| Capitulum 22 | Chapter 22 |
| Discipulus: Quantum ad opus istud michi sufficiunt ea que dicta sunt in genere predicto capitulo 79 huius sexti. Ideo ad materiam aliam annexam precedentibus me converto. Inquisivimus enim a capitulo 10o an imponentes pape heretico perfidiam heresis sint audiendi et an eis fides debeat adhiberi. Nunc autem interrogo an scripta eorum que perfidiam pape heretici declarare nituntur sint videnda, si in scriptis personam pape heretici et doctrinam eius conati fuerint reprobare. | Student: As far as this work is concerned, what was said in general in the aforementioned Chapter 79 of Book VI is sufficient for me. Therefore, I turn to another matter connected with the foregoing. For we have inquired since Chapter 10 whether those who accuse the heretic pope of heresy should be heard and whether credence should be given to them. Now I ask whether the writings of those who strive to declare the faithlessness of the heretic pope should be seen [i.e. read], if in their writings they have attempted to condemn the person of the heretic pope and his doctrine. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod scripta talium cum diligentia et studio sunt videnda. Quod eisdem rationibus quibus ostenditur quod imponentes pape heretico pravitatem hereticam debent audiri videtur posse probari. | Master: The answer made is that the writings of such people should be seen with diligence and attention. This seems provable by the same arguments that show that those who accuse the heretic pope of heretical wickedness should be heard. |
| Discipulus: Allega rationes speciales si quas habes. | Student: Give special arguments if you have any. |
| Magister: Hoc videtur posse probari primo sic. Magis legenda sunt et videnda scripta catholicorum hereticam impugnantium pravitatem quam scripta paganorum infidelium, et hereticorum, que catholicam reprobant veritatem. Sed scripta paganorum infidelium, et hereticorum, sunt legenda et videnda, non ad approbandum vel tenendum sed ad reprobandum et convincendum. Ergo multo magis scripta catholicorum perfidiam pape heretici impugnantium et reprobantium sunt legenda et videnda. | Master: This seems provable first thus. The writings of Catholics attacking heretical wickedness should be read and seen more than the writings of pagans, unbelievers, and heretics, who repudiate Catholic truth. But the writings of pagans, unbelievers, and heretics should be read and seen, not to approve or hold, but to disprove and convince. Therefore, much more, the writings of Catholics attacking and repudiating the faithlessness of the heretic pope should be read and seen. |
| Maior probatione non indiget. Minor auctoritatibus manifestis videtur posse probari. Hieronymus enim, ut legitur dist. 37 c. Qui de mensa, ait: “Qui de mensa regis et de vino potus eius nolunt comedere, ne polluantur, utique si sapientiam atque doctrinam Babiloniorum scirent esse peccatum, numquam acquiescerent discere quod non licebat. Discunt autem, non ut sequantur, sed ut iudicent atque convincant. Quomodo si quispiam adversus mathematicos velit scribere imperitus mathematis, risui pateat, et adversus philosophos disputans, si ignorat dogmata philosophorum. Discunt ergo ea mente doctrinam Chaldaicam, qua et Moyses omnem sapientiam Egiptiorum didicerat.” | The major does not need proof. The minor seems provable by manifest authorities. For Jerome, as we read in dist. 37 c. Qui de mensa says: “Those who refuse to eat from the king's table and drink his wine lest they be defiled, certainly if they knew that the wisdom and doctrine of the Babylonians was a sin, they would never consent to learn what was not permitted. But they do learn, not that they may follow, but that they may judge and convince. Just as if someone wished to write against mathematicians who was unskilled in mathematics, he would be laughed at, also if he were disputing against philosophers, if he were ignorant of the doctrines of the philosophers. Therefore they learn the Chaldean doctrine with that mind with which Moses also learned all the wisdom of the Egyptians.” |
| Item, Ambrosius, ut habetur dist. predicta c. Legimus, ait: “Legimus aliqua, ne negligantur, legimus ne ignoremus, legimus, non ut teneamus, sed ut repudiemus.” | Likewise, Ambrose, as is found in the aforementioned c. Legimus, says: “We read some things lest they be neglected, we read lest we be ignorant, we read, not that we may hold, but that we may repudiate.” |
| Ex quibus patet quod scripta philosophorum paganorum, et hereticorum, sunt legenda et videnda, non ut approbentur sed ut reprobentur. Ergo multo magis scripta catholicorum declarantium perfidiam pape heretici sunt legenda et videnda. | From these it is clear that the writings of pagan philosophers and heretics should be read and seen, not that they may be approved but that they may be rejected. Therefore, much more, the writings of Catholics declaring the faithlessness of the heretic pope should be read and seen. |
| Discipulus: Hec ratio bene procederet si constaret tales scribentes esse catholicos. Quando autem non constaret eos esse catholicos scripta eorum videnda non essent. | Student: This argument would work well if it were certain that such writers were Catholics. But when it be not certain that they are Catholics, their writings should not be seen. |
| Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod omnino hic desipis. Quia audientes alios composuisse libros adversus papam et doctrinam eius aut reputant eos catholicos aut hereticos, aut dubitant, nescientes an sint catholici vel heretici. Si reputant eos catholicos libros eorum non debent respuere sed videre. Si reputant eos hereticos libros eorum videre debent ad reprobandum erronea et ad respondendum sophisticis argumentis eorum, exemplo sanctorum Moysi et Danielis qui libros infidelium perlegerunt. Quomodo enim hereticorum fallacie dissolventur nisi legantur? Si autem dubitant, nescientes eos esse neque catholicos neque hereticos, libros debent eorum videre et legere, ut approbent si sint catholici vel reprobent si fuerint heretica labe respersi. | Master: It seems to some that here you are altogether foolish. Because when some hear that others have composed books against the pope and his doctrine, either they consider them [i.e. the writers] Catholics or heretics, or they doubt, not knowing whether they are Catholics or heretics. If they consider them Catholics, they should not reject their books, but rather see them. If they consider them heretics, they should see their books in order to refute their errors and to answer their fallacious arguments, following the example of Saints Moses and Daniel, who read through the books of unbelievers. For how will the fallacies of heretics be dissolved unless they are read? But if they doubt, not knowing whether they are Catholics or heretics, they should see and read their books, so that they may approve if they are Catholics or disapprove if they have been tainted with heretical taint. |
| Discipulus: Facias alias rationes. | Student: Give other arguments. |
| Magister: Secunda ratio specialiter probat quod ignorantes papam esse hereticum scripta aliorum contra ipsum debent legere et videre. Nam dubia, maxime de hiis que sunt necessaria ad salutem, sunt diligenter discutienda, teste Apostolo qui 1 Thess. 5o ait: “omnia autem probate, quod bonum est tenete”, ubi dicit glossa: “probate, id est, ratione discutite” omnia probanda scilicet (certa enim non egent discussione), “et” quod bonum est, id est, “quod bonum invenitur, tenete.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod dubia, presertim si fidem et salutem tangunt, sunt diligenter discutienda. Sed illa que scribuntur contra papam hereticum sunt necessaria ad salutem, quia spectant ad fidem que est necessaria ad salutem. Ergo nescientes an tales scribentes sint catholici vel heretici debent eorum scripta diligenter discutere et examinare. | Master: A second argument specifically proves that those who do not know that the pope is a heretic should read and see the writings of others against him. For doubts, especially about things that are necessary for salvation, should be diligently analysed, as the Apostle testifies in 1 Thess. 5: “But test all things, hold fast to that which is good,” where the gloss says: “Test, that is, analyse by argument,” namely, all things that should be tested (for things that are certain do not need analysing), “and”, i.e. that which is good, “what is found good, hold on to it.” From these words it is gathered that doubts, especially if they touch upon faith and salvation, should be diligently analysed. But things written against a heretic pope are necessary for salvation, because they concern faith, which is necessary for salvation. Therefore, those who do not know whether such writers are Catholics or heretics should diligently analyse and examine their writings. |
| Tertia ratio est hec. Illorum scripta sunt videnda cum quibus est licitum disputare, quia easdem rationes ore quis profert et scribit. Quod autem debet audiri debet et legi si scribitur. Sed cum illis qui dicunt et scribunt papam esse hereticum licitum est disputare ad veritatem inveniendam. Ergo et eorum scripta debent legi et videri. | A third argument is this. Those persons' writings should be seen with whom it is permissible to dispute [orally], because a person speaks and writes the same arguments. But what ought to be heard should be read if it is written. But to find the truth it is permissible the dispute with those who say and write that the pope is a heretic. Therefore, their writings should also be read and seen. |
| Capitulum 23 | Chapter 23 |
| Discipulus: Quia iste rationes michi videntur apparentiam aliqualem habere, reputoque probabile quod scripta catholicorum contra papam hereticum sunt nullatenus contempnenda, licet contra predicta alique obviationes michi occurrant, nolo tamen hic eas tractari, sed inferius dabo tibi occasionem discutiendi eas. Ideo dic nunc breviter an illi qui nolunt credere referentibus papam esse hereticum, quando in rei veritate esset hereticus, et qui nolunt scripta catholicorum contra papam hereticum legere nec videre, sint inter dampnabiliter credentes pape heretico numerandi, et qua pena sunt plectendi. | Student: Because these arguments seem to me to have some plausibility, and I consider it probable that the writings of Catholics against a heretic pope are in no way to be despised, although some objections to the aforesaid occur to me, I do not wish to treat of them here, but I will give you an opportunity to discuss them below. Therefore, tell me now briefly whether those who refuse to believe those who report that the pope is a heretic, when in reality he is a heretic, and who refuse to read or see the writings of Catholics against a heretic pope, should be counted among the blameworthy believers in a heretic pope, and with what penalty they should be punished. |
| Magister: Iuxta pertractata duas interrogationes proponis, ad quarum primam distinguendo respondetur, quia nolentium credere papam esse hereticum quando esset hereticus quidam sunt qui dampnabiliter nolunt hoc credere, vel quia nolunt de eius perfidia informari, vel quia licet sint informati nolunt informationibus sufficientibus et fidem facientibus de perfidia pape heretici adhibere fidem. Quidam autem sunt vel esse possunt qui absque crimine nolunt credere papam esse hereticum, utpote illi per quos non stat quin de perfidia pape heretici informentur et, eisdem informationibus fidem facientibus, de perfidia pape heretici credant et fidem adhibeant. Item, dampnabiliter recusantium credere papam esse hereticum quidam sunt qui quamvis crederent eum esse hereticum in nullo possent ei vel eius erroribus obviare. Aliqui vero possent ei vel eius erroribus obviare publice vel occulte. | Master: In accordance with the matters treated above [Chapters 13-23], you propose two questions. The first is answered by distinguishing, because among those who refuse to believe that the pope is a heretic when he is a heretic, there are some who blameably refuse to believe this, either because they do not wish to be informed of his faithlessness, or because, though they are informed, they do not wish to believe sufficient and credible information about the faithlessness of a heretic pope. But there are (or can be) some who are not willing to believe that the pope is a heretic without crime, such as those who posed no obstacle to being informed of the heretic pope’s faithlessness and, giving credence to that information, believing and giving credence to the heretic pope’s faithlessness [translation uncertain]. Likewise, among those who blameably refuse to believe that the pope is a heretic there are some who, although they believe that he is a heretic, are in no way able to oppose him or his errors. Some, however, could oppose him or his errors publicly or secretly. |
| Dicitur ergo quod nolentes credere informationibus rationabilibus facientibus hominibus fidem de perfidia pape heretici, si possunt sibi vel eius erroribus obviare, non solum credentes dampnabiliter pape heretico sed etiam fautores eius sunt censendi. Si vero in nullo possunt pape heretico vel eius erroribus obviare, credentes et non fautores reputari debent. Si vero sunt aliqui qui nolunt credere papam esse hereticum quia non sunt de eius perfidia informati, nec per eos stat quod non informantur, nec fautores nec dampnabiliter credentes pape heretico sunt censendi. | It is said, therefore, that those who refuse to believe reasonable information causing men to believe about the faithlessness of a heretic pope, if they are able to oppose him or his errors, should be considered not only blameworthy believers in the heretic pope but also as his supporters. But if they cannot in any way oppose the heretic pope or his errors, they should be considered believers and not supporters. But if there are some who are not willing to believe that the pope is a heretic because they are not informed of his faithlessness, and it is not through them [by their doing?] that they are not informed, they should not be considered either supporters or blameworthy believers in the heretic pope. |
| Discipulus: Intelligo responsionem istorum quantum ad hoc. Ideo dic qua pena illi qui dampnabiliter renuunt credere papam esse hereticum sunt plectendi. | Student: I understand their response in this regard. Therefore, tell me with what penalty those who blameably refuse to believe that the pope is a heretic should be punished. |
| Magister: Ad hoc patet responsio per illa que dicta sunt hic et superius capitulo 2o, quia ut dictum est hic, tales sunt dampnabiliter credentes, ibi autem dictum est quod credentes sunt excommunicationis sententia involuti. Ergo qui dampnabiliter renuunt credere papam esse hereticum sunt excommunicationis sententie vinculo alligati. | Master: The response to this is clear from what was said here and above in Chapter 2. Because as has been said here, such people are blameably believers, but it was said in Chapter 2 that believers are involved in the sentence of excommunication. Therefore those who blameably refuse to believe that the pope is a heretic are bound by a sentence of excommunication. |
| Discipulus: Dic ad secundam interrogationem. | Student: Speak to the second question. |
| Magister: Ad ipsam respondetur quod illi qui dampnabiliter renuunt legere vel videre aut audire scripta catholicorum contra papam hereticum, si possunt obviare pape heretico vel eius erroribus, non solum credentes sed etiam fautores eiusdem sunt habendi. Si autem obviare non possunt, solummodo credentes sunt putandi, et tam hii quam illi excommunicationis sententia sunt ligati. | Master: To that the answer made is that those who blameably refuse to read or see or hear the writings of Catholics against a heretic pope, if they can oppose the heretic pope or his errors, should be considered not only believers but also supporters of the same. But if they cannot oppose, they should be considered believers only, and both these and those are bound by a sentence of excommunication. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid illa que dicta sunt prius secundum istos debent intelligi de credentibus aliis hereticis quam pape? | Student: Should those things which have been said above be understood, according to these, of believers in heretics other than a pope? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod de aliis consimiliter debent intelligi, licet gravius peccent illi qui credunt pape heretico quam aliis, eo quod papa hereticus est magis nocivus et magis periculosus quam alii heretici. | Master: The answer made is that they should be understood in a similar way about other heretics, although those who believe in a heretic pope sin more grievously than believers in others, because a heretic pope is more harmful and more dangerous than other heretics. |
| Capitulum 24 | Chapter 24 |
| Discipulus: Propter illa que in hoc capitulo dicta sunt, hic esset locus querendi de fautoribus hereticorum. Sed antequam inquiram de eis, peto ut respondeas ad rationes supra c. 12o allegatas quibus ostenditur quod volentibus declarare perfidiam pape heretici minime est credendum. Puto enim quod per responsiones quas narrabis, sive alique earum fuerint rationabiles sive irrationabiles, totam materiam de credentibus hereticis clarius et magis profunde intelligam. | Student: Because of what has been said in this chapter, this would be the place to ask about the supporters of heretics. But before I inquire about them, I ask that you respond to the arguments brought forward above in Chapter 12, which show that those who wish to declare the heretic pope’s faithlessness should not be believed at all. For I think that through the responses that you will narrate, whether some of them are reasonable or unreasonable, I will understand the whole matter about believers in heretics more clearly and more deeply. |
| Magister: Ad primam illarum dicitur quod sacra pagina minime reprehendit omnes adhibentes fidem narrantibus aliquid sinistrum de alio. Sed eum qui cito credit narrantibus mala de aliquo sacra pagina reprehendit. Propter quod non scribitur quod “qui credit levis corde est”, sed “qui credit cito levis corde est.” Ad cuius evidentiam dicitur esse sciendum quod non ideo dicitur aliquis dampnabiliter cito credere quia statim credit quando aliquid sive bonum sive malum narratur de alio. Nam et David, ut legitur 2 Reg. 3, ut audivit Joab interfecisse Abner, credidit, nec tamen in hoc peccavit. Sed qui cito credit malum de proximo levis corde est, et, si malum quod cito credit de proximo est peccatum mortale, credendo cito mortaliter peccat. Est ergo videndum quis credit cito malum de proximo et quis non credit cito. | Master: To the first of these it is said that the sacred page does not blame everyone who puts faith in people who tell something sinister about another, but the sacred page does blame anyone who quickly believes those who tell bad things about someone. For this reason it is not written that “someone who believes is light-hearted”, but “someone who believes quickly is light-hearted.” To make this clear it is said that it should be known that someone is not said to believe quickly in a blameworthy way for the reason that he immediately believes when something, whether good or bad, is told about another. For David also, as we read in 2 Kings 3[:26-7], believed when he heard that Joab had killed Abner, and yet did not sin in this. But someone who quickly believes evil about his neighbor is light-hearted, and if the evil that he quickly believes about his neighbor is [that the neighbour has committed] a mortal sin, by quickly believing he [himself] sins mortally. It is therefore necessary to see who quickly believes evil about his neighbor and who does not quickly believe it. |
| Dicitur igitur quod aliquis potest credere malum de aliquo dupliciter, quia vel credit malum de alio ex aliquo quod ipsemet percipit de ipso, vel solummodo ex relatione seu narratione aliorum. Si autem aliquis credit malum de alio ex aliquid [aliquo BbFiAnLy] quod ipsemet percipit de ipso, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia aut illud potest fieri bene et male, aut tantummodo male. Si potest fieri bene et male, aut ergo, ut communiter, non fit nisi male, licet in casu singulari et speciali et raro possit fieri bene, aut frequenter fit bene et frequenter fit male. | It is said, therefore, that someone can believe evil about someone in two ways, because either he believes evil about another from something that he himself perceives about him, or only from the report or narration of others. But if someone believes evil about another from something that he himself perceives about him [i.e. an action he has done], this can be in two ways, because either it [the action] can be done well and badly, or only badly. If it can be done well and badly, either it is commonly done only badly (although in a singular and special case, and rarely, it can be done well), or it is frequently done well and frequently done badly. |
| Si frequenter fit bene et frequenter fit male, sicut frequenter homines cum mulieribus bona intentione loquuntur et frequenter mala, sepe etiam bona intentione visitant eas et dant munera ipsis ac diversa solacia habent cum eis, et sepe mala intentione talia fiunt, si in hoc casu vel consimili aliquis credat peccatum mortale de alio, peccat mortaliter, quia est iudicium temerarium contra caritatem quam habere debet ad proximum, qua illa que possunt fieri bene et male in meliorem partem interpretari debemus, sicut dicit Beda, ut habetur Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote. | If it is frequently done well and frequently done badly, as men frequently converse with good intentions with women, and frequently with bad (often with good intentions they visit them and give them gifts and have various comforts with them), and often such things are done with bad intentions: if in this or a similar case someone believes a mortal sin about another, he [himself] sins mortally, because it is a rash judgment against the charity that he should have for his neighbour, by which we should interpret for the better things that can be done well and badly, as Bede says, as is found in Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote. |
| Si autem illud ex quo quis credit malum de alio est tale quod ut communiter fit male, raro autem vel nunquam fit bene, licet possit fieri bene, sic non peccat quis suspicando malum de alio. Peccat tamen firmiter credendo malum de ipso, et multo magis peccat credendo malum gravius quam sit illud quod videt de alio, maxime si illud malum quod credit de alio est aliquod enorme excedens peccata que ab hominibus communiter fiunt. Sicut si quis, videns aliquem multum iratum contra alium, crederet quod ille iratus intenderet eundem occidere, multo magis peccat quam solummodo credendo iram quam videt esse peccatum mortale. Et tamen, credendo ipsum ex hoc solo quod irascitur peccare mortaliter, si iratus ultra non procedat, peccat mortaliter. Potest enim aliquis irasci multum et intense contra alium zelo iustitie et intentione bona absque peccato mortali, et quandoque venialiter solum. Verumptamen, suspicando vel dubitando talem iram esse peccatum mortale in ipso non est peccatum mortale. | But if that from which one believes evil about another is such as is commonly done badly but rarely or never done well, although it can be done well, then one does not sin by suspecting evil about another. However, one does sin by firmly believing evil of him, and much more by believing an evil more grievous than that which he sees done by the other, especially if the evil he believes about him is some enormous sin exceeding the sins men commonly commit. For example, if someone, seeing someone very angry against another, were to believe that that person, in his anger, intended to kill him, he sins much more than merely by believing that the anger he sees is a mortal sin. And yet, by believing that he sins mortally from the mere fact that he is angry, if the angry person does not proceed further, he [i.e. the one seeing it] sins mortally. For someone can be angry greatly and intensely against another out of zeal for justice and a good intention without mortal sin, and sometimes only venially. However, suspecting that, or doubting whether, such anger is a mortal sin is in itself not a mortal sin. |
| Sic etiam, si ex illis que habent aliquam speciem mali que tamen possunt in casu fieri absque peccato mortali, quis credat alium peccatum grande committere, peccat mortaliter. Et de hoc videtur poni exemplum 34 dist. c. 1, ubi Nicholaus papa, scribens Albino archiepiscopo de immoderata familiaritate quam habuit quidam episcopus cum filia sua, non vult credere quod idem episcopus carnaliter peccaverit cum filia eadem, licet illa immoderata familiaritas habuit speciem mali, sed vult propter scandalum quod eandem familiaritatem dimittat, scribens in hec verba: “Nichilominus autem de hoc episcopo relatum est apostolatui nostro, quod cum quadam filia sua immoderatam teneat familiaritatem, et ob id mala fama ei orta sit, pro qua re a sanctitate tua ceterisque coepiscopis suis commonitus atque correctus est, sed nullatenus emendatus; que res in hoc maxime displicet, et magis ac magis de se deteriorem reddit opinionem in quo beatitudinis tue et ceterorum coepiscoporum suorum rationibus non obedit et per inobedientiam in culpam protoplasti relabitur. Oportet ergo fraternitatem tuam sinodale cum episcopis et suffraganeis tuis convocare concilium, et hunc salubribus eloquiis episcopum convenire, atque illi pastorali auctoritate precipere quatenus ab omnium bestiarum vel volucrum venatione penitus alienus existat, atque ab immoderata filie sue familiaritate semet omnino coherceat. Quod si parere contempserit, et tam pro venationis declinatione quam pro immoderata filie sue conversatione vitanda vobis ammonentibus obedire distulerit, a vestro collegio excommunicatus abscedat. Quod si in hoc adhuc contumax apparuerit, a ministerio cessare debebit.” | So also, if, from things that have some appearance of evil that can nevertheless be done on occasion without mortal sin, someone believes that another commits a great sin, he sins mortally. And an example of this seems to be given in dist. 34 c. 1, where pope Nicholas, writing to Archbishop Albinus about the immoderate intimacy that a certain bishop had with his daughter, does not want to believe that the bishop sinned carnally with his daughter, although that immoderate intimacy had the appearance of evil, but because of the scandal wants that intimacy to stop, writing in these words: “It has been reported to our Apostolate about this bishop that he maintains an immoderate intimacy with a certain daughter of his, and because of this a bad fame has arisen for him, for which matter he has been admonished and corrected by your holiness and the rest of his fellow bishops, but he has not been reformed in any way; this matter is most displeasing, and makes opinion of him worse and worse, in that he does not obey the reasons of your beatitude and the rest of his fellow bishops and through disobedience falls back into the guilt of the first man [i.e. Adam]. It is therefore necessary for your brotherhood to convene a synodal council with your bishops and suffragans, and to meet this bishop with wholesome words, and command him by pastoral authority to be completely removed from hunting all beasts or birds, and that he completely restrain himself from immoderate intimacy with his daughter. But if he disdains to obey, and delays obeying your warnings both for giving up hunting and avoiding immoderate intimacy with his daughter, he will leave your college excommunicated. But if in this he still appears contumacious, he must cease from ministry.” |
| Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod episcopus immoderatam familiaritatem habuit cum filia sua. Et qualis fuerit illa immoderata familiaritas, glossa super verbo ‘fama’ exprimit, dicens: “coram omnibus eam nimis osculabatur, et ponebit manus in gremium eius.” Quod speciem mali videtur habere quia, ut communiter, osculum mulieris nimium iteratum et positio manus in gremium sive sinum ex immundo corde procedit et cor impudicum pretendit. Et tamen ex tali specie mali noluit nichilominus Nicholaus papa non solum credere, sed nec etiam suspicari, quod idem episcopus in lapsum carnis inciderit. Nec etiam voluit quod ei indiceretur purgatio, non obstante mala fama ex hoc orta de ipso, testante glossa, que ibidem ait: “non quod aliquid ibi sevi criminis existimaretur propter fedus nature, scilicet quia coram omnibus eam nimis osculabatur et ponebit manus in gremium eius, et ideo non fuit ei indicta purgatio.” | From these words it is gathered that the bishop had an immoderate familiarity with his daughter. And what that immoderate familiarity was, the gloss on the word ‘fame’ expresses, saying: “he kissed her too much in front of everyone, and he will put his hand on her lap.” This seems to have the appearance of evil because, usually, kissing a woman too often and placing his hand on her lap or bosom proceeds from an unclean heart and shows an unchaste heart. And yet, from such an appearance of evil, pope Nicholas nevertheless did not only refuse to believe, but even to suspect, that the same bishop had fallen into a lapse of the flesh. Nor did he even wish that a purgation be prescribed for him, despite the bad fame that arose about him from this, as the gloss testifies, which says there: “not that anything in it was considered a serious crime because of a foulness of nature, namely because he kissed her too much in front of everyone and he will put his hand on her lap, and therefore a purgation was not prescribed for him.” |
| Discipulus: Quare non fuit ei indicta purgatio ex quo extitit diffamatus, teste Nicholao, qui in verbis premissis dicit “et ob id mala fama ei orta sit.” | Student: Why was he not ordered to make a purgation? Because he was defamed, as Nicholas testifies, who in the above words says “and because of that a bad reputation arose for him.” |
| Magister: Respondetur quod purgatio non debet diffamato indici nisi quando de crimine diffamatur. Iste autem episcopus de crimine, puta de lapsu carnis, minime extitit diffamatus, sed erat tantummodo diffamatus de immoderata familiaritate filie sue. Que, quamvis fuit immoderata et, ut communiter, immoderata familiaritas mulieris sit cum peccato mortali, tamen talis immoderatio potest carere peccato mortali, quia non omnis immoderatio est peccatum mortale. Ideo, iste episcopus non fuit de crimine diffamatus. Quare sibi non debuit indici purgatio, sed debuit ammoneri, quia etiam de venialibus ammonitio fieri potest. | Master: The answer made is that purgation should not be ordered to a defamed person except when he is defamed for a crime. But this bishop was not defamed for a crime, for example for a carnal lapse, but was only defamed for immoderate intimacy with his daughter. This, although it was immoderate, and immoderate intimacy with a woman is commonly accompanied by mortal sin, nevertheless such immoderation can be without mortal sin, because not all immoderation is a mortal sin. Therefore, this bishop was not defamed for a crime. Therefore it was not appropriate to direct him to make a purgation, but a warning was appropriate, because a warning can be given even about venial sins. |
| Discipulus: Unde accidit quod aliquis credit malum de alio ex illo quod frequenter fit bene et male, et ex illo quod habet speciem mali et frequenter fit male et nunquam vel raro bene? | Student: How does it happen that someone believes evil about another from something that is frequently done well and badly, and from something that has the appearance of evil and is frequently done badly and never or rarely well? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod ut communiter hoc provenit de duobus. Ex hoc, videlicet, quod taliter credentes malum de alio consimilibus criminibus publice vel occulte aut voluntate sunt infecti, et ideo iudicant de aliis sicut sentiunt de seipsis, et quia credunt alios esse tales in actibus exterioribus etiam indifferentibus quales sciunt esse seipsos publice vel occulte aut secundum voluntatem et desiderium cordis. Unde sunt quidam qui omnes suspiciosos et cito credentes crimina quecunque de proximo reputant actu vel voluntate eisdem criminibus irretitos. Provenit etiam talis credulitas mala ex inimicitia aut odio vel ira quam habent sic credentes ad illos quos credunt esse malos, quia unusquisque malus cito credit malum de illo quem odit. | Master: The answer made is that this generally comes from two sources. From this, namely, that those who believe evil about others are infected with similar crimes, either publicly or secretly or in the will, and therefore judge others as they think of themselves, and because they believe others to be such in outward acts, even indifferent ones, as they know themselves to be, publicly or secretly or according to the will and desire of their hearts. Hence there are some who are suspicious of all and are quick to believe any crimes about their neighbor, considering them to be caught up in the same crimes, either actually or in will. Such evil belief also comes from the enmity or hatred or anger that those who believe so have towards those whom they believe to be evil, because every evil person quickly believes evil about someone he hates. |
| Discipulus: Dic de credente aliquem esse malum ex aliquo quod non potest fieri nisi male. | Student: Tell me about someone who believes that someone is evil from something that can only be done badly. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod qui credit aliquem esse malum quia percipit per semetipsum aliquid de eo quod non potest fieri bene sed tantummodo male non peccat ex hoc quod credit malum de ipso, quia propter illa que non possunt fieri bene licitum est cuilibet iudicare et reputare malum illum qui facit. Hec est sententia Bede, ut habetur Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote, qui ait:“quod enim scriptum est ‘ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos’, de manifestis dictum est, que non possunt bono animo fieri, ut stuprum, blasphemie, furta, ebrietates et similia, de quibus nobis permittitur iudicare.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod propter illa que non possunt fieri bene licet credere aliquem esse malum. | Master: It is said that someone who believes that someone is evil because he perceives something about him that cannot be done well but only badly does not sin because he believes something bad about him, because on account of things that cannot be done well it is permissible for anyone to judge and consider the person who does it evil. This is the opinion of Bede, as found in Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote, who says: “For what has been written, ‘by their fruits you will know them,’ is said of obvious things that cannot be done with a good mind, such as adultery, blasphemy, theft, drunkenness and the like, of which we are permitted to judge.” From these words it is gathered that because of those things that cannot be done well it is permissible to believe that someone is bad. |
| Discipulus: Dic de illo qui credit malum de alio solummodo propter relationem seu narrationem alicuius vel etiam aliquorum. | Student: Tell me about someone who believes evil about another solely because of the report or narration of someone, or, also, of some others. |
| Magister: De hoc, quando scilicet quis debeat credere malum de aliquo propter relationem vel narrationem alicuius vel aliquorum et quando non debet, difficile vel impossibile est dare regulam generalem que in nullo casu deficiat. Quia aliquando credendum est extra iudicium dicto unius, aliquando non est credendum dicto unius etiam extra iudicium, aliquando etiam credendum est dicto multorum, et aliquando non, quandoque etiam credendum est fame, et quandoque non est credendum fame, interdum etiam credendum est presumptionibus que narrantur, et interdum illis minime est credendum. Ista omnia, ut nonnullis apparet, per rationes apertas, exempla, et iura, possent copiose probari, sed propter prolixitatem vitandam videtur non esse insistendum. | Master: About this, namely when someone should believe evil about someone because of the report or narration of someone (or, also, of more than one person), and when he should not, it is difficult or impossible to give a general rule that will never fail. Because sometimes one should believe outside the court the saying of one person, sometimes one should not believe the saying of one person even outside the court; sometimes one should also believe the saying of many, and sometimes not; sometimes also one must believe fame, and sometimes one must not believe fame; sometimes also one must believe narrated presumptions, and sometimes one must not believe them at all. All these, as it seems to some, could be amply proved by open arguments, examples, and laws, but in order to avoid prolixity it seems that it is not necessary to insist. |
| Dicitur igitur quod, quemadmodum, ut habetur Extra, De testibus, c. Preterea, iudex circumspectus et discretus debet formare “motum animi sui ex argumentis et testimoniis, que rei aptiora esse compererit”, ita etiam unusquisque audiens extra iudicium referentes malum de aliquo ad hoc quod credat vel non credat sepe ex multis conscientiam suam formare tenetur, quia sepe extra iudicium sicut in iudicio ad faciendum fidem de malo alterius, etsi non possunt singula, multa collecta simul iuvant. | It is said, therefore, that, just as, as is stated in Extra, De testibus, c. Preterea, a circumspect and discreet judge must form “the motion of his mind from the arguments and testimonies which he has found to be more suitable to the case”, so also every person hearing outside the court people reporting something bad about someone, to decide whether to believe or not believe often he must form his conscience from many things, because often outside the court, as in the court, to form a belief about the badness of another, even if individual [considerations] cannot help, many collected together do help. |
| Discipulus: Applica predicta ad propositum. | Student: Apply the above to the purpose. |
| Magister: Secundum ista dicitur quis cito credere malum de proximo qui ex hiis solummodo que possunt fieri bene et male credit ipsum esse malum. Qui autem credit ipsum esse malum ex hiis que nunquam bono animo fieri possunt, non cito credit. | Master: According to these things, someone is said to quickly believe evil about his neighbor who believes that he is bad solely from things that can be done both well and badly. But someone who believes that he is bad from things that can never be done with a good intention does not quickly believe. |
| Iterum, qui credit alium esse malum ex hiis que possunt fieri bene et male et aliis aminiculis concurrentibus simul, ex quibus simul potest quis licite formare conscienciam suam de malo proximi, non cito credit eum esse malum. | Again, someone who believes that another is bad from things that can be done well and badly and other concurrent supporting considerations at the same time, from which together one can permissibly form one’s conscience about his neighbour’s badness, does not quickly believe that he is bad . |
| Iterum, si ex sola relatione malorum inimicorum adversariorum causam habentium contra aliquem, absque aliis aminiculis, quis credit ipsum esse malum, cito credit. Qui autem credit ex relatione virorum fidelium, presertim sub iuramento asserentium per certam scientiam malum de proximo, etiam extra iudicium non cito credit. | Again, if someone believes that a person is bad only from the report of bad enemies, adversaries who have an issue against him, without other supporting considerations, he quickly believes. But if he believes evil of his neighbor from the report of faithful men, especially those who, under oath, affirm with certain knowledge, even outside the court, he does not quickly believe. |
| Iterum, qui ex relatione malorum vel inimicorum, aliis concurrentibus indiciis et aminiculis que simul iuncta faciunt fidem, credit, non cito credit. | Again, someone who believes from the report of evildoers or enemies, with other concurring indications and supporting considerations which, when joined together, make faith, does not quickly believe. |
| Discipulus: Satis apparet quod non est facile dare regulam generalem qua cognoscatur quando quis credit cito vel non credit cito extra iudicium. Quia alio modo cognoscatur unus credere cito in uno casu, et alio modo constat in alio casu quod credit cito. Ideo, hoc generali omisso, dic alias vias secundum istos quibus in speciali cognoscitur quod credens papam esse hereticum credit cito vel non cito. | Student: It is quite clear that it is not easy to give a general rule to know when someone believes quickly or does not believe quickly outside of court. Because in one way a person is known to believe quickly in one case, and in another way it is clear in another case that he does believe quickly. Therefore, leaving aside this generality, tell of other ways according to these [i.e. those whose position is being explained] by which it is known in particular that someone who believes the pope to be a heretic believes quickly or not quickly. |
| Magister: De hoc dicitur quod videns bullam hereticalem pape et cognoscens eam esse hereticalem et ex hoc credens papam esse hereticum non credit cito nec peccat in aliquo, imo peccaret si hereticum eum non crederet. Quia scire tenetur quod, quamvis non omnis errans contra fidem sit hereticus, tamen errans contra fidem et suum errorem sollempniter ultimata deliberatione diffiniens hereticus est. | Master: Of this it is said that someone seeing a heretical bull from the pope and knowing it to be heretical and from this believing the pope to be a heretic does not believe quickly nor does he sin in anything, indeed he would sin if he did not believe the pope to be a heretic. Because he is bound to know that, though not everyone who errs against the faith is a heretic, nevertheless someone who errs against the faith and defines his error with solemn final deliberation is a heretic. |
| Iterum, videns transsumptum bulle hereticalis et cognoscens quod est transsumptum bulle, ac credens in ipso heresim diffiniri, et ex hoc credens papam talem hereticum, non cito credit, imo credere tenetur de necessitate salutis, sicut credere tenetur si videret bullam hereticalem talis pape. | Again, seeing a transcript of a heretical bull and knowing that it is a transcript of a bull, and believing that heresy is defined in it, and from this believing that this pope is a heretic, he does not quickly believe, indeed he is bound to believe for the necessity of salvation, just as he is bound to believe if he saw a heretical bull from that pope. |
| Iterum, si quis audit alios, qui hactenus bone fame fuerint, publice et constanter asserere et paratos iurare papam heresim manifestam, quam in speciali exprimunt et exponunt, sollempniter diffinisse, quamvis neque bullam hereticalem neque transsumptum ostenderant, et ex hoc credens papam esse hereticum, non cito credit nec peccat credendo. | Again, if someone hears others who have hitherto been of good fame publicly and consistently assert, and are ready to swear, that the pope has solemnly defined a manifest heresy, which they express and expound in detail, although they had shown neither the heretical bull nor a transcript of the bull -- and believing from this that the pope is a heretic, he does not quickly believe nor does he sin by believing. |
