| Capitulum 1 | Chapter 1 | |
| Discipulus: Hactenus de punitione hereticorum, et precipue pape si efficeretur hereticus, quamplura quesivi, licet multa obmiserim, de quibus post hoc opus sollicite mentem tuam inquiram. Nunc vero de credentibus, fautoribus, defensoribus, et receptatoribus hereticorum investigare propono. Primo autem de credentibus disputas, de quibus ante omnia disseras qui sunt censendi credentes. | Student: So far I have asked many questions about the punishment of heretics, and especially of a pope if he were to become a heretic, although I have omitted many things about which after [completing] this work I will diligently inquire into your thinking. Now, however, I propose to investigate the believers, supporters, defenders, and receivers of heretics. First, however, discuss believers, and about them discuss first who should be considered believers. | |
| Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod credentes possunt in duplici differentia reperiri. Quidam enim explicite hereticorum credunt erroribus, quemadmodum Ariani credebant explicite quod filius Dei non est verus Deus, que fuit error Arii heretici. Et de hiis videtur loqui Gregorius 9us qui, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 2o, ait: “Credentes autem eorum erroribus hereticos similiter iudicamus.” | Master: It appears to some that believers can be found in two classes. [1] Some explicitly believe the errors of heretics, just as the Arians explicitly believed that the Son of God is not the true God, which was the error of the heretic Arius. And Gregory IX seems to be speaking about these; as is found in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 2o, he says: “But those who believe their errors we likewise judge to be heretics.” | |
| Alii vero videntur esse credentes qui, licet non credant explicite hereticorum erroribus, credunt tamen hereticis, ipsos censentes inter catholicos computandos et eorum doctrinam catholicam reputantes, sed in quo explicite discrepent a doctrina catholica ignorent. Et isto modo videtur quod illi qui ad hereticos causa addiscendi accedunt, qui secundum leges minus puniuntur quam docentes, inter credentes debeant numerari. | Others, however, seem to be believers who, although they do not explicitly believe in the errors of heretics, nevertheless [2] believe in the heretics, considering them to be counted among Catholics and considering their doctrine to be Catholic, but they do not know how they [the heretics] explicitly differ from Catholic doctrine. And in this way it seems that those who go to heretics to learn (who according to the laws are punished less than teachers) should be counted among believers. | |
| Discipulus: Distinctionem de credentibus, sive sit vera sive falsa, intelligo, et ideo de utroque membro te interrogare intendo. Dic autem in primis de primis credentibus, an omnes sint inter hereticos computandi, cum hoc auctoritas Gregorii superius allegata videatur asserere, cum indistincte, non distinguendo inter hos credentes et illos, dicat: “credentes autem eorum” (scilicet hereticorum) “erroribus hereticos similiter iudicamus.” | Student: I understand the distinction concerning believers (whether it is true or false), and therefore I intend to ask you about both members. But tell me first of all about the first believers, whether they are all to be counted among heretics, since this is what the authority of Gregory cited above seems to assert when he says indistinctly, without distinguishing between these believers and those, “Those who believe their”, namely the heretics’, “errors we likewise judge to be heretics.” | |
| Magister: Est quedam assertio quod non debet dici indistincte quod omnes credentes explicite hereticorum erroribus sunt censendi heretici. Quare de credentibus etiam explicite hereticorum erroribus distinguendum apparet. Credentium enim hereticorum erroribus quidam sciunt ipsos errores esse ab ecclesia condempnatos. Quidam vero nesciunt quod sunt ab ecclesia condempnati, et istorum quidam adherent pertinaciter talibus erroribus, quidam vero non adherent pertinaciter sed corrigi sunt parati. | Master: There is a certain assertion that it should not be said indistinctly that all who explicitly believe in the errors of heretics should be counted to be heretics. Therefore concerning those who believe even explicitly in the errors of heretics it seems a distinction must be made. For of those who believe in the errors of heretics [1a] some know that these errors themselves have been condemned by the Church. [1b] Some do not know that they have been condemned by the Church, and of these [1bi] some adhere pertinaciously to such errors, while [1bii] others do not adhere pertinaciously but are ready to be corrected. | |
| Primi credentes hereticorum erroribus absque alia examinatione sunt inter hereticos computandi. Cuius ratio assignatur, quia errans contra fidem qui non est paratus corrigi est inter hereticos computandus (24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus). Sed credens hereticorum erroribus quos scit ab ecclesia condempnatos non est paratus corrigi, quia quilibet errans contra fidem debet esse paratus corrigi per doctrinam ecclesie, et aliter est pertinax reputandus. Sed qui scit errorem aliquem ab ecclesia esse dampnatum, et tamen credit eidem errori, non est paratus corrigi per doctrinam ecclesie. Ergo talis pertinax et hereticus est censendus. | The [1bi] first believers in the errors of heretics should be counted among heretics without further examination. An argument for this is assigned, because anyone who errs against the faith and is not ready to be corrected should be counted among the heretics (24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus). But anyone who believes in the errors of heretics that he knows have been condemned by the Church is not ready to be corrected. Because anyone who errs against the faith must be ready to be corrected by the teaching of the Church, and otherwise he should be considered pertinacious. But anyone who knows that some error has been condemned by the Church, and yet believes in that error, is not ready to be corrected by the teaching of the Church. Therefore such a person should be considered pertinacious and a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Secundum ista quicumque crederet errori contra fidem dampnato a papa Romano esset hereticus reputandus. Et ita, per consequens, nullo modo liceret sententie summi pontificis contraire. | Student: According to this, whoever believed in an error against the faith condemned by the Roman pope would be considered a heretic. And so, consequently, it would in no way be permissible to contradict the sentence of the Supreme Pontiff. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sententie catholice Romani pontificis late contra errorem in fide nulli licet absque heretica pravitate resistere. Sed sententie erronee pape contra fidem debet quilibet catholicus, qui scit sententiam eius esse erroneam, obviare. | Master: The answer made is that no one is permitted, without heretical wickedness, to resist a Catholic sentence of a Roman Pontiff delivered against an error in the faith. But any Catholic must oppose a pope’s erroneous sentence against the faith if he knows that it is erroneous. | |
| Discipulus: Si licet sententie Romani pontificis obviare (et Romanus pontifex semper habebit sequaces) schisma sequetur inter christianos, quod est omnino vitandum. Ergo quilibet tenetur, saltem propter schisma vitandum, acquiescere sententie pape. | Student: If it is permitted to oppose the sentence of the Roman Pontiff, and the Roman Pontiff will always have followers, schism will follow among Christians, which should be avoided altogether. Therefore everyone is bound, at least for the sake of avoiding schism, to acquiesce to the sentence of a pope. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si sententia pape fuerit erronea contra fidem, schisma sequetur tale quale semper fuit inter hereticos et catholicos. Quale schisma catholici, compescendo hereticos, sedare debent si possunt. Si autem non possunt, propter nullum schisma vitandum debent acquiescere sententie false, licet in casu, quando viderent turbationem periculosam oriri absque utilitate fidelium, cessare deberent saltem ad tempus a divulgatione catholice veritatis. | Master: The answer made is
that if the sentence of the pope is erroneous against the
faith, schism will follow, such as always has existed
between heretics and Catholics. Such a schism Catholics
should allay if they can, by restraining the heretics. But
if they cannot, they should never acquiesce in a false
sentence for the sake of avoiding schism, although on
occasion, if they see a dangerous disturbance arising
without benefit to the faithful, they should at least
temporarily cease from spreading Catholic truth. [Note: See Knysh's introduction to ABMA vol.42, pp.16-20.] |
|
| Discipulus: Si non est credendum pape in hiis que fidei sunt, cui credetur? | Student: If the pope should not be believed in things that are matters of faith, who should be believed? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod credetur scripture divine et doctrine quam universalis ecclesia hactenus tenuit, predicavit, et docuit. Scriptura enim divina et doctrina precedentium patrum ab universali ecclesia approbata doctrine pape posterioris est anteponenda, quod in decretis dist. 19 insinuari videtur expresse, ubi sic legitur: “Hoc autem”, scilicet quod decretales epistole sunt paris auctoritatis cum canonibus et per consequens quod est eis adhibenda fides, “intelligendum est de illis sanctionibus vel decretalibus epistolis in quibus nec precedentium patrum decretis nec evangelicis preceptis aliquid contrarium invenitur. Anastasius enim secundus favore Anastasii imperatoris, quos Achatius post sententiam in se prolatam sacerdotes vel levitas ordinaverat, rite fungi acceptis officiis debere decrevit.” | Master: The answer made is that belief should be given to divine Scripture and the doctrine that the universal Church has until now held, preached, and taught. For divine Scripture and the doctrine of the preceding fathers approved by the universal Church should be preferred to the doctrine of a later pope. This seems to be expressly suggested in the decrees, dist. 19, where it reads: “This,” namely that decretal epistles are of equal authority with the canons and consequently that faith should be given to them, “should be understood of those sanctions or decretal epistles in which nothing is found contrary to the decrees of the preceding fathers or to the evangelical precepts. For Anastasius II, with the favor of the emperor Anastasius, decreed that those whom Achatius had ordained priests or levites after the sentence was pronounced against him, should duly perform the duties of the offices they had received.” | |
| De cuius constitutione eadem distinctione § Quia ergo subiungitur: “Quia ergo illicite et non canonice, sed contra decreta predecessorum et successorum suorum hec rescripta dedit, ut probat Felix et Gelasius, qui Achatium ante Anastasium excommunicaverunt et Hormisda, qui ab ipso Anastasio tertius eundem Achatium postea dampnavit, ideo ab ecclesia Romana repudiatur, et a Deo percussus fuisse legitur.” | About his constitution, in the same distinction, § Quia ergo, it is added: “Because therefore he gave these rescripts illicitly and not canonically, but against the decrees of God, his predecessors and successors, as Felix and Gelasius prove (who excommunicated Achatius before Anastasius), and Hormisdas (the third from Anastasius himself) who afterwards condemned Achatius; therefore he was repudiated by the Roman Church, and it is read that he was struck by God.” | |
| Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod si papa constitutionem condiderit in hiis que ad doctrinam fidei spectant doctrine precedentium patrum approbate contrariam, non est sibi credendum. Sed talis eius constitutio est a fidelibus reprobanda, suntque credentes ei scientes doctrinam suam dogmatibus orthodoxorum precedentium patrum esse contrariam inter hereticos computandi, quemadmodum ipse papa, si aliquid tale diffinitive tenet, est hereticorum numero aggregandus. | From these words it is given to be understood that if a pope has established a constitution in things pertaining to the doctrine of the faith that are contrary to the approved doctrine of preceding fathers, he should not be believed, but such a constitution of his should be rejected by the faithful; and those who believe him, knowing that his doctrine is contrary to the teachings of orthodox preceding fathers, must be counted among heretics; just as the pope himself, if he holds diffinitively anything of the kind, should be added to the number of heretics. | |
| Discipulus: Quid si aliqui, scientes talem diffinitionem pape esse determinationi ecclesie obviantem, et tamen credentes in corde determinationem ecclesie esse veram, exterius ore vel timore vel ambitione vel ex aliqua alia causa tenent aut docent diffinitionem pape determinationi ecclesie contrariam? | Student: What if some people, knowing that such a definition of the pope is contrary to the determination of the Church, and yet believing in their hearts that the determination of the Church is true, outwardly by mouth, either out of fear or ambition or for some other reason, hold or teach the pope’s definition contrary to the determination of the Church? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod licet tales apud Deum sint deteriores hereticis eo quod negant agnitam veritatem, et ideo peccant in Spiritum Sanctum, tamen apud Deum non sunt heretici, quia mentaliter contra fidem minime errant. Hoc tamen non obstante, si coram ecclesia probatum fuerit quod ipsi non ignorant determinationem ecclesie et tamen tenent diffinitionem pape contrariam, ecclesia, que de manifestis iudicat non de occultis, debet eos hereticos reputare et tanquam hereticos condempnare, etiam si post assererent quod diffinitionem pape contrariam determinationi ecclesie nunquam corde tenuerunt, quia tali assertioni eorum de occultis cordium fidem tenetur minime adhibere. | Master: The answer made is that although such people are worse than heretics in the sight of God because they deny an acknowledged truth, and therefore sin against the Holy Spirit, yet they are not heretics in the sight of God, because they do not err mentally against the faith. However, despite this, if it is proved before the Church that they are not ignorant of the determination of the Church and yet hold the pope’s contrary definition, the Church, which judges about manifest things, not about hidden things, must consider them heretics and condemn them as heretics, even if they later assert that they never held in their hearts the pope’s definition contrary to the determination of the Church, because it is obliged not to give any credence to such an assertion of theirs about hidden matters of the heart. | |
| Capitulum 2 | Chapter 2 | |
| Discipulus: Quid si determinatio pape est ambigua, habens diversos sensus, quorum unus qui est hereticalis est de intentione pape, quem in aliis scriptis posterioribus vel prioribus explicat manifeste, alius autem sensus talis determinationis seu diffinitionis pape est catholicus. Nunquid credens tali determinationi pape, putans sensum catholicum esse de mente pape est hereticus reputandus, si scit alium sensum esse ab ecclesia condempnatum. | Student: What if the determination of the pope is ambiguous, having different meanings, one of which, which is heretical, is the pope's intention, which he clearly explains in other later or earlier writings, while the other sense of the pope's determination or definition is Catholic. Should a person who believes in such a determination of the pope, thinking that the Catholic sense is in accordance with pope’s intention, be considered a heretic, if he knows that another sense is condemned by the Church? | |
| Magister: Una assertio tenet quod talis est hereticus reputandus, quod tali ratione videtur posse probari. Sicut nichil differt in vitio dicere bonum malum et malum dicere bonum, ita non videtur distare in vitio dicere scripturam catholicam esse hereticam et dicere scripturam hereticam esse catholicam. Quod Isaias propheta c. 5 videtur testari, cum hoc facientibus imprecatur ve dampnationis eterne, dicens: “Ve qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum malum: ponentes tenebras lucem, et lucem tenebras: ponentes amarum in dulce, et dulce in amarum.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod quemadmodum uterque dampnabili crimine irretitur, scilicet et qui dicit malum esse bonum et qui dicit bonum esse malum, ita uterque dampnabilis est, scilicet et qui ponit tenebras (hoc est pravitatem hereticam) esse lucem (id est catholicam veritatem), et qui dicit lucem (id est catholicam veritatem) esse tenebras (id est hereticam pravitatem). Sed qui dicit scripturam catholicam esse hereticam pravitatem, trahendo eam videlicet ad sensum hereticum et “aliter” exponendo “quam sensus Spiritus Sancti efflagitat” est hereticus reputandus (24 q. 3 Heresis). Ergo ille qui scripturam hereticam trahit ad sensum catholicum eam erronee exponendo hereticus est censendus. Et ita qui determinationem pape secundum mentem eius hereticam reputat catholicam, sciens quod ille sensus qui secundum rei veritatem est de mente pape est dampnatum, debet hereticus iudicari, licet nesciat quod ille sit sensus pape heretici. | Master: One assertion holds that such a person should be considered a heretic, which seems provable by an argument as follows. Just as there is no difference in vice in calling good evil and evil good, so there seems to be no difference in vice in calling Catholic Scripture heretical and calling heretical writing Catholic. This the prophet Isaiah, c. 5, seems to testify, when he implores eternal condemnation for those who do this, saying: “Woe to you who call evil good and good evil, putting darkness for light and light for darkness, putting bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter.” From these words it is gathered that just as both are implicated in a damnable crime, namely, both the one who says that evil is good and the one who says that good is evil, so both are blameworthy, namely, both the one who posits darkness (that is, heretical wickedness) as light (that is, Catholic truth), and the one who says that light (that is, Catholic truth) is darkness (that is, heretical wickedness). But whoever says that Catholic Scripture is heretical wickedness, namely, by drawing it to a heretical sense and by expounding it “otherwise than as the sense of the Holy Spirit demands” should be considered a heretic (24 q. 3 Heresis). Therefore, whoever draws heretical writing to a Catholic sense by erroneously expounding it should be considered a heretic. And thus whoever considers the determination of the pope (according to his intention heretical) to be Catholic, knowing that a sense (which is in truth the pope’s meaning) is condemned, must be judged a heretic, although he does not know that that is the heretic pope’s meaning. | |
| Alia assertio tenet quod talis sic exponens determinationem pape hereticam et trahens eam ad sensum catholicum quem putat esse de mente pape non est hereticus iudicandus, quod videtur tali ratione posse probari. Ille qui non errat contra fidem non est hereticus iudicandus, licet erret contra intentionem alicuius heretici vel catholici. Sed qui determinationem pape habentem diversos sensus, unum catholicum et alium hereticum, trahit ad sensum catholicum putans eum esse de mente pape, quamvis non sit, non errat contra fidem sed tantum circa mentem pape, quia tenet quicquid spectat ad fidem. In hoc tamen errat quod putat sensum catholicum esse de mente pape, qui tamen non est. Ergo talis non est hereticus reputandus. | A different assertion holds that a person thus expounding a heretical determination of the pope and drawing it to the Catholic sense which he thinks is the pope’s meaning should not be judged a heretic. This seems provable by the argument following. Someone who does not err against the faith should not be judged a heretic, even if he errs against the intention of some heretic or Catholic. But someone who draws to the Catholic sense a determination of the pope having different senses, one Catholic and the other heretical, thinking it to be in accordance with the pope’s intention, although it is not, does not err against the faith but only about the pope’s intention, because this person holds whatever pertains to the faith. However, in this respect he errs, in thinking the Catholic sense to be in accordance with the pope’s intention, which however it is not. Therefore such a person should not be considered a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Que predictarum assertionum sit verior post consummationem istius operis sollicite indagabo. Nunc autem dic an peccet mortaliter ille qui trahit determinationem pape secundum mentem pape hereticam ad sensum catholicum quem tamen non credit esse de intentione pape, sed credit quod sensus hereticus est de mente pape. | Student: I will diligently investigate which of the aforementioned assertions is truer after the completion of this work. Now, tell me whether a person sins mortally if he draws a determination of the pope that is, as the pope intends it, heretical, to a Catholic sense, which he nevertheless does not believe to be what the pope means, but believes that the pope’s meaning is the heretical sense. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod talis, si non tantummodo recitando sed exterius affirmando trahit determinationem hereticam ad sensum catholicum quem non credit esse de mentis taliter determinantis, peccat mortaliter, quia committit crimen mendacii, sive adulando sive ex timore sive ex ambitione taliter mentiatur. Nec potest a peccato mortali quomodolibet excusari, quia omne tale mendacium est peccatum mortale. Et si ex desiderio complacendi pape heretico mendacium tale procedat, gravius est quam si ex timore solummodo emanaret. Quia in pusillanimi timor aliquo modo diminuit peccatum. In illo autem qui homini placere desiderat, crimen mendacii crimini adulationis aut cupiditatis vel ambitionis adiungitur, et ideo talis gravius et multiplicius peccat. | Master: The answer made is that such a person, if -- not only by "reciting" but also by outwardly affirming -- he draws the heretical determination to a Catholic sense that he does not believe to be the meaning of the person so determining, sins mortally, because he commits the crime of lying, whether by flattery or out of fear or ambition. Nor can he be excused from mortal sin in any way, because every such lie is a mortal sin. And if such a lie proceeds from the desire to please the heretic pope, it is more serious than if it emanated from fear alone, because in the pusillanimous fear in some way diminishes a sin. But in someone who desires to please men, the crime of lying is joined to the crime of flattery or greed or ambition, and therefore such a person sins more seriously and more often. | |
| Capitulum 3 | Chapter 3 | |
| Discipulus: Post interrogationem de trahentibus diffinitionem pape hereticam habentem tamen diversos sensus, unum hereticum et alium catholicum, ad sensum catholicum, peto ut dicas quid sentiendum esset de illis qui diffinitionem pape hereticam in omni sensu quem talis diffinitio potest habere de virtute verborum, traherent ad sensum catholicum, scientes quod quilibet illorum sensuum qui secundum rei veritatem potest elici ex verbis determinationis pape est hereticus. | Student: After the question about those who draw a heretical definition of a pope that nevertheless has different meanings, one heretical and the other Catholic, to the Catholic sense, I ask you to say what should be thought of those who draw a definition of a pope that is heretical in every sense that such a definition can have by virtue of the words, to a Catholic sense, knowing that every sense that can be elicited from the words of the pope’s definition is heretical. | |
| Magister: Est quedam assertio dicens quod tales essent credentes errori pape heretici et etiam heretici reputandi, nisi sollicite quererent veritatem, parati corrigi quam cito veritatem invenirent. Quod enim tales inter credentes hereticorum errori debeant computari videtur sic posse probari. Ille qui credit hereticorum errori qui nullum potest habere sensum catholicum est inter credentes hereticorum errori merito computandus, sicut ille qui pertinaciter defendit hereticorum errorem qui nullum potest habere sensum catholicum est hereticus reputandus (24 q. 3 c. Qui aliorum). Cum ergo per positum tales credant errori qui nullum potest habere sensum catholicum, inter credentes sunt merito computandi. Et per idem patet quod tales, nisi sollicite querant veritatem, parati corrigi cum invenerint, sunt heretici iudicandi. Quia errans contra fidem, nisi querat sollicite veritatem, paratus corrigi cum invenerit, est inter hereticos numerandus (24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus). Ex quo infertur quod qui exponerent et traherent determinationem pape hereticam in omni sensu quem potest habere de virtute verborum ad sensum catholicum, si simul cum hoc persequerentur et molestarent qualitercunque diffinitionem pape hereticam impugnantes, essent inter hereticos computandi, quia non quererent cauta sollicitudine veritatem. | Master: There is a certain assertion that says that such people should be considered believers in the error of a heretic pope and also heretics, if they did not diligently seek the truth, ready to be corrected as soon as they found the truth. That such people should be counted among believers in the error of heretics seems provable as follows. Anyone who believes in an error of heretics that cannot have any Catholic sense is deservedly counted among believers in an error of heretics, just as someone who pertinaciously defends an error of heretics that cannot have any Catholic sense should be considered a heretic (24 q. 3 c. Qui aliorum). Since, therefore, by hypothesis, such people believe in an error that cannot have any Catholic meaning, they are deservedly to be counted among believers. And by the same token it is clear that such people, unless they diligently seek the truth and are ready to be corrected when they find it, must be judged heretics, because anyone who errs against the faith, unless he diligently seeks the truth and is ready to be corrected when he finds it, should be counted among heretics (24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus). From this it is inferred that those who would expound and draw to a Catholic sense a pope’s definition that is heretical in every sense it can have from by virtue of the words, if at the same time they were to persecute and harass in any way those who attack the pope’s heretical definition, should be counted among heretics, because they would not diligently seek the truth. | |
| Alia est assertio que de trahentibus taliter diffinitionem pape hereticam ad sensum catholicum dicit esse distinguendum, quia aut tales sunt periti in arte distinguendi assertiones ambiguas diversos sensus habentes aut in tali arte sunt minime eruditi. Primi excusari non possunt de crimine mendacii, nec etiam de crimine heretice pravitatis, sed sunt censendi sibiipsis contrarii, quemadmodum heretici sepe reperiuntur sibiipsis contrarii, quia, secundum Augustinum, ut habetur 23 q.7 c. Quod autem, heretici “adeo... calumpniandi cupiditate cecantur, ut non attendant, quam sint inter se contraria que loquuntur.” Et ideo cum tales sint periti in arte distinguendi assertiones ambiguas, presumptio est violenta quod tenent assertionem pape hereticam sub aliquo senso quem sonat, et quod simul cum hoc tanquam contrarii sibiipsis tenent catholicam veritatem. Si autem tales non sunt periti in arte distinguendi assertiones ambiguas, non sunt statim heretici iudicandi. Sed si pertinaciter defenderent talem assertionem esse sub tali sensu catholico sustinendam, deberent heretici iudicari. | There is another assertion which says that a distinction should be made among those who in this way draw an heretical definition of a pope to a Catholic sense, because either such people are experts in the art of distinguishing ambiguous assertions having different meanings or they are not at all learned in such an art. The first cannot be excused from the crime of lying, nor also from the crime of heretical depravity, but should be considered contrary to themselves, just as heretics are often found to be contrary to themselves. Because, according to Augustine, as is found in 23 q.7 c. Quod autem, heretics “are so blinded by the desire to slander that they do not attend to how contrary to one another their statements are.” And therefore since such people are experts in the art of distinguishing ambiguous assertions, there is a violent presumption that they hold the pope’s heretical assertion under some sense it seems to have, and at the same time, as being contrary to themselves, they hold the Catholic truth. But if these people are not experts in the art of distinguishing ambiguous assertions, they should not be immediately judged heretics. But if they pertinaciously defend that such an assertion should be sustained under such a Catholic sense, they should be judged heretics. | |
| Discipulus: Quomodo convincetur talis de pertinacia. | Student: How will such a person be convicted of pertinacity? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod de pertinacia convincetur si, postquam fuerit sibi ostensum evidenter quod assertio pape heretici talem sensum habere non potest, adhuc in sua opinione permanserit. Dicitur etiam quod multis aliis modis de pertinacia potest convinci, puta, si de veritate quando convenienter potest renuit informari, si impugnatores heretice pravitatis persequitur vel molestat, si alios minis, preceptis, penis vel alio quovis modo compellit ad suam opinionem pertinaciter defendendam. Et forte aliquibus aliis modis de quibus dictum est supra libro quarto est de pertinacia convincendus. | Master: The answer made is
that he will be convicted of pertinacity if, after it has
been clearly shown to him that the assertion of a heretic
pope cannot have such a meaning, he still persists in his
opinion. It is also said that he can be convicted of
pertinacity in many other ways, for example, if he refuses
to be informed of the truth when he conveniently can be,
if he persecutes or harasses opponents of heretical
wickedness, if he compels others by threats, precepts,
punishments, or in any other way to pertinacioulsy defend
his opinion. And perhaps he should be convicted of
pertinacity in some of the other ways mentioned above in
Book IV. [See 1 Dial. 4.5 onwards.] |
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| Discipulus: Quid si aliquis promittit vel iurat quod tenebit semper talem assertionem hereticam, et intendit tenere sub sensu catholico, quem tamen sensum catholicum de virtute verborum habere non potest. | Student: What if someone promises or swears that he will always hold such a heretical assertion, and intends to hold it under a Catholic sense, which Catholic sense, however, it cannot have by virtue of the words. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod talis est hereticus iudicandus, quia ex quo tenet assertionem hereticam in omni sensu quem de virtute verborum habere potest, et promisit seu iurat quod semper tenebit eadem, non est paratus corrigi, et per consequens hereticus est censendus. | Master: The answer made is that such a person should be judged a heretic, because since he holds an assertion that is heretical in every sense it can have by virtue of the words, and has promised or sworn that he will always hold it, he is not prepared to be corrected, and consequently he should be considered a heretic. | |
| Capitulum 4 | Chapter 4 |
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| Discipulus: Ponatur quod papa diffiniente aliquam assertionem hereticam esse tenendam tanquam catholicam, alius prelatus, puta archiepiscopus, vel episcopus aut alius, sciens diffinitionem pape esse hereticam, ordinet, statuat, precipiat, aut mandet sub gravi pena quod nullus subditorum suorum audeat diffinitionem pape aliqualiter reprobare, sed de ea et etiam de persona pape quilibet subditus suus loquatur omnino reverenter, nomen tamen pape in tali ordinatione, statuto, precepto, vel mandato nullatenus exprimendo. Nunquid talis prelatus est credens errori pape et hereticus reputandus? | Student: Suppose that when
a pope defines that some heretical assertion must be held
as Catholic, another prelate, for example an archbishop,
or bishop or other, knowing that the pope’s definition is
heretical, orders, enacts, instructs or commands under
grave penalty that none of his subjects dare to reject the
pope’s definition in any way, but that each of his
subjects should speak of it, and also of the pope’s
person, with complete reverence -- yet in no way
mentioning the pope’s name in such order, enactment,
instruction, or command. Is such a prelate a believer in
the pope’s error and to be considered a heretic? [Note: See Knysh's notes, ABMA vol.42, pp.35-6.] |
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| Magister: Circa hoc sunt diverse opiniones. Una est quod talis prelatus est credens errori pape et hereticus reputandus. Quod enim inter credentes errori pape debeat computari ex hoc probatur quod statuit diffinitionem pape nullatenus reprobandam, sed quod de ea cum reverentia est loquendum. Error autem est reprobandus et non est cum reverentia de errore loquendum. Ergo talis ordinans, statuens, precipiens sive mandans, credit diffinitionem pape esse tenendam, et per consequens inter credentes errori pape est merito computandus. | Master: There are various opinions about this. One is that such a prelate is a believer in the pope’s error and should be considered a heretic. That he should be counted among believers in the pope's error is proved from this, that he has enacted that the definition of the pope is in no way to be repudiated, but that it should be spoken of with reverence. But error should be repudiated, and error should not be spoken of with reverence. Therefore whoever gives such an order, enactment, instruction, or command, believes that the definition of the pope should be held, and consequently he should deservedly be counted among those who believe in the error of the pope. | |
| Quod vero talis prelatus sit hereticus reputandus tali ratione probatur. Credens errori contra fidem et ad eundem errorem tenendum alios minis, statutis, vel preceptis compellens, est hereticus reputandus, quia talis est pertinax computandus, ut ex hiis que dicta sunt libro quarto videtur posse probari. Talis autem prelatus est credens errori pape et ad eundem errorem tenendum alios compellit statutis et preceptis. Ergo non solum credens errori pape sed etiam hereticus est censendus. | But that such a prelate should be considered a heretic is proved by this argument. Whoever believes in an error contrary to the faith and compels others to hold that error by threats, enactments, or precepts must be considered a heretic, because such a person must be counted as pertinacious, as seems provable from what was said in Book IV. But such a prelate is one who believes in the error of the pope and compels others to hold the same error by enactments and precepts. Therefore he is not only to be considered a believer in the error of the pope, but also a heretic. | |
| Alia est opinio quod si prelatus inferior, puta archiepiscopus vel episcopus aut alius prelatus precise talibus verbis vel equipollentibus utatur: “statuo, mando vel precipio, vel sub pena excommunicationis vel etiam carceris, ut nullus michi subiectus diffinitiones domini summi pontificis audeat reprobare, vel de eis aut persona pape qualitercunque male loqui, sed loquatur cum omnimoda reverentia de eisdem” talis prelatus sine maiori examinatione non est inter credentes errori pape nec inter hereticos computandus. Cuius ratio assignatur. Quia propter verba generalia talia que ita possunt intelligi de diffinitionibus catholici pape sicut de diffinitionibus pape heretici, non est aliquis inter credentes erroribus pape heretici vel inter hereticos computandus. Sed verba predicta ita possunt intelligi de diffinitionibus pape catholici sicut de diffinitionibus pape heretici. Ergo propter talia verba non est aliquis inter credentes vel hereticos computandus. | Another opinion is that if a lower prelate, for example an archbishop or bishop or another prelate, uses precisely these words or equivalents: “I decree, command or order, either under penalty of excommunication or even imprisonment, that no one who is subject to me dare repudiate the definitions of the Lord Supreme Pontiff, or to speak ill of them or of the person of the pope in any way, but to speak with all due reverence about them” -- such a prelate should not be counted among those who believe in the error of the pope or among heretics without further examination. The argument for this is stated: because of such general words, which can be understood of the definitions of a Catholic pope as well as of the definitions of a heretic pope, no one should be counted among those who believe in the errors of a heretic pope or among the heretics. But the aforesaid words can be understood of the definitions of a Catholic pope as well as of the definitions of a heretic pope. Therefore, no one should be counted because of such words among believers or among heretics. | |
| Discipulus: Ista ratio esset apparens si, quando fit tale statutum vel preceptum esset aliquis papa catholicus sicut est papa hereticus. | Student: This argument would be plausible if, when such an enactment or precept is made, there were some Catholic pope, just as there is a heretic pope [i.e. whereas the pope is a heretic]. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod hoc non obstat. Quia, sicut sepe est prudenter futuris casibus occurrendum (dist. 23, c. In nomine), et ad cautelam futurorum est aliquid faciendum (Extra, De electione et electi potestate, c. Licet), ita ex causa aliqua statuuntur et etiam precipiuntur que non in tempore quo statuuntur vel precipiuntur sed in tempore futuro locum valebunt habere. Et ideo talia statuta et precepta non pro tempore quo fiunt sed pro tempore futuro debent intelligi. | Master: The answer made is that this is no objection. Because, just as it is often prudent to anticipate future cases (dist. 23, c. In nomine), and something must be done to guard against future things (Extra, De electione et electi potestate, c. Licet), so for some argument things are enacted and also prescribed that will not have effect at the time in which they are enacted or prescribed, but in a future time. And therefore such enactments and precepts should not be understood for the time in which they are made, but for a future time. | |
| Et ideo, licet aliquis prelatus, quando papa esset hereticus, statueret sub gravi pena quod nullus subditorum suorum diffinitiones pape audeat reprobare, tale statutum quantum est ex forma verborum non deberet intelligi pro tempore quo fit, nec etiam pro tempore quo papa esset hereticus, sed pro tempore quo erit summus pontifex catholicus et catholice de difficultatibus circa fidem diffiniret. Tale enim statutum, quantum est ex forma verborum, taliter debet intelligi qualiter intelligeretur si non solum secundum veritatem sed etiam secundum opinionem omnium fidelium vacaret apostolica sedes, et qualiter intelligeretur si non solum secundum veritatem sed etiam secundum opinionem omnium catholicorum papa qui est hereticus esset omni auctoritate et dignitate privatus. Et ideo, sicut tunc non intelligeretur de diffinitionibus pape heretici, ita nec nunc debet intelligi de diffinitionibus pape heretici, quantumcunque a multitudine christianorum minime crederetur quod vacaret apostolica sedes aut quod papa esset hereticus. | And therefore, even if some prelate, when the pope was a heretic, were to decree under grave penalty that none of his subjects should dare to repudiate the definitions of the pope, such a statute, as far as the form of the words goes, should not be understood for the time in which it is made, nor, also, for a time in which the pope would be a heretic, but for a time in which he will be a Catholic supreme pontiff and will define Catholically about difficulties concerning the faith. For such a statute, as far as the form of words goes, should be understood as it would be if the Apostolic See were vacant, not only according to the truth but also according to the opinion of all the faithful, and as it would be understood if, not only according to the truth but also according to the opinion of all Catholics, a pope who is a heretic were deprived of all authority and dignity. And therefore, just as then it would not be understood of the definitions of a heretic pope, so now it should not be understood about the definitions of a heretic pope, however much the majority of Christians may not believe that the Apostolic See was vacant or that the pope was a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Ex qua causa liceret condere tale statutum tali intentione quod statutum illud non debet intelligi de diffinitionibus pape qui est hereticus, sed de diffinitionibus futuri pape catholici? | Student: For what argument would it be permissible to enact such a statute with the intention that the statute should not be understood of the definitions of a pope who is a heretic, but of the definitions of a future Catholic pope? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod hoc liceret in casu ad deludendam seviciam pape heretici. Si enim aliquis prelatus, sciens diffinitiones pape esse hereticales vel etiam dubitans eas esse hereticales, probabiliter ex certis coniecturis et causis estimaret quod papa eum et sibi subiectos male tractaret nisi tale quod statueret, posset idem prelatus condere talem statutum, non intelligens statutum de illo qui habetur pro papa nec de diffinitionibus suis, sed de futuro papa catholico et diffinitionibus eius orthodoxis. Verbis enim generalibus et figurativis locutionibus atque ambiguis, ac etiam verbis equivocis et multiplicibus, licet deludere seviciam perfidorum. | Master: The answer made is that this would be permissible on occasion to deceive the violence of a heretic pope. For if some prelate, knowing that the pope’s definitions are heretical, or even doubting whether they are heretical, from certain conjectures and arguments would estimate probably that the pope would treat him and his subjects badly unless he established such a statute, that prelate could enact such a statute, not understanding the statute of the one who is [currently] considered pope nor about his definitions, but about a future Catholic pope and his orthodox definitions. For with general and figurative expressions and ambiguous words, and also with equivocal and multiple words, it is permissible to deceive the violence of the wicked. | |
| Discipulus: Licet videatur quod talis prelatus suam intentionem occultando deludens papam etiam hereticum graviter peccat, quia non videtur a vitio simulationis immunis, tamen motiva dicentium quod taliter liceat aliquos deludere non differas indicare. | Student: Although it may seem that such a prelate, by concealing his meaning and deceiving a pope, even a heretic, sins gravely, because he does not seem to be immune from the vice of dissimulation, nevertheless do not hesitate to indicate the arguments of those who say that it is permissible to deceive some people in this way. | |
| Magister: Quod liceat taliter deludere malos ad eorum seviciam declinandam sic videtur posse probari. Cui licet uti insidiis ad hostes seu emulos expugnandos, eidem licet uti verbis generalibus ac equivocis et multiplicibus atque sermonibus figurativis ad malignorum seviciam declinandam. Sed homini iusto et sancto licet uti insidiis ad hostes seu emulos expugnandos (23 q. 2 c. Dominus noster). Ergo homini iusto et sancto licet uti verbis generalibus et equivocis ac multiplicibus et etiam sermonibus figurativis ad malorum seviciam declinandam. | Master: That it is permissible to deceive the wicked in this way in order to avoid their violence seems provable as follows. Whoever is permitted to use ambushes to overcome his enemies or rivals is also permitted to use general and equivocal and multiple words and figurative speech to avoid the violence of the wicked. But a just and holy man is permitted to use ambushes to overcome his enemies or rivals (23 q. 2 c. Dominus noster). Therefore a just and holy man is permitted to use general and equivocal and multiple words and also figurative speech to avoid the violence of the wicked. | |
| Secundo sic. Dolus qui potest esse absque mendacio verbo et facto est licitus contra hostem. Sed delusio que fit verbis generalibus, equivocis, multiplicibus et figurativis est dolus quidam, et potest esse absque mendacio verbo et facto. Ergo huiusmodi delusio hostis est licita. | Second, thus. Deceit that can take place without lying in word and deed is permissible against an enemy. But deception made by general, equivocal, multiple and figurative words is a kind of deceit, and can take place without lying in word and deed. Therefore such deception of the enemy is permissible. | |
