatores vel alio modo
repellerentur ab accusatione secundum iura, ex quo
Christus dedit iure {iura &Mz} {*om. &NaRe}
volentibus accusare potestatem accusandi. Et per
consequens ex tali potestate data {*a add. &MzNaRe}
Christo erant iudices {*trs. &NaRe} superiores
Christo, in quantum erat homo mortalis, et Christus sic
fuit eis inferior, licet sponte, {*sicut et sponte add.
&NaRe} fuit passibilis et mortalis.
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Master It seems to others that the
above words do establish their purpose, namely that
Christ was able to be accused, in this way, that the
judges, who were bound to listen to the accusers, could
not reject those wanting to accuse Christ unless for a
reason, (if, for instance, they did not seem to be
legitimate accusers or they were rejected in some other
way by an accusation according to the laws) because
Christ gave power to accuse to those wanting to accuse
him. And consequently, by virtue of that power given by
Christ the judges were superior to Christ, in so far as
he was a mortal man, and Christ was thus inferior to
them, although by his own free will, just as also by his
own free will he was mortal and able to suffer.
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Et haec de tertia parte Dialogorum pro nunc tibi
sufficiant {*Et haec ... sufficiant om. &MzNaRe}.
[[The text for the rest of chapter 23 is printed from
...]]
Discipulus Quomodo probatur quod alii
poterant testificari contra Christum?
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Student How is it proved that others
were able to testify against Christ?
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Magister Hoc asserit ipsemet
Christus, ut videtur {dicens add. &NaRe} [[crossed
out Re]] danti sibi alapam et male {*om. &NaRe}
dicenti, sic respondens pontifici, "Si male locutus sum,
testimonium perhibe {perhibere &NaRe} de malo." Ioh.
18:[23] Hoc etiam Gracianus sentire videtur, qui, ut
legitur 2, q. 7, # Ecce ostensum est, ait,
"Christus, quamvis esset pastor suorum {*suarum
&NaReZn} ovium, quas verbo et exemplo pascebat,
tamen quantum ad officiorum distributionem, ex qua hodie
in ecclesiis {*ecclesia Zn} alii presunt aliis, unde
quidam prelati, quidam subditi vocantur, in populo illo
pastorale officium non gerebat. Mistica enim et visibili
unctione nec in regem nec in sacerdotem unctus erat, que
sole in illo populo persone prelati veri {*prelati veri:
prelature &NaReZn} nomen sibi vendicabant." Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus, in quantum homo
mortalis, erat subditus illis qui preerant {erant
&Re} in populo illo.
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Master Christ himself asserts this,
it seems, to the one who struck his face and spoke to
him, speaking as follows to the priest, "If I have
spoken wrongly, testify to the wrong." (John 18:23)
Gratian also seems to think this. As we read in 2, q. 7,
# Ecce ostensum est [c.39, col.495], he says,
"Although Christ was the shepherd of his sheep, whom he
fed by teaching and example, yet he did not as far as
the distribution of offices was concerned carry on a
pastoral office among that people, as a result of which
[distribution] some people are above others in the
church today, with some called prelates and some called
subjects. For he had not been anointed with a mystic and
visible anointing either as a king or a priest, which
persons alone laid claim to the name of a prelature
among that people." We gather from these words that as a
mortal man Christ was subject to those who were in
command among that people.
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Discipulus Hoc Graciano repugnare
videtur, qui ubi primo {*prius &NaRe} ait, "Christus
Iudeos ad se arguendum admisit perfectione humilitatis,
non severitate iuris. Si enim legis rigore essent
admissi, hac auctoritate criminosi et {etiam &Na}
infames in accusatione religiosorum recipiendi essent,
cum essent sceleratissimi, qui de morte {*nece
&NaReZn} Christi tractantes innocentem condempnare
volebant." Ex quibus verbis comprehenditur {om.