| Item, audiens papam publice de determinata heresi diffamari, nec papa negat se illum docere, nec purgat in aliquo famam suam, non cito credit si credit ipsum hereticum esse. | Likewise, if someone hears the pope publicly defamed about a specific heresy, and the pope neither denies that he teaches it nor purges his reputation in any way, he does not quickly believe if he believes that the pope is a heretic. |
| Item, audiens a fide dignis papam publice predicare hereses manifestas et quod tenentibus, docentibus, predicantibus, et divulgantibus ipsas favet, ac eos diligit, promovet, et honorat, tenentes autem contrarias veritates odit, persequitur, et molestat, non credit cito si credit ipsum papam hereticum esse. | Likewise, if someone hears from trustworthy people that the pope publicly preaches manifest heresies and that he favors those who hold, teach, preach, and publicise them, and that he loves, promotes, and honors them, but hates, persecutes, and harasses those who hold contrary truths, he does not quickly believe if he believes that the pope himself is a heretic. |
| Item, sciens quod pape a viris literatis hactenus providis et discretis hereses manifestas imponuntur, qui etiam petunt cum instantia fieri concilium generale, si papa impedit celebrari concilium generale, nec suam declarat innocentiam de impositis criminibus manifestis, non cito credit si ipsum credit hereticum esse. | Likewise, if someone knows that manifest heresies are imposed on the pope by learned men who are so far foresighted and discreet, who also demand with insistence that a general council be held, if the pope prevents the celebration of a general council, and does not declare his innocence of the manifest crimes imposed on him, he does not quickly believe if he believes him to be a heretic. |
| Qui autem videns in bulla pape assertionem aliquam contineri que sensum et hereticum potest habere, et nec ex antecedentibus nec ex sequentibus nec ex aliis dictis vel scriptis talis pape potest patenter inferri quod sensus hereticus de mente pape est, cito credit et peccat mortaliter si sic credit eum esse hereticum, quia maliciose pervertit assertionem pape, et idem est tenendum de assertionibus et opinionibus aliorum. | But someone who sees in a papal bull that some assertion is contained that can have a heretical meaning, and it cannot be clearly inferred from the preceding or following or from other words or writings of such a pope that the heretical meaning is the pope’s meaning, he quickly believes and sins mortally if he thus believes him to be a heretic, because he maliciously perverts the pope’s assertion; and the same must be held of the assertions and opinions of others. |
| Item, qui videt aliquod scriptum pape in quo non diffinitive tanquam papa determinat, sed tanquam privata persona de diversis tractat, docet, et inquirit, et in eodem scripto heresim reperit manifestam, cuius contrariam veritatem non tenetur papa explicite credere, si propter talem heresim credit papam esse hereticum, cito credit, licet non cito credat credendo ipsum errare. Si autem in scripto pape quocunque reperit heresim manifestam cuius contrarium tenetur credere explicite, et non solummodo recitatam sed assertam aut opinatam vel etiam dubitatam, non credit cito si credit papam hereticum antedictum. Unde, si quis legeret in libro, sermone, seu scripto pape quocunque quod Christus non fuit mortus, quod non ascendit in celum, aut quod mortui non resurgent, vel quod non est infernus, vel aliquod tale cuius contrarium tenetur papa explicite credere, non crederet cito qui statim crederet papam esse hereticum, postquam sibi constaret tale scriptum esse pape. | Likewise, whoever sees some writing of the pope in which he does not definitively determine as pope, but as private person treats, teaches, and investigates various things, and in the same writing finds a manifest heresy, the contrary truth of which the pope is not bound to believe explicitly, if because of such a heresy he believes that the pope is a heretic, he quickly believes (although he does not quickly believe in believing that he errs). But if in any writing of the pope he finds a manifest heresy the contrary of which the pope is bound to believe explicitly, not only recited but asserted or opined or even doubted, he does not quickly believe if he believes that the pope is a heretic. Hence, if anyone were to read in any book, sermon, or writing of a pope that Christ did not die, that he did not ascend into heaven, or that the dead will not rise again, or that there is no hell, or anything of the kind the contrary of which the pope is bound to believe explicitly, he would not quickly believe if he immediately believed that the pope is a heretic, after he became sure that the writing was the pope’s. |
| Item, qui videns solummodo aliquas reportationes sermonum vel determinationum aut assertionum pape in quibus aliqua heresis de qua non est intentio principalis asseritur, si credit papam esse hereticum, cito credit et peccat mortaliter. Si vero audit a fide dignis asserentibus talem heresim esse de mente pape, et quod est veraciter reportata et non ex errore, non credit cito si credit papam esse hereticum. | Likewise, whoever sees only some reports of speeches or determinations or assertions of the pope in which some heresy is asserted that is not the main intention, if he believes that the pope is a heretic, he quickly believes and sins mortally. But if he hears from trustworthy people who assert that the heresy is the pope’s intention, and that it is truthfully reported and not by mistake, he does not quickly believe if he believes that the pope is a heretic. |
| Item, qui audit aliquos criminosos pestilentes inimicos pape, leves detractores, conspiratores, malum de aliis credentes faciliter, referentes papam esse hereticum, si credit ex hoc papam esse hereticum, cito credit, licet in rei veritate esset hereticus. Talibus enim nunquam in preiudicium alterius est credendum. | Likewise, whoever hears some criminal, pestilent enemies of the pope, light detractors, conspirators, who easily believe evil about others, reporting that the pope is a heretic, if he believes from this that the pope is a heretic, he quickly believes, even if in reality the pope was a heretic. For such people should never be believed to another’s prejudice. |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod credendum sit eis, quia non est verisimile quod aliquis sit immemor tam sanitatis corporalis quam spiritualis. Sed tales, si mendaciter papam de heresi diffamarent, essent in periculo tam corporis quam anime, quia et dampnabiliter mentirentur et papa de eis gravissimam sumeret ultionem. | Student: It seems that they should be believed, because it is not likely that someone would be careless of both physical and spiritual health. But if such people were to falsely defame the pope for heresy, they would be in danger of both body and soul, because they would be lying in a damnable manner and the pope would take the most severe revenge on them. |
| Magister: De hoc distinguitur, quia aut tales criminosi pestilentes et huiusmodi solummodo in occulto diffamant papam de heretica pravitate, aut publice in speciali sibi imponunt hereses manifestas, offerentes se probaturos papam esse hereticum, et cum instantia petentes iustitiam. In primo casu non esset eis credendum, et qui eis credit, cito credit. Nec etiam propter eorum verba in occulto est aliqualiter suspicandum vel presumendum papam esse hereticum, quia verba talium in occulto non debent facere fidem, sed debent esse suspecta, ut nequaquam in preiudicium cuiuscunque credatur eisdem. In secundo vero casu, licet talibus minime sit credendum, propter eos tamen licet suspicari papam esse hereticum, et dubitare de fidelitate eius, in tantum quod quilibet, quantum sibi licet pro gradu suo et officio, tenetur de hoc querere sollicite veritatem. | Master: About this a distinction is made. Either such pestilent criminals and the like defame the pope concerning heretical wickedness only in secret, or they publicly and specifically impose manifest heresies on him, offering to prove that the pope is a heretic, and demanding justice with urgency. In the first case, they should not be believed, and whoever believes them quickly believes. Nor also should it be suspected or presumed that the pope is a heretic because of their words in secret, because the words of such people in secret should not be believed, but should be suspect, so that they are never believed to the prejudice of anyone. In the second case, however, although such people should not be believed at all, it is nevertheless permissible because of them to suspect that the pope is a heretic and to doubt his faithfulness, insofar as anyone (as far as he is permitted to do so according to his rank and office) is bound to inquire diligently into the truth of this. |
| Capitulum 25 | Chapter 25 |
| Discipulus: Aliqualiter distinguendo, interrogo an propter verba criminosorum et detractorum et huiusmodi pestilentium publice heresim seu aliud crimen de aliquo asserentium maior suspicio sit habenda de papa seu alio prelato vel subdito, de divite et potente vel paupere. | Student: Distinguishing in
some way, I ask whether, because of the words of criminals
and detractors and such pestilent people who publicly
assert heresy or some other crime about someone, should
greater suspicion be held about the pope or another
prelate or [about a] subject, about a rich and powerful
person or a poor person. [Note: the poor persons Ockham likely has in mind are especially the Franciscans (i.e. members of the Order of Friars Minor) and other mendicant religious.] |
| Magister: Ad hoc dicitur distinguendo. Quia aut imponentes vel referentes crimen de alio sunt lesi, turbati, vel provocati qualitercunque ab eo cui crimen imponunt, sive etiam sunt emuli, inimici, adversarii vel quomodocunque sive in agibilibus sive in speculabilibus notabiliter contrariantes eidem, seu talium amici, subditi, prelati, vel quomodolibet talibus adherentes; aut imponentes vel etiam referentes crimen de alio non sunt lesi, nec per aliquod factum aut dictum eius vel amicorum eius sunt provocati contra ipsum, nec aliquam contentionem notabilem sive contrarietatem neque in speculabilibus neque in agibilibus habent contra ipsum. | Master: To this answer is made by making a distinction. Either [1] those who impose or report a crime about another are injured, disturbed, or provoked somehow by the person on whom they impose the crime, or, also, they are rivals, enemies, adversaries, or somehow notably opposed to the same person, either in matters of action or speculation, or they are friends, subjects, prelates of such people, or in some way connected with such people; or else [2] those who impose or report a crime about another are not injured, nor are they provoked against him by any deed or word of his or of his friends, nor do they have any notable contention or opposition against him, either in matters of speculation or action. |
| Si itaque aliqui diffamant vel imponunt seu referunt crimen de paupere a quo sunt secundum veritatem vel secundum opinionem ipsorum lesi vel quomodolibet perturbati contra ipsum, vel sunt inimici, emuli, adversarii, vel quoquo modo contrariantes eidem, minus credendum est eis quam si imponerent vel referrent crimen de papa, etiam dictis modis pape emuli existentes sive non. | If, therefore, some defame or impose or report a crime against a poor person by whom they are, according to the truth or according to their own opinion, injured or in any way disturbed against him, or are enemies, rivals, adversaries, or in any way contrary to him, they should be believed less than if they imposed or reported a crime against the pope, even if they are rivals of the pope in the said ways or not. |
| Similiter, si referentes crimen de papa et de paupere nec ab uno nec ab alio sunt offensi nec aliquam rationem contrarietatis vel inimicitie habent plus contra unum quam contra alium, magis presumendum est de referentibus crimen pape quam pauperis quod minime mentiantur. | Similarly, if those reporting a crime against the pope and the poor person are not offended by either one or the other, nor do they have any reason for antagonism or enmity more against one than against the other, it is more to be presumed that those reporting a crime against the pope than against the poor person that they do not lie. |
| Si vero referentes crimen de paupere contra ipsum nullam rationem contrarietatis vel inimicitie habent, contra papam vero quem similiter infamant habent rationem contrarietatis predicte, magis presumendum est tunc de crimine pauperis quam de crimine pape quod a veritate nequaquam aberrent. Et idem proportionaliter dicitur de omnibus supradictis, scilicet prelato et subdito divite et paupere. | But if those reporting a crime against the poor person have no reason for antagonism or enmity against him, but against the pope whom they similarly defame they have a reason for antagonism as aforesaid, then it is more to be presumed that they do not err about the crime of the poor person than about the crime of the pope. And the same is said proportionally about all the above-mentioned, namely, the rich and the poor, the prelate and the subject. |
| Discipulus: Primum breviter probare coneris. | Student: Try briefly to prove the first. |
| Magister: Primum, scilicet quod minus credendum est adversariis qui erga pauperem sunt offensi vel turbati quam adversariis pape probatur primo sic. Tanto minus credendum est adversariis alicuius imponentibus seu referentibus crimen de ipso quanto habent pauciora retrahentia ipsos a talibus diffamationibus vel relationibus de ipso. Sed adversarii pauperis sunt huiusmodi. | Master: The first, namely, that adversaries offended or disturbed by a poor person should be believed less than adversaries of a pope, is proved first as follows. So much the less credence should be given to adversaries who impose or report a crime against someone the fewer reasons they have holding them back from such defamations or reports about him. But the adversaries of the poor are of this kind. |
| Quia quicquid retraheret adversarium pauperis a talibus retraheret etiam adversarium pape. Si enim ex conscientia dimittit adversarius pauperis referre talia de paupere, hoc etiam dimitteret adversarius pape de papa. Si etiam dimittit ne inveniatur mendax, eadem ratione ne mendax inveniatur de papa. Si etiam dimittit ne alios scandalizet vel offendat, multo magis ex hoc silebit de papa. Et sic consimiliter quicquid tales retraheret ad referendum malum de paupere, retraheret etiam ne referrent malum de papa. | Because whatever would hold back an adversary of a poor person from such things would also hold back an adversary of the pope. For if out of conscience an adversary of a poor person refrains from reporting such things about the poor person, an adversary of the pope would also refrain from this about the pope. If also he refrains lest he be found a liar, by the same reason lest he be found a liar about the pope. If also he refrains lest he scandalize or offend others, much more he will for this reason be silent about the pope. And so similarly, whatever would hold back such adversaries from reporting evil about a poor person would also hold him back from reporting evil about a pope. |
| Multa vero retrahunt adversarium a referendo malum de papa que non retrahunt adversarium pauperis a referendo de paupere, puta timor potentie pape. Unde per experientiam cotidianam cognoscitur quod nonnulli adversarii pape timore eius a relatione eius criminum se compescunt, qui tamen contra pauperes eis crimen imponendo vel imposita referendo linguas suas laxare impudenter non desinunt. Similiter, spes obtinendi beneficium vel honorem a papa potest retrahere adversarium eius a predictis relationibus, non autem adversarium pauperis, a quo beneficium vel magnum honorem sperare non potest, nequaquam retraheret. Plura etiam alia retraherent et retrahunt adversarium pape que nequaquam adversarium pauperis retrahere dinoscuntur. Ergo minus credendum est adversariis pauperis imponentibus sibi crimen vel impositum referentibus quam adversario pape sibi eadem facienti. | But there are many things that hold back an adversary from reporting evil about a pope that do not restrain an adversary of a poor person from reporting evil about the poor person, for example, fear of the pope’s power. Hence it is known from daily experience that some of the pope’s adversaries restrain themselves from reporting his crimes through fear of him, but they do not cease to shamelessly loose their tongues against a poor person by accusing them of crimes or by reporting those of which they have been accused. Similarly, the hope of obtaining a favor or honor from the pope can hold back his adversary from such reports, but it would not at all hold back an adversary of a poor person, from whom he cannot hope for a favor or great honor. Many other things would, and do, hold back an adversary of a pope that are not known to hold back an adversary of a poor person. Therefore, less credence should be given to adversaries of a poor person who impose (or report as having been imposed) crimes on them, than to an adversary of a pope who does the same to him. |
| Secundo sic. Minus credendum est adversariis eorum qui citius et facilius et communius calumpniam, odium, persecutionem, et infestationem aliorum incurrunt quantum ad opus exterius, quam adversariis illius qui non ita cito nec ita faciliter calumpniam, odium, et cetera huiusmodi incurrit. Sed huiusmodi est pauper respectu pape, ergo minus est adversarius in talibus credendum. Maior est manifesta, quia homines facilius male loquuntur de illis quos calumpniantur, persequuntur et odiunt, quam de aliis. Propter quod, secundum iura, testimonium inimici nullatenus est admittendum. Minor autem per scripturas divinas probatur aperte. | Second as follows. Less credence should be given the adversaries of those who more quickly and easily and more commonly incur calumny, hatred, persecution, and harassment of others as regards exterior action than to the adversaries of those who do not so quickly and easily incur calumny, hatred, and the like. But such is a poor person in relation to a pope, therefore less credence should be given to the adversary of the poor person. The major is clear, because people speak ill of those they slander, persecute, and hate more easily than of others. For this reason, according to the laws, the testimony of an enemy is by no means to be admitted. But the minor is clearly proved by the divine Scriptures. |
| Unde Proverb. c.14 dicitur: “etiam proximo suo pauper odiosus erit: amici vero divitum multi”, quod precipue verum est de odio exterius, quia licet sepe divites odium interius plurimum incurrant quam pauperes pro eo quod plures offendunt, sepe tamen odientes divites odium in exteriori opere minime manifestant. | Hence Proverbs c.14 says: “The poor man shall be hateful even to his own neighbour: but the friends of the rich are many.” This is especially true of external hatred, because although the rich often incur greater internal hatred than the poor because they offend more, yet often those who hate the rich do not manifest their hatred in external actions. |
| Item, Salomon ibidem c. 19: “divitie addunt amicos plurimos: a paupere autem et hii, quod habuit, separantur.” Et post: “multi colunt personam potentis, et amici sunt dona tribuentis. Fratres hominis pauperis oderunt eum: insuper et amici procul recesserunt ab eo.” Ex quibus patet quod pauperes citius quam divites odium predictum incurrunt. | Likewise, Solomon, in the same place, ch. 19: “Riches make many friends: but from the poor man, even they whom he had, depart.” And afterwards: “Many honour the person of him that is mighty, and are friends of him that giveth gifts. The brethren of the poor man hate him: moreover even his friends have departed far from him.” From this it is clear that the poor incur exterior hatred sooner than the rich. |
| Item, Ecclesiastici 13 scribitur: “dives locutus est, et omnes tacuerunt, et verbum illius usque ad nubes perducent. Pauper locutus est, et dicunt ‘quis est hic’ et si offenderit subvertent illum.” | Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 13 it is written: “The rich man hath spoken, and all are silent, and his word shall be carried up to the clouds. The poor man hath spoken, and they say, Who is this? and if he stumble, they shall overthrow him.” |
| Item, ibidem: “dives commotus confirmatur ab amicis suis: humilis autem cum ceciderit expelletur et a notis. Diviti decepto multi recuperatores: locutus est superbe et iustificaverunt illum. Humilis deceptus est, insuper et arguitur: locutus est sensate, et non est datus ei locus.” | Likewise, in the same place: “When a rich man is shaken, he is kept up by his friends: but when a poor man is fallen down, he is thrust away even by his acquaintance. When a rich man hath been deceived, he hath many helpers: he hath spoken proudly, and they have justified him. The humble man has been deceived, and he is also rebuked: he hath spoken wisely, and no place is given him”. |
| Et Amos 4 sic scribitur: “Audite verbum hoc vacce pingues, que estis in monte Samarie que calumpniam facitis egenis, et confringitis pauperes.” | And in Amos 4 is written thus: “Hear this word, you fat cows, who are on the mountain of Samaria, who slander the needy and crush the poor.” |
| Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus aperte colligitur quod pauperes communius persecutionem, infestationem et calumpniam patiuntur quam divites et potentes. Et ideo minus credendum est adversariis eorum quam divitum de ipsis sinistra narrantibus. Magis igitur presumendum est de adversariis pape cum publice crimen heresis vel aliud sibi imponunt quod dictum eorum non est a veritate totaliter alienum, quamvis si sint criminosi eis sit fides nullatenus adhibenda, et multo minus crederetur criminosis pauperi crimen imponentibus vel ab aliis impositum narrantibus vel divulgantibus quoquo modo, quod maxime continet veritatem quando pauper multos offendit et plurimos habet adversarios divites et potentes. | From these and many other things it is clearly gathered that the poor suffer persecution, harassment and slander more commonly than the rich and powerful, and therefore less credence should be given to their adversaries when they report bad things about them than to adversaries of the rich. Therefore, we should presume more about the adversaries of the pope, when they publicly accuse him of the crime of heresy or some other crime, that their statement is not entirely foreign to the truth; although if they are criminals, faith should not be given to them at all. And we should give much less credence to criminals who accuse the poor or who narrate or spread in any way what others have accused them of. This is especially true when the poor person offends many and has many rich and powerful adversaries. |
| In hoc enim casu sceleratior homo mundi unico verbo potest de paupere infamiam falsissimam, absque divino miraculo indelebilem, suscitare. Si enim mendacissimus crimen quodcunque de paupere odioso confinxerit et uni soli asserendo retulerit, ille aliis divulgabit, dicens tale crimen tali imponitur, qui postea aliis assertissime narrabunt, et sic tale mendacium tanquam verum et certum ad omnes inimicos eius deveniet, et amicos tandem non latebit, et sic erit apud omnes, quamvis mendaciter, diffamatus. Quare causa pauperis odiosi est diligentissime et strictissime perscrutanda, ne per potentiam et mendacia opprimatur. | For, in this case, the most wicked man in the world can, with a single word, raise a very false infamy about a poor person, [which will be,] without a divine miracle, indelible. For if a most deceitful liar invents any crime against a hated poor man and reports it to one person alone, that person will spread it to others, saying that such a crime is being imposed on such a person, who will then most assertively tell it to others, and thus such a lie will reach all his enemies as true and certain, and at length will not remain hidden from his friends, and thus he will be defamed by all, though mendaciously. Therefore the cause of a hated poor man must be investigated most diligently and strictly, lest he be oppressed by power and lies. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid peccant mortaliter qui conficta mendacia absque assertione, solummodo recitando, publicant et divulgant? | Student: Do they sin mortally who publish and spread fabricated lies without assertion, merely by reciting them? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod peccant omnes tales mortaliter. | Master: The answer made is that all such people sin mortally. |
| Discipulus: Istud videtur durum, cum videamus fere omnes relata crimina, etiam non probata, aliis enarrare. Quod etiam hoc non sit peccatum mortale videtur posse probari, quia relatio criminis pro qua alius nullum dampnum neque in persona neque in bonis temporalibus neque in fama incurrit non videtur peccatum mortale. Sed sepe crimina referuntur absque predictis dampnis illius de quo referuntur. Ergo talis relatio non est semper peccatum mortale. | Student: This seems hard, since we see that almost all reported crimes, even unproved ones, are told to others. That this too is not a mortal sin seems proveable, because the report of a crime for which another incurs no damage either in person or in temporal goods or in reputation does not seem to be a mortal sin. But crimes are often reported without the aforementioned damages to the person of whom they are reported. Therefore such a report is not always a mortal sin. |
| Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur concedendo quod fere omnes adulti detractionis vitio quod est peccatum mortale sunt implicati, quod glossa super illud Prov. 24 “cum detractoribus non comiscearis” testari videtur, dicens: “Hoc specialiter vitio totum pene genus periclitatur humanum.” Unde quam plurimi reperiuntur qui putant se sanctos et sine peccato mortali, et tamen aliquando decies una die, aliis detrahendo et relata crimina enarrando, peccant mortaliter. | Master: The answer made to the first of these is to concede that almost all adults are involved in the vice of detraction, which is a mortal sin, as the gloss on Prov. 24 “Do not associate with detractors” seems to testify, saying: “This particular vice endangers almost the entire human race.” Hence very many are found who think themselves holy and without mortal sin, and yet they sin mortally sometimes ten times a day, by detracting from others and repeating reports of crimes. |
| Discipulus: Ex quo ignorant gravitatem relationis criminum que minime sunt probata excusari videntur. | Student: From this they seem to be excused by ignorance of the seriousness of reporting crimes that have not been proved. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod ignorantia iuris, precipue naturalis, non excusat, et ideo, quamvis ignorent gravitatem huius criminis, non essent excusati. Quia de iure naturali est quod nemo debet referre crimen de alio nisi sit notorium vel confessum vel manifeste probatum, nisi constaret certitudinaliter vel saltem probabiliter quod ex tali relatione criminis ille de quo refertur nunquam in perpetuum iacturam in fama, vel honore, aut aliquo alio modo esset passus. Ignorantia ergo huius non excusat, que tamen in multis minime reperitur, quia multi legunt in scripturis gravitatem detractionis, et audiunt a predicantibus et docentibus verbum Dei, et tamen se ab huiusmodi vitium non compescunt. Et ideo conceditur quod sepe omnes adulti hoc vitio dampnabiliter sunt infecti, et sepe magis ac gravius isto vitio laborant qui sanctiores cupiunt reputari, ut de multis qui raro vel nunquam reputant se peccare mortaliter vel volunt absque peccato mortali censeri et pro sanctis haberi, liceat viris sanctis et discretis certitudinaliter iudicare, asserere, et sentire quod sepissime peccant mortaliter et quod sunt homines male et reprobe vite. | Master: The answer made is that ignorance of law, especially natural law, does not excuse, and therefore, even if they were ignorant of the gravity of this crime, they would not be excused. Because it is belongs to natural law that no one should report a crime about another unless it is notorious or confessed or clearly proved, unless it is certain or at least probable that from such a report of the crime the person about whom it is reported would never suffer permanent loss in reputation, or in honour, or in any other way. Therefore ignorance of this does not excuse. This ignorance, however, is not found in many, because many read in the scriptures the gravity of detraction, and hear the word of God from preachers and teachers, and yet they do not restrain themselves from this kind of vice. And therefore it is conceded that often all adults are damnably infected with this vice, and often those who desire to be considered holier [in fact] labour under this vice more, and more severely. So that, concerning many who rarely or never consider themselves to sin mortally and wish to be considered without mortal sin and to be held as saints, it is permissible for holy and discreet men to judge, assert, and feel with certainty that those people very often sin mortally and are men of bad and base life. |
| Sicut enim ei qui vidit alium furari vel percutere innocentem aut etiam fornicari, aut audivit alium blasphemare vel fidem negare, licet absque vitio iudicare quod furans, percutiens innocentem, fornicans, blasphemans et fidem negans peccat mortaliter, ita ei qui audierit alium crimen falsum vel occultum quod non est notorium neque confessum neque potest aperte probari de proximo referentem, licet absque vitio iudicare quod peccat mortaliter, cuiuscunque dignitatis, preeminentie, conditionis, status, opinionis aut fame est sic referens antedictus, etiam si putaretur quod Deus mille miracula fecisset pro eo, nisi tali modo referret crimen alterius falsum vel occultum quod certitudinaliter vel saltem probabiliter crederetur quod talis relatio nunquam deberet obesse neque in fama neque in aliquo alio ei de quo crimen tale refertur. | For just as someone who has seen another steal or beat an innocent person or even commit fornication, or has heard another blaspheme or deny the faith, may judge without fault that the person who steals, beats an innocent person, commits fornication, blasphemes and denies the faith sins mortally, so someone who has heard another report about his neighbor a crime that is false or is hidden, is not notorious or confessed, and cannot be openly proved, may judge without fault that he [the reporter] sins mortally, whatever dignity, preeminence, condition, status, opinion or fame the aforementioned reporter may have, even if it were thought that God had performed a thousand miracles for him -- unless he reported the false or hidden crime of another in such a way that it would be believed with certainty, or at least probability, that such a report should never harm either the reputation or anything else belonging to the person about whom such a crime is reported. |
| Discipulus: Si ista essent vera pauci istis diebus salvarentur adulti. | Student: If these things were true, few adults would be saved in these days. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod hiis diebus verificata est auctoritas Salomonis qui Ecclesiasti primo ait: “Stultorum infinitus est numerus.” Quamquam principalissime intelligendam nonnulli putant de illis qui, dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt, quales precipue arbitrantur illos qui, iuxta testimonium Salvatoris, excollantes culicem camelum deglutiunt, qui similes sunt sepulchris dealbatis, qui a foris quidem apparent hominibus iusti, intus autem pleni sunt hipocrisi et iniquitate, quia foris in incessu veste ieiuniis, orationibus, cerimoniisque diversis exempla sanctitatis ostendunt, intus autem pleni sunt invidia, odio, ira, rancore, superbia, inani gloria et ambitione, ex quibus in persecutiones innocentium, detractiones, sursurationes, adulationes, simulationes, scismata, contentiones, discordias, dolos, proditiones, malicias, variaque crimina spiritualia deteriora furto et fornicatione prorumpunt, qui tamen sancti volunt omnino putari. | Master: The answer made is that in these days the text of Solomon has been verified, who said in Ecclesiastes 1: “The number of fools is infinite.” Although some think that it should be understood most primarily about those who, claiming to be wise, have become fools, such as they especially consider those who, according to the testimony of the Savior, strain out a gnat and swallow a camel, who are like whitewashed tombs, who indeed appear righteous men from the outside, but within are full of hypocrisy and iniquity, because outwardly they show examples of holiness in their walk, clothing, fasting, prayers, and various ceremonies, but within they are full of envy, hatred, anger, rancor, pride, vainglory, and ambition, from which they break out into persecutions of the innocent, detractions, whisperings, flatteries, pretenses, schisms, contentions, discords, deceits, betrayals, malice, and various spiritual crimes worse than theft and fornication, who nevertheless want to be considered altogether saints. |
| Discipulus: De ista materia in speciali interrogabo te plura in tractatu De gestis circa fidem altercancium orthodoxam. Ideo dic breviter quomodo respondetur ad secundum quod tetigi. | Student: I will ask you more about this matter in detail in the treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith.” Therefore, tell me briefly how you respond to the second point I touched on. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sicut, ut habetur Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, c. ultimo: “qui occasionem dampni dat, dampnum videatur dedisse”, sic qui aliquid facit ex quo potest verisimiliter dampnum contingere vel iactura non est immunis a culpa, quia quilibet de necessitate salutis cavere tenetur ne aliquid faciat, maxime absque commodo proposito ex quo in futurum potest dampnum vel iactura proximo provenire. | Master: The answer made is that just as, as is stated in Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, c. ult.: “Whoever gives occasion of damage, seems to have given damage,” so whoever does something from which damage or loss can likely occur is not immune from guilt, because everyone is bound of necessity for salvation to be careful not to do anything, especially without a benefit in mind, from which future damage or loss can result to a neighbor. |
| Propter hoc enim in lege divina precipiebatur quod fodiens cisternam operiret eam, sicut habetur Exod. 21, quia ipsa non operta poterat bos vel asinus in ipsam incidere. Propter hoc etiam, ut habetur ibidem, precipiebatur ut dominus bovis quem sciret cornupetam recluderet eum, quia ipso non recluso poterat hominem vel mulierem occidere. Unde et in hoc casu dominus non recludens ipsum, si aliquem occidebat, precipiebatur occidi, cum sic legitur ibidem: “Si bos cornupeta fuerit ab heri et nudius tertius, et contestati sunt dominum eius nec recluserit eum, occideritque virum aut mulierem, et bos lapidibus obruetur, et dominum eius occident.” Ob eadem etiam rationem cavebatur in lege ut faciens novam domum faceret murum tecti per circuitum. Unde Deuter. 22 sic legitur: “Cum edificaveris domum novam, facies murum tecti per circuitum ne effundatur sanguis in domo tua, et sis reus labente alio, et in preceps ruente.” Ex quibus aperte colligitur quod quilibet de necessitate salutis ea tenetur facere quibus obmissis potest dampnum verisimiliter vel iactura proximo provenire. | For it was prescribed for this reason in divine law that whoever digs a cistern should cover it, as is stated in Exod. 21, because if it is not covered, an ox or donkey could fall into it. For this reason also, as is stated in the same place, it was prescribed that the owner of an ox that he knew had gored should shut it up, because if it were not shut up it could kill a man or a woman. Hence in this case also, if the owner had not shut it up, if it killed someone, it was commanded to be killed, since it is read in the same place [Exod. 21:29]: “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and it shall kill a man or a woman: then the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death.” For the same reason, the law also provided that whoever builds a new house should make a wall around the roof. Hence Deuteronomy 22 reads: “When thou buildest a new house, thou shalt make a wall to the roof round about: lest blood be shed in thy house, and thou be guilty, if any one slip, and fall down headlong.” From these [texts] it is clearly concluded that anyone is bound to do those things for the sake of safety, which, if omitted, can likely result in damage or loss to a neighbor. |
| Ergo, per eandem rationem, quilibet de necessitate salutis ea tenetur obmittere quibus non obmissis sed factis potest verisimiliter proximun dampnum vel notabilem lesionem incurrere. Sed ex relatione falsi criminis vel occulti, maxime publica, potest verisimiliter dampnum in fama vel honore seu aliis proximo provenire, licet forte tunc quando refertur nullum tale inferatur, quia aliquis eorum qui audierunt a primo referente potest postea idem crimen in notabile detrimentum alterius enarrare. Quare a relatione talis criminis de necessitate salutis quilibet abstinere tenetur, nisi forte non ex levibus sed ex probabilibus coniecturis et urgentibus arbitretur quod nunquam in posterum nec ex ipso nec ex aliquo audientium occasione talis relationis aliquod eveniet detrimentum. | Therefore, by the same argument, anyone is bound of necessity for salvation to omit those things which, if not omitted, but done, can likely result in damage or significant injury to a neighbor. But from the report of a false or secret crime, especially a public report, damage to fame or honor or in other respects can probably result to a neighbour, although perhaps at the time of the report no such harm is caused, because someone who heard it from the first reporter may later narrate the same crime to the notable detriment of another. Therefore, everyone is bound of necessity for salvation to abstain from reporting such a crime -- unless perhaps he thinks, not from frivolous but from probable and urgent conjectures, that no harm will ever result in the future, either from himself or from any of the listeners, on account of such a report. |
| Discipulus: Circa hanc materiam magis quam proposuerim evagati sumus. Ideo, ceteris pretermissis, unam solummodo obiectionem contra primam conclusionem principalem responsionis peto secundum opinionem predictam dissolvi. Est autem obiectio talis. Minus credendum est referentibus crimen de illo ad cuius condempnationem est cum cautela diligentissima procedendum quam referentibus crimen de illo ad cuius condempnationem non oportet cum tanta cautela procedere. Sed cum maiori cautela procedendum est ad condempnationem pape et prelatorum ac divitum et potentum quam subditorum et pauperum. Ergo minus credendum est referentibus crimen de papa, potentibus, divitibus et prelatis, quam referentibus crimen de pauperibus et subditis, sive referentes fuerint criminosi et infames sive fuerint bone fame. | Student: We have wandered further about this matter than I proposed. Therefore, leaving aside others, I ask that only one objection against the first main conclusion of the response be resolved according to the aforementioned opinion. The objection is as follows. Less credence is due to those who report a crime about someone whose condemnation requires the most diligent caution than to those who report a crime about someone whose condemnation does not require such caution. But greater caution is required for the condemnation of the pope and prelates and the rich and powerful than for subjects and the poor. Therefore, less credence is due to those who report a crime about the pope, the powerful, the rich and prelates than to those who report a crime about the poor and subjects, whether the reporters are criminal and infamous or of good fame. |
| Maior videtur aperta. Minor auctoritate Innocentii tertii probatur, que ponitur Extra, De accusationibus, inquisitionibus et denunciationibus, c. Qualiter et quando. Ait enim: “Licet autem hoc sit observandum in subditis, diligencius tamen est observandum in prelatis, qui quasi signum sunt positi ad sagittam. Et quia non possunt omnibus complacere, cum ex officio suo teneantur non solum arguere, sed etiam increpare, quin etiam interdum suspendere, nonnunquam vero ligare: frequenter odium multorum incurrunt et insidias patiuntur. Et ideo sancti patres provide statuerunt, ut accusatio prelatorum non facile admittatur, ne concussis columpnis corruat edificium, nisi diligens adhibeatur cautela, propter quam non solum false, sed etiam maligne criminationi ianua precludatur.” Ex quibus colligitur, ut videtur, quod in procedendo contra prelatos maior est adhibenda cautela quam contra alios procedendo. Quare minus credendum est referentibus crimen de papa quam referentibus crimen de aliis quibuscunque. | The major seems obvious. The minor is proved by the authority of Innocent III, given in Extra, De accusationibus, inquisitionibus et denunciationibus, c. Qualiter et quando. He says: “Although this must be observed in subjects, it must be observed more diligently in prelates, who are like a mark placed for an arrow. And because they cannot please everyone, since by their office they are bound not only to accuse, but also to reprove, and sometimes to suspend, and sometimes to bind, they frequently incur the hatred of many and suffer plots. And therefore the holy fathers have prudently decreed that accusation of prelates should not be easily admitted, lest the pillars be shaken and the building collapse, unless careful caution is exercised, by which the door is closed not only to false but also to malicious accusation.” From this it seems to be concluded that in proceeding against prelates greater caution should be exercised than in proceeding against others. Therefore those who bring charges against the pope are to be believed less than those who bring charges against anyone else. |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod Innocentius in decretali predicta consideravit ea que frequentius accidunt, non ea que raro. Et ideo quia sepius accidit quod prelati multos offendunt, pauperes autem quia timent sibi cavent ab offensis, et ideo nec tot nec tam potentes offendunt sicut prelati, hinc, ut frequenter, de facto maior cautela adhibenda est cum prelatus accusatur, defertur, denunciatur vel diffamatur quam cum pauper. Si tamen de facto pauper abiectus et oppressus offenderet tot et tam potentes et tam graviter sicut prelatus, maior cautela adhibenda esset quando talis pauper accusaretur vel etiam diffamaretur ab emulis vel provocatis contra ipsum aut ab amicis eorum, quam si prelatus dives et potens accusaretur vel diffamaretur a talibus. Quemadmodum si aliquis omni auxilio destitutus impugnaretur iniuste ab emulis eque potentibus, magis iuvandus esset quam dives et potens qui per potentiam posset ab impugnantibus se tueri. Si enim rex vel princeps tam pauperem rusticum quam comitem divitem et potentem contra adversarios eque potentes debeat defensare, necesse est quod maius auxilium pauperi quam comiti potenti exhibeat. Sic, si pauper tot et tantos vel plures, vel plures potentes, habeat emulos ipsum graviter diffamantes vel quomodolibet impedientes quam papa, maiori auxilio indiget quam papa, et ideo minus credendum est talibus emulis pauperis quam equalibus vel minoribus emulis pape. | Master: To this the answer made is that in the aforesaid decretal Innocent considered things that occur more often, not those that occur rarely. And therefore, because it happens more often that prelates offend many, while the poor, because they fear for themselves, avoid giving offense, and therefore do not offend as many or as powerful people as prelates do, hence greater caution should usually be exercised when a prelate is accused, indicted, denounced, or defamed than when a poor person is. However, if a poor person, despised and oppressed, were in fact to offend as many and as powerful people and offend them as severely as a prelate [might], greater caution should be exercised when such a poor person was accused or defamed by rivals or those provoked against him, or by their friends, than if a rich and powerful prelate were accused or defamed by such. Just as if someone deprived of all help were unjustly attacked by rivals and powerful people, he would be more to be helped than a rich and powerful person who could protect himself from his attackers by his power. For if a king or ruler should defend both a poor peasant and a rich and powerful count against adversaries and powerful people, it is necessary that he should give greater assistance to the poor person than to the powerful count. Thus, if a poor man has so many or more, or more powerful, rivals who seriously defame him or hinder him in any way than the pope has, he needs greater help than the pope. And therefore less credence should be given to such rivals of the poor man than to equal or lesser rivals of the pope. |