| Maior dictis maiorum ostenditur. Ait enim beatus Hieronymus, ut habetur 22 q. 2 c. Utilem: “Utilem simulationem et in tempore assumendam, Iehu regis Israel nos doceat exemplum, qui, cum non potuisset interficere sacerdotes Baal, nisi finxisset se idolum velle colere, dicens ‘congregate michi omnes sacerdotes Baal,’” etc. Et infra: “et David, quando mutavit faciem suam coram Abimelech, et dimisit eum, et abiit. Nec mirum quamvis iustos homines tamen aliqua simulare pro tempore ob suam et aliorum salutem, cum et ipse Dominus noster, non habens peccatum, nec carnem peccati, simulationem peccatricis carnis assumpsit, ut condemnans, in carne peccatum.” Ubi glossa super primum verbum dicit: “argumentum quod dolus contra hostem bonum est.” | The major is shown by the sayings of the elders. For blessed Jerome says, as is found in 22 q. 2 c. Utilem: “Let Jehu, king of Israel, teach us the example of a useful pretense and one to be assumed for a time; when he could not kill the priests of Baal, unless he pretended to be willing to worship the idol, saying ‘Gather to me all the priests of Baal,’” etc. [4/2 Kings 10]. And below: “and David, when he changed his face before Abimelech, and he dismissed him, and he went away [1 Kings/1 Samuel 21:13]. And it is not surprising that even righteous men pretend some things for the sake of their own and others’ safety, since our Lord Himself, having neither sin nor a body of sin, assumed the pretense of sinful flesh, so as to condemn sin in the flesh.” Where the gloss on the first word says: “an argument that deceit is good against an enemy.” | |
| Item, Origenes, ut legitur dist. 43 c. In mandatis, loquens de viro malis moribus involuto se ingerendum ad scrutandum secreta fidei, ait: “si ingesserit se et provocaverit nos dicere que eum minus recte agentem non oporteat audire, prudenter eum debemus eludere.” Ubi dicit glossa: “nota dolum esse bonum contra hostem.” | Likewise, Origen, as we read in the dist. 43 c. In mandatis, speaking of a man wrapped in bad morals who intrudes to investigate the secrets of the faith, says: “if he intrudes himself and challenges us to say things that this person, who acts less rightly, should not hear, we should prudently elude him.” Where the gloss says: “note that deceit is good against an enemy.” | |
| Item, glossa (23 q. 2 c. Dominus noster) ait: “ergo per insidias et per dolum possumus licite vincere hostes nostros... dum tamen fidem non rumpamus hosti.” | Likewise, the gloss (23 q. 2 c. Dominus noster) says: “therefore by ambush and deceit we can permissibly defeat our enemies... as long as we do not break the enemy's trust.” | |
| Ex quibus patet quod dolus, qui potest esse absque peccato verbo et facto, est licitus contra hostem. | From these [texts] it is clear that deceit that can take place without sin in word and deed is permissible against the enemy. | |
| Minor, scilicet quod delusio que fit verbis generalibus etc. est dolus qui potest esse absque mendacio verbo et facto, patet, quia verba in quibus potest veritas reperiri possunt omni carere mendacio. Sed in verbis generalibus, equivocis et multiplicibus, atque ambiguis, ac etiam figurativis, potest veritas reperiri. Aliter vir iustus nunquam eis uti deberet. Ergo talia verba omni possunt carere mendacio. Ergo ad hostis malitiam declinandam licitum est uti talibus, que bonum intellectum possunt habere. | The minor, namely that deception done with general words etc. is a deceit that can take place without lying in word and deed, is clear, because words in which truth can be found can be free from all falsehood. But in general words, equivocal, multiple and ambiguous, and also figurative, truth can be found. Otherwise a just man should never use them. Therefore such words can be free from all lying. Therefore to ward off an enemy's malice it is permissible to use such as can have a good understanding. | |
| Discipulus: Non ex opinionibus singulorum, sed ex communi usu, nomina sunt intelligenda. Ergo si talia verba communiter intellecta habeant malum sensum, sub malo sensu deberent intelligi, et per consequens non licet per talia verba declinare malitiam cuiuscunque. | Student: Names should be understood not from the opinions of individuals, but from common usage. Therefore if such words commonly understood have a bad meaning, they should be understood under the bad meaning, and consequently it is not permissible to ward off someone’s malice by such words. | |
| Item, nulli licet illum decipere cui fidelitas est servanda. Sed hosti cuicunque servanda est fidelitas, sicut et fides sibi promissa est ei servanda. Ergo nulli licet hostem quemcunque per verba generalia, equivoca, multiplicia seu ambigua vel figurativa decipere. | Likewise, no one is permitted to deceive someone to whom faith must be kept. But faith must be kept to any enemy, just as faith promised to someone must be kept with him. Therefore no one is permitted to deceive any enemy by general, equivocal, multiple or ambiguous or figurative words. | |
| Item, verba cuiuscunque intelligenda sunt sicut ea Deus accipit. Deus autem accipit verba alicuius sicut ille intelligit cui dicuntur. Ergo verba intelligenda sunt sicut ille intelligit cui dicuntur. Sed subditi quibus dicerentur verba talis statuti intelligerent ea de papa qui a multitudine christianorum haberetur pro papa. Ergo et sic deberent intelligi. | Likewise, a person’s words should be understood as God takes them. But God takes a person’s words as they are taken by the person to whom they are said. Therefore, words should be understood as they are understood by the person to whom they are said. But the [prelate’s] subjects to whom the words of such a statute would be said would understand them of the pope considered by the multitude of Christians to be pope. Therefore, they should be understood in this way. | |
| Quod autem Deus accipiat verba hominis sicut ille intelligit cui dicuntur, patet. Nam Deus non facit differentiam inter verba iuramenti et simplicis loquele, teste Chrisostomo qui, ut habetur 22 q. 5 c. Iuramenti, ait: “Dominus inter iuramenta et loquelam nostram nullam vult esse distantiam, quia, sicut in iuramento nullam convenit esse perfidiam, ita quoque in verbis nostris nullum debet esse mendacium.” Sed Dominus accipit verba iuramenti sicut ille intelligit cui iuratur, teste Isidoro qui, ut legitur causa et questione predictis c. Quacumque, ait: “Quacumque arte verborum quisque iuret, Deus tamen, qui conscientie testis est, ita hoc accipit, sicut ille, cui iuratur, intelligit.” Ergo etiam Deus sic accipit verba talis statuti sicut illi qui illo astringuntur intelligunt. | But that God understands a person’s words as they are understood by the person to whom they are said is clear. For God makes no difference between the words of an oath and simple speech, as Chrysostom testifies, who (22 q. 5 c. Iuramenti) says: “The Lord does not want there to be any distance between oaths and our speech, because, just as there should be no faithlessness in an oath, so also there should be no lying in our words.” But the Lord takes the words of an oath as it is understood by the person to whom it is made, as Isidore testifies (same Cause and Question, c. Quacumque) who says: “By whatever art of words a person swears, yet God, who is a witness to conscience, takes it as the person to whom he swears understands it.” Therefore, God also takes the words of such a statute as those who are bound by it understand it. | |
| Et confirmatur hec ratio. Quia statutum non debet esse captiosum ut aliter scilicet intelligatur quam illi quibus editur intelligunt (dist. 4 c. Erit). Sed subditi talis prelati, nescientes papam esse hereticum neque scientes diffinitionem eius esse hereticam, intelligerent tale statutum de illo qui habetur pro papa et de diffinitionibus eius. Ergo sic deberet intelligi. | And this argument is confirmed. Because a statute should not be tricky so that it is understood differently than those to whom it is issued understand it (dist. 4 c. Erit). But the subjects of such a prelate, not knowing that the pope is a heretic nor knowing that his definition is heretical, would understand such a statute as referring to the person who is regarded as pope and to his definitions. Therefore, it should be understood in this way. | |
| Et hec sunt que movent animum meum ad tenendum quod sermonibus ambiguis et generalibus nullius est deludenda malitia. Ad que gratia exercitii satagas respondere. | And these are [the considerations] that move my mind to hold that no one's malice should be deceived by ambiguous and general words. For the sake of exercise, try to answer them. | |
| Magister: Sunt nonnulli qui ista frivola putant, quorum tibi responsionem breviter recitabo. Ad primum itaque dicitur quod ambiguitas et similiter generalitas verborum quandoque incidit in iudiciis, quandoque in contractibus, quandoque in legibus constitutis, quandoque in doctrina alicuius scribentis aut docentis, quandoque in simplici assertione seu narratione alicuius. | Master: There are some who think these things frivolous; I will briefly report their answer to you. To the first, therefore, it is said that ambiguity, and likewise generality of words, sometimes occurs in judgments, sometimes in contracts, sometimes in established laws, sometimes in the doctrine of some writer or teacher, sometimes in the simple assertion or narration of someone. | |
| Ubi ergo ambiguitas vel generalitas verborum incidit in iudiciis vel contractibus, non est semper recurrendum ad mentem loquentis, quam scilicet ex virtute verborum potest habere, secundum quod ex verbis glosse Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Ex literis, colligitur evidenter. | Where ambiguity or generality of words occurs in judgments or contracts, one should not always have recourse to the intention of the speaker, i.e. that which can be had by virtue of the words, as is evidently gathered from the words in the gloss Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Ex literis. | |
| Quando vero ambiguitas vel generalitas verborum in statutis et legibus reperitur, si fuerit talis ambiguitas vel generalitas verborum quod sensus qui ex virtute verborum huiusmodi potest haberi neque legi divine, neque legi nature, neque legi humane minime abrogate repugnat, neque potest vergere in nocumentum iniustum alterius (quantumcunque possit vergere in nocumentum iustum alterius), recurrendum est ad intentionem legem statuentis, et sic intelligenda est lex quemadmodum ipse intelligit, et si quis aliter intelligit talis intellectus in dampnum vel periculum aut infamiam statuentis redundare non debet. Quia in talibus legibus in quibus generalitas vel ambiguitas verborum incidit, ubi virtus verborum permittit verum sensum qui neque iuri divino neque iuri naturali neque iuri humano nullatenus abrogato repugnat, neque potest vergere in nocumentum iniustum alterius, cuius est condere eius est interpretari et quem in condendo habeat sensum exprimere. | But when ambiguity or generality of words is found in statutes and laws, if there is such ambiguity or generality of words that the meaning that can be had by virtue of such words is repugnant to divine law, natural law, or unrepealed human law, nor can it tend to the unjust harm of another (however much it may tend to the just harm of another), one should have recourse to the intention of the lawmaker, and the law must be understood in the way he himself understands it, and if anyone understands it differently, such an understanding must not result in damage, danger, or disrepute to the lawmaker. Because in such laws in which generality or ambiguity of the words occurs, where the force of the words permits a true meaning that is repugnant neither to divine law nor natural law nor not-abrogated human law, and it cannot tend to the unjust harm of another, it is for the lawmaker to interpret it and express which meaning he had in making it. | |
| Discipulus: Quid si conditor legis talis est mortuus antequam sensum quem habeat in condendo legem expresserit? | Student: What if the maker of such a law died before he had expressed which meaning he had in making the law? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sicut facta que possunt fieri bene et male in meliorem partem interpretanda sunt, ita peritus in arte distinguendi diversos sensus legum talia verba generalia et ambigua in benigniorem partem interpretari debet, ut scilicet lex condita talis magis valeat et putetur iusta et licita quam illicita vel iniusta. Consimiliter dicitur quod ubi incidit ambiguitas vel generalitas verborum in doctrina alicuius scribentis aut docentis, recurrendum est ad intentionem loquentis ut ipse seipsum exponat. Et si quidem exprimit sensum verum quem permittit virtus verborum, est nullatenus reprobandus nisi convinci posset quod talis sensus verus aliis dictis suis esset contrarius vel impertinens, et quod talibus verbis generalibus vel ambiguis usus fuisset ad aliquem introducendum errorem. Tunc enim putandum esset quod talem sensum verum contra conscientiam exprimeret, vel taceret alium sensum ad aliquod incommodum vel periculum evitandum vel ad aliquod commodum consequendum. De ambiguitate etiam verborum que incidit in simplici loquela vel narratione recurrendum est ad intentionem loquentis, ut stetur interpretationi et intellectui suo, nisi probatur aperte vel violenter aut probabiliter presumatur quod tali modo loquendi generali et ambiguo usus est ad aliquem decipiendum iniuste vel ad aliquem alium malum finem. | Master: The answer made is
that just as deeds that can be done well and badly should
be interpreted in the better part, so one skilled in the
art of distinguishing the different meanings of laws
should interpret such general and ambiguous words in a
more benign way, namely, so that the law that has been
made is valid and is considered just and permissible
rather than impermissible or unjust. Similarly, it is said
that where ambiguity or generality of words occurs in the
doctrine of any writer or teacher, recourse must be had to
the intention of the speaker so that he explains himself.
And if indeed he expresses a true sense which the force of
the words permits, he should in no way be rebuked unless
it could be proved that such true sense was contrary to or
irrelevant to other words of his, and that he had used
such general or ambiguous words to introduce some error.
For then it should be thought that he expressed such a
true sense against his conscience, or that he was silent
about another sense in order to avoid some inconvenience
or danger or to obtain some advantage. Regarding the
ambiguity of words that occurs in simple speech or
narration, we must have recourse to the intention of the
speaker, so that it should stand by his interpretation and
understanding, unless it is clearly proved, or is presumed
probably or violently, that such a general and ambiguous
way of speaking was used to deceive someone unjustly or
for some other bad purpose. [Note: "probable" and "violent" presumption are technical terms, indicating the strength of the presumption.] |
|
| Per hoc respondetur ad primam tuam instantiam. Quia, cum dicis “non ex opinionibus singulorum sed ex communi usu nomina sunt intelligenda”-- dici potest quod hec regula fallit in multis casibus, secundum quod ex glossa predicta Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Ex literis, potest haberi patenter. Et ideo quando quis legem statuit vel etiam loquitur ut iuste et licite hostem suum deludat, non est recurrendum ad communem intelligentiam verborum, sed recurrendum est ad intentionem loquentis sive legem statuentis. Et siquidem exprimit sensum quod permittit virtus verborum, quantumcunque non sit sensus quem homines communiter de talibus verbis concipiunt, sed sensus valde extraneus et inusitatus, ita tamen quod virtus verborum ipsum permittat, standum est conditori statuenti et loquenti, si talis sensus sit solummodo ad salutem loquentis et non vergat in nocumentum vel preiudicium illicitum aut iniquum alterius, quantumcunque esset in nocumentum seu preiudicium aliorum iustum et licitum. | Through this your first objection is answered. When you say “names should be understood not from the opinions of individuals but from common usage”, it can be said that this rule fails in many cases, as can be clearly seen from the aforementioned gloss Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Ex literis. And therefore when someone enacts a law, or even speaks, intending to justly and permissibly deceive his enemy, we must not have recourse to the common understanding of the words, but we must have recourse to the intention of the speaker or the maker of the law. And if he expresses some sense that the force of the words permits -- however much it is not the sense that people commonly conceive from such words but a very strange and unusual sense, yet as long as the force of the words permits it, one must rely on the lawmaker or speaker, if such a sense is only for the safety of the speaker and does not tend to harm or prejudice someone else impermissibly or unjustly, however much it might justly and permissibly be to the harm or prejudice someone else. | |
| Discipulus: Si posset probari quod in verbis ambiguis recurrendum esset ad intentionem loquentis et non ad communem intelligentiam verborum, predicta responsio apparentiam videretur habere. Ideo si ad hoc allegare contingat, ostende. | Student: If it could be proved that in ambiguous words one should have recourse to the intention of the speaker and not to the common understanding of the words, the aforementioned response would seem plausible. Therefore, if it is possible to argue for this, show it. | |
| Magister: Quod recurrendum sit ad intentionem loquentis et non ad communem intelligentiam verborum dicta maiorum sonare videntur. Dicit enim glossa Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Intelligentia: “non statim debemus intelligere, ut verba prima facie sonare videntur, maxime ubi ambigua sunt, sed debemus recurrere ad intentionem loquentis ut hic dicit. Argumentum bonum supra De prebendis c. ultimo et c. Cum causam.” Et infra dicit sic: “argumentum est quod verba ad extraneum sensum sunt trahenda, ubi res aliter salva esse non potest.” Et consimiliter verba sunt trahenda ad sensum extraneum quando aliter veritas verborum vel equitas salvari non potest. Quod intelligendum est quando talis sensus extraneus nulli nocet iniuste et verba ad introducendum errorem minime sunt adducta. Ideo in huiusmodi standum est interpretationi seu expositioni loquentis. | Master: Sayings of the elders seem to suggest that one should have recourse to the intention of the speaker and not to the common understanding of the words. For the gloss on Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Intelligentia, says: “We should not immediately understand the words as they seem to sound at first, especially where they are ambiguous, but we should have recourse to the intention of the speaker, as he says here. A good argument above, De prebendis c. ult. and c. Cum causam.” And below the gloss says: “The argument is that words should be drawn to an extraneous sense, where the matter cannot be saved otherwise.” And similarly words should be drawn to an extraneous sense when otherwise the truth of the words or equity cannot be saved. This should be understood when such an extraneous sense harms no one and the words are not at all brought forward to introduce error. Therefore, in such a case, we must stand by the interpretation or exposition of the speaker. | |
| Item, glossa Extra, De procuratoribus, c. Petitio, ait: “quando verba generalia, sive dubia ponuntur in huiusmodi instrumentis procurationis, recurrendum est ad intentionem constituentis sic etiam de privilegis infra De decimis, c. Ex multiplici.” | Likewise, the gloss Extra, De procuratoribus, c. Petitio, says: “When general or doubtful words are placed in such instruments of procuration, recourse must be had to the intention of the establisher, as also of privileges, below, De decimis, c. Ex multiplici.” | |
| Item, glossa Extra, De prebendis et dignitatibus, c. Cum causam, ait: “nota recurrendum esse ad intentionem mandantis.” | Likewise, the gloss Extra, De prebendis et dignitatibus, c. Cum causam, says: “Note that recourse must be had to the intention of the mandator.” | |
| Discipulus: Scio glossas in multis locis asserere recurrendum esse ad intentionem loquentis, mandantis, et scribentis, sed vellem scire in quibus auctoritatibus se fundare nituntur. | Student: I know that glosses assert in many places that recourse must be had to the intention of the speaker, the mandator, and the writer, but I would like to know on which authorities they try to base themselves. | |
| Magister: Fundant se in diversis auctoritatibus sanctorum que in decretis et decretalibus inseruntur. Prima est Gregorii, que ponitur 22 q. 5, c. Humane, qui ait: “Certe noverit ille, qui intentionem et voluntatem alterius variis explicat verbis, quia non debet aliquis verba considerare, sed voluntatem et intentionem, quia non debet intentio verbis deservire, sed verba intentioni.” | Master: They base themselves on diverse texts of the saints inserted in decrees and decretals. The first is one of Gregory, which is placed in 22 q. 5, c. Humane, who says: “Certainly anyone who explains the intention and will of another in various words should know, that no one should consider the words, but the will and intention, because intention should not serve words, but words intention.” | |
| Secunda est beati Hieronymi qui ut legitur 1 q. 1, c. Marcion, ait: “Nec putemus in verbis scripturarum esse evangelium, sed in sensu; non in superficie, sed in medulla; non in sermonum foliis, sed in radice rationis.” | The second is that of blessed Jerome, who, as we read in 1 q. 1, c. Marcion, says: “Nor should we think that the gospel consists in the words of the Scriptures, but in the sense; not in the surface, but in the marrow; not in the pages of words, but in the root of reason.” | |
| Tertia est beati Clementis, que ponitur dist. 37 c. Relatum, qui ait: “Sunt enim multa verba in divinis scripturis, que possunt trahi ad eum sensum quem sibi unusquisque sponte presumpserit, sed fieri non oportet.” | The third is that of blessed Clement, which is placed in dist. 37 c. Relatum, who says: “For there are many words in the divine Scriptures that can be drawn to the sense each person has spontaneously assumed for himself, but that should not be done.” | |
| Quarta est Hilarii que ponitur Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Intelligentia, qui ait: “Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei sermo est subiectus.” | The fourth is that of Hilary, which is placed in Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Intelligentia, who says: “The understanding of words must be taken from the causes of the speech, because the matter is not subject to the words, but the words are subject to the matter.” | |
| Discipulus: Desine plures auctoritates adducere, quia in tractatu De gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam super materiam hanc revertar, ubi in speciali de pervertentibus scripta et dicta aliorum inquiram. | Student: Stop citing more texts, because in the treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith” [not extant] I will return to this matter, where I will specifically investigate about those who twist writings and sayings. | |
| Magister: Si interrogaveris me de hoc in illo tractatu, narrabo tibi opinionem aliquorum de quibusdam, etiam magistris et prelatis in particulari, quos probare nituntur, imo videtur eis quod demonstrative probant, eos propter tale vitium esse peiores et gravioribus involutos criminibus quam sint fures, latrones, predones, fornicatores, et adulteri, et maiori pena et confusione plectendos. | Master: If you ask me about this in that treatise, I will tell you the opinion of some about certain people, even teachers and prelates in particular, whom they strive to prove, nay, it seems to them that they demonstratively prove, that because of such a vice they are worse and involved in more serious crimes than thieves, robbers, plunderers, fornicators, and adulterers, and that they should be punished with greater punishment and disgrace. | |
| Discipulus: Isti grandia spondent que nunquam valebunt persolvere, et tamen quomodo solvere conabuntur, cum ad illum tractatum venerimus, gratia exercitii, libenter ascultabo. Nunc autem qualiter ad instantias alias supra inductas respondetur, expone. | Student: These people promise great things that they will never be able to perform, and yet how they will try to perform them, when we come to that treatise, for the sake of practice, I will gladly listen. Now, however, explain how the other objections urged above are answered. | |
| Magister: Ad secundam dici potest quod decipere aliquem contingit dupliciter: vel falsum quod nullum sensum potest habere verum dicendo, aut aliquod illicitum committendo (et sic nulli est licitum decipere alium cui fidelitas est servanda), vel veritatem et mentem ac intentionem et consilia occultando, aut aliquid licitum faciendo per quem modum in publicis bellis decipiuntur hostes (quia et eis consilia occultantur, et bellatores ubi hostes non estimant collocantur multisque aliis modis licitis decipiuntur hostes). Et isto modo condens statutum, utens verbis generalibus et ambiguis que ita possunt intelligi ex forma verborum de papa catholico futuro sicut de papa heretico si papa superstes esset hereticus, deludit papam hereticum, non falsum dicendo nec iniquum aliquod statuendo, sed mentem suam et intentionem et sensum quem habet de verbis sui statuti tacendo. Et ideo nullum committit illicitum, sed pro sua salute caute deludit hostis nequitiam. | Master: To the second, it can be said that deceiving someone can happen in two ways: either by saying something false that can have no meaning that is true, or by committing something impermissible (and thus it is not permissible for anyone to deceive another with whom faith must be kept), or by concealing the truth and one's thinking, intention and plans, or by doing something permissible, in the way in which enemies are deceived in public wars (because plans are also concealed from them, and warriors are placed where the enemy does not expect them, and enemies are deceived in many other permissible ways). And in this way, enacting a statute using general and ambiguous words that can be understood from the form of the words in the same way of a future Catholic pope as of a heretic pope, if the present pope were a heretic, he deceives the heretic pope, not by saying something false or enacting something unjust, but by keeping silent about his own mind and intention and the meaning he has of the words of his statute. And therefore he commits nothing impermissible, but for his own safety he cautiously deceives the enemy's wickedness. | |
| Ad tertiam respondetur quod non semper Deus accipit verba sicut ille cui dicuntur intelligit, quemadmodum non semper accipit verba iuramenti sicut cui iuratur intelligit, teste Gratiano qui, 22 q. 5, § Ex hiis, ait: “Ex hiis omnibus colligitur, quod iuramenta secundum intentionem prestantis, non recipientis, a Deo iudicantur.” Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod sicut iurans, ita conditor legis, doctor, et simpliciter loquens aliquando utitur calliditate iniqua ad alium malitiose et iniuste decipiendum. Et in isto casu verba iurantis, legem condentis, scribentis, et loquentis, sic intelligenda sunt sicut et ille, qui simplici intentione et pura recipit verba, intelligit. Et in isto casu loquitur Isidorus cum dicit “quacumque arte verborum”, scilicet iniqua et callida ad iniuste et impie decipiendum alios quis iuret, Deus tamen, qui conscientie, scilicet tam calliditate iniqua iurantis quam simplici intentione recipientis, “testis est, ita hec accipit, sicut ille, cui iuratur, intelligit.” Sic etiam quando quis calliditate iniqua ad decipiendum alios aliquid statuit, docet, vel loquitur, Deus sic accipit verba sicut illi quibus diriguntur intelligunt. | To the third, the answer made is that God does not always take words as the person to whom they are said understands them, just as he does not always take the words of an oath as the person to whom the oath is taken understands them, as Gratian testifies, who, in 22 q. 5, § Ex hiis, says: “From all this it is gathered that oaths are judged by God according to the intention of the one who swears them, not of the one who receives them.” To illustrate this, it is said that it should be known that just as someone who swears, so also a lawmaker, teacher, and someone who simply speaks, sometimes use unfair cunning to maliciously and unjustly deceive another. And in this case the words of the one who swears, the lawmaker, the writer, and the speaker, should be understood as the person who receives the words with a simple and pure intention understands them. And in this case Isidore speaks when he says “By whatever art of words a person swears”, namely, an unjust and cunning one, to deceive others unjustly and impiously, “yet God, who is a witness to conscience”, namely to both the unjust cunning of the swearer and the simple intention of the recipient, “takes it as the person to whom he swears understands it.” So also when someone enacts, teaches, or speaks something by unjust cunning to deceive others, God takes the words as those to whom they are addressed understand them. | |
| Aliquando autem sicut iurans ita conditor legis, docens, scribens, et loquens, utitur calliditate bona non ad alium decipiendum iniuste sed ad salutem suam vel aliorum, absque hoc quod cuicunque iniuste officiat. Et in isto casu intelligenda sunt verba sicut iurans, legem condens, doctor, aut scribens vel loquens intelligit, quando scilicet forma verborum talem sensum permittit, quantumcunque sit extraneus a communi intelligentie verborum eorundem. | Sometimes, however, just as the swearer and the lawmaker, so also the teacher, the writer, and the speaker, uses good cunning not to deceive another unjustly but for his own safety or that of others, without unjustly impeding anyone. And in this case the words should be understood as the swearer, lawmaker, teacher, writer or speaker understands them, namely when the form of the words permits such a sense, however much it may be foreign to the common understanding of those words. | |
| Ad confirmationem, que difficilior esse videtur, potest dici quod quandoque subditi alicuius prelati vel omnes vel multi sunt pestilentes, insidiantes suo prelato vel ad insidiandum et impugnandum eundem proni, dispositi et parati. In quo casu, sicut liceret prelato inferiori papam, si esset hereticus, licita cautela deludere, ita si essent sui subditi pestilentes liceret sibi per tale statutum eosdem deludere. Aliquando autem subditi sunt benevoli, rationabiles, pre oculis divinum timorem habentes, et in hoc casu prelatus tale statutum ambiguum absque declaratione et interpretatione convenienti apud subditos suos nequaquam publicare deberet. Unde si vellet statutum condere ad deludendam malitiam persequentis, sensum rectum deberet suis subditis explicare. | To the confirmation, which seems more difficult, it can be said that sometimes the subjects of a prelate are, either all or many of them, pestilent, plotting against their prelate or are inclined, disposed, and ready to plot and attack him. In this case, just as it would be permissible for an inferior prelate to deceive the pope, if he were a heretic, by permissible caution, so if his [i.e. the inferior prelate’s] subjects were pestilent, it would be permissible for him to deceive them by such a statute. Sometimes, however, the subjects are well-wishing, reasonable, having the fear of God before their eyes, and in this case the prelate should by no means publish among his subjects such an ambiguous statute without a suitable explanation and interpretation. Hence, if he wished to make a statute to deceive the malice of the persecutor, he should explain the correct meaning to his subjects. | |
| Discipulus: Recitasti diversas sententias de statuto inferioris prelati, sub verbis generalibus que de omni papa presente et futuro ac etiam diffinitionibus eorum possunt intelligi, obligantis sibi subiectos ad reverenter loquendum de persona pape, nullum tamen nominando, et de diffinitionibus eius nullatenus reprobandis. Nunc autem dic quid est tenendum de tali statuto si de nullo alio quam de papa heretico possit intelligi, quia nomen pape heretici expresse exprimitur in eodem. | Student: You have recited various opinions about a statute of a lower prelate framed in general terms that can be understood of every pope, present and future, and also of their definitions, obliging his subjects to speak reverently of the person of the pope, yet not naming anyone and in no way repudiating his definitions. Now tell me what should be held about such a statute if it can be understood of no one except a heretic pope, because the name of a heretic pope is expressly expressed in it. | |
| Magister: Ad hoc secundum aliquos respondetur quod talis prelatus credens et hereticus est censendus. Quod autem inter credentes debeat computari videtur tali ratione posse probari. Ille qui expresse asserit, mandat, aut precipit errores alicuius heretici esse tenendos inter credentes eius erroribus est censendus. Sed talis prelatus per tale statutum assereret, preciperet, et mandaret errores pape heretici esse tenendos. Ergo inter credentes computari deberet. Quod etiam esset hereticus reputandus probatur ex hoc quod qui cogit aliquos penis, preceptis, vel statutis ad pertinaciter errores contra fidem tenendos, est inter hereticos computandus. Talis esset prelatus qui conderet statutum de quo est sermo. Ergo esset inter hereticos computandus. | Master: To this, according to some, the answer made is that such a prelate should be considered a believer [in a heresy] and a heretic. That he should be counted among believers seems to provable by the following argument. Whoever expressly asserts, commands, or instructs that the errors of some heretic should be held should be counted among those who believe in his errors. But such a prelate by such a statute would assert, instruct and command that the errors of the heretic pope should be held. Therefore he should be counted among believers. That he should also be considered a heretic is proved from the fact that someone who compels others by means of penalties, precepts, or statutes to pertinaciously hold errors against the faith should be counted among heretics. Such would be a prelate who enacted the statute of which we are speaking. Therefore he would be to be counted among heretics. | |
| Capitulum 5 | Chapter 5 | |
| Discipulus: Dic de prelato inferiori qui, sciens diffinitiones pape esse hereticas, ipsas de mandato eiusdem pape heretici tanquam tenendas solummodo divulgaret inter sibi subiectos. | Student: Tell me about an inferior prelate who, knowing that the pope’s definitions are heretical, by mandate of the same heretic pope only publishes them [i.e. without endorsing them himself] among his subjects as being to be held. | |
| Magister: Diversimode respondetur. Dicitur enim uno modo quod quantumcunque talis coram Deo non esset hereticus nec credens erroribus pape heretici, tamen apud fideles, qui de occultis iudicare non possunt, esset credens erroribus pape heretici [et hereticus added We] iudicandus. | Master: Different answers are given. For it is said in one way that, however much such a prelate may not be a heretic before God or a believer in the errors of a heretic pope, yet among the faithful, who cannot judge about hidden things, he would have to be judged a believer in the errors of the heretic pope. | |
| Quod enim esset credens censendus ex hoc probatur quia qui divulgat aliquem errorem tanquam tenendum asserit verbo vel facto talem errorem esse tenendum. Qui autem asserit aliquem errorem esse tenendum debet reputari credens tali errori. Ergo qui divulgat errorem tanquam tenendum inter credentes merito computatur. | That he should be considered a believer is proved from this. Anyone who publishes an error as something that should be held asserts by word or deed that that error should be held. But anyone who asserts that some error should be held must be considered a believer in that error. Therefore anyone who spreads an error as something that should be held is deservedly counted among believers. | |
| Quod vero talis hereticus sit censendus ostenditur. Quia qui verbo vel facto cogit alios ad pertinaciter errores tenendos quibus credit est hereticus reputandus. Talis autem prelatus quantum in se est cogit alios ad pertinaciter tenendos errores contentos in diffinitionibus pape heretici, quibus ostendit se credere. Ergo hereticus est censendus. | That such a person should be considered a heretic is shown, because anyone who, by word or deed, forces others to pertinaciously hold the errors he believes should be considered a heretic. But such a prelate, as far as he is able, forces others to hold pertinaciously the errors contained in the definitions of a heretic pope, which he shows himself to believe. Therefore he should be considered a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Talis prelatus nullum cogeret ad tenendum errores pape, quia si solum divulgat illos errores non cogit alios ad tenendos eosdem. | Student: Such a prelate would not force anyone to hold the errors of the pope, because if he only publishes those errors he does not compel others to hold them. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod qui solummodo divulgat errores et non divulgaret preceptum quo sub pena preciperet tales errores esse tenendos, nullum cogeret ad tenendum eosdem errores. Sed qui divulgat preceptum quo mandatur sub gravi pena quod certi teneantur errores, quodammodo cogit audientes tenere errores. Hoc autem faceret qui tales diffinitiones pape heretici divulgaret, quia in eisdem diffinitionibus preciperetur sub pena gravi quod tenerentur errores ibi contenti. Ergo talis divulgans cogeret alios ad pertinaciter tenendos errores, et per consequens esset hereticus reputandus. | Master: The answer made is that whoever merely disseminates errors and does not disseminate a precept by which he commands under penalty that such errors should be held, would not compel anyone to hold those errors. But whoever disseminates a precept by which it is commanded under grave penalty that errors be held as certain, in a way compels his hearers to hold errors. But anyone who disseminates such definitions of a heretic pope would do this, because in those definitions it would be commanded under grave penalty that the errors contained therein should be held. Therefore such a disseminator would be compelling others to pertinaciously hold errors, and consequently should be considered a heretic. | |
| Aliter dicitur quod talis prelatus divulgans diffinitiones pape quas scit esse hereticas mortalissime peccat et est inter credentes apud catholicos reputandus, sed non est inter hereticos computandus. Quod enim mortalissime peccet probatur. Nam qui scienter alios inducit quantum in se est ad negandum catholicam fidem mortalissime peccat. Sed qui divulgat diffinitiones pape quas scit esse hereticas, quantum in se est scienter inducit alios ad negandum catholicam veritatem, quia, quantum est ex forma divulgationis, per divulgationem huiusmodi audientes ad tenendas diffinitiones pape heretici inducuntur. Ergo talis divulgans mortalissime peccat. | Otherwise, it is said that a prelate who disseminates definitions of the pope which he knows to be heretical sins most mortally and should be considered among Catholics to be among the believers [of heresy], but should not be counted among heretics. That he sins most mortally is proved. For someone who knowingly induces others, so far as he can, to deny the Catholic faith sins most mortally. But anyone who disseminates definitions of a pope that he knows to be heretical knowingly induces others, so far as he can, to deny Catholic truth, because, as far as the form of the dissemination is concerned, through such dissemination hearers are induced to hold the definitions of the heretic pope. Therefore such a disseminator sins most mortally. | |
| Item, secundum Apostolum ad Romanos 1o, non solum peccant qui mala faciunt, “sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus.” Sed talis divulgans diffinitiones pape heretici consentit pape heretico inducenti catholicos ad tenendos errores. Ergo talis divulgans gravissime peccat. | Likewise, according to the Apostle to the Romans 1[:32], not only do those sin who do bad things, “but also those who consent to those who do bad things.” But anyone who spreads the definitions of a heretic pope agrees with the heretic pope who is leading Catholics to hold errors. Therefore such a disseminator sins most gravely. | |
| Quod vero talis divulgans debeat a catholicis inter credentes erroribus pape heretici computari licet in rei veritate non sit credens, patet, quia licet corde non credat, tamen diffinitiones pape heretici exterius confitetur. Catholici autem non de corde sed de exteriore confessioni iudicare debent. Ergo talis inter credentes est a catholicis numerandus. | That someone who disseminates should be counted by Catholics as being among those who believe the errors of the heretic pope, although in reality he is not a believer, is clear, because although he does not believe in his heart, he nevertheless outwardly confesses the definitions of the heretic pope. But Catholics should judge not from the heart but from the outward confession. Therefore such a person must be counted by Catholics as being among those who believe. | |
| Quod autem non sit hereticus iudicandus probatur per hoc quod talis, qui solummodo diffinitiones pape hereticales divulgat, licet possit probari errans, non tamen de pertinacia et quod non sit corrigi paratus potest convinci. Ergo non est iudicandus hereticus. | But that he should not be judged a heretic is proved by the fact that such a person who merely spreads the definitions of the heretic pope, although he can be proved to be in error, cannot be convicted of pertinacity and of not being ready to be corrected. Therefore he should not be judged a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Adverto quod ad sciendum an talis divulgans diffinitiones pape hereticales sit pertinax et hereticus iudicandus oportet ad illa que tractavimus superius libro quarto recurrere, que hic non reputo replicanda. Sed cupio scire an idem sentiendum sit de prelato divulgante diffinitiones pape hereticas quas scit esse hereticas, et de alio divulgante diffinitiones easdem quas nescit esse hereticas. | Student: I note that to know whether someone who spreads heretical definitions of a pope is pertinacious and should be judged a heretic it is necessary to have recourse to what we discussed above in the Book IV, which I do not think needs to be repeated here. But I desire to know whether the same opinion should be held of a prelate who spreads heretical definitions of the pope that he knows to be heretical, and of another who spreads the same definitions but does not know them to be heretical. | |
| Magister: Quantum ad ecclesiam idem tenendum est de uno et de alio, quia inter unum et alium in actibus exterioribus nulla apparet distantia. Sed apud Deum magna est inter eos distantia, sicut coram Deo magna differentia reperitur inter corde credentem errori et confitentem eundem et non credentem corde, tamen exterius confitentem. | Master: As for the Church, the same must be held of one and of the other, because between one and the other in external acts there appears no distance. But with God there is a great distance between them, just as before God there is a great difference between one who believes in error in his heart and confesses it and one who does not believe in his heart, yet confesses it outwardly. | |
| Capitulum 6 | Chapter 6 | |
| Discipulus: Parum disgrediendo a proposito principali, te interrogare studebo de comparatione credentis corde errori dampnato explicite pape heretici vel aliorum hereticorum, quem scit esse dampnatum, ad corde non credentem tali errori quem scit esse dampnatum explicite, tamen, timore vel ambitione aut ex alia causa tractus, talem errorem occulte vel publice confitentem, docentem, predicantem vel laudantem tanquam catholicum et consonum veritati. Primo autem quero quis eorum gravius peccat coram Deo. | Student: Digressing a little from the main subject, I will endeavor to ask you about the comparison of someone who believes in his heart the error explicitly condemned by the heretic pope or other heretics (which he knows to be condemned), to someone who does not believe in his heart in such an error (which he [also] knows to be condemned explicitly), yet, drawn by fear or ambition or for some other reason, secretly or publicly confesses, teaches, preaches or praises such an error as Catholic and consonant with the truth. First I ask which of them sins more grievously before God. | |
| Magister: Circa hoc sunt diversi modi dicendi. Unus est quod gravius peccat ille qui corde credit errori tali dampnato pape heretici vel alterius heretici, quam ille qui non credit corde et tamen exterius confitetur. Cuius ratio assignatur talis. Peccatum infidelitatis est gravissimum peccatorum, quod Augustinus sentire videtur, qui, super illud Iohannis 15 “si non venissem, et locutus fuissem eis, peccatum non haberent”, ait: “magnum quoddam peccatum... sub generali nomine vult intelligi. Hoc est enim peccatum” infidelitatis “quo tenentur cuncta peccata.” Sed qui credit corde errori quem scit esse dampnatum, peccat peccato infidelitatis. Ergo gravius peccat quam ille qui non credit corde et tamen solummodo talem errorem exterius confitetur, predicat, docet, vel laudat. | Master: There are different ways of talking about this. [1] One is that whoever in his heart believes in such a condemned error of a heretic pope or of another heretic sins more seriously than someone who does not believe in his heart and yet confesses outwardly. The argument for this is given as follows. The sin of unbelief is the gravest of sins, as Augustine seems to think, who, on the words of John 15, “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have had sin,” says: “Under the general name [sin] he wishes to be understood a certain great sin. For this is the sin” of unbelief “under which all other sins are included.” But if anyone in his heart believes in an error that he knows to be condemned, he sins with the sin of unbelief. Therefore he sins more seriously than someone who does not believe in his heart and yet only confesses, preaches, teaches, or praises such an error outwardly. | |