&NaRe} [[add. interlinear Re]] quod Christus ex
rigore iuris accusari non poterat, sed tantummodo ex
perfectione humilitatis.
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Student This seems to oppose Gratian
who says at this same place [col.495], "Christ allowed
the Jews to accuse him out of the perfection of his
humility, not out of the strictness of the law. For if
they had been allowed out of the rigour of the law, the
guilty and notorious on this authority would have been
accepted in an accusation against the religious, because
they were very wicked men who in discussing the death of
Christ wanted to condemn an innocent man." We understand
from these words that Christ could not be accused out of
the strictness of the law, but only out of the
perfection of his humility.
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Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod
Christus non poterat accusari ex severitate iuris, que
Christo necessitatem imponeret, quia Christus, in
quantum deus, supra omnem talem legem fuit, et tamen, in
quantum homo, ex perfectione humilitatis sponte se
subdidit huiusmodi iuri, ut posset accusari ab illo, qui
erat recipiendus in publico, et ita Christus subdidit
erat {*iuri add. &NaRe}, in quantum homo. Quia tamen
sponte, etiam in quantum homo, erat subditus huiusmodi
iuri {trs. &Na}, ideo quodammodo fuit supra
huiusmodi {huius &Re} ius, quia in potestate sua
fuit posse accusari et non posse accusari {et non posse
accusari om. &Na}; et tamen quamdiu ex perfectione
humilitatis voluit, poterat accusari. Ex quo sequitur
quod quamdiu voluit ex perfectione humilitatis, fuit
subditus iudicibus illis qui erant iudices in populo.
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Master The reply to this is that
Christ could not be accused out of the strictness of the
law imposing its necessity on him, because, as God,
Christ was above every such law, and yet, as a man, he
willingly subjected himself to such a law out of the
perfection of his humility, with the result that he
could be accused by him who should have received him in
public, and so, as a man, Christ subjected himself to
the law. Yet because, even as a man, he willingly
subjected himself to a law of this kind, he was as a
result to a certain extent above that law because it was
in his power to be able to be accused and not to be able
to be accused; and yet just as long as he consented out
of the perfection of his humility, he could be accused.
It follows from this that just as long as he consented
out of the perfection of his humility he was subject to
those judges who were judges among the people.
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Discipulus Istud est multum pro
papa; quia sicut Christus fuit subditus, quamdiu voluit,
iudicbus illis, qui iudicabant in partibus illis, ita
etiam papa potest se submittere, si voluerit, iudicio
laicorum. Set non est necessarie, quod se submittat, et
ita cum sit vicarius Christi, non est subditus alicuius,
nisi sponte vellet {*velit &NaRe}.
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Student That is very much for the
pope [too], because, just as Christ was subject, just as
long as he consented, to the secular judges who used to
judge in those parts, so also, if he consents, can the
pope submit himself to the judgement of laymen. But he
does not submit himself necessarily, and so, since he is
the vicar of Christ, he is not subject to anyone unless
he consents willingly.
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Magister Non est omnino simile de
Christo et de papa. Quia enim papa est vicarius Christi,
ideo non habet omnem potestatem, quam habuit Christus,
etiam in quantum homo. Christus enim etiam in quantum
homo instituit sacramenta et sponte instituit, ita quod
potuit dispensare contra ipsa quod tamen papa non
potest. Papa ergo, cum sit solummodo vicarius Christi,
servare tenetur ea que Christus verbo et exemplo docuit
servanda. Cum ergo Christus subdens se aliis exemplo
docuerit subiectionem exhibendam iudicibus, papa
huiusmodi subiectionem servare tenetur.
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Master There is not a complete
similarity between Christ and the pope. For because the
pope is the vicar of Christ, he does not, as a result,
have all the power that Christ, even as a man, had. For
even as a man Christ established the sacraments and so
established them of his own free will that he could make
a dispensation against them; yet the pope can not do
this. Since the pope is only the vicar of Christ,
therefore, he is bound to preserve those things which by
teaching and example Christ taught should be preserved.