| Capitulum 26 | Chapter 26 |
| Discipulus: De ista materia et annexis eidem puto quod scires quam plurima recitare, que ad tractatum De gestis crca fidem altercancium orthodoxam volo differri. Ideo dic quomodo respondetur ad rationes alias quibus supra c. 12 videtur ostendi quod volentibus perfidiam pape heretici declarare fides non debeat adhiberi. | Student: I think you know how to recite much about this matter and matters annexed to it, which I wish to defer to the treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith.” Therefore tell me how answer is made to the other arguments that seem to show above in Chapter 12 that faith should not be given to those who wish to declare the faithlessness of a heretic pope. |
| Magister: Ad secundam rationem adductam ibidem, respondetur quod sepe neque bona narrata de aliquo neque mala sunt credenda. Quando enim nescitur unde vel a quibus fama sive bona sive mala habeat ortum, non est fame credendum neque bone neque male. Similiter, quando scitur quod fama bona vel mala orta est ab inimicis, criminosis, detractoribus, malivolis, maledicis, vel ab hiis qui faciliter credunt vel rumores incertos libenter narrant et asserunt, vel a mendacibus et falsis hominibus, aut etiam ab adulatoribus, ambitiosis, avaris, histrionibus, vel a quibuscunque qui hominibus placere desiderant, non est tali fame credendum. | Master: To the second argument adduced there, the answer made is that often neither good nor bad things reported about someone should be believed. For when it is not known where or from whom fame, whether good or bad, has arisen, fame should not be believed, either good or bad. Similarly, when it is known that fame, good or bad, has arisen from enemies, criminals, detractors, the malevolent, slanderers, or from those who easily believe and willingly tell and assert rumors that are uncertain, or from lying and false men, or from flatterers, the ambitious, the greedy, actors, or from anyone who desires to please men, such fame should not be believed. |
| Quando autem quis scit vel per se vel per alios fide dignos quod fama bona vel mala ortum habet a fide dignis personis, nec sunt amici speciales nec inimici illius cuius famam divulgant bonam vel malam, nec sunt ambitiosi, nec hominibus placere desiderant, nec sunt mendaces, nec detractores, nec maledici, credere tali fame bone vel male non videtur illicitum, ita tamen quod propter famam malam de aliquo absque certitudine sufficienti nullus ad actum preiudicialem illi de quo est mala fama prorumpat. Et ideo personis fide dignis qui non odio nec rancore asserunt et cupiunt declarare perfidiam pape heretici est credendum, nisi aliquid eis contingit obiicere quare eis minime est credendum. | But when someone knows, either by himself or through others worthy of trust, that good or bad fame has arisen from trustworthy persons, who are neither special friends nor enemies of the one whose fame (good or bad) they spread, nor ambitious, nor desirous of pleasing men, nor liars, nor detractors, nor slanderers, it does not seem impermissible to believe such fame, good or bad, so long as no one, because of someone’s bad fame for which there is not sufficient certainty, rushes into an act prejudicial to the person concerning whom that bad fame exists. And therefore credence should be given to trustworthy persons who without hatred or rancor assert and desire to declare a heretic pope’s faithlessness, unless something happens to be against them why they should not be believed. |
| Ad illud autem quod dicitur de regina Saba, respondetur quod quedam fama vaga de excellentia Salomonis, saltem quantum ad multa, ad ipsam pervenerat, de qua nescivit unde vel a quibus ortum habuerit, et ideo eis tanquam prudens et sagax fidem adhibere nolebat. Secus est de fama pape heretici quando bulla hereticalis vel transsumptum per universum orbem promulgatum ostenditur. Et ideo in hoc casu credere papam esse hereticum est licitum, debitum, atque iustum. | But to what is said about the Queen of Sheba, the answer made is that a certain vague fame of Solomon's excellence, at least in many respects, had reached her, but she did not know where or from whom it had arisen, and therefore, as a prudent and sagacious person, she was unwilling to give them credence. It is different with the fame of a heretic pope when a heretical bull or a transcription is shown to have been promulgated throughout the whole world. And therefore in this case to believe that the pope is a heretic is permissible, due, and just. |
| Ad tertiam rationem breviter respondetur quod credere narrantibus sive bona sive mala non universaliter dissuadetur in scriptura divina, sed omnibus et semper credere dissuadetur, propter quod signanter dicitur Ecclesiastico 19: “non omni verbo credas”, et non dicitur “nulli verbo credas”, quia alicui verbo credendum est et alicui verbo minime est credendum. | To the third argument, the answer made, briefly, is that to believe those who tell good or bad things is not universally discouraged in divine Scripture, but it is discouraged to believe all and always, which is why in Ecclesiasticus 19 it is said significantly: “Do not believe every word,” and not “Do not believe any word,” because some words must be believed and some words must not be believed at all. |
| Ad illud autem quod adducitur de Ieremie 12 patet ex serie textus qui loquitur de inimicis. Nam ibidem premittitur: “fratres tue, et domus patris tui, etiam ipsi pugnaverunt adversum te, et clamaverunt post te plena voce”, et tunc immediate subiungitur: “ne credas eis cum locuti fuerint tibi bona.” Et ita patet quod loquitur de inimicis. Inimicis autem nunquam est credendum, iuxta illud Sapientis Eccles. 12: “non credas inimico tuo in eternum.” Sicut autem tu non debes credere inimico tuo in eternum, ita nec in eternum credere debes inimico alterius contra ipsum. | To what is brought forward from Jeremiah 12 it is clear from the context that it speaks of enemies. For there it is preceded by: “Your brothers, and your father’s house, they also fought against you, and cried out after you with a loud voice,” and then it is immediately added: “Do not believe them when they speak good things to you.” And thus it is clear that it is speaking of enemies. But enemies are never to be believed, according to the saying of the Wise Man in Ecclesiastes 12: “Do not believe your enemy forever.” But just as you should not believe your enemy forever, so you should not believe the enemy of another against him forever. |
| Ad illud Michee 7: “Nolite credere amico”, respondetur quod loquitur de amico trahente ad infidelitatem vel peccatum. | To that of Micah 7: “Do not believe a friend,” the answer made is that it speaks of a friend who leads to unbelief or sin. |
| Ad dictum 1 Joh. 4: “Nolite omni spiritui credere” patet, quia signanter dicit “omni spiritui credere”, quia alicui spiritui est credendum et alicui spiritui nullatenus est credendum. Propter quod subdit ibidem: “sed probate spiritum si ex Deo sint.” Quare si qui dixerint papam esse hereticum non statim credendum est (eis scilicet), sed quia nunciant periculum esse omnium orthodoxorum, probandi sunt, hoc est examinandi sollicite, et, si legitima documenta attulerint ad probandum papam esse hereticum, puta si ostenderint bullam hereticalem vel transsumptum ipsius publice et sollempniter promulgate, credendum est papam esse hereticum. | To the statement of 1 John 4: “Do not believe every spirit,” it is clear, because he says significantly “every spirit,” because some spirits should be believed and some spirits should not be believed. For this reason he adds in the same place: “but test the spirits, whether they are of God.” Therefore, if some say that the pope is a heretic they should not be believed immediately, but because they announce that there is a danger to all orthodox people, they should be tested, that is, examined carefully, and, if they bring lawful proofs to prove that the pope is a heretic, for example if they show a heretical bull or a transcription of it publicly and solemnly promulgated, it should be believed that the pope is a heretic. |
| Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod maior falsa est propter tres instantias. Tum quia notorium est credendum licet secundum ordinem iudiciarium minime sit probatum, tum quia confesso de crimine absque omni [tali We] ordine est credendum, tum quia extra iudicium multis et in multis est credendum absque ordine iudiciario observato. | To the fourth argument the answer made is that the major is false for three reasons: because it is notorious it should be believed even though it has not been proved according to the judicial order; because when a crime is confessed it should be believed without such order [i.e. judicial proceedings]; and because outside the court many people and many things should be believed without observing the judicial order. |
| Ad omnes igitur auctoritates respondetur unico verbo, quod omnes intelligende sunt de credulitate iudicis in iudicio quando crimen impositum non est notorium, nec reus confitetur crimen impositum. Et ideo si crimen heresis pape imponitur de quo coram iudice accusatur, iudex, nisi sit notoria heresis pape, vel ipse confiteatur, non debet credere illa credulitate que habenda est in iudicio antequam ordine iudiciario observato probetur, licet credulitate que spectat ad aliquem non tanquam ad iudicem credere possit in casu papam esse hereticum. Si enim aliqui fide digni de quorum fidelitate iudex non dubitat referunt assertione iudici se audivisse papam negare fidem vel resurrectionem mortuorum, iudex potest credere eis illa credulitate que inter socios habenda est, sed non debet habere illam credulitatem que ad iudicem spectat antequam in iudicio legitime probatum extiterit, nisi sit notorium iudici et aliis, vel nisi papa in iudicio heresim confiteatur. | To all the texts the answer made is one word, which is which is that they are all to be understood of the belief of a judge in a trial when the crime imposed is not notorious and the accused does not confess the crime imposed. And therefore if the crime of heresy is imposed on the pope and he is accused of it before a judge, until it has been proved according to the judicial order, unless it is notorious or he confesses, the judge should not believe with the belief that should be had in a trial -- though, on occasion, he may believe that the pope is a heretic with the belief that pertains to someone other than a judge. For if some trustworthy persons, of whose fidelity the judge has no doubt, report to the judge by assertion that they have heard the pope deny the faith or the resurrection of the dead [for example], the judge can believe them with the belief that is to be had among associates, but -- until it has been lawfully proved in a trial, unless it is notorious to the judge and others, or unless the pope confesses heresy in the trial -- he should not have the belief that pertains to a judge. |
| Capitulum 27 | Chapter 27 |
| Discipulus: Quamvis cogitaverim per singula que allegata sunt pro sententia supra c. 13 recitata discurrere, quia tamen prolixitatem magnam volo pro posse vitare, illis usque post completionem huius operis remanentibus indiscussis, ad fautores hereticorum et precipue pape heretici me converto. De quibus in primis peto ut dicas, secundum unam sententiam vel plures, qui fautores hereticorum debent reputari. | Student: Although I had intended to go through each of the arguments that were adduced in favor of the opinion recited above in Chapter 13, however, because I wish to avoid great prolixity as much as possible, leaving those unexamined until after the completion of this work, I turn to the supporters of heretics and especially of the heretic pope. About these, I ask you first of all to say, according to one opinion or several, who should be considered supporters of heretics. |
| Magister: De fautoribus hereticorum distinguitur. Quia aut favent tantummodo personis hereticorum, eis scilicet prebendo consilium et auxilium qualecunque, nichil de eorum erroribus penitus intromittendo, quomodo sepe christiani iudeis, sarracenis et aliis infidelibus favent, quamvis eorum erroribus non faveant neque adhereant. Sepe enim reges et principes favendo iudeis et infidelibus eos in officiis publicis prefecerunt, quamvis eorum errores minime approbarent. Christiani etiam qui, ut habetur Extra, De iudeis et sarracenis et eorum servis, c. Ad liberandam, sarracenis consilium vel auxilium ad Terre Sancte dispendium impendere [impenderunt We], arma, ferrum et galearum ligamina defferentes eisdem. Illi etiam qui eis galeas vel naves vendebant poterant fautores sarracenorum non immerito appellari, et tamen eorum erroribus contra fidem non favebant, nec fuerunt per ecclesiam fautores pravitatis heretice vel infidelitatis iudicati. | Master: There is a distinction among supporters of heretics. [1] Either they favor only the persons of heretics, namely by offering them advice and assistance of any kind, without at all introducing their errors, just as Christians often favor Jews, Saracens, and other unbelievers, though they do not favor or adhere to their errors. For often kings and rulers favoring Jews and unbelievers have placed them in public offices, although they do not at all approve of their errors. Christians also who, as is stated in Extra, De iudeis et sarracenis et eorum servis, c. Ad liberandam, gave advice or aid to the Saracens to the detriment of the Holy Land, bringing them arms, iron, and helmet bands. Those who sold them helmets or ships could also be called, not without reason, supporters of the Saracens, and yet they did not favor their errors against the faith, nor were they judged by the Church to be supporters of heretical wickedness or unbelief. |
| Aut fautores hereticorum favent eorum erroribus, ipsos approbando, docendo, divulgando, animo alliciendi vel attrahendi alios ad approbationem eorum, et hii non solum sunt fautores hereticorum, sed etiam sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. | Or [2] supporters of heretics favor their errors, by approving them, teaching them, spreading them, with the intention of alluring or attracting others to approving them, and these are not only supporters of heretics, but they are also supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Primi autem sunt fautores hereticorum duntaxat, sed non sunt censendi fautores heretice pravitatis. | The first are supporters of heretics only, but should not be considered supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Michi apparet secundum predicta quod aliqui sunt vel possunt esse fautores hereticorum quamvis non sint fautores heretice pravitatis. Sed nunquid econverso aliqui sunt vel possunt esse fautores heretice pravitatis quamvis non sint fautores hereticorum? | Student: It appears to me according to the foregoing that some are or can be supporters of heretics even though they are not supporters of heretical wickedness. But is it conversely true that some are or can be supporters of heretical wickedness even though they are not supporters of heretics? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sic. Sicut enim potest quis tenere doctrinam alicuius non propter eum sed quia reputat eam veram, et tamen in nullo est fautor et amicus eius, imo potest esse emulus et inimicus eius mortalis, ita potest quis favere erroribus aliquorum hereticorum licet personis eorum non faveat sed penitus adversetur. | Master: The answer made is yes. For just as someone can hold the doctrine of someone not because of him but because he considers it true, and yet is in no way his supporter and friend, indeed he can be his rival and mortal enemy, so someone can favor the errors of some heretics, although he does not favor their persons but is completely opposed to them. |
| Discipulus: Ex hiis michi videtur quod isti habent de fautoribus ponere distinctionem trimembram, quia aliqui sunt fautores hereticorum tantummodo et non heretice pravitatis, aliqui heretice pravitatis tantummodo et non hereticorum, aliqui vero sunt fautores et hereticorum et heretice pravitatis. | Student: From these it seems to me that they have to make a threefold distinction about supporters, because [1] some are supporters of heretics only and not of heretical wickedness,[2a] some of heretical wickedness only and not of heretics, and [2b] some are supporters of both heretics and heretical wickedness. |
| Magister: De hoc ita dicunt ut eis imponis. | Master: They say about this just what you attribute to them. |
| Discipulus: Dic ergo secundum istos quomodo fautores a credentibus de quibus supra inquisivimus distinguuntur. | Student: Tell me, then, according to these people [presumably, those whose position has been presented from Chapter 13 onwards], how supporters are distinguished from the believers about whom we inquired above. |
| Magister: De quibus fautoribus interrogas? | Master: About which supporters are you asking? |
| Discipulus: Primo dic de fautoribus hereticorum. | Student: First, tell me about [1] supporters of heretics. |
| Magister: De fautoribus hereticorum adhuc distinguitur. Quia quidam scienter favent hereticis, hoc est scientes eos esse hereticos, quomodo multi christiani scienter favent iudeis et sarracenis quos sciunt esse iudeos et sarracenos. Sic etiam sepe parentes favent filiis et filii parentibus, quamvis sciant eos esse hereticos et eorum errores detestentur. Quidam autem favent hereticis ignoranter, nescientes eos esse hereticos. | Master: There is a further distinction about supporters of heretics. Because [1a] some knowingly favor heretics, that is, knowing that they are heretics, just as many Christians knowingly favor Jews and Saracens whom they know to be Jews and Saracens. So also parents often favor their children and children their parents, although they know that they are heretics and detest their errors. But [1b] some ignorantly favor heretics, not knowing that they are heretics. |
| Primi, scilicet qui favent scienter [hereticis added We] et non favent heretice pravitati non sunt credentes nec hereticis nec eorum erroribus, quia non approbant ipsos errores, nec ipsos reputant inter catholicos numerandos. Qui autem ignoranter favent hereticis, hoc est nescientes eos esse hereticos, sunt aliquo modo censendi credentes, quia ipsos qui sunt heretici credunt inter catholicos computandos. Et siquidem laborant ignorantia dampnabili, affectata videlicet aut crassa et supina, dampnabiliter sunt credentes hereticis et excommunicationis sententia sunt ligati. Si autem laborant ignorantia probabili aut invincibili, que non est dampnabilis, sunt aliquo modo credentes, sed non sunt dampnabiliter censendi credentes, nec sunt in numero illorum credentium qui Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o excommunicationis vinculo innodantur. | The first, namely, those who knowingly favor heretics and do not favor heretical depravity, are not believers in either heretics or their errors, because they do not approve of the errors themselves, nor do they consider them [i.e. the heretics] to be numbered among Catholics. But those who ignorantly favor heretics, that is, without knowing that they are heretics, are in some way to be considered believers, because they believe that those who are heretics should be counted among Catholics. And if indeed they suffer from blameworthy ignorance, namely affected or gross and supine, they are blameworthy believers in heretics and are bound by the sentence of excommunication. But if they suffer from probable or invincible ignorance, which is not blameworthy, they are in some way believers, but they should not be considered blameworthy believers, nor are they among those believers who are bound (Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o ) by the bond of excommunication. |
| Discipulus: Dic quomodo fautores heretice pravitatis a credentibus distinguuntur. | Student: Tell me how supporters of heretical wickedness are distinguished from believers. |
| Magister: Fautores heretici pravitatis et sunt censendi credentes hereticorum erroribus de quibus legitur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 2o, et sunt credentes hereticis de quibus fit mentio Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, quia fautores heretice pravitatis et pravitatem hereticam reputant catholicam veritatem, et ipsos auctores reputant catholicos vel saltem recte tenentes. | Master: Supporters of heretical wickedness should also be considered believers in the errors of heretics, of which we read in Extra, De heretics, c. Excommunicamus 2o, and they are believers of heretics mentioned in Extra, De heretics, c. Excommunicamus 1o, because the supporters of heretical wickedness both consider heretical wickedness to be Catholic truth, and consider the authors to be Catholics, or at least to right-thinking. |
| Discipulus: Dic de fautoribus tam hereticorum quam heretice pravitatis, quomodo a credentibus distinguuuntur. | Student: Tell us about the supporters of both heretics and heretical wickedness, how they are distinguished from believers. |
| Magister: Ad hoc dicitur sicut dictum est de fautoribus heretice pravitatis. | Master: To this it is said as was said about the supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Capitulum 28 | Chapter 28 |
| Discipulus: Iuxta distinctionem predictam de fautoribus hereticorum et heretice pravitatis, de omnibus fautoribus interrogabo diversa. Incipiam autem primo a fautoribus heretice pravitatis, de quibus ante alia dic qui sunt fautores pravitatis heretice iudicandi. | Student: In accordance with the aforementioned distinction of supporters of heretics and heretical wickedness, I will ask various questions about all kinds of supporters. But I will begin first with supporters of heretical wickedness, about whom, before anything else, tell me who are to be adjudged supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Magister: Omnes modos favendi heretice pravitati non est facile numerare. Et ideo videtur difficile dare regulam generalem qua de omnibus cognoscatur an faveant vel non faveant heretice pravitati. | Master: It is not easy to enumerate all the ways of favoring heretical wickedness, and therefore it seems difficult to give a general rule to know of everyone whether they favor or do not favor heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Dic aliquos modos favendi pravitati heretice ex quibus alii facilius cognoscantur. | Student: Tell me some ways of favoring heretical wickedness, from which others may be more easily known. |
| Magister: Quamvis favere heretice pravitati aliquo modo distinguatur a credere heretice pravitati, quia favor videtur actum exteriorem respicere, credere autem actum interiorem, tamen omnibus modis exterioribus quibus aliquis ostendit aut declarat se credere hereticorum erroribus, eisdem modis videtur favere eisdem erroribus. Et ideo quicunque dicit se erroribus adherere aut laudat eos tanquam catholicos, vel divulgat tanquam consonantes veritati, vel legit, docet, aut predicat tanquam tenendos, vel scribit animo adherendi, vel suadet, precipit, consulit, aut quovis modo inducit alios ad tenendum, videtur favere heretice pravitati. Qui etiam quoquo modo persequitur impugnantes errores eosdem aut propter impugnationem huiusmodi quomodolibet adversatur vel etiam infestat docentes, tenentes, et predicantes contrariam veritatem, fautor pravitatis heretice est tenendus. | Master: Although there is in some way a difference between favoring heretical wickedness and believing in heretical wickedness, because favor seems to refer to an external act while believing refers to an internal act, nevertheless in all the external ways in which someone shows or declares that he believes in the errors of heretics, in the same ways he seems to favor those errors. And therefore whoever says that he adheres to errors or praises them as Catholic, or spreads them as consonant with the truth, or lectures, teaches, or preaches them as being to be held, or writes with the intention of adhering to them, or persuades, instructs, advises, or in any way induces others to hold them, seems to favor heretical depravity. Whoever also in any way persecutes those who attacks the same errors or, because of this attack, in any way opposes or harasses those who teach, hold, and preach the contrary truth, should be held to be a supporter of heretical depravity. |
| Discipulus: Suntne aliqui modi speciales quibus sit quis dicendus fautor pravitatis heretice a papa heretico, si essent heretici ad invicem? [essent ... invicem: esset hereticus adinvente BbWe -- not good grammar. Adinventus?] | Student: Are there any
special ways in which someone can be called a supporter of
heretical depravity on the part of a heretic pope, if he
were found to be a heretic? [Meaning uncertain.] |
| Magister: Difficile vel forte impossibile est, secundum quosdam, quod aliquis faveat aliquo modo errori pape quin possit eodem modo favere errori alterius, quamvis si papa esset hereticus, forte de facto aliquibus modis aliqui faverent erroribus eius qui non faverent de facto erroribus aliorum. | Master: It is difficult or perhaps impossible, according to some, for someone to favor the error of a pope in some way without being able to favor the error of someone else in the same way, although if the pope were a heretic, perhaps in some ways some people would in fact favor his errors who would not in fact favor the errors of others. |
| Discipulus: Qui sunt illi modi? | Student: What are those ways? |
| Magister: Unus modus est consentiendo diffinitioni erronee pape heretici contra fidem. Si enim papa esset hereticus et contra fidem aliquid diffiniret, quicunque diffinitioni sue erronee consentiret esset fautor heretice pravitatis. | Master: One way is by consenting to an erroneous definition made by the heretic pope against the faith. For if the pope were a heretic and defined something against the faith, whoever consented to his erroneous definition would be a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Quicunque etiam consuleret vel induceret aut hortaretur eum ad diffiniendum aliquid contra fidem esset fautor heretice pravitatis. | Whoever also advised or induced or exhorted him to define something against the faith would be a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Quicunque etiam sollempniter in scholis diffinitionem suam hereticalem legeret tanquam tenendam, vel super ipsam non improbando sed approbando glossas, apparatus, lecturam vel scriptum quodcunque componeret, esset fautor heretice pravitatis. | Whoever also solemnly in the schools read his heretical definition as something to be held, or composed upon it -- not disapproving but approving -- glosses, apparatus, a lecture or any writing, would be a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Quicunque etiam, cum posset convenienter, eandem diffinitionem hereticalem minime impugnaret, esset inter fautores pravitatis heretice numerandus. | Whoever also did not at all attack the same heretical definition, when he suitably could, would be counted among the supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Qui etiam impugnantes, detestantes, vel reprobantes diffinitionem predictam propter hoc quomodolibet infestaret, diffamaret, reprobaret, vitaret, vel vitandos aut quocunque modo molestandos putaret, non esset a fautoria pravitatis heretice alienus. | Whoever also in any way harassed, defamed, reproved, avoided, or thought should be avoided or in any way molested, those who attack, detest, or reject the aforesaid definition, for the reason that they do so, would not be alien to the support of heretical wickedness. |
| Qui etiam scripturas catholicas contrarias predicte diffinitioni, eo quod contrarie essent eidem, teneri, legi publicari, vel doceri presumeret prohibere, inter fautores pravitatis heretice esset non immerito computandus. | Whoever also presumed to prohibit Catholic writings contrary to the aforesaid definition, because they are contrary to it, from being held, published, or taught, should not undeservedly be counted among the supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Qui insuper iuraret vel promitteret quoquo modo diffinitionem talem pape se esse in perpetuum servaturum, esset fautor heretice pravitatis. | Whoever, moreover, swore or promised in any way that he will forever maintain such a papal definition, would be a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Qui etiam scripturas catholicas ad reprobandum diffinitionem hereticalem pape compositas in detestationem earum combureret tanquam erroneas, aut aliquod circa eas ludibrium exerceret, a fautoria pravitatis heretice nequaquam esset immunis. | Whoever also burned in detestation of them as being erroneous Catholic writings composed to reprove the pope’s heretical definition, or makes some mockery of them, would by no means be immune from the support of heretical wickedness. |
| Qui etiam in favorem pape heretici novos errores confingeret, quemadmodum Sergiani in favorem Sergii pape quarti multos finxerunt errores, dicentes papam non posse dampnari, sicut in quodam antiquissimo opere edito contra Sergianos legi, esset inter fautores pravitatis heretice numerandus. | Whoever also invents new errors in favor of a heretic pope, as the Sergians invented many errors in favor of pope Sergius the Fourth [cf. 1 Dial. 2.27], saying that the pope cannot be damned, as I have read in a certain very ancient work published against the Sergians, should be counted among the supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Capitulum 29 | Chapter 29 |
| Discipulus: Quoniam iuxta canonicas sanctiones ad cautelam futurorum est aliquid faciendum, quia, ut leges imperiales insinuant et recta ratio dictat, providere quis debet quod contingere potest, unde et viri prudentes, providi, et discreti pacis in tempore munitiones parant, fortes edificant civitates, fabricant arma, divitias congregant et thesauros, propinquos et amicos sibi conciliant ut, si eis rabies bellorum ingrueret hostilis aggressio facilius reprimatur. Idcirco, quamvis hiis temporibus a papa catholico fides catholica defendatur virilius, et heretica pravitas animosius expurgetur, quia tamen potest contingere quod vel nostris diebus vel secuturis papa surget hereticus, sequaces et fautores quamplures habiturus, qui veritatem catholicam reprobare, destruere, et extirpare ac hereticam pravitatem inducere satagent toto posse, contra huiusmodi casum possibilem cupio me et alios premunire, ut, si unquam talis casus acciderit, ego et alii orthodoxi sciamus quos debeamus fautores heretice pravitatis et pape heretici reputare. Propter quod de fautoribus pravitatis heretice discurrere et in speciali te interrogare propono. Dic autem primo de consentientibus diffinitioni hereticali pape, an aliquis absque peccato mortali tali diffinitioni valeat consentire. | Student: Since according to canonical laws something must be done to guard against future events, because, as imperial laws suggest and right reason dictates, one must provide for what may happen, hence prudent, provident, and discreet men prepare fortifications in time of peace, build strong cities, make weapons, gather wealth and treasures, and win over neighbours and friends so that, if the fury of war should fall upon them, hostile aggression may be more easily repressed. Therefore, although in these times the Catholic faith is defended more manfully by a Catholic pope, and heretical wickedness is more courageously purged, yet because it can happen in our own time or in the future that a heretic pope will arise, having many followers and supporters, who will strive with all their might to reject, destroy, and eradicate Catholic truth and to introduce heretical wickedness, I desire to fortify myself and others against this possible case, so that, if such a case ever occurs, I and other orthodox Catholics may know whom we should consider to be supporters of heretical wickedness and a heretic pope. For this reason I propose to run through the supporters of heretical wickedness and question you in particular. But tell me first about those who consent to a pope’s heretical definition, whether anyone can without mortal sin consent to such a definition. |
| Magister: Ad evidentiam interrogationis tue putant nonnulli dupliciter distinguendum de consensu. Contingit enim dupliciter consentire diffinitioni hereticali pape, scilicet, vel consentiendo quod papa diffiniat assertionem que est heretica, vel consentiendo assertioni que per papam hereticum diffinitur. Si enim papa volens heresim diffinire requirat aliorum consensum, potest unus dicere: ‘consentio assertioni quia reputo eam veram, et consentio quod diffiniatis eam’. Et iste proprie consentiret diffinitioni pape heretici. Alius vero posset respondere: ‘consentio tali assertioni quia reputo eam veram, sed non consentio quod diffiniatis eam’. Et iste non consentiret proprie diffinitioni que est actus diffiniendi. Consentiret tamen diffinitioni que potest vocari assertio diffinitiva. Quemadmodum “fides” aliquando vocatur actus credendi, et aliquando ipsum obiectum creditum. Unde et collectio articulorum quod credimus aliquando vocatur “fides”, ut notat glossa Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. Firmiter. | Master: To clarify your question, some think that a distinction should be made about consent, in two ways. [1] For it happens in two ways to consent to a pope’s heretical definition, namely, [1a] either by consenting that the pope define an assertion that is heretical, or [1b] by consenting to the assertion that is defined by the heretic pope. For if a pope, wishing to define a heresy, calls for the consent of others, one can say: ‘I consent to the assertion because I consider it true, and I consent to your defining it.’ And this person would properly consent to a heretic pope’s definition. But another could reply: ‘I consent to such an assertion because I consider it true, but I do not consent to your defining it.’ And this person would not properly consent to the definition that is the act of defining; however, he would consent to a definition that can be called a definitive assertion. Just as “faith” is sometimes called the act of believing, and sometimes the object believed itself. Hence the collection of articles that we believe is sometimes called “the faith,” as the gloss notes, Extra, De summa trinitate et fide Catholica, c. Firmiter. |
| Alia distinctio ponitur de consensu quam ponit glossa Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. 1, dicens: “Nota quod quadruplex est consensus, scilicet negligentie, consilii, cooperationis et auctoritatis seu defensionis.” | [2] Another distinction is made about consent, which is stated in the gloss Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. 1, saying: “Note that consent is fourfold, namely, of [2a] negligence, of [2b] counsel, of [2c] cooperation and of [2d] authority or defense.” |
| Discipulus: Puto quod istas distinctiones intelligo. Ideo, iuxta membra earum te interrogare studebo. Dic ergo primo an solummodo consentiens assertioni hereticali pape, non consentiendo quod diffiniat eam, semper peccat mortaliter. | Student: I think I understand these distinctions. Therefore, I will try to question you according to their members. Tell me, then, first, whether someone who [1b] merely consents to the heretical assertion of the pope, without consenting that he define it, always sins mortally. |
| Magister: De assertione pape hereticali distinguitur, quia aut est talis assertio quod consentiens tenetur credere explicite contrariam veritatem, et in hoc casu consentiens peccat mortaliter et est hereticus reputandus (secundum quod colligi potest ex quarto huius, c. 11 et 12), aut assertio pape hereticalis est talis quod consentiens non tenetur credere explicite contrariam veritatem, et tunc aut in suo consensu est pertinax aut non est pertinax. Si est pertinax peccat mortaliter, et est hereticus reputandus et pena hereticorum plectendus. Si vero non est pertinax sed paratus est corrigi et solummodo est deceptus et querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem, non peccat mortaliter nec per consequens est hereticus reputandus, nec etiam proprie fautor heretice pravitatis. | Master: A distinction is made about the assertion of a heretic pope. Either the truth contrary to the pope’s heretical assertion is something the person who consents to the assertion is bound to believe explicitly, and in this case the person consenting sins mortally and should be considered a heretic (as can be gathered from Book IV, chapters 11 and 12). Or the contrary truth is something the person who consents is not bound to believe explicitly, and then either he is pertinacious in his consent or he is not pertinacious. If he is pertinacious, he sins mortally and should be considered a heretic and should be punished with the punishment of heretics. If, however, he is not pertinacious but is ready to be corrected and is only deceived and seeks the truth with cautious solicitude, he does not sin mortally and consequently should not be considered a heretic, nor is he properly a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Quid de illo qui exterius ore consentit assertioni pape, vel ut placeat vel saltem ne displiceat, et corde dissentit? | Student: What of someone who outwardly consents with his mouth to the pope’s assertion, either to please him or at least to not displease him, and dissents in his heart? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod peccat mortaliter, quia in doctrina religionis aperte mentitur, et ideo magis peccat quam ille qui ore et mente consentit, quia ille, licet dicat falsum tamen non mentitur. Et ideo vel non peccat nisi venialiter, vel minus peccat quam ille qui ore consentit et dissentit corde. Iste enim est falsus, duplex, mendax, et proditor agnite veritatis, et ideo merito est infamis, omni spoliandus honore et in perpetuum ab omni testimonio repellendus. | Master: The answer made is that he sins mortally, because he openly lies in the doctrine of religion, and therefore he sins more than someone who consents with both mouth and mind, because although he [i.e. the latter] says something false, he does not lie, and therefore either he does not sin except venially, or he sins less than the one who consents with his mouth and dissents in his heart -- for he is false, duplicitous, a liar, and a traitor to the acknowledged truth, and therefore he is deservedly infamous, to be stripped of all honor and forever repelled from all testimony. |
| Capitulum 30 | Chapter 30 |
| Discipulus: Hec que dicta sunt de consentiente assertioni pape tantummodo ex hiis que dicta sunt prius de credentibus, et ex illis que tractata sunt libro quarto dependere videntur. Ideo transeas ad consentientem quod papa hereticam diffiniat pravitatem, qui, scilicet, requisitus a papa, consentit quod assertio que in rei veritate est hereticalis diffiniatur sollempniter tanquam catholica, et quod christianis omnibus iniungatur ut eam sicut catholicam teneant, sentiant, et acceptent. | Student: What has been said about a person who only consents to the pope’s assertion seems to depend on what has been said before about believers, and on things dealt with in Book IV. Therefore, pass on to [1a] someone who consents that the pope define heretical wickedness, who, namely, having been consulted by the pope, consents that an assertion that is in reality heretical be defined solemnly as Catholic, and that all Christians be enjoined to hold, think, and accept it as Catholic. |
| Magister: Dixi prius quod quadrupliciter quis potest consentire. De quo ergo consentiente interrogas? | Master: I said before [2] that one can consent in four ways. So about which consent do you ask? |
| Discipulus: Licet istam distinctionem quadrimembram in genere aliquo modo intelligam, tamen ad consentientem diffinitioni hereticali pape heretici ipsam nescio applicare. Ideo in primis declara quomodo contingit quadrupliciter diffinitioni hereticali pape heretici consentire. | Student: Although I understand this four-fold distinction in some way in general, I do not know how to apply it to a person who consents to a heretical definition of a heretic pope. Therefore, first of all, explain how it happens in four ways to agree to a heretical definition of a heretic pope. |
| Magister: Quod quadrupliciter consentire contingat diffinitioni hereticali pape heretici nonnulli declarant, dicentes quod ille consentit consensu negligentie diffinitioni predicte qui, sciens eam esse hereticalem, non resistit. | Master: Some explain that it happens in four ways to agree to a heretical definition of a heretic pope, saying that a person agrees [2a] by negligence to the aforementioned definition who, knowing it to be heretical, does not resist it. |
| $Discipulus: Quomodo potest ostendi quod non resistens ei consentit? | Student: How can it be shown that someone who does not resist consents to it? |