| Secundo sic. Gravius peccatum pena graviori punitur, secundum illud Deuteronomi 25: “pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus.” Sed qui timore mortis inter sarracenos vel alios infideles constitutus negaret Christum et Machometum laudaret et veneraretur minus puniretur quam si corde hoc faceret. Primus autem non esset excommunicatus nec omni gradu ecclesiastico privaretur, quemadmodum beatus Marcellinus papa, licet negasset Christum et sacrificasset idolis timore mortis, non fuit excommunicatus nec papatu privatus. Qui autem corde negaret Christum esset hereticus, et per consequens excommunicatus et omni gradu et ecclesiastica dignitate privatus. Ergo qui corde credit errori dampnato gravius peccat quam qui corde non credit et exterius tantum confitetur et tenet. | Second, thus. A graver sin is punished with a graver penalty, according to Deuteronomy 25: “According to the measure of the sin shall be the measure of the lashes.” But if someone living among Saracens or other unbelievers denied Christ and praised and venerated Mohammed, he would be punished less than if he did this in his heart: the former would not have been excommunicated nor deprived of any ecclesiastical rank, just as blessed pope Marcellinus, although he had denied Christ and sacrificed to idols under fear of death, was not excommunicated or deprived of the papacy. But whoever denied Christ in his heart would be a heretic, and consequently would be excommunicated and deprived of any rank and ecclesiastical dignity. Therefore, anyone who believes in a condemned error in his heart sins more gravely than someone who does not believe in his heart and only confesses and holds it outwardly. | |
| Alius modus dicendi circa propositam interrogationem est quod ille peccat gravius qui non credit corde tali errori et tamen talem errorem exterius confitetur, docet, predicat, aut laudat, et maxime si promittit aut iurat quod talem assertionem quam putat in corde erroneam in perpetuum tenere proponit. Cuius ratio assignatur, quia scienter peccans gravius peccat quam peccans ignoranter. Unde Augustinus dicit, ut habetur 6 q. 1 c. Quero, regulam esse quare “peccata scientium peccatis ignorantium preponuntur.” Sed qui corde non credit errori, et tamen exterius confitetur, scienter peccat. Alius autem peccat ignoranter, credens verum esse quod tenet. Ergo gravius peccat qui non credit corde et tamen exterius tenet talem errorem quam ille qui credit corde eandem errorem. | Another way of talking about the proposed question is [2] that a person sins more gravely if he does not believe the error in his heart and yet confesses, teaches, preaches, or praises it outwardly, and especially if he promises or swears that he intends to hold forever this assertion that he thinks in his heart to be erroneous. The argument for this is as follows. Someone who sins knowingly sins more gravely than someone who sins ignorantly. Hence Augustine says, as is found in 6 q. 1 c. Quero, that there is a rule why “the sins of the knowing rank above the sins of the ignorant.” But if someone who does not believe the error in his heart yet confesses it outwardly, he sins knowingly. But the other person sins ignorantly, believing that what he holds is true. Therefore, someone who does not believe in his heart and yet outwardly holds such an error sins more gravely than someone who believes in his heart the same error. | |
| Secundo sic. Gravius peccat qui mentitur quam ille qui solummodo dicit falsum credens esse verum illud quod dicit, secundum quod ex verbis beati Augustini in Encheridion que ponuntur 22 q. 2 c. Is autem colligitur evidenter. Nam qui mentitur vult fallere. Qui autem dicit falsum quod putat esse verum non vult fallere. Gravius autem est velle fallere quam non velle fallere. Ergo mentiens gravius peccat quam proferens falsum quod putat esse verum. Ille autem qui non credit erroribus hereticorum, sive pape sive aliorum, et tamen exterius tenet tales errores, mentitur, quia contra illud quod in animo sentit loquitur voluntate fallendi. Ille autem qui credit tali errori confitendo eum exterius non mentitur, quia contra illud quod in animo sentit non loquitur. Ergo gravius peccat qui corde non credit hereticorum erroribus et tamen tenet exterius quam ille qui corde credit eisdem erroribus. | Second, thus. Someone who lies sins more gravely than one who merely speaks a falsehood believing that what he says is true, as is evidently gathered from the words of blessed Augustine in the Encheridion set forth in 22 q. 2 c. Is autem. For someone who lies intends to deceive. But someone who speaks a falsehood that he thinks is true does not intend to deceive. It is worse to wish to deceive than not to wish to deceive. Therefore, someone who lies sins more gravely than someone who utters a falsehood he thinks is true. But a person who does not believe in the errors of heretics, whether of the pope or of others, and yet holds such errors outwardly, lies, because he speaks contrary to what he believes in his mind with a will to deceive. But someone who believes in such an error by confessing it does not lie outwardly, because he does not speak contrary to what he believes in his mind. Therefore, someone who does not believe in the errors of heretics in his heart and yet holds them outwardly sins more gravely than someone who believes those errors in his heart. | |
| Discipulus: Rationes pro utroque modo ponendi predicto apparentes michi videntur, et ideo dic quomodo ad utrasque potest responderi. | Student: The arguments for both of the aforementioned ways of putting things seem persuasive to me, and therefore tell me how each can be answered. | |
| Magister: Ad primam pro primo modo dicendi dicerent forte alii quod infidelitas non est gravissimum peccatorum, nam odium Dei videtur multo gravius. Ad Augustinum autem respondetur quod ipse non dicit infidelitatem esse gravissimum peccatorum, sed dicit esse magnum peccatum quo tenentur cuncta peccata causaliter vel dispositive aut occasionaliter. Sepe autem peccatum minus est causa, dispositio vel occasio gravioris. | Master: To the first in favor of the first way of speaking, others might say that unbelief is not the gravest of sins, for hatred of God seems much graver. To Augustine it is answered that he does not say that unbelief is the gravest of sins, but that it is a great sin by which all sins are causally or dispositively or occasionally held. Often a lesser sin is the cause, disposition or occasion of a graver sin. | |
| Ad secundam potest dici quod multum refert ex qua causa vel occasione quis negat Christum. Si enim timore mortis negaret quis Christum, minus peccaret quam negans absque tali timore, quia talis negatio parum haberet de voluntario et ideo diminueretur peccatum, et esset minus peccato infidelitatis seu heresis et minus puniri deberet. Et ideo beatus Marcellinus negando Christum et sacrificando idolis timore mortis nec fuit excommunicatus nec dignitate papali privatus. Sed non ita diminuitur voluntarium peccatum quando quis negat Christum timore perditionis honoris vel rerum, aut status, aut cupiditate commodi temporalis vel honoris adipiscendi. Et ideo qui negat Christum in tali casu vel etiam scienter tenet errorem dampnatum, et sententiam excommunicationis incurrit et omni dignitate ecclesiastica et auctoritate privatur. Nec talis minus peccat quam qui credit mente errori dampnato. Imo magis peccaret, licet qui timore mortis ore non corde diceret se credere tali errori dampnato minus peccaret quam mente credens. | To the second it can be said that it matters a lot for what argument or occasion someone denies Christ. For if someone were to deny Christ out of fear of death, he would sin less than someone who denies without such fear, because such denial [out of fear of death] would have little of a voluntary nature and therefore the sin would be diminished, and it would be less than a sin of unbelief or heresy and would be less deserving of punishment. And therefore in denying Christ and sacrificing to idols for fear of death blessed Marcellinus was neither excommunicated nor deprived of papal dignity. But sin is not thus less voluntary diminished when someone denies Christ out of fear of loss of honor or possessions, or status, or out of desire for temporal gain or honor. And therefore someone who denies Christ in such a case, or, also, knowingly, holds a condemned error, both incurs the sentence of excommunication and is deprived of all ecclesiastical dignity and authority. Nor does such a person sin less than someone who believes in a condemned error with his mind. Indeed, he would sin more -- although someone who, out of fear of death, said with his mouth, not with his heart, that he believed in such a condemned error would sin less than one who believed in his mind. | |
| Discipulus: Dic quomodo potest ad rationes in oppositum responderi. | Student: Tell me how one can respond to the opposite arguments. | |
| Magister: Ad primam illarum dicitur quod illa regula fallit. Interdum peccata scientium peccatis ignorantium preponuntur. Crucifixores enim Christi, licet se prestare obsequium Deo crediderint, gravius tamen peccaverunt quam fures vel latrones vel ebriosi scienter, quia, ut videtur innuere Augustinus hoc “facit in heresi ipsius sceleris magnitudo, quod facit in avaritia scientis admissio.” | Master: To the first of these
it is said that the rule fails. Sometimes the sins of the
knowing rank above the sins of the ignorant. For though
the crucifiers of Christ believed they were rendering
service to God, yet they sinned more grievously than those
who are knowingly thieves or robbers or drunkards,
because, as Augustine seems to suggest,
“in heresy, the greatness of the crime itself does what
knowing commision does in avarice.” |
|
| Ad secundam potest dici quod licet quantum ad crimen mendacii exterioris gravius peccet qui mentitur quam qui loquitur falsum quod putat esse verum, tamen quantum ad aliquem modum peccandi interius potest gravius peccare ille qui loquitur falsum quod putat esse verum quam ille qui mentitur. Unde qui dicit se credere erroribus alicuius heretici prepotentis, ut talis heretici gratiam consequatur vel indignationem evitet, et tamen mente non credit eisdem erroribus, gravius peccat quantum ad crimen mendacii quam ille qui credit et dicit se credere eisdem erroribus. Quantum tamen ad credulitatem interiorem minus peccat quam alius, quia primus non habet credulitatem mentalem erroneam, secundus autem habet credulitatem mentalem dampnabilem et ita quantum ad hoc minus peccat. | To the second it can be said that although as regards the crime of outwardly lying, someone who lies sins more gravely than someone who speaks a falsehood he thinks is true, yet as regards some manner of sinning interiorly, a person who speaks a falsehood he thinks is true can sin more gravely than someone who lies. Hence, someone who says he believes the errors of some powerful heretic to gain the heretic’s favor or avoid his indignation, and yet does not believe those errors in his mind, sins more gravely as regards the crime of lying than someone who believes, and says that he believes, those same errors. However, as regards internal belief, he [the former] sins less than the other, because the first does not have an erroneous mental belief, while the second has a condemnable mental belief, and so in this respect he [the former] sins less. | |
| Discipulus: Hic restaret eadem questio que prius, utrum scilicet crimen mendacii in mentiente huiusmodi sit gravius quam error mentalis in illo qui loquitur falsum quod putat esse verum. Quam tamen questionem ad presens noli tractare, quia eam ad aliud tempus censeo differendam. Nunc autem dicas qua pena feriendus est uterque predictorum, scilicet et ille qui mentiendo dicit se assertionibus alicuius heretici adherere, et ille qui mente huiusmodi credit erroribus. | Student: Here the same question would remain as before, namely whether the crime of lying in a liar of this kind is more grave than the mental error in one who speaks a falsehood he thinks is true. However, do not treat this question at present, because I think it should be postponed to another time. Now, however, tell me by what penalty should each of the aforementioned be struck, namely, both the one who falsely says he adheres to the assertions of some heretic, and the one who mentally believes such errors. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod uterque puniendus est pena hereticorum, quia unus est hereticus apud Deum et apud ecclesiam, alius autem, licet non sit hereticus coram Deo, est tamen apud catholicos hereticus reputandus, et ideo sicut hereticus condempnandus. | Master: The answer made is that both should be punished with the punishment of heretics, because one is a heretic before God and the Church, and the other, though not a heretic before God, should nevertheless be considered a heretic among Catholics and should therefore be condemned as a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Nunquid sunt equaliter puniendi, vel unus est gravius quam alius feriendus? | Student: Should they be punished equally, or is one to be struck more severely than the other? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si ille qui non credit erroribus alicuius heretici et tamen, ut eius gratiam assequatur vel indignationem evitet, dicit se tenere assertiones easdem, postea recognoscit, volens se forsitan excusare quod non credit eisdem erroribus, gravius est plectendus quam ille qui credidit et fatetur se eisdem erroribus credidisse, si uterque redit ad fidei veritatem. Cuius ratio assignatur. Quia qui fatetur se non credidisse erroribus quibus se prius dixerat adherere puniendus est tam pro peccato in fide quam pro peccato in moribus. Est quidem puniendus pro peccato in fide quia prius exterius tenuit pertinaciter hereticam pravitatem, et ideo catholici qui de manifestis non de occultis iudicare debent, ipsum punient pro heretica pravitate. Est etiam puniendus pro crimine in moribus, quia pro crimine mendacii. Aut enim nunc crimine mendacii irretitur, asserens se non tenuisse mente quod corde credebat, aut prius mentiebatur aperte de seipso, dicens se tenere quod nequaquam corde credebat. Et ideo non solum tanquam hereticus, sed tanquam falsus et mendax, bilinguis et duplex, est gravius puniendus, putandusque est quod omni dolositate, proditione, falsitate, periurio, et fallacia sit, saltem secundum preparationem cordis, nequius involutus. Quare nunquam in quocunque negotio est sibi credendum, sed pro infami et ignominioso in perpetuum est habendus. | Master: The answer made is that, if both persons return to the truth of the faith, if the one who does not believe in the errors of a heretic and yet, to gain his favor or avoid his indignation, says that he holds those assertions, later acknowledges [this] (perhaps wishing to excuse himself that he did not believe those errors), he should be punished more severely than the one who believed those errors and confesses that he believed them. An argument for this is stated. Someone who confesses that he did not believe in the errors to which he had previously said he adhered to should be punished both for a sin in faith and for a sin in morals. He is indeed to be punished for a sin in faith because he previously pertinaciously held heretical depravity outwardly, and therefore Catholics, who must judge of manifest things not of hidden things, will punish him for heretical depravity. He is also to be punished for a moral crime, because for the crime of lying: for either he is now caught in the crime of lying, asserting that he did not hold in his mind what he did believe in his heart, or he previously lied openly about himself, saying that he held what he did not believe in his heart at all. And therefore, not only as a heretic, but as false and a liar, double-tongued and duplicitous, he should be punished more severely, and it must be thought that he is, at least according to the preparation of his heart, more wickedly involved in every deceit, treachery, falsehood, perjury and misleading behaviour. Therefore, he is never to be trusted in any business whatsoever, but should be held forever as infamous and disgraced. | |
| Capitulum 7 | Chapter 7 | |
| Discipulus: Audivi diversas sententias de credentibus hereticorum erroribus quos sciunt ab ecclesia condempnatos. Nunc autem discutias de credentibus qui nec sciunt errores hereticorum quibus credunt esse dampnatos, nec pertinaciter adherent eisdem, an scilicet tales heretici sint censendi, cum Gregorius 9 us ubi prius de credentibus hereticorum erroribus non distinguit. | Student: I have heard various opinions about those who believe the errors of heretics that they know have been condemned by the Church. Now, however, please discuss believers who neither know that the errors of heretics they believe have been condemned, nor pertinaciously adhere to them: whether such people should be considered heretics, since Gregory IX (as quoted above) does not distinguish among those who believe the errors of heretics. | |
| Magister: Si loquaris de erroribus qui obviant veritatibus catholicis quas credens non tenetur explicite credere, sed solum implicite, dicunt quidam quod credentes huiusmodi erroribus non sunt heretici reputandi. Tales enim credentes videntur esse illi de quibus loquitur Augustinus, ut habetur 24 q. 3 c. Hereticus, dicens: “ille autem, qui huiusmodi hominibus credit, est imaginatione quadam veritatis illusus.” Et ideo deceptus, non hereticus, videtur esse putandus. | Master: If you speak of errors that oppose Catholic truths that the believer is not bound to believe explicitly, but only implicitly, some say that those who believe in such errors should not be considered heretics. For such believers seem to be those of whom Augustine speaks, as is found in 24 q. 3 c. Hereticus, saying: “But someone who believes such men is deluded by a certain imagination of the truth.” And therefore it seems he should be considered deceived, not a heretic. | |
| Si autem loquaris de erroribus qui opponuntur catholicis veritatibus quas quis tenetur explicite credere, videtur quibusdam quod tales credentes quamvis non pertinaciter adhereant sunt heretici reputandi, aliis dicentibus quod nullus potest credere errori contrario veritati catholice quam quis tenetur explicite credere, nisi pertinaciter eidem errori adhereat, quia eo ipso quod quis credit errori contrario veritati catholice quam tenetur explicite credere non est paratus corrigi, et per consequens pertinax est censendus. | But if you speak of errors that are opposed to Catholic truths that someone is bound to believe explicitly, to some it seems that such believers, even though they do not adhere to these errors pertinaciously, should be considered heretics, while others say that no one can believe an error contrary to a Catholic truth that one is bound to believe explicitly unless he adheres to that error pertinaciously, because by the very fact that one believes an error contrary to a Catholic truth one is bound to believe explicitly, one is not prepared to be corrected and consequently should be considered pertinacious. | |
| Discipulus: Suntne omnes credentes eisdem erroribus reputandi heretici vel omnes pro hereticis nequaquam habendi? | Student: Should all who believe in those errors be considered heretics, or should all not be considered heretics at all? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non, quia aliqui credentes erroribus aliquibus sunt heretici reputandi, et aliqui credentes eisdem erroribus non sunt heretici reputandi, et hoc potest contingere dupliciter. Primo quia aliqui tenentur credere explicite veritates contrarias illis erroribus, et alii non tenentur explicite credere veritates illas. Secundo potest hoc contingere quia aliqui pertinaciter adherent, aliqui non pertinaciter adherent. | Master: The answer made is no, because some who believe in certain errors should be considered heretics, and some who believe in the same errors should not be considered heretics. This can happen in two ways. First, because some are bound to believe explicitly the truths contrary to those errors, and others are not bound to believe those truths explicitly. Second, it can happen because some adhere pertinaciously, some do not adhere pertinaciously. | |
| Discipulus: Quia, ut estimo, ad sciendum quis credens hereticorum erroribus est censendus hereticus et quis non est censendus hereticus oportet scire quis credens est pertinax et quis credens non est pertinax, eo quod pertinaciter credens est hereticus, ille autem qui non est pertinaciter credens non est hereticus reputandus (quis autem sit pertinax et quomodo de pertinacia debeat quis convinci tractatum est superius libro quarto), ideo circa hanc materiam hic nolo insistere. Propter quod dic breviter quomodo debet intelligi auctoritas Gregorii 9i c. 1o huius septimi allegata. | Student: Because, as I believe, to know which believer in the errors of heretics should be considered a heretic and which not it is necessary to know who is a pertinacious believer and who is not, because a pertinacious believer is a heretic but one who is not pertinacious should not be considered a heretic (who is pertinacious and how someone should be convinced of pertinacity was discussed above in Book IV). Therefore I do not want to dwell on this matter here. Therefore, explain briefly how the text of Gregory IX quoted in Chapter 1 of this seventh book should be understood. | |
| Magister: Breviter respondetur quod debet intelligi de credentibus hereticorum erroribus quos sciunt esse dampnatos vel quibus pertinaciter credunt. Quo etiam modo dicitur quod debet intelligi auctoritas Gelasii pape posita 24 q. 1 c. 1 cum dicit: “quicunque enim in heresim semel dampnatam labitur, eius dampnatione seipsum involvit.” | Master: The brief answer made is that it should be understood of those who believe the errors of heretics that they know have been condemned or that they believe pertinaciously. In the same way it is said that the authority of pope Gelasius given in 24 q. 1 c. 1 should be understood when he says: “For whoever falls into a heresy once condemned involves himself in its condemnation.” | |
| Capitulum 8 | Chapter 8 | |
| Discipulus: Postquam vidimus de credentibus explicite hereticorum erroribus, consideremus de credentibus ipsis hereticis, qui, scilicet, reputarent ipsos catholicos, licet ignorent in quo discrepent a doctrina catholica atque sana, an scilicet tales sint heretici reputandi, et qua pena debeant plecti. | Student: After we have seen about those who explicitly believe errors of heretics, let us consider about those who believe the heretics themselves, that is, those who consider them Catholics, though they do not know in what respects they differ from Catholic and sound doctrine: namely, whether such people should be considered heretics, and with what penalty they should be punished. | |
| Magister: Circa hoc possunt esse diversi modi dicendi. Unus est quod tales, si nullum errorem hereticorum explicite credunt, quia nesciunt in speciali qui sint errores eorum, non sunt inter hereticos computandi stricte loquendo de hereticis. Large tamen accipiendo hereticos pro implicite pertinaciter tenentibus errores qui sapiunt heresim manifestam, heretici sunt censendi. | Master: There can be different ways of speaking. [1] One is that such people, if they explicitly believe none of the errors of heretics, because they do not know in particular what their errors are, should not be counted among heretics, strictly speaking of “heretics”. However, taking “heretics” broadly, as pertinaciously holding implicitly errors that smack of manifest heresy, they should be considered heretics. | |
| Primum istorum declaratur sic. Sicut ille qui nullam catholicam veritatem explicite credit quamvis credat in genere fidem catholicam esse veram, non est catholicus reputandus, sic ille qui nullum errorem contrarium veritati catholice explicite credit non est inter hereticos computandus. Sed ille qui credit aliquos catholicos qui tamen sint heretici, et nescit in speciali aliquem errorem eorum, nulli errori contrario fidei explicite credit. Ergo talis non est inter hereticos computandus, nomine hereticorum stricte sumpto. | The first of these is explained as follows. Just as someone who does not explicitly believe any Catholic truth, although he believes in general that the Catholic faith is true, should not be considered a Catholic, so someone who does not explicitly believe any error contrary to Catholic truth should not be counted among heretics. But someone who believes some persons to be Catholics who are in fact heretics, but does not know in particular any error of theirs, does not explicitly believe any error contrary to the faith. Therefore such a person should not be counted among heretics, with the term “heretics” taken strictly. | |
| Secundum, scilicet quod, large accipiendo nomen hereticorum, pertinaciter credentes hereticis licet nullum errorem ipsorum in speciali et explicite credant sunt heretici iudicandi, sic videtur posse probari. Tenentes pertinaciter errorem ex quo et quibusdam veris que negari non possunt sequitur heresis manifesta possunt heretici nuncupari, large accepto vocabulo. Sed tales credunt errorem ex quo et quibusdam veris sequitur heresis manifesta. Verbi gratia: si aliquis hereticus teneret pertinaciter animas reproborum in inferno minime cruciari et quod anime sancte non vident Deum in celo, et quod omnia de necessitate eveniunt, credentes pertinaciter talem esse catholicum tenerent errorem ex quo et quodam vero quod negari non potest sequitur heresis manifesta. Sequitur enim: talis, puta Martinus vel Iacobus est catholicus, et Martinus vel Jacobus tenet irrevocabiliter quod anime reproborum non cruciantur in inferno, et quod anime sanctorum in celo non vident Deum, et quod omnia de necessitate eveniunt. Ergo anime reproborum non cruciantur in inferno, nec anime sanctorum in celo vident Deum et omnia de necessitate eveniunt. Conclusio ista concludit hereses manifestas, et isti credentes de quibus est sermo pertinaciter explicite tenent maiorem, et minor potest aperte probari. Ergo isti credentes, large sumpto vocabulo, sunt heretici iudicandi. | The second, namely that, taking the term “heretics” broadly, those who pertinaciously believe heretics, although they do not specifically and explicitly believe any error of theirs, should be judged heretics, seems provable in this way. Those who pertinaciously hold an error from which, together with certain truths that cannot be denied, follows a manifest heresy, may be called heretics, taking the term broadly. But such people believe an error from which, together with certain truths that cannot be denied, follows a manifest heresy. For example: if some heretic were to pertinaciously hold that the souls of the reprobate are not tormented in hell and that holy souls do not see God in heaven and that all things happen of necessity, those who believe that such a person is a Catholic would pertinaciously hold an error from which, together with a certain truth that cannot be denied [i.e. "that a proposition a genuine Catholic holds irrevocably must be true"], follows a manifest heresy. For it follows: such a person, for example Martin or James, is a Catholic, and Martin or James irrevocably holds that the souls of the reprobate are not tormented in hell and that the souls of the saints do not see God in heaven and that all things happen of necessity; therefore [it is true that] the souls of the reprobate are not tormented in hell, nor do the souls of the saints see God in heaven and all things happen of necessity. This conclusion concludes manifest heresies, and the believers of whom we are speaking pertinaciously hold explicitly the major, and the minor can be clearly proved. Therefore, these believers, taking the term broadly, should be judged heretics. | |
| Alius modus ponendi potest esse quod tales credentes nec uno modo nec alio sunt heretici reputandi, quia sicut nullus est reputandus catholicus nisi habeat fidem de veritate incommutabili que falsificari non potest, ita nullus est hereticus reputandus nisi adhereat errori qui verificari non potest. Tales autem credentes non adherent nisi erroribus qui verificari possunt. Si enim Jacobus vel Johannes hodie est hereticus, cras potest esse catholicus. Ergo tales non sunt heretici reputandi. | [2] Another way of putting it could be that such believers should not be considered heretics in one way or the other [i.e. strictly or broadly], because just as no one should be considered Catholic unless he has faith in an immutable truth that cannot be falsified, so no one should be considered a heretic unless he adheres to an error that cannot be made true. But such believers adhere only to errors that can be made true. For if James or John is a heretic today, he may be a Catholic tomorrow. Therefore, such people should not be considered heretics. [Perhaps I become aware of his errors and no longer regard him as a Catholic?] | |
| Capitulum 9 | Chapter 9 | |
| Discipulus: Ista difficultas, an scilicet tales credentes sint censendi heretici, videtur michi magis esse de nomine quam de re. Ideo ipsa dimissa, dic an omnes credentes hereticis modo predicto, licet in speciali nullum sciant errorem ipsorum, graviter peccent, et an sint acriter puniendi. | Student: This difficulty, namely, whether such believers should be considered heretics, seems to me to be more about name than about substance. Therefore, leaving it aside, tell me of those who believe in heretics in the aforesaid way, although they do not know in particular any of their errors, whether they sin gravely, and whether they should be severely punished. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si tales credentes sciant hereticos esse dampnatos, graviter et mortaliter peccant. Si autem nesciant eos esse dampnatos, nec sciunt quod sunt heretici, et non laborant ignoratia crassa et supina, non peccant mortaliter. Si vero laborant ignorantia crassa et supina peccant mortaliter. | Master: The answer made is that if such believers know that the heretics have been condemned, they sin gravely and mortally. But if they do not know that they have been condemned, and do not know that they are heretics, and do not labour under gross and supine ignorance, they do not sin mortally. But if they do labour under gross and supine ignorance, they sin mortally. | |
| Discipulus: Quomodo scietur qui credentes hereticis quos nesciunt esse hereticos laborant ignorantia crassa et supina et qui non? | Student: How is it known which believers in heretics that they do not know to be heretics labour under gross and supine ignorance and which do not? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod illi dicuntur esse credentes hereticis ignorantia crassa et supina sive dampnabili laborantes, qui nolunt scire vel non curant scire quos putant catholicos esse hereticos. | Master: The answer made is that people are said to be believers in heretics who labour under gross and supine or blameworthy ignorance if they do not want to know, or do not care to know, that those they think to be Catholics are heretics. | |
| Discipulus: Et quomodo scietur quod aliqui credentes hereticis nolunt scire ipsos esse hereticos? | Student: And how is it known that some believers in heretics do not want to know that they are heretics? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod illi nolunt scire aliquos esse hereticos qui veram informationem de hereticorum perfidia nolunt audire. Unde si sint aliqui scientes hereticorum perfidiam qui laborant et paratis sunt ostendere quod sunt pravitate heretica infecti, illi qui nolunt eos audire, et multo magis qui tales volentes eos de hereticorum perfidia informare repellunt, persequuntur, et molestant, ignorantia dampnabili et affectata laborant. | Master: The answer made is that they do not want to know that some are heretics if they do not want to hear true information about the faithlessness of the heretics. Hence if there are some who know the faithlessness of the heretics who labor and are ready to show that they [the heretics] are infected with heretical wickedness, those who do not want to listen to them, and much more those who repel, persecute, and molest those who want to inform them about the faithlessness of the heretics, labor under blameworthy and affected ignorance. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod tales repellentes, persequentes, et molestantes eos qui cupiunt eos informare de illis quos putant catholicos et ostendere quod sunt heretici non peccant, imo faciunt quod debent. Nam ex quo putant tales catholicos esse, reputare debent illos esse detractores qui eos cupiunt de pravitate heretica diffamare. | Student: It seems that people who repel, persecute, and molest those who desire to inform them about those whom they think are Catholics and show that they are heretics, do not sin, but rather do what they should. For from the fact that they [the former] think such people are Catholics, they should consider them [those who desire to inform them] to be detractors who desire to defame them [the people they think are Catholics] concerning heretical wickedness. | |
| Detractores autem repellere, molestare, et persequi non est peccatum sed actus virtutis, teste Psalmista qui ait: “detrahentem secreto proximo suo, hunc persequebar.” | But to repel, persecute, and persecute detractors is not a sin but an act of virtue, as the Psalmist testifies, who says [Psalm 100:5]: “Someone who secretly detracts from his neighbor, him I persecuted.” | |
| Cui Salomon concordare videtur, qui Proverbio 25 ait: “ventus aquilo dissipat pluvias, et facies tristis linguam detrahentem.” | Solomon seems to agree with this, who says in Proverbs 25[:23]: “The north wind scatters the rain, and a sad face a detracting tongue.” | |
| Et Proverbio 4 o c. ait: “detrahentia labia sint procul a te.” | And Proverbs 4[:24] says: “Let detracting lips be far from you.” | |
| Et 24o c. dicit: “cum detractoribus non commiscearis”. | And Proverbs 24[:21] says: “Do not mix with detractors”. | |
| Quibus concordat illud Ecclesiastici 28: “sepi aures tuas spinis”, et “linguam nequam noli audire.” | With this Ecclesiasticus 28[:28] agrees: “Hedge your ears with thorns”, and “Do not listen to a wicked tongue.” | |
| Ex quibus aliisque quam plurimis testimoniis scripturarum sacrarum patenter colligitur quod dectractores non sunt audiendi sed repellendi et molestandi. | From which and many other testimonies of the sacred scriptures it is clearly gathered that detractors should not be listened to but should be repelled and molested. | |
| Quod etiam Anterius papa, ut habetur 6 q. 1 c. Ex merito, aperte insinuat dicens: “Caveatque unusquisque, ne aut linguam, aut aures habeat prurientes, id est, ne aut ipse aliis detrahat, aut alios detrahentes audiat.” | Pope Anterius, as found in 6 q. 1 c. Ex merito, also openly suggests this, saying: “And let everyone beware lest he have either his tongue or his ears itch, that is, lest he himself slander others, or listen to others slandering.” | |
| Hoc etiam ex octava synodo, prout legitur 11 q. 3 c. Non solum, colligitur evidenter, cum dicitur: “Non solum ille reus est, qui falsum de aliquo profert, sed etiam is, qui aurem cito criminibus prebet.” | This is also gathered evidently from the eighth synod, as we read in 11 q. 3 c. Non solum, when it is said: “Not only is someone guilty who utters falsehood about another, but also one who quickly lends his ear to accusations.” | |
| Quod etiam Gregorius sentire videtur, ut habetur eisdem causa et questione c. In cunctis, scribens archiepiscopo Mediolanensi in hec verba: “sanctitas vestra debet mentem suam a maledicorum hominum rumoribus atque obtrectationibus disiungere.” | Gregory also seems to think this, as is found in the same Cause and Question, c. In cunctis, writing to the Archbishop of Milan in these words: “Your Holiness should detach your mind from the rumors and slanders of evil men.” | |
| Ex quibus aliisque quam plurimis patenter infertur quod detractores, calumpniatores, diffamatores, et criminum impositores non sunt aliqualiter audiendi sed omnimode repellendi. Ergo si apparent aliqui qui volunt alios informare de papa quod sit pravitate heretica irretitus, quantumcunque papa esset hereticus illi qui nescirent papam esse hereticum non deberent tales informatores audire. Ex quo sequitur quod tales propter hoc quod nolunt de perfidia pape heretici informari non essent dicendi ignorantia dampnabili laborantes. | From these and many others [texts] it is clearly inferred that detractors, calumniators, defamers, and accusers should not be listened to at all but should be repelled in every way. Therefore, if some appear who wish to inform others about that the pope is ensnared by heretical wickedness, no matter how much it may be true that the pope is a heretic, those who do not know that the pope is a heretic should not listen to such informers. It follows from this that such people should not be said to be suffering from a blameworthy ignorance because they do not wish to be informed about the pope’s faithlessness. | |
| Hec inter alia movent me ad tenendum quod volentes ignorantes papam vel alios pravitatem hereticam incurrisse de veritate informare non sunt aliquatenus audiendi, sed tanquam detractores repellendi. Qualiter tamen ad ista responderi contingat explana. | These things, among others, move me to hold that those who wish to inform of the truth those who do not know that the pope or others have fallen into heretical wickedness should not be listened to in any way, but should be repelled as detractors. But explain how these points can be answered. | |
| Magister: Ad omnes auctoritates quibus suadetur detractores esse minime audiendos respondetur unico verbo, quod omnes debent intelligi quando sciuntur esse detractores. Quia illi de quibus scitur quod detractionis vitio sunt infecti, absque magna causa audiri non debent cum volunt de aliis aliquid narrare sinistrum. Illi autem de quibus ignoratur an sint detractores sunt omnino audiendi, precipue cum aliquid quod in dispendium potest vergere boni communis cupiunt enarrare. Et multo magis audiendi sunt illi qui hactenus discreti et bone fame reputati fuerunt, si intendunt aliquid sinistrum de aliquo referare. Quare si tales laborant ostendere quod papa est pravitate heretica maculatus sunt audiendi omnino. | Master: To all the texts that suggest that detractors should not be listened to at all, the answer made is one word, that all should be understood [under the qualification] “when they are known to be detractors.” Because those known to be infected with the vice of detraction should not, without a strong argument, be listened to when they wish to tell something sinister about others. But those of whom it is not known whether they are detractors should by all means be listened to, especially when they wish to tell about something that may tend to the detriment of the common good. And much more should they be listened to if they have hitherto been considered discreet and of good reputation, if they intend to report something sinister about someone. Therefore, if such people take pains to show that the pope is tainted with heretical wickedness, they should by all means be listened to. | |
| Discipulus: Non obstante ista responsione generali, dic quomodo ad auctoritates singulariter respondetur. | Student: Notwithstanding this general answer, say how answer is made to the texts one-by-one. | |
| Magister: Ad primam dicitur quod Psalmista loquebatur de illo quem sciebat esse detrahentem, et ideo tanquam malum iuste persequebatur eundem. | Master: To the first it is said that the Psalmist spoke of him whom he knew to be a detractor, and therefore he justly persecuted him as bad. | |
| Ad secundam dicitur quod auditor per faciem tristem debet repellere illum quem esse detrahentem agnoscit. | To the second it is said that the listener should repel with a sad face one whom he recognizes to be a detractor. | |
| Ad tertiam per idem respondetur quod labia detrahentium quod scit esse detrahentes debent esse procul a quolibet bono viro. | To the third, it is answered through the same that the lips of those whom he knows to be detractors should be far from any good man. | |
| Ad quartam respondetur quod nullus debet scienter cum detractoribus commisceri. | To the fourth, the answer made is that no one should knowingly mix with detractors. | |
| Ad quintam respondetur quod non est audienda lingua nequam que scitur esse nequam. | To the fifth, the answer made is that one should not listen to a wicked tongue that is known to be wicked. | |
| Ad sextam de Anterio pape respondetur quod nemo debet audire scienter alios detrahentes. | To the sixth, concerning pope Anterius, the answer made is that no one should knowingly listen to others who are detractors. | |
| Ad septimam respondetur quod aurem cito prebere criminibus contingit dupliciter, vel absque credulitate solummodo audiendo, vel adhibendo fidem et credendo. Primo modo nemo debet cito aurem prebere criminibus quando narrantur ab illis quos scit mendosos, falsos, detractores, vel in quocunque crimino irretitos, quia omnes tales debet habere suspectos ne falso et mendaciter vel mala intentione crimina referre nitantur. Et ideo eos debet repellere et quantum sibi competit pro gradu suo et officio ad correctionem et punitionem eorum tenetur fideliter laborare. Si vero criminum relatores non fuerint antea aliquo crimine, puta nec detractionis nec mendacii nec aliquo alio irretiti, cito auris eis est prebenda, solummodo audiendo et ad cautelam in memoria retinendo. Sed secundo modo, scilicet fidem adhibendo et credendo nullus debet cito aurem prebere criminibus. Hoc enim vitio criminali minime caret. | To the seventh, the answer made is that one can be "quick to listen" to accusations in two ways, either by simply listening without belief, or by offering faith and believing. In the first way, no one should be quick to listen to accusations made by those one knows to be deceitful, false, detractors, or who have been caught in any crime, because one should hold all such people under suspicion lest they attempt to report crimes falsely and mendaciously or with bad intentions. And therefore one should repel them, and, as far as is appropriate according to rank and office, one is bound to work faithfully for their correction and punishment. But if the reporters of crimes have not previously been implicated in any crime, for example, neither in detraction nor in lying nor in any other, they should be given a quick ear, only by hearing and retaining it in memory as a precaution. But in the second way, namely by offering credence and believing, no one should give a quick ear to crimes, for this is by no means lacking in criminal vice. | |
| Ad ultimam auctoritatem respondetur quod vir sanctus mentem suam ab obtrectationibus et rumoribus illorum hominum quos scit esse maledicos debet disiungere, non solummodo fidem eis minime adhibendo, sed nec eos absque causa magna aliqualiter audiendo. | The answer made to the last text is that a holy man should detach his mind from the slanders and rumors of men he knows to be slanderers, not only by not giving credence to them, but also by not listening to them at all, without a strong argument. | |
| Discipulus: Quare dicitur quod tales “absque causa magna” audiri non debent, cum per hoc innuatur quod ex causa magna detractores et maledici debent audiri? | Student: Why is it said that such people should not be heard “without a strong argument”, since this implies that for a strong argument [even] detractors and slanderers should be heard. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod quemadmodum nullus criminosus est regulariter ad accusandum vel testificandum in iudicio admittendus, et tamen in quibusdam criminibus enormibus ad accusandum et denunciandum deberet admitti, licet nunquam fides ei debeat adhiberi nisi per legitima documenta sue assertionis probaverit veritatem, ita detractores regulariter audiri non debent. In casu tamen magno, pro magno periculo evitando, presertim si aliqua indicia veritatis pretenderent, deberent audiri ad aperiendum vias investigandi citius veritatem. Nullus tamen debet credere eis. | Master: The answer made is
that just as no criminal is regularly admitted to accuse
or testify in court, and yet in certain enormous crimes he
should be admitted to accuse and denounce, although he
should never be trusted unless he has proved the truth of
his assertion by lawful proofs, so detractors should not
regularly be heard. However, in a serious case, in order
to avoid great danger, especially if they provide some
evidence of truth, they should be heard, to open the way
for investigating the truth more quickly. However, no one
should believe them. [Cf. Book VI, Chapter
79.] |
|
| Capitulum 10 | Chapter 10 | |