Therefore since in subjecting himself to others, Christ
taught by this example that subjection should be
tendered to judges, the pope is bound to maintain
subjection of this kind.
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Discipulus Potestne probari aliter,
quod Christus fuit subditus imperatori et aliis
iudicibus?
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Student Can it be proved in another
way that Christ was subject to the emperor and to other
judges?
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Magister Hoc probatur aliter per
hoc, quod Christus fuit subditus matri et patri
putativo, sicut legitur Luc 2:[51]. Ergo fuit subditus
illis qui fuerunt superiores et domini patris putativi
et matris {matres &Na}, quales fuerunt Romani. Unde
et Ioseph, ut legitur Luc 2:[4-5], ascendit de Galilea
in Bethleem, ut profiteretur et faceret {faceretur
&Na} se subiectum imperatori cum Maria desponsata
sibi uxore. Ergo Christus fuit subditus, in quantum homo
mortalis, imperatori, licet sponte et voluntarie, sicut
et sponte fuit portatus a diabolo in montem et etiam in
Ierusalem, ubi statuit eum supra propinaculum templi.
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Master This is proved in another way
by the fact that Christ was subject to his mother and
his putative father, as we read in Luke 2:51. Therefore
he was subject to those who were the superiors and lords
of his putative father and his mother, and the Romans
were such people. Whence too, as we read in Luke 2:4-5,
Joseph went up from Galilee to Bethlehem to be
registered and to make himself and Mary, to whom he was
engaged, subject to the emperor. As a mortal man,
therefore, Christ was subject to the emperor, although
of his own free will and voluntarily, just as of his own
free will too he was carried by the devil to a mountain
and even to Jerusalem where he stood upon the pinnacle
of the temple.
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Discipulus Adduxisti aliquas
allegaciones ad probandum quod Christus, in quantum homo
mortalis, fuit sub imperatore, quantum ad iurisdictionem
coactivam. Nunc nitere probare hoc de apostolis.
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Student You have adduced some
arguments to prove that, as a mortal man, Christ was
under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction
was concerned. Now try to prove this of the apostles.
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Magister Quod apostoli et omnes alii
christiani et discipuli Christi fuerunt sub imperatore,
quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam, multipliciter
videtur posse probari. Nam religio christiana et per
consequens Christus neminem, eciam secularem et
infidelem, privavit iure suo. Sed apostoli {*antequam
essent apostoli add. &NaRe} fuerunt subiecti
imperatori et aliis potestatibus secularibus et
infidelibus; ergo postquam fuerunt apostoli, fuerunt
eisdem et in eisdem subiecti. Minor istius racionis
videtur manifesta, quia non plus erant apostoli ante
conversionem et apostolatum exempti a iurisdictione
imperatoris, quam alii Iudei, qui tamen erant subiecti
imperatori et aliis potestatibus secularibus. Maior
autem multis modis ostenditur. Ait enim Ambrosius super
epistolam ad Titum, "Admone illos principibus et
potestatibus subditos esse, quasi etsi tu habes imperium
spirituale, tamen admone illos subditos esse
principibus, scilicet regibus et ducibus et potestatibus
minoribus, quia christiana religio neminem privat iure
suo." Item Augustinus super Iohannem ait, "Regnum meum
non est de hoc mundo, decepti estis, non impedio
dominacionem vestram in mundo, ne vane timeatis et
seviatis." Item Leo papa in sermone de Epiphania ait,
"Dominus mundi temporale non querit regnum; {qui add.