| Magister: Hoc pluribus sanctorum patrum auctoritatibus videtur posse probari. Ait enim Innocentius papa, ut habetur dist. 83, c. Error: “Error, cui non resistitur, approbatur.” Ex quibus verbis sic arguitur. Error cui non resistitur, approbatur. Ergo diffinitio hereticalis pape cui non resistitur, approbatur. Qui autem ipsam approbat, consentit eidem. Ergo qui non resistit, consentit. | Master: This seems to be provable by the authorities of many holy fathers. For pope Innocent says, as is found in dist. 83, c. Error: “An error not resisted is approved.” From these words it is thus argued. Error that is not resisted is approved. Therefore, an heretical definition of a pope that is not resisted is approved. But someone who approves it, consents to it. Therefore, anyone who does not resist, consents. |
| Item, ibidem dicit Innocentius: “Veritas, cum minime defensatur, opprimitur.” Ex quibus verbis infertur quod veritas contraria diffinitioni hereticali pape, cum minime defensatur, opprimitur. Qui autem opprimit veritatem catholicam, consentit contrarie heretice pravitati. Qui vero non resistit, non defendit. Ergo qui non resistit diffinitioni hereticali pape, consentit eidem. | Likewise, in the same place Innocent says: “Truth is oppressed when it is not defended.” From these words it is inferred that the truth contrary to a heretical definition of a pope is oppressed, if it is not defended. But someone who oppresses Catholic truth consents to contrary heretical wickedness. But someone who does not resist, does not defend. Therefore someone who does not resist the heretical definition of a pope consents to it. |
| Item, ibidem subnectitur: “nec caret scrupulo societatis occulte, qui manifesto facinori desinit obviare.” | Likewise, in the same place it is added: “He who gives up resisting a manifest crime is not free from suspicion of secret confederacy.” |
| Et eandem sententiam sub eisdem verbis asserit Eleuterius papa, ut habetur 2 q. 7, c. Negligere. | And the same opinion is asserted by pope Eleutherius under the same words, as found in 2 q. 7, c. Negligere. |
| Et Anastasius et Damasus papa, ut legitur 23 q. 3, c. Qui potest, sic ait: “Qui potest obviare et perturbare perversos, et non facit, nichil aliud est quam favere impietati eorum, nec caret scrupulo etc..” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod qui potest resistere diffinitioni hereticali pape et non resistit, consentit eidem. | And Anastasius and Pope Damasus, as is read in 23 q.3, c. Qui potest, says: “Someone who can obstruct and disturb the perverse, and does not do so, [*faulty grammar in original] is nothing else than to favor their impiety, nor is he free from suspicion” etc. From these words it is inferred that someone who can resist the heretical definition of a pope and not resist, consents to it. |
| Quod Augustinus, ut legitur 23 q. 3, c. Ostendit, videtur asserere, dicens: “qui desinit obviare, cum potest, consentit.” Ergo qui non resistit diffinitioni hereticali pape, consentit. | Augustine, as read in 23 q. 3, c. Ostendit, seems to assert this, saying: “He who gives up resisting, when he can, consents.” Therefore, someone who does not resist a heretical definition of a pope, consents. |
| Item, Gregorius, ut habetur dist. 83, c. Consentire, ait: “Consentire videtur erranti, qui ad resecanda, que corrigi debet, non occurrit.” Ergo qui non resistit diffinitioni hereticali pape, consentit eidem. | Likewise, Gregory, as found in dist. 83, c. Consentire, says: “Whoever does not attend to the curtailing of things that should be corrected seems to consent to the person who errs.” Therefore, someone who does not resist the heretical definition of the pope, consents to the same. |
| Quod intelligendum est quando quis scit diffinitionem pape esse hereticalem, et potest resistere, et non resistit. | This should be understood when someone knows that the definition of the pope is heretical, and can resist, and does not resist. |
| Discipulus: Dic de consensu consilii. | Student: Tell about the consent [2b] of counsel. |
| Magister: Ille dicitur consentire consulendo qui suadet et inducit papam, vel hortatur, quod assertionem que est hereticalis sollempniter diffiniat et determinet esse tenendam. | Master: He is said to consent by advising who persuades and induces the pope, or urges him, that he solemnly define and determine that an assertion which is heretical should be held. |
| Discipulus: Dic de consensu cooperationis. | Student: Tell me about the consent [2c] of cooperation. |
| Magister: Ille dicitur consentire cooperando diffinitioni hereticali pape qui assertionem pape hereticam, sollempniter diffiniendam, dictat, scribit, et rationibus aut auctoritatibus quod sit tenenda et sollempniter diffinienda probare molitur. | Master: He is said to consent by cooperating with the heretical definition of a pope who dictates, writes a heretical assertion to be solemnly defined by the pope, and attempts to prove by arguments or authorities that it should be held and solemnly defined. |
| Discipulus: Ergo secundum ista quicunque scriberet talem diffinitionem consentiret cooperando eidem. | Student: Therefore, according to these [people], whoever wrote such a definition would consent by cooperating with it. |
| Magister: Si quis scribit talem diffinitionem hereticalem pape postquam extitit promulgata, non intelligitur consentire cooperando actui diffiniendi seu determinandi qui iam precessit. Ille autem qui scriberet eam ante actum diffiniendi, si intelligeret et adverteret quod assertio diffinienda fidei repugnaret, intelligeretur consentire cooperando. Si autem hoc non adverteret esset per ignorantiam excusatus. | Master: If anyone writes such a heretical definition of a pope after it has been promulgated, he is not understood to consent by cooperating with the act of defining or determining, which has already happened. But someone who wrote it before the act of defining, if he understood and noticed that the assertion to be defined was repugnant to the faith, would be understood to consent by cooperating. But if he did not notice this, he would be excused through ignorance. |
| Discipulus: Dic de consensu auctoritatis seu defensionis. | Student: Tell me about the consent [2d] of authority or defense. |
| Magister: Consensus auctoritatis et consensus defensionis distingui videntur, sicut auctoritas et defensio distinguuntur. Auctoritas enim ad superiorem spectare videtur, defensio autem tam ad maiorem quam ad minorem potest pertinere. Nam et superior potest inferiorem defendere, et inferior potest defendere superiorem. Imo quamvis nullus habeat auctoritatem super seipsum, potest tamen seipsum quis defendere, iuxta illud Rom. 12: “nos [BbFiWe: non] vosmetipsos defendentes carissimi.” Et Act. 26 dixit Paulus: “cum sim defensurus me hodie.” | Master: Consent of authority and consent of defense seem to be distinguished, just as authority and defense are distinguished. For authority seems to pertain to a superior, but defense can pertain to both the greater and the lesser. For both the superior can defend the inferior, and the inferior can defend the superior. Indeed, although no one has authority over himself, yet someone can defend himself, according to Rom. 12: “Not defending yourselves, dearly beloved.” And Acts 26 Paul said: “as I will defend myself today.” |
| Consensus igitur auctoritatis respectu diffinitionis papalis locum non videtur habere, cum papa nullius auctoritate vel mandato possit aliquid diffinire. Sed consensus defensionis potest habere locum respectu pape. Potest enim aliquis consentire diffinitioni hereticali pape, offerens se diffinitionem defensurum eandem. | Therefore, the consent of authority does not seem to have a place with respect to a papal definition, since the pope cannot define anything by the authority or mandate of anyone [else]. But the consent of defense can have a place with respect to the pope. For someone can consent to the heretical definition of a pope, offering to defend that definition. |
| Capitulum 31 | Chapter 31 |
| Discipulus: Obmisso consensu defensionis quousque tractaverimus de defensoribus hereticorum, et obmisso consensu auctoritatis qui, ut videtur, respectu pape locum habere non potest, interrogabo te primo de consensu negligentie, an, scilicet, omnis talis consentiens peccet mortaliter. | Student: Leaving aside the consent of defense until we discuss the defenders of heretics, and leaving aside the consent of authority which, as it seems, cannot have a place with respect to the pope, I will ask you first about the consent of negligence, namely, whether everyone who consents in this way sins mortally. |
| Magister: Ista negligentia qua quis negligit resistere pape quando assertionem hereticalem diffinire sollempniter seu determinare conatur, et ideo intelligitur consentire, videtur esse quedam taciturnitas. Quamobrem videndum est an omnis taciturnitas in hoc casu sit peccatum mortale, et an pro consensu sit habenda. Circa quam sunt diverse sententie. | Master: The negligence by which someone neglects to resist the pope when he attempts to solemnly define or determine a heretical assertion, and therefore is understood to consent, seems to be a certain keeping silent (taciturnitas) . Therefore we must see whether keeping silent in this case [i.e. of heretical papal definition] is always a mortal sin, and whether it should be considered consent. Concerning this there are different opinions. |
| Una est quod aliqua taciturnitas in hoc casu est peccatum mortale, et aliqua minime, quia aliqua est habenda pro consensu, et aliqua pro consensu minime est habenda. Taciturnitas enim illius qui reclamando posset predictam diffinitionem impedire esset peccatum mortale et pro consensu esset habenda. Unde, si papa requirente consilium cardinalium vel aliorum super aliqua assertione heretica diffinienda, unus posset reclamando impedire papam a diffinitione huius, quia forte esset tante opinionis et fame in populo vel tante potentie quod papa ipso reclamante talem diffinitionem minime attemptaret, si ille taceret, peccaret mortaliter, et eius taciturnitas esset pro consensu habenda. Si vero esset aliquis qui reclamando talem diffinitionem hereticalem pape impedire non posset, tacendo non peccaret mortaliter, nec eius taciturnitas esset pro consensu habenda. | One is that keeping silent in this case is sometimes a mortal sin and sometimes not, because sometimes it should be considered consent and sometimes not. For the silence of one who by protesting could impede the aforesaid definition would be a mortal sin and should be considered consent. Hence, if the pope were to seek the advice of the cardinals or others on some heretical assertion to be defined, one person could by protesting impede the pope from defining it, because perhaps he would be of so much opinion and fame among the people, or of so much power, that if he protested the pope would not attempt such a definition: if that person were to remain silent, he would sin mortally, and his silence would be considered consent. But if there were someone who could not impede such an heretical papal definition by protesting, he would not sin mortally by remaining silent, nor would his silence be considered consent. |
| Huic sententie glossa Extra, De presumptionibus, c. Nonne, concordare videtur. Ait enim: “melius dicas quod ubi per prohibitionem meam possum prohibere quod fit, et taceo: tunc taciturnitas pro consensu habetur 54 dist. Si servus. Si vero per prohibitionem meam non possum prohibere, quod fit, tunc non obest michi taciturnitas.” Et hanc eandem distinctionem ponit glossa dist. 27, c. Diaconus. Hoc etiam glossa 2 q. 7, c. Plerumque insinuare videtur, distinguens tres casus in quibus taciturnitas minime nocet, dicens: “taciturnitas non obstat ei qui non potest probare. Item non nocet ei qui non potest impedire... vel etiam erubescit loqui... Item nec nocet ei, qui scit suum ius durare.” Et post sequitur: “alias semper obstat taciturnitas, ut Extra, De hiis que fiunt a prelatis sine consensu capituli, c. 2, et 54 dist. Si servus.” | With this opinion the gloss on Extra, De presumptionibus, c. Nonne, seems to agree. For it says: “You should rather say that where by my prohibition I can forbid what is done, and I remain silent, then silence is considered consent, dist. 54 Si servus. But if by my prohibition I cannot prohibit what is done, then keeping silent does not tell against me.” And this same distinction is made by the gloss on dist. 27, c. Diaconus. The gloss on 2 q. 7, c. Plerumque also seem to suggest this, distinguishing three cases in which keeping silent does no harm, saying: “Keeping silent does not hinder someone who cannot prove. Likewise it does not harm someone who cannot prevent... or even blushes to speak... Likewise it does not harm someone who knows his right endures.” And afterwards it continues: “Otherwise keeping silent always hinders, as in Extra, De hiis que fiunt a prelatis sine consensu capituli, c. 2, and 54 dist. Si servus.” |
| Ex quibus patet quod si requisitus a papa super aliqua assertione hereticali diffinienda prohibere non potest, huiusmodi taciturnitas non nocet. Si vero potest prohibere, taciturnitas nocet et est habenda pro consensu. | From these [texts] it is clear that if, when consulted by a pope about some heretical assertion to be defined, he cannot prohibit, this kind of silence does not harm. But if he can prohibit, keeping silent harms and should be considered consent. |
| Discipulus: Ista sententia probabilis michi videtur. Ideo ad intelligendam eam aliqualiter volo insistere. Quare, secundum istam sententiam, dicas quid tenendum est de taciturnitate alicuius collegii, puta si papa requireret collegium super diffinitione huiusmodi, nunquid si taceret peccaret mortaliter et pro consentiente deberet haberi? | Student: This opinion seems probable to me. Therefore, I want to dwell on understanding it in some way. Therefore, according to this opinion, tell me what should be said about the silence of a certain college, for example, if the pope were to call on a college about a definition of this kind, would it sin mortally and should it be considered as consenting if it kept silent? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si totum collegium posset prohibere diffinitionem huiusmodi, quia, scilicet, papa contra totum collegium talem assertionem hereticalem minime diffiniret, totum collegium tacendo peccaret mortaliter et pro consentiente deberet haberi. Si autem impedire non posset taciturnitas non noceret. | Master: The answer made is that if the whole college could prohibit a definition of this kind, because, namely, the pope would not define such a heretical assertion against the whole college, the whole college would sin mortally by remaining silent and should be considered as consenting. But if it could not prevent it, keeping silent would not harm. |
| Discipulus: Si collegium potens prohibere tacendo peccat mortaliter, quis ergo primo de omnibus peccat? Non videtur quod primus peccet tacendo, quia ille prohibere non posset, et eadem ratione secundus requisitus non peccet, nec tertius, et sic videtur quod nullus tacendo peccat. Ergo nec totum collegium tacendo peccat. | Student: If a college that is able to prohibit sins mortally by keeping silent, who then of all of them sins first? It does not seem that the first sins by keeping silent, because he could not prohibit, and for the same argument the second person consulted does not sin, nor the third, and so it seems that no one sins by keeping silent. Therefore neither does the whole college sin by keeping silent. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod primus tacendo peccat. Tum quia debet probabiliter suspicari quod si ipse diffinitioni inique resisterit alii etiam resistent eidem. Tum quia ex quo nescit quod alii non concordabunt cum eodem, potest probabiliter dubitare an, ipse reclamando, una cum aliis possit diffinitionem hereticam impedire. In dubiis autem via certior est sequenda. Via autem certior est quod reclamet. Ergo tunc reclamare tenetur. Tum quia tacendo alios scandalizat, prebens eis occasionem tacendi in causa fidei. Ergo tacendo peccat mortaliter. | Master: The answer made is that the first sins by keeping silent. First, because he must probably suspect that if he himself resists the wicked definition, others will also resist it. Second, because since he does not know that others will not agree with him, he can have probable doubt whether, by protesting, he can, together with others, prevent the heretical definition. But in doubtful cases, the more certain way should be followed. And the more certain way is that he protest. Therefore then he is bound to protest. Third, because by keeping silent he causes others to stumble, giving them an occasion to keep silent in a matter of faith. Therefore by keeping silent he sins mortally. |
| Et sicut primus tacendo peccat mortaliter, ita secundus, et tertius, et deinceps usque ad minorem partem collegii. Postquam autem maior pars collegii tacendo consentit, ille qui postea fuit requisitus, si tacet, cernens quod maior pars collegii tacendo consentit, et quod papa propter minorem partem suam diffinitionem hereticalem nequaquam dimittet, non peccat tacendo, ex quo per suam contradictionem impedire non posset. | And just as the first person sins mortally by keeping silent, so the second, and the third, and so on down to the lesser part of the college. But after the majority of the college consents by keeping silent, one who was later consulted, if he keeps silent, being aware that the majority of the college consents by keeping silent, and that the pope will not give up his heretical definition because of the minor part, does not sin by keeping silent, since he could not prevent it by his contradiction. |
| Discipulus: Quomodo peccat primus tacendo ex quo solus diffinitionem hereticalem pape prohibere non posset? | Student: How does the first person sin by keeping silent, since he alone could not prohibit the pope from making a heretical definition? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod licet solus non posset prohibere, posset tamen cum aliis prohibere, et ideo, quia non constat sibi quod alii non resistent, peccat tacendo. | Master: It is answered that although he alone could not forbid, he could nevertheless forbid with others, and therefore, because it is not certain to him that others will not resist, he sins by keeping silent. |
| Discipulus: Quid si papa simul requirit omnes cardinales et non unum ante alium, quis peccat si omnes tacent? | Student: What if the pope calls on all the cardinals at the same time and not one before the other, who sins if they all keep silent? |
| Magister: Dicitur quod in hoc casu omnes peccant, tacendo, mortaliter, quia in hoc casu quilibet tenetur respondere ac si esset primus requisitus. | Master: It is said that in this case all sin, by keeping silent, mortally, because in this case each one is bound to answer as if he were the first to be asked. |
| Discipulus: Dic aliam sententiam. | Student: Say another opinion. |
| Magister: Alia sententia est quod requisitus a papa super aliqua assertione hereticali diffinienda, si scit ipsam obviare doctrine ecclesie, et tacet, sive reclamando possit prohibere huiusmodi diffinitionem sive non, peccat mortaliter, nisi ex contradictione sua periculum fidei vel fidelium absque omni fidelium utilitate sequeretur. | Master: Another opinion is that [i] when a person is consulted by the pope concerning the definition of some heretical assertion, if he knows that it contradicts the doctrine of the Church, and keeps silent, whether he can prevent such a definition by protesting or not, he sins mortally, [ii] unless from his contradiction danger to the faith or to the faithful would result without any benefit to the faithful. |
| Primum probatur. Quia ad exteriorem confessionem fidei quilibet est astrictus quando requiritur, si ex omissione confessionis alii scandalizantur, quia quilibet tenetur vitare scandalum fratris sui. Sed cardinalis, sive possit prohibere diffinitionem hereticalem pape sive non possit, si tacet requisitus de veritate fidei, proximos scandalizat, quia per eius taciturnitatem alii possunt presumere quod heretice consentiat pravitati. Ergo sive reclamando possit impedire diffinitionem hereticalem pape sive non, tenetur in hoc casu, ne infirmos et simplices scandalizet, ad exteriorem confessionem catholice veritatis. | The first is proved. Because everyone is bound to an external confession of faith when consulted, if by the omission of confession others are caused to stumble, because everyone is bound to avoid causing his brother to stumble. But a cardinal, whether he can prevent a heretical definition by the pope or not, if he keeps silent when consulted about the truth of the faith, causes his neighbors to stumble, because from his silence others can presume that he consents to heretical depravity. Therefore whether he can prevent a heretical definition by the pope by protesting or not, he is bound in this case, lest he cause the weak and simple to stumble, to an external confession of Catholic truth. |
| Secundum, scilicet quod si ex contradictione tali sequeretur periculum fidei vel fidelium quia papa hereticus et complices sui ad exterminationem fidelium vel ad magis divulgandum errorem cum multorum periculo inflamarentur, tacens non peccaret mortaliter, probatur per illud Matth. 7: “Nolite dare sanctum canibus.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod absque omni utilitate bonorum et cum dampno eorum, et sine conversione et emendatione malorum, non est impiis et infidelibus catholica veritas propalanda. Et ita in hoc casu tacere licet, nec tacens consentit. Quemadmodum inter sarracenos existens fidelis, inter quos non posset proficere, non intelligeretur eorum consentire erroribus licet contra eos minime clamaret. | The second, namely, that if from such a contradiction there would follow danger to the faith or to the faithful, because the heretic pope and his accomplices would be inflamed to exterminate the faithful or to further spread error with danger to many, he would not sin mortally by remaining silent, is proved by a text of Matthew 7: “Do not give what is holy to dogs.” From these words it is gathered that if there is no benefit to the good but harm, and if there is no conversion and amendment of the evil, the Catholic truth should not be proclaimed to the wicked and unbelievers. And so in this case it is permissible to remain silent, nor does someone who keeps silent consent. Just as a faithful person living among the Saracens, among whom he could not make progress, would not be understood to consent to their errors even though he did not cry out against them. |
| Discipulus: Dic quomodo secundum illam sententiam glosse que in contrarium sonare videntur debent intelligi. | Student: Tell me how, according to that opinion, the glosses which seem to sound contrary should be understood. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod glosse ille debent intelligi de negotiis in quibus vertitur proprium commodum vel incommodum temporale ipsius tacentis. Ubi autem ex taciturnitate ipsius potest provenire diminutio honoris divini vel dampnum spirituale proximorum, puta aversio a fide vel scandalum infirmorum, per reclamationem autem vel contradictionem ipsius, licet non posset prohibere vel impedire seu retrahere papam a sua intentione nefaria, potest tamen catholicos consolare et confirmare in fide, et ne crederent pape heretico preservare, reclamare tenetur. Et ideo taciturnitas eius per quam et divino honori subtrahitur, et utilitas proximorum necessaria impeditur, non est absque peccato mortali, quia ista taciturnitas tam amori Dei quam proximi manifeste repugnat. | Master: It is said that the glosses should be understood of matters involving the personal advantage or temporal disadvantage of the person keeping silent. But where from his silence there may result a diminution of divine honor or spiritual harm to his neighbors, for example aversion from the faith or scandal to the weak, but through his protest or contradiction, although he could not prohibit or hinder or withdraw the pope from his nefarious intention, he can nevertheless console and confirm Catholics in the faith, and to preserve them from believing in a heretic pope, he is bound to protest. And therefore his silence, by which both divine honor is taken away and the necessary benefit of his neighbors is hindered, is not without mortal sin, because this silence is manifestly repugnant both to the love of God and of his neighbor. |
| Capitulum 32 | Chapter 32 |
| Discipulus: Quia non est verisimile quod papa requireret cardinales super aliqua assertione hereticali quam diffinire seu determinare intenderet et eosdem sustineret tacere et non cogeret respondere, ideo transeo ad consensum consilii, de quo dic an omnes consulendo consentientes quod papa quamcunque heresim sollempniter diffiniat et determinet peccent mortaliter, et an sint fautores heretice pravitatis. | Student: Because it is not likely that the pope would call on the cardinals about some heretical assertion that he intended to define or determine and would put up with their keeping silent and not force them to respond, therefore I pass to the consent [2b] of counsel. Concerning this, tell me whether all who consent by advising that the pope solemnly define and determine any heresy sin mortally, and whether they are supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod omnes consulentes huiusmodi peccant mortaliter, nec possunt per quamcunque ignorantiam excusari. Quod enim peccent mortaliter videtur aperte posse probari. Nam de consulente negari non potest quin sit aperte et expresse consentiens. Consentiens autem peccanti mortaliter peccat mortaliter. Papa autem diffiniendo seu determinando assertionem que est heretica peccat mortaliter. Ergo consulens quod eam determinet mortaliter peccat. | Master: To this the answer made is that all such advisers sin mortally and they cannot be excused by any ignorance. That they sin mortally seems clearly provable. For it cannot be denied of a adviser that he openly and expressly consents. But someone who consents to someone sinning mortally [himself] sins mortally. But the pope sins mortally by defining or determining an assertion that is heretical. Therefore someone who advises that he determine it sins mortally. |
| Discipulus: Quamvis michi videatur probabile quod consentientes consulendo diffinitioni hereticali pape, si non possint per ignorantiam excusari, peccant mortaliter, videtur tamen quod ignorans assertionem pape esse hereticam per ignorantiam valeat excusari, saltem a peccato mortali. Nam si consulens pape quod assertionem hereticalem diffiniat peccat mortaliter, peccatum suum est consimile peccato pape. Peccatum autem pape est peccatum heresis. Ergo peccatum consulentis est peccatum heresis. Sed hoc non videtur, quia ignorans non eo ipso est hereticus quod ignorans. Ergo cum iste sit tantum ignorans, non videtur quod sit hereticus reputandus. | Student: Although it seems probable to me that those who consent to the pope’s heretical definition by advising him, if they cannot be excused through ignorance, sin mortally, it seems nevertheless that one who does not know that the pope’s assertion is heretical can be excused through ignorance, at least from mortal sin. For if one who advises the pope to define a heretical assertion sins mortally, his sin is similar to the pope’s sin. But the pope’s sin is a sin of heresy. Therefore the sin of the adviser is a sin of heresy. But this does not seem to be the case, because an ignorant person is not a heretic by the very fact that he is ignorant. Therefore, since he is only ignorant, it does not seem that he should be considered a heretic. |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod iste consulens ultra ignorantiam addit pertinaciam: velle, scilicet, pertinaciter adherere assertioni hereticali. Et ideo, sicut papa diffiniens est pertinax et ideo peccat mortaliter, ita consiliarius eius participans secum in crimine est pertinax, et ideo nullo modo potest per ignorantiam excusari a peccato mortali. | Master: To this the answer made is that this adviser adds pertinacity to ignorance: namely, to will to adhere pertinaciously to the heretical assertion. And therefore, just as the pope who defines is pertinacious and therefore sins mortally, so his advisor who participates with him in the crime is pertinacious, and therefore can in no way be excused from mortal sin through ignorance. |
| Discipulus: Si non credit se in aliquo obviare catholice veritati, quare non potest per ignorantiam excusari, quemadmodum ille qui opinatur assertionem hereticalem excusatur quia non credit se in aliquo obviare catholice veritati? | Student: If he does not believe that he is in any way in conflict with Catholic truth, why cannot he be excused by ignorance, just as someone who holds a heretical assertion as an opinion is excused because he does not believe that he is in any way in conflict with Catholic truth? |
| Magister: Ideo iste non excusatur per quamcunque ignorantiam, quia ad actum tam sollempnem sicut debet esse papalis diffinitio nullus debet procedere, nec aliquis consulere debet ut fiat, nisi sit certus certitudine sufficienti quod talis diffinitio est consona veritati. Opinari tamen potest quis absque tali certitudine, et ideo unus peccat mortaliter et alius minime. | Master: This person is not excused by any ignorance, because no one should proceed to such a solemn act as a papal definition should be, nor should anyone advise that it be done, unless he is certain with sufficient certainty that such a definition is consonant with the truth. However, one can hold an opinion without such certainty, and therefore one sins mortally and *another not at all. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid talis consiliarius pape heretici est fautor heretice pravitatis? | Student: Is such an adviser of a heretic pope a supporter of heretical wickedness? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod talis consiliarius est aperte fautor heretice pravitatis, quod probatur sic. Sicut consiliarius magis expresse consentit quam ille qui tacet licet prohibere possit illud quod fit, ita consiliarius magis expresse favet quam ille qui solummodo tacet, quamvis prohibere possit illud quod fit. Sed qui tacet cum prohibere potest censetur fautor. Ergo multo magis consiliarius censendus est fautor. Quare consiliarius pape in diffinitione hereticali fautor pravitatis heretice est censendus. | Master: The answer made is that such an adviser is an open supporter of heretical wickedness, which is proved as follows. Just as an adviser consents more expressly than one who is silent though he could prevent what is done, so an adviser favors more expressly than one who is only silent though he could prevent what is done. But someone who is silent when he can prevent is considered a supporter. Therefore, much more, an adviser should be considered a supporter. Therefore, an adviser to the pope in a heretical definition should be considered a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Hic sunt duo probanda. Quorum primum est quod magis favet consiliarius quam qui tacet quamvis prohibere possit. Secundum est quod qui tacet cum prohibere potest, favet. | Here two things need to be proved. The first is that an adviser favors more than one who is silent though he could prevent. The second is that someone who keeps silent when he can prevent, favors. |
| Primum probatur quia magis favet committens quam omittens, cum favere malo magis videatur peccatum commissionis quam omissionis. Sed qui tacet quamvis prohibere possit magis videtur habere peccatum omissionis. Consulens autem peccatum commissionis committit. Ergo magis directe et magis proprie favet consiliarius pape heretici tali diffinitioni quam tacens. | The first is proved, because a committer favours more than an omitter, since favoring evil seems more a sin of commission than of omission. But someone who keeps silent though he could prevent seems rather to have a sin of omission. But an adviser commits a sin of commission. Therefore someone who advises a heretic pope to such a definition favours more directly and more properly than someone who keeps silent. |
| Secundum, scilicet quod qui tacet cum prohibere potest, favet, et ideo tacens qui potest prohibere reclamando vel contradicendo tali diffinitioni est fautor pravitatis heretice, multipliciter videtur posse probare. Primo quidem per illud Anastasii et Damasum papam, quod allegatum est supra c. 30, cum dicitur: “qui potest obviare et perturbare perversos, et non facit, nichil aliud est quam favere impietati eorum.” Et eandem sententiam fere sub eisdem verbis ponit Innocentius papa ut legitur dist. 83, c. Error, et Johannes 8us ut legitur dist. 86, c. Facientis, et Eleutherius papa, ut habetur 2 q. 7, c. Negligere. Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod qui potest obviare diffinitioni hereticali pape et non obviat, favet heretice pravitati. | The second, namely, that someone who keeps silent when he can prevent, favors, and therefore someone who keeps silenet when he can prevent by protesting or contradicting such a definition is a supporter of heretical wickedness, seems provable in many ways. First indeed by a text of Anastasius and Pope Damasus, quoted above in chapter 30, when it is said: “Someone who can obstruct and disturb the perverse, and does not do so, is nothing else than to favor their impiety”. And the same opinion is put in almost the same words by pope Innocent, as read in dist. 83, c. Error, and John VIII as read in dist. 86, c. Facientis, and pope Eleutherius, as found in 2 q. 7, c. Negligere. From these words it is evidently gathered that someone who can obstruct a heretical definition of a pope and does not do so, favors heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Verba predicta “qui potest obviare” etc. debent intelligi de prelatis. Unde dicit glossa 2 q. 7 c. Negligere quod illud capitulum quod continet eandem sententiam cum verbis predictis debet intelligi de prelatis, “ut q. 4 Duo ista nomina… et q. ultima, Preterea.” Et ideo qui esset prelatus pape et non resisteret diffinitioni hereticali eius si posset, faveret impietati eius. Cardinales autem requisiti super diffinitioni hereticali quam papa intenderet facere, sive taceant cum possint resistere sive non taceant, non sunt prelati pape. Quare predicta de ipsis non debent intelligi. | Student: The aforementioned words “who can obstruct” etc. should be understood of prelates. Hence the gloss on 2 q. 7 c. Negligere says that the chapter that contains the same opinion with the aforesaid words should be understood of prelates: “as in q. 4 Duo ista nomina… et q. ultima, Preterea.” And therefore whoever was a prelate of the pope and did not resist his heretical definition if he could, would favor his impiety. But cardinals who are consulted about a heretical definition that a pope intended to make, whether or not they keep silent when they could resist, are not the pope’s prelates [i.e. superiors]. Therefore the aforesaid [text] should not be understood of them. |
| Magister: Quod verba predicta intelligi debeant de tacentibus sive negligentibus obviare diffinitioni hereticali pape glossa ubi prius aperte insinuare videtur. | Master: The gloss above quoted seems openly to suggest that the aforesaid words should be understood of those who keep silent or neglect to obstruct a pope’s heretical definition. |
| Tum quia dicit “vel intellige”, scilicet c. illud Negligere cum possis perturbare, “de atrocibus ut tunc quilibet teneatur”, scilicet perturbare perversos. Sed diffinire hereticam pravitatem est inter atrocissimas perversitates merito computandum. Ergo tali diffinitioni quilibet qui potest obviare tenetur. Et si non facit, favet. | First, because it says “or, understand” (that is, that of c. Negligere, when you can disturb) “of atrocious actions, that then each person is bound”, namely to perturb the perverse. But to define a heretical depravity is deservedly to be counted among the most atrocious perversities. Therefore, anyone who can is bound to obstruct such a definition. And if he does not, he favors it. |
| Tum quia glossa ibidem subdit: “vel dic quod quilibet tenetur prohibere proximum a peccato committendo 22 q. 5 Hoc videtur. Secus in commisso.” Si ergo papa intendit aliquid contra fidem catholicam diffinire, quilibet qui potest eum prohibere tenetur, et si non prohibet sibi favere convincitur. | Also because the gloss there also adds: “or, say that everyone is bound to prevent his neighbor from committing sin, 22 q. 5 Hoc videtur. *It is otherwise of a sin [already] committed.” Therefore, if the pope intends to define something against the Catholic faith, anyone who can is bound to prevent him, and if he does not do so he is convicted of favoring it. |
| Quod autem dicis de glossa que dicit quod illud capitulum Negligere de prelatis debet intelligi, respondetur quod glossa hoc dicit solummodo recitando. Unde dicit hec verba “alii hoc capitulum intelligunt de prelatis”. | But as to what you say about the gloss, that the chapter Negligere should be understood of prelates, the answer made is that the gloss says this only recitatively. Hence it says these words: “others understand this chapter of prelates”. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid istorum opinio quam hic recitat glossa potest salvari secundum predicta? | Student: Can the opinion of the people the gloss here recites be saved according to the aforesaid? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod verificari potest iuxta diffinitionem quam ponit glossa 23 q. 4, c. 1, ubi dicit sic: “Aliter enim debent prelati corrigere delinquentes, et alio modo socii. Prelatus corrigit increpando et verberando, ut infra eadem questione c. Forte. Socius vero admonendo et reprobando factum eius, ut infra eadem questione c. Ecce. Simile infra eadem questione c. Duo et 24 q.3 c. Tam sacerdotes.” Ex quibus verbis patet quod duplex est correctio, una que spectat ad prelatos, alia que spectat ad socios et inferiores. Et sicut est duplex correctio, ita est duplex obviatio et duplex perturbatio perversorum, quia omnis correctio quandam obviationem et perturbationem annexam habere videtur. Qui enim corrigit alium, manifestum est quod obviat aliquo modo correcto. Qui etiam corrigit alium ipsum aliquo modo perturbat, quia vel correctus corrigitur a peccato et perturbatur de peccato commisso vel voluntate committendi, vel se non corrigit et tunc perturbatur de reprehensione corrigentis seu corripientis. | Master: The answer made is that it can be verified according to the definition which the gloss gives in 23 q. 4, c. 1, where it says: “For prelates should correct offenders in one way, and equals in another. A prelate corrects by rebuking and beating, as below in the same question c. Forte, but an equal by admonishing and reproving his deed, as below in the same question c. Ecce. Similarly below in the same question c. Duo and in 24 q. c. Tam sacerdotes.” From theses words it is clear that correction is twofold, one which concerns prelates, the other which concerns equals and inferiors. And just as correction is twofold, so is the “obstruction and disturbance of the perverse” twofold, because every correction seems to have a certain obviation and disturbance attached to it. For whoever corrects another, it is clear that he is in some way obstructing the corrected. Someone who also corrects another disturbs him in some way, because either the corrected person is corrected from sin and is disturbed from the sin committed or the intention to commit it, or he does not correct himself and is then disturbed by the corrector’s reproof. |
| Si igitur illa opinio quam recitat glossa intelligat capitulum de obviatione et perturbatione perversorum que spectat ad prelatos, sic potest verificari, non de alia. Requisiti autem a papa volente aliquid contra fidem catholicam diffinire seu determinare non debent obviare tanquam prelati nisi possent aperte probare quod papa in sua intentione perversa esset pertinax, sed debent obviare tamquam veri et sinceri fidei zelatores, papam scilicet consiliis, persuasionibus, et reprobationibus heresis quam intendit a peccato quod proponit convertendo, id est a diffinitione heretica retrahendo, etiam si oportet cum perturbatione et indignatione pape. | If, therefore, the opinion the gloss recites understands the chapter to be about the obviation and disturbance of the perverse that pertains to prelates, in that way it can be verified, but not of the other [obviation and disturbance that pertains to equals and inferiors]. But when those consulted by a pope who wishes to define or determine something against the Catholic faith, they should not obstruct it as prelates unless they could clearly prove that the pope was pertinacious in his perverse intention. But they should obstruct it as lovers of the true and pure faith, namely by turning the pope away from the sin he proposes, by advice, persuasion and disproof of the heresy he intends, that is, by holding him back from the heretical definition, even if necessary with disturbance and indignation on the part of the pope. |
| Discipulus: Secundum ista si papa publice requireret cardinales vel alios super assertione hereticali quam diffinire sollempniter seu determinare intenderet, ipsi publice deberent papam reprehendere et corripere de intentione sua perversa, quod tamen auctoritate Innocentii tertii que ponitur Extra, De hereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto, repugnare videtur. Ait enim: “Nec quisquam sue presumptionis audaciam illo defendat exemplo, quod asina legitur reprehendisse prophetam, vel quod dominus ait: ‘quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato?’cum aliud sit fratrem in se peccantem occulte corripere, quod quisque tenetur efficere secundum regulam evangelicam (in quo casu sane potest intelligi, quod Balaam fuit correptus ab asina), et aliud est fratrem suum delinquentem reprehendere manifeste, quod utique nulli licet secundum evangelicam veritatem: ‘nam qui etiam dicit fratri, fatue, reus erit gehenne ignis’.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod nulli subdito licet manifeste et publice corripere vel reprehendere superiorem suum prelatum, licet in occulto licite possit eundem corripere. Quare cardinales et alii publice requisiti a papa volente assertionem hereticalem sollempniter diffinire non debent ei publice contraire nec corripere manifeste. | Student: According to these things, if a pope were to publicly consult the cardinals or others on a heretical assertion which he intended to solemnly define or determine, they would have to publicly rebuke and rebuke the pope for his perverse intention, which, however, seems to conflict with the text of Innocent III given in Extra, De hereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto. He says: “Nor should anyone defend the audacity of his presumption by that example, that an ass is read to have rebuked the prophet [Numbers 22:28-30], or that the Lord said: ‘Which of you will convict me of sin?’ [John 8:46], since it is one thing to rebuke secretly a brother who sins against oneself, which everyone is bound to do according to the evangelical rule (in which case it can certainly be understood that Balaam was rebuked by the ass), and it is another to rebuke his delinquent brother openly, which certainly no one is permitted to do, according to the evangelical truth: ‘For whoever says to a brother, You fool, shall be in danger of hell fire’ [Matt. 5:22].” From these words it is gathered that no subject is permitted to openly and publicly correct or rebuke his superior prelate, although he may permissibly correct him in secret. Therefore cardinals and others publicly consulted by the pope who wishes to solemnly define a heretical assertion should not publicly contradict him or rebuke him openly. |