| Discipulus: Licet dominum nostrum summum pontificem nunc Dei providentia in cathedra Sancti Petri sedentem, dominum videlicet Iohannem 22um, catholicum atque sanctum ab omni pravitate heretica alienum absque omni dubitatione existimem, et ideo omnia que dicta sunt de papa heretico et dicentur, de ipso nullo modo intelligam, quia tamen probabiliter existimo quod papa, cum non sit confirmatus neque in gratia neque in fide, in hereticam valeat incideri pravitatem, in quo cum fratre Michaeli quondam generali ministro Fratrum Minorum complicibusque suis convenio, qui, ut audio, probare nituntur quod in hiis que proponunt contra dominum summum pontificem sunt a catholicis audiendi, eorumque scripta contra doctrinam ipsius et personam eius a fidelibus sunt videnda et cum deliberatione provida discutienda et examinanda, quod et dominus noster summus pontifex de scriptis eorum fecisse dinoscitur, cum ad scripta eorum etiam sub bulla subtiliter et sufficienter respondit, peto ut motiva dicentium quod volentes informare ignorantes papam esse hereticum de erroribus eiusdem pape heretici atque pertinacia eius, si antea periti et bone fame fuerunt, sint ab ignorantibus papam esse hereticum audiendi. Forsitan enim pro tempore quo aliquis papa futurus efficeretur hereticus possent esse utilia vel ad probandum vel ad improbandum. Expedit enim nonnunquam scire motiva impugnantium veritatem. | Student: Although without any doubt I consider our Lord Supreme Pontiff by the providence of God now sitting in the chair of Saint Peter, namely Lord John XX, to be Catholic, and holy, and a stranger to all heretical wickedness, and therefore do not interpret as being about him all the things that have been said, and will be said, about a heretic pope: nevertheless, because I believe with probability that a pope (since he is not confirmed either in grace or in faith) can fall into heretical wickedness -- in this I agree with Brother Michael, formerly the minister general of the Friars Minor, and his accomplices, who, as I hear, are striving to prove that they should be heard by Catholics in the things they propose against the Lord Supreme Pontiff, and that their writings against his doctrine and person should be seen by the faithful and discussed and examined with provident deliberation (which our Lord the Supreme Pontiff is also known to have done regarding their writings, since even under a bull he answered their writings subtly and sufficiently) -- I ask that the arguments of those who say that those who wish to inform people who do not know that a pope is a heretic about the errors of that heretic pope and his pertinacity, if they were previously experts and of good reputation, should be heard by those who do not know that the pope is a heretic. For perhaps in a time when some future pope does become a heretic these arguments could be useful, either to prove or disprove. For it is sometimes beneficial to know the arguments of those who attack the truth. | |
| Magister: Videtur quod intendis ponere casus quod papa in rei veritate sit hereticus et quod aliqui catholici satagunt eius errores et perfidiam publicare. | Master: It seems that you intend to put a case [i.e. hypothetical case] that the pope is in fact a heretic and that some Catholics are trying to publicize his errors and faithlessness. | |
| Discipulus: Ita est ut dicis. Unde procedas ac si papa esset hereticus quamvis in rei veritate non sit. | Student: It is as you say. So please proceed as if the pope were a heretic, although in truth he is not. | |
| Magister: Quod catholici imponentes pape, quantumcunque fuerit hereticus, pravitatem hereticam, sint ab ignorantibus papam esse hereticum audiendi, illi precipue qui antea bone fame fuerunt, videtur multis modis posse probari. Primo quidem sic. Illi qui sunt pro aliqua causa ab aliquibus defendendi sunt multo fortius audiendi ab eisdem, cum minus sit audire aliquos quam defensare eosdem. Sed catholici imponentes pape heretico pravitatem hereticam sunt etiam ab ignorantibus papam esse hereticum defendendi. Ergo multo fortius audiri debent ab eisdem. | Master: That Catholics who impose heretical wickedness on the pope [“impose on”: i.e. accuse of], however much he may be a heretic, should be heard by those who do know know that the pope is a heretic, especially if they [the accusers] have previously been of good reputation, seems provable in many ways. First thus. Those who should be defended by some people for some cause should, much more strongly, be heard by those people, since it is less to hear someone than to defend them. But Catholics who impose heretical wickedness on a heretic pope should also be defended by those who do not know that the pope is a heretic. Therefore, much more strongly, they should be heard by the same. | |
| Discipulus: Video quod ratio ista dependet ab illis que dicta sunt supra libro 6o a capitulo 37o usque ad capitulum 55um, quia per illa videtur minor posse probari. Ideo istam rationem noli amplius pertractare, sed si alias cogitasti adducas. | Student: I see that this argument depends on what was said above in Book 6, from Chapter 37 to Chapter 55, because it seems that by them the minor [premise] can be proved. Therefore do not discuss this argument any further, but if you have thought of other things, bring them forward. | |
| Magister: Secunda ratio ad eandem conclusionem talis est. Velox ad audiendum debet prebere aurem illis qui errores et perfidiam pape heretici publicare nituntur. Sed omnis homo debet esse velox ad audiendum, teste beato Jacobo qui, canonica sua 1o ait: “Sit autem omnis homo velox ad audiendum, tardius autem ad loquendum.” Ergo etc. | Master: The second argument to the same conclusion is as follows. A person quick to hear should lend an ear to those who try to publicize the errors and faithlessness of a heretic pope. But every man should be quick to listen, as blessed James testifies. In his canonical letter 1[:19], he says: “Let every man be quick to hear, but slow to speak.” Therefore etc. | |
| Discipulus: Ista auctoritas beati Jacobi pro istis non facit, quia homo velox debet esse ad audiendum bona, non autem ad audiendum mala. Ergo per hanc auctoritatem non potest probari quod ignorantes papam esse hereticum debeant audire illos qui volunt eius errores et perfidiam publicare. | Student: This text of blessed James does not favour them, because a man should be quick to hear good things, but not to hear evil things. Therefore, by this text it cannot be proved that those who do not know that the pope is a heretic should listen to those who want to publicize his errors and faithlessness. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod auctoritas beati Jacobi non tantum de bonis sed etiam de malis audiendis debet intelligi. Nam eodem modo proportionaliter debet intelligi quod beatus Jacobus dicit “sit omnis homo velox ad audiendum” et quod dicit “tardius autem ad loquendum.” Sed homo debet esse tardius ad loquendum mala, ergo debet etiam esse velox ad audiendum mala, non quidem ut credat vel approbet, sed ut caveat et evitet. | Master: The answer made is that the text of blessed James should be understood not only of good things but also of bad things. For blessed James’s statements, “let every man be quick to listen”, and “but slow to speak” should be understood in the same way proportionally. But a man should be slow to speak bad things, therefore he should also be quick to hear bad things -- not indeed that he may believe or approve, but that he may beware and avoid. | |
| Et ex hoc potest tertia ratio sic formari. Homo debet esse velox ad audiendum illa que scire potest esse utilia sibi et toti communitati. Sed scire papam esse hereticum quando est hereticus potest esse utile cuilibet fideli et toti communitati fidelium, quia per hoc facilius et melius eius malitie resistetur. Ergo quilibet debet libenter audire volentes errores et perfidiam pape heretici publicare. | And from this a third argument can be formed as follows. A man should be quick to hear things if knowing them can be useful to himself and to the whole community. But to know that the pope is a heretic, when he is a heretic, can be useful to any faithful man and to the whole community of the faithful, because by this the pope’s malice will be more easily and better resisted. Therefore everyone should willingly listen to those who wish to publicize the errors and faithlessness of a heretic pope. | |
| Quarta ratio est hec. Illa debet homo catholicus libenter audire que debet velle scire. Illa autem que cavenda sunt debet catholicus velle scire, quia cavenda nisi sciantur caveri non possunt. Non tantum autem debet catholicus cavere peccatum in se, sed etiam debet quantum in se est cavere pericula que communitati vel fidei imminere dicuntur. Si autem papa infectus fuerit heretica pravitate, periculum imminet fidei orthodoxe, et per consequens offerentes se ad pandendum et monstrandum perfidiam pape heretici debent libenter audiri. | A fourth argument is this. A Catholic man should willingly hear things he should want to know. But a Catholic should want to know things that should be guarded against, because they cannot be guarded against unless they are known. Not only should a Catholic guard against sin in himself, but he should also, as far as in him lies, guard against dangers that are said to threaten the community or the faith. But if the pope is infected with heretical wickedness, danger threatens the orthodox faith, and consequently those who offer themselves to expose and show the faithlessness of the heretic pope should be willingly listened to. | |
| Quinta ratio est hec. Hoc debet catholicus libenter audire cuius veritatem cum nunciatur tenetur inquirere. Sed si catholicis, etiam ignorantibus papam esse hereticum, nunciatur eius perfidia, ipsi tenentur veritatem inquirere. Ergo tales nunciantes papam hereticum debent audiri. Maior videtur probatione minime indigere. Minor auctoritatibus divine scripture videtur aperte posse probari. | A fifth argument is this. A Catholic should willingly hear something the truth of which, once it is announced, he is bound to investigate. But if the pope’s faithlessness is announced to Catholics, even to those who do not know that the pope is a heretic, they are bound to investigate the truth. Therefore, people who announce that the pope is a heretic should be listened to. The major seems to need no proof at all. The minor seems to be clearly proved by the authorities of divine Scripture. | |
| Nam sicut supra allegatum existit, Deuteronomio 13o c. sic legitur: “Si audieris in una urbium tuarum, quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi ad habitandum, dicentes aliquos egressi sunt filii Belial de medio tui, et averterunt habitatores urbis sue atque dixerunt ‘eamus, et serviamus diis alienis quos ignoratis’ quere sollicite etc.” Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod cum aliqui dicunt quod aliqui volunt fidem eorum corrumpere, veritas est sollicite inquirenda. Ergo si aliqui asserunt papam hereticum velle fidem corrumpere orthodoxam, alii fideles etiam ignorantes papam tali respersum perfidia debent sollicite querere veritatem. | For, as was alleged above, Deuteronomy 13[:12-14] reads: “If you hear in one of your cities which the Lord your God gives you to live in, saying, Some sons of Belial have gone out from among you and have turned away the inhabitants of your city, saying, 'Let us go and serve foreign gods', which you have not known, inquire carefully and diligently,” etc. By these words it is given to be understood that when some say that some want to corrupt their faith, the truth must be inquired into diligently. Therefore, if some assert that the pope is a heretic who wants to corrupt the orthodox faith, other faithful, even those who do not know that the pope is stained with such faithlessness, must inquire diligently about the truth. | |
| Quod etiam Iob 29 innuitur cum ipsemet Iob dicit: “causam quam nesciebam, diligentissime investigabam.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum alicuius cause que potest esse in detrimentum omnium veritas ignoratur, debet diligentissime investigari. | This is also suggested in Job 29[:16], when Job himself says: “The matter I did not know I investigated very diligently.” From these words it is gathered that when the truth of some matter that may be detrimental to all is not known, it must be investigated most diligently. | |
| Hinc Salomon Proverb. 25 ait: “gloria regum investigare sermonem.” Quod verum est cum periculum imminet publice utilitatis. | Hence Solomon in Proverbs 25[:2] says: “The glory of kings is to investigate speech.” This is true when danger threatens public utility. | |
| Discipulus: Iste auctoritates nichil faciunt pro conclusione intenta, quia auctoritates predicte et consimiles de prelatis et iudicibus sive regentibus duntaxat debent intelligi, quia illorum et non aliorum est inquirere subditorum excessus cum mala fama de eis exierit, secundum canonicas sanctiones. | Student: These texts do nothing for the intended conclusion, because the aforementioned and similar texts should be understood only of prelates and judges or rulers, because, according to canonical laws, it is for them, not others, to investigate the excesses of their subjects when a bad report has gone out about them. | |
| Magister: Dicunt alii quod verba auctoritatum predictarum et etiam sacrorum canonum quibus asseritur quod prelati ad corrigendos subditorum excessus debent assurgere nequaquam intelligis. Quia correctio est duplex, una potestativa per publicam punitionem, et hec pertinet ad prelatos et ad in sublimitatibus constitutos. Alia est per simplicem admonitionem, et hec pertinet ad omnes charitatem habentes, qua unicuique precipitur amovere malum cuiuslibet subditi et prelati, si potest. | Master: Others say that you do not understand at all the words of the aforementioned texts, and also of the sacred canons, which assert that prelates should rise up to correct the excesses of their subjects. Because correction is twofold, one is potentative by public punishment, and this pertains to prelates and those in high places. Another is by simple admonition, and this pertains to all who have charity, by which everyone is urged to remove the evil of any subject and prelate, if he can. | |
| Sic duplex est inquisitio sive investigatio peccati alterius. Una est potestativa et iudicialis, qua quis compellit alios ex officio, vel potest compellere, dicere veritatem de peccato, et etiam de mala intentione alterius. Et ista regulariter spectat ad prelatos, non ad subditos. Alia est inquisitio sive investigatio peccati alterius, vel etiam periculi quod potest sibi et aliis imminere, per simplicem interrogationem absque omni precepto et sollempnitate, seu compulsione et punitione nolentium, quam scirent dicere veritatem. Et ista inquisitio sive investigatio peccati vel periculi quod sibi potest et aliis imminere spectat ad omnes qui curam de se et de aliis debent habere. Omnes autem non solum de seipsis sed etiam de proximis, quos sicut seipsos debent diligere, tenentur aliquam curam et sollicitudinem pro loco et tempore et cum aliis circumstantiis debitis requisitis habere, iuxta illud Apostoli ad Romanos 12o “sollicitudine non pigri”. Quod non tantum dicitur ad prelatos sed etiam ad subditos quorum est aliquam sollicitudinem non solum pro se sed etiam pro omnibus aliis inferioribus, equalibus, et superioribus, quando convenienter possunt, habere. | Thus the inquiry or investigation of another's sin is twofold. One is potentative and judicial, by which one compels, or can compel, others ex officio to tell the truth about the sin, and also about the evil intention of another. And this regularly pertains to prelates, not to subjects. The other is the inquiry or investigation of another's sin, or also of a danger that may threaten oneself and others, by simple questioning, without any precept and solemnity, or compulsion and punishment of those who do not wish to tell a truth that they know. And this inquiry or investigation of sin, or of a danger that may threaten oneself and others, pertains to all who ought to have care for themselves and for others. Now all are bound to have some care and solicitude (according to the place and time and with other requisite due circumstances) not only for themselves but also for their neighbors, whom they must love as themselves, according to the text of the Apostle to the Romans 12[:11] “not slothful in solicitude” -- this is said not only to prelates but also to subjects, who should have some solicitude (when they suitably can) not only for themselves but also for all others, inferior, equal, and superior. | |
| Discipulus: Ista ratio apparentiam videtur habere, si quilibet teneretur pro omnibus aliis, superioribus et aliis, aliquam sollicitudinem et curam habere. Et ideo indica si hoc potest aliquo modo probari. | Student: This argument seems plausible, if everyone were bound to have some solicitude and care for all others, superiors and others. And therefore indicate whether this can be proved in any way. | |
| Magister: Hoc Apostolus in diversis locis insinuare videtur. Nam 1o Corinthiarum 12o expresse, ut apparet, probare conatur quod, exemplo membrorum corporis quorum quodlibet aliquam sollicitudinem videtur habere de alio, quilibet pro alio debet esse sollicitus. Unde dicit ibidem Apostolus: “Non sit schisma in corpore, sed idipsum pro invicem sollicita sint membra. Et si quid patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra: sive gloriatur unum membrum congaudent omnia membra.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod cum simus membra unius corporis, quilibet pro omnibus debet esse sollicitus. Hoc dicit glossa ita: “Non sit schisma, id est discordia in corpore humano vel in ecclesia ubi debet esse unitas, sed omnia membra potius sollicita sint, in rebus agendis pro se invicem sollicita sint, dico, ita ut tendant in idipsum, id est, in id sollicitudinis, quod sit ipsum, id est indifferens, ut non sit minus pro alio quam pro se sollicita sint.” Ex quibus aperte colligitur quod omnes de omnibus sollicitudinem debent habere. | Master: The Apostle seems to suggest this in various places. For 1 Corinthians 12[:25-26] expressly, as it appears, he attempts to prove, by the example of the members of the body each of which seems to have some concern for another, that each Christian should be concerned for another. Hence the Apostle says there: “Let there be no schism in the body, but let the members be concerned for one another. And if one member suffers, all the members suffer with it; if one member rejoices, all the members rejoice with it.” From these words it is evidently gathered that since we are members of one body, each one should be concerned for all. The gloss says this as follows: “‘Let there be no schism’, that is, discord in the human body or in the Church where there should be unity, but let all the members be concerned, let them be concerned in doing things for one another, I say, so that they are concerned in such a way that they tend to the same thing, that is, to that concern, which is itself, that is, indifferent, so that it is not less for another than for oneself.” From which it is clearly gathered that all should be concerned for all. | |
| Quod etiam Apostolus ad Ephesos 4 aperte insinuare videtur, cum dicit: “Digne ambuletis vocatione, qua vocati estis, cum omni humilitate, et mansuetudine, cum patientia subportantes invicem in caritate sollicite servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis.” Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod sicut omnes se debent invicem supportare, ita pro invicem debent esse solliciti, ne unitas in eis rumpatur. Unitas autem spiritus in catholicis rumpitur si pravitate inficerentur heretica. Ergo omnes qui sunt membra corporis Christi debent esse solliciti ne fides catholica, que est fundamentum unitatis spiritus et omnium bonorum spiritualium, corrumpatur. Et ita omnes tenentur audire illos qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici satagentis fidem corrumpere orthodoxam ad occurrendum periculo fidei publicare. | The Apostle also seems to openly suggest this in Ephesians 4[:1-3], when he says: “Walk worthy of the calling in which you were called, with all humility and gentleness, with patience, supporting one another in love, careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.” From these words it is clearly seen that just as all should support one another, so they should be sollicitus for one another, lest their unity be broken. Now the unity of the Spirit in Catholics is broken if they become infected with heretical wickedness. Therefore all who are members of the body of Christ should be sollicitous lest the Catholic faith, which is the foundation of the unity of the Spirit and of all spiritual goods, be corrupted. And thus all are bound to listen to those who want to publicize the faithlessness of a heretic pope who is trying to corrupt the orthodox faith, in order to oppose a danger to the faith. | |
| Discipulus: Debent ergo catholici aliquas occupationes dimittere et intendere illis qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici divulgare? | Student: Must Catholics therefore give up some occupations and pay attention to those who want to publicize the faithlessness of the heretic pope? | |
| Magister: Non dicunt isti quod omnes teneantur omnes alias occupationes dimittere, sed dicunt quod iudicandum est de audientia danda illis qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici publicare, sicut iudicandum est de aliis actibus affirmativis qui cadunt sub precepto quod semper obligat sed non obligat ad semper sed pro loco et tempore cum aliis circumstantiis debitis requisitis. Et ideo non est facile certam regulam dare in speciali quo tempore tenetur quis de necessitate salutis audire illos qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici divulgare. Potest tamen dici quod tunc ad hoc tenetur unusquisque quando non habet rationabilem excusationem quare tunc eos audire minime teneatur. Si enim sit aliis occupationibus utilioribus vel urgentibus occupatus, potest rationabiliter respondere “modo michi non vacat audire.” Si autem non est aliqualiter occupatus nec aliter impeditus, se excusare non potest. Si autem dimittit illos audire, vel quia de periculo fidei minime curat, aut quia reputat facta fidei ad se nullatenus pertinere, vel quia vult illi quem reputat papam catholicum complacere, aut saltem ei nullatenus displicere, non audiendo peccat mortaliter et inter credentes dampnabiliter pape heretico (licet nulli errori eius explicite credat) est merito computandus. | Master: They do not say that everyone is bound to give up all other occupations, but they say that one must judge about giving an audience to those who want to publicize the faithlessness of the heretic pope, just as one must judge about other affirmative acts that fall under the precept that always obliges but does not oblige for always, but for place and time with other requisite due circumstances. And therefore it is not easy to give a certain specific rule for when someone is bound of necessity of salvation to listen to those who want to publicize the faithlessness of a heretic pope. It can, however, be said that everyone is bound to do this when he does not have a reasonable excuse why he is then not bound to listen to them. For if he is occupied with other more useful or urgent occupations, he can reasonably answer, “At present I am not free to listen.” But if he is not occupied in any way or otherwise hindered, he cannot excuse himself. But if he omits to hear them (either because he cares little about the danger of the faith, or because he considers facts of faith to be of no concern to him, or because he wants to please him whom he considers to be the Catholic pope, or at least to displease him in no way), then by not hearing he sins mortally and should rightly be counted among the blameworthy believers in the heretic pope (although he may not explicitly believe in any of his errors). | |
| Discipulus: Cerno quod isti non dampnant omnes istos qui nolunt audire eos qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici divulgare, sed tantummodo illos qui absque causa rationabili illos audire recusant, putantes quod nec timor pape quem reputant catholicum, nec dilectio ad ipsum, nec odium ad publicantes perfidiam eius, nec aliquid tale eos valeat excusare, sed solummodo utilior occupatio cui sunt intenti, aut alicuius periculi maioris vitatio vel divulgationis inutilitas vel aliud simile eosdem apud Deum valeat excusare. Et ad istam intentionem aliquas rationes, si quas audisti vel vidisti aut etiam cogitasti, sine magna discussione, causa abbreviationis breviter tangendo allega. | Student: I see that these do not condemn all those who do not want to hear those who want to publicise the faithlessness of a heretic pope, but only those who refuse to hear them without a reasonable cause, thinking that neither fear of the pope whom they consider to be Catholic, nor love for him, nor hatred of those who publicize his faithlessness, nor anything of the like can excuse them, but only a more useful occupation on which they are intent, or the avoidance of some greater danger, or the uselessness of publicising it, or something similar can excuse them before God. And for this position, if you have heard or seen or even thought of any, allege some arguments, without much discussion, touching briefly for the sake of abbreviation. | |
| Magister: Sexta ratio est hec. Qui non est ex se sufficiens ad agendum recte ea que sibi incumbumt, aliorum qui eum cupiunt informare debet audire consilia. Sed quilibet debet esse sollicitus, sicut probatum existit, de fide catholica ne per quamcunque aliqualiter subvertatur, debetque corrumpere fidem volentibus quantum sibi licet pro gradu suo et officio obviare viriliter. Ergo si non est sufficienter informatus de illis qui volunt fidem destruere, debet audire eorum consilia et informationes qui eum cupiunt de talibus informare. | Master: A sixth argument is this. Someone who is not of himself sufficient to act rightly in things incumbent upon him should listen to the counsels of others who wish to inform him. But as has been proved, everyone should be sollicitous about the Catholic faith lest it be subverted in any way and should vigorously oppose those who wish to destroy the faith (as far as he is permitted to do according to his rank and office). Therefore, if he is not sufficiently informed about those who wish to destroy the faith, he should listen to the counsels and information of those who wish to inform him about such things. | |
| Minor ex hiis que dicta sunt supra in ratione quinta videtur posse probari. Maior autem auctoritatibus divine scripture insinuatur aperte. Ecclesiastici enim 32o sic scribitur: “Fili sine consilio nichil facias, et post factum non penitebis.” Et Proverbiis 12o ait Salomon: “qui autem sapiens est, audit consilia.” Et idem in eodem 13 o c. ait: “qui autem agunt omnia cum consilio, reguntur sapientia.” Et, ut legitur Tob. 4, Tobias filium suum instruens ait: “consilium semper a sapiente perquire.” Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus colligitur evidenter quod in arduis negotiis non solum audienda sed etiam requirenda sunt consilia peritorum. Cum ergo negotium fidei, quando scilicet fides catholica impugnatur, precipue ab illo qui plurimos potest trahere ad suos errores, cuiusmodi est papa hereticus, sit arduissimum negotium, in hoc casu oportet non solum audire sed etiam requirere consilia et informationes eorum qui perfidiam pape heretici non ignorant undecunque innotuit eis. | The minor seems provable from the things said above in the fifth argument. The major is clearly implied by texts of divine scripture. For in Ecclesiasticus 32[:24] is written thus: “My son, do nothing without counsel, and after the deed you will not repent.” And in Proverbs 12[:15] Solomon says: “But someone who is wise listens to counsel.” And Solomon in [Proverbs] 13[:10] says: “But those who do everything with counsel are guided by wisdom.” And, as is read in Tob. 4[:19], Tobias, instructing his son, says: “Always seek counsel from the wise.” From these and many other texts it is evidently gathered that in difficult matters the counsel of experts should not only be heard but also sought. Since, therefore, a matter of faith, namely when the Catholic faith is attacked (especially by one who can draw many to his errors such as a heretic pope), is a most difficult matter, in this case it is necessary not only to hear but also to seek the counsel and information of those who are not ignorant of the heretic pope’s faithlessness, from wherever it may have come to their knowledge. | |
| Discipulus: Quamvis antea cogitaverim quod rationes iste nequaquam discuterentur prolixe, volo tamen contra istam movere duas instantias, quarum prima est quod quamvis in arduis sint peritorum informationes et consilia requirenda, non tamen sunt requirenda nisi ab hiis ad quos huiusmodi spectant negotia. Negotium autem fidei, quando papa esset hereticus, non spectat nisi tantummodo ad prelatos, et non ad simplices nec ad laicos. Unde ad religiosos pauperes et alios, nisi essent cardinales vel patriarche aut episcopi, nullatenus pertineret. Et ideo alii non tenentur audire volentes perfidiam pape heretici declarare, presertim si eis fuerit a superioribus suis iniunctum vel preceptum quod eis audire non debeant. | Student: Although I previously thought that these arguments should not be discussed at length, I nevertheless wish to raise two objections against them. The first is that although in difficult matters the information and advice of experts should be sought, they should nevertheless be sought only from those whom such matters concern. Now the business of faith, when the pope is a heretic, concerns only prelates, and not the simple or the laity. Hence it would not concern poor religious and others, unless they were cardinals or patriarchs or bishops. And therefore others are not bound to listen to those who wish to declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope, especially if there have been injunctions or precepts from their superiors that they should not listen to them. | |
| Secunda instantia est quod quamvis in arduis sint consilia requirenda, non oportet consilia querere nisi quando videatur periculum imminere. Et ideo, illi qui nesciunt papam esse hereticum, cum non sentiant ex perfidia pape heretici aliquod periculum imminere, non teneantur eos audire qui volunt eos de perfidia pape heretici informare. Hec sunt instantie que rationem predictam videntur totaliter refellere. Et tamen quomodo respondere contingat ad ipsas enarra. | The second objection is that although in difficult matters advice should be sought, it is not necessary to seek advice except when the danger seems imminent. And therefore, those who do not know that the pope is a heretic, since they do not think that any danger is imminent from the faithlessness of a heretic pope, are not bound to listen to those who wish to inform them of the faithlessness of a heretic pope. These are objections which seem to completely refute the aforementioned argument. But tell how they can be answered. | |
| Magister: Putant nonnulli quod iste instantie ex ignorantia intelligentie scripturarum emanant. Primam autem instantiam dicunt absurditatem perniciosam et periculosam et hereticalem ac etiam stultissimam continere, que est illorum assertio et adinventio qui suam desidiam, imo nequitiam pessimam, palliare nituntur. Est autem hec absurditas quod negotium fidei, quando papa esset hereticus, nullo modo spectat ad simplices et pauperes sed solummodo ad prelatos, puta cardinales, patriarchas, achiepiscopos et episcopos, et non ad pauperes religiosos nec ad laicos nec ad clericos sub episcopis constitutos. Quam absurditatem diabolicam arbitrantur ex astutia diaboli ad subversionem fidei adinventam. Quomodo enim defensio patrie pertinebit ad omnes si defensio fidei, que est amplius quam patriam, defendere non spectat ad omnes? Aut quomodo defensio proprie vite pertinebit ad subditos simplices et pauperes, si defensio fidei que debet esse unicuique carior quam vita corporalis non spectat ad omnes? | Master: Some think that these objections emanate from ignorance of the meaning of the Scriptures. They say that the first objection contains a pernicious, dangerous, heretical, and also very foolish, absurdity, which is an assertion and invention of those who try to cover up their own laziness, nay, their very bad wickedness. This absurdity is that the business of faith, when the pope is a heretic, in no way concerns the simple and the poor, but only prelates, for example cardinals, patriarchs, archbishops and bishops, and not poor religious people nor laymen nor clerics living under bishops. This absurdity they consider diabolical, invented by the cunning of the devil to subvert the faith. For how will the defense of the fatherland belong to all, if the defense of the faith, which is more than the fatherland, does not concern every person? Or how will the defense of one’s own life pertain to simple and poor subjects, if the defense of faith, which should be dearer to each one than bodily life, does not pertain to all? | |
| Discipulus: An negotium fidei spectat ad omnes discussum est libro 6o. Ideo de hoc ad presens pertranseas, et tantummodo dic quomodo respondetur ad hoc quod dicitur quod si superiores iniunxerunt subditis ne audiant illos qui volunt perfidiam pape heretici divulgare, non debent eos audire. | Student: Whether a matter of faith pertains to all is discussed in Book 6. Therefore, pass over this to the present, and only say how one responds to what is said that if superiors have enjoined their subjects not to listen to those who wish to spread the faithlessness of the heretic pope, they should not listen to them. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod in hoc casu est cum magna cautela et prudentia procedendum, et forma mandati est diligentissime inspicienda, alique circumstantie sunt subtiliter pensande. Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod, sicut ex sacris canonibus 11 q. 3 Si quis episcopum, et c. Non semper enim, et c. Si Dominus, et aliis innumeris colligitur evidenter, non est superioribus obediendum in omnibus. Si enim aliquid precipiunt quod est contrarium scripturis divinis aut iuri naturali aut vergat in patens dispendium honoris divini, vel fidei orthodoxe, vel communis boni, aut etiam salutis spiritualis vel corporalis, non debent eis subditi obedire, sed sententiam beati Gregorii debent in memoriam retinere, qui, ut legitur 2 q. 7 c. Ammonendi, ait: “Ammonendi sunt subditi, ne plus quam expedit sint subiecti, ne, cum student plusquam necesse est hominibus subiici, compellantur eorum vitia venerari.” Et ita in dispendium communis boni subditi superioribus debent nullatenus obedire. | Master: The answer made is that in this case one must proceed with great caution and prudence, and the form of the command must be examined most carefully, and certain circumstances must be carefully weighed. To make this clear, it is said that one must know that, as is clearly gathered from the sacred canons 11 q. 3 Si quis episcopum and c. Non semper enim and c. Si Dominus, and countless others, superiors should not be obeyed in all things. For if they command something that is contrary to the divine scriptures or natural law or tends to the clear detriment of divine honor, or of the orthodox faith, or of the common good, or also of spiritual or bodily health, subjects should not obey them, but should keep in mind the opinion of blessed Gregory. As is read in 2 q. 7 c. Ammonendi, he says: “Subjects should be admonished, lest, when they strive to be subject to men more than is necessary, they be compelled to venerate their vices.” And thus subjects must by no means obey their superiors to the detriment of the common good. | |
| Per hoc ad propositum respondetur quod si superiores nude mandant subditos ut tales volentes perfidiam pape heretici declarare nullatenus audiant, nullam causam rationabilem quare audire non debeant assignantes, subditi tanquam sinceri fidei zelatores et fidem omni homini preferentes, eis rescribant quare eos intendunt audire, instar prelati cui mandat Alexander 3us, ut habetur Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, quod si mandatum apostolicum adimplere non debeat, causam rationabilem quare adimplere non valeat per literas studeat intimare. Ita in hoc casu subditi debent suis superioribus intimare quod eorum mandatum adimplere non debeant, cum in audiendo tales nullum ingruet periculum, non audiendo autem posset grande periculum fidei imminere. | Through this to the point, it is answered that if superiors barely command their subjects that they should not listen at all to people who wish to declare a heretic pope’s faithlessness, assigning no reasonable argument why they should not listen, the subjects, as sincere lovers of the faith and preferring faith to all men, should write back to them [to explain] why they intend to listen to them, on the example of the prelate whom Alexander III commands, as is found in Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, that if he should not fulfill an Apostolic mandate, he should endeavor to communicate by letter a reasonable cause why he cannot fulfill it. Thus, in this case, subjects should communicate to their superiors that they should not fulfill their mandate, since there is no danger in listening to such people, but in not listening a great danger could threaten the faith. | |
| Si autem in tali mandato causa rationabilis exprimatur quare subditi audire non debeant volentes pape heretici perfidiam declarare, puta quia sunt de calumpnia, mendaciis vel detractione aut inimicitia convicti, non essent saltem in publico audiendi, nisi verisimiliter apparet quod vias scirent dare probabiles quibus perfidia pape heretici panderentur. In omnibus enim talibus non voluntatem prelatorum, qui forte timore, ambitione vel cupiditate essent corrupti, sed honorem Dei et defensionem fidei deberent attendere, et illud verbum Petri Actibus 5 “obedire oportet Deo magis, quam hominibus” memoriter retinere. | But if in such a mandate a reasonable cause were expressed why subjects should not listen to those who wish to declare the heretic pope’s faithlessness -- for example because they have been convicted of slander, lies, or detraction or enmity -- they should not be heard, at least in public, unless it appears likely that they know how to give probable ways in which the faithlessness of the heretic pope could be exposed. For in all such matters they should not pay attention to the will of the prelates, who perhaps have been corrupted by fear, ambition, or greed, but to God’s honour and the defense of the faith, and they should keep in mind that word of Peter, Acts 5[:29]: “We must obey God rather than men.” | |
| Discipulus: Dic ad secundam instantiam. | Student: Speak to the second objection. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non solum in arduis negotiis, ubi peritia propria non subpetit tunc sunt peritorum consilia requirenda quando quis videret periculum imminere, sed etiam quando imminens periculum nunciatur, maxime si a fide dignis et providis intimatur, ne [non Ly] nolentibus [volentibus BbFiAnLy] denunciato periculo obviare attendat illud Apostoli 1o Thess. 5 “cum enim dixerint pax et securitas tunc repentinus eis superveniet interitus”, scilicet fidei orthodoxe in cordibus infirmorum, postquam forte superveniet nonnullorum interitus corporalis. | Master: The answer made is that not only in difficult matters where one's own expertise is not sufficient should the advice of experts be sought when one sees that danger is imminent, but also when an imminent danger is announced, especially if it is communicated by people who are trustworthy and prudent. Those who are not willing to meet a danger when it is announced should heed the word of the Apostle, 1 Thess. 5[:3] “For when they shall say, ‘Peace and safety’, then shall sudden destruction come upon them,” namely, destruction of the orthodox faith in the hearts of the weak; perhaps later bodily destruction shall come upon some. | |
| Discipulus: Breviter tange alias rationes. | Student: Briefly touch upon other arguments. | |
| Magister: Septima ratio ex predictis accipit fulcimentum, que potest sic formari. Illi debent audiri qui periculum grande omnibus imminere asserunt et affirmant, ne audire nolentes, cum eos apprehendit periculum nuntiatum “dicentes intra se” illud Sapientis 5o, penitentiam agentes, et pre angustia spiritus gementes, “hii” (scilicet qui nobis nunciaverunt pericula que supervenerunt nobis) “sunt, quos aliquando habuimus in derisum, et in similitudinem improperii. Nos insensati vitam eorum estimabamus insaniam, et finem illorum sine honore.” | Master: A seventh argument receives support from the foregoing. It can be formulated thus. Those should be heard who assert and affirm that great danger threatens all, lest those unwilling to hear, when the announced danger seizes them, “Saying within themselves” that [text] of the Wise Man [Wisdom] 5[:3-4], “repenting and groaning in anguish of spirit, ‘These’” (namely, those who announced to us the dangers that have come upon us) “‘are they whom we once held in derision and for a parable of reproach. We fools esteemed their life as madness and their end without honor.” | |
| Unde de nolentibus audire pericula nunciantes dicitur Ezech. 33: “Audiens autem, quisque ille est, sonitum buccine et se non observaverit, veneritque gladius, et tulerit eum: sanguis ipsius super caput eius erit. Sonum buccine audivit, et non se observavit, sanguis eius in ipso erit.” Ille audit sonum buccine qui audit in confuso quod sunt aliqui imminentia pericula predicantes, sed non observat se, quia in speciali ad occurrendum periculis annunciantibus renuit informari. Et ideo, cum periculum apprehendit ipsum, se per ignorantiam non potest excusare, sed sanguis ipsius super caput eius erit. Sed si sunt aliqui volentes catholicos de perfidia pape heretici informare, grandia pericula futura populo christiano predicunt. Ergo qui non audierint diligenter informationes eorum, nequaquam poterunt per ignorantiam excusari, si papa hereticus infecerit populum christianum. | Hence, concerning those unwilling to hear the danger announced, it is said in Ezek. 33[:4-5]: “But if anyone hears the sound of the trumpet and does not take heed, and the sword comes and takes him away, his blood shall be upon his own head. He heard the sound of the trumpet and did not take heed, his blood shall be upon himself.” A person "hears the sound of the trumpet" who hears [at first] unclearly that there are some who are preaching imminent dangers, but "does not take heed", because he refuses to be clearly informed to meet the dangers that are announced. And therefore, when the danger seizes upon him, he cannot excuse himself through ignorance, but "his blood shall be upon his own head". But if there are any who wish to inform Catholics about the heretic pope’s faithlessness, they foretell great dangers to come to the Christian people. Therefore, those who do not listen diligently to their information will by no means be able to be excused through ignorance if the heretic pope infects the Christian people. | |
| Discipulus: Auctoritas Ezechieli loquitur de speculatore super populum constituto, et ideo si episcopus vel prelatus qui est speculator super subditos constitutus nunciaret papam esse hereticum, et illi informationes eius nollent audire, non essent per ignorantiam excusati. Secus est de illis qui nunciant papam esse hereticum et non sunt speculatores super populum constituti, quia tales audiri non debent. | Student: Ezekiel’s text speaks of a watchman appointed over the people, and therefore if a bishop or prelate, who is a watchman appointed over his subjects, were to announce that the pope is a heretic, and they were unwilling to listen to his information, they would not be excused through ignorance. It is otherwise with those who announce that the pope is a heretic who are not watchmen appointed over the people, because such should not be listened to. | |
| Magister: Dicitur quod ista responsio non impedit rationem predictam, quia licet predicta verba Ezechielis principalius intelligantur de speculatoribus super populum constitutis, tamen debent etiam de quibuscunque nunciantibus imminentia pericula populo vel persone cuicunque intelligi. | Master: It is said that this answer does not hinder the aforesaid argument, because although the Ezekiel's words are understood primarily of watchmen appointed over the people, nevertheless they should also be understood of anyone who announces imminent dangers to the people or to any person. | |
| Cuius ratio assignatur. Quia propter caritatem et amicitiam qua unusquisque debet proximum suum diligere sicut seipsum, quilibet, quantum ad simplicem admonitionem et informationem ac simplicem instructionem mutuamque defensionem et subventionem, quantum licet cuique pro gradu suo et officio, debet esse alterius speculator, custos, defensor, protector, adiutor, informator, consiliarius, et instructor, licet nullus debeat super proximum suum iurisdictionem, potestatem, aut auctoritatem indebite usurpare. Cum ergo quilibet debeat speculatorem nunciantem gladium venientem audire (quod non est tantummodo verum de speculatore qui iurisdictione et potestate fungitur super alios, sed etiam de quocunque speculatore pericula ingruenta advertente), sequitur quod qui nunciaverint pericula que intendit papa hereticus, licet non sint prelati, debent audiri. | A reason is assigned for this. Because on account of the charity and friendship by which each one ought to love his neighbor as himself, each one, as far as simple admonition and information and simple instruction and mutual defense and assistance are concerned, should be (as far as is permitted to him according to rank and office) the other’s watchman, guardian, defender, protector, helper, informer, counselor, and instructor (although no one should unduly usurp jurisdiction, power, or authority over his neighbor). Since therefore everyone should hear a watchman who announces a coming sword (which is not only true of a watchman who exercises jurisdiction and power over others, but also of any watchman who warns of impending dangers), it follows that those who announce the dangers threatened by a heretic pope, even if they are not prelates, should be heard. | |