&NaRe} prestat eternum." Item sic canit {ait
&Na} eccelsia, "Non eripit mortalia qui regna dat
celestia." Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod nec
Christus nec religio christiana alicui etiam infideli
tollit ius suum, ut scilicet per hoc quod aliquis
christianus efficitur vel efficiebatur tempore Christi,
sive apostolus sive alius, imperator et alii sub eo
nullum ius quod habebant {habebat &Na} penitus
perdiderunt. Quod in verbis apostoli 1 Timoth. 6:[1]
innuitur, cum ait, "Quicumque sunt sub iugo servi,
dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen
domini et doctrina blasphemetur." Ex his enim verbis
videtur haberi quod subiecti dominis infidelibus, quando
efficiebantur christiani, ut prius in omnibus dominis
suis servire et obedire debebant, ne domini dicerent
quod religio christiana esset iniuriosa et iniuriam
dominis conversorum facere niteretur. Quod Augustinus
aperte videtur {trs. &Na} asserere exponens verba
predicta; ait enim, "Sciendum est quosdam predicasse
communem omnibus in Christo esse libertatem; quod de
spirituali utique libertate verum est, non de carnali,
ut illi intelligebant: ideo contra eos loquitur hic
apostolus iubens servos dominis suis subditos esse. Non
ergo exigant servi christiani, quod de Hebreis dicitur,
ut sex annis serviant et gratis dimittantur liberi, quod
misticum est; et quare hoc precipiat apostolus,
supponit, ne blasphemetur nomen domini quasi aliena
invadentis et doctrina christiana {christi &Na}
quasi iniusta et contra leges predicet, sed pocius per
obsequia servorum fidelium domini infideles
convertantur." Ex quibus verbis concluditur quod per
conversionem apostolorum et assumptionem eorum ad
apostolatum domini infideles nullum ius in eis quod
prius habuerant amittebant, et ita remanebant subditi
eis in omnibus, sicut prius.
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Master It seems provable in many
ways that the apostles and all other christians and
disciples of Christ were under the emperor, as far as
his coercive jurisdiction was concerned. For the
christian religion, and consequently Christ, did not
deprive anyone, even someone secular and unbelieving, of
his right. But before they were apostles, the apostles
were subject to the emperor and other secular and
unbelieving powers; after they were apostles, therefore,
they were subject to the same people and in the same
things. The minor [premise] of this argument seems
manifest, because before their conversion and their
apostolate the apostles were not more exempt from the
jurisdiction of the emperor than were other jews; yet
the latter were subject to the emperor and other secular
powers. The major [premise], however, is shown in many
ways. For Ambrose says on the letter to Titus [P.L. 17,
530], "Admonish them to be subject to princes and
powers, as if, although you have a spiritual empire, yet
advise them to be subject to princes, that is kings,
dukes and minor powers, because the christian religion
deprives no one of his right." Again, writing on John
[P.L. 35, 1939], Augustine says, "My kingdom is not of
this world; you have been deceived; I am not impeding
your domination in the world, so you fear and rage
vainly." Again, Pope Leo in his sermon on epiphany [P.L.
54, 113] says, "The Lord of the world does not seek a
temporal kingdom; his eternal kingdom surpasses it."
Again, the church sings as follows, "He who gives
celestial kingdoms does not snatch at mortal ones." We
gather from all these that neither Christ nor the
christian religion removes anyone's right, even an
unbeliever's, that is, neither the emperor nor others
under him completely lost any right which they had
because of the fact that someone, whether an apostle or
someone else, becomes or became a christian in the time
of Christ. This is implied in the words of the apostle
in 1 Tim. 6:1, when he says, "Let all who are under the
yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all
honour, so that the name of God and the teaching may not
be blasphemed." For these words seem to hold that when
those subject to unbelieving masters became christians
they had to serve and obey their masters in everything
as before, so that their masters would not say that the
christian religion was wrongful and was trying to
inflict a wrong on the masters of converts. Augustine
seems clearly to assert this when he expounds those
words. For he says, "It should be known that certain
people preached that in Christ freedom was common to
everyone; this is certainly true about spiritual
freedom, not about carnal freedom as those people meant;
therefore the apostle speaks against them, ordering
slaves to be subject to their masters. Christian slaves
do not demand what was said of the Hebrews, therefore,
that they serve six years and be freely released to
freedom. This is mystical, and so the apostle instructs
this, he assumes, so that the name of the Lord is not
blasphemed as one who takes possession of what belongs
to others and so that christian teaching does not preach
what is as it were unjust and against the laws, but
rather that unbelieving masters are converted by the
obedience of believing slaves." We conclude from these
words that by the conversion of the apostles and their
assumption into the apostolate their unbelieving masters
lost no right over them that they had had before, and so
they remained subject to them just as before.