| Hiis etiam glossa super verbo ‘quod quisque tenetur’ concordare videtur, cum dicit: “ad correctionem quilibet tenetur sicut hic dicit, et hoc intellige de occulta correctione sive reprehensione, arg. 23 q. 5, c. Non putes, ut hic dicit. Sed manifeste corripere pertinet ad prelatos, vel ad illos qui habent aliquam potestatem in aliquos, 23 q. 4, c. Duo ista et c. Forte. Pater enim filium potest corripere, et prelatus subditum et occulte et manifeste. Unde Apostolus: ‘argue, obsecra, increpa’, ut 45 dist. c. 1, et 8 q. 1, c. Quid autem. Sed filius non potest publice reprehendere seu corripere patrem, nec subditus prelatum, ut hic sequitur in litera, et 21 dist., c. Nolite. Erubescit enim lex filios castigaturos parentes in Autenticis, De nuptiis, § Sed quod sancitum est, coll. 4, versus finem per unam column. Hec est canonica correctio secundum evangelicam veritatem, ut occulta ad omnes, manifesta ad prelatos, vel alios aliquam potestatem habentes pertineat.” Ex quibus videtur quod papa a nullo debet manifeste et publice corripi seu reprehendi. | The gloss on the word ‘which everyone is bound to do’ also seems to agree with these things, when it says: “Everyone is bound to [carry out] correction, as it says here, and understand this of hidden correction or reproof, argued in 23 q. 5 c. Non putes, as it says here. But to correct openly belongs to prelates or to those who have some power over someone, 23 q. 4 c. Duo ista and c. Forte. For a father can correct his son, and a prelate his subject, both secretly and openly. Whence the Apostle: ‘argue, entreat, rebuke’ [2 Tim. 4:2], as in 45 dist. c. 3 and 8 q. 1 c. Quid autem. But a son cannot publicly rebuke or correct his father, nor a subject his prelate, as follows here in the letter, and 21 dist. c. Nolite. For ‘the law will blush to authorise children to chastise their parents’ in Authentica, De nuptiis, § Sed quod sancitum est, coll. 4 (one column from the end) [see here, translated here]. This is canonical correction according to gospel truth. So that hidden [correction] pertains to all, manifest to prelates or others having some power.” From this it seems that the pope should not be openly and publicly corrected or rebuked by anyone. |
| Magister: Ad ista respondetur dupliciter. Uno modo quod Innocentius et glossa loquuntur de reprehensione seu correctione coactiva vel punitiva. Ista enim solummodo pertinet ad prelatos vel ad alios potestatem habentes. Non autem loquuntur de quacunque manifesta et publica correctione seu reprehensione. Constat enim quod qui aliquem in iudicio accusat de crimine, vel etiam in iudicio de crimine denunciat, ipsum aliquo modo manifeste et publice reprehendit, sibi crimen publice imponendo et de eo iustitiam fieri postulando, et ita reprehendit eum et corripit. Manifestum autem est quod accusatio et denunciatio in iudicio ad alios spectat quam ad prelatos eorum qui corripiuntur et reprehenduntur, et ita aliqua correctio et reprehensio manifesta et publica spectat ad alios quam ad prelatos. Sed correctio et reprehensio coactiva pertinet solummodo ad prelatos vel ad alios in alios potestatem habentes, et ideo quamvis cardinales vel alii requisiti a papa super aliqua assertione heretica diffinienda, antequam constiterit quod papa in suo proposito est pertinax, ipsum non debeant reprehendere seu corripere coactive vel aliqualiter puniendo, debent tamen de necessitate salutis assertionem suam hereticam reprobare, et ipsi efficaciter suadere ne aliquo modo talem assertionem hereticam diffinire presumat. | Master: To these answer is made in two ways. In one way, Innocent and the gloss are speaking of coercive or punitive reproof or correction. For this pertains only to prelates or to others who have power. But they are not speaking of any manifest and public correction or reproof. For it is clear that whoever accuses someone in court of a crime, or even denounces him in court of a crime, in some way manifestly and publicly reproves him, by publicly imposing the crime on him and demanding that justice be done concerning him, and thus reproves and corrects him. Now it is clear that accusation and denunciation in court pertain to others besides prelates of those who are corrected and reproved, and thus some manifest and public correction and reproof pertain to others besides prelates. But correction and coercive reproof pertain only to prelates or to others who have power over others. Therefore, although cardinals or others consulted by the pope regarding the definition of some heretical assertion, before it is established that the pope is persistent in his purpose, they should not reprove or correct him coercively or punish him in any way, nevertheless they should, of necessity for salvation, argue against his heretical assertion and effectively persuade him not to presume to define such an assertion in any way. |
| Aliter respondetur, quod predicte responsioni non obviat, quod Innocentius et glossa loquuntur in aliis criminibus quam in crimine heretice pravitatis, quia subditi prelatum suum, nisi eum voluerunt in iudicio accusare vel rite denuntiare, de alio crimine quam de crimine heresis reprehendere seu corripere manifeste non debent, quamvis possunt eum reprehendere in occulto. De crimine autem heresis possunt et debent prelatum suum reprehendere et corripere manifeste etiam extra iudicium, si crimen eius publicum et manifestum extiterit. Quod patet per exemplum de beato Paulo qui beatum Petrum publice reprehendit (supra libro 5, c. 2 probatum existit). Quod etiam expresse Clemens, ut legitur 2 q. 7, c. Sacerdotes, asserere videtur aperte cum dicit: “Sacerdotes et reliqui ministri ecclesie omnesque plebes episcopos suos diligere debent, et eorum preceptis obedire, etiam si aliter (quod absit) agant, nisi in fide erraverint.” Cui Eusebius papa eisdem causa et questione, c. Oves concordare videtur cum dicit: “Oves que suo pastori commisse sunt, eum nec reprehendere (nisi a recta fide exorbitaverit) debent nec ullatenus accusare possunt.” | Answer is made in another way (which does not contradict the first), that Innocent and the gloss speak of crimes other than the crime of heretical depravity, because subjects (unless they wish to accuse him in court or duly denounce him) should not openly reprove or correct their prelate for any crime except the crime of heresy, though they can reprove him in secret. But they can and must reprove and correct their prelate openly even outside the court for the crime of heresy, if his crime has been public and manifest. This is clear from the example of blessed Paul who publicly rebuked blessed Peter (this is proved above in Book V, chapter 2). Clement also seems to expressly assert this openly, as we read in 2 q. 7, c. Sacerdotes, when he says: “Priests and other ministers of the Church and all the common people must love their bishops and obey their precepts, even if (let it not be so) they act otherwise, unless they have erred in the faith.” With this pope Eusebius seems to agree, in the same cause and question [2 q.7], c. Oves, when he says: “The sheep that are committed to their shepherd cannot rebuke him (unless he has deviated from the faith) nor accuse him in any way.” |
| Ex quibus verbis colligitur manifeste quod si papa a fide erraverit, licet cardinalibus et aliis ipsum corripere et reprehendere manifeste. Et ita verba Innocentie et glosse superius allegata non debent intelligi cum prelati crimine pravitatis heretice sunt infecti. | From these words it is clearly gathered that if the pope has erred from the faith, it is permissible for cardinals and others to rebuke and reprove him manifestly, and thus the words of Innocent and the gloss quoted above should not be understood [as applying] when prelates are infected with the crime of heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Prosecuti sumus unam probationem qua ostenditur quod tacens qui potest prohibere diffinitionem hereticalem pape est fautor heretice pravitatis. Ideo alias allegationes, si tibi occurrunt, adducas. | Student: We have pursued one proof by which it is shown that someone who can prohibit a heretical definition by a pope but keeps silent is a supporter of heretical wickedness. Therefore, adduce other allegations, if any occur to you. |
| Magister: Hoc etiam probatur sic. Non minus peccat nec minus est fautor pravitatis heretice ille qui tacet cum potest prohibere diffinitionem hereticalem pape, quam ille est fautor iniectionis manuum violente in clericum qui talem violentiam prohibere potest et non facit. Sed qui potest prohibere violentiam talem et non prohibet est fautor iniectionis eiusdem, et eandem penam incurrit cum illo. Ergo qui tacet cum potest prohibere contradicendo, reclamando, vel reprobando diffinitionem hereticalem pape est fautor heretice pravitatis, quia est fautor hereticalis diffinitionis seu determinationis pape. | Master: It is also proved thus. Someone who keeps silent when he can prohibit a heretical definition by the pope does not sin less, nor is he a supporter of heretical wickedness less, than someone is a supporter of a violent assault on a cleric who can prevent such violence and does not do so. But someone who can prevent such violence and does not do so is a supporter of the assault and incurs the same penalty as the assailant. Therefore someone who keeps silent when he can prevent a heretical definition by the pope by contradicting, protesting, or disproving it is a supporter of heretical wickedness, because he is a supporter of a heretical definition or determination by the pope. |
| Maior, licet evidens, videatur tamen probari sic. Non minus tenentur requisiti a papa super diffinitione hereticali facienda defendere catholicam veritatem quam quicunque teneantur clericos defendere, imo multo ferventius et efficacius ac animosius defendenda est veritas orthodoxa quam quicunque clericus vel prelatus. Ergo non minus peccat ille qui tacendo non defendit fidem quam ille qui clericum non defendit. | The major, although evident, nevertheless seems to be proved as follows. Those consulted by the pope about making a heretical definition are no less bound to defend Catholic truth than anyone is bound to defend clerics; indeed, orthodox truth should be defended much more fervently, effectively, and courageously than any cleric or prelate. Therefore, someone who by remaining silent does not defend the faith sins no less than someone who does not defend a cleric. |
| Minor probatur auctoritate Innocentii tertii qui, ut habetur Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante, ait: “Ne autem solos violentie huius auctores aliquorum presumptio existimet puniendos, facientes et consentientes pari pena plectendos catholica condempnat auctoritas eos delinquentibus favere interpretans, qui, cum possint, manifesto facinore desinunt obviare.” | The minor is proved by the authority of Innocent III who, as is found in Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante, says: “But lest the presumption of some should deem that only the authors of this violence should be punished, Catholic authority condemns those who commit and those who consent to be punished with the same penalty, interpreting them as favoring the offenders, who, when they can, fail to prevent a manifest crime.” |
| Discipulus: Glossa ibidem dicit quod hoc debet intelligi de prelatis. | Student: The gloss there says that this should be understood of prelates. |
| Magister: Alii dicunt, sicut glossa recitat ibi, quod de omnibus debet intelligi. Sed quicquid sit de hoc, argumentum stare videtur. Nam nullus prelatus magis obligatur defendere clericum, presertim sibi non subditum, quam quilibet christianus teneatur defendere fidem suam cum potest. Si ergo prelatus qui clericum non defendit interpretatur fautor violentie talis, multo magis qui non defendit fidem cum potest contra diffinitionem hereticalem pape interpretandus est fautor diffinitionis huiusmodi. | Master: Others say, as the gloss there reports, that it should be understood of all. But however this may be, the argument seems to stand. For no prelate is more bound to defend a cleric, especially one not subject to him, than any Christian is bound to defend his faith when he can. If therefore a prelate who does not defend a cleric is interpreted as a supporter of such violence, much more must one who does not defend the faith when he can against the heretical definition of the pope be interpreted as a supporter of such a definition. |
| Discipulus: Si omnes rationes que in scripturis possunt fundari auctenticis induceres ad probandum quod talis tacens est fautor talis diffinitionis, et prolixe tractares, opus nimis prolixum efficeres. Ideo absque formatione rationum aliquas auctoritates ex quibus sumi valeant argumenta ad conclusionem prefatam allega. | Student: If you were to bring in all the arguments that can be based on authentic writings to prove that such person who keeps silent is a supporter of such a definition, and you were to treat it at length, you would make the work too lengthy. Therefore, without forming the arguments, allege some authorities from which arguments for the aforementioned conclusion can be taken. |
| Magister: Ad hoc valere videtur auctoritas Johannis 8i qui, ut habetur dist. 86, c. Facientis, ait: “Facientis proculdubio culpam habet, qui quod potest corrigere negligit emendare.” | Master: A text of John VIII seems to avail for this. As is found in dist. 86, c. Facientis, he says: “Whoever neglects to put right something he can correct undoubtedly has the fault of a perpetrator.” |
| Item, dist. 83 § 1 sic legitur: “mortem enim languentibus probatur infligere, qui hanc, cum possit, non excludit.” | Likewise, dist. 83 § 1 reads as follows: “For he is proved to inflict death on the weak if he does not prevent this when he can.” |
| Item, Innocentius, ut allegatum est supra, dist. 83, c. Error, ait: “Error, cui non resistitur, approbatur, et veritas, cum minime defensatur, opprimitur.” | Likewise, Innocent, as quoted above, dist. 83, c. Error, says: “An error not resisted is approved, and truth not defended is oppressed.” |
| Item, Ambrosius, ut habetur dist. 86, c. Pasce, ait: “Quisquis enim pascendo hominem servare poteris, si non paveris, occidisti.” | Likewise, Ambrose, as is found in dist. 86, c. Pasce, he says: “For whoever by feeding can save a man, if he does not feed him, has killed him.” |
| Item, Leo papa, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. 2, ait: “qui alios, cum potest, ab errore non revocat, seipsum errare demonstrat.” | Likewise, pope Leo, as found in Extra, De hereticis, c. 2, says: “Whoever does not call others back from error when he can, demonstrates that he is in error himself.” |
| Item, Johannes 8us, ut habetur 23 q. 8, c. Preterea, ait: “qui crimina, cum potest emendare, non corrigit, ipse committit.” | Likewise, John VIII, as found in 23 q. 8, c. Preterea, says: “Whoever does not correct crimes when he can amend them, commits them himself.” |
| Item, Alexander tertius, ut habetur Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut dignum, ait: “qui potuit hominem liberare a morte, et non liberavit, eum occidit.” | Likewise, Alexander III, as found in Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut dignum, he says: “Whoever could free a man from death and did not free him, killed him.” |
| Ex quibus aliisque auctoritatibus quam plurimis consimilibus argumenta sumuntur ad probandum quod quicunque reclamando, contradicendo, reprobando assertionem hereticalem pape, vel quocunque alio modo eum possunt retrahere ne diffiniat hereticam pravitatem, si tacent, sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. | From these and many other similar texts, arguments are taken to prove that whoever can hold the pope back from defining heretical wickedness by protesting, contradicting, disproving the pope’s heretical assertion, or in any other way, are supporters of heretical wickedness if they remain silent. |
| Discipulus: Quamvis una ratione apparenti nisus sis probare quod consentiens pape consulendo quod hereticam diffiniat pravitatem est fautor pravitatis eiusdem, adhuc tamen eandem conclusionem auctoritatibus, vel si malueris rationibus, nitare ostendere. Et quia idem michi videtur iudicium de consulente non tacite sed expresse et de cooperante diffinitioni hereticali pape quantum ad hoc quod si unus est fautor heretice pravitatis et alius, ideo cum uterque expresse consentiat, sufficit michi quod probes consentientem tali diffinitioni hereticali esse fautorem diffinitionis eiusdem,et hoc vel rationibus vel auctoritatibus, ut tibi placuerit. | Student: Although you have tried to prove by a plausible argument that someone who consents by advising the pope to define heretical wickedness is a supporter of the same wickedness, yet still try to show the same conclusion by authorities, or if you prefer by arguments. And because it seems to me that the judgment is the same about someone who advises not tacitly but expressly and about someone who cooperates with the pope in a heretical definition, insofar as if one is a supporter of heretical wickedness the other is also, therefore, since both expressly consent, it is enough for me that you prove that one who consents to such a heretical definition is a supporter of the same definition, and this either by arguments or by authorities, as you please. |
| Magister: Sunt nonnulli dicentes quod quia raro et pauci hactenus extiterunt summi pontifices qui diffinitiones seu determinationes hereticales sollempniter ediderint, pauce vel nulle auctoritates poterunt reperiri que de huiusmodi diffinitionibus pape hereticalibus et consentientibus eis loquuntur expresse. Multe tamen inveniuntur que, quamvis de eis non nominatim, tamen in genere faciunt mentionem. Et ideo videtur eis quod in hac materia magis rationibus demonstrativis patrum auctoritatibus communitis quam nudis auctoritatibus oportet conclusionem propositam comprobare. | Master: There are some who say that because there have rarely been, and few, supreme pontiffs who have solemnly issued heretical definitions or determinations, few or no authorities can be found that speak expressly about such heretical papal definitions and about those who consent to them. However, many are found that, although not by name, nevertheless make mention of them in general. And therefore it seems to them that in this matter it is necessary to prove the proposed conclusion more by demonstrative arguments reinforced by authorities of the fathers than by bare authorities. |
| Discipulus: Placet quod rationes adducas, sed an sint demonstrative vel sophistice post hoc opus tecum inquiram. | Student: I am pleased that you adduce arguments, but whether they are demonstrative or sophistical I will investigate with you after this work. |
| Magister: Una ratione ad probandum quod omnes consentientes sive consulendo sive cooperando diffinitioni hereticali pape sunt fautores heretice pravitatis sis contentus ad presens. Est autem hec ratio. Qui communicat alicui in crimine pravitatis heretice est fautor pravitatis eiusdem, quia communicans alicui in crimine favorem eidem quantum ad idem crimen impendit. Sed consentiens diffinitioni hereticali pape sive consulendo sive cooperando communicat eidem in crimine diffinitionis hereticalis. Ergo est fautor pravitatis eius. | Master: For one argument to prove that all those who consent, whether by advising or cooperating with the pope’s heretical definition, are supporters of heretical wickedness, be content with the present. This is the argument. Someone who shares with someone in the crime of wickedness heretically is a supporter of the same wickedness, because by sharing with someone in the crime he gives him favor in respect of that crime. But someone who consents to the heretical definition of the pope, whether by advising or cooperating, shares with him in the crime of the heretical definition. Therefore he is a supporter of his wickedness. |
| Maior videtur manifesta, cum eadem pena plectantur criminosus et communicans ei in crimine (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Nuper, et c. Si concubine). | The major seems clear, since the same penalty is imposed on the criminal and on one who shares with him in the crime (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Nuper, and c. Si concubine). |
| Minor aperte probatur auctoritate beati Augustini qui, ut habetur 23 q. 4, c. A malis, ait: “duobus modis non te maculat malus: si ei non consentias, et si redarguas. Hoc est non communicare, non consentire: communicare quippe, quando facto eius consortium voluntatis vel approbationis adiungitur. Neque ergo consentientes sitis malis, ut approbetis; neque negligentes, ut non arguatis.” Ex quibus verbis clare colligitur quod consentiens criminoso facto alicuius approbando vel volendo, et per consequens consulendo vel cooperando, communicat eidem. Et ita consentiens diffinitioni hereticali pape communicat eidem in crimine heretice pravitatis. Et hanc etiam minorem aperte insinuat beatus Augustinus in epistola contra Donatistas, et ponitur causa et questione predictis, c. Si quis a catholica, qui ait: “communio malorum non maculat aliquem participatione sacramentorum, sed consensione factorum.” Ex quibus verbis patet quod qui consentit factis malorum in crimine communicat eis. | The minor is clearly proved by an authority of blessed Augustine who, as is found in 23 q. 4, c. A malis, says: “In two ways does an evil person not stain you: if you do not consent to him, and if you refute him. This is not to share: not to consent. To share, indeed, when the partnership of will or approval is added to his deed. Neither therefore be consenting to evil, that you approve; nor negligent, that you do not refute him.” From these words it is clearly gathered that someone who consents to the criminal deed of someone by approving or willing, and consequently by advising or cooperating, shares with him. And thus someone who consents to the heretical definition of the pope shares with him in the crime of heretical wickedness. And blessed Augustine openly suggests this minor also in his letter against the Donatists, quoted in the Cause and Question aforementioned [23 q.4], c. Si quis a Catholica [see here, p.293]. He says: “Being in communion with bad persons does not defile a person through taking part [with them] in the sacraments, but by consent to their deeds.” From these words it is clear that someone who consents to the deeds of the wicked shares in their crime. |
| Capitulum 33 | Chapter 33 |
| Discipulus: Post predicta, dic qua pena consentientes diffinitioni hereticali pape sunt plectendi, et an debeant heretici iudicari. | Student: After the above, tell me what punishment should be inflicted on those who consent to the pope’s heretical definition, and whether should be adjudged heretics. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod pena hereticorum sunt plectendi. Nam consentientes et facientes pari pena sunt plectendi. Sed papa determinans et diffiniens sollempniter assertionem hereticalem est hereticus et pena hereticorum plectendus. Ergo consentientes diffinitioni sue hereticali pena hereticorum sunt plectendi. | Master: It is said that they should be punished with the punishment of heretics. For those who consent and those who do should be punished with the same punishment. But a pope who solemnly determines and defines a heretical assertion is a heretic and should be punished with the punishment of heretics. Therefore, those who consent to his heretical definition should be punished with the punishment of heretics. |
| Maior sanctorum patrum auctoritatibus evidenter asseritur. Ait enim Lucius papa, ur habetur 17 q. 4, c. Omnes: “non solum qui faciunt rei iudicantur, sed etiam qui facientibus consentiunt. Par enim pena et agentes et consentientes comprehendit.” | The major is clearly asserted in texts of the holy fathers. For pope Lucius says, in 17 q. 4, c. Omnes: “Not only those who do the deed are judged, but also those who consent to the doers. For equal punishment includes both the doers and those who consent.” |
| Item, Nicholaus papa, ut legitur 2 q. 1, c. Notum, ait: “facientem et consentientem par pena constringit.” | Likewise, pope Nicholas, as read in 2 q. 1, c. Notum, says: “The doer and the consenter are bound by equal punishment.” |
| Item, Alexander tertius, ut legitur Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. Quia quesitum, ait: “agentes et consentientes pari pena scripture testimonio puniuntur.” | Likewise, Alexander III, as read in Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati, c. Quia quesitum, says: “Those who act and those who consent are punished with equal punishment by the testimony of Scripture.” |
| Hoc etiam Gregorius, dist. 86, c. Tanta, insinuat manifeste, ubi glossa super verbo ‘excommunicatos’ ait: “argumentum quod quandoque magis puniuntur consiliarii quam facientes.” | Gregory also clearly suggests this, in dist. 86, c. Tanta, where the gloss on the word ‘excommunicatos’ says: “An argument that sometimes the advisers are punished more than the doers.” |
| Hoc etiam ex c. Gelasii pape, quod ponitur dist. 96, c. Duo, aperte elicitur, cum ait: “Innocentius papa Archadium imperatorem quia consensit ut sanctus Iohannes Chrysostomus a sua sede pelleretur excommunicavit”. Ubi dicit glossa super verbo ‘consensit’: “argumentum consentientem maiori pena astringi, quam facientem.” Cui concordat glossa 24 q. 3, c. Qui aliorum: “nota quod plus punitur consulens quam faciens.” Et glossa 23 q. 5, c. Cum homo, super verbo ‘pocius’ ait: “magis punitur consentiens quam faciens.” Ex quibus aliisque quam pluribus probatur quod consentientes et facientes pari pena sunt plectendi. | This is also clearly elicited from a chapter of pope Gelasius, which is placed in dist. 96, c. Duo, when he says: “Pope Innocentius excommunicated the emperor Arcadius because he consented that Saint John Chrysostom be driven from his see,” where the gloss on the word ‘consensit’ says: “An argument that the consenter is bound by a greater penalty than the doer.” With this the gloss on 24 q. 3, c. Qui agrees: “Note that the adviser is punished more than the doer.” And the gloss on 23 q. 5, c. Cum homo, on the word ‘pocius’ says: “The consenter is punished more than the doer.” From these and many other texts it is proved that those who consent and those who do should be punished with equal punishment. |
| Quod ex verbis beati Pauli Rom. 1 accipitur, ut videtur, cum ait: “Qui talia agunt, digni sunt morte: et non solum qui ea faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus”, ubi dicit glossa: “consentire est tacere cum possis arguere vel errorem adulando fovere.” Si autem adulando fovere est consentire, multo magis consulere et cooperari est consentire. Et per consequens consentientes et cooperantes diffinitioni hereticali pape pari pena sunt plectendi, et ita pena hereticorum feriri debent. | From the words of the blessed Paul in Rom. 1 that is taken, as it seems, when he says: “Those who do such things are worthy of death: and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those who do them,” where the gloss says: “To consent is to remain silent when you can blame them, or to encourage error by flattery.” But if to encourage by flattery is to consent, much more to advise and cooperate is to consent. And consequently, those who consent and cooperate with the pope’s heretical definition should be punished with the same penalty, and thus they should be struck with the penalty of heretics. |
| Discipulus: Ista maior ‘consentientes et facentes pari pena sunt plectendi’ non videtur vera de consentientibus tantummodo consulendo, quod Alexander tertius, ut legitur Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut, affirmare videtur cum dicit: “qui vero se asserunt animum regis inflammasse ad odium, unde homicidium fuit secutum, dure et aspere, sed non ita severe sunt puniendi”, sicut (supple) qui occidunt. Ex quibus verbis videtur quod inflammans et per consequens consentiens non ita punitur sicut faciens. | Student: That major ‘consenting and doing should be punished with equal punishment’ does not seem true of those who consent only by advising. Alexander III, as we read in Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut, seems to affirm this when he says: “Who indeed assert that they have inflamed the king’s mind to hatred, from which homicide followed, should be punished harshly and roughly, but not so severely,” as (supply) those who kill. From these words it seems that the inflamer and consequently the consenter is not punished as much as the doer. |
| Quod glossa Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati asserit manifeste, dicens: “in secundo casu, scilicet consilii, minus punitur” quam (supple) faciens, “plus tamen quam negligens.” Glosse ergo que dicunt quod consulens plus punitur quam faciens tam Alexandri tertio quam glosse ultime allegate repugnare videntur. | The gloss on Extra, De officio et potestate iudicis delegati clearly asserts this, saying: “In the second case”, namely, of the adviser, “he is punished less” than (supply) the doer, “but more than the negligent.” Therefore the glosses which say that the adviser is punished more than the doer seem to contradict both Alexander III and the gloss just cited. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod hoc regulare est quod consulens et faciens pena consimili puniuntur, ut si unus est excommunicatus, alter est excommunicatus, et si unus est suspensus similiter et alter. Quandoque tamen quantum ad aliquam circumstantiam pene consimilis, gravius punitur consulens quam faciens, et quandoque econverso. Et ideo, quantum ad conclusionem propositam, sufficienter ostenditur quod consulendo consentiens constitutioni hereticali pape pena hereticorum est plectendus. | Master: The answer made is that this is regular [i.e. true as a rule], that the adviser and the doer are punished with similar penalties, so that if one is excommunicated, the other is excommunicated, and if one is suspended so also the other. Sometimes, however, in some circumstance almost similar, the adviser is punished more severely than the doer, and sometimes vice versa. And therefore, as to the conclusion proposed, it is sufficiently shown that someone who by advising consents to a heretical constitution of the pope should be punished with the punishment of heretics. |
| Capitulum 34 | Chapter 34 |
| Discipulus: Dixisti secundum opinionem predictam quod consentientes diffinitioni hereticali pape sive consulendo sive cooperando non solum pena hereticorum sunt plectendi sed etiam heretici sunt censendi. Ideo ad propositum quod sunt heretici aliqua motiva non differas allegare. | Student: You said according to the aforementioned opinion that those who consent to a pope’s heretical definition, whether by advising or cooperating, should not only be punished with the punishment of heretics but should also be considered heretics. Therefore, do not hesitate to allege any motives for the proposition that they are heretics. |
| Magister: Quod omnes consentientes consulendo, hortando, inducendo, suadendo, suggerendo, diffinitioni hereticali pape sunt inter hereticos computandi multis modis videtur posse probari. | Master: That all who consent to a pope’s heretical definition, whether by advising, encouraging, inducing, persuading, suggesting, should be counted among heretics seems provable in many ways. |
| Primo quidem sic. Qui simili modo cum heretico est culpabilis iudicandus, crimine heresis irretitur. Hec videtur nota per se. Sed omnes consentientes diffinitioni hereticali pape sunt cum papa heretico simili modo culpabiles iudicandi. Hoc ex verbis Isidori, qui recitat et approbat, ut habetur 11 q. 3, c. Qui consentit, colligitur evidenter, cum dicit: “alius pater ait ‘si quis alterius errori consentit,… sciat se cum illo simili modo culpabilem iudicatum’.” Ergo omnes consentientes quod papa assertionem que est heretica diffiniat et determinet sunt heretici cum papa iudicandi. | First, thus. Someone who should be judged guilty in a similar way as a heretic is caught in the crime of heresy. This seems self-evident. But all who consent to a pope’s heretical definition should be judged guilty in a similar way as a heretic pope. This is evidently gathered from the words of Isidore, who recites and approves, as found in 11 q. 3, c. Qui consentit, when he says: “Another father says ‘if anyone consents to another’s error, let him know that he has been judged guilty in a similar way with him’.” Therefore, all who consent to the pope defining and determining an assertion that is heretical should be judged heretics with the pope. |
| Secundo sic. Qui alicui communicat in crimine simili crimine irretitur. Sed consentientes quod papa hereticam diffiniat pravitatem communicant pape in crimine heresis. Ergo crimine heresis involvuntur. | Second, thus. Someone who shares with someone in a crime is caught in a similar crime. But those who consent that the pope define heretical wickedness share with the pope in the crime of heresy. Therefore they are involved in the crime of heresy. |
| Tertio sic. Omnes credentes pertinaciter erroribus hereticorum sunt heretici reputandi. Omnes autem consentientes quod papa sollempniter hereticam diffiniat seu determinet pravitatem sunt credentes pertinaciter errori pape. Ergo sunt inter hereticos computandi. | Third, thus. All who pertinaciously believe the errors of heretics should be considered heretics. But all who consent that the pope solemnly define or determine heresy as wickedness are pertinaciously believing the pope’s error. Therefore they should be counted among heretics. |
| Maior ex verbis Gregorii 9i que ponuntur Extra, De hereticis, Excommunicamus 2o patenter habentur, cum dicit, ut allegatum est supra, “credentes autem eorum erroribus hereticos similiter iudicamus.” | The major is clearly established from the words of Gregory IX, Extra, De hereticis, Excommunicamus 2, when he says, as was quoted above, “But those who believe their errors we likewise judge to be heretics.” |
| Minor patet, quod enim sint credentes claret, quia qui consentit errori iudicandus est quod illi errori adhereat. Quod etiam sint pertinaciter credentes patet ex hoc quod non solum consentiunt errori quem papa diffinit, sed etiam consentiunt pertinacie sue qua sollempniter diffinit errorem. Ergo non solum communicant pape credendo errorem, sed etiam sibi communicant in pertinacia. Ergo pertinaces et per consequens heretici sunt censendi. | The minor is clear, for that they are believers is clear, because whoever consents to an error should be judged as adhering to that error. That they are also pertinacious believers is clear from the fact that they not only consent to the error the pope defines, but also consent to his pertinacity with which he solemnly defines error. Therefore they not only share with the pope in believing the error, but they also share with him in pertinacity. Therefore, they should be considered pertinacious and consequently heretics. |
| Quarto sic. Non minus est hereticus reputandus cuius consilio seu cooperatione crimen heretice pravitatis committitur, quam ille est dicendus homicida cuius consilio seu cooperatione homicidium perpetratur. Sed ille cuius consilio et, eadem ratione, cuius cooperatione homicidium perpetratur dicitur homicida. Ergo omnes consulentes et cooperantes quod papa, diffiniendo assertionem que est heretica crimen committat heretice pravitatis, sunt inter hereticos numerandi. | Fourth, thus. Someone is no less to be considered a heretic by whose advice or cooperation the crime of heretical wickedness is committed than someone should be called a murderer by whose advice or cooperation a murder is perpetrated. But a person by whose advice and, for the same reason, cooperation a murder is perpetrated is called a murderer. Therefore, all those who advise and cooperate that a pope, in defining an assertion which is heretical, commit the crime of heretical wickedness should be counted among heretics. |
| Maior non videtur probatione aliqualiter indigere. Minor auctoritate Augustini, que ponitur De penitentia, dist. 1, c. Periculose, videtur aperte posse probari, cum dicit: “Periculose se decipiunt, qui existimant, eos tantum homicidas esse, qui manibus hominem occidunt, et non potius eos, per quorum consilium, et fraudem, et exhortationem homines extinguuntur. Nam iudei Dominum nequaquam propriis manibus interfecerunt, sicut scriptum est ‘nobis non licet inteficere quemquam’. Sed tamen illis Domini mors imputatur, quia ipsi lingua eum interfecerunt, dicentes ‘crucifige, crucifige eum’.” Ex quibus verbis patet quod homicida censetur qui consilio, exhortatione, et per consequens cooperatione hominem interficit. | The major does not seem to need any proof. The minor seems to be clearly proved on the authority of Augustine, which is given in De penitentia, dist. 1, c. Periculose, when he says: “They deceive themselves dangerously who think that only those are murderers who kill a man with their hands, and not rather those by whose advice, fraud, and exhortation men are destroyed. For the Jews did not kill the Lord with their own hands, as it is written, ‘It is not permissible for us to kill anyone.’ But nevertheless the death of the Lord is imputed to them, because they themselves killed him with their tongues, saying, ‘Crucify, crucify him.’” From these words it is clear that a murderer is considered to be someone who kills a man by advice, exhortation, and consequently cooperation. |
| Cui Celestinus tertius, ut legitur Extra, De clericis pugnantibus in duello, c. Henricus, concordare videtur, cum dicit: “homicidium autem tam facto quam precepto, sive consilio aut defensione non est dubium perpetrari” Hinc glossa Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut, ait: “nota quod homicidium committitur facto, consilio, precepto, et defensione, 50 dist. c. Si quis viduam.” | Celestine III, as read in Extra, De clericis pugnantibus in duello, c. Henricus, seems to agree with him, when he says: “There is no doubt that murder is committed either by deed or by command, whether by advice or by defense.” Hence the gloss in Extra, De homicidio voluntario vel casuali, c. Sicut, says: “Note that murder is committed by deed, advice, command, and defense, 50 dist. c. Si quis viduam.” |
| Quod ex scriptura divina videtur trahere fulcimentum, cum etiam secundum scriptura sacram ille dicatur occidere cuius intuitu quis occidit. Nam ut legitur 3 Regum 21, uxor regis Achab, non ipse Achab, iussit occidi Naboth Jezrahelitam, ut vineam suam traderet regi, et tamen de mandato Dei dixit ad eum Elias propheta: “occidisti insuper et possedisti.” Patet ergo quod aliter quam manu potest quis committere homicidium, quia consilio et etiam precepto et cooperatione. Ergo et eadem ratione perfidia heresis consilio perpetratur. | This seems to draw support from divine Scripture, since also according to sacred Scripture he is said to kill in whose view one kills. For as we read in 3 Kings 21, the wife of King Ahab, not Ahab himself, ordered the killing of Naboth the Jezreelite, to give his vineyard to the king, and yet the prophet Elijah said to him [Ahab] by God’s command: “Thou hast slain, moreover also thou hast taken possession.” It is clear, therefore, that someone can commit homicide in another way than by hand, because by advice and also by command and cooperation. Therefore, and for the same reason, heresy is perpetrated by advice. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istos potest aliter dici hereticus ille qui consentit diffinitioni hereticali pape quam ille dicitur homicida cuius consilio homicidium perpetratur? | Student: Is it the case, according to these, that someone who consents to a pope’s heretical definition can be called a heretic in a different way than someone by whose counsel a murder is committed is called a murderer? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod verius et magis proprie dicitur hereticus ille qui consentit diffinitioni hereticali pape quam ille dicitur homicida cuius consilio homicidium perpetratur. Nam ille qui solum consilio committit homicidium non habet rationem complectissimam homicidii eo quod manu nequaquam interficit. Sed illi qui consentit diffinitioni hereticali pape nichil deficit de complectissima ratione heretici, quia ad complectissimam rationem heretici sufficit quod quis pertinaciter adhereat assertioni contrarie catholice veritati. Hoc autem ratio invenitur ita in consentiente dicte diffinitioni sicut in papa diffiniente, licet istam pertinaciam unus ostendat uno modo et alius alio modo, quia unus diffiniendo et alius diffinitioni consentiendo. Et ideo ita vere et ita proprie est unus reputandus hereticus sicut alius. Non autem ita est de homicidio, quia licet quis dederit consilium de homine occidendo, non propter hoc homo vere et realiter occiditur. | Master: The answer made is that a person is more truly and properly called a heretic who consents to the heretical definition of the pope than someone by whose advice a murder is committed is called a murderer. For one who commits murder only by advising it does not have the most comprehensive nature of murder, since he does not kill with his hand. But one who consents to a pope’s heretical definition lacks nothing of the most comprehensive nature of a heretic, because for the most complete nature of a heretic it is sufficient that one pertinaciously adhere to an assertion contrary to Catholic truth. Now this nature is found in the person who consents to the definition as in the person who defines, although the one shows this pertinacity in one way and the other in another, because the one by defining it and the other by consenting to the definition. And therefore the one should be considered a heretic as truly and properly as the other. But it is not so with murder, because although someone has given advice about killing a man, the man is not on this account truly and really killed. |
| Discipulus: Puto quod pro opinione predicta fortiora motiva quam sunt prescripta non est facile invenire. Ideo illa ad presens sufficiant, et dic an in aliquo casu consentientes dicte diffinitioni valeant excusari. | Student: I think that it is not easy to find stronger motives for the aforementioned opinion than those written above. Therefore, let them suffice for the present, and tell me whether those who consent to the said definition can in any case be excused. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod in nullo casu, neque per ignorantiam neque per timorem mortis, possunt excusari a peccato mortali. Quod non per ignorantiam patet per hoc quod actui tam sollempni sicut debet esse diffinitio summi pontificis circa illa que spectant ad fidem nullus debet consentire nisi sit certus certitudine sufficienti. De assertione autem hereticali nullus potest esse certus, sicut nec potest esse certus de falso. Ergo tali diffinitioni nullus consentire debet. | Master: The answer made is that in no case can they be excused from mortal sin, either through ignorance or through fear of death. That not through ignorance is clear from the fact that no one should consent to an act as solemn as the Supreme Pontiff's definition should be about things that pertain to the faith unless he is certain with sufficient certainty. But no one can be certain about a heretical assertion, just as he cannot be certain about a false one. Therefore no one should consent to such a definition. |