| Octava ratio est hec. Unusquisque tenetur audire illum qui eum informare tenetur, sicut discipulus tenetur audire doctorem si doctor tenetur discipulum informare, et filius tenetur audire patrem, qui filium debet instruere. Sic etiam vicinus debet vicinum audire si vicinus vicinum informare tenetur, quod sacra scriptura insinuare videtur. Ecclesiastici enim 32o scribitur: “Ubi auditus non est, non effundas sermonem.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ubi auditores nequaquam tenentur audire, nullus tenetur sermonem effundere. Quare ubi quis tenetur sermonem effundere, ibi sint aliqui qui tenentur sermonum audire. Sed scientes papam hereticum niti fidem corrumpere orthodoxam et conari fideles a recta fide avertere de necessitate salutis tenentur, debitis circumstantiis observatis, instruere ignorantes de perfidia et intentione iniqua pape heretici, ut se observent et pro loco et tempore, modis sibi convenientibus, eidem heretico toto posse resistant. Ergo et ignorantes papam esse hereticum debent audire eos qui eos volunt de perfidia et iniquis conatibus pape heretici informare. | An eighth argument is this. Everyone is bound to listen to anyone who is bound to inform him, just as a student is bound to listen to a teacher if the teacher is bound to inform the student, and the son is bound to listen to the father, who must instruct his son. Thus also a neighbor must listen to his neighbor if the neighbor is bound to inform his neighbor, which holy Scripture seems to imply. For in Ecclesiasticus 32[:6] it is written: “Where there is no hearing, do not pour out words.” From this it is gathered that where listeners are not bound to listen, no one is bound to pour out words. Therefore where one is bound to pour out words, there must be some who are bound to listen to the words. But those who know that a heretic pope is striving to corrupt the orthodox faith and attempting to turn the faithful away from the right faith, they are bound, of necessity of salvation (observing due circumstance), to instruct those who do not know the heretic pope’s faithlessness and wicked intention, that they should see for themselves and (for place and time, in ways suitable to them) resist that heretic with all their power. Therefore even those who are ignorant that the pope is a heretic must listen to those who wish to inform them of a heretic pope’s faithlessness and wicked attempts. | |
| Quod autem scientes papam esse hereticum teneantur ignorantibus eius perfidiam revelare, probatur ex hoc quod non minus debet unusquisque preservare, si potest, proximum a morte spirituali quam a morte corporali. Sed si aliquis videt alium volentem proximum suum neci tradere corporali, debet hoc ei ut sibi precaveat intimare. Ergo multo magis si sit papam hereticum satagere omnes christianos occidere spiritualiter eos inficiendo heretica pravitate, debet inscios, si convenienter potest, de iniquo molimine pape heretici informare. | But that those who know that the pope is a heretic are bound to reveal his faithlessness to those who are ignorant of it is proved from the fact that everyone should preserve, if possible, his neighbor from spiritual death as well as from bodily death. But if anyone sees another willing to hand over his neighbor to bodily death, he should inform him of this so that he may take precautions. Therefore, much more so, if there is a heretic pope who is trying to kill all Christians spiritually by infecting them with heretical depravity, he should, if he can, inform those who do not know of the heretic pope’s wicked attempt. | |
| Nona ratio est hec. Sicut quis tenetur peccata vitare, ita, si potest, tenetur pericula tam corporalia quam spiritualia tam in se quam in aliis precavere. Sed propter hoc quod quilibet tenetur vitare peccata debet corrigentem se audire. Ergo similiter audire tenetur illum qui pericula tam corporalia quam spiritualia denunciare conatur. Sed declarantes perfidiam pape heretici pericula omnium fidelium tam corporalia quam spiritualia denunciare noscuntur. Ergo audientia eis negari non debet. | A ninth argument is this. Just as one is bound to avoid sins, so, if he can, he is bound to guard against dangers, both bodily and spiritual, both in himself and in others. But because everyone is bound to avoid sins, he should listen to someone correcting him. Therefore, he is similarly bound to listen to someone who tries to denounce dangers both bodily and spiritual. But those who declare the heretic pope’s faithlessness are known to denounce dangers for all the faithful both bodily and spiritual. Therefore, an audience should not be denied them. | |
| Capitulum 11 | Chapter 11 | |
| Discipulus: Quantum intelligo, omnes rationes predicte, et forte omnes alie que possent fieri ad conclusionem eandem, duobus fundamentis inniti videntur. Quorum primum est quod unusquisque tenetur proximos suos sicut se ipsum diligere, et eis facere quod vellet sibi fieri. Secundum est quod fides catholica est omni homini preferenda, ut ob timorem, favorem, amorem vel gratiam cuiuscunque mortalis nullatenus obmittatur quod ad salvationem, exaltationem, et dilatationem fidei christiane noscitur pertinere. Quare pro conclusione predicta desine allegare, quia forte alie rationes eandem virtutem cum predictis haberent, et dic qua pena, secundum assertionem predictam, ignorantes ignorantia dampnabili papam esse hereticum et de eius perfidia informari nolentes sint plectendi, et an sint heretici vel credentes aut fautores pape heretici reputandi. | Student: As far as I understand, all the arguments above, and perhaps all others that could be made to the same conclusion, seem to rest on two foundations. The first is that everyone is bound to love his neighbors as himself and to do for them what he would wish to be done for him. The second is that the Catholic faith should be preferred to every man, so that what is known to pertain to the salvation, exaltation, and expansion of the Christian faith should not be omitted because of fear, favor, love, or grace of any mortal whatever. Therefore cease to argue in favor of the aforesaid conclusion, because perhaps other arguments would have the same force as the the above, and tell with what penalty, according to the aforesaid assertion, those who by blameworthy ignorance are ignorant that the pope is a heretic, and those who refuse to be informed of his faithlessness, should be punished, and whether they should be considered heretics or believers or supporters of the heretic pope. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod ad sciendum qua pena ignorantes ignorantia dampnabili papam esse hereticum (quia nolunt scire vel etiam quia non curant aut contempnunt scire), sint plectendi, oporteret primo videre an sint heretici, vel credentes, aut fautores vel defensores pape heretici iudicandi. | Master: The answer made is that to know with what penalty those should be punished who are ignorant of the pope’s heretical heresy because they do not want to know, or, also, because they do not care to know or despise to know, it would be necessary first to see whether they should be judged to be heretics, or believers, or supporters or defenders of the heretic pope. | |
| Discipulus: Ab hoc ergo primo incipias. | Student: Please, therefore, begin with this first. | |
| Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod tales non sint heretici, stricte accipiendo ‘hereticorum’ vocabulum, nec sunt proprie fautores vel defensores pape heretici, quia fautoria et similiter defensio aliquem actum positivum exteriorem importare videntur. Tales autem ignorantes, per hoc solummodo quod nolunt vel non curant aut contempnunt scire papam esse hereticum, nullum actum exteriorem exercent. Ergo propter hoc solummodo non sunt fautores vel defensores pape heretici iudicandi. Dicitur ergo quod sunt credentes non quidem explicite erroribus pape, cum nesciant eum errare, sed sunt credentes ipsi pape heretico, ipsum esse catholicum dampnabiliter reputantes. Et isto modo videtur accipi nomen ‘credentium’ Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o. Aliter autem accipitur nomen ‘credentium’ eodem titulo, c. Excommunicamus 2o. | Master: It appears to some that such people are not heretics, taking the term “heretics” strictly. Nor are they properly supporters or defenders of the pope who is heretic, because support and similarly defense seem to imply some positive external act, but such ignorant people, by the mere fact that they do not want to know or do not care or despise to know that the pope is heretic, do not exercise any external act; therefore, for this alone, they are not to be judged supporters or defenders of the heretic pope. It is said, therefore, that they are believers, not indeed explicitly in the pope’s errors, since they do not know that he is in error, but they are believers in the heretic pope himself, blameably considering him to be Catholic. And in this way the name ‘believers’ seems to be taken, Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o. (But the name ‘believers’ is taken differently in the same title [De hereticis], c. Excommunicamus 2o.) | |
| Quod vero tales papam esse catholicum quando est hereticus dampnabiliter reputantes credentes valeant nuncupari videtur posse probari. Nam omnes dampnabiliter errantes et peccantes ex adhesione ad personam pape heretici vel sunt credentes, vel fautores, vel defensores, vel receptatores. Non enim plures inveniuntur qui propter crimen ex adhesione ad personas hereticorum secundum iura sint puniendi. Sed qui dampnabiliter reputat papam esse catholicum qui est hereticus, non est ex hoc solummodo fautor neque defensor pape heretici, sicut dictum est prius, nec est propter hoc receptator pape heretici. Ergo propter hoc solummodo debet inter credentes merito computari. Non tamen propter hoc est hereticus iudicandus, quia erroribus pape heretici minime credit, nec forte crederet si sciret errores eius. Quia ex hoc solummodo peccat quia non vult, aut contempnit, vel non curat scire papam esse hereticum, nullum etiam prestando consilium, auxilium, defensionem, receptationem, vel favorem. Nec forte actu ei obedit, licet forsitan sit obedire paratus. Imo potest contingere quod ex alia causa quam ex causa heresis, puta propter contentionem inter eum et papam hereticum de temporalibus, vel ex aliqua alia causa ei renuit obedire, paratus eum totis viribus impugnare, nolens tamen scire quod sit hereticus, nec volens permittere quod hereticus publicetur. | That such people who blameably consider the pope to be Catholic when he is a heretic can be called believers seems provable. For all those who blameably err and sin by adhering to the person of a heretic pope are either believers, or supporters, or defenders, or receivers. For there are not more who should be punished according to the laws for the crime of adhering to the persons of heretics. But someone who blameably considers the pope to be Catholic who is a heretic is not, because of this alone, a supporter or defender of the heretic pope, as was said before, nor is he on this account a receiver of the heretic pope. Therefore because of this alone he should be deservedly counted among believers. However, he should not because of this be judged a heretic, because he does not believe in the errors of the heretic pope at all, nor perhaps would he believe them if he knew his errors. Because he sins only because he does not want, or despises, or does not care, to know that the pope is a heretic, also not giving [to the pope] advice, help, defense, reception, or favor. Nor does he actually obey him, although perhaps he is ready to obey. Indeed, it may happen that for some cause other than the cause of heresy, for example because of a contention between him and the heretic pope about temporal matters, or for some other reason, he refuses to obey him, ready to attack him with all his might, yet not wanting to know that he is a heretic and not willing to allow it to be published that he is a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Dixisti secundum unam assertionem quod reputantes dampnabiliter papam esse catholicum, qui in rei veritate est hereticus, debent censeri credentes. Ideo nunc dic, secundum assertionem eandem, qua pena tales sint plectendi. | Student: You said according to one assertion that those who blamably consider the pope to be Catholic, who is in reality a heretic, should be considered believers. Therefore, now tell me, according to the same assertion, with what penalty such people should be punished. | |
| Magister: Pena eorum, secundum assertionem prescriptam, taxatur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, cum dicitur: “Credentes preterea, receptatores, defensores et fautores hereticorum excommunicationi decernimus subiacere, firmiter statuentes, ut, postquam quilibet talium fuerit excommunicatione notatus, si satisfacere contempserit infra annum, ex tunc ipso iure sit factus infamis, nec ad publica consilia seu officia nec ad eligendos aliquos ad huiusmodi nec ad testimonium admittatur. Sit etiam intestabilis, ut nec testandi liberam habeat facultatem nec ad hereditatis successionem accedat. Nullus preterea ipsi super quocunque negotio, sed ipse aliis respondere cogatur. Quod si forte iudex extiterit, eius sententia nullam obtineat firmitatem, nec cause alique ad eius audientiam perferantur. Si fuerit advocatus, eius patrocinium nullatenus admittatur, si tabellio instrumenta confecta per ipsum nullius sint momenti, sed cum auctore dampnato dampnentur. Et in similibus idem precipimus observari.” | Master: Their penalty, according to the above assertion, is assessed in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1, when it is said: “We decree that believers, receivers, defenders and supporters of heretics are subject to excommunication, firmly establishing that, after any such person has been marked with excommunication, if he has neglected to make satisfaction within a year, from that time on he shall be made infamous ipso iure, and he shall not be admitted to public councils or offices, nor to elect any to such, nor to be a witness. He shall also be incapable of making a will, so that he shall not have the free faculty to make a will nor shall he be permitted to acceed to the succession of an inheritance. No one, moreover, may be compelled to answer to him in any matter whatsoever, but he himself is compelled to answer. But if it happens that he is a judge, his sentence shall not obtain any firmness, nor shall any case be brought to his hearing. If he is an advocate, his advocacy shall not be admitted in any way. If he is a notary, the instruments drawn up by him are of no weight, but they shall be condemned together with the author. And in similar cases we command that the same be observed.” | |
| Ex quibus verbis elicitur quod credentes de quibus hic fit mentio pena hereticorum sunt minime puniendi. Ex quo videtur patenter inferri quod credentes quorum pena hic taxatur non sunt heretici iudicandi, quia si essent heretici pena hereticorum essent merito percellendi. Et ita videtur aperte ostendi quod aliter accipitur nomen ‘credentium’ in isto capitulo et in capitulo eiusdem tituli Excommunicamus 2o, ubi credentes heretici iudicantur. Hic autem non reputantur heretici. Patet ergo hic qua pena credentes qui dampnabiliter reputant papam esse catholicum, qui tamen est hereticus, sint plectendi. | From these words it is evident that the believers mentioned here should not be punished with the penalty of heretics. From which it seems to be clearly inferred that the believers whose punishment is here assessed should not be judged heretics, because if they were heretics the punishment of heretics should deservedly be inflicted. And thus it seems to be clearly shown that the word “believers” is understood differently in this chapter and in the chapter of the same title Excommunicamus 2o, where believers are judged heretics. But here they are not considered heretics. It is therefore clear here with what punishment believers who blameably consider the pope to be Catholic, who is nevertheless a heretic, should be punished. | |
| Verumptamen circa penas credentium et aliorum in prescriptis verbis taxatas sunt diverse opiniones. Una est quod credentes, receptatores, defensores, et fautores hereticorum ipso facto sunt solummodo excommunicationis sententia involuti, et, si nunquam nominatim a prelatis ecclesie fuerint denuntiati excommunicati, alias penas non incurrunt. Sed si fuerint denuntiati nominatim excommunicati, incurrunt eas penas post annum, si satisfacere contempserint infra annum. | However, there are different opinions regarding the punishments of believers and others assessed in the prescribed words. One is that believers, receivers, defenders, and supporters of heretics are ipso facto only involved in the sentence of excommunication, and, if they have never been specifically denounced as excommunicated by the prelates of the church, they do not incur other penalties. But if they have been specifically denounced as excommunicated, they incur those penalties after a year, if they have neglected to make satisfaction within a year. | |
| Alia est opinio quod omnes predicti omnes alias penas ab excommunicatione post annum incurrunt si satisfacere infra annum contempserint, sive fuerint nominatim denuntiati excommunicati sive non. | Another opinion is that all the aforementioned incur all other penalties of excommunication after a year if they have neglected to make satisfaction within a year, whether they have been specifically denounced as excommunicated or not. | |
| Discipulus: Dixisti secundum unam opinionem de illis qui reputant papam hereticum esse catholicum quia nolunt scire vel non curant scire eum esse hereticum. Nunc dic de illis qui putant papam hereticum esse catholicum, qui tamen non contempnunt scire. | Student: You have spoken according to one opinion about those who consider the heretic pope to be Catholic because they do not want to know or do not care to know that he is a heretic. Now tell me about those who consider the heretic pope to be Catholic, who nevertheless do not despise to know. | |
| Magister: Breviter respondetur quod si sint aliqui qui nesciunt papam esse hereticum, et ignorantia eorum non est affectata neque crassa et supina, quia in nullo resisterent illis qui eos vellent de perfidia pape heretici informare sed parati essent eos audire, non sunt pena aliqua feriendi propter hoc, nisi in aliquo alio delinquere convincantur. Ignorantia enim talis eos excusat. | Master: The answer made is, in brief, that if there are some who do not know that the pope is a heretic, and their ignorance is not affected nor gross and supine because they would in no way resist those who wanted to inform them of the heretic pope’s faithlessness but would be ready to listen to them, they should not be punished for this, unless they are convicted of some other offense. For such ignorance excuses them. | |
| Capitulum 12 | Chapter 12 | |
| Discipulus: Supra recitasti opinionem dicentem quod volentes perfidiam pape heretici declarare debent audiri, et quod nolentes eos audire, credentes papam hereticum esse catholicum, sunt excommunicationis sententia involuti. Nunc autem dic an talibus volentibus perfidiam pape heretici declarare fides debeat adhiberi. | Student: You have recited above the opinion that says that those who wish to declare a heretic pope’s faithlessness should be heard, and that those who do not wish to hear them, believing that the heretic pope is a Catholic, are involved in a sentence of excommunication. Now tell me whether credence should be given to the people who wish to declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope. | |
| Magister: Una est assertio quod talibus minime est credendum, quod probatur primo sic. Illud non debet quis facere quod sacra pagina reprehendit. Sed fidem adhibere narrantibus aliquid sinistrum de alio sacra pagina reprehendit. Ecclesiastici enim 19 sic scribitur: “Qui credit cito, levis corde est, et minorabitur.” Ergo homo non debet credere referentibus et narrantibus papam esse hereticum. | Master: One assertion is that such people should not be believed at all, which is proved first as follows. No one should do something that the sacred page condemns. But to give faith to those who tell something sinister about another is condemned by the sacred page. For Ecclesiasticus 19[:4] writes: “Someone who believes quickly is light of heart and will be brought low.” Therefore one should not believe those who report and tell that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Item, minus credenda sunt mala que referuntur de aliquo quam bona, quia unusquisque pronior esse debet ad iudicandum bene de proximo quam male. Sed bona relata de aliquo non statim sunt credenda. Unde et regina Saba cum multa excellentia audisset de Salomone, laudabiliter dixit ad Salomonem, ut legitur 3 Regum 10: “Verus est sermo quem audivi in terra mea super sermonibus tuis et super sapientia tua: et non credebam narrantibus michi, donec ipsa veni et vidi oculis meis, et probavi quod media pars michi nunciata non fuerat.” Ergo multo magis non debet quis credere narrantibus mala de aliquo. Et ita referentibus perfidiam pape heretici minime est credendum. | Likewise, evils that are reported about someone should be believed less than good things, because everyone should be more inclined to judge well of his neighbor than badly. But good things reported about someone should not be believed immediately. Whence also the Queen of Sheba, having heard many excellent things about Solomon, said praiseworthily to Solomon, as we read in 3 Kings 10[:6-7]: “The report is true that I heard in my own land concerning thy words and thy wisdom. And I did not believe those who told me, until I came myself and saw with my own eyes and experienced that the half had not been told me.” Therefore, much more, no one ought to believe those who tell bad things about any one. And thus those who report the faithlessness of the heretic pope are by no means to be believed. | |
| Tertio sic. Illud quod dissuadetur in scriptura divina minime est agendum. Sed credere narrantibus sive bona sive mala dissuadetur in scriptura divina. Ergo non debet quis fidem narrantibus adhibere, et per consequens referentibus papam esse hereticum fides est nullatenus adhibenda. Maior est manifesta, quia nichil dissuadetur in scriptura divina nisi peccatum, quod catholicus minime facere debet. Minor diversis auctoritatibus scripture divine videtur posse aperte probari. Ecclesiastici capitulo19 sic scribitur: “non omni verbo credas.” Et Ieremie 12 legitur: “ne credas eis cum locuti fuerint tibi bona.” Et Michee 7: “Nolite credere amico.” Et 1 Johanne 4: “Nolite omni spiritui credere.” Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus colligitur quod credere narrantibus dissuadet scriptura divina. Quare licet aliqui narrent quod papa est hereticus, eis nullatenus est credendum. | Third, thus. That which is dissuaded in divine Scripture is not to be done. But believing those who report, whether good things or bad, is dissuaded in divine Scripture. Therefore no one should give faith to reporters, and consequently faith is by no means to be given to those who report that the pope is a heretic. The major is manifest, because nothing is dissuaded in divine Scripture except sin, which a Catholic should never do. The minor seems to be clearly proved by divine Scripture from various authorities. In Ecclesiasticus 19[:16] it is written thus: “Believe not every word.” And in Jeremiah 12[:6] we read: “Believe them not when they speak good things to you.” And in Micah 7[:5]: “Believe not a friend.” And in 1 John 4[:1]: “Believe not every spirit.” From these and many other texts it is gathered that the divine Scripture dissuades us from believing reporters. Therefore, although some may report that the pope is a heretic, we must by no means believe them. | |
| Quarto sic. Nullum crimen est credendum de aliquo antequam ordine iudiciario observato probatum extiterit. Sed per solam narrationem illorum qui asserunt papam esse hereticum crimen heresis de papa secundum ordinem iuris minime est probatum. Ergo talibus referentibus papam esse hereticum fides debet nullatenus adhiberi. Minor, ut videtur, probatione non indiget, quia absque iudice nichil secundum ordinem iuris ostenditur. Maior per sacros canones videtur aperte probari. Nam, ut legitur 30 q. 5 c. 9, Victor papa ait: “Quamvis enim vera sint, non tamen credenda sunt nisi que manifestis indiciis comprobantur, nisi que manifesto indicio convincuntur, nisi que iudiciario ordine publicantur.” | Fourth, thus. No crime should be believed about anyone before it has been proved in accordance with the judicial order. But by the mere narration of those who assert that the pope is a heretic, the crime of heresy about the pope is not at all proved according to the order of law. Therefore, faith should by no means be given to people who report that the pope is a heretic. The minor, as it seems, does not need proof, because without a judge nothing is shown according to the order of law. The major seems to be clearly proved by the sacred canons. For, as we read in 30 q. 5 c. 9, pope Victor says: “For even though they are true, they should not be believed unless they are proved by clear evidence, unless they are convicted by a manifest judgment, unless they are published in the judicial order.” | |
| Item, Evaristus papa, ut legitur causa et questioni predictis, c. Nullum, ait: “ Mala itaque audita nullum moveant, nec passim dicta absque certa probatione quisquam unquam credat; sed ante audita diligenter inquirat, nec precipitando quicquam aliquis agat.” | Likewise, pope Evaristus, as is read in the aforementioned Cause and Question, c. Nullum, says: “Therefore, let bad things heard move no one, nor let anyone ever believe what is said everywhere without certain proof; but let him beforehand diligently investigate what he has heard, and let no one act rashly.” | |
| Item, Gregorius, ut habetur 2 q. 3 c. In cunctis, scribens Constantino Mediolanensi episcopo, ait: “De vestra igitur sanctitate absit a christianorum iudicio ea, que maledicorum hominum rumoribus conficta credimus, in qualicunque modulo suspicionis adduci, quia ex sacre eloquii testimonium tenemus, ut mala maiora cum forsitan dicuntur, nisi probata credi non debeant, sed citius probata ulcisci.” Et infra: “Hec igitur dixi, ut nimie levitatis esse ostenderem, si quis mala gravia credere studeat que probari non possunt.” | Likewise, Gregory, as found in 2 q. 3 c. In cunctis, writing to Constantine, bishop of Milan, says: “Of your holiness, therefore, be it far from the judgment of Christians adduce in any measure of suspicion things we believe to be fabricated by the rumors of slanderous men, because we hold from the testimony of sacred eloquence that when greater evils are perhaps said, they ought not to be believed unless they are proved, but that proved ones should be avenged sooner.” And below: “I have said this, therefore, to show that it is too frivolous if anyone strives to believe grave evils which cannot be proved.” | |
| Item, Gregorius, ut legitur dist. 86 c. Si quid, ait: “Si quid vero de quocunque clerico ad aures tuas pervenerit, quod te iuste possit offendere, facile non credas, nec ad vindictam te res accendat incognita, sed presentibus ecclesie tue senioribus diligenter est veritas perscrutanda.” Et eadem sententia sub eisdem verbis habetur Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Heli. | Likewise, Gregory, as we read in dist. 86 c. Si quid, says: “If anything comes to your ears about any cleric whomsoever that may justly offend you, do not easily believe it, nor let the thing unknown incite you to revenge, but the truth must be diligently investigated in the presence of the elders of your church.” And the same opinion is found under the same words in Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Heli. | |
| Item, Augustinus in epistola ad Vincentium, ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. Quam magnum, ait: “Facta nocentium que innocentibus demonstrari, vel ab innocentibus credi non possunt, non coinquinant quemquam.” | Likewise, Augustine in his letter to Vincent, as found in 23 q. 4 c. Quam magnum [Epistola 93 iv.15], says: “The deeds of the guilty that cannot be demonstrated to the innocent, or believed by the innocent, do not defile anyone.” | |
| Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus videtur aperte probari quod mala de aliquo credi non debent antequam secundum ordinem iuris manifeste probentur, et per consequens referentibus extra iudicium papam esse hereticum minime est credendum. | From these and many other [texts] it seems to be clearly proved that evils about someone should not be believed before they are clearly proved according to the order of the law, and consequently those who report extra-judicially that the pope is a heretic are by no means to be believed. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod iste ultime auctoritates non faciunt ad propositum, quia loquuntur solum de iudicibus et prelatis qui non debent credere ea que deferuntur ad ipsos antequam probentur aperte. Cum hoc tamen stat quod alii debent credere hiis que de perfidia pape heretici nuntiantur. | Student: It seems that these last authorities do not serve the purpose, because they speak only of judges and prelates who should not believe what is brought to them before it is clearly proved. It is consistent with this, however, that others should believe what is reported about the heretic pope. | |
| Magister: Hoc videtur irrationabiliter dictum, quia illi qui levius decipi possunt non debent esse promptiores ad credendum narratis quam alii. Sed alii quam iudices et prelati levius decipi possunt, quia minorem peritiam et experientiam rerum habent quam iudices et prelati. Ergo multo minus debent credere huiusmodi relationibus antequam clare secundum iudiciarium ordinem sint probate. | Master: This seems to be said unreasonably, because those who can be deceived more easily should not be more ready to believe reports than others. But persons who are not judges and prelates can be deceived more easily, because they have less expertise and experience of things than judges and prelates. Therefore much less should they believe such reports before they are clearly proved according to the judicial order. | |
| Capitulum 13 | Chapter 13 | |
| Discipulus: Quamvis prescripta assertio videatur bene fundata, tamen peto ut assertionem contrariam recitare digneris, et eam fulcire nitaris. | Student: Although the above assertion seems well founded, I nevertheless ask that you kindly recite the contrary assertion and endeavor to support it. | |
| Magister: Tenentes assertionem contrariam variis modis reputant distinguendum. Quorum prima distinctio accipitur ex glossa dist. 86 c. Si quid, quod duplex est credulitas, una que spectat ad iudicem, alia que spectat ad socios. Credulitas que spectat ad iudicem est illa secundum quam iudex debet proferre sententiam. Credulitas autem que spectat ad socios est illa qua quis extra iudicium credit socio. | Master: Those who hold the contrary assertion consider that it is necessary to make various distinctions. The first is taken from the gloss on dist. 86 c. Si quid, that belief is twofold, one that pertains to a judge, the other that pertains to equals. The belief that pertains to a judge is that according to which the judge must pronounce sentence. The belief that pertains to equals is that by which someone outside a court believes an equal. | |
| Secunda distinctio est quia aut referentes perfidiam pape heretici vel quodcunque crimen alterius fuerunt antea providi, discreti, et bone fame, aut fuerunt criminosi et male fame. | The second distinction is that those reporting the heretic pope’s faithlessness or any other crime of another person either were previously prudent, discreet, and of good fame, or they were criminal and of bad fame. | |
| Tertia distinctio est quia aut narrant tantum secundum famam aut secundum certam scientiam. | The third distinction is that they either narrate only according to fame or according to certain knowledge. | |
| Quarta distinctio est quia, si referentes sunt criminosi et male fame, aut ad assertionem relationis sue adducunt aliqua legitima documenta, aut nulla. | The fourth distinction is that, if the reporters are criminal and of bad fame, they either adduce to the assertion of their report some lawful proofs, or none. | |
| Quinta distinctio est quia aut referunt notoria, aut illa que non sunt notoria que tamen probari possunt. | The fifth distinction is that they either report notorious things, or things that are not notorious but can nevertheless be proved. | |
| Iuxta has distinctiones tenent isti septem conclusiones, quarum prima est quod, loquendo de credulitate que spectat ad iudicem, nullus debet credere referentibus papam esse hereticum nisi sit notorium vel iudiciario ordine observato probatum. | According to these distinctions, these [those whose position is being explained] hold seven conclusions, the first of which is that, speaking of the belief that pertains to a judge, no one should believe those reporting that the pope is a heretic unless it is notorious or proved with the judicial order observed. | |
| Secunda conclusio est quod, loquendo de credulitate que est inter socios, secundum quod unus socius extra iudicium credit alteri, nullus tenetur credere uni soli, cuiuscunque fame vel opinionis existat, asserenti papam esse hereticum. | The second conclusion is that, speaking of the belief that exists between equals, insofar as one equal believes another outside the court, no one is bound to believe one person alone, of whatever fame or opinion he may be, who asserts that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Tertia conclusio est quod uni soli bone fame et opinionis referenti per certam scientiam papam esse hereticum potest quis credere absque peccato, licet ei credere minime teneatur. | The third conclusion is that one person alone of good fame and opinion reporting through certain knowledge that the pope is a heretic can be believed without sin, although no one is bound to believe him. | |
| Quarta conclusio est quod pluribus honestis et discretis referentibus per certam scientiam papam esse hereticum tenetur quis credere. | The fourth conclusion is that one is bound to believe several honest and discreet persons reporting through certain knowledge that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Quinta conclusio est quod referentibus providis et honestis per famam publicam papam esse hereticum debet quis credere. | The fifth conclusion is that one should believe prudent and honest persons reporting through public fame that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Sexta conclusio est quod quibuscunque criminosis adducentibus legitima documenta quod papa est hereticus est credendum. | The sixth conclusion is that whoever brings forward lawful proofs that the pope is a heretic should be believed. | |
| Septima conclusio est quod quibuscunque criminosis vel male fame, si non declaraverint per legitima documenta papam esse hereticum minime est credendum. | The seventh conclusion is that anyone who is a criminal or of bad fame, if they do not declare by lawful proofs that the pope is a heretic, should not be believed at all. | |
| Discipulus: Si prolixe istas septem conclusiones nitaris ostendere librum nimis prolixum efficeres. Ideo circa eas succincte procedas. | Student: If you try to show these seven conclusions at length, you will make the book too long. Therefore, proceed briefly about them. | |
| Magister: Prima conclusio per auctoritates allegatas capitulo precedente pro assertione contraria sufficienter videtur esse probata. Nam auctoritates ultime asserunt manifeste quod iudex non debet credere hiis que dicuntur nisi probentur, hoc enim [est Ly], non debet reputare sententiam super hiis que obiciuntur esse ferendam antequam sint aperte probata. Quod intelligendum est de illis que non sunt notoria sibi et aliis. Et ideo, quicunque esset iudex pape heretici non deberet contra eum diffinitivam ferre sententiam antequam convinceretur legitime vel esset confessus, nisi esset notorium ipsum esse hereticum. In notoriis enim non est necesse ordinem iudiciarium observare. | Master: The first conclusion seems to be sufficiently proved by the texts cited in the preceding chapter for the contrary assertion. For the last texts clearly assert that a judge should not believe what is said unless it is proved, i.e., he should not consider that a sentence should be passed on what is presented until it has been clearly proved. This should be understood of things that are not notorious to himself and others. And therefore, whoever would be the judge of a heretic pope should not pass a definitive sentence against him before he was lawfully convicted or has confessed, unless it is notorious that he is a heretic. (For in notorious matters it is not necessary to observe the judicial order.) | |
| Discipulus: Nunquid ille qui esset iudex pape heretici posset absque manifesta probatione in iudicio papam hereticum detinere vel aliter citra diffinitivam sententiam coartare? | Student: Could someone who was a judge of a heretic pope detain a heretic pope in court without manifest proof or otherwise restrain him without a definitive sentence? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod tanta et talis posset iudici fieri fides extra iudicium de perfidia pape heretici et ingerente per eum periculo, quod iudex ante causam iudicialiter captam posset papam hereticum detinere. Quod probatur sic. Eque vel magis potest iudex detinere illum de quo est sibi facta fides extra iudicium, qui maiori et periculosiori ac perniciosori crimine alligatur, quam alium de minori solum sibi suspectum, quia fides de maiori crimine magis debet movere iudicem ad detinendum criminosum quam sola suspicio de minori. Sed iudex potest detinere illum qui de minori crimine et minus periculoso quam sit crimen heresis est sibi suspectus. Ergo multo magis potest detinere papam hereticum de quo est sibi facta fides certa extra iudicium quod est hereticus, et quod intendit fideles avertere a fide orthodoxa. | Master: The answer made is that a belief so great and of such a character could come to exist in a judge, outside the court, about the faithlessness of a heretic pope, and the danger brought in by him, that the judge could detain the heretic pope before the case was judicially taken up. This is proved as follows. If a belief has come to exist in a judge, outside the court, that a person is implicated in a greater and more dangerous and pernicious crime, the judge can detain that person, as much as, or more than, he can detain someone else suspected of a lesser crime; because belief about a greater crime should move the judge more to detain a criminal than mere suspicion of a lesser crime. But a judge can detain someone he suspects of a lesser crime, and a crime less dangerous than the crime of heresy. Therefore, much more, he can detain a heretic pope about whom a sure belief has come to exist in him, outside the court, that he is a heretic and that he intends to turn the faithful away from the orthodox faith. | |
| Maior probatione videtur minime indigere. Minor aperte probatur auctoritate Alexandri tertii qui, ut habetur Extra, De deposito, c. 1, mandavit ut furem suspectum iudices vel legati sub questione ad rationem ponerent, etiam, si oporteret, vinculis alligatum, donec reddere compelleretur pecuniam. Ubi dicit glossa super verbo ‘questionibus’: “Nota, quod suspecti sunt torquendi et in vinculis detinendi.” Ex quibus verbis insinuatur quod Alexander loquitur in casu in quo fur non fuit convictus sed suspectus tantummodo. Et ita solummodo suspecti possunt etiam in vinculis detineri. | The major seems to need no proof at all. The minor is clearly proved by the authority of Alexander III, who, as is stated in Extra, De deposito, c. 1, ordered that judges or legates should put a suspected thief under questioning, even, if necessary, bound in chains, until he was compelled to return the money. The gloss on the word ‘questioning’ says: “Note, that suspects should be tortured and kept in chains.” From these words it is suggested that Alexander is speaking in a case in which the thief was not convicted but only suspected. And thus those who are merely suspects can be kept in chains. | |
| Item, ex capitulo Karoli imperatoris, ut legitur dist. 19 c. In memoriam, sic habetur: “Si vero, quod non decet, quilibet, sive sit presbiter sive diaconus, aliquam perturbationem machinando et nostro ministerio insidiando redarguatur falsam ab apostolica sede detulisse epistolam, vel aliud quod inde non venerit, salva fide et integra erga apostolicum humilitate penes episcopum sit potestas, utrum eum in carcerem, aut in aliam detrudat custodiam, usque quo per epistolam aut per idoneos sue partis legatos apostolicam interpellet sublimitatem, ut potissimum sua sancta legatione dignetur decerneret quid de talibus lex romana statuat diffinire.” Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod ante sententiam, et antequam sit certum aliquem esse falsarium, licite in carcere detinetur. Quod glossa super verbo ‘carcerem’ aperte insinuat, dicens: “si certum est eum esse falsatorem, deponitur dist. 50 c. Si episcopus et Extra, De crimine falsi, c. Ad falsariorum. Sed ubi est dubium, sit quod hic dicitur.” Et ita in casu solummodo suspecti licite detinentur. Quod etiam Extra, De rescriptis, Ex literis innuitur manifeste. Et hoc obtinuit consuetudo iudicum infidelium et iudicum fidelium ecclesiasticorum et secularium. Ergo multo fortius si papa est hereticus, et suo iudici facta est fides de eius perfidia, etiam extra iudicium licebit eidem iudici, precipue si periculum viderit imminere, eundem papam hereticum etiam in vinculis detinere. | Also, from a chapter of the Emperor Charles, as we read in dist. 19 c. In memoriam: “If, however, which is not fitting, anyone, whether a presbyter or a deacon, plotting some disturbance and undermining our ministry, is accused of having brought a false letter from the Apostolic See, or of having brought something else that did not come from there, the bishop has the power, with all faith and complete humility towards the Apostolic [i.e. the pope], to throw him either into prison or into some other custody, until he can appeal to the Apostolic sublimity by letter or by suitable legates from him, so that he may deign to decide in the best way by his holy legation what Roman law establishes to define regarding such cases.” From these words it is given to be understood that before the sentence, and before it is certain that someone is a forger, he is permissibly detained in prison. The gloss on the word ‘prison’ clearly suggests this, saying: “if it is certain that he is a forger, he is deposed, dist. 50 c. Si episcopus and Extra, De crimine falsi, c. Ad falsariorum. But where there is doubt, let what is said here happen.” And so on occasion people who are only suspects are permissibly detained. This is also clearly indicated in Extra, De rescriptis, Ex literis. And this has been the custom of unbelieving judges, and of faithful ecclesiastical and secular judges. Therefore, much more strongly, if the pope is a heretic, and his judge has come to believe in his faithlessness, even outside the court, it will be permissible for the judge, especially if he sees danger imminent, to detain the heretic pope even in chains. | |
| Discipulus: Contra hoc due occurrunt instantie. Prima est quod aliter tractandus est papa, quamvis efficiatur hereticus, quam alii in tanta dignitate minime constituti. Ergo licet alii criminosi crimine heresis irretiti valeant detineri, tamen papa est nullatenus detinendus. Secunda est quia licet papa efficiatur hereticus, tamen antequam degradetur et traditus fuerit curie seculari gaudet privilegio clericali, et per consequens absque excommunicationis vinculo nullus eum detinere valebit. | Student: Two objections arise against this. The first is that a pope, even if he becomes a heretic, should be treated differently from others who are not so highly placed. Therefore, although other criminals caught in the crime of heresy may be able to be detained, a pope should by no means be detained. The second is that, even if the pope becomes a heretic, before he is degraded and handed over to the secular court he enjoys clerical privilege, and consequently no one will be able to detain him without [incurring] the bond of excommunication. | |
| Magister: Iste instantie frivole reputantur. Unde ad primam dicitur quod, quia papa, si efficiatur hereticus ipso facto tam iure divino quam iure humano est omni dignitate et auctoritate privatus, nullo gaudet privilegio ultra alios episcopos effectos hereticos, imo videtur quod, quia si non sit alius papa quando papa est hereticus, non potest haberi recursus ad papam verum, quando autem papa manente catholico, si alii episcopi efficiantur heretici, potest haberi recursus ad papam verum, oportet in hoc casu speciale aliquid observare circa papam hereticum, ut scilicet contra eum strictius et rigidius quam contra episcopos quando est papa catholicus per inferiores iudices procedatur, quia tunc non possunt habere recursum ad papam verum. Si vero papa labente in heresim manifeste, electores alium novum papam catholicum eligerent, videtur eodem modo procedendum per iudices inferiores papa circa papam hereticum et circa alios episcopos heretica labe respersos, nisi papa hereticus maiori uteretur potentia temporali. Tunc enim animosius et efficacius esset procedendum contra ipsum, quia ubi maius existat periculum ibi est fortius et plenius consulendum. | Master: These arguments are considered frivolous. Hence, to the first, it is said that because, if he becomes a heretic then ipso facto, both by divine law and by human law, a pope is deprived of all dignity and authority [and] enjoys no privilege beyond other bishops who have become heretics. Indeed it seems that – because, if there is no other pope when the pope is a heretic, there can be no recourse to a true pope, but when the pope remains a Catholic, if other bishops become heretics there can be recourse to a true pope -- it is necessary in this case to observe something special regarding the heretic pope, namely that proceedings against him be carried out more strictly and rigidly by inferior judges than against bishops when there is a Catholic pope, because then they cannot have recourse to a true pope. But if, however, when the pope is clearly falling into heresy, the electors were to elect another new Catholic pope, it seems judges inferior to the pope should follow the same procedure regarding the heretic pope as they do regarding other bishops stained with heretical taint, unless the heretic pope were to exercise greater temporal power. For then it would be appropriate to proceed against him more energetically and more effectively, because where there is greater danger, there stronger and fuller consultation should be had. | |