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Amplius quod omnes apostoli, saltem alii a beato
Petro, fuerint subiecti imperatori et aliis dominis
secularibus, probatur per illud beati Petri canonica sua
1, 7 {*2 &NaRe}:[13], "Subiecti estote omni creature
propter Deum sive regi precellenti sive ducibus tanquam
ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero
bonorum." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod beatus Petrus
voluit omnes subditos suos in spiritualibus esse
subditos {subiectos &Na}, sicut ante conversionem,
omni creature que super eos ante habuerat potestatem.
Nam, ut testatur Innocentius tertius, Extra, De
maioritate et obedientia, Solite,
beatus Petrus ibidem "scribebat subditis suis et eos ad
humilitatis meritum {om. &Na} provocabat"; sed
apostoli erant subditi beati Petri; ergo beatus Petrus
voluit, quod apostoli essent subditi {subiecti &Na}
regibus et ducibus, quibus fuerant, antequam essent
christiani, subiecti.
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Further, that the apostles, at least some apart from
[[correct??]] Peter, were subject to the emperor and
other secular lords is proved by what Peter says in 1
Peter 2:13, "For the Lord's sake accept the authority of
every human institution, whether of the emperor as
supreme, or of governors as sent by him to punish those
who do wrong and to praise those who do right." We
gather from these words that blessed Peter wanted all
his subjects to be subject in spiritual matters, just as
before their conversion, to every authority that had
previously had power over them. For as Innocent III
attests in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia,
c. Solitae [c.6, col.196] blessed Peter at that
point "was writing to his subjects and challenging
them to the merit of humility"; but the apostles were
subjects of blessed Peter; therefore blessed Peter
wanted the apostles to be subject to the kings and
governors to whom they had been subject before they
were christians.
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Discipulus Adhuc alias raciones ad
probandum quod imperator est iudex adducas?
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Student Would you bring forward even
more arguments to prove that the emperor is the judge
[[of the pope: add??]]?
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Magister Alia racio que in
scripturis fundatur adducitur, que talis est. Si religio
christiana nullum dominum aut principem infidelem,
imperatorem vel alium privat iure suo, sicut ostensum
est prius, multo forcius imperatorem fidelem et alios
dominos fideles non privat iure suo, quod apostolus 1
Timoth. 6:[1-2] aperte insinuare videtur, qui postquam
dixit, "Quicunque sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni
honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen domini et doctrina
blasphemetur," statim subiunxit, "Qui autem fideles
habent dominos, non contempnant, quia fratres sunt, sed
magis serviant, quia fideles et dilecti." Imperator ergo
fidelis per religionem christianam nullum ius perdidit;
ergo papa in omnibus est subiectus imperatori, in quibus
fuit subiectus ante papatum.
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Master We adduce as follows another
argument, which is based on the scriptures. If, as has
been shown above, the christian religion does not
deprive any unbelieving lord, prince, emperor or other
[ruler] of his right, it is much more the case that it
does not deprive a believing emperor and other believing
lords of their right, as the apostle clearly seems to
imply in 1 Tim. 6:1-2. After he has said, "Let all who
are under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as
worthy of all honour," he immediately added, "Those who
have believing masters must not be disrespectful to them
on the grounds that they are brothers; rather they must
serve them all the more since they are brothers and
beloved." Therefore a believing emperor lost no right
because of the christian religion; the pope is subject
to the emperor, therefore, in all those things in which
he was subject before his papacy.