| Discipulus: Quid si credit se esse certum quod talis diffinitio continet catholicam veritatem, licet in rei veritate doctrine catholice adversatur. | Student: What if he believes himself to be certain that such a definition contains Catholic truth, though in truth it opposes Catholic doctrine. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non sufficit quod quis credat se esse certum. Sicut ad excusandum sarracenos et iudeos non sufficit quod credant leges et sectas suas esse bonas. Nec ad excusandum hereticos sufficit quod credant se esse certos quod non obviant catholice veritati. Quilibet ergo qui vult consentire diffinitioni pape debet esse certus quod est consona catholice veritati, et non sufficit quod credat se esse certus. Ignorantia enim iuris in hoc casu non excusat, licet forte attenuet. | Master: The answer made is that it is not enough for someone to believe himself to be certain, just as it is not enough to excuse Saracens and Jews that they believe that their laws and sects are good. Nor is it enough to excuse heretics that they believe they are certain that they do not contradict Catholic truth. Therefore, anyone who wants to agree with the pope’s definition must be certain that it is consonant with Catholic truth, and it is not enough that he believes he is certain. For ignorance of the law does not excuse in this case, although perhaps it attenuates it. |
| Discipulus: Quare non potest quis consentiens diffinitioni hereticali excusari a peccato mortali per timorem mortis? | Student: Why is it not possible for someone who agrees to the heretical definition to be excused from mortal sin by fear of death? |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod ideo minime excusatur quia pro nullo metu debet quis peccatum mortale incurrere (Extra, De hiis qui vi metusve causa fiunt, c. Sacris, et 32 q. 5, c. Ita ne), quia, ut dicit Nicholaus papa, secundum quod legitur 31 q. 2, c. Lotharius: “cum nec etiam occisores corporis sunt timendi contra iustitiam homines impellentes”, Salvatore dicente Matth. 10: “nolite timere eos, qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere.” | Master: To this the answer made is that he is not excused for the reason that no one should incur mortal sin for any fear (Extra, De hiis qui vi metusve causa fiunt, c. Sacris, and 32 q. 5, c. Ita ne). Because, as pope Nicholas says, according to what is read in 31 q. 2, c. Lotharius: “since not even those who kill the body should be feared, if they drive men against justice”; as the Savior says in Matt. 10: “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.” |
| Discipulus: Nunquid per timorem mortis potest quis consentiens diffinitioni hereticali pape excusari a perfidia heretice pravitatis? | Student: Can anyone who agrees to a pope’s heretical definition be excused from the faithlessness of heretical wickedness by fear of death? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod timor mortis et forte gravium tormentorum excusaret consentientem a perfidia heresis, sed timor perditionis honoris, rerum, et fame seu cuiuscunque rei temporalis minime excusaret quin esset inter hereticos computandus. | Master: The answer made is that the fear of death, and perhaps of grave torments, would excuse someone who agrees from the faithlessness of heresy, but the fear of loss of honor, possessions, and fame or any temporal thing would in no way excuse anyone from being counted among heretics. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid consentientes diffinitioni hereticali pape omnibus penis quibus papa hereticus sunt plectendi? | Student: Should those who consent to a pope’s heretical definition be punished with all the penalties with which a heretic pope should be punished? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sic, quia vere et proprie sunt heretici iudicandi. | Master: The answer made is yes, because they are truly and properly to be adjudged heretics. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid cardinales consentientes tali diffinitioni sunt privati potestate eligendi summum pontifice? | Student: Are cardinals who consent to such a definition deprived of the power to elect the Supreme Pontiff? |
| Magister: Dicitur quod sic, quia sunt ipso facto quod consentiunt cardinalatus dignitate de iure privati. | Master: The answer made is yes, because they are deprived by the law of the dignity of the cardinalate by the very fact that they consent. |
| Discipulus: Quid si omnes consentirent preter unum? Nunquid ille unus haberet solus potestatem eligendi summum pontificem? | Student: What if all consented except one? Would that one alone have the power to elect the Supreme Pontiff? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sic, quia ius eligendi potest in uno solo remanere , ut notat glossa Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. Gratum, et dist. 65, c. Si forte. | Master: The answer made is yes, because the right of electing can remain in one person alone, as the gloss notes Extra, De postulatione prelatorum, c. Gratum, et dist. 65, c. Si forte. |
| Discipulus: Quid si omnes electores consentirent diffinitioni tali? | Student: What if all the electors consented to such a definition? |
| Magister: Dicitur quod in hoc casu potestas eligendi summum pontificem divolvitur ad Romanos alios preter cardinales, vel ad omnes vel ad aliquos tantum. | Master: It is said that in this case the power of electing the supreme pontiff devolves to other Romans besides the cardinals, either to all or to some only. |
| Discipulus: De hac materia te interrogabo sollicite in tractatu “De gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam”. Ideo, ipsa dimissa, dic an aliquis consentiens diffinitioni hereticali pape esset eligibilis in summum pontificem. | Student: I will ask you carefully about this matter in the treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith.” Therefore, leaving it aside, tell me whether anyone who consented to a pope’s heretical definition pope would be eligible to be supreme pontiff. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non. quia nullus hereticus est eligibilis in summum pontificem. Crimen enim heresis electo in papam potest opponi, ut notat glossa Extra, De electione, c. Licet. | Master: The answer made is no, because no heretic is eligible to be supreme pontiff. For the crime of heresy can be brought against a pope elect, as the gloss on Extra, De electione, c. Licet notes. |
| Discipulus: Dic quid esset faciendum cardinalibus et aliis requisitis a papa heretico ut sue diffinitioni hereticali preberent consensum. | Student: Tell me what should be done by the cardinals and others consulted by a heretic pope to give their consent to his heretical definition. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod vel deberent de necessitate salutis publice et manifeste contradicere, reclamare, et pro viribus obviare, vel, si videretur eis expediens, possent publice vel occulte fugiendo ad loca tutiora se conferre, ut fortius et efficacius perfidie pape heretici resistere valerent. | Master: The answer made is that either they should, of necessity for salvation, publicly and openly contradict, protest, and oppose it with all their power, or, if it seemed expedient to them, they could flee publicly or secretly to safer places, so that they might be able to resist the heretic pope’s faithlessness more strongly and effectively. |
| Capitulum 35 | Chapter 35 |
| Discipulus: Quia probabiliter estimo quod si unquam aliquis papa futurus temporali vallandus potentia, et qui plurimos exaltabit ad ecclesiasticas dignitates, rabie inficietur heretica, non solum tertiam partem stellarum, sed forte mille partes ecclesie militantis trahet cauda sua in abissum heretice pravitatis, ut, iuxta sententiam beati Gregorii, tolerabilius tanta mala, si unquam evenerint, valeamus suscipere, si contra ipsa per providentie clipeum fuerimus premuniti, post predicta de consentientibus quod papa assertionem hereticalem sollempniter et manifeste diffiniat, volo de christianis diversorum statuum, officiorum, et graduum, qui doctrine pestifere pape heretici favere valerent, interrogare quamplura. Propono enim inquirere sigillatim de episcopis et prelatis, de doctoribus et magistris, de religiosis, de regibus, principibus, et publicis potestatibus, et de communitatibus, et ultimo de laicis et simplicibus nullam potestatem habentibus coactivam. | Student: Because I estimate that if ever some future pope fortified by temporal power, and who will exalt many to ecclesiastical dignities, becomes infected with heretical madness, he will drag with his tail into the abyss of heretical depravity not only “a third part of the stars” [Apoc. 8:12], but perhaps a thousand parts of the Church Militant: so that, according to the opinion of blessed Gregory, we may be able to bear such evils, if they ever occur, more tolerably, if we are protected against them by the shield of providence: after the above discussion about those who consent that the pope solemnly and clearly define a heretical assertion, I want to ask several questions about Christians of different states, offices, and degrees who might favor the pestilent doctrine of a heretic pope. For I propose to inquire individually about bishops and prelates, about doctors and teachers, about religious, about kings, rulers, and public powers, and about communities, and finally about laymen and simple people who have no coercive power. |
| Incipiendo ergo ab episcopis et prelatis, quorum nomine etiam patriarchas et archiepiscopos ac abbates et alios maiores prelatos comprehendo, peto primo ut disseras an episcopi et prelati publicantes et divulgantes per se vel per alios doctrinam erroneam pape heretici sint fautores pravitatis heretice reputandi. | Beginning therefore with bishops and prelates, by whose name I also include patriarchs and archbishops and abbots and other major prelates, I ask first that you discuss whether bishops and prelates who publish and spread, themselves or through others, an erroneous doctrine of a heretic pope should be considered supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Magister: Circa hoc possunt esse diverse sententie. Una, quod scientes doctrinam pape veritati catholice obviare, si eam per se vel per alios publicant et divulgant sunt fautores heretice pravitatis et heretici iudicandi. Si autem nesciunt eam veritati repugnare catholice, non sunt fautores heretice pravitatis nec inter hereticos numerandi. | Master: There can be different opinions about this. One, [1] that if they publish and spread the pope’s doctrine themselves or through others knowing that it is contrary to Catholic truth, they are supporters of heresy and should be judged heretics, but [2] if they do not know that it is contrary to Catholic truth, they are not supporters of heresy and should not be counted among heretics. |
| Primum probatur sic. Illi sunt fautores heretice pravitatis qui scienter heretice pravitati consentiunt, non solum tacendo sed etiam divulgando, et, ut teneatur, doceatur, et etiam defendatur, opem dando. Tales autem sunt episcopi et prelati qui doctrinam predictam pape heretici publicant et divulgant. Ergo sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. | The first is proved as follows. They are supporters of heresy who knowingly consent to heresy, not only by remaining silent but also by spreading it and giving aid so that it may be held, taught, and even defended. Such are the bishops and prelates who publish and spread a pope’s heretical doctrine. Therefore they are supporters of heresy. |
| Discipulus: Nunquid secundum istam opinionem tales censendi sunt heretici? | Student: According to this opinion, are such people to be considered heretics? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, quia in rei veritate heretice pravitati favent, dando opem et operam ut heretica pravitas doceatur et teneatur. Tamen non sunt heretici, quia corde non credunt doctrinam quam publicant esse veram. | Master: The answer made is that they are supporters of heretical wickedness, because in reality they favor heretical wickedness, giving aid and assistance so that heretical wickedness is taught and maintained. However, they are not heretics, because in their hearts they do not believe that the doctrine they publish is true. |
| Discipulus: Quomodo probant secundum? | Student: How do they prove the second? |
| Magister: Probant hoc modo. Omnes fautores heretice pravitatis peccant mortaliter, quia fautoria heresis, cum puniatur gravi pena, puta pena excommunicationis, est peccatum mortale. Qui autem ignorant doctrinam pape esse hereticam, et eam publicant et divulgant per se et per alios, non peccant mortaliter. Ergo non sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. | Master: They prove it as follows. All supporters of heretical wickedness sin mortally, because supporting heresy, when punished by a grave penalty, such as the penalty of excommunication, is a mortal sin. But those who are ignorant that the pope’s doctrine is heretical, and publish and spread it themselves and through others, do not sin mortally. Therefore they are not supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Maior videtur manifesta. Minor probatur sic. Qui preceptum superioris implet quando tenetur non peccat mortaliter. Sed quando nescitur an preceptum superioris sit iustum vel licitum, obediendum est precepto superioris, teste Augustino, qui, scribens contra Manicheos, ut legitur 23 q. 1 c. Quid culpatur, ait: "vir iustus, si forte sub rege homine etiam sacrilego militet, recte potest illo iubente bellare, si vice pacis ordinem servans, quod sibi iubetur vel non esse contra Dei preceptum, certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est, ita ut fortasse reum faciat regem iniquitas imperandi, innocentem autem militem ostendat ordo serviendi.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod obediens precepto superioris, quando non est certum preceptum eius esse contra preceptum Dei, non peccat. Qui ergo publicat et divulgat doctrinam pape quam nescit esse contra catholicam veritatem, non peccat, et per consequens non est fautor heretice pravitatis. | The major seems manifest. The minor is proved thus. Someone who fulfills the precept of his superior when he is obliged to do so does not sin mortally. But when it is not known whether the command of a superior is just or permissible, one must obey the command of the superior, as Augustine testifies. Writing against the Manichaeans, as we read in 23 q. 1 c. Quid culpatur [Contra Faustum xxii.75], he says: “A just man, if perhaps he serves under a king, even a sacrilegious man, can rightly fight at his command, if, instead of keeping the order of peace, [Augustine’s text: "serving the order of civic peace"] either it is certain that what he is commanded to do is not against God’s precept, or it is not certain whether it is, so that the injustice of the command perhaps makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent.” From these words it is concluded that someone who obeys the command of a superior, when it is not certain that his command is against the command of God, does not sin. Therefore, someone who publishes and spreads the doctrine of the pope which he does not know to be against the Catholic truth, does not sin, and consequently is not a supporter of heretical wickedness. |
| Capitulum 36 | Chapter 36 |
| Discipulus: Aliam sententiam tracta. | Student: Deal with another opinion. |
| Magister: Alia sententia est quod omnes episcopi et prelati publicantes et divulgantes sollempniter coram sibi subiectis doctrinam erroneam pape heretici tanquam catholicam et tenendam, sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, sive sciant eam esse erroneam sive ignorent. Hoc per rationem pro prima parte superioris sententie factam videtur aperte probari. Nam qui consentit dando opem et operam ut hereticalis doctrina tanquam catholica doceatur et teneatur est fautor heretice pravitatis .Huiusmodi sunt episcopi et prelati qui per se vel per alios doctrinam erroneam pape heretici tanquam catholicam publicant et divulgant. Ergo sunt aperti fautores heretice pravitatis. | Master: Another opinion is that all bishops and prelates who solemnly publish and spread among their subjects a heretic pope’s erroneous doctrine as Catholic and to be held are supporters of heretical wickedness, whether they know it to be erroneous or not. This seems to be clearly proved by the argument given for the first part of the above opinion [Reference unclear. Maybe here, or here]. For someone who consents by giving aid and assistance that a heretical doctrine be taught and held as Catholic is a supporter of heretical wickedness. Such are bishops and prelates who, themselves or through others, publish and spread a heretic pope’s erroneous doctrine as Catholic. Therefore they are open supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Minor est evidens. Maior testimonio Pii pape ostenditur, qui, ut legitur dist. 83 c. Quid enim prodest, ait: "Quid enim prodest illi suo errori non pollui, qui consensum prestat erranti?", quasi diceret "nichil.” Ergo nichil prodest ut excusetur a fautoria heresis ille qui consentit dando opem et operam ut error pape tanquam catholicus divulgetur. | The minor is evident. The major is shown by the testimony of pope Pius, who, as we read in dist. 83 c. Quid enim prodest, says: “What does it profit him not to be polluted with his error, if he gives consent to the person erring?” as if to say “nothing.” Therefore nothing excuses someone of favouring heresy if he consents by giving aid and assistance that the error of the pope be spread as Catholic. |
| Secundo sic. Minus peccare videtur qui non resistit errori, quam qui errorem tanquam catholicum publicat et divulgat. Sed qui non resistit errori censetur ipsum approbare, secundum quod per plures auctoritates quarum alique allegate sunt supra aperte probatur. Ergo multo fortius qui errorem publicat et divulgat tanquam catholicum eundem approbare dinoscitur. Qui autem approbat errorem fautor erroris existit. Ergo episcopi et prelati publicantes et divulgantes doctrinam erroneam pape heretici eiusdem doctrine hereticalis sunt fautores. | Second, thus. It seems that someone who does not resist error sins less than someone who publishes and disseminates error as Catholic. But someone who does not resist error is considered to approve of it, as is clearly proved by many authorities, some of which were cited above. Therefore, much more strongly, someone is known to approve of error who publishes and disseminates error as Catholic. But someone who approves error is a supporter of error. Therefore, bishops and prelates who publish and disseminate the erroneous doctrine of a heretic pope are supporters of the same heretical doctrine. |
| Tertio sic. Qui aliis offendicula erroris preparat est fautor erroris. Sed qui doctrinam pape erroneam publicat et divulgat preparat audientibus offendicula erroris. Ergo fautor erroris est censendus. | Third, thus. Someone who prepares for others stumbling blocks of error is a supporter of error. But someone who publishes and disseminates an pope’s erroneous doctrine prepares stumbling blocks of error for those who hear him. Therefore, he should be considered a supporter of error. |
| Quarto sic. Ille qui doctrinam novam hereticalem pape tanquam catholicam publicat et divulgat, sequitur opiniones falsas et novas. Qui autem sequitur opiniones falsas et novas, non solum fautor heresum sed etiam hereticus est censendus, teste Augustino, qui, ut legitur 24 q. 3 c. Hereticus, ait: "Hereticus est qui alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime glorie principatusque sui gratia novas ac falsas opiniones vel gignit vel sequitur.” Ergo episcopi et prelati, presertim si, ut aliquod commodum consequantur a papa vel vitent incommodum, opiniones falsas et novas pape publicant et divulgant, non solum fautores sed etiam heretici sunt censendi. | Fourth, thus. Someone who publishes and disseminates a new heretical doctrine of the pope as Catholic follows false and new opinions. But someone who follows false and new opinions should be considered not only a supporter of heresies but also a heretic, according to Augustine, who, as we read in 24 q. 3 c. Hereticus, says: “A heretic is one who creates or follows new and false opinions for the sake of some temporal advantage, and especially for the sake of his own glory and rulership.” Therefore bishops and prelates, especially if, in order to obtain some advantage from the pope or avoid an inconvenience, they publish and spread false and new opinions to the pope, should be considered not only supporters but also heretics. |
| Quinto sic. Qui aliis est causa et occasio favendi et adherendi pertinaciter heretice pravitati videtur esse fautor pravitatis eiusdem, et sibi imputari debet. Sed episcopi et prelati publicantes et divulgantes doctrinam erroneam pape heretici sunt aliis causa et occasio favendi et pertinaciter adherendi eidem doctrine erronee. Ergo taliter publicantes sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, et si alii audientes eidem faverint et pertinaciter adherere presumpserint, publicantibus et divulgantibus imputari debet. | Fifth, thus. Someone who is the cause and occasion for others to favor and adhere pertinaciously to heretical wickedness seems to be a supporter of the same wickedness, and it must be imputed to him. But bishops and prelates who publish and spread an heretic pope’s erroneous doctrine are the cause and occasion for others to favor and adhere pertinaciously to that erroneous doctrine. Therefore those who publish in this way are supporters of heretical wickedness, and if others, hearing it, favor it and presume to adhere to it pertinaciously, it should be imputed to those who publish and spread it. |
| Maior patet, quia "ita punitur qui causam prestat sicut et ipse faciens", sicut notat glossa Extra, De homicidio, c. Suscepimus. Quod etiam ex aliis sacris canonibus elicitur evidenter. Quemadmodum enim qui causam dampni vel occasionem dat, dampnum dedisse videtur (Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, c. ultimo), ita qui causam aut occasionem peccati dat, peccare videtur. Qui ergo causam et occasionem favendi et adherendi doctrine erronee dat, peccat mortaliter. Tale autem peccatum videtur ad fautoriam vel crimen heresis debere reduci, ergo talis est fautor heresis vel hereticus reputandus. | The major is clear, because “someone who presents the cause is punished in the same way as he is punished himself”, as the gloss notes, Extra De homicidio, c. Suscepimus. This is also clearly elicited from other sacred canons. For just as someone who gives the cause or occasion of harm seems to have caused the harm (Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, last chapter), so someone who gives the cause or occasion of sin seems to sin. Therefore someone who gives the cause and occasion of favoring and adhering to an erroneous doctrine sins mortally. It seems, however, that such a sin should be led back to support or to the crime of heresy, therefore such a person should be considered a supporter of heresy or a heretic. |
| Discipulus: Videtur quod hec ratio non procedit. Nam secundum Augustinum, ut legitur 23 q. 5 c. De occidendis, sepe bonum et licitum potest esse occasio mali, et tamen tale malum habenti aut facienti bonum ex quo provenit imputari non debet. Ergo quamvis ex promulgatione et publicatione doctrine pape audientes faveant et adhereant pertinaciter eidem doctrine erronee, publicantibus imputari non debet. Aliter enim sequeretur quod nullus deberet aliquam doctrinam erroneam coram aliis ad improbandum legere vel etiam recitare, quia ex tali recitatione posset contingere quod aliqui audientes qui doctrinam huiusmodi nunquam ante audierant, favere eidem inciperent et pertinaciter adherere. | Disciple: It seems that this argument does not succeed. For according to Augustine, as we read in 23 q. 5 c. De occidendis, often a good and lawful thing can be an occasion for evil, and yet such evil should not be imputed to the person who has the good thing or does the good deed from which it comes. Therefore, although those who hear the promulgation and publication of the pope's doctrine may favor and adhere obstinately to that erroneous doctrine, that should not be imputed to those who publish it. For otherwise it would follow that no one should read or even recite any erroneous doctrine before others in order to disprove it, because from such recitation it could happen that some listeners who had never heard that doctrine before would begin to favor it and adhere to it pertinaciously. |
| Magister: Ista responsio faciliter, ut nonnullis apparet, refellitur. Nam, sicut ex dictis maiorum elicitur, si quis dat operam rei licite et diligentiam debitam adhibet, ei minime imputatur si aliquid mali inde acciderit. Et in hoc casu loquitur Augustinus in predicto capitulo, dicens: "absit, ut ea, que propter bonum ac licitum facimus aut habemus, si quid per hoc preter nostram voluntatem cuiquam mali acciderit, nobis imputetur". Si vero aliquis dat operam rei licite [illicite We] et debitam diligentiam non adhibet, si aliquid mali inde acciderit, sibi est merito imputandum (Extra, De homicidio, c. Presbyterum, et c. Continebatur). Et ex pluribus aliis sacris canonibus elicitur evidenter. | Master: This response is easily refuted, as it seems to some. For, as is evident from the sayings of the elders, if someone gives effort to a matter lawfully and exercises due diligence, if any evil occurs as a result it is not imputed to him. Augustine speaks [here, chapter 5] regarding this case in the aforementioned chapter, saying: “God forbid that it be imputed to us if, without our will, something bad happens to someone from things we do or have for a good or licit [purpose].” But if someone gives effort to a matter illicitly and does not exercise due diligence, if any evil results from it, it should be be deservedly imputed to him (Extra, De homicidio, c. Presbyterum, et c. Continebatur). And it is evidently elicited from many other sacred canons. |
| Cum igitur qui doctrinam erroneam pape heretici tanquam catholicam publicat et divulgat det operam rei illicite et diligentiam debitam nequaquam adhibeat, si ex tali publicatione vel divulgatione aliquis faverit vel pertinaciter adheserit doctrine erronee pape heretici, publicanti et divulganti non immerito imputatur. Secus autem est de illo qui publicat vel legit ipsam et improbat, quia non dat operam rei illicite. Et ideo, si aliqui audientes ex malitia propria eidem doctrine erronee faverint vel pertinaciter adheserint, publicanti et divulganti imputari non debet. | Since therefore whoever publishes and disseminates as Catholic the erroneous doctrine of a heretic pope gives effort to the matter unlawfully and does not exercise due diligence at all, if by such publication or dissemination anyone favors or pertinaciously adheres to the heretic pope’s erroneous doctrine, it is not undeservedly imputed to the publisher and disseminator. But it is otherwise with him who publishes or reads it and disproves it, because he does not give effort to the matter unlawfully. And therefore, if some listeners, out of their own malice, erroneously favor or pertinaciouly adhere to that doctrine, it should not be imputed to the publisher and disseminator. |
| Discipulus: Dic quomodo secundum istam sententiam ad rationem in contrarium factam in precedenti capitulo respondetur. | Student: Tell me how, according to this opinion, the argument given to the contrary in the previous chapter is answered. |
| Magister: Ad illam rationem respondetur quod, quando quis implet preceptum superioris de quo non tenetur scire antequam impleat quod est contra preceptum Dei, non peccat implendo. Si autem tenetur scire quod est contra preceptum Dei, peccat implendo, licet nesciat preceptum esse contra preceptum Dei, quia, quantum ad ilud quod quis tenetur scire, ignorantia non excusat. | Master: The answer made to that argument is that when someone fulfills a commandment of a superior about which he is not bound to know before fulfilling it that it is contrary to the commandment of God, he does not sin by fulfilling it. But if he is bound to know what is contrary to the commandment of God, he sins by fulfilling it, even though he does not know that the commandment is contrary to the commandment of God, because, as regards something a person is bound to know, ignorance does not excuse. |
| Prelati autem et episcopi, antequam publicent et divulgent diffinitionem pape, tenentur scire an sit consona vel dissona catholice veritati, nec antequam sciant debent diffinitionem pape aliqualiter publicare tanquam catholicam. Circa enim publicationem auctenticam et solempnem eorum que ad fidem spectant est cautela diligentissima adhibenda, quia, si erratur in fide, nullum bonum, etiam mors pro nomine Christi suscepta, potest proficere ad salutem, et ideo nullus circa causam cuiuscunque maiorem debet adhibere cautelam quam circa ea que ad fidem spectant. Cum ergo nullus episcopus vel prelatus debeat quemquam subditum suum de crimine dampnare antequam diligenter inquisierit veritatem, multo magis nullam doctrinam debet solempniter publicare tanquam catholicam antequam aperte cognoverit quod est consona catholice veritati. | But prelates and bishops, before they publish and disseminate the definition of a pope, are bound to know whether it is consonant or dissonant with Catholic truth, and before they know it they should not publish the definition of the pope as Catholic. For about the authentic and solemn publication of things that pertain to faith, the most diligent caution must be exercised, because, if one errs in faith, no good, not even death undertaken for the name of Christ, can advance salvation, and therefore no one should exercise greater caution about any cause than about those things that pertain to faith. Since, therefore, no bishop or prelate should condemn any of his subjects for a crime before he has diligently investigated the truth, much more should he solemnly publish no doctrine as Catholic before he has openly known that it is consonant with Catholic truth. |
| Discipulus: Ad episcopos et prelatos non pertinet examinare doctrinam pape sibi sub bulla transmissam, sed tantummodo iuxta mandatum pape eam debent coram subditis publicare. | Student: It is not for bishops and prelates to examine the doctrine transmitted to them by the pope under a bull, but they must only publish it among their subjects according to the pope’s mandate. |
| Magister: Videtur nonnullis quod hic omnino a veritatis recedis. Nam secundum sacros canones in rebus maioribus est maior inquisitio et examinatio facienda (7 q. 2 c. ult.). Episcopi autem et prelati, recipientes mandatum pape super provisionibus clericorum et aliis rebus multo minoribus quam sit catholica fides, bullas sibi missas licite examinant diligenter. | Master: It seems to some that here you are completely departing from the truth. For according to the sacred canons, in greater matters a greater investigation and examination should be made (7 q. 2 c. ult). But bishops and prelates, receiving a mandate from the pope over the provisions of clerics and other matters much less important than the Catholic faith, permissibly examine diligently the bulls sent to them. |
| Quod eis esse licitum Alexander tertius asserit manifeste, qui, ut habetur Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, ait: "Si quando aliqua tue fraternitati dirigimus, que animum tuum exasperare videntur, turbari non debes", et infra: "qualitatem negotii, pro quo tibi scribitur, diligenter considerans, aut mandatum nostrum reverenter adimpleas, aut per literas tuas quare adimplere non possis rationabilem causam pretendas.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod licet recipienti mandatum pape qualitatem negotii pro quo scribitur examinare et discutere diligenter. Igitur multo magis, si papa scribit aliquid quod tangit fidem, scripturam suam examinare et discutere diligenter oportet, et, si inveniatur in ea aliquid fidei obvians orthodoxe, est nullatenus publicanda. | That this was permissible for them is clearly asserted by Alexander III, who, as is stated in Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, he says: “If when we address something to your brotherhood that seems to irritate your mind, you should not be disturbed”, and below: “considering diligently the nature of the matter for which it is written to you, either reverently fulfill our mandate, or through your letters provide a reasonable cause why you are unable to fulfill it.” From these words it is gathered that it is permissible for the recipient of a mandate of the pope to examine and analyse diligently the nature of the matter for which it is written. Therefore, much more so, if the pope writes something that touches on faith, his writing must be examined and analysed diligently, and, if anything is found in it that contradicts the orthodox faith, it must not be published. |
| Discipulus: Forte episcopi et prelati non sunt in divina scriptura excellenter instructi, quare ad eos profunda scripture scrutari non spectat, et ita non debent doctrinam pape discutere. | Student: Perhaps bishops and prelates are not excellently instructed in divine Scripture, and therefore it is not for them to search deeply into [the pope’s] writing, and so they should not analyse the teaching of the pope. |
| Magister: Dicunt nonnulli quod hoc est principium periclitationis fidei in populo christiano constituere episcopos et prelatos scripturarum divinarum ignaros, quia, iuxta sententiam Salvatoris, si cecus ceco "ducatum prestet, ambo in foveam cadunt.” | Master: Some say that the appointment of bishops and prelates ignorant of divine Scripture is the source of danger of faith in the Christian people, because, according to the Savior's opinion, if the blind “lead the blind, both will fall into the pit.” |
| Discipulus: De episcopis et prelatis non habentibus sacrarum peritiam literarum in tractatu “De gestis circa fidem altercantium orthodoxam” aliqua indagare studebo. Nunc vero, quomodo secundum istam sententiam ad auctoritatem Augustini respondere contingat, expone. | Student: I will study bishops and prelates who do not have expertise in sacred literature in the treatise “On the deeds of those disputing about orthodox faith”. Now, explain how one might respond to Augustine's text according to this opinion. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod Augustinus loquitur de militante sub rege sacrilego quando non tenetur scire an preceptum regis sit contra preceptum Dei. Si vero miles ignorat preceptum regis esse contra preceptum Dei, et tamen tenetur scire, obediendo peccat. Nam si rex preciperet militi, dicens "interfice istum quia colit Deum", miles interficiendo peccaret, quia scire tenetur quod nullus debet interfici propter hoc quod colit Deum. | Master: It is said that Augustine speaks of a soldier serving under a sacrilegious king when he is not bound to know whether the king's command is against the command of God. But if a soldier does not know that the king's command is against the command of God, and yet is bound to know, he sins by obeying. For if the king were to order a soldier, saying “kill this man because he worships God,” the soldier would sin by killing him, because he is bound to know that no one should be killed because he worships God. |
| Capitulum 37 | Chapter 37 |
| Discipulus: Contingitne aliter respondere ad interrogationem meam supra c. 35 propositam? | Student: Is it possible to answer my question proposed above in Chapter 35 in a different way? |
| Magister: Una est sententia que inter predictas sententias aliquo modo mediare videtur, quia distinguit de doctrina erronea papae heretici. | Master: There is an opinion that seems in a way to mediate between the aforementioned opinions [here and here], because it makes a distinction about the erroneous doctrine of the heretic pope. |
| Aut enim assertio est explicite condempnata, utpote quia sub propria forma est dampnata vel quia est contraria alicui veritati explicite approbate, qualis est omnia veritas in scriptura divina et determinationibus ecclesie assertive contenta, aut assertio pape heretici est solummodo implicite condempnata, qualis est omnis error qui quocunque scripture divine vel determinationibus ecclesie universalis repugnat, cuiusmodi sunt multe opiniones theologorum, (quia circa ea que ad fidem spectant contrarie opinantur, quare constat quod una contrariarum illarum est erronea et heresis saltem implicite condempnata, quia veritas contradictoria est saltem implicite approbata, eo quod omnis veritas catholica quantumcunque latens et multis incognita est per universalem ecclesiam in genere et implicite approbata.) | For either the assertion is explicitly condemned, for example because it is condemned under its own form, or because it is contrary to some truth explicitly approved such as all truth assertively contained in divine Scripture and the determinations of the Church; or else the assertion of the heretic pope is only implicitly condemned, such as every error that is repugnant to any divine Scripture or the determinations of the universal Church, as is true of many opinions of theologians. (Because they hold contrary opinions about things that pertain to faith. It is clear that one of those contrary opinions is erroneous and at least implicitly condemned as heresy, because the contradictory truth is at least implicitly approved, because all Catholic truth, however much hidden and unknown to many, is generally and implicitly approved by the universal Church.) |
| Si assertio pape erronea est solummodo implicite condempnata, divulgantes eam et publicantes tamquam catholicam, obediendo mandato pape qui mandaret quod talis assertio ab omnibus tanquam catholica teneatur, non sunt heretici nec fautores heretice pravitatis nec peccant mortaliter, quia ex quo nec sciunt nec tenentur scire quod talis assertio est erronea non peccant mortaliter eam taliter publicando, quemadmodum theologi non peccant mortaliter docendo et tenendo assertiones que in rei veritate sunt erronee et hereticales, quas tamen non sciunt nec tenentur scire esse erroneas. | If the pope’s erroneous assertion is only implicitly condemned, those who spread and publish it as Catholic, obeying the pope’s command that such an assertion be held by all as Catholic, are not heretics nor supporters of heretical wickedness, nor do they sin mortally, because, since they neither know nor are bound to know that such an assertion is erroneous, they do not sin mortally by publishing it in such a way, just as theologians do not sin mortally by teaching and holding assertions that in reality are erroneous and heretical that they nevertheless do not know nor are bound to know are erroneous. |
| Si vero assertio pape erronea est explicite condempnata quia est contradictoria alicuius assertionis que in scriptura divina vel determinatione ecclesie sub forma propria continetur, vel patenter omnibus sequitur ex assertione tali, episcopi et prelati, talem assertionem pape solempniter divulgantes tanquam catholicam sunt fautores heretice pravitatis reputandi, quia nullam assertionem debent solempniter publicare antequam eis constiterit quod non est heresis explicite condempnata, et si hoc non possunt facile scire per seipsos, debent consulere peritos. | But if the erroneous assertion of the pope is explicitly condemned because it contradicts some assertion that is contained in divine Scripture or in a determination of the church under its own form, or follows in a way that is clear to everyone from such an assertion, bishops and prelates who solemnly publish such an assertion of the pope as Catholic should be considered supporters of heretical wickedness, because they should not solemnly publish any assertion until they are certain that it is not a heresy explicitly condemned, and if they cannot easily know this for themselves, they should consult experts. |