| Ad secundam instantiam respondetur quod licet papa hereticus non careret omni privilegio clericali, non tamen propter hoc iudex eius vel alius auctoritate iudicis detinens ipsum sententiam excmmunicationis incurreret, quia licet iudici et aliis auctoritate eius violenter clericos detinere (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Ut fame). | To the second objection it is answered that although a heretic pope would not be deprived of all clerical privilege, yet his judge, or another detaining him by the authority of a judge, would not on that account incur the sentence of excommunication, because it is permissible for a judge, and others by his authority, to forcibly detain clerics (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Ut fame). | |
| Discipulus: Illa decretalis non loquitur nisi de laicis qui auctoritate prelatorum possunt capere clericos violenter. Ergo saltem nullus laicus sive sit rex vel princeps vel alius valet capere papam hereticum absque sententia excommunicationis. | Student: That decretal speaks only of laymen who can forcibly detain clerics by the authority of prelates. Therefore at least no layman, whether king or ruler or other, can detain a heretic pope without [incurring] a sentence of excommunication. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod hoc generale est quod omnis superior habens iurisdictionem coactivam potest subditum detinere et capere absque sententia excommunicationis. Et ideo, quia reputant se sufficienter probare quod in casu laici habent iurisdictionem coactivam super papam hereticum, de qua probatione visum est libro sexto, ideo dicunt quod in casu possunt laici etiam absque auctoritate clericorum violenter papam hereticum detinere et in vinculis custodire. Cum vero dicis quod decretalis allegata non loquitur nisi de laicis qui auctoritate superiorum possunt absque excommunicationis sententia clericos detinere, respondetur quod in illa decretali unus solummodo casus excipitur in quo licet laicis in clericos manus iniicere violentas, cum quo stat quod multi alii casus excipiuntur. Et ita potest quis laicus in casu in papam hereticum absque excommunicationis sententia manus iniicere violentas. | Master: It is answered that it is a general [rule] that every superior having coercive jurisdiction can detain and arrest a subject without [incurring] a sentence of excommunication. And therefore, because they consider themselves to have sufficiently proved that on occasion laymen have coercive jurisdiction over a heretic pope, the proof of which has been seen in Book VI [c.93-100], they therefore say that on occasion laymen can, even without the authority of clerics, forcibly detain a heretic pope and keep him in chains. But when you say that the quoted decretal speaks only of laymen who, by the authority of superiors, can detain clerics without a sentence of excommunication, the answer made is that in that decretal only one case is excepted in which laymen are permitted to lay violent hands on clerics, with which it is consistent that many other cases are excepted. And thus any layman can, on occasion, lay violent hands on a heretic pope without [incurring] a sentence of excommunication. | |
| Discipulus: Miror quod cum nulla lex loquitur de papa heretico, isti ita intrepide de punitione pape heretici loqui presumunt, cum ubi leges deficiunt oportet ad conditorem legum recurrere. Aliter enim liceret cuilibet in tali casu ubi leges deficiunt ad sensum suum recurrere, et proprie inniti prudentie, contra illud Proverb. 3: “ne inniteris prudentie tue.” | Student: I am surprised that when no law speaks of a heretic pope, these men presume to speak so boldly about the punishment of a heretic pope, since where the laws fail, recourse must be had to the maker of the laws. Otherwise it would be permissible for anyone in a case where laws fail to have recourse to his own opinion and to rely on his own prudence, contrary to that of Proverbs 3[:5]: “Do not rely on your own prudence.” | |
| Magister: Respondent quod ubi aliquid est necessario agendum, si leges positive deficiunt quia in tali casu generali [speciali We] et singulari nulla lex specialis est edita, nec potest convenienter absque periculo haberi recursus ad conditorem legum (in scripturis divinis, ratione et industria naturali ac rationali scientia precellentem), recurrendum est ad peritos in predictis et in legibus, si possunt haberi. Si autem iudex est in omnibus supradictis sufficienter instructus, ipse suo sensu uti potest in casu tali. Et ideo quia de papa heretico leges non sunt condite speciales, ubi papa esset hereticus et ex eius perfidia periculum fidei immineret, et non esset papa catholicus ad quem posset convenienter haberi recursus, alii iudices inferiores, scripturis divinis et iuri naturali innitendo, ipsum deberent debite corrigere. | Master: They answer that where something must be done, if positive laws fail because in such a special and singular case no special law has been issued, nor can recourse be had conviently without danger to a maker of laws who is outstanding in the divine scriptures, in reason, in natural diligence and rational science, one must have recourse to experts in the aforementioned and in the laws, if such experts can be had. But if the judge is sufficiently instructed in all the above, he himself can use his own sense in such a case. And therefore, because no special laws have been made concerning a heretic pope, if the pope were a heretic and from his faithlessness a danger to the faith threatened and there were no Catholic pope to whom recourse could be conveniently had, other inferior judges, relying on divine scriptures and natural law, should duly correct him. | |
| Discipulus: Secundum ista magis esset innitendum in casu isto theologis et in philosophia et scientia morali peritis quam iuristis. | Student: According to these [who hold this position], in this case reliance should more be on theologians and experts in philosophy and moral science than on jurists. | |
| Magister: Hoc nonnulli concedunt, dicentes, sicut tactum est prius, quod ubicunque emergit dubitatio inter iuristas que per aliquam legem expressam solvi non potest, ad theologos et philosophos est ultimo recurrendum, ad quos spectat ( si fuerint precellentes, licet nullum gradum honoris in theologia et philosophia habuerint) de legibus quibuscunque profundius et certius, licet non semper promptius, iudicare quam ad iuristas, nisi iuriste in aliis scientiis fuerint excellentes. | Master: Some grant this, saying, as was touched upon before [1 Dial. 1.8, 14], that wherever a doubt arises among jurists that cannot be resolved by any express law, one should ultimately have recourse to theologians and philosophers, to whom it pertains (if they are excellent, even if they have no degree of honor in theology and philosophy) to judge about any laws more profoundly and certainly, although not always more readily, than to jurists, unless the jurists are excellent in the other sciences. | |
| Capitulum 14 | Chapter 14 | |
| Discipulus: De hoc disputatum est libro primo. Ideo te convertas ad secundam conclusionem in principio capituli precedentis propositam. | Student: This was discussed in the first book. Therefore, turn to the second conclusion proposed at the beginning of the previous chapter. | |
| Magister: Secunda conclusio ibi proposita est hec. Loquendo de credulitate extra iudicium secundum quod unus socius credit alteri, nullus tenetur credere uni soli cuiuscunque fame aut opinionis existat narranti papam esse hereticum. Hoc videtur sic posse probari. Nullus tenetur credere alium esse malum antequam probetur. Ergo nullus tenetur credere papam esse hereticum antequam probetur esse hereticum. Sed relatio unius nichil probat. Ergo propter relationem unius nullus tenetur credere papam esse hereticum. | Master: The second conclusion proposed there is this. Speaking of belief outside the court, according to which one equal believes another, no one is bound to believe a single person, whatever his fame or [good] opinion, who tells him that the pope is a heretic. This seems provable as follows. No one is bound to believe that another is evil before it is proved. Therefore, no one is bound to believe that the pope is a heretic before he is proved to be a heretic. But the report of one person proves nothing. Therefore, because of the report of one person, no one is bound to believe that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Istam conclusionem nolo discuti amplius, quia satis apparet michi certa. Ideo tertiam conclusionem probare nitaris. | Student: I do not wish to discuss this conclusion any further, because it seems certain enough to me. Therefore you are trying to prove the third conclusion. | |
| Magister: Tertia conclusio est quod uni soli bone fame et opinionis asserenti papam esse hereticum potest quis credere absque peccato, licet sibi minime credere teneatur. Que videtur sic posse probari. Si duo equalis fame et opinionis sibi contrariantur circa idem, licet alii credere cui vult illorum. Sed possibile est quod papa et aliquis alius apud eundem eiusdem fame et opinionis quo ad veritatem et bonitatem vite existunt. Ergo si unus se gerit pro papa catholico et alius dicit eum esse hereticum, licet alii apud quem equalis fame et opinionis existunt credere cui illorum voluerit. Et ita licet sibi credere asserenti papam esse hereticum. | Master: The third conclusion is that if only one person of good fame and opinion asserts that the pope is a heretic, one can believe him without sin, though one is not bound to believe him. This seems provable in this way. If two people of equal fame and opinion contradict each other about the same matter, it is permissible for another to believe whichever of them he wishes. But it is possible for the pope and someone else to be, for a given person, of the same fame and opinion as to truth and goodness of life. Therefore if one of them presents himself as a Catholic pope and the other says that the former is a heretic, it is permissible for the person with whom they [the pope and his accuser] have equal fame and opinion to believe whichever of them he wishes. And thus it is permissible for him to believe that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Item, frustra alicuius peccatum alteri revelatur nisi liceat illi cui revelatur credere revelanti. Sed peccatum alicuius, etiam occultum, licite in secreto alteri qui potest prodesse et non obesse revelatur, imo nonnunquam revelari debet. Ergo licet illi cui revelatur credere revelanti, et per consequens si aliquis etiam in secreto revelat alii perfidiam pape heretici, licet credere revelanti. | Likewise, it is pointless for the sin of one person to be revealed to another unless it is permissible for the person to whom it is revealed to believe the one who reveals it. But it is permissible to reveal in secret a sin, even a hidden sin, of one person to another who can benefit and not harm, indeed, it sometimes ought to be revealed. Therefore, it is permissible for the one to whom it is revealed to believe the one who reveals it, and consequently if someone even in secret reveals to another the faithlessness of the heretic pope, it is permissible to believe the one who reveals it. | |
| Discipulus: Hec ratio in uno falso fundari videtur, quod videlicet licet alicui revelare peccatum alterius occultum. Quod tamen esse illicitum multis modis videtur posse probari. | Student: This argument seems to be based on a falsehood, namely that it is permissible for someone to reveal the secret sin of another. However, it seems that it can be proved that this is impermissible in many ways. | |
| Primo quidem, quia proditionem facere nulli est licitum. Sed revelare crimen occultum est proditionem facere, teste Augustino qui, ut legitur 2 q. 1 c. Si peccaverit, ait: “quia enim secretum fuit, quando peccavit in te, secretum quere, cum corrigis quod in te peccavit. Nam si solus nosti quia peccavit in te, et eum vis coram omnibus arguere, non eris corrector sed proditor.” Ergo nulli licet peccatum occultum alicuius alteri revelare, quia sicut contingit prodere aliquem multis, ita contingit prodere aliquem uni soli. Si igitur ille est proditor peccati occulti qui multis revelat, ita etiam est proditor qui uni soli revelat. | First because it is not permissible for anyone one to commit treason. But to reveal a secret crime is to commit treason, as Augustine testifies, as we read in 2 q. 1 c. Si peccaverit. [Sermo 82.10]. He says: “For since it was secret when he sinned against you, seek for secrecy when you correct his sin against you. For if you alone know that he sinned against you, and you wish to rebuke him before everyone, you will not be a corrector but a betrayer.” Therefore, it is not permissible for anyone to reveal the secret sin of another, because just as it is possible to betray someone to many, so it is possible to betray someone to one alone. Therefore, if he is a betrayer of a secret sin who reveals it to many, so is he a betrayer who reveals it to one alone. | |
| Item, quod fidelitati repugnat nulli est licitum. Sed revelare peccatum alicuius occultum fidelitati repugnat, teste Salomone qui Prov. 11 ait: “qui ambulat fraudulenter, revelat archana: qui autem fidelis est animi, celat amici commissum.” Ergo nulli licet peccatum proximi alteri revelare. | Likewise, what is repugnant to fidelity is not permissible for anyone. But revealing someone's secret sin is repugnant to fidelity, as Solomon testifies in Prov. 11[:13]: “Someone who walks deceitfully reveals secrets: but someone who is faithful in spirit conceals what his friend has committed.” Therefore, no one is permitted to reveal the sin of his neighbor to another. | |
| Item, non solum est detractor qui falsum dicit, sed etiam qui peccatum revelat occultum. Sed nulli licet verba detractoria loqui. Ergo nulli licet crimen occultum alicuius alteri revelare. Ex quo patenter infertur quod nulli licet perfidiam pape heretici alteri revelare, si est occulta. Quare si quis perfidiam pape heretici occultam alteri revelare presumit, peccat mortaliter. Et ille cui revelat secreto debet ipsum reputare peccare mortaliter. Quare ipsum pro criminoso in corde suo debet habere, et per consequens ipsi credere nullatenus debet, quia criminoso nunquam est credendum. | Likewise, not only is a detractor one who speaks falsely, but also one who reveals a hidden sin. But no one is permitted to speak derogatory words. Therefore no one is permitted to reveal the hidden crime of another. From this it is clearly inferred that no one is permitted to reveal to another the faithlessness of a heretical pope, if it is hidden. Therefore, if anyone presumes to reveal the hidden faithlessness of a heretical pope to another, he sins mortally. And he to whom he reveals it secretly must consider him to be sinning mortally. Therefore he must hold him in his heart as a criminal, and consequently he must not believe him at all, because a criminal is never to be believed. | |
| Hec sunt que movent me ad tenendum quod nullus debet credere asserenti secrete papam esse hereticum. Porro quia non solum assertiones veras sed etiam falsas debemus audire (per ipsas enim nostra excitantur ingenia, iuxta sententiam Sapientis), ideo pro assertione contraria satage allegare. | These are things that move me to hold that no one should believe someone who secretly asserts that the pope is a heretic. Furthermore, since we should not only listen to true but also to false statements (for our minds are aroused by them, according to the opinion of the wise man [Aristotle]), therefore try to argue in favor of the contrary assertion. | |
| Magister: Sunt quidam dicentes quod licet non debeat quis passim crimen alicuius occultum alteri revelare, tamen in casu, quando quis per certitudinem (non solummodo per famam) scit aliquem crimen aliquod comisisse vel etiam velle committere, licet sibi non omnibus sed alicui revelare secrete. Et ideo, si papa perfidia heresis est respersus et intendit christianos a fide avertere orthodoxa, licet unus solus sciret, sibi liceret alicui principi aut regi vel alteri, qui posset prodesse et non obesse, crimen et intentionem pape malivolam revelare. | Master: There are some who say that although one should not everywhere reveal to another the secret crime of another, nevertheless on occasion, when one knows with certainty (not only by fame) that someone has committed. or even intends to commit. a crime, it is permissible to reveal it secretly, not to everyone but to one. And therefore, if the pope is imbued with the faithlessness of heresy and intends to turn Christians away from the orthodox faith, even if only one knew it, it would be permissible for that one to reveal the pope’s crime and malicious intention to some ruler or king or other who could do good and not harm. | |
| Quod enim liceret crimen alicuius occultum alteri revelare Augustinus videtur asserere, qui in regula sua docet quod peccatum fratris “prius preposito debet ostendi” quam testibus. Ergo licet alicui crimen fratris occultum preposito revelare. | Augustine seems to assert that it would be permissible to reveal the secret crime of one person to another . He teaches in his Rule that the sin of a brother “must first be shown to the superior before” [being shown] to witnesses. Therefore it is permissible for someone to reveal the secret crime of a brother to the superior. | |
| Item, vir christianus Christum debet in suis operibus imitari. Sed Christus crimen et intentionem perversam Iude occultum non solum uni sed etiam pluribus revelavit, cum dixit de ipso Marci 14: “unus ex duodecim, qui intinguit mecum manum in cathino” ?tradet’ (supple ?me’). Et Ioh. 13 sic legitur Christus dixisse Apostolis: “Amen, amen dico vobis quia unus ex vobis tradet me.” Et sequitur: “ille est, cui ego intinctum panem porrexero. Et cum intinxisset panem, dedit Iude Simonis Scariote.” Ergo licet peccatum alicuius occultum aliis revelare. | Likewise, a Christian man should imitate Christ in his works. But Christ revealed the hidden crime and perverse intention of Judas not only to one but even to many, when he said of himself in Mark 14[:20, 18]: “one of the twelve, who dips his hand with me in the dish” will betray me. And in John 13[:21, 26] we read that Christ said to the Apostles: “Amen, amen, I say to you that one of you will betray me… it is he to whom I will give the dipped bread. And when he had dipped the bread, he gave it to Judas Iscariot, Simon’s son.” Therefore it is permissible to reveal someone’s hidden sin to others. | |
| Discipulus: Per istam rationem probaretur quod liceret non uni soli sed etiam omnibus revelare peccatum alicuius occultum, quia Christus non uni soli sed omnibus aliis apostolis peccatum Iude revelavit. | Student: By this argument it would be proved that it is permissible not to reveal someone’s hidden sin to one alone but also to everyone, because Christ revealed Judas’ sin not to one alone but to all the other apostles. | |
| Magister: Respondent quod peccatum alicuius occultum non solum uni sed etiam multis revelare licet, quia omnibus illis qui possunt prodesse et non obesse. Hinc est quod quia omnes apostoli preter Iudam erant tales quod poterant prodesse et non obesse, ideo omnibus Christus revelavit peccatum Iude. Et hanc rationem videtur innuere glossa 2 q. 1 c. Si peccaverit, que, super verbo ‘proditor’ obiiciens, ait: “sed nonne Dominus prodidit crimen Iude cum dixit ‘qui intingit manum mecum etc.’” Et post, respondens, ait: “responde illi quibus dicebatur poterant tantum prodesse.” | Master: They answer that it is permissible to reveal someone’s hidden sin not only to one but also to many, namely to all those who can benefit and not harm. Hence it is that because all the apostles except Judas were such that they could benefit and not harm, therefore Christ revealed the sin of Judas to all. And this reason seems to be hinted at by the gloss on 2 q. 1 c. Si peccaverit, which, on the word ‘betrayer’, says: “But did not the Lord reveal the crime of Judas when he said ‘who dips his hand with me’” etc. And afterwards, responding, it says: “Answer, those to whom it was said could only do good.” | |
| Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod illis licet revelare crimen alicuius occultum qui possunt prodesse, et ideo si multi sunt qui prodesse possunt, multis crimen occultum licite revelatur. Sed quia nunquam invenitur quod omnes possent prodesse et non obesse, imo multi obessent, ideo omnibus nunquam debet revelari crimen occultum quod probari non potest. Quare cum magna cautela est crimen cuiuscunque occultum alteri revelandum, quia nulli criminoso quantumcunque sit prelatus, nulli de quo sciens peccatum occultum suspicatur quod non sit constans in amore ad omnem proximum, amicum et inimicum, est pandendum peccatum occultum alterius, quia de omni tali dubitandum est an velit tantum prodesse et non obesse. | From these words it is gathered that it is permissible to reveal someone’s hidden crime to those who can benefit, and therefore, if there are many who can benefit, it is permitted to reveal a hidden crime to many. But since it is never found that all could benefit and not harm, indeed, many would harm, therefore a hidden crime that cannot be proved should never be revealed to everyone. Therefore, the secret sin of any one should be revealed to another with great caution, because the secret sin of another should not be revealed to any criminal, no matter how much he may be a prelate, and not to anyone of whom the person who knows the secret sin suspects that he is not constant in love towards every neighbor, friend and enemy; because of every such person one must doubt whether he wishes only to do good and not harm. | |
| Discipulus: Ergo secundum ista subditus non tenetur revelare peccatum occultum fratris prelato suo etiam in secreto. | Student: Therefore, according to these, a subject is not bound to reveal the secret sin of a brother to his prelate, even in secret. | |
| Magister: Conceditur, quando sciens peccatum occultum alterius cognoscit prelatum suum aliquando peccasse mortaliter etiam in secreto, vel dubitat eum velle [nolle Ly] etiam pro morte vitanda peccare mortaliter. Si autem subditus in conscientia sua reputat prelatum suum esse talem quod nec pro aliquo temporali commodo consequendo, nec pro morte corporali vitanda vellet peccare mortaliter, crimen occultum fratris posset prelato eidem revelare secrete. Et omni alii quem talem putat, si non decipitur, potest crimen occultum revelare, quia talis est ille qui potest prodesse et non obesse. Si autem alicui alteri aliter crimen revelat occultum, proditor et detractor est censendus, nec debet de peccato mortali aliqualiter excusari, nisi probabiliter credat quod revelando bono communi aut peccanti proficiat. | Master: It is granted, when the person knowing the secret sin of another knows that his prelate has at some time sinned mortally, even in secret, or doubts whether he is unwilling to sin mortally even to avoid death. But if the subject considers in his conscience that his prelate is such that he would not wish to sin mortally, either for the sake of gaining any temporal advantage or for the sake of avoiding bodily death, he could secretly reveal the secret sin of his brother to that prelate. And he can reveal a hidden crime to any other person whom he thinks to be such, if he is not deceived, because such a person is someone who can do good and not harm. But if he reveals a hidden crime to any other person in any other way, he should be considered a betrayer and a detractor, and he should not be excused from mortal sin in any way, unless he probably believes that by revealing it he will benefit the common good or the sinner. | |
| Capitulum 15 | Chapter 15 | |
| Discipulus: Puto quod ista materia multas habet difficultates annexas que succincte dillucidari non possunt. Ideo ipsam usque ad tractatum De gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam (in quo de detractoribus, impositoribus falsorum criminum, calumpniatoribus, et proximorum diffamatoribus in particulari sollicite indagabo) censeo differendam. Nunc vero ad quartam conclusionem assertionis in capitulo 13o recitate accede. | Student: I think that this matter has many difficulties attached to it that cannot be explained succinctly. Therefore I think it should be deferred until the [non-extant] treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith”,in which I will carefully investigate in particular detractors, false accusers, calumniators, and defamers of one’s neighbors. Now, however, proceed to the fourth conclusion of the assertion recited in Chapter 13. | |
| Magister: Quarta conclusio ibi proposita est quod pluribus honestis et discretis referentibus per scientiam certam papam esse hereticum tenetur aliquis credere extra iudicium. Que videtur sic posse probari. In actibus humanis illud quod maiorem probabilitatem habet magis est credendum. Sed maiorem probabilitatem habet quod dictum multorum sit verum quam dictum unius. Cum ergo papa sit unus, licet ipse negaret se esse hereticum, si multi assererent ipsum esse hereticum magis credendum esset multis quam pape heretico, et ita credendum esset papam esse hereticum. | Master: The fourth conclusion proposed there is that if several honest and discreet people report that a certain pope is a heretic, one is bound to believe them outside of court. This seems provable in this way. In human acts, what has greater probability is more to be believed. But it is more probable that the statement of many is true than that the statement of one is true. Since therefore the pope is one, even if he himself denied that he was a heretic, if many asserted that he was a heretic, many should more be believed than the heretic pope, and so it should be believed that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Ista ratio nichil probat, quia nonnunquam plus credendum est uni quam multis. | Student: That argument proves nothing, because sometimes one should be believed rather than many. | |
| Magister: Hoc, si esset verum, rationem prefatam minime impediret. Nam si plus creditur uni quam pluribus hoc non est precise propter maiorem dignitatem, quia quilibet in dignitate constitutus plurium testimonio potest convinci, quod non esset verum si, ex hoc ipso quod aliquis est in maiori dignitate constitutus, plus esset sibi soli credendum quam aliis multis. Ergo si est plus credendum uni quam multis hoc est quia meliorem rationem habet pro se, vel quia melioris vite, vel quia de causa est magis instructus, vel propter aliquam rationem consimilem. Si ergo papa non est melioris vite quam multi qui dicunt eum esse hereticum, nec magis literatus in scripturis divinis, nec in aliquo alio alios excellit nisi in sola dignitate papali et annexis dignitati, non est magis sibi credendum quam multis. Ergo si multi asserunt quod papa est hereticus est eis credendum. | Master: This, if it were true, would not in the least hinder the aforementioned argument. For if one is believed more than many, this is not precisely because of greater dignity. Because anyone established in dignity can be convinced by the testimony of many, which would not be true if, from the very fact that someone is established in greater dignity, he alone were to be believed more than many others. Therefore, if one should be believed more than many, this is because he has a better argument for himself, or because he is of better life, or because he is more instructed in the cause, or for some similar reason. Therefore, if the pope is not of better life than many who say that he is a heretic, and is not more literate in the divine Scriptures, and does not excel others in anything else except in the papal dignity alone and the things annexed to the dignity, he should not be believed more than many. Therefore, if many assert that the pope is a heretic, they should be believed. | |
| Item, non minus est credendum aliquibus extra iudicium quam in iudicio. Sed multis in iudicio asserentibus papam esse hereticum esset credendum. Aliter enim nunquam papa posset convinci de heretica pravitate. Ergo multis asserentibus extra iudicium papam esse hereticum est credendum. | Likewise, some should be believed no less outside the court than in the court. But many asserting in the court that the pope is a heretic would have to be believed, for otherwise a pope could never be convicted of heretical wickedness. Therefore, many asserting outside the court that the pope is a heretic must be believed. | |
| Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur peccare dupliciter. Primo, quia testes in iudicio sunt iurati, extra vero iudicium non iurant. Magis autem credendum est iuratis quam non iuratis. Ergo magis est credendum multis in iudicio quam extra iudicium. | Student: This argument seems to be flawed in two ways. First, because witnesses in court are sworn, but outside the court they do not take an oath. But we must believe more in the case of sworn witnesses than in the case of unsworn witnesses. Therefore, the many are more to be believed in court than outside the court. | |
| Secundo, quia ad condempnandum papam non sufficeret duos testes adducere, cum presul non debeat dampnari nisi cum 72 testibus (2 q. 5 c. Presul). Ergo nec duobus asserentibus extra iudicium papam esse hereticum est credendum. | Second, because to condemn a pope it would not be enough to bring two witnesses, since a prelate should not be condemned except with 72 witnesses (2 q. 5 c. Presul). Therefore, we must not believe two asserting outside the court that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Magister: Non habes mentem asserentium conclusionem suprascriptam. Non enim intendunt quod, quilibet audiens aliquos asserentes papam esse hereticum statim fides eis debeat adhiberi, sed volunt quod huiusmodi asserentes papam esse hereticum, antequam credatur eis, sunt cum maxima diligentia examinandi, utrum scilicet sint parati iurare illa que asserunt de papa esse vera, vel utrum possent ea apertis ostendere documentis, pro qua heresi dicunt papam esse hereticum, quomodo sciunt papam huiusmodi heresim affirmare, quomodo sciunt eum esse in sua heresi pertinacem. | Master: You have not taken the meaning of those who assert the above conclusion. They do not mean that, when one hears someone asserting that the pope is a heretic, one should immediately believe them, but they mean that people who assert that the pope is a heretic, before they are believed, should be examined with the greatest diligence, namely to find out whether they are ready to swear that the things they assert about the pope are true, or whether they could show with open proofs their reasons for saying that the pope is a heretic, how they know the pope affirms this kind of heresy, how they know that he is pertinacious in his heresy. | |
| Et tandem videtur expediens quod talibus asserentibus papam esse hereticum, antequam credatur eis, examinentur et exigantur iuramentum quod circa ipsum papam hereticum meram dicunt veritatem, ut forte non minus tales asserentes papam esse hereticum antequam credatur eis examinentur extra iudicium quam essent examinandi in iudicio, quamvis ad iurandum et alia facienda non debeant compelli extra iudicium sicut in iudicio compelli valerent. | And it seems useful eventually that those who assert that the pope is a heretic, before they are believed, should be examined and an oath demanded that they tell the pure truth about the heretic pope, so that perhaps before they are believed they should be examined outside the court no less than they should be examined in the court, though they should not be compelled to swear and do other things outside the court as could be compelled in court. | |
| Quibus rite factis credendum est eis extra iudicium sicut in iudicio crederetur, licet credulitas in iudicio aliquem alium effectum possit et debeat habere quam credulitas sola extra iudicium. | When these things are properly done, those people must be believed outside the court as they would be believed in the court, although belief in the court can and should have some other effect than belief only outside the court. | |
| Hec maxime servanda sunt circa extraneos et ignotos, circa quos etiam est sollicite inquirendum cuius vite et opinionis extiterint, an etiam pro aliqua alia causa quam pro causa fidei habuerint occasionem male volendi pape. | These things should be observed especially with strangers and unknown people. One must also carefully inquire into their life and reputation, whether for any other cause than for the sake of faith they have occasion for ill-will toward the pope. | |
| Per hoc respondetur ad primam instantiam quam fecisti, quia ab asserentibus extra iudicium papam esse hereticum videtur ad maiorem cautelam debere exigi iuramentum. | Through this your first objection is answered. It seems that as a greater precaution an oath should be required of those who assert outside the court that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Ad secundam videtur respondere glossa super preallegatum capitulum Presul, que querens ibidem: “nunquid contra papam duplicabuntur testes” respondet dicens: “non, imo duo sufficiunt et in hoc est deterioris conditionis, quia ipse sine comparatione aliorum creatus est maior et ideo sine spe venie condempnandus est ut diabolus.” Dicunt tamen quod si duo testes soli apparerent papam de heretica pravitate accusantes, examinandi essent multum stricte, propter hoc quod papa, qui est positus quasi signum ad sagittam, habet multos offendere. Et sic etiam dicunt quod si quis audit duos viros sibi notos, bonos, sanctos et veraces, qui nec amore nec odio alicuius, nec timore nec cupiditate vellent alicui crimen imponere, asserentes se scire papam heresim manifestam et determinatam pertinaciter tenuisse, declarantes modum heresis et pertinacie, debet credere eis et reputare papam hereticum. | The second seems to be answered by the gloss on the previously cited chapter Presul. In the same place it asks: “Will the witnesses against a Pope be doubled?”, and answers by saying: “No, indeed two are enough, and in this case he is of a worse condition, because he was created incomparably greater than the others and therefore must be condemned without hope of pardon, like the devil.” They say, however, that if only two witnesses appeared to accuse a pope of heretical wickedness, they would have to be examined very strictly, because the pope, who is placed "as a target for an arrow" [Lamentations 3:12], has to offend many [i.e. he is a target for slander]. And so they also say that if anyone hears two men known to him -- good, holy and truthful, who do not wish to accuse anyone of a crime through love or hate of anyone or through fear or greed -- assert that they know the pope has held pertinaciously a clear and definite heresy, declaring the measure of the heresy and pertinacity, then he should believe them and consider the pope a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Quare dicunt isti quod asserentes papam esse hereticum examinandi sunt utrum ea que dicunt de papa possint apertis ostendere documentis. | Student: Why do these people [who assert this position] say that when they [accusers] assert that the pope is a heretic, they must be examined to see whether they can show by open proofs what they say about the Pope ? | |
| Magister: Hoc dicunt propter hoc quod asserunt dupliciter posse aliquos perfidiam pape heretici declarare. Uno modo per testimonium proprium, si videlicet affirmant se audivisse papam asserentem pertinaciter heresim determinatam et apertam, vel etiam docentem heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam credere tenetur explicite. Puta, si dicunt se audivisse papam asserere quod fides christiana est falsa, vel quod Christus non est verus Deus, vel quod non fuit passus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam si affirmant se audivisse papam pertinaciter asserere vel defendere quamcunque heresim scripture sacre adversantem. | Master: They say this because they assert that there are two ways in which some can declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope. [1] In one way by their own testimony, namely if they affirm that they have heard the pope pertinaciously assert a clear and definite heresy, or also teach a heresy contrary to the Catholic truth which he is bound to believe explicitly. For example, if they say that they heard the pope assert that the Christian faith is false, or that Christ is not the true God, or that he did not suffer, or something of the kind, or also if they affirm that they heard the pope pertinaciously assert or defend some heresy that is opposed to sacred scripture. | |
| Aliter possunt aliqui perfidiam pape heretici declarare non per testimonium proprium sed per legitima documenta. Puta, si ostenderent bullam pape in qua diffiniretur heresis manifesta, vel si ostenderent copiam talis bulle per regiones fidelium publicatam, vel etiam si ostenderent instrumentum vel scripturam auctenticam modum quo fuit papa convictus de pravitate heretica continentem. | [2] In another way, some can declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope not by their own testimony but by lawful proofs. For example, if they were to show a papal bull in which manifest heresy was defined, or if they were to show a copy of such a bull published throughout the regions of the faithful, or also if they were to show an authentic instrument or writing containing a way in which the pope was convicted of heretical wickedness. | |
| Discipulus: Si habes alias rationes ad conclusionem predictam, adducas. | Student: If you have other arguments for the aforementioned conclusion, adduce them. | |
| Magister: Tertia ratio est hec. Ad illa que innocentie sunt quilibet obligatur. Sed credere viris bone fame et opinionis cum aliqua asserunt et affirmant ad innocentiam spectat, teste Ambrosio qui, ut habetur 22 q. 4 c. Innocens, ait: “Innocens credit omni verbo’. Non vituperanda facilitas, sed laudanda bonitas.” Cum ergo viri boni et veraces asserunt et affirmant modo predicto papam esse hereticum, eis audiens fidem adhibere tenetur. | Master: A third argument is this. Everyone is bound to the things that are innocent. But believing men of good fame and opinion when they assert and affirm something pertains to innocence, as Ambrose [Duties of the Clergy, III.x.68] testifies. In 22 q. 4 c. Innocens, says: “An innocent man believes every word’ [Proverbs 14:15]. His readiness [to believe] should not be blamed, but his goodness should be praised.” Therefore, when good and truthful men assert and affirm in the aforementioned way that the pope is a heretic, anyone who hears them is bound to believe them. | |
| Quarta ratio est hec. Illud non est obmittendum sine quo societas humana et conversatio mutua hominum rite non poterit conservari. Sed nisi unus alteri credat, nec humana societas nec mutua conversatio hominum rite poterit conservari. Ergo unus tenetur alteri credere, nisi sit aliquo crimine irretitus propter quod de falsitate debeat haberi suspectus. Cui autem credendum est in uno, et in omnibus, quia si aliquibus in uno credendum est hoc non est nisi quia presumuntur veraces. Si enim non presumerentur veraces non esset eis credendum. Qui autem presumitur verax, in omnibus dictis suis presumitur verax, quia si in uno esset mendax non presumeretur verax. Ergo veracibus asserentibus papam esse hereticum est credendum. | A fourth argument is this. We must not omit anything without which human society and the mutual interaction of men cannot be properly preserved. But unless one person believes another, neither human society nor the mutual interaction of men can be properly preserved. Therefore one is bound to believe another, unless the latter is implicated in some crime because of which he should be suspected of falsehood. But whoever should be believed in one matter should also be believe in all, because if some people should be believed in one thing, this is only because they are presumed to be truthful. For if they were not presumed to be truthful, they should not be believed. But someone who is presumed to be truthful is presumed to be truthful in all he says, because if he were a liar in one thing he would not be presumed to be truthful. Therefore, when truthful persons assert that the pope is a heretic, they should be believed. | |
| Discipulus: Per istam rationem probaretur quod uni soli asserenti modo preexposito papam esse hereticum esset credendum, quia presumitur verax, ergo in omnibus est sibi credendum. | Student: By this argumenting it would be proved that if just one asserts it in the way previously explained, it should be believed that the pope is a heretic, because the accuser is presumed to be truthful, therefore he should be believed in everything. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod secus est de uno et pluribus, quia plus est credendum pluribus quam uni, et ideo propter assertionem multorum potest quis licite credere malum de alio quem plures asserunt esse malum. Sed quando unus refert malum de alio, propter talem relationem non est magis presumendum illum de quo malum narratur esse malum quam illum esse veracem qui narrat, et ideo nullus tenetur credere uni soli referenti papam esse hereticum. | Master: The answer made is that it is different with one and many, because more belief should be given to many than to one, and therefore someone can because of the assertion of many permissibly believe evil about another whom many assert to be evil. But when one reports evil about another, it should not be presumed, because of that report, that the person about whom the evil is reported is bad, any more than that the person who reports it is truthful; and therefore no one is bound to believe just one person who reports that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Non adducas plures rationes pro ista conclusione, sed dic quem effectum debet habere ista credulitas. | Student: Do not adduce more arguments for this conclusion, but say what effect this credence should have. | |
| Magister: Respondetur distinguendo, quia aut ista credulitas fit iudici pape heretici, aut alii qui non est iudex eius. Si fit iudici pape heretici et illi qui faciunt talem credulitatem iudici sunt parati in iudicio eadem asserere, iudex ad condempnationem pape heretici debet procedere. Si autem ista credulitas fit alii quam iudici, et fit talis credulitas quod papa potest convinci legitime, illi qui taliter credunt papam esse hereticum ipsum tanquam excommunicatum vitare tenentur, et ideo ei debent nullatenus obedire, sed pro defensione fidei quantum possunt, modis sibi convenientibus, laborare tenentur ne, videlicet, papa hereticus inficere valeat orthodoxos. | Master: The answer is made with a distinction. Either this credence comes to exist in the judge of the heretic pope, or in someone who is not his judge. If it comes to be in the judge of the heretic pope, and if those who produce this belief in the judge are ready to assert the same in court, the judge should proceed to condemn the heretic pope. But if this credence comes to be in someone other than the judge, and if the belief that comes to exist is such that the pope can be lawfully convicted, those who thus believe the pope to be a heretic are bound to avoid him as being excommunicated, and therefore they must not obey him in any way but are bound to work as much as they can for the defense of the faith (in ways that are suitable to them), lest, namely, the heretic pope be able to infect the orthodox. | |
| Capitulum 16 | Chapter 16 | |
| Discipulus: Conclusionem quintam supra capitulo 13 premissam discutias. | Student: Discuss the fifth conclusion stated above in chapter 13. | |
| Magister: Quinta conclusio
est hec. Viris providis et honestis referentibus per famam
publicam papam esse hereticum est credendum. Que sic
probatur. Illis est credendum papam esse hereticum propter
quorum relationem papa tanquam hereticus est vitandus. Sed
propter relationem talem papa tanquam hereticus est
vitandus [quia solum propter publicam (plubicam We) famam
excommunicatus est vitandus added WeVc]
(Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum
desideres). Papa autem hereticus est
excommunicatus. Ergo propter solam famam publicam est
vitandus, et per consequens narrantibus papam esse
hereticum per publicam famam est credendum. [Note: Something seems wrong with this paragraph. See Knysh’s appartus, p.97 line 9. Between “vitandus” and “(Extra”, WeVc insert: “quia propter solam publicam famam excommunicatus est vitandus”. Compare gloss on Cum desideres, s.v. Si publica fama: “Nota quod si fama est aliquem esse excommunicatum, vitandus est… Et ita fama facit probationem.” Ki] |
Master: The fifth
conclusion is this. Prudent and honest men who report
through public fame that the pope is a heretic should be
believed. This is proved thus. Belief that the pope is a
heretic should be given to those on account of whose
report the pope should be avoided as being a heretic. But
because of such a report the pope should be avoided as a
heretic, because merely because of public fame alone an
excommunicated person should be avoided (Extra, De
sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum desideres).