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Discipulus Papa etiam ante papatum
non fuit subiectus imperatori, quia fuit episcopus vel
clericus, et ideo imperator non fuit iudex ipsius.
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Student Even before his papacy the
pope was not subject to the emperor because he was a
bishop or cleric, and therefore the emperor was not his
judge.
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Magister Ista responsio excluditur
per hoc primo, quod episcopi sunt subiecti imperatori.
Sed de isto forte postea queres. Ideo secundo excluditur
per hoc quod purus servus imperatoris, etiam si tonsuram
clericalem non haberet, possit {*posset &Re} eligi
in papam, et ita cum imperator non debeat privari iure
suo per ecclesiam, papa talis remaneret subiectus
imperatori, et per consequens papa ratione papatus non
est exemptus a iurisdictione imperatoris.
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Master That reply is excluded
firstly by the fact that bishops are subject to the
emperor. But perhaps you will ask about this later.
Therefore it is excluded secondly by the fact that a
pure servant of the emperor, even if he were not to have
the clerical tonsure, could be elected as pope, and so,
since the emperor should not be deprived of his right by
the church, such a pope would remain subject to the
emperor, and consequently the pope is not exempt from
the jurisdiction of the emperor by reason of his papacy.
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Discipulus Minor dignitas quam sit
papatus, liberat a patria potestate et etiam a potestate
dominica, ergo multo forcius electus in papam eo ipso
est liberatus ab omni iurisdictione imperatoris.
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Student A lesser dignity than the
papacy frees one from paternal power and even from
seignorial power; much more is it the case, therefore,
that one elected as pope is by that very fact freed from
all jurisdiction of the emperor.
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Magister Dicunt alii quod ista
obiectio nichil valet. Quod enim minor dignitas quam
papatus liberet a patria potestate et dominica, est ex
ordinacione humana non ex ordinacione divina, et ita ex
ordinacione imperatoris potest electus {electio &Na}
in papam eximi a potestate inferiorum iudicum; sed non
eximitur ex ordinacione divina. Quod et {*etiam &Na}
tali racione probatur: non magis debet aliquis invitus
privari iure suo quod habet in aliquo, ut ei aliqua
dignitas ecclesiastica conferatur, sine qua potest
salvari, quam aliquis debeat privari iure suo quod habet
in filio, ut eidem filio conferatur baptismus, sine quo
non potest salvari. Sed Iudei et alii infideles non
debent privari inviti iure quod habent in parvulis, ut
baptizentur, nec ipsi parvuli baptizari debent, ne
patres priventur iure, quod habent in eis. Ergo multo
forcius, quandocumque {*quantumcumque &NaRe} aliquis
qui erat servus imperatoris vel aliter sibi subiectus
fiat papa, imperator non privabitur invitus...[[At this
point Na and Re break off.]]
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Master Some say that that objection
is not at all valid. For that a lesser dignity than the
papacy frees one from paternal and seignorial power is
by human regulation, not by divine regulation, and so
one elected as pope can by the emperor's regulation be
released from the power of inferior judges; but he is
not released by divine regulation. This is also proved
by the following argument. No more should someone who is
unwilling be deprived of the right which he has in
someone because some ecclesiastical dignity, without
which he can be saved, is conferred on the latter, than
someone should be deprived of the right which he has in
his son because baptism, without which he can not be
saved, is conferred on that son. But jews and other
unbelievers should not be unwillingly deprived of the
right which they have in their children, because they
are baptised, and those children should not be baptised
lest their fathers are deprived of a right which they
have in them. It is much more the case, therefore, that
whenever someone who was the servant of the emperor or
was otherwise subject to him becomes pope, the emperor
will not be unwillingly deprived ... .
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