| Discipulus: Quid si periti dicunt eis quod talis assertio pape non est explicite condempnata, sed est consona veritati? | Student: What if the experts tell them that such an assertion by the pope is not explicitly condemned, but is in harmony with the truth? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod non debet eis sufficere quod periti hoc eis dicant solo verbo, sed debent petere ab eisdem peritis ut eis evidenter ostendant quod sit consona catholici veritati. Quod si periti hoc facere non potuerint, debent supersedere, et assertionem pape erroneam explicite condempnatam nullatenus publicare. Quemadmodum episcopi et prelati, quando considerant vel etiam dubitant quod mandatum pape est eis preiudiciale, ipsum differunt adimplere, et quod adimplere minime teneantur multis et fortibus allegationibus probare nituntur. Ergo multo fortius, si non vident quomodo assertio pape est consona catholica veritati, mandatum pape super tali publicatione facienda implere non debent, sed debent ostendere causas quare tale mandatum implere non possunt. Si enim episcopi et prelati, recipientes mandatum pape quod eorum honori vel commodo temporali obviare videtur, ipsum non implent, sed cum maxima diligentia allegare conantur quod tale mandatum est preiudiciale et ideo adimplere non debent, cum vero recipiunt mandatum pape super aliquo quod ad fidem spectat, et non curant studiosissime per se et per alios indagare an tale mandatum deroget quoquo modo honori divino et fidei orthodoxe, sed statim absque omni deliberatione, vel absque deliberatione sufficienti, precipitanter assertionem erroneam tanquam catholicam publicant et divulgant, ostendunt aperte quod que sua sunt querunt, non que Iesu Christi. Ne enim per mandatum pape aliquid eorum divitiis vel honori depereat diligentissime investigant, sed an per mandatum pape fides catholica destruatur penitus non attendunt. Et ideo, si diligentiam debitam non adhibent et publicant sollempniter hereticam pravitatem, fautores pravitatis heretice sunt censendi. | Master: The answer made is that it should not be enough for them that the experts tell them this only in a word, but they should ask the experts to show them clearly that it is in harmony with Catholic truth. But if the experts are unable to do this, they should refrain, and not publish the pope’s erroneous assertion that has been explicitly condemned. Just as bishops and prelates, when they consider that, or even doubt whether, a mandate from the pope is prejudicial to them, postpone fulfilling it, and strive to prove with many and strong allegations that they are not bound to fulfill it. Therefore, much more strongly, if they do not see how the pope’s assertion is in harmony with Catholic truth, they should not fulfill the mandate of the pope about making such a publication, but should show reasons why they cannot fulfill such a mandate. For if bishops and prelates, receiving a mandate from the pope that seems to conflict with their honor or temporal advantage, do not fulfill it, but with the greatest diligence try to allege that such a mandate is prejudicial and therefore they should not fulfill it, but when they receive a mandate from the pope about something that concerns the faith, and do not care to investigate most diligently by themselves and through others whether such a mandate derogates in any way from divine honor and the orthodox faith, but immediately, without any deliberation, or without sufficient deliberation, they hastily publish and spread an erroneous assertion as Catholic, they show openly that they seek what is their own, not what is Jesus Christ's. For they investigate most diligently lest anything be lost to their wealth or honor by the pope’s mandate, but they do not pay any attention to whether the Catholic faith is destroyed by the pope’s mandate. And therefore, if they do not exercise due diligence, and solemnly publish heretical wickedness, they should be considered supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Non videtur licitum indagare an sententia pape super aliquo quod tangit fidem sit consona veritati, quia, si hoc esset licitum, liceret episcopis et prelatis de sententia pape super causa fidei disputare. Quod non videtur verum, tum quia secundum Nicholaum papam, ut legitur 17 q. 4 c. Nemini, nulli licet de iudicio sedis apostolice iudicare, et per consequens nemini licet de eiusdem iudicio disputare, tum quia de illius sententia in causa fidei ad quem cause fidei sunt ultimo perferende non est licitum disputare. Ille autem est papa, ergo de sententia pape disputare non licet. | Student: It does not seem permissible to inquire whether the opinion of the pope on something that touches faith is consonant with the truth, because, if this were permissible, it would be permissible for bishops and prelates to dispute about the opinion of the pope on a cause of faith. This does not seem true, both because according to pope Nicholas, as we read in 17 q. 4 c. Nemini, no one is permitted to judge about the judgment of the Apostolic See, and consequently no one is permitted to dispute about its judgment; and also because it is not permissible to dispute about the opinion in the cause of faith of the person to whom the causes of faith are ultimately to be referred: but that person is the pope; therefore it is not permissible to dispute about the opinion of the pope. |
| Magister: Ista frivola reputantur. Nam de sententiis iudiciis et literis summi pontificis tota die licite disputatur, et cum sollicitudine maxima examinantur, discutiuntur, et videntur. | Master: These [objections] are considered frivolous. For the judgments and letters of the Supreme Pontiff are lawfully debated all day long, and are examined, discussed, and looked at with the greatest solicitude. |
| Quod enim de sententia pape licite disputatur, etiam in dubium revocando an sit iuste lata, probatur. Nam de sententia que potest retractari et in melius commutari est licitum disputare. Sed sententia pape potest retractari et in melius commutari, teste Gregorio, qui, ut habetur 35 q. 9 c. Apostolice, ait: "Apostolice sedis sententia tanta semper consilii moderatione concipitur, tanta patientie maturitate decoquitur, tantaque deliberationis gravitate profertur, ut retractatione non egeat nec immutari necessarium ducat, nisi forte sit prolata sic, ut rectractari possit, vel immutanda secundum tenorem premisse conditionis existat.” Ex quibus colligitur evidenter quod apostolice sedis sententia retractari potest et etiam immutari. | For that it is permissible to debate about a papal sentence, and also call into doubt whether it is made justly, is proved. For it is lawful to debate about a sentence that can be reconsidered and changed for the better. But a papal sentence can be reconsidered and changed for the better, according to Gregory, who, as is found in 35 q. 9 c. Apostolice, says: “A sentence of the Apostolic See is always conceived with such moderation of counsel, drafted with such maturity of patience, and pronounced with such gravity of deliberation, that it does not need reconsidertion nor does necessity lead it to be changed, unless perhaps it has been pronounced in such a way that it can be retracted, or it must be changed according to change of a premised condition.” From which it is evidently concluded that a sentence of the Apostolic See can be reconsidered and even changed. |
| cui etiam Innocentius papa (causa et questione predictis, c. Veniam) concordare videtur, dicens: "Veniam nunc ad Maximum, Photimum quasi ad quoddam thema, et (quod michi anxium est ac difficillimum) maiorum meorum revolvam sententias. Fuerat de illo quoquo pacto (ut ipsi etiam commeministis) aliquid utique gravius constitutum. Verum, quoniam id per rumorem falsum, ut asseritis, subreptum huic sedi et elicitum per insidias demonstratur, quia res ad salutem reddit, veniam nos hinc intantum vobis adnitentibus post condempnationem more apostolico subrogamus, tantisque vestris assertionibus, vobisque tam bonis, tam caris non dare consensum, omnibus duris rebus durius arbitramur.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod sententia summi pontificis retractari potest. | Pope Innocent (in the aforementioned cause and question [35 q.9], c. Veniam) seems to agree, saying: “I will now come to Maximus and Photius, as if to a certain theme, and (which is very anxious and difficult for me) I will overturn the sentences of my elders. There had certainly, no matter how, been something more serious established about him (as you yourselves have also mentioned). But since it is shown that this was obtained by stealth from this see by false rumor, as you assert, and elicited by intrigue, because the matter restores to health, we hereby, in accordance with the apostolic custom, substitute a pardon for you, who are striving after condemnation, and we consider it harder than all other hard matters not to give consent to your great assertions, and to you, who are so good and so dear.” From these words it is gathered that the opinion of the supreme pontiff can be reconsidered. |
| Quod Nicholaus papa, ut habetur sequenti capitulo Sententiam, asserit manifeste, dicens: "Sententiam Romane sedis non negamus posse in melius commutari, cum aut subreptum fuerit aliquid, aut ipsa pro consideratione etatum, vel temporum, seu gravium necessitatum dispensatione quedam ordinare decrevit", et infra: (quod tamen observandum est) “quando illa, Romana videlicet ecclesia, disertissima consideratione hoc fieri delegerit.” Ex quibus colligitur quod sententia Romane sedis potest retractari et in melius commutari, et per consequens licet de tali sententia disputare. | Pope Nicholas, as is stated in the following chapter Sententiam, clearly asserts this, saying: “We do not deny that the sentence of the Roman See can be changed for the better, when either something has been done by stealth, or it has decided to order something in consideration of age, or times, or by dispensation of grave necessities”, and below: (which, however, must be observed) “when the Roman Church, with the most skilfully expressed consideration, has chosen that this be done.” From this it is concluded that the sentence of the Roman See can be reconsidered and changed for the better, and consequently it is permissible to dispute about such a sentence. |
| Quomodo etiam super literis et rescriptis summi pontificis tota die coram iudicibus disputatur et etiam litigatur nullus qui sequitur causas ignorat. Ergo licet super sententia pape disputare. | Just as also letters and rescripts of the Supreme Pontiff are debated and even litigated all day long before judges, everyone who follows cases knows. Therefore it is permissible to dispute about the sentence of the Pope. |
| Discipulus: Causa quare super rescriptis et literis summi pontificis licite disputatur est quia litere sepe per subreptionem et falsas suggestiones impetrantur, quandoque etiam papa multis ex causis decipi potest. Ideo super talibus literis disputare licet. Illa autem que emergunt circa fidem et diffiniuntur per papam, deliberatione maxima proferuntur, ideo super illis disputare non licet. | Student: The reason why it is permissible to debate about the rescripts and letters of the Supreme Pontiff is that letters are often obtained by stealth and false suggestions, and sometimes also the pope for many reasons can be deceived. Therefore, it is permissible to debate about such letters. But those that arise concerning faith and are defined by the pope are brought forward with the greatest deliberation. Therefore it is not permissible to debate about them. |
| Magister: Ex ista sententia tua putant nonnulli se demonstrative probare quod sententia pape super aliqua difficultate fidei lata est per peritos ad quorum notitiam pervenerit cum maxima diligentia et studio examinanda, et quod super ea disputare licet, et quod si inventa fuerit, disputando, contraria veritati, est penitus respuenda et omnimode reprobanda. | Master: From this opinion of yours, some think that they demonstratively prove that the opinion of the pope on some difficulty of faith was issued by experts to whose knowledge it had come as something to be examined with the greatest diligence and study, and that it is [still] permissible to debate about it; and that if it is found, in the course of debate, to be contrary to the truth, it should be completely rejected and in every way reprobated. |
| Arguitur autem sic. Eadem causa eundem habet effectum. Causa autem quare litere pape quecunque sint inspiciende diligenter ac vidende et examinande, et quare de eis disputare licet, et quare in casu eis nequaquam obedire oportet, est quia papa potest decipi. Si enim papa nullo modo posset decipi, predicta non licerent. Sed papa ita potest decipi circa ea que fidei sunt sicut circa quecunque alia. Aliter enim papa hereticari non posset, cuius oppositum supra libro quinto auctoritatibus, rationibus, et exemplis multipliciter est ostensum. Ergo litere pape que super aliqua difficultate fidei emanare noscuntur diligentissime sunt vidende et examinande, et de eis disputare licet, et si a quocunque prelato vel subdito, discipulo vel magistro, fuerint deprehense a fide recedere orthodoxa, sunt penitus respuende et efficaciter reprobande. | It is argued thus. The same cause has the same effect. But the reason why any letters of the pope should be diligently inspected and looked at and examined, and why it is permissible to debate about them, and why on occasionit is necessary not to obey them, is because a pope can be deceived. For if a pope could in no way be deceived, the aforesaid would not be permissible. But a pope can be deceived about things of faith, as he can about anything else: for otherwise a pope could not become a heretic, the opposite of which has been shown in many ways in Book V by authorities, arguments, and examples. Therefore, the letters of the pope known to emanate on some difficulty of faith should be looked at and examined most carefully, and it is permissible to dispute about them, and if they are found by anyone, prelate or subject, disciple or master, to depart from the orthodox faith, they should be utterly rejected and effectively reproved. |
| Discipulus: Quare ergo cotidie cernimus prelatos et alios de literis pape que tangunt negotia tantum ecclesiastica disputare, et omnes timent disputare de diffinitione pape super hiis que ad fidem pertinent orthodoxam? | Student: Why then do we daily see prelates and others disputing about the pope’s letters which touch only ecclesiastical matters, and all fear to dispute about the pope’s definition of things that pertain to the orthodox faith? |
| Magister: Causa multiplex assignari potest. Una tamen, et precipua, assignanda est ad presens, que est defectus zeli catholice veritatis et amor terrenarum divitiarum et honorum. Quia enim multi christiani nichil asperum, nichil difficile, nullum periculum, nullam indignationem alicuius potentis quem timent, volunt pro fide catholica sustinere, nec curant an fides proficiat vel deficiat. Ideo nolunt disputare de diffinitionibus pape, quia eius indignationem timent incurrere. Pro temporalibus autem divitiis et honoribus labores et pericula sunt parati subire, ideo quia ex disputatione de literis pape que ipsorum tangunt negotia sperant honores vel divitias adipisci, vel saltem dampnum aut periculum temporale vitare, disputare de huiusmodi literis summi pontificis non verentur. Et similiter, si de disputatione super sententia pape heretica honorem aut commodum sperarent, de ipsa disputare nullatenus formidarent. | Master: Many causes can be assigned. However, one, and the chief one, should be assigned at present, which is a lack of zeal for Catholic truth and a love of earthly riches and honors. For because many Christians are willing to endure nothing harsh, nothing difficult, no danger, no indignation of any powerful person whom they fear, for the Catholic faith, and they do not care whether the faith advances or declines, they are therefore not willing to dispute about papal definitions, because they fear incurring his indignation. But for temporal riches and honors they are ready to undergo labors and dangers. Therefore, because they hope to gain honors or riches from a dispute about papal letters that touch their own affairs, or at least to avoid temporal harm or danger, they would not be afraid to dispute about such letters of the supreme pontiff. And similarly, if they hoped for honor or advantage from a dispute about a pope’s heretical opinion, they would not be afraid to dispute about it. |
| Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam per quam probavi quod non licet alicui de sententia pape super fida catholica disputare. | Student: Tell me how to respond to the second [argument] by which I proved that it is not permissible for anyone to dispute about the pope’s opinion on the Catholic faith. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod, quamvis ad summum pontificem sint cause fidei deferende, quia tamen summus pontifex errare potest circa fidem, sententia eius super difficultate aliqua fidei christiane est studiosissime examinanda et diligentissime disputanda, et, si per disputationem vel per aliquem alium modum fuerit deprehensa a veritate deviare catholica, est penitus condempnanda et tanquam heretica reprobanda, exemplo catholicorum qui, ut colligitur ex decretis (dist. 19 c. Secundum ecclesie et § Quicquid ergo et c. Anastasius 2us), diffinitionem hereticalem Anastasii secundi sollicite inspexerunt, et an esset consona veritati catholice quesierunt attente, sive disputando sive alio modo, quam, cum invenissent contrariam fidei orthodoxe, tanquam hereticam respuerunt. Et ita constat quod de diffinitione pape antequam sciatur esse catholica est licitum disputare. | Master: The answer made is that, although causes of faith should be referred to the Supreme Pontiff, nevertheless, because a Supreme Pontiff can err about faith, his opinion on any difficulty of the Christian faith should be most studiously examined and most diligently disputed, and, if by dispute or by any other means, it is found to deviate from the Catholic truth, it should be utterly condemned and rejected as heretical, following the example of the Catholics who, as is gathered from the decrees (dist. 19 c. Secundum ecclesie and § Quicquid ergo and c. Anastasius 2us), carefully examined the heretical definition of Anastasius II, and they carefully inquired whether it was consonant with Catholic truth, whether by dispute or in some other way, and, when they found it contrary to the orthodox faith, they rejected it as heretical. And thus it is clear that it is permissible to dispute about the pope’s definition before it is known to be Catholic. |
| Discipulus: Omnes catholici absque omni inquisitione debent supponere quod diffinitio pape super fide catholica sit consona fidei orthodoxe, quia Gregorius dicit, ut allegatum est supra, "apostolice sedis sententia", precipue super hiis que spectant ad fidem, "tanta semper consilii moderatione concipitur, tanta patientie maturitate decoquitur, tantaque deliberationis gravitate profertur", ut omnino recta sit credenda. Ergo omnes debent presumere sententiam pape esse catholicam. Quare eam examinare non debent, nec de ea disputare licet. | Student: All Catholics must assume without any investigation that a papal definition on the Catholic faith is consonant with orthodox faith, because Gregory says, as was quoted above, “A sentence of the Apostolic See”, especially on those things that concern the faith, “is always conceived with such moderation of counsel, drafted with such maturity of patience, and pronounced with such gravity of deliberation”, that it should be believed to be altogether correct. Therefore, all should presume that the sentence of the pope is Catholic. Therefore they should not examine it, nor is it permissible to dispute about it. |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod Gregorius loquitur de modo qui servari debet circa sententiam apostolice sedis, et qui, ut frequenter, servatus est. Cum hoc tamen constat [stat We] quod talis modus potest omitti circa sententiam pape, quemadmodum Anastasius secundus talem modum circa suam sententiam non servavit. Et ideo, quamvis sententia pape, maxime circa fidem, tanta consilii moderatione concipi debeat, tantaque maturitate patientie decoqui, et tanta deliberationis gravitate proferri, ut, antequam contrarium evidenter appareat, presumi debeat consona veritati, quia tamen papa potest errare contra fidem, potest etiam esse proprii sensus, et prudentie ac sapientie proprie nimis inniti, ac capitositatis, precipitationis, presumptionis, et temeritatis vitio laborare, non est tam firmiter et tam certitudinaliter presumemdum pro sententia pape quin debeat diligenter examinari, discuti, et videri, et quin de ea, antequam non solummodo presumptive sed etiam evidenter constiterit quod a veritate non deviat, liceat disputare. Quemadmodum de omnibus literis pape presumendum est antequam constiterit contrarium quod eis oporteat obedire, non tamen debet ista presumptio esse tam violenta ut non liceat literas pape examinare et investigare sollicite an eis oporteat obedire. Omnes ergo sententie pape, qui contra fidem et bonos mores potest errare, examinande sunt diligentissime et probande iuxta illud Apostoli: "omnia probate", quod de illis que dubia esse possunt debet intelligi. | Master: To this the answer made is that Gregory is speaking of the method that should be observed regarding a sentence of the Apostolic See, and which, usually, is observed. However, it is consistent with this that such a method can [sometimes] be omitted regarding a sentence of the pope, just as Anastasius II did not observe such a method regarding his own sentence. And therefore, although a papal sentence, especially concerning faith, should be “conceived with such moderation of counsel, drafted with such maturity of patience, and pronounced with such gravity of deliberation”, that, before the contrary clearly appears, it should be presumed to be consonant with the truth, nevertheless, because a pope can err against the faith, can also rely too much on his own sense, prudence and wisdom, and suffer from the vice of obstinacy, precipitation, presumption, and rashness, it should not be presumed so firmly and with such certainty in favor of pope’s sentence but that it should be diligently examined, analysed, and looked at, and but that it is permissible to dispute about it until it is not only presumptively, but also evidently, established that it does not deviate from the truth. Just as it should be presumed about all letters of the pope before it is established to the contrary that it is necessary to obey them, nevertheless this presumption should not be so violent that it is not permissible to examine the letters of the pope and diligently investigate whether it is necessary to obey them. Therefore, all sentences of a pope, who can err against faith and good morals, must be examined most carefully and tested, according to the Apostle's words: “Test all things,” which must be understood of those that can be doubtful. |
| Discipulus: Contra predicta una adhuc michi occurrit obiectio. Videtur enim quod episcopi et prelati publicantes et divulgantes doctrinam pape hereticam non sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, imo etiam videtur quod hoc possunt facere absque peccato mortali. Nam minus est publicare et divulgare solummodo doctrinam hereticalem alterius quam publice predicare et docere heresim manifestam alienam vel propriam. Sed absque peccato mortali potest quis ex ignorantia vel simplicitate predicare publice et docere heresim manifestam cuius contrarium in scripturis sacris reperitur expresse, quia quantumcumque publice quis predicet vel doceat heresim manifestam, si paratus est corrigi non est hereticus, et per consequens non peccat mortaliter. Ergo multo fortius possunt episcopi et prelati publicare doctrinam pape hereticalem absque peccato mortali, et per consequens absque fautoria heretice pravitatis. | Student: One further objection against the foregoing occurs to me. For it seems that bishops and prelates who publish and spread a pope’s heretical doctrine are not supporters of heretical wickedness; indeed it even seems that they can do this without mortal sin. For it is less only to publish and spread the heretical doctrine of another than to publicly preach and teach a manifest heresy of another or of one's own. But without mortal sin, someone can, out of ignorance or simplicity, publicly preach and teach a manifest heresy, the opposite of which is expressly found in the sacred Scriptures, because no matter how publicly someone preaches or teaches a manifest heresy, if he is ready to be corrected he is not a heretic, and consequently does not sin mortally. Therefore, much more strongly, bishops and prelates can publish a pope’s heretical doctrine without mortal sin, and consequently without supporting heretical wickedness. |
| Magister: Ad hoc respondetur distinguendo, quia aut doctrina erronea pape est per ipsum sollempniter diffinita et ab eo tanquam papa determinata, aut ipse papa assertionem erroneam solummodo predicat et docet, aut tenet sed sollempniter non diffinit. | Master: An answer is made to this by distinguishing: because either the pope’s erroneous doctrine is solemnly defined by him and determined by him as pope, or the pope himself only preaches and teaches an erroneous assertion, or holds it but does not solemnly define it. |
| Iterum, aut assertio heretica pape est talis quod episcopi et prelati tenentur explicite credere contrariam veritatem, aut non tenentur explicite credere contrariam veritatem. | Again, either the heretical assertion of the pope is such that bishops and prelates are bound explicitly to believe the contrary truth, or they are not bound explicitly to believe the contrary truth. |
| Si itaque episcopi et prelati publicant et divulgant sollempniter per se vel per alios diffinitionem hereticalem pape, sunt expresse fautores heretice pravitatis. Si etiam publicant doctrinam pape hereticalem cuius contrariam veritatem tenentur credere explicite, peccant mortaliter et sunt censendi fautores heretice pravitatis. Si vero non publicant aliquam diffinitionem hereticalem pape sed aliquam assertionem eius hereticalem quam absque diffinitione sollempni pertinaciter tenet et asserit, et ipsi publicantes non tenentur explicite credere contrariam veritatem, non sunt censendi fautores heretice pravitatis, sed antea examinari debent sollicite an ex ignorantia vel simplicitate, vel pertinacia, talem assertionem predicant et divulgant, et in hoc comparantur publice predicanti et docenti. | If therefore bishops and prelates publish and spread solemnly, themselves or through others, a heretical definition of the pope, they are expressly supporters of heretical wickedness. If also they publish a heretical doctrine of the pope whose contrary truth they are bound explicitly to believe, they sin mortally and should be considered supporters of heretical wickedness. But if they do not publish any heretical definition of the pope, but some heretical assertion of his that he pertinaciously holds and asserts without a solemn definition, and they themselves who publish are not bound explicitly to believe the contrary truth, they should not be considered supporters of heretical wickedness, but they must first be carefully examined as to whether it is out of ignorance or simplicity, or out of pertinacity, that they preach and spread such assertion, and in this they are compared to someone who publicly preaches and teaches. |
| Discipulus: Quare qui publicant diffinitionem hereticalem pape sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, et publice predicantes heresim manifestam vel docentes non sunt censendi fautores heretice pravitatis nec etiam peccare mortaliter? | Student: Why are those who publish the pope’s heretical definition supporters of heretical wickedness, and those who publicly preach or teach manifest heresy should not be considered supporters of heretical wickedness nor even to be sinning mortally? |
| Magister: Huius ratio assignatur talis. Sicut maior deliberatio requiritur ad iuramentum quam ad simplicem loquelam, et ideo gravius peccat periurus quam qui simplici loquela mentitur, ita cum maiori deliberatione debet papa aliquid sollempniter diffinire quam absque tali diffinitione sollempni docere vel etiam publice predicare, et gravius peccat si assertionem contra fidem diffinit sollempniter quam si absque tali diffinitione aliquid contra fidem publice predicat vel docet. Si enim publice diffinit aliquid contra fidem, habetur pro tenente ultimata deliberatione assertionem suam contra fidem. Sed si solummodo publice predicat vel docet contra fidem, non habetur propter hoc pro tenente ultimata deliberatione assertionem suam. Et ideo est post predicationem publicam examinandus an paratus sit corrigi vel non, et si inveniatur paratus corrigi non est hereticus reputandus, si autem non est paratus corrigi pro heretico est habendus. | Master: A reason for this is given as follows. Just as greater deliberation is required for an oath than for simple speech, and therefore a perjurer sins more gravely than one who lies in simple speech, so the pope must solemnly define something with greater deliberation than [is needed when] he teaches or even preaches publicly without such a solemn definition, and he sins more gravely if he solemnly defines an assertion against the faith than if, without such a definition, he publicly preaches or teaches something against the faith. For if he publicly defines something against the faith, he is regarded as holding his assertion against the faith by final deliberation. But if he only publicly preaches or teaches against the faith, he is not regarded because of this as holding his assertion by final deliberation. And therefore after public preaching he should be examined to see whether he is ready to be corrected or not, and if he is found ready to be corrected he should not be considered a heretic, but if he is not ready to be corrected he should be held for a heretic. |
| Sicut autem papa gravius peccat aliquid diffiniendo sollempniter contra fidem, quam solummodo publice predicando vel docendo, sic gravius peccat qui sollempnem diffinitionem hereticalem pape publicat sollempniter et divulgat, quam qui eandem assertionem vel consimilem solummodo publice docet vel predicat, et ideo publicando diffinitionem hereticalem pape est fautor heretice pravitatis, sed non solummodo publice predicando vel docendo. | But just as the pope sins more gravely by solemnly defining something against the faith than by merely preaching or teaching it publicly, so someone who solemnly publishes and spreads a solemn heretical definition of the pope sins more gravely than someone who merely teaches or preaches the same or similar assertion publicly, and therefore by publishing a heretical definition to the pope he is a supporter of heretical wickedness, but not merely by publicly preaching or teaching it. |
| Discipulus: Quare non requiritur tanta deliberatio ad publice docendum vel predicandum quanta requiritur ad aliquid sollempniter diffiniendum? | Student: Why is not so much deliberation required for publicly teaching or preaching as is required for solemnly defining something? |
| Magister: Actus publice predicandi et docendi est multo communior et pluribus convenit quam aliquid sollempniter diffinire, sicut simplex loquela est actus multum communior quam iuratio, et ideo, sicut non requiritur tanta deliberatio ad simplicem loquelam sicut ad iuramentum (quia sepe est loquendum et raro iurandum), ita non requiritur tanta deliberatio cum quis publice docet aut predicat, sicut quando papa aliquid tanquam catholicum diffinit sollempniter. Et ideo quia iste actus diffiniendi sollempniter et determinandi aliquid tanquam catholicum exerceri non debet nisi deliberatio ultima precedat, si in hoc casu est error, est inexcusabilis error, quia ad hunc actum nullus debet accedere nisi sit sufficienter certus, qualiter non potest aliquis esse de falso. | Master: The act of publicly preaching and teaching is much more common and done by more people than defining something solemnly, just as simple speech is a much more common act than an oath, and therefore, just as not so much deliberation is required for simple speech as for an oath (because one must often speak and seldom swear), so not so much deliberation is required when someone publicly teaches or preaches as when the pope solemnly defines something as Catholic. And therefore because this act of solemnly defining and determining something as Catholic should not be exercised unless final deliberation precedes, if in this case there is an error, it is an inexcusable error, because no one should approach this act unless he is sufficiently certain, as no one can be of a falsehood. |
| Et propter consimilem rationem nullus debet publicare sollempniter diffinitionem pape tanquam catholicam circa ea que tangunt fidem nisi sit certus quod est consona catholice veritati. Et ideo inexcusabilis est qui sollempniter publicat diffinitionem hereticalem pape tanquam catholicam. Secus est de illis qui non sunt prelati, ad quos solempnis publicatio et obligatoria non spectat, et ideo si legunt vel recitant coram aliis multis diffinitionem hereticalem pape quam nesciunt esse hereticalem non sunt ex hoc ipso fautores pravitatis heretice reputandi. | And for a similar reason no one should solemnly publish the definition of the pope as Catholic about things that touch the faith unless he is certain that it is consonant with Catholic truth. And therefore a person is inexcusable if he solemnly publishes the definition of a heretic pope as Catholic. It is otherwise with those who are not prelates, to whom solemn and binding publication does not pertain, and therefore if they read or recite in the presence of many others a heretical definition of the pope that they do not know to be heretical, they are not by this very fact to be considered supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Capitulum 38 | Chapter 38 |
| Discipulus: Postquam autem disseruisti de episcopis et prelatis divulgantibus et publicantibus sollempniter doctrinam hereticalem pape per se vel per alios, tracta de episcopis et prelatis qui, sive publicant sollempniter doctrinam hereticalem pape sive non, sustinent et permittunt quod doctrina erronea pape in suis diocesibus et inter suos subditos publicatur, tenetur, et docetur, nec sequaces pape heretici talia presumentes corrigunt vel castigant. Cupio enim scire an literati tales episcopos et prelatos reputant fautores heretice pravitatis vel peccare mortaliter, et qua pena sint plectendi. Dic autem primo de culpa eorum. | Student: Now after you have spoken of bishops and prelates who solemnly spread and publish the heretical doctrine of the pope, themselves or through others, treat of bishops and prelates who, whether they solemnly publish the pope’s heretical doctrine or not, support and permit the pope’s erroneous doctrine to be published, held, and taught in their dioceses and among their subjects, and do not correct or chastise the followers of the heretic pope who presume to do so. For I desire to know whether the learned consider such bishops and prelates to be supporters of heretical wickedness or to be mortally sinning, and with what penalty they should be punished. But first tell me about their guilt. |
| Magister: Quidam dicunt quod episcopi et prelati talia sustinentes aut sciunt aut scire tenentur quod sequaces pape doctrinam erroneam contra fidem tenent et docent, aut nesciunt nec scire tenentur, quia forte sequaces pape heretici ita occulte et secrete procedunt quod eorum excessus ad notitiam prelatorum pervenire non potest. Iterum, aut assertio pape heretici est condempnata explicite aut tantum implicite. | Master: Some say that bishops and prelates who support such things either know (or are bound to know) that the followers of the pope hold and teach an erroneous doctrine against the faith, or do not know (and are not bound to know), because perhaps the followers of the heretic pope proceed so hiddenly and secretly that their excesses cannot reach the knowledge of the prelates. Again, the heretic pope’s assertion is condemned either explicitly or only implicitly. |
| Si talis assertio est heresis implicite tantummodo condempnata, prelati, sive sciant sequaces pape tenere et docere doctrinam pape hereticam sive ignorent, non sunt propter hoc quod non corrigunt taliter tenentes et docentes fautores pravitatis heretice reputandi, quemadmodum prelati episcopi, licet sciant theologos in suis diocesibus circa ea que ad fidem spectant contraria opinari, et per consequens sciunt quod alteri tenent et docent errores (quia non est possibile quod utraque contradictoriarum sit consona catholice veritati), tamen non tenentur eos corrigere si neutri docent errorem explicite condempnatum. | If such an assertion is a heresy condemned only implicitly, then prelates (whether they know that the pope’s followers hold and teach the pope’s heretical doctrine or do not know) should not (for the reason that they do not correct those who thus hold and teach) be considered supporters of heretical wickedness, just as prelate bishops, although they know that theologians in their dioceses hold contrary opinions about things that pertain to the faith, and consequently know that one or the other party holds and teaches errors (because it is not possible that both contradictory opinions are consonant with Catholic truth), are nevertheless not bound to correct them if neither party teaches an error explicitly condemned. |
| Si autem assertio pape est heresis dampnata explicite, quia, videlicet, vel sub propria forma est ab ecclesia condempnata, vel eius contradictoria est expresse et patenter in scriptura divina reperta, vel est expresse in determinatione ecclesie approbata, vel est apud omnes catholicos tanquam catholica divulgata, puta si papa assereret pertinaciter vel sollempniter diffiniret Christum non fuisse vere passum, aut nullam animam in inferno puniri, vel Christum non elegisse Iudam in apostolum, vel in Christo non fuisse duas voluntates, aut aliquid huiusmodi, in hoc casu episcopi et prelati qui scirent vel tenerentur scire sequaces pape tenere et pertinaciter docere talem doctrinam pape hereticam, essent fautores heretice pravitatis si sequaces pape heretici nullatenus cohercerent. Si autem nescirent nec tenerentur scire tales sequaces pape suos subditos taliter informare, nec scirent eos esse tales, non essent fautores heretice pravitatis. | But if the pope’s assertion is a heresy explicitly condemned, namely because it is condemned by the Church in its proper form, or because its contradictory is expressly and openly found in divine Scripture, or because it is expressly approved in a determination of the Church, or because it is spread among all Catholics as Catholic -- for example, if the pope were to assert pertinaciously or solemnly define that Christ did not truly suffer, or that no soul is punished in hell, or that Christ did not choose Judas as an apostle, or that there were not two wills in Christ, or something of the kind -- in this case bishops and prelates who knew, or were bound to know, that the pope’s followers held and pertinaciously taught such a heretical doctrine of the pope, would be supporters of heretical wickedness if they did not in any way coerce the heretic pope’s followers. But if they did not know, and were not bound to know, that such followers of the pope informed their subjects in such a way, and did not know that they were such, they would not be supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Discipulus: Tantummodo tractes predictam materiam de episcopis et prelatis scientibus vel qui tenentur scire sequaces pape esse in suis diocesibus qui docent doctrinam pape explicite condempnatam, quando scilicet est rumor et fama de talibus. | Student: Treat only treat the above matter regarding bishops and prelates who know, or are bound to know, that there are followers of the pope in their dioceses who teach a doctrine of the pope that has been explicitly condemned, namely when there is a rumor and fame about such people. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod in hoc casu episcopi sunt fautores heretice pravitatis si huiusmodi tenentes et docentes doctrinam pape heretici non cohercent. Quod enim episcopi in hoc casu dampnabiliter peccant multis sanctorum auctoritatibus videtur aperte probari. Ait enim Augustinus, ut habetur dist. 83 c. Nemo: "episcopus itaque, qui talia crimina non corrigit, magis dicendus est canis impudicus quam episcopus.” | Master: It is said that in this case the bishops are supporters of heretical wickedness if they do not coerce those holding and teaching the doctrine of the heretic pope. For that bishops sin in this case seems clearly proved by many texts of saints. For Augustine says, as is found in dist. 83 c. Nemo: “A bishop therefore who does not correct such crimes is more to be called an shameless dog than a bishop.” |
| Discipulus: Sicut ad episcopos non spectat corrigere papam, ita nec sequaces pape, et ideo, licet sequaces pape subditi episcoporum predicent, doceant, et teneant doctrinam hereticalem pape heretici, non sunt per episcopos cohercendi. | Student: Just as it does not pertain to bishops to correct the pope, so neither [does it pertain to bishops to correct] followers of the pope, and therefore, although followers of the pope who are subjects of the bishops preach, teach, and hold the heretical doctrine of the heretic pope, they should not be coerced by bishops. |
| Magister: Ista responsio putatur tam stulta quod reprobatione non indiget, et tamen multipliciter reprobatur. Primo, quia ex hac responsione sequeretur quod quamvis aliqui predicarent, docerent, et tenerent fidem christianam esse falsam, et Christum falsum fuisse prophetam, non essent per episcopos corrigendi sed tolerandi. Quod enim hoc absurdum sequatur patet aperte, quia possibile est quod aliquis papa futurus teneat et sollempniter diffiniat fidem christianam esse falsam et Christum fuisse falsum prophetam, quia nescitur an Antichristus erit papa futurus. Si ergo episcopi non debent corrigere sequaces pape heretici, ipsi non debent in hoc casu corrigere publice predicantes et docentes fidem christianam esse falsam, et Christum fuisse falsum prophetam, quod omnes aures catholice horrerent. | Master: This response is thought to be so foolish that it does not need reproof, and yet it is reproved in many ways. First, because from this response it would follow that although some preached, taught, and held that the Christian faith was false, and that Christ was a false prophet, they should not be corrected by bishops but should be tolerated. That this absurdity follows is clearly evident, because it is possible that some future pope may hold and solemnly define that the Christian faith is false and that Christ was a false prophet, because it is not known whether Antichrist will be a future pope. If therefore bishops should not correct the followers of a heretic pope, they should not in this case correct those who publicly preach and teach that the Christian faith is false and that Christ was a false prophet, which all Catholic ears would abhor. |
| Discipulus: Si papa hereticus tam enormiter deviaret a fide, sequaces eius essent per episcopos corrigendi, sed si erraret in aliis non essent sequaces eius per episcopos corrigendi. | Student: If a heretic pope deviated so enormously from the faith, his followers should be corrected by the bishops, but if he erred in other respects, his followers should not be corrected by the bishops. |
| Magister: Ista responsio videtur nulla, quia ita episcopi tenentur corrigere unam heresim explicite dampnatam sicut aliam. Omnem enim heresim dampnatam explicite debent episcopi extirpare de suis diocesibus, et per consequens omnes hereticos docentes, predicantes, seu tenentes quamcunque heresim dampnatam explicite cohercere tenentur. Quare sequaces pape heretici quamcunque heresim dampnatam explicite predicantes, docentes, seu manifeste tenentes, sunt per episcopos castigandi, quia idem iuris est de magnis et de hiis que hereses parve videntur. | Master: This response seems null, because bishops are thus bound to correct one explicitly condemned heresy as well as another. For bishops must extirpate every explicitly condemned heresy from their dioceses, and consequently they are bound to coerce all heretics who teach, preach, or hold any explicitly condemned heresy. Therefore the followers of the heretic pope who explicitly preach, teach, or hold any condemned heresy should be chastised by the bishops, because the same law applies to great heresies and to those that seem to be minor heresies. |
| Discipulus: Improbasti uno modo responsionem meam ad auctoritatem beati Augustini. Improba aliter. | Student: You have disproved in one way my response to Blessed Augustine’s text, now disprove it in another. |
| Magister: Quod sequaces pape heretici sint per episcopos corrigendi ostenditur sic. Propter pravitatem hereticam pape nullus est a iurisdictione episcoporum exemptus. Sed predicantes et docentes quamcumque heresim dampnatam explicite essent per episcopos castigandi si papa esset catholicus. Ergo propter hoc quod sunt sequaces pape heretici non sunt a iurisdictione episcoporum exempti, et per consequens ita sunt per episcopos corrigendi sicut si non essent sequaces pape. | Master: That the followers of a heretic pope should be corrected by the bishops is shown as follows. [1] No one is exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishops because of a pope’s heretical wickedness. But those who preach and teach any explicitly condemned heresy would be to be chastised by the bishops if the pope were Catholic. Therefore, they are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishops because they are followers of a heretic pope, and consequently they should be corrected by the bishops as if they were not followers of a pope. |
| Iterum, sequaces pape non sunt magis exempti a iurisdictione episcoporum quam ipsemet papa hereticus. Sed cum papa hereticus sit omni dignitate privatus, eo ipso quod sit hereticus esset ratione delicti de iurisdictione episcopi in cuius diocesi moraretur, sicut superius multipliciter est ostensum. Ergo sequaces pape heretici sunt per episcopos cohercendi. | [2] Again, the followers of the pope are no more exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishops than is the heretic pope himself. But since the heretic pope is deprived of all dignity, by the very fact that he is a heretic, he would by reason of crime belong to the jurisdiction of the bishop in whose diocese he resides, as has been shown above in many ways. Therefore the followers of a heretic pope should be coerced by the bishops. |
| Discipulus: Quid si episcopus attemptaret corrigere sequaces pape heretici, et ipsi ad papam appellarent, nunquid episcopus appellationi tali deferre deberet? | Student: What if a bishop were to attempt to correct the followers of a heretic pope, and they appealed to the pope. Should the bishop defer to such an appeal? |
| Magister: Respondetur quod tali appellationi esset minime deferendum, tum quia a correptione appellare non licet nisi corrigens modum correptionis excederet, tum quia ad hereticum appellare non licet, et ita appellationi que fit ad papam hereticum est minime deferendum. | Master: The answer made is that such an appeal should not be deferred to, both because it is not permissible to appeal from a correction unless the corrector exceeds the mode of correction, and also because it is not permissible to appeal to a heretic, and thus an appeal made to a heretic pope should not be deferred to. |
| Discipulus: Quid si tales appellarent ad concilium generale? | Student: What if such people appealed to a general council. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod cum tales tenerent heresim dampnatam explicite, non esset deferendum appellationi eorum. | Master: The answer made is that since such people would hold a heresy explicitly condemned, their appeal should not be deferred to. |
| Discipulus: Alias auctoritates vel rationes ad conclusionem principalem adducas. | Student: Adduce other authorities or arguments for the main conclusion. |
| Magister: Quod episcopi
qui tales sequaces pape heretici negligunt castigare
dampnabiliter peccant et sunt fautores heretice pravitatis
probatur per easdem auctoritates quibus supra c. 32 et 33
est ostensum quod qui tacent, cum possunt crimen heretice
pravitatis corrigere, et qui consentiunt pravitati
heretice, sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. Quia, quamvis
auctoritates ille et consimiles possunt de subditis
intelligi, tamen principalius intelligende sunt de
prelatis. |
Master: [3] That bishops
who neglect to chastise such followers of the heretic pope
sin damnably and are supporters of heretical wickedness is
proved by the same texts that showed above in chapters 32 and 33 that
those who remain silent when they can correct the crime of
heretical wickedness, and those who consent to heretical
wickedness, are supporters of heretical wickedness. For,
although those and similar texts can be understood of
subjects, nevertheless they should be understood more
principally of prelates. |
| Preter illas autem sunt multe alie ex quibus evidenter ostenditur quod prelati qui negligunt sequaces pape heretici castigare dampnabiliter peccant, et sunt merito inter fautores pravitatis heretice computandi. Leo enim papa, ut habetur dist. 86 c. 1, ait: "Inferiorum ordinum culpe ad nullos magis referende sunt, quam ad desides negligentesque rectores, qui multam sepe nutriunt pestilentiam, dum austeriorem dissimulant adhibere medicinam.” Ex quibus verbis patenter infertur quod culpe sequacium pape heretici docentium hereses dampnatas explicite in diocesibus episcoporum ipsis sunt episcopis imputande, si sequaces pape heretici negligunt castigare. Imo fautores pravitatis heretice sunt censendi, quia illi qui nutriunt pravitatem hereticam sunt fautores pravitatis heretice. Tales autem episcopi, ut ex verbis predictis colligitur, nutriunt pravitatem hereticam, que est gravis pestilentia dum austeriorem dissimulant adhibere medicinam. Ergo merito fautores pravitatis heretice sunt censendi. | [4] Besides these, however, there are many others from which it is evidently shown that prelates who neglect to chastise the followers of a heretic pope sin damnably, and are deservedly to be counted among the supporters of heretical wickedness. For pope Leo, as is found in dist. 86 c. 1, says: “The faults of the lower orders should be referred to no one more than to lazy and negligent rulers, who often nourish much pestilence, while disguising themselves as applying austere medicine.” From these words it is clearly inferred that the faults of followers of a heretic pope teaching heresies condemned explicitly in the dioceses of the bishops should be imputed to the bishops themselves, if they neglect to chastise the followers of the heretic pope. Indeed, they should be considered supporters of heretical wickedness, because those who nourish heretical wickedness are supporters of heretical wickedness. But such bishops, as is gathered from the words above, nourish heretical wickedness, which is a grave pestilence while disguising themselves as applying austere medicine. Therefore they should be deservedly considered supporters of heretical wickedness. |
| Item, Gregorius, ut legitur dist. 43 c. Ephesiis, ait: "Ephesiis Paulus dicit 'munde sunt manus mee a sanguine omnium vestrum: non enim subterfugi, quominus annunciarem omne consilium Dei vobis'. Mundus ergo a sanguine eorum non esset, si eis Dei consilium annunciare noluisset, quia, cum increpare delinquentes noluerit, eos proculdubio tacendo pastor occidit.” Ex quibus verbis dupliciter patet quod episcopi qui non corrigunt sequaces pape heretici dampnabiliter peccant. Primo, quia ille dampnabiliter peccat qui non est mundus a sanguine subditorum. Sed episcopi negligentes corrigere subditos suos sequaces pape heretici a sanguine eorum non sunt mundi, quia consilium Dei, hoc est catholicam veritatem, non eis annunciant. Ergo non sunt mundi a sanguine eorum, et per consequens damnpnabiliter peccant. Iterum, ille dampnabiliter peccat qui alios occidit. Sed episcopi qui non corrigunt sequaces pape heretici eos tacendo occidunt, secundum sententiam beati Gregorii. Ergo dampnabiliter peccant. | Likewise, Gregory, as we read in dist. 43 Ephesiis, says: “Paul says to the Ephesians, 'My hands are clean from the blood of you all: for I did not shrink from announcing to you the whole counsel of God.' Therefore he would not have been clean from their blood if he had been unwilling to announce to them the counsel of God, because when a shepherd refuses to rebuke offenders, by keeping silent he undoubtedly kills them.” From these words it is clear in two ways that bishops who do not correct the followers of a heretic pope sin damnably. First, because a person sins damnably who is not clean from the blood of his subjects. But bishops who neglect to correct their subjects who follow a heretic pope are not clean from their blood, because they do not announce to them the counsel of God, that is, the Catholic truth. Therefore they are not clean from their blood, and consequently they sin damnably. Again, he sins damnably who kills others. But bishops who do not correct followers of the heretic pope kill them by remaining silent, according to the opinion of blessed Gregory. Therefore they sin damnably. |
| Item, pastores qui gregem sibi commissum non defendunt a lupis crudeliter invadentibus dampnabiliter peccant. Sed episcopi et prelati, si non corrigunt et cohercent sequaces pape heretici manifestas hereses predicantes, docentes, ac tenentes, et ad tenendum alios inducentes, non defendunt a lupis gregem dominicum sibi commissum, sed, teste Isaia propheta, sunt "canes muti non valentes latrare.” Sunt etiam iuxta vocem dominicam mercenarii, non pastores, quia veniente lupo fugiunt, dum, sequacibus pape heretici atrociter per pravitatem hereticam greges sibi commissos conantibus iugulare, sub silentio se abscondunt. Ergo dampnabiliter peccant, et merito, si greges sibi commissi pravitate inficiuntur heretica, est eis eadem infectio imputanda. | Likewise, shepherds who do not defend the flock entrusted to them from wolves cruelly attacking them sin damnably. But bishops and prelates, if they do not correct and coerce the followers of a heretic pope who preach, teach, and hold manifest heresies and lead others to hold them, do not defend the Lord's flock entrusted to them from the wolves, but, as the prophet Isaiah testifies, are “dumb dogs that cannot bark.” They are also, according to the Lord's word, hirelings, not shepherds, because when the wolf comes they flee, while when the followers of the heretic pope atrociously attempt to slaughter the flocks entrusted to them through heretical wickedness, they hide themselves in silence. Therefore they sin reprehensibly, and if the flocks entrusted to them are infected with heretical wickedness, that infection should rightly be imputed to them. |
| Item, illi sunt per episcopos cohercendi cum quibus nec ipsi nec subditi communicare debent. Sed nec ipsi episcopi nec eorum subditi communicare debent cum hereticis sequacibus pape heretici (24 q. 3 c. Illud, et c. Clericus, et c. Cum quibus), quia excommunicati sunt (Extra, De hereticis, Ab abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus 1o et 2o, et c. Sicut). Ergo sequaces pape heretici sunt per episcopos cohercendi. | Likewise, those are to be coerced by bishops with whom neither the bishops nor their subjects should communicate. But neither the bishops themselves nor their subjects should communicate with the heretical followers of a heretic pope (24 q. 3 c. Illud, et c. Clericus, et c. Cum quibus), because they have been excommunicated (Extra, De hereticis, Ab abolendam, et c. Excommunicamus 1o et 2o, et c. Sicut). Therefore the followers of the heretical pope are to be coerced by the bishops. |
| Quinto principaliter videtur posse probari eandem conclusio sic. Putride carnes sunt a corpore resecande per illum qui curam corporis gerit, ne totum corpus penitus corrumpatur, et, similiter, ovis scabiosa et morbida repellenda est a caulis per illum qui curam caularum gerit, ne totus grex inficiatur, teste Hieronymo qui, ut habetur 24 q. 3 c. Resecande, ait: "Resecande sunt carnes putride, et scabiosa a caulis ovis repellenda, ne tota domus, massa, et corpus et peccora ardeant, corrumpantur, putrescant, intereant. Arrius in Alexandria una scintilla fuit, sed quoniam non statim oppressus est, totum orbem eius flamma populata est.” Sed sequaces pape heretici sunt putridas carnes reliquas partes corporis corrumpentes, et sunt oves scabiose et morbide inficientes gregem, teste Hieronymo qui, ut legitur dist. 45 c. Sed illud, ait: "sicut ex una ove morbida universus grex inficitur, sic etiam uno vel fornicante vel aliud quodcunque scelus committente", et per consequens uno heretico doctrinam pape heretici publice predicante, "plebs universa polluitur.” Ergo sequaces pape heretici tanquam putride carnes et oves scabiose sunt per episcopos a corpore resecandi et a caulis fidelium repellendi. | [5] Fifth, principally, it seems possible to prove the same conclusion as follows. Putrid flesh is to be cut off from the body by him who takes care of the body, lest the whole body be completely corrupted, and, similarly, scabby and diseased sheep are to be driven away from the folds by him who takes care of the folds, lest the whole flock be infected, according to Jerome, as is found in 24 q. 3 c. Resecande. He says: “The rotten flesh must be cut off, and the scabies must be driven away from the sheepfolds, lest the whole house, the mass, and the body and the cattle burn, corrupt, putrefy, and perish. Arius was a single spark in Alexandria, but since he was not immediately suppressed, his flame devastated the whole world.” But the followers of a heretical pope are rotten flesh corrupting the remaining parts of the body, and they are sheep scabby and diseasedly infecting the flock, as Jerome testifies. As we read in dist. 45 c. Sed illud, he says: “just as from one diseased sheep the whole flock is infected, so also by one who commits fornication or any other crime,” and consequently by one heretic publicly preaching the doctrine of a heretical pope, “the whole people are polluted.” Therefore the followers of a heretical pope, like rotten flesh and scabies, must be cut off from the body and driven away from the folds of the faithful by the bishops. |
| Sexto sic. Episcopi et prelati voce prophetica iubentur ab omnibus malis spiritualiter recedere et exire, et eos omnino non tangere, teste Isaia, qui, 52 capitulo, ait: "recedite, recedite, exite inde, pollutum nolite tangere.” Quod exponens beatus Augustinus in libro De verbo Domini, et habetur 23 q. 4 c. 1, ait: "Tollerandi sunt quidem mali pro pace, nec corporaliter ab eis recedatur, sed spiritualiter.” Et idem, ut habetur causa et questione predictis, c. Ecce inquiunt, ait: "Ecce, inquiunt, dicit propheta: 'recedite, exite inde, et immundum ne tetigeritis'. Quomodo ergo malos tollerabimus pro pace, a quibus exire et recedere iubemur, ne tangamus immundum? Nos istam recessionem spiritualiter intelligimus.” Ex quibus verbis patet aperte quod prelati ab universis malis spiritualiter tenentur recedere. Ergo spiritualiter tenentur recedere a sequacibus pape heretici doctrinam pape erroneam docentibus et tenentibus. Episcopi autem et prelati a sequacibus pape heretici spiritualiter non recedunt nisi eos corrigendo et cohercendo, si possunt. Ergo episcopi et prelati sequaces pape heretici debent corrigere et arcere. | [6] Sixth, thus. Bishops and prelates are commanded by the prophetic voice to spiritually withdraw and depart from all evil, and not to touch them at all, as Isaiah testifies, who, in chapter 52, says: “Retreat, retreat, go out from there, touch not the unclean thing.” Explaining this, blessed Augustine says in his book On the Word of the Lord, and it is found in 23 q. 4 c. 1: “The evil are indeed to be tolerated for the sake of peace, and we should depart from them not bodily, but spiritually.” And Augustine says, as is found in the aforementioned cause and question, [23 q.4] c. Ecce inquiunt: “Behold, they say, the prophet says: 'Retreat, depart from there, and touch not the unclean thing.' How then shall we tolerate bad people for the sake of peace, from whom we are commanded to depart and withdraw lest we touch an unclean thing? We understand this withdrawal spiritually.” From these words it is clear that prelates are bound to withdraw spiritually from all evil. Therefore they are bound to withdraw spiritually from the followers of the heretical pope who teach and hold the erroneous doctrine of the pope. But bishops and prelates do not depart spiritually from the followers of the heretical pope except by correcting and coercing them, if they can. Therefore bishops and prelates must correct and restrain the followers of the heretical pope. |
| Quod autem episcopi et prelati spiritualiter non recedunt a talibus sequacibus, nisi cum eos,quando possunt, corrigunt et castigant, patet aperte per beatum Augustinum qui, ut habetur 23 q. 4 c. 1, ait: "spiritualiter exire est facere quod pertinet ad correptionem malorum quantum licet pro gradu cuiusque, salva pace.” Et infra: "hoc ergo est exire, ore non parcere, hoc est immundum non tangere, voluntate non consentire.” | But that bishops and prelates do not depart spiritually from such followers except when they correct and chastise them, when they can, is clearly evident from blessed Augustine who, as found in 23 q. 4 c. 1, says: “To depart spiritually is to do what pertains to the correction of evils, as far as is permissible according to each person’s degree while preserving peace.” And below: “This, therefore, is to depart: not to spare with the mouth. This is not to touch the unclean: not to consent with the will.” |
| Item, idem ut habetur causa et questione predictis, c. Ecce, ait:"clamamus et nos, et dicimus vobis, recedite, exite inde, et immundum ne tetigeritis, sed contactu cordis, non corporis. Quid est enim tangere immundum, nisi consentire peccatis? Quid est autem exire inde, nisi facere quod pertinet ad correptionem malorum, quantum pro uniuscuiusque gradu atque persona, salva pace, fieri potest?" Et infra: "quicquid inter vos malorum esse nostis, quantum potestis, improbate, ut corde recedatis, et redarguite, ut exeatis inde, et nolite consentire, ut immundum non tangatis.” | Likewise, Augustine says, as found in the same cause and question, c. Ecce: “We also cry out, and we say to you, depart, depart from there, and do not touch the unclean: but by contact of the heart, not of the body. For what is it to touch the unclean but to consent to sins? And what is it to depart from there, but to do what pertains to the correction of evil, as much as can be done for each one’s degree and person, while preserving peace?” And below: “Whatever evils you know to be among you, as much as you can, disapprove, so that you may depart in heart, and reprove, so that you may depart from there, and do not consent, so that you do not touch the unclean.” |
| Item, idem Augustinus, ut habetur causa et questione eisdem, c. Recedite, ait: "quid est exire inde, nisi facere quod pertinet ad correptionem malorum, quantum pro uniuscuiusque gradu atque persona, salva pace, fieri potest? Displicuit tibi quod quisque peccavit? Non tetigisti immundum. Redarguisti, corripuisti, monuisti, adhibuisti etiam, si res exigit, congruam, et que unitatem non violet disciplinam? Existi inde.” Et infra: "hoc est exire, ore non parcere, hoc est immundum non tangere, et voluntate non consentire.” | Likewise, the same Augustine, as found in the same Cause and Question, c., Recedite, says: “What is going out from there, except to do what pertains to the correction of bad people, as much as can be done for each one’s degree and person, while preserving peace? Did you displease yourself that someone sinned? You did not touch the unclean. Did you rebuke, reprimand, warn, and even, if the situation demands, apply appropriate discipline that does not violate unity? You have gone out from there.” And below: “This is going out, not sparing your mouth, this is not touching the unclean, and not to consent with the will.” |
| Ex quibus, ut videtur, colligitur evidenter quod a malis quibuscunque, et per consequens a sequacibus pape heretici, prelati spiritualiter non recedunt nisi faciant quod spectat ad correptionem eorum, nisi ore non parcant, nisi redarguant, nisi corripiant, nisi moneant, nisi, quando possunt, congruam adhibeant disciplinam.Quare patenter infertur quod sequaces pape heretici sunt per episcopos et prelatos arcendi. | From these [texts], as it seems, it is evidently gathered that prelates do not spiritually withdraw from bad persons of any kind, and consequently from the followers of the heretical pope, unless they do what pertains to their correction, unless they do not spare with the mouth, unless they rebuke, unless they correct, unless they warn, unless, when they can, they apply appropriate discipline. Wherefore it is clearly inferred that the followers of the heretical pope should be restrained by bishops and prelates. |
| Discipulus: Ex predictis verbis Augustini colligitur quod sequaces pape heretici, quando salva pace nequeunt coherceri, sunt equanimiter tollerandi. Ergo non est semper necesse quod episcopi et prelati eos corrigant et castigent. | Student: From the aforementioned words of Augustine it is gathered that the followers of a heretic pope, when they cannot be coerced in peace, should be tolerated with equanimity. Therefore it is not always necessary for bishops and prelates to correct and chastise them. |
| Magister: Ad hoc dupliciter respondetur. Primo, quod secus est de crimine heresis et de aliis minoribus, quia heretici totam salutem nituntur extinguere, et ideo ipsis est resistendum etiam usque ad mortem, quia in decretis 7 q. 1, c. Adversitas, § hoc tunc vel § cum vero, sic legitur: "cum vero non prelatorum tantum, sed totius ecclesie salus queritur, fides impugnatur, necesse est, ut ex adverso ascendant, et in die belli seipsos murum opponant pro domo Domini, animas suas ponant pro ovibus suis, ut exemplo sue passionis accendant quos sermone doctrine diutius confirmare non valent.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum sequaces pape heretici totius ecclesie salutem querunt destruere, fidemque impugnant, necesse est quod prelati se eis opponant etiam usque ad mortem, eis firmiter resistendo, et quantum vires suppetunt compescendo. Cum hereticis nullo modo in dampnum fidei est pax habenda. Pro istis enim dixit Christus Matthei 10: "nolite arbitrari quia venerim mittere pacem in terram, non veni mittere pacem sed gladium.” Et Luce 12: "putatis quia pacem veni dare in terram, non dico vobis sed separationem.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum hereticis non est pax habenda ut propter eam prelati ab eorum correptione desistant. | Master: To this answer is made in two ways. First, that there is a difference between the crime of heresy and other lesser crimes, because heretics strive to extinguish all salvation, and therefore they must be resisted even to the point of death, because in the decrees 7 q. 1, c. Adversitas, § hoc tunc or § cum vero, we read: “When the salvation not only of prelates, but of the whole Church is in question, and the faith is attacked, they [the prelates] must go up against them and in the day of war set themselves up as a wall for the house of the Lord [Cf. Ezechiel 13:5], and lay down their lives for their sheep, so that by the example of their suffering they may enkindle those whom they are no longer able to confirm with word and doctrine.” From these words it is gathered that when the followers of a heretic pope seek to destroy the salvation of the whole Church and attack the faith, prelates must oppose themselves to them even to the point of death, by firmly resisting them and restraining them as much as they have strength. Peace is not to be maintained with heretics to the detriment of the faith. For Christ said concerning them in Matthew 10: “Do not think that I have come to send peace on earth; I came not to send peace, but the sword.” And in Luke 12: “Do you think that I have come to give peace on earth? I tell you, no, but separation.” From these words it is gathered that peace should not be maintained with heretics, as if prelates should desist from correcting them for the sake of peace. |
| Aliter dicitur quod ubi cernerent episcopi evidenter quod ex cohertione hereticorum nullus fructus neque fidei neque fidelium proveniret, sed gravis oriretur catholicorum turbatio, episcopi possent a correctione cessare ad tempus, quod intelligendum est non tantum respectu sequacium pape heretici, sed respectu quorumcunque hereticorum. Et ita equaliter omnino coherceri debent sequaces pape heretici sicut sequaces imperatoris heretici vel alterius divitis et potentis. Ubi enim prelati viderent quod ex cohertione sequacium imperatoris heretici grave periculum fidei immineret absque omni fructu, possent a correctione cessare. Ita est etiam sentiendum, ut videtur, de sequacibus pape heretici. Et ita nec ratione papatus, nec ratione imperii, nec ratione regni est cessandum a cohertione sequacium pape heretici, sed ratione periculi quod [delete quod?] propter potentiam pape heretici vel imperatoris, vel propter aliquam aliam causam que ita reperiri potest in sequacibus imperatoris heretici sicut pape, possunt prelati dissimulare interdum et a cohertione sequacium pape vel imperatoris heretici abstinere. | In another way it is answered that where the bishops evidently saw that from the coercion of heretics no fruit would come, either for faith or for the faithful, but that grave disturbance of Catholics would arise, the bishops could cease from correcting for a time. This should be understood not only with respect to the followers of a heretic pope but with respect to any heretics whatsoever. And thus the followers of a heretic pope must be coerced altogether equally with the followers of a heretical emperor or another rich and powerful person. For where the prelates see that from the coercion of the followers of a heretical emperor a grave danger to the faith threatens without any fruit, they may cease from correction. This should also be thought, it seems, of the followers of a heretic pope. And thus coercion of a heretic pope’s followers should cease, not by reason of papacy [i.e. not because of anything relating to the papacy], nor by reason of empire, nor by reason of kingdom. But by reason of danger on account of the power of the heretic pope or of the emperor, or on account of some other cause that can be found in the followers of a heretic emperor just as in those of a pope, prelates can dissimulate for a time and refrain from coercing the followers of a heretic pope or emperor. |
| Discipulus: Ut prolixitatem quantum possumus evitemus, auctoritates tam scripture divine quam sanctorum patrum ex quibus possunt accipi argumenta ad probandum hanc eandem conclusionem allega, rationes ex eis non formando. | Student: To avoid prolixity as much as possible, cite texts of both divine Scripture and of the holy fathers from which arguments can be taken to prove this same conclusion, without forming arguments from them. |
| Magister: Pro hanc conclusioni hortari videtur Isaia 58o capitulo dicens: "clama ne cesses quasi tuba exalta vocem tuam et annuncia populo meo scelera eorum et domum Iacob peccata eorum.” | Master: Isaiah 58[:1] seems to encourage this conclusion, saying: “Cry, cease not, lift up your voice like a trumpet and announce to my people their wicked doings and to the house of Jacob their sins.” |
| Item, Ierem. 23 scribitur: "Ve pastoribus qui dispergunt et dilacerant gregem pascue mee, ait Dominus", et post: "vos dispersistis gregem meum et eiecistis eos et non visitastis eos.” | Likewise, Jer. 23[:1]: “Woe to the shepherds who scatter and tear the flock of my pasture, says the Lord”. And later: “You have scattered my flock and driven them away, and have not visited them.” |
| Item, Ezech. 34 sic legitur:"Ve pastoribus Israel qui pascebant semetipsos, nonne greges pascuntur a pastoribus? Lac comedebatis et lanis operiebamini et quod crassum erat occidebatis, gregem autem meum non pascebatis, quod infirmum fuit non consolidastis et quod egrotum non sanastis, quod fractum est non alligastis et quod abiectum est non reduxistis, quod perierat non quesistis sed cum austeritate eis imperabatis et cum potentia et disperse sunt oves mee eo quod non esset pastor et facte sunt in devorationem omnium bestiarum agri", sequacium scilicet pape heretici totam fidem vastantium orthodoxam. | Likewise, Ezek. 34[:2-5] reads: “ Woe to the shepherds of Israel, who fed themselves. Should not the flocks be fed by the shepherds? You ate milk and covered yourselves with wool and killed what was fat, but you did not feed my flock, you did not strengthen the weak and you did not heal the sick, you did not bind up what was broken and you did not bring back what was driven away, you did not seek what was lost. But you ruled over them with harshness and with power, and my sheep were scattered because there was no shepherd and they became a prey for all the beasts of the field”, namely the followers of the heretic pope who devastated the entire orthodox faith |
| Item, Threnorum 2: "prophete tui viderunt tibi falsa et stulta nec aperiebant iniquitatem tuam ut te ad penitentiam provocarent.” | Likewise, Lamentations 2[:14]: “Your prophets have seen false and foolish things for you and have not exposed your iniquity to provoke you to repentance.” |
| Item, prelati huiusmodi increpantur Ezech. 13 cum dicit Dominus: "non ascendistis ex adverso neque opposuistis murum pro domo Israel ut staretis in prelio in die Domini.” Et 33 c. sic habetur: "Si speculator viderit gladium venientem et non insonuerit bucina, et populus non se custodierit, veneritque gladius et tulerit de eis animam, ille quidem in iniquitate sua captus est, sanguinem autem eius de manu speculatoris requiram.” | Likewise, prelates of this kind are rebuked in Ezek. 13[:5] when the Lord says: “You have not gone up against them nor built up a wall for the house of Israel to stand in the battle in the day of the Lord.” And 33[:6]: “If the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet, and the people do not guard themselves, and the sword comes and takes away a soul from among them, he is indeed taken in his iniquity, but his blood I will require at the hand of the watchman.” |
| Item, Exod. 22: "maleficos non patieris vivere.” | Likewise, Exod. 22[:18]: “You shall not suffer evildoers to live.” |
| Item, Deuter. 13: "si surrexerit in medio tui prophetes etc.", quere supra lib ro sexto capitulo 99. | Likewise, Deuteronomy 13[:1]: “If prophets arise in your midst,” etc.. See above, book six, chapter 99. |
| Item, ibidem: "si tibi voluerit persuadere frater tuus etc.", quere ubi prius. | Likewise, in the same place: “If your brother persuades you,” etc. See above. |
| Item, ibidem: "si audieris in una urbium tuarum etc.", quere ubi supra. | Likewise, in the same place: “If you hear in one of your cities,” etc. See above. |
| Item, Deuter. 17: "cum reperti fuerint etc.", quere ubi prius. | Likewise, Deuteronomy 17: “When they are found,” etc. See above. |
| Item, Ierem. 3 dicit Dominus: "dabo vobis pastores iuxta cor meum et pascent vos scientia et doctrina.” Et Ierem. 6: "pascet unusquisque eos qui sub manu sua sunt.” | Likewise, Jer. 3[:15] says the Lord: “I will give you shepherds according to my heart, and they shall feed you with knowledge and instruction.” And Jer. 6[3]: “Every one shall feed those under his hand.” |
| Item, Malach. 2: "labia enim sacerdotis custodiunt scientiam etc." | Likewise, Malach. 2[:7]: “For the lips of the priest keep knowledge,” etc. |
| Item, Ezech. 3: "si dicente me ad impium morte morieris non annunciaveris ei neque locutus fueris ut avertatur a via sua impia et vivat ipse impius in iniquitate sua morietur, sanguinem autem eius de manu tua requiram.” | Likewise, Ezek. 3[:18]: “If, when I say to the wicked ‘you will surely die’, you do not announce it to him, or speak to turn him from his wicked way and live, the wicked man will die in his iniquity, but his blood I will require at your hand.” |
| Item, Apostolus ad Titum 1: "oportet enim episcopum sine crimine esse", et post: "amplectentem eum qui secundum doctrinam est fidelem sermonem, ut potens sit et exhortari in doctrina sana et eos qui contradicunt arguere", et post: "increpa illos dure ut sani sint in fide.” | Likewise, the Apostle to Titus 1[:7, 9, 13]: “For a bishop must be without crime.” And later: “… embracing the faithful word that is according to the doctrine, that he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince contradictors.” And later: “… rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith.” |
| Item, 1 o ad Corinth. 5: "auferte malum ex vobis ipsis.” | Likewise, 1 Corinthians 5[:13]: “Put away the evil one from among yourselves.” |
| Item, 1 o ad Tim. 5: "peccantes coram omnibus argue, ut et ceteri timorem habeant.” | Likewise, 1 Timothy 5[:20]: “Those who sin rebuke before all, that the rest also may fear.” |
| Item, ad Galat. 2: "cum autem venisset Cephas Antiochiam in faciem ei restiti, quia reprehensibilis erat.” | Likewise, Galatians 2[:11]: “But when Cephas came to Antioch, I withstood him to his face, because he was blameworthy.” |
| Discipulus: Sufficiant iste auctoritates ex scripturis divinis accepte, ideo auctoritates sanctorum patrum ad eandem conclusionem adducas. | Student: Let these texts from divine Scriptures suffice. Therefore bring texts of the holy fathers to the same conclusion. |
| Magister: Hoc beatus Hieronymus sentire videtur, cum dicit in prologo biblie: "Sancta quippe rusticitas solum sibi prodest: et quantum edificat ex vite merito ecclesiam Christi, tantum nocet, si destruentibus non resistat.” | Master: Blessed Jerome seems to think this, when he says in the prologue to the Bible: “For holy rusticity benefits only itself: and as much as it builds up the Church of Christ from the merit of life, so much does it harm, if it does not resist those who destroy.” |
| Item, Innocentius tertius, ut legitur Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Hely, ait: "Licet Hely summus sacerdos in se bonus existeret, quia tamen filiorum excessus efficaciter non corripuit, et in se pariter, et in ipsis animadversiones divine vindictam accepit, dum, filiis eius in bello peremptis, ipse de sella corruens fractis cervicibus expiravit. Ad corrigendos ergo excessus subditorum tanto diligentius debet prelatus assurgere quanto dampnabilius eorum offensas desereret incorrectas.” Et ista sententia ultima sub eisdem verbis ponitur Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando 2o. | Likewise, Innocent III, as we read in Extra, De simonia, c. Licet Hely, says: “Though Hely was a good high priest in himself, because nevertheless he did not effectively correct the excesses of his sons, and both in himself and in his [sons] he received divine vengeance, when, after his sons were killed in battle, he himself fell from his chair and expired with a broken neck. A prelate should therefore rise up all the more diligently to correct the excesses of his subjects, the more damnably he would fail to concern himself with their offenses [if he left them] uncorrected.” And this last opinion is put under the same words in Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando 2o. |
| Item, idem, ut habetur Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Irrefragabili, in concilio generali ait: "Irrefragabili constitutione sancimus, ut ecclesiarum prelati ad corrigendum subditorum excessus, maxime clericorum, et reformandos mores prudenter ac diligenter intendant, ne sanguis eorum de suis manibus requiratur", ubi dicit glossa: "durum verbum est istud pro prelatis negligentibus subditos corrigere.” | Likewise, Innocent III, as we find in Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Irrefragabili, says in a general council: “We decree by an incontrovertable constitution that the prelates of the churches should strive prudently and diligently to correct the excesses of their subjects, especially of the clergy, and to reform morals, lest their blood be required from their hands”. There the gloss says: “This is a hard word for prelates who neglect to correct their subjects.” |
| Item, Anacletus, scribens cunctis fidelibus, ut legitur dist. 83 c. Nichil, ait: "Nichil illo pastore miserius, qui luporum gloriatur laudibus. Quibus si placere voluerit, atque ab his amari delegerit, erit hinc ovibus magna pernicies. Nullus igitur pastorum placere lupis et gregibus ovium potest.” | Likewise, Anacletus, writing to all the faithful, as is read in dist. 83 c. Nichil, says: “Nothing is more miserable than a shepherd who boasts of the praises of wolves. If he wishes to please them, and chooses to be loved by them, great destruction will come from this to the sheep. Therefore, no shepherd can please the wolves and the flocks of sheep.” |
| Item, papa Nicholaus, ut legitur dist. 43, c. Dispensatio, ait: "Dispensatio est nobis celestis seminis iniuncta: 've si non sparserimus, ve si tacuerimus'. Quod cum electionis vas formidet et clamet, quanto magis cuilibet exiguo metuendum est? Proinde, sicut non leve discrimen incumbit pontificibus, siluisse pro divinitatis cultu et ecclesie correctione quod congruit”, etc. | Likewise, pope Nicholas, as read in dist. 43, c. Dispensatio, says: “Upon us is enjoined stewardship of the heavenly seed: 'Woe if we do not sow it, woe if we keep silent' [cf. Paul, 1 Cor. 9:16-17]. When the vessel of election [i.e. Paul, Acts 9:15] fears and cries out, how much more is it to be feared by any lesser person? Therefore, just as it is no small crime for the pontiffs to have remained silent about the worship of the divinity and the suitable correction of the church,” etc. |
| Item, Gregorius, ut legitur dist. 43, c. Sit rector, ait: "sicut incauta locutio in errorem pertrahit, ita indiscretum silentium eos, qui erudiri poterant, in errore derelinquit. Sepe namque rectores improvidi, humanam amittere gratiam formidantes, loqui libere recta pertimescunt.” | Also, Gregory, as read in dist. 43, c. Sit rector, says: “Just as careless speech leads into error, so indiscreet silence leaves those who could be instructed in error. For often imprudent rulers, fearing to lose human grace, are afraid to speak freely and rightly.” |
| Cui concordat Hieronimus, ut legitur dist. 45, c. Sed illud, dicens: "Sed illud non otiose transmittendum est, quod uno peccante ira Dei super omnem populum venit. Hoc quando accidit? Quando sacerdotes, qui populo presunt, erga delinquentes benigni videri volunt, et verentes peccantium linguas, ne forte male de eis loquantur, sacerdotalis severitatis immemores nolunt complere quod scriptum est 'peccantem coram omnibus argue'.” Et infra: "dum uni parcunt, universe ecclesie moliuntur interitum. Que ista bonitas? que ista misericordia? uni parcere, et omnes in discrimen adducere?" | Jerome agrees with him, as read in dist. 45, c. Sed illud. He says: “But this should not be passed on idly, that when one man sins the wrath of God comes upon the whole people. When does this happen? When the priests who preside over the people want to appear kind to offenders, and fearing the tongues of sinners, lest perhaps they speak ill of them, unmindful of priestly severity, do not want to fulfill what is written, 'reprove the sinner before all.'“ And below: “While they spare one, they are plotting the destruction of the whole church. What is this goodness? What is this mercy? To spare one, and bring all into danger?” |
| Item, Anacletus, ut legitur dist. 43, c. Scimus, ait: "Scimus autem, multos ob id infestare doctores, ut eos perdant, et proprie voluntatis placita adimpleant. Non propterea tamen doctores (in quantum vires suppetunt) a recta emulatione et bona intentione recedere debent, scientes, quia beati, qui persecutionem patiuntur propter iustitiam.” | Likewise, Anacletus, as we read in dist. 43, c. Scimus,, says: “We know, however, that many teachers are attacked for this reason, to destroy them, and do what pleases their own will. Teachers should not on this account withdraw from right emulation and good intention (insofar as they have the strength), knowing that ‘blessed are those who suffer persecution for the sake of justice’.” |
| Item, Leo papa, ut habetur 24 q. 3, c. Illud sane, ait: "Illud sane plurimum michi displicere significo, quod inter dilectionis tue clericos quidam esse dicuntur, qui adversariorum conveniant pravitati, et vasa ire vasis misericordie misceantur. Quibus investigandis et severitate congrua cohercendis debet diligentia tua vigilanter insistere ita, ut his quibus prodesse non potuerit correptio, non parcat abscissio. Oportet enim nos evangelici meminisse mandati, quod ab Ipsa Veritate precipitur, ut, si nos oculus aut pes, aut dextera scandalizaverit manus, a compage corporis auferatur, quia melius sit his in ecclesia carere membris, quam cum ipsis in eterna supplicia ire. Nam superfluo [superflue We] extra ecclesiam positis resistimus, si ab his qui intus sunt, in eis, quos decipiunt, vulneramur. Abicienda prorsus pestifera hec a sacerdotali vigore patientia est, que sibimet, peccatis aliorum parcendo, non parcit.” | Likewise, Pope Leo, as we find in 24 q. 3, c. Illud sane, says: Indeed I express my great displeasure that among your beloved clerics there are said to be some who agree with the wickedness of the adversaries and mix vessels of anger with vessels of mercy. Your diligence should vigilantly persist in investigating these and in coercing them with appropriate severity, so that those whom correction could not benefit, amputation should not spare. For we must remember the evangelical commandment, which is decreed by the Truth itself, that if an eye or a foot or a right hand offend us, it should be removed from the unity of the body, because it is better to be in the Church without these members than to go with them into eternal punishment. For we pointlessly resist those placed outside the church, if by those within we are wounded in those whom they deceive. This tolerance, which is absolutely pestilent, is to be cast aside by priestly vigor, which, by sparing the sins of others, does not spare itself.” |
| Item, Gregorius in Registro, ut legitur Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Quamvis, ait: "non potest esse pastoris excusatio, si lupus oves comedit, et pastor nescit.” | Likewise, Gregory in the Register, as read Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Quamvis, he says: “there can be no excuse for the shepherd, if the wolf eats the sheep, and the shepherd does not know it.” |
| Item, Cornelius papa, ut habetur dist. 47, c. Quod ad nos, ait: "Quod ad nos attinet, conscientie nostre convenit, frater, dare operam, ne quis culpa nostra de ecclesia pereat.” | Likewise, Pope Cornelius, as is found in dist. 47, c. Quod ad nos, says: “As far as we are concerned, it is fitting for our conscience, brother, to take care that no one perishes from the Church through our fault.” |
| Discipulus: Plures allegasti auctoritates ex quibus accipere nescio argumentum ad probandum quod episcopi et prelati debent cohercere sequaces pseudopape heretici. Quare, da michi vias quibus omnes auctoritates ad propositum valeam applicare. | Student: You have cited several authorities from which I do not know how to take an argument to prove that bishops and prelates should coerce the followers of an heretical pseudo-pope. Therefore, give me ways in which I can apply all the authorities to that purpose. |
| Magister: Tribus propositionibus tanquam certis suppositis, satis patenter potest conclusio suprascripta ex auctoritatibus allegatis inferri. | Master: With three propositions as if certain suppositions, that conclusion can be quite clearly inferred from the authorities cited. |
| Quarum prima est quod non minus debent episcopi et prelati corrigere hereticos sibi subiectos quam alios criminosos. | The first is that bishops and prelates should correct heretics subject to them no less than other criminals. |
| Secunda est quod prelati et episcopi omnes sibi subiectos hereticos et catholicos debent per se vel per alios de veritate fidei informare (Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Inter cetera), quod maxime veritatem habet quando heretici greges prelatorum a veritate nituntur avertere. | The second is that prelates and bishops should inform all their subjects, heretics and Catholics, either themselves or through others, about the truth of the faith (Extra, De officio iudicis ordinarii, c. Inter cetera), which is especially true when heretics strive to turn their flocks away from the truth. |
| Tertia est quod sequaces pape heretici