And a heretic pope is excommunicated. Therefore because of
public fame alone he should be avoided, and consequently
those who report that the pope is a heretic through public
fame should be believed. |
|
| Discipulus: De hoc tactum est supra libro sexto, capitulo 94, ubi recitasti virtualiter opinionem eandem, que videtur omnino falsa. Nam cum constet quod sepe publica fama est falsa et sepe ita diffamantur de crimine innocentes sicut nocentes, nullo modo videtur quod propter relationem publice fame debeat papa hereticus censeri. Quia ita potest diffamari papa catholicus sicut hereticus. | Student: This was touched upon above in Book VI, Chapter 94, where you recited virtually the same opinion, which seems entirely false. For since it is clear that public reputation is often false, and innocent and guilty alike are often defamed of crime, it in no way seems that a pope should be considered a heretic because of a report of public fame. For a Catholic pope can be defamed in this way just like a heretic. | |
| Magister: Licet argumentum tuum non videatur habere colorem, tamen conclusio supradicta clarius quam prius ab aliquibus explicatur. | Master: Although your argument does not seem to have any plausibility, however some explain the above conclusion more clearly than before. | |
| Discipulus: Dic primo quomodo argumentum meum non videatur habere colorem. | Student: Tell me first how my argument does not seem to have any plausibility. | |
| Magister: Dicitur quod non obstante quod ita diffamantur innocentes sicut rei, est aliquis propter famam publicam evitandus, quemadmodum non obstante quod ita convincuntur sepe innocentes per testes qui veraces creduntur sicut rei, et tamen postquam aliquis convictus fuerit et dampnatus, sive innocens fuerit sive reus, sententia est servanda, et si est sententia que sequestrationem a fidelium cetu includat, est vitandus. | Master: It is said that notwithstanding that innocent and guilty alike, a person should be avoided because of public fame, just as notwithstanding that innocent and guilty alike are often convicted by witnesses who are believed to be truthful, and yet after someone has been convicted and condemned, whether innocent or guilty, the sentence should be observed, and if there is a sentence that includes sequestration from the congregation of the faithful, he should be avoided. | |
| Discipulus: De hac responsione in alio tractatu faciam mentionem, ideo dic quomodo predicta conclusio explicatur. | Student: I will make mention of this response in another treatise, so tell me how the aforementioned conclusion is explained. | |
| Magister: Distinguitur de referentibus per famam publicam papam esse hereticum. Quia aut narrant famam publicam quam sciunt a quibus orta fuit etc. aut quam nesciunt a quibus orta fuit, nec an alique persone possunt veritatem fame probare. In primo casu videtur quod propter talem narrationem sit papa hereticus ab audientibus evitandus. In secundo casu non videtur quod debeat evitari. | Master: A distinction is made among those who report by public fame that the pope is a heretic. Either they relate a public rumor they know from whom it originated, etc., or they do not know from whom it originated, nor can anyone prove the truth of the fame. In the first case it seems that because of such a narration the pope is a heretic to be avoided by those who hear [the rumour]. In the second case it does not seem that he should be avoided. | |
| Capitulum 17 | Chapter 17 | |
| Discipulus: Illa conclusione dimissa, de qua alias te diligenter interrogare propono, dissere conclusionem sextam supra capitulo 13o recitatam. | Student: Leaving aside that conclusion, about which I propose to ask you carefully elsewhere, discuss the sixth conclusion recited above in chapter 13. | |
| Magister: Conclusio sexta est quod quibuscunque criminosis adducentibus legitima documenta vel indicia manifesta quod papa est hereticus est credendum, non quod propter assertionem criminosorum, sed propter ipsa documenta legitima et indicia manifesta credatur papa esse hereticus. | Master: The sixth conclusion is that whoever brings lawful proofs or clear indications that the pope is a heretic should be believed, not because of the assertion of criminals, but because of the lawful proofs and clear indications themselves, the pope is believed to be a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Que sunt ista documenta legitima et indicia manifesta propter que credendum est papam esse hereticum. | Student: What are these lawful proofs and manifest indications on account of which one must believe that a pope is a heretic? | |
| Magister: De hoc tactum est supra capitulo 15, ubi dictum est quomodo possunt aliqui perfidiam pape heretici declarare per legitima documenta. | Master: This was touched upon above in Chapter 15, where it was said how some can declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope by lawful proofs. | |
| Discipulus: Si illis aliquid est addendum secundum taliter opinantes non differas explanare. | Student: If anything needs to be added to them, according to those who think this way, do not hesitate to explain. | |
| Magister: Inter legitima documenta et indicia manifesta distinguunt. Nam ‘legitima documenta’ vocant scripturas perfidiam pape heretici absque pallio declarantes, ‘indicia manifesta’ vocant suspiciones seu presumptiones probabiles perfidiam pape heretici comprobantes. | Master: They distinguish between lawful proofs and manifest indications. For ‘lawful proofs’ they call writings declaring the faithlessness of a heretic pope without disguise, ‘manifest indications’ they call suspicions or probable presumptions proving the faithlessness of a heretic pope. | |
| Discipulus: Pone exempla ex predictis. | Student: Give examples from the aforementioned. | |
| Magister: De legitimis documentis supra capitulo 15 posita sunt exempla. Quorum primum est de bulla pape heretici, in qua aliquis error contra doctrinam ecclesie affirmatur. Secundum est de copia bulle eius. Tertium est de aliquo instrumento vel scriptura auctentica modum quo fuit papa hereticus convictus de heresi continente. Et quartum potest poni de scriptura auctentica alicuius prelati vel principis transsumptum bulle vel illius particule in qua error hereticalis asseritur continente. | Master: Examples of lawful proofs are given above in chapter 15. The first is of a bull of a heretic pope affirming some error against the doctrine of the Church. The second is of a copy of his bull. The third is of some instrument or authentic writing, containing a way in which a heretic pope was convicted of heresy. And the fourth can be put forward of an authentic writing of some prelate or ruler containing a transcript of a bull or of part of it in which the heretical error is asserted. | |
| Discipulus: Antequam exemplifices de indiciis manifestis, peto ut tractes duo exempla prima de legitimis documentis, et primo primum. | Student: Before giving examples of manifest indications, I ask you to give two examples first from the lawful proofs, and first of all the first. | |
| Magister: Quod propter talem bullam pape heresim asserentem sit credendum papam esse hereticum sic videtur posse probari. Si non esset credendum papam esse hereticum propter huiusmodi bullam, aut hoc esset quia papa posset sub bulla heresim asserere absque heretica pravitate, aut quia tali bulle fides est minime adhibenda. Non propter primum, quia supra libro quarto videtur probatum aperte quod papa sub bulla asserens heresim est pertinax, et per consequens hereticus reputandus, quia non est paratus corrigi et ultimata deliberatione heresim diffinivit. Nec propter secundum, quia bulle papali fides debet adhiberi. | Master: That because of such a bull a pope asserting heresy should be believed to be a heretic seems provable as follows. If it were not to be believed that the pope is a heretic because of such a bull, this would be either because a pope could assert heresy under a bull without heretical depravity, or because faith should not be given to such a bull. Not because of the first, because it seems to have been clearly proved above in the fourth book that a pope asserting heresy under a bull is pertinacious, and consequently must be considered a heretic, because he is not prepared to be corrected and after final deliberation has defined a heresy. Nor because of the second, because faith should be given to a papal bull. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod isti sibiipsis sint contrarii. Nam isti assentire videntur quod pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum. Ergo nec bulle sue fides debet aliqualiter adhiberi, et ita propter bullam suam minime est hereticus reputandus. | Student: It seems that these are contradictory to each other. For these [i.e. those whose position is being reported] seem to agree that a heretic pope should not be trusted in any matter. Therefore, faith should not be given to his bull, and so he should not be considered a heretic because of his bull. | |
| Magister: Dicunt quod ipsos nequaquam intelligis. Cum enim dicunt quod pape heretico in nullo negotio est credendum, verum est pro se et precipue contra alium. Tamen pape heretico, sicut cuilibet criminoso, credendum est contra se. Unde, si criminosus confiteatur crimen suum, creditur sibi quia aliter propter confessionem propriam minime dampnaretur. Si tamen criminosus confiteatur vel asserat crimen alterius, sibi nullatenus est credendum. Et sic dicunt quod bulle sive diffinitioni hereticali pape heretici bene est credendum contra papam, ut propter eam hereticus iudicetur, sed bulle huiusmodi in aliis minime est credendum. Si enim in eadem bulla vel alia pape heretici aliquid asseratur contra fidem, vel etiam in preiudicium cuiuscunque catholici, sibi nullatenus est credendum, quia in nullo negotio supra alium pape heretico est credendum. | Master: They say that you do not understand them at all. For when they say that a heretic pope should not be believed in any matter, it is true [when he testifies] for himself and especially against another. Nevertheless, a heretic pope, like any criminal, should be believed against himself. Hence, if a criminal confesses his crime, he is believed, because otherwise he would not be condemned because of his own confession. However, if a criminal confesses or asserts the crime of another, he should not be believed at all. And so they say that a bull or heretical definition of a heretic pope should be believed against the pope, so that he is judged a heretic because of it, but bulls of this kind should not be believed in other matters. For if in the same bull or another of a heretic pope anything is asserted against the faith, or also to the prejudice of any Catholic, he should not be believed at all, because in no matter should a heretic pope be believed above another person. | |
| Capitulum 18 | Chapter 18 | |
| Discipulus: Tracta secundum exemplum de copia bulle pape heretici in qua heresis affirmatur. | Student: Deal with the second example, of a copy of a bull of a heretic pope in which a heresy is affirmed. | |
| Magister: Quod propter talem copiam sive transsumptum papa debeat hereticus iudicari videtur posse probari sic. In omnibus credendum est copie sive transsumpto bulle pape catholici. Ergo credendum est copie sive transsumpto bulle pape heretici in hiis que sunt contra ipsum. Antecedens videtur probatione minime indigere. Consequentia probatur per hoc quod tantum valet copia sive transsumptum bulle pape heretici contra ipsum quantum valet copia sive transsumptum bulle pape catholici quantum ad omnia que continet, quemadmodum tantum valet ipsa bulla pape heretici contra se quantum valet ipsa bulla pape catholici quantum ad omnia que continet et includit. Ergo sicut in omnibus credendum est transsumpto bulle pape catholici, ita, quantum ad illa que sunt contra papam hereticum, credendum est transsumpto bulle pape heretici. | Master: That because of such a copy or transcript the pope should be judged a heretic seems provable thus. A copy or transcript of a bull of a Catholic pope must be believed in every respect. Therefore a copy or transcript of a bull of a heretic pope must be believed in things that are against him. The premise seems to need no proof at all. The consequence is proved by this, that a copy or transcript of a bull of a heretic pope is valid against him as much as a copy or transcript of a bull of a Catholic pope is valid in respect of all that it contains, just as the bull of a heretic pope is valid against him as much as the bull of a Catholic pope is valid in respect of all that it contains and includes. Therefore, just as in all things a copy or transcript of a bull of a Catholic pope is valid, so, in respect of things that are against a heretic pope, a copy or transcript of a bull of a heretic pope must be believed. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod nec transsumptum bulle pape catholici nec transsumptum bulle pape heretici a criminosis vel infamibus divulgatum fidem debeat facere cuicunque, quia, sicut verba criminosorum debent esse suspecta, ita etiam tales ostentiones transsumptorum papalium debent esse suspecte, ut nullus talibus ostentionibus transsumptorum papalium fidem debeat adhibere, quia non debet quis propter criminosos credere illa esse vera transsumpta. | Student: It seems that neither a transcript from a bull of a Catholic pope nor a transcript from a bull of a heretic pope if disseminated by criminals or infamous people should be believed by anyone, because, just as the words of criminals should be suspect, so also such exhibitings of papal transcripts should be suspect, so that no one should give credence to such exhibitings of papal transcripts, because no one should believe from criminals that they are true transcripts. | |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur distinguendo de diffinitionibus pape sive heretici sive catholici. Quia aut sunt publice et sollempniter promulgate aut non. De primis dicitur quod ignorantia talium nullum excusat post duos menses. De secundo dicitur quod de eis potest quis per ignorantiam excusari. Per hoc dicitur ad argumentum quod fecisti, concedendo quod propter criminosos, sive propter ostensionem transsumptorum papalium a criminosis factam, nullus tenetur credere umquam papam esse hereticum. Tamen propter huiusmodi ostensionem transsumptorum papalium continentium hereticam pravitatem a criminosis factam, si aliquis in rei veritate ignorat papam talem diffinitionem hereticalem edidisse, debet inquirere veritatem. | Master: To this answer is made by distinguishing between definitions made by a pope, whether heretic or Catholic. Either they are publicly and solemnly promulgated or not. Of the first it is said that ignorance of such does not excuse anyone after two months. Of the second it is said that someone can be excused through ignorance of them. By this it is said to the argument you have made, conceding that no one is ever bound to believe that the pope is a heretic because of criminals, or because of a exhibiting of papal transcripts made by criminals. However, because of this kind of exhibiting of transcribed papal decrees containing the heretical depravity made by criminals, if anyone is in fact unaware that the pope issued such a heretical definition, he should investigate the truth. | |
| Discipulus: Hic deberent isti duo probare. Quorum primum est quod de constitutione hereticali pape publice et sollempniter promulgata nullus valet se per ignorantiam excusare. Secundus est quod, propter verba criminosorum, ignorantes talem constitutionem hereticalem pape deberent querere veritatem. Unde de istis duobus velis disserere, et non solum referas circa ipsa sententiam predictorum, sed etiam aliorum. | Student: Here these [those whose position is being explained] should prove two things. The first is that no one can excuse himself by ignorance about a heretical constitution publicly and solemnly promulgated by the pope. The second is that those who are unaware of such a heretical papal constitution should investigate the truth because of the words of criminals. Wherefore would you like to discuss these two? And report not only the opinion about these things of the aforementioned, but also of others. | |
| Magister: Circa primum sunt diverse sententie. Una est quod nullus de constitutione hereticali pape post duos menses potest se per ignorantiam excusare, nec potest in hoc casu ignorantiam allegare, et si allegat non est sibi credendum, nisi ignorantiam probaverit quam allegat. Quemadmodum nullus potest ignorantiam allegare de constitutione pape catholici post duos menses, quia eam omnes scire tenentur, et omnes ad eius observantiam obligantur. Et ista videtur esse sententia glossatorum decretalium et decretorum. | Master: About the first there are various opinions. One is that no one can excuse himself by ignorance about a heretical constitution of a pope after two months, nor can he allege ignorance in this case, and if he does, he should not be believed unless he proves the ignorance he alleges. Just as no one can allege ignorance about a constitution of a Catholic pope after two months, because all are bound to know it, and all are bound to observe it. And this seems to be the opinion of the glossators of the decretals and decrees. | |
| Unde, de sententia publice promulgata cardinalis infra legationem suam, de qua minus videtur, dicit glossa Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, capitulo primo: “cum publice sententia illa fuerit promulgata, eam ignorare non potest, neque debet, et presumitur eam scire, 12 q. 2 Qui et humanis, et 16 dist. Quod dicitis.” Et infra: “ubi enim allegatur ignorantia circa ea que plerique sciunt et que publice fiunt, non creditur ei nisi hoc probetur.” | Hence, regarding a publicly promulgated sentence of a cardinal within his legation, about which there seems to be less, the gloss Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. 1, says: “When that judgment has been publicly promulgated, he cannot and must not be ignorant of it, and he is presumed to know it, 12 q. 2 Qui et humanis and dist. 16 Quod dicitis.” And below: “For where ignorance is alleged about things that most people know, and which are done publicly, he is not believed, unless this is proved.” | |
| Item, glossa Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cognoscentes, loquens de constitutione pape, ait: “ex quo publice promulgata est et publicata, omnes tenentur ad ipsius observantiam. Et omnes ligat post duos menses a publicationis tempore elapsos.” | Likewise, the gloss Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cognoscentes, speaking of a constitution of the pope, says: “From the fact that it has been publicly promulgated and published, all are bound to observe it. And it binds all after two months have elapsed from the time of publication.” | |
| Item, glossa 9 q. 1 c. Ordinationes ait: “in hiis, que publice fiunt, non potest quis ignorantiam allegare.” | Also, the gloss on 9 q. 1 c. Ordinationes says: “In things done publicly, no one can plead ignorance.” | |
| Item, glossa 16 dist. capitulo ultimo ait: “nulli licet ignorare ea que publice facta sunt.” | Also, the gloss on dist. 16, last chapter says: “No one is permitted to be ignorant of things done publicly.” | |
| Item, glossa 8 q. 1 c. Licet ait: “in hiis que publice facta sunt, non potest contradici.” | Also, the gloss on 8 q. 1 c. Licet says: “In things done publicly, it is not possible to be contradicted.” | |
| Item, glossa dist. 54 c. Nulli ait: “Si aliqua sunt publice facta, nemo postea auditur contradictor.” | Also, the gloss on dist. 54 c. Nulli says: “If some things are done publicly, no one is afterwards heard as a contradictor.” | |
| Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus colligitur, ut videtur, quod non solum non auditur qui allegat se ignorare constitutionem pape publice promulgatam, sed etiam qui allegat se ignorare alia quecunque, que tamen publice facta sunt. Quia quamvis dicat se nescire, presumitur tamen scire, et ideo quamvis aliquis dicat se nescire papam edidisse constitutionem in qua assertio que est heretica diffinitur, non est sibi credendum, quia ex quo talis constitutio hereticalis est publice promulgata, quilibet presumitur scire ipsam. | From these and many others it is gathered, it seems, that not only is a person not heard if he claims to be ignorant of a papal constitution publicly promulgated, but also someone who claims to be ignorant of any other things done publicly. Because although he says he does not know, he is nevertheless presumed to know, and therefore even if someone says he does not know that the pope issued a constitution defining an heretical assertion, he should not be believed, because from the moment such a heretical constitution is publicly promulgated, everyone is presumed to know it. | |
| Discipulus: In quo fundant se glosse predicte? | Student: What is the basis of these glosses? | |
| Magister: In legibus civilibus et canonicis quamplurimis se fundant, de quibus sufficiat adducere decretalem epistolam Innocentii tertii ad decanum et capitulum Senonense, que ponitur Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. primo, in quo, ponens allegationes procuratoris episcopi Altisiodorum volentis eundem episcopum per ignorantiam excusare, et eam excludens, sic ait: “Quoniam antequam idem magister ad Sedem Apostolicam accessisset nobis quasi pro certo constabat quod idem episcopus interdicti sententiam non servasset, quod etiam idem magister non negavit, in fratrorum nostrorum presentia requisitus a nobis, in ipsius episcopi excusationem allegans, quod sententiam latam servare nullatenus tenebatur, que ad eius notitiam nec per literas nostras nec per cardinalem tunc apostolice sedis legatum, qui eandem sententiam promulgarat, nec per deputati ad hoc executoris mandatum vel literas pervenisset.” Et infra: “quod nec sufficit, imo nec proficit ad excusationem predicti episcopi, cum cardinalis idem sententiam interdicti, presentibus multis sollempniter ac publice promulgavit, et eadem interdicti sententia in regno Francorum iam a multis publice ceperit observari, nec sit necessarium, cum constitutio sollempniter editur aut publice promulgatur, ipsius notitiam singulorum auribus per speciale mandatum vel literas inculcare, sed id solum sufficit, ut ad eius observantiam teneatur qui noverit eam sollempniter editam aut publice promulgatam, cum et contra quosdam, qui Sardinense concilium non servabant, tanquam illud non habuerint aut perceperint, canonica tradat auctoritas, quod eis non facile facultas credendi tribuitur, cum idem penes illos in suis regionibus actum fuerit et receptum.” | Master: They are based on a great many civil and canonical laws, for which it is sufficient to cite the decretal letter of Innocent III to the dean and chapter of the Sens, found in Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. 1, in which, setting forth the allegations of the procurator of the bishop of Auxerre, who wished to excuse the same bishop through ignorance, and excluding it, he says as follows: “Because, before the same master [the procurator] approached the Apostolic See it was almost certain to us that the same bishop had not observed the sentence of interdict. The same master did not deny this when we asked in the presence of our brothers [the Cardinals]; he alleged in the bishop’s excuse that he was in no way bound to observe the sentence passed, which had come to his knowledge neither through our letters nor through the cardinal who was then the legate of the Apostolic See, who promulgated the same sentence, nor through the mandate of the executor appointed for this purpose, or through letters.” And below: “This is neither sufficient, nor even helpful, for excusing the aforementioned bishop, since the same cardinal solemnly and publicly promulgated the sentence of interdict in the presence of many, and the same sentence of interdict had already begun to be publicly observed by many in the kingdom of the Franks; nor is it necessary, when a constitution is solemnly issued or publicly promulgated, to impress its knowledge on the ears of individuals by special mandate or letters, but it is sufficient only that anyone who knows that it was solemnly issued or publicly promulgated be bound to observe it, since also against some who did not observe the Council of Sardinia, as if they had not had or learned it, canonical authority delivers that the ability to believe is not easily given to them, since the same was acted upon and received among the people in their own regions.” | |
| Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod constitutione aliqua publice et sollempniter promulgata, nulli eam ignorare licet, ita quod si fuit constitutio pape, omnes ligat et omnes eam scire tenentur. Si autem fuit prelati inferioris, omnes de sua iurisdictione debent scire ipsam. Ex eisdem etiam verbis infertur quod illa que publice fiunt nemini commoranti in loco ubi publice fiunt licet ignorare. Ex quibus concluditur quod si papa constitutionem hereticalem publice et sollempniter promulgavit, nemini licet ignorare ipsam. | From these words it is gathered that when any constitution has been publicly and solemnly promulgated, no one is allowed not to know it, so that if it was a constitution of the pope, it binds all and all are bound to know it. If however it was [a decision] of a lower prelate, all within that prelate's jurisdiction must know it. From the same words it is also inferred that no one living where something is done publicly is permitted to be ignorant of a thing done publicly. From this it is concluded that if the pope has publicly and solemnly promulgated a heretical constitution, no one is permitted to be ignorant of it. | |
| Discipulus: Non apparet quod omnes debeant scire constitutiones pape heretici, cum non sit verus prelatus omnium. Ad nullius autem constitutiones omnes astringuntur christiani nisi veri pape, quia constitutio solius veri pape omnes astringit. | Student: It does not appear that all should know the constitutions of a heretic pope, since he is not the true prelate of all. But all Christians are not bound to the constitutions of anyone except to those of a true pope, because the constitution of a true pope alone binds all. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod ad sciendum constitutiones pape heretici quilibet qui nescit eum esse hereticum et putat eum verum papam est astrictus. Sed postquam scit papam esse hereticum non tenetur scire constitutiones eius posteriores, nisi sicut ceterorum hereticorum scripta et dicta. In casu enim catholicus obligatur ad sciendum constitutiones et dicta hereticorum, non ad approbandum sed ad improbandum. Ex quibus infertur quod quilibet tenetur scire constitutionem hereticalem pape, nisi sint aliqui qui per alium modum quam per constitutionem hereticalem sciunt ipsum esse hereticum. | Master: The answer made is that anyone who does not know that he is a heretic and thinks that he is the true pope is bound to know the constitutions of a heretic pope. But after he knows that the pope is a heretic, he is not bound to know his later constitutions, except as [he may be bound to know] the writings and sayings of other heretics. For on occasion a Catholic is bound to know the constitutions and sayings of heretics, not to approve but to disprove them. From this it is inferred that everyone is bound to know a heretical constitution of the pope, unless there are some who know that he is a heretic by some other means than by the heretical constitution. | |
| Quod enim quilibet alius teneatur scire constitutionem hereticalem pape probatur, quia aut antequam scit constitutionem hereticalem ipsius reputat eum verum papam, aut non reputat eum verum papam. Si reputat eum verum papam, ergo tenetur scire constitutionem eius. Si non reputat eum verum papam, hoc non est nisi quia scit constitutionem hereticalem eius, et ita vel scit vel tenetur scire constitutionem hereticalem eius, si nescit eum esse hereticum per alium modum. | That everyone else is bound to know a heretical constitution of the pope is proved, because before he knows his heretical constitution either he considers him a true pope, or he does not consider him a true pope. If he considers him to be the true pope, then he is bound to know his constitution. If he does not consider him to be the true pope, this is only because he knows his heretical constitution, and thus he either knows or is bound to know his heretical constitution, if he does not know in some other way that he is a heretic. | |
| Discipulus: Nunquid secundum glossas in nullo casu potest quis allegare se ignorare constitutiones pape vel ea que publice fiunt? | Student: According to the glosses, is there no case in which someone can allege that he is ignorant of the constitutions of the pope or of things done publicly? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod secundum glossas aliquando contingit talem ignorantiam allegare. Sed taliter alleganti minime est credendum nisi ignorantiam probaverit quam allegavit. Quam quidem aliquando potest probare iuramento, aliquando autem iuramentum non sufficit. | Master: The answer made is that according to the glosses, it is sometimes possible to allege such ignorance, but anyone who makes such a claim should not be believed unless he proves the ignorance he has alleged. This indeed he can sometimes prove by oath, but sometimes an oath is not sufficient. | |
| De hoc tamen glossa dist. 82 c. Proposuisti diversas recitat opiniones, dicens: “cum enim constitutio sit publice promulgata quilibet tenetur eam scire…et secundum leges tenetur eam quilibet scire usque ad duos menses, ut in authen. ut facte nove constitutiones § 1 coll. 6, secundum canones usque ad sex menses ut 18 dist. c. Decernimus. Quia ergo presumebatur pervenisse ad istos, tenebantur ipsi probare ignorantiam, et hoc est generale, quod propter presumptionem cogitur aliquis probare ignorantiam ut hic, et Extra, De electione, c. Innotuit et 1 q. 1 Si qui a simoniacis.” Et infra: “Sed qualiter probat se aliquis ignorasse? Dico suo sacramento ut 34 q. 2 In lectum... ut not. 4 q. 5 c. Quisquis in fine vel etiam alio modo, si potest probare se fuisse in alio loco, et forte si presumptio est contra eum non crederem iuramento suo. Sed quid si collegium vel aliquis conventus dicit se ignorasse, nunquid omnes iurabunt ? Dico quod sufficit si episcopus cum maioribus de capitulo iurant ut ff. de condit. et demonst. l. municipibus. Alii dicunt quod eo ipso probatur ignorantia quod non probatur scientia, ut C. qui mili. non pos. super servis lib. 12.” | On this the gloss of dist. 82 c. Proposuisti recites diverse opinions, saying: “For when a constitution is publicly promulgated everyone is bound to know it… and according to the laws everyone is bound to know it up to [after?] two months, as in Novels, Ut facte nove constitutiones § 1 coll. 6 [Novellae 66.1, here, here] according to the canons, for up to six months, as in dist. 18 c. Decernimus. Therefore, because it was presumed to have reached them, they were bound to prove ignorance, and this is general [i.e. a general rule], that because of presumption, a person is forced to prove ignorance, as here, and Extra, De electione, c. Innotuit, and 1 q. 1 Si qui a simoniacis.” And below: “But how does someone prove that he was ignorant? I say by their oath, as in 34 q. 2 In lectum... as noted in 4 q. 5 c. Quisquis (near the end); or also in another way, if he can prove that he was in another place; and perhaps if there is a presumption against him I would not believe his oath. But what if a college or some convent says that they were ignorant, will they all swear? I say, that it is sufficient if the bishop and the seniors of the chapter swear, as ff De condicionibus et demonstrationibus, l. Municipibus [Digest 35.1.97]. Others say that ignorance is proved by that very fact that knowledge is not proved, C. Qui mili. non pos. l. Super servis lib. 12 [Codex 12.33.6] | |
| Discipulus: Durum michi videtur asserere quod omnes teneantur scire omnes constitutiones pape, quia tunc omnes tenerentur scire omnia decreta, omnes decretales summorum pontificum, quod rationabile non videtur, cum in multis annis sciri non possint. Ideo circa predicta aliam narra sententiam. | Student: It seems to me hard to assert that everyone is bound to know all the constitutions of the pope, because then everyone would be bound to know all the decrees and all the decretals of the supreme pontiffs, which does not seem reasonable, since they cannot be known in many years. Therefore, tell me another opinion about the above question. | |
| Magister: Quorundam aliorum est sententia quod inferiores episcopis non tenentur scire quamcunque constitutionem pape, neque hereticalem neque aliam, nisi fuerit per episcopum publicata. Dicunt enim quod prelati immediate sub episcopo constituti non tenentur scire constitutionem pape nisi episcopus intimaverit eis, sicut etiam alii prelati sub illis prelatis immediate constituti non tenentur scire constitutionem pape nisi prelati sui indicaverint eis, et sic usque ad laicos et alios curam animarum non habentes, qui non tenentur scire constitutionem pape nisi presbiteri seu rectores eorum, aut alii prelati superiores, publicaverint eandem constitutionem pape inter ipsos. Sic etiam dicunt de religiosis, quod religiosi subditi nullam constitutionem pape scire tenentur antequam prelati eorum publicaverint eam inter ipsos. | Master: The opinion of some others is that inferiors to bishops are not bound to know any constitution of the pope, whether heretical or otherwise, unless it has been published by the bishop. For they say that prelates immediately under a bishop are not bound to know a constitution of the pope unless the bishop has informed them, just as other prelates immediately under those prelates are not bound to know a constitution of the pope unless their prelates have informed them, and so on down to laymen and others who do not have the care of souls, who are not bound to know a constitution of the pope unless their priests or rectors, or other superior prelates, have published that papal constitution among them. They also say of religious [orders] that religious subjects are not bound to know any constitution of the pope before their prelates have published it among them. | |
| Hec sententia videtur posse probari primo sic. Si quilibet teneretur scire constitutionem pape post duos menses, vel post sex, frustra episcopi tenerentur publicare eam. Sed episcopi tenentur publicare constitutionem pape. Ergo ante publicationem talem non omnes tenentur scire constitutionem pape. Maior videtur manifesta. Minor ostenditur sic. Non minus tenentur episcopi publicare constitutionem pape quam ea que in conciliis provincialibus singulis annis aguntur. Sed illa debent episcopi publicare, sicut in concilio Toletano decernitur, ut habetur dist. 18 c. Decernimus. Ergo et constitutiones pape noviter editas publicare tenentur. | This opinion seems provable first thus. If everyone were bound to know a constitution of the pope after two months, or after six, it would be pointless to require bishops to publish it. But the bishops are bound to publish a constitution of the pope. Therefore, not all are bound to know a constitution of the pope before such a publication. The major seems obvious. The minor is shown thus. Bishops are no less bound to publish the constitution of the pope than they are to publish things done in provincial councils each year. But bishops must publish those things, as is decreed in the Council of Toledo, found in dist. 18 c. Decernimus. Therefore bishops are also bound to publish constitutions newly issued by the pope. | |
| Item, non transitur ab extremo ad extremum nisi per medium. Sed episcopi sunt medii inter papam et suos subiectos. Ergo non tenentur subiecti scire constitutiones pape nisi eis per episcopos tanquam per medium intimentur. | Likewise, one does not pass from extreme to extreme except through a middle. But bishops are intermediaries between the pope and his subjects. Therefore subjects are not bound to know the pope’s constitutions unless they are intimated to them through bishops as through an intermediary. | |
| Tertio sic. Nullus potest ad impossibile obligari. Sed impossibile est illiteratos intelligere constitutiones pape nisi prelati exposuerint eis. Ergo non tenentur eas scire antequam per prelatos eorum fuerint eis exposite. | Third, thus. No one can be bound to the impossible. But it is impossible for illiterate people to understand the pope’s constitutions unless prelates have explained them to them. Therefore they are not bound to know them before they have been explained to them by their prelates. | |
| Discipulus: Ista sententia decreto Innocentii tertii superius allegato adversari videtur, cum dicitur “nec sit necessarium, cum constitutio sollempniter editur aut publice promulgatur, ipsius notitiam singulorum auribus per speciale mandatum vel literas inculcare.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod nonnulli tenentur scire constitutionem sollempniter editam et publice promulgatam licet eorum auribus neque ab episcopo neque ab aliquo inferiori per speciale mandatum vel literas fuerit inculcata. Et ita ad hoc quod teneantur scire constitutionem pape, nulla publicatio preter primam que fit in curia pape requiritur. | Student: This sentence seems to be opposed to the decree of Innocent III cited above, when it is said, “Nor is it necessary, when a constitution is solemnly issued or publicly promulgated, to impress its knowledge on the ears of individuals by special mandate or letters.” From these words it is gathered that some are bound to know a constitution solemnly issued and publicly promulgated even though it has not been impressed on their ears either by a bishop or by any inferior by special mandate or letters. And so in order for them to be bound to know a constitution of the pope, no publication beyond the first one which takes place in the papal court is required. | |
| Item, non est consuetudo ecclesie quod omnes constitutiones pape noviter edite priusquam obligent per episcopos divulgentur. Ergo prima solemnis divulgatio sufficit ad hoc quod constitutio pape obliget universos. Hoc etiam glossa super dicto capitulo Innocentii tertii videtur asserere, que dicit quod “videtur sufficere quod per solam famam ad ipsum pervenit.” | Likewise, it is not the custom of the church that all constitutions newly issued by the pope be published by the bishops before they become binding. Therefore, the first solemn publication is sufficient for the constitution of the pope to bind everyone. This is also what the gloss on the said chapter of Innocent III seems to assert, which says that “it seems sufficient that it reaches him by mere fame.” | |
| Item, preceptum superioris non minus obligat quam preceptum inferioris. Ergo similiter divulgatio facta per superiorem non minus obligat quam divulgatio facta per inferiorem, et secundum istam sententiam divulgatio constitutionis pape facta per episcopum ligat inferiores episcopo. Ergo non minus ligat eos divulgatio facta per papam. | Likewise, the precept of a superior is no less binding than the precept of an inferior. Therefore, similarly, the publication made by a superior is no less binding than the publication made by an inferior, and according to this opinion, the publication of a constitution of the pope made by a bishop binds inferior bishops. Therefore, the publication made by the pope binds them no less. | |
| Item, sicut episcopi sunt superiores abbatibus, decanis, archidiaconis, et huiusmodi inferioribus prelatis, ita archiepiscopi sunt superiores episcopis. Sed constitutio pape ligat episcopos, licet ad eos per archiepiscopos nequaquam pervenit (Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. 1). Ergo et constitutio pape ligat inferiores episcopis licet episcopi non publicaverint constitutionem eandem. | Likewise, just as bishops are superior to abbots, deans, archdeacons, and such inferior prelates, so archbishops are superior to bishops. But the constitution of the pope binds bishops, although it does not at all reach them through archbishops (Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. 1). Therefore, the constitution of the pope binds inferior bishops even though the bishops have not published the same constitution. | |
| Hec inter alia movent me supra predictam sententiam. Ideo aliam sententiam libenter audirem. | These, among other things, move me to the above-mentioned opinion. Therefore I would gladly hear another opinion. | |
| Magister: Sunt quidam qui glossas de ista materia negare nolunt, sed eas, ut affirmant, explanant, de constitutione pape dupliciter distinguentes. Aut enim publice fertur non solum in curia pape sed in universis regionibus christianorum papam de aliqua determinata materia constitutionem noviter edidisse, aut talis rumor ad omnes regiones christianorum vel aliquas non pervenit. Item, aut constitutio nova pape omnes tangit, aut aliquas determinatas personas vel aliqua collegia certa. | Master: There are some who do not wish to deny the glosses on this matter, but, as they affirm, explain them, distinguishing concerning a constitution of the pope in two ways. For [1] either it is publicly reported, not only in the papal court but in all Christian regions, that the pope has issued a new constitution on some determinate matter, or such a rumor does not reach some or all Christian regions. Likewise, [2] either the new constitution of the pope affects everyone, or some determinate persons, or some certain colleges. | |
| Si itaque aliqua constitutio nova pape in eius curia sollempniter et publice promulgatur que omnes tangit, et publicus rumor aut sermo de tali constitutione ad omnes regiones christianorum pervenit, omnes conclusionem constitutionis huiusmodi scire tenentur, precipue illi qui de facili per se vel per alios eam scire possunt. | If, therefore, some new constitution of the pope is solemnly and publicly promulgated in his court that affects everyone, and public rumor or talk about such a constitution reaches all Christian regions, everyone is bound to know the conclusion of such a constitution, especially those who can easily know it themselves or through others. | |
| Ab hac tamen regula, secundum quosdam, excipiuntur milites, rustici, minores, et mulieres, qui constitutionem talem scire non tenentur. Secundum quosdam vero, si eam de facili possunt scire, eam ignorare non debent, precipue si sit constitutio que bonum commune respiciat. | However, from this rule, according to some, are excepted soldiers, peasants, minors, and women, who are not bound to know such a constitution. According to some, however, if they can easily know it, they should not be ignorant of it, especially if it is a constitution that concerns the common good. | |
| Huius ratio assignatur talis. Ignorantia crassa et supina et peior nullum excusat. Sed ignorantia iuris quemcunque tangentis quod quis potest de facili scire est ignorantia crassa et supina vel peior. Ergo talis ignorantia nullum excusat. | The argument for this is given as follows. Gross and supine ignorance, and worse, does not excuse any one. But ignorance of any law that anyone can easily know is gross and supine ignorance or worse. Therefore such ignorance does not excuse any one. | |
| Maior probatur auctoritate Alexandri tertii qui, ut habetur Extra, De ordinatis ab episcopo qui renuntiavit episcopatui, c. 1, ait: “si ab eodem sacros ordines scienter quis receperit, quia indignum se fecit, executionem officii non habebit. Ubi autem non scienter, poterit, nisi crassa et supina fuerit ignorantia, discretus pontifex dispensare.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ignorantia crassa et supina dispensationem alias licitam impedit, et per consequens ignorantia crassa et supina non excusat. Quod glossa Extra, De electione et electi potestate, c. Innotuit, asserit manifeste, dicens: “ignorantia crassa et supina non excusat.” | The major is proved by the authority of Alexander III who, as is stated in Extra, De ordinatis ab episcopo qui renuntiavit episcopatui, c. 1, says: “If anyone knowingly receives sacred orders from the same, because he has made himself unworthy, he will not have the execution of the office. But where not knowingly, the discreet Pontiff may dispense, unless the ignorance is gross and supine.” From these words it is gathered that gross and supine ignorance prevents a dispensation otherwise permissible, and consequently gross and supine ignorance does not excuse. The gloss on Extra, De electione et electi potestate, c. Innotuit, clearly asserts this, saying: “Gross and supine ignorance does not excuse.” | |
| Minor, scilicet quod ignorantia iuris quemcunque tangentis quod quis potest de facili scire est ignorantia crassa et supina probatur. Quia ignorantia dampnabilis est crassa et supina vel peior. Sed talis ignorantia est dampnabilis, teste Augustino qui, ut legitur dist. 37, c. ultimo, ait: “Non omnis ignorans est immunis a pena. Ille enim ignorans potest excusari a pena qui a quo disceret non invenit. Illis autem hoc ignosci petit, qui, habentes a quo discerent operam non dederunt.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod ignorantes illa que spectant ad ipsos qui possunt faciliter scire minime excusantur. Quod etiam Apostolus 1 Cor. 14 aperte insinuat cum dicit, ut etiam recitatur dist. 37 § Ut itaque: “qui ignorat ignorabitur.” Quod Gratianus ibidem dicit intelligendum de eo “qui noluit intelligere ut bene ageret”, ubi dicit glossa “qui ignorat”: “id est qui negligit scire, vel contempnit scire.” Et infra: “nec excusatur quis per ignorantiam, qui potest habere copiam peritorum, ff. de iuris et facti ignorantia L. Regula, vel si sua prudentia facile potuit illud scire.” Ex quibus colligitur quod omnes illos ignorantia non excusat qui nolunt scire, qui ideo ignorant quia non dant operam ad sciendum, qui negligunt scire, qui contempnunt scire, qui habent copiam peritorum, qui sua prudentia facile possunt scire. Et ita omnis talis ignorantia est dampnabilis et per consequens est crassa et supina vel peior. | The minor, namely that ignorance of any law that anyone can easily know is gross and supine ignorance, is proved. Because blameworthy ignorance is gross and supine or worse. But such ignorance is blameworthy, according to Augustine who, as we read in dist. 37, last chapter, says: “Not every ignorant person is exempt from punishment. For an ignorant person can be excused from punishment who does not find someone from whom he would learn. But this begs to be forgiven for those who, having someone from whom they would learn, did not make the effort.” From these words it is evidently gathered that those who are ignorant of things that concern themselves who can easily know are not excused. The Apostle also openly suggests this when he says, 1 Cor. 14, as is also recited in dist. 37 § Ut itaque: “Whoever does not know will not be known.” Gratian in the same place says that this should be understood of him “who did not want to understand in order to act well”, where the gloss on “who does not know” says: “i.e. who neglects to know, or despises to know.” And below: “Nor is anyone excused by ignorance who can access a multitude of experts, Digest, De iuris et facti ignorantia, l. Regula [Digest 22.6.9], or if by his own prudence he could easily know it.” From this it is gathered that ignorance does not excuse all those who do not wish to know, who are ignorant because they do not put forth the effort to know, who neglect to know, who despise to know, who have an abundance of experts, who can easily know by their own prudence. And so all such ignorance is blameworthy and consequently is crass and supine or worse. | |
| Ex quo infertur quod constitutionem pape, quantum ad subiectum constitutionis contentum in ipsa, omnes tenentur scire, si omnes tangit et rumor de tali constitutione ad omnes regiones christianorum pervenit, quia nemini licet ignorare ea de quibus in regione ubi moratur est publicus rumor, si omnes tangunt. Si autem rumor de tali constitutione non ad omnes regiones christianorum pervenit, commorantes in regionibus in quibus nullus est rumor de tali constitutione pape eam scire non tenentur, quia ignorantia probabilis ipsos excusat. Ignorans enim sicut errans, quemadmodum insinuat glossa 1 q. 4 § Notandum, non est necesse “quod sit nimis scrupulosus, et diligens, et curiosus in inquirendo, nec quod sit nimis negligens et dissolutus non inquirendo.” Ille autem qui in regione moratur ubi de constitutione pape nova nulla fit mentio non est nimium negligens et dissolutus in inquirendo. Ergo ignorantia probabili laborat, et per consequens est merito excusandus licet constitutionem pape non sciat. | From which it is inferred that all are bound to know a constitution of the pope, as regards the subject matter of the constitution contained therein, if it affects all and the rumor of it reaches all Christian regions, because no one is permitted to be ignorant of those things about which there is public rumor in the region where he resides, if they affect all. But if the rumor of such a constitution does not reach all Christian regions, those residing where it does not reach are not bound to know it, because probable ignorance excuses them. For the ignorant, like the errant, as the gloss on 1 q. 4 § notandum suggests, it is not necessary “to be too scrupulous, and diligent, and curious in investigating, nor too negligent, and lax in not investigating.” But someone who resides in a region where no mention is made of a new constitution of the pope is not too negligent and dissolute in investigating. Therefore he suffers from probable ignorance, and consequently he should justly be excused even though he does not know the constitution of the pope. | |
| Si vero constitutio pape non tangit omnes sed aliquas determinatas personas, puta tantummodo episcopos, vel tantummodo monachos, vel tantum presbiteros seu rectores vel aliquas alias certas personas vel collegia, non omnes tenentur scire constitutiones huiusmodi, sed tantummodo illi quos constitutio tangit, et illorum illi solummodo qui in regionibus manent ubi inter tales personas de constitutione huiusmodi est publicus rumor. | If, however, a constitution of the pope does not affect all but only some determinate persons, for example only bishops, or only monks, or only priests or rectors, or some other certain persons or colleges, not all are bound to know such constitutions, but only those whom the constitution affects, and only those of them who reside in regions where there is public rumor among such persons about such a constitution. | |
| Per hoc dicitur ad propositum de constitutione hereticali pape quod, cum talis constitutio pape omnes tangat, quia fidem omnium quantum in se est destruit et enervat, omnes illi qui in regionibus commorantur in quibus est rumor publicus de constitutione tali eam scire tenentur, non ad servandum sed ad resistendum pro posse. Illi autem qui morantur in regionibus ubi non est rumor de tali constitutione eam scire non tenentur, et ideo si eam non impugnant per ignorantiam probabilem excusantur. | By this it is said to the proposition about a heretical constitution of the pope that, since such a constitution of the pope affects all, because (as far as it goes) it destroys and weakens the faith of all, all those who reside in regions where there is public rumor about such a constitution are bound to know it, not in order to observe it but in order to resist it with all their power. But those who reside in regions where there is no rumor about such a constitution are not bound to know it, and therefore if they do not attack it they are excused by probable ignorance. | |
| Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istos ad hoc quod aliqui teneantur scire constitutionem hereticalem pape requiritur quod in omnibus civitatibus illius regionis fiat talis rumor? | Student: Is it not required according to these [i.e. those whose position is being explained] that in order for some to be bound to know a heretical constitution of the pope, that such a rumor be made in all the cities of that region? | |
| Magister: Respondetur distinguendo, quia manentium in aliqua regione quidam ex consuetudine in una civitate morantur continue, non transeundo de civitate ad civitatem, quidam vero ad civitates diversas profiscuntur. Primi non tenentur scire constitutionem hereticalem pape antequam rumor de tali constitutione pape hereticali ad civitatem pervenit. Alii vero tenentur scire si in aliqua civitatum ad quas sunt solliti proficisci rumor talis fuerit divulgatus. | Master: The answer is made by distinguishing, because of those who remain in a certain region, some by custom remain in one city continuously, not going from city to city, while others go to different cities. The former are not bound to know a heretical constitution of the pope before the rumor of such a heretical constitution of the pope reaches the city. The latter are bound to know if such a rumor has been spread in any of the cities to which they are accustomed to go. | |
| Discipulus: Ista non videntur bene dicta, quia subditi et simplices non videntur [tenentur Ly] habere explicitam fidem de multis que credit ecclesia. Ergo multo fortius non tenentur habere noticiam explicitam de constitutionibus hereticalibus pape quantumcunque fuerit rumor quod de fide constitutiones hereticales ediderit. | Student: These things do not seem well said, because subjects and simple people are not bound to have explicit faith in many of the things that the Church believes. Therefore, much more, they are not bound to have explicit knowledge of the heretical constitutions of the pope, no matter how widespread the rumor that he has issued heretical constitutions concerning faith. | |
| Magister: Respondetur distinguendo de constitutionibus hereticalibus pape. Quia aut continent heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam quilibet tenetur credere explicite, puta si diffiniret quod fides christiana est falsa, vel quod Christus non fuit mortuus, aut quod anime reproborum minime cruciantur, aut quod non est vita futura, et talem constitutionem omnes manentes in civitatibus ad quas rumor vel fama de constitutione tali pervenit scire tenentur, quemadmodum veritatem contrariam credere tenentur explicite. Quia, sicut tenentur explicite credere veritatem catholicam et pro loco et tempore eam exterius confiteri, ita heresim contrariam debent discredere mente, et pro loco et tempore exterius reprobare et horrere. | Master: The answer is made by distinguishing among the heretical constitutions of the pope. Because either they contain a heresy contrary to a Catholic truth that everyone is bound to believe explicitly, for example if it defined that the Christian faith is false, or that Christ did not die, or that the souls of the reprobate are not tormented, or that there is no future life, and all those residing in the cities to which the rumor or fame of such a constitution has reached are bound to know such a constitution, just as they are bound to believe explicitly the contrary truth. Because, just as they are bound to believe the Catholic truth explicitly and to confess it outwardly according to place and time, so they must disbelieve the contrary heresy mentally and reject and dread it outwardly (according to place and time). | |
| Si vero non contineat talem heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam omnes tenentur credere explicite, sed est heresis que contrariatur veritati quam aliqui tenentur credere explicite et aliqui ad hoc non tenentur, illi qui non tenentur explicite credere veritatem contrariam heresi diffinite in constitutione pape, non tenentur scire constitutionem pape hereticalem, nisi in casu. Illi vero qui tenentur credere explicite veritatem contrariam, tenentur etiam scire constitutionem pape hereticalem, si fama de tali constitutione ad civitatem ubi morantur pervenerit. | But if it does not contain a heresy contrary to a Catholic truth that all are bound to believe explicitly, but is a heresy which is contrary to the truth which some are bound to believe explicitly and some are not bound to do so, those who are not bound to believe explicitly the truth contrary to the heresy defined in the constitution of the pope are not bound to know that the constitution of the pope is heretical, except on occasion. But those who are bound to believe explicitly the contrary truth are also bound to know of a heretical papal constitution, if the fame of such a constitution has reached the city where they reside. | |
| Capitulum 19 | Chapter 19 | |
| Discipulus: Nunc tracta secundum premissum circa principium precedentis capituli, an scilicet propter verba criminosorum asserentium constitutionem hereticalem pape esse noviter editam debeant ignorantes inquirere veritatem. | Student: Now deal with the second point put forward near the beginning of the previous chapter, namely whether, because of the words of criminals who assert that the pope has recently issued a heretical constitution, those who do not know should investigate the truth. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si aliqui criminosi diffamant papam in genere, dicentes quod in constitutione sua heresim diffinivit, neque constitutionem neque heresim specificando, non est necesse propter verba eorum inquirere veritatem. Si autem in speciali tam heresim quam constitutionem specificant, dicendo ‘in tali constitutione papa talem heresim diffinivit’, videtur quod illi qui veritatem contrariam credere tenentur explicite, licet non debeant credere criminosis, debeant tamen cauta sollicitudine querere veritatem, legendo scilicet in statuto constitutionem eandem. | Master: The answer made is that if some criminals defame the pope in general, saying that in his constitution he defined heresy, without specifying either the constitution or the heresy, it is not necessary to investigate the truth because of their words. But if in particular they specify both heresy and the constitution, saying ‘in such and such a constitution the pope defined such and such a heresy’, it seems that those who are bound to believe the contrary truth explicitly, though they are not obliged to believe the criminals, yet are obliged to investigate the truth with cautious solicitude, namely by reading the same constitution in the statute. | |
| Hoc probatur primo sic. In dubiis via tutior est tenenda (Extra, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Iuvenis, et De penitencia, dist. 7, c. Si quis positus, et Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Significasti et c. Ad audientiam). Sed querere veritatem de constitutione pape, cum nunciatur heresim continere, est via tutior quia omni caret periculo. Non querere autem veritatem magnum habet periculum, quia propter hoc quod non quereretur veritas, posset in nonnullis periclitari fides. Ergo propter huiusmodi famam veritas sollicite est querenda. | This is proved first as follows. In doubtful matters the safer way should be taken (Extra, On sponsalibus et matrimoniis, c. Iuvenis, and De penitencia, dist. 7, c. Si quis positus, and Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Significasti and c. Ad audientiam). But to inquire into the truth about the constitution of the pope, when it is reported that it contains heresy, is the safer way because it is devoid of all danger. But not to inquire into the truth has great danger, because of not inquiring the faith of some might be endangered. Therefore because of this kind of fame the truth must be inquired into with care. | |
| Secundo sic. Propter assertionem illorum de constitutione hereticali pape est querenda veritas extra iudicium propter quorum denuntiationem coram iudice esset veritas iudicialiter inquirenda. Sed propter denuntiationem criminosorum debet iudex pape heretici inquirere veritatem. Nam criminosi in exceptis criminibus inter que est heresis ad denuntiandum debent admitti. Ergo etiam extra iudicium propter assertionem talem criminosorum veritas est querenda. | Second, as follows. Because of the assertion of those about the heretical constitution of the pope, the truth should be investigated outside court that should be investigated judicially if they made a denunciation in court. For criminals, in excepted crimes [Cf. Book VI, Chapter 79], among which is heresy, must be admitted to denunciation. Therefore, even outside the court the truth must be inquired into because of such an assertion made by criminals. | |
| Discipulus: Secundum canonicas sanctiones de nullo est inquisitio facienda nisi fuerit graviter diffamatus. Ergo propter verba criminosorum non est de papa inquisitio facienda nisi taliter fuerit diffamatus quod absque scandalo tolerari non posset. | Student: According to canonical laws, an inquiry should not be made about anyone unless he has been gravely defamed. Therefore, an inquiry should not be made about a pope because of the words of criminals unless he has been so defamed that it could not be tolerated without scandal. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod iudicialis inquisitio, que absque gravamine et nota illius de quo inquiritur nequaquam fieri potest, non est aliqualiter facienda nisi fuerit graviter diffamatus, et de illa inquisitione loquuntur canonice sanctiones. Alia autem inquisitio veritatis, que fit extra iudicium, que in casu proposito solum per inspectionem et studium constitutionis hereticalis pape fieri potest, facienda est etiam absque precedente infamia pape, quia per talem inquisitionem veritatis nullum gravamen vel nota infertur illi de quo inquiritur, licet postea invenientes veritatem debeant papam hereticum evitare. | Master: The answer made is that a judicial inquiry, which cannot be done without causing the person being investigated to know and be inconvenienced [by the investigation], should not be done in any way unless he has been gravely defamed, and canonical laws speak of that inquiry. But there is another inquiry into the truth, which is done outside the court, which in the present case can be done merely through inspection and study of the heretical constitution of the pope, should also be done without previous infamy of the pope, because by such an inquiry into the truth no inconvenience or knowledge is caused to the person being investigated, although later on, those who discover the truth should avoid the heretic pope. | |
| Discipulus: Ista responsio non videtur sufficere, quia propter verba criminosorum non est credendum quod transsumpta ostensa sint vera transsumpta. Ergo licet in illis transsumptis per criminosos ostensis inveniatur aliqua heresis diffinita, non est credendum papam esse hereticum. | Student: This answer does not seem to be sufficient, because on account of the words of criminals it should not be believed that the transcripts shown are true transcripts. Therefore, although in those transcripts shown by criminals some definite heresy is found, it should not be believed that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod in hoc casu non solum audiens relationem ostendentium transsumpta huiusmodi debet illa transsumpta legere et studere, sed etiam debet diligenter inquirere an sint vera vel falsa transsumpta. Quod quia potest fieri absque nota et gravamine pape, si est innocens, ex habundanti cautela tenetur audiens huiusmodi criminosos inquirere veritatem. | Master: To this the answer is made that in this case not only should a person who hears the report of those who show such transcripts read and study them, but he should also diligently inquire whether they are true or false transcripts. Because this can be done without the knowledge and inconvenience of the pope, if he is innocent, out of abundant caution someone hearing such criminals is bound to inquire into the truth. | |
| Capitulum 20 | Chapter 20 | |
| Discipulus: Quia raro aut nunquam invenitur criminosus qui publice se auderet offerre ad convincendum papam catholicum statuta hereticalia edidisse, et propter hoc ex hoc ipso quod criminosi publice et manifeste etiam extra iudicium de papa talia affirmarent esset quedam presumptio quod eorum assertio non esset a veritate extranea, ideo circa istam materiam nolo amplius immorare. Quapropter de indiciis manifestis de quibus dictum est supra capitulo 17 velis disserere. | Student: Because it is rarely or never found that a criminal would dare to publicly offer himself to prove that a Catholic pope had issued heretical statutes, and because of this, from the very fact that criminals would publicly and openly affirm such things about a pope, even outside the court, there would be a certain presumption that their assertion was not alien to the truth, therefore I do not wish to dwell further on this matter. Therefore you might like to discuss the “clear indications” mentioned in Chapter 17 above. | |
| Magister: Sententia predictorum est quod asserentibus extra iudicium indicia manifesta declarantia perfidiam pape heretici est credendum, cuius ratio assignatur talis. Magis credendum est asserentibus indicia manifesta ad aliquod comprobandum quam assertioni simplici quorumcunque. Sed sepe credendum est assertioni simplici aliquorum fide dignorum, cum etiam nonnunquam credatur uni (De consecratione, dist. 4, c. Parvulos et c. Cum itaque). Ergo multo fortius asserentibus papam esse hereticum et simul cum hoc asserentibus indicia manifesta, hoc est suspiciones et presumptiones probabiles, quibus eius perfidia declaratur est credendum. | Master: The opinion of the aforementioned [i.e. those whose opinion has been presented since Chapter 13] is that those who assert outside the court clear indications declaring the faithlessness of a heretic pope should be believed. An argument for this is assigned as follows. We should believe more those who assert clear evidence to prove something than anyone’s simple assertion. But often we should believe the simple assertion of some trustworthy person, since sometimes we believe even one person (De consecratione, dist. 4, c. Parvulos and c. Cum itaque). Therefore, much more, we should believe those who assert that the pope is a heretic and at the same time assert clear evidence, that is, suspicions and probable presumptions, by which his faithlessness is declared. | |
| Discipulus: Pone exemplum ut melius predicta intelligam. | Student: Give an example so that I may understand this better. | |
| Magister: Exempla multa possent poni, secundum quod suspiciones seu presumptiones possent esse quam plurime, imo innumere. Unum autem potest esse tale. Ponatur quod papa publice predicet quod Christus non fuit verus Deus, aut quod non fuit passus, vel aliquid tale quod est hereticum manifeste. Insuper omnes tenentes contrarium persequatur, destruat, et confundat, omnes vero suam doctrinam pestiferam defendentes, tenentes, predicantes, et docentes diligat, promoveat, et exaltet. Sint etiam aliqui qui ignorent papam talem heresim predicare, tenere, aut docere, et tamen sciunt quosdam alios de eadem doctrina inter se altercationem habere, quorum quidam tenent catholicam veritatem, et alii eam impugnant. Hoc posito, si taliter ignorantes papam doctrinam hereticam predicare, asserere, vel tenere audierint postea aliquos referentes quod talis est doctrina pape, et ad hoc confirmandum inducentes quod defensores veritatis catholice papa deprimit et confundit, docentes vero contrariam hereticam pravitatem promovet et exaltat, sicut etiam ipsi ignorantes papam esse hereticum manifeste conspiciunt, taliter adducentibus indicia manifesta ad probandum papam esse hereticum est credendum, quia pro dicto eorum est presumptio violenta, ex quo papa talem doctrinam hereticam defendentes diligit, iuvat, et exaltat, et tenentes veritatem catholicam odit, persequitur, et molestat. Que presumptio magis ostenditur violenta si nulla ratio apparet quare istos deprimit et illos exaltat, nisi quia isti doctrinam talem negant et alii tenent eandem. Que etiam nimis urgere videntur si papa illos, quos ante diligebat, odit vel persequitur ex quo doctrinam suam hereticam impugnare ceperunt, et econverso eos quibus minus favorabiliter videbatur, cariores habet ex quo doctrinam suam hereticam defenderunt, docuerunt, divulgaverunt, asseruerunt, vel tenuerunt. Quare per talem presumptionem credendum est papam esse hereticum. | Master: Many examples could be given, as the suspicions or presumptions could be very numerous, indeed innumerable. But one can be as follows. Suppose that the pope publicly declares that Christ was not the true God, or that he did not suffer, or something of the kind that is manifestly heretical. Moreover, let him persecute, destroy, and confound all who hold the contrary, but let him love, promote, and exalt all who defend, hold, preach, and teach his pestilent doctrine. Let there be also some who are unaware that the pope preaches, holds, or teaches such a heresy, and yet they know that certain others are having an altercation with each other about the same doctrine, some of whom hold the Catholic truth, and others who attack it. This being so, if those who are thus unaware that the pope preaches, asserts, or holds a heretical doctrine later hear some people reporting that such is the pope’s doctrine and, to confirm this, adducing that the pope depresses and confounds defenders of Catholic truth but promotes and exalts those who teach the contrary heretical wickedness -- as they themselves, not knowing that the pope is a heretic, clearly see --, they must believe those who thus adduce clear indications to prove that the pope is a heretic. Because in favour of what they say there is a violent presumption, from the fact that the pope loves, helps, and exalts those who defend this heretical doctrine, and hates, persecutes, and molests those who hold the Catholic truth. This presumption is more shown to be violent if no reason appears why he depresses these and exalts those, except that these deny his doctrine and the others hold it. This [presumption] seems even more urgent if the pope hates or persecutes those whom he previously loved from the time when they began to attack his heretical doctrine, and conversely holds those whom he viewed less favorably dearer from the time when they defended, taught, disseminated, asserted, or held his heretical doctrine. Therefore by such presumption it should be believed that the pope is a heretic. | |
| Item, si papa de heresi diffamatur, maxime per viros literatos et in sacra pagina eruditos, petentes instanter et totis viribus laborantes ut generale concilium celebretur ad discutiendum et examinandum illa que papa tanquam hereticalia imponuntur, se subiicere generalis concilii iudicio, idem generale concilium ne celebretur impediendo, recusat, est contra ipsum presumptio violenta quod est heretica labe respersus. | Likewise, if the pope is defamed for heresy, especially by educated men learned in the sacred scriptures, who are urgently requesting and working with all their might that a general council be held to discuss and examine the things the pope imposes, on the grounds that they are heretical, and the pope refuses to submit himself to the judgment of the general council and prevents the same general council from being held, there is a violent presumption against him that he is covered with heretical taint. | |
| Item, si de heresi manifesta publice diffamatur et ipse de tali heresi se non purgat, sed eam predicat, tenet, et docet, est contra eum presumptio violenta quod est hereticus manifestus. | Likewise, if he is publicly defamed for manifest heresy and he does not purge himself of such heresy, but preaches, holds, and teaches it, there is a violent presumption against him that he is a manifest heretic. | |
| Et ita asserentibus tales presumptiones apertas ad probandum papam esse hereticum videtur esse credendum. | And thus it seems that those who assert such open presumptions to prove that the pope is a heretic should be believed. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod ista dicta inter se repugnant, nam suspicio sive presumptio non est credulitas nec causa credulitatis. Cum ergo indicia manifesta non sint nisi quedam suspiciones seu presumptiones, propter indicia manifesta non debet quis credere papam esse hereticum. | Student: It seems that these statements conflict, because suspicion or presumption is not belief nor the cause of belief. Therefore, since manifest indications are simply certain suspicions or presumptions, no one should believe that the pope is a heretic because of manifest indications. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod differentia est inter scientiam et credulitatem, quia scientia est ex evidentia rei, credulitas autem non est ex evidentia rei. Et ideo licet indicia manifesta que sunt suspiciones seu presumptiones probabiles vel violente nunquam causant scientiam, causant tamen sepe credulitatem. Sepe tamen non causant tam certam credulitatem quod credens a sua credulitate neque debeat neque possit recedere. | Master: The answer made is that there is a difference between knowledge and belief, because knowledge is from the evidence of the thing but belief is not from the evidence of the thing. And therefore, although clear indications which are suspicions or probable or violent presumptions never cause knowledge, they often cause belief. However, they often do not cause such certain belief that the believer should not or cannot depart from his belief. | |
| Discipulus: Quomodo potest probari quod presumptio probabilis vel violenta causat aliquando credulitatem? | Student: How can it be proved that probable or violent presumption sometimes causes belief? | |
| Magister: Hoc videtur aperte posse probari. Primo per hoc quod iudex absque credulitate quod reus sit dampnandus non debet ad sententiam condempnationis procedere. Sed sepe etiam diffinitiva sententia condempnationis et alia fertur propter solam presumptionem, Extra, De presumptione, c. Afferte, ubi dicit glossa super verbo ‘date huic’: “hec enim fuit sententia diffinitiva lata per solam presumptionem.” Et eodem titulo c. Quanto dicit glossa: “violenta presumptio quandoque sufficit ad condempnationem.” Ergo ad credulitatem nonnunquam sufficit violenta presumptio. | Master: This seems to be clearly provable. First, by the fact that a judge without belief that the guilty person should be condemned should not proceed to a sentence of condemnation. But often also a definitive sentence of condemnation and others are passed because of presumption alone, Extra, De presumptione, c. Afferte, where the gloss on the words ‘date huic’ says: “for this was a definitive sentence passed by presumption alone.” And under the same title, c. Quanto the gloss says: “violent presumption sometimes suffices for condemnation.” Therefore, a violent presumption is sometimes sufficient for belief. | |
| Secundo probatur idem sic. Compurgatores alicuius se purgantis licite iurant se credere quod se purgans dicit veritatem (Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. De testibus et c. Quotiens et c. ultimo). Sed talem credulitatem non habent nisi ex sola presumptione qua presumunt quod purgatus nolit periurare. Ergo sola presumptio sufficit ad credulitatem. | Second, the same is proved thus. The compurgators of someone purging themselves permissibly swear that they believe that the person purging himself is telling the truth (Extra, De purgatione canonica, c. De testibus et c. Quotiens et c. ultimo). But they do not have such belief except from the mere presumption by which they presume that the person purged does not wish to perjure himself. Therefore, presumption alone is sufficient for belief. | |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod hic possit fieri difficultas de differentia inter presumptionem et credulitatem. Quia tamen non reputo eam multum utilem ad propositum quod intendo, nolo ut eam discutias. Sed dic quem effectum habebit ista credulitas de perfidia pape heretici que solis presumptionibus probabilibus vel violentis, seu indiciis manifestis, habetur? | Student: It seems that here a difficulty can arise about the difference between presumption and belief. However, since I do not consider it to be very useful for the purpose I intend, I do not want you to discuss it. But tell me what effect will that belief about the faithlessness of a heretic pope have which is obtained only by probable or violent presumptions, or by manifest indications? | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod talis credulitas aliquem effectum debet habere respectu persone pape heretici, et aliquem respectu quorundam aliorum. Respectu pape heretici duplicem potest habere effectum, secundum quod varia potest esse presumptio de perfidia pape heretici. Quia aut est talis presumptio quod non sufficit ad condempnationem, etiam si esset ordine iudiciario servato probata, aut est presumptio tam violenta quod sufficit ad condempnandum papam hereticum si probata extiterit. | Master: The answer made is that such belief should have some effect with respect to the person of the heretic pope, and some with respect to certain others. With respect to the heretic pope it can have a double effect, according as the presumption about the faithlessness of a heretic pope can vary. Because either there is a presumption not sufficient for condemnation, even if it were proved in accordance with the judicial order, or there is a presumption so violent that it is sufficient for condemning a heretic pope if it is proved. | |
| Propter primam presumptionem et credulitatem papa in secreto est vitandus, sed non in publico. Quod enim sit in secreto vitandus patet per hoc quod quilibet qui creditur esse excommunicatus est vitandus, saltem in secreto. Sed papa per talem credulitatem creditur esse excommunicatus, ergo a tali credulitate saltem in secreto est vitandus. Quod autem non sit vitandus in publico propter talem credulitatem videtur sic posse probari. Nullus debet alium in publico tanquam hereticum et excommunicatum vitare nisi possit probari excommunicatus, vel nisi publica fama de excommunicatione eius possit probari. Sed papa propter talem presumptionem solam neque potest probari excommunicatus neque potest probari fama quod est excommunicatus. Ergo propter talem presumptionem non est in publico devitandus. | Because of the first presumption and belief, the pope should be avoided in secret, but not in public. That he should be avoided in secret is clear from the fact that anyone who is believed to be excommunicated should be avoided, at least in secret. But by such a belief the pope is believed to be excommunicated, therefore by such a belief he should be avoided at least in secret. But that he should not be avoided in public because of such belief seems provable in this way. No one should avoid another in public as a heretic and excommunicated unless he can be proved to be excommunicated, or unless the public fame of his excommunication can be proved. But the pope cannot be proved to be excommunicated by such a presumption alone, nor can the fame that he is excommunicated be proved. Therefore, he should not be avoided in public because of such a presumption. | |
| Discipulus: Potest esse quod talis presumptio sit publica vel etiam notoria, ergo fama est quod papa est hereticus, et per consequens fama est quod est excommunicatus. Propter famam autem est aliquis tanquam excommunicatus etiam in publico devitandus (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum desideres). Ergo propter talem presumptionem debet papa etiam in publico devitari. | Student: It is possible that such a presumption is public or even notorious, therefore there is fame that the pope is a heretic, and consequently there is fame that he is excommunicated. But because of fame, someone should be avoided as being excommunicated even in public (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Cum desideres). Therefore, because of such a presumption the pope must be avoided even in public. | |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non propter solam presumptionem talem que non sufficit ad condempnationem pape heretici, quantumcunque sit publica vel notoria, potest haberi quod papa sit tanquam hereticus publice diffamatus. Aliquando enim ex presumptione nulla consurget infamia, et ideo propter tales presumptiones solas non est papa reputandus hereticus vel excommunicatus. | Master: The answer made is that it is not because of such a presumption alone, which is not sufficient to condemn a heretic pope, howevermuch it is public or notorious, that it can be held that the pope is publicly defamed as a heretic. For sometimes no infamy arises from presumption, and therefore because of such presumptions alone the pope should not be considered a heretic or excommunicated. | |
| Discipulus: Nonne lex dicit quod ex levi causa probatur quis hereticus? Ergo propter presumptionem probabilem est papa reputandus hereticus. | Student: Does not the law say that someone is proved a heretic from a slight cause? Therefore because of a probable presumption the pope should be considered a heretic. | |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondet glossa Extra, De presumptione, c. Literas, dicens quod lex debet intelligi quantum ad hoc quod suspectus de heresi habeatur, sed non ut condempnetur de heresi. Quod Innocentius tertius capitulo idem Literas satis aperte insinuare videtur, dicens: “propter solam suspicionem, quamvis vehementem, nolumus illum de tam gravi crimine”, scilicet heresis, “condempnari.” Ex quibus verbis patet quod non propter omnem presumptionem est quis hereticus reputandus, licet propter eam suspectus de heresi habeatur. | Master: To this the gloss answers (Extra, De presumptione, c. Literas), saying that the law should be understood in respect of this, that the person be suspected of heresy, but not so as to be condemned for heresy. Innocent III seems to suggest this quite clearly in the same c. Literas, saying: “On account of suspicion alone, however vehement, we do not want him to be condemned for so grave a crime,” namely heresy. From these words it is clear that a person should be considered a heretic not on account of every presumption, although on account of it may be suspected of heresy. | |
| Discipulus: Dixisti de presumptione que non sufficit ad condempnandum eum de heretica pravitate. Nunc dic de alia. | Student: You spoke of a presumption that is not sufficient to condemn him for heretical wickedness. Now speak of the other. | |
| Magister: Dicitur quod si est presumptio tam violenta contra papam quod sufficeret ad condempnandum eum de heretica pravitate si fuerit in iudicio comprobata, credens propter talem presumptionem papam esse hereticum, si potest eam probare in iudicio, tenetur papam in publico tanquam hereticum et excommunicatum vitare. | Master: It is said that if there is such a violent presumption against the pope that it would be sufficient to condemn him for heretical wickedness if it were proved in court, anyone believing that the pope is a heretic because of such a presumption, if he can prove it in court, is bound to avoid the pope in public as being a heretic and excommunicated. | |
| Discipulus: Hoc videtur repugnare assertioni concilii generalis sub Innocentio tertio celebrati quod, ut legitur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicatus 1o, ait: “qui autem inventi fuerint sola suspicione notabiles, nisi iuxta considerationem suspicionis qualitatemque persone propriam innocentiam congrua purgatione monstraverint, anathematis gladio feriantur, et usque ad satisfactionem condignam ab omnibus evitentur.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod propter nullam presumptionem seu suspicionem de heretica pravitate est aliquis excommunicatus, licet sit excommunicandus. | Student: This seems to contradict the assertion of the general council celebrated under Innocent III which, as is read in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicatus 1o, says: “But those who are found notable by mere suspicion, unless (according to the consideration of the suspicion and the quality of the person) they have shown their innocence by appropriate purification, should be struck with the sword of anathema and should be shunned by all until they have made a fitting satisfaction.” From these words it is gathered that not because of any presumption or suspicion of heretical wickedness is someone [in fact] excommunicated, although he should be excommunicated. | |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod verba premissa concilii generalis intelligenda sunt de suspicione probabili que non est adeo violenta ut ad condempnationem sufficiat, non de illa que sufficit ad condempnationem. Quod enim sit aliqua suspicio seu presumptio que ad condempnandum aliquem tanquam hereticum sufficiat, et propter quam debeat hereticus reputari, patet per verba que immediate sequuntur verba prescripta, cum dicit concilium generale. “ita, quod si per annum in excommunicatione perstiterint, ex tunc velut heretici condempnentur.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod est aliqua presumptio que sufficit ad condempnandos hereticos, quia per hoc quod aliquis in excommunicatione persistit per annum. Propter suspicionem precedentem de heretica pravitate non habetur per certam scientiam quod est hereticus, sed solummodo presumptive. | Master: To this the answer made is that the foregoing words of the general council should be understood of probable suspicion, which is not so violent as to be sufficient for condemnation, not of that which is sufficient for condemnation. For that there is some suspicion or presumption that is sufficient for condemning someone as a heretic, and on account of which he should be regarded as a heretic, is clear from the words that immediately follow the above-written words, when the general council says. “so that if they persist in excommunication for a year, from that time they shall be condemned as heretics.” From these words it is evidently gathered that there is some presumption which is sufficient for condemning heretics, because by this [i.e. by the presumption arising from the fact], that someone persists in excommunication for a year. On account of the preceding suspicion of heretical wickedness it is not held that he is a heretic by certain knowledge, but only presumptively. | |
| Discipulus: Postquam recitasti quem effectum debet habere credulitas habita per solam presumptionem respectu persone pape, dic quem effectum debet habere respectu aliorum. | Student: After you have recited what effect belief held by mere presumption should have with respect to the person of the pope, tell what effect it should have with respect to others. | |
| Magister: Dicitur quod credentes propter solam presumptionem papam esse hereticum debent illis qui papam impugnant de heretica pravitate, nisi constiterit eis legitimis documentis quod calumpniose vel maliciose procedunt, prebere defensionem quam possunt ac etiam consilium, auxilium et favorem, et eos in nullo penitus molestare. | Master: It is said that those who believe because of mere presumption that the pope is a heretic should offer to those who attack the pope concerning heretical wickedness (unless it is established by lawful proofs that they proceed with slander or malice) the defense they can, and also advice, aid and favor, and should not molest them in any way at all. | |
| Capitulum 21 | Chapter 21 | |
| Discipulus: Hec assertio dependere michi videtur ex hiis que dicta sunt libro sexto a capitulo 37 usque ad capitulum 55, ubi allegasti quod impugnantes papam hereticum de heretica pravitate sunt a catholicis defendendi. Ideo circa ipsam noli insistere, sed tracta aliam conclusionem supra capitulo 13 istius septimi recitatam. | Student: This assertion seems to me to depend on what was said in Book VI Chapter 37 to Chapter 55, where you alleged that those who attack a heretic pope concerning heretical wickedness should be defended by Catholics. Therefore I do not wish to dwell on it, but deal with another conclusion recited above in chapter 13 of this Book VII. | |
| Magister: Septima conclusio est quod quibuscunque criminosis et existentibus male fame, si non declaraverint per legitima documenta aut manifesta indicia papam esse hereticum, minime est credendum. Hoc videtur posse probari sic. Nulli criminoso in quocunque negotio est credendum. Ergo nec criminosis contra papam est credendum de heretica pravitate si dictum suum nec per legitima documenta nec per indicia manifesta probaverint. Antecedens probari potest, ut videtur, per illa que dicta sunt supra libro sexto capitulo 79o. Consequentia probatione videtur nullatenus indigere. | Master: The seventh conclusion is that anyone who is criminal and being in bad fame, unless they declare by lawful proofs or clear indications that the pope is a heretic, should not be believed at all. This seems provable as follows. No criminal should be believed in any matter whatsoever. Therefore, no criminals should be believed against the pope concerning heretical wickedness unless they have proved their statement by lawful proofs or by clear evidence. The antecedent can be proved, as it seems, by what was said above in Book VI, Chapter 79. The inference seems to need no proof at all. |
Go to 1 Dial. 7, Chapter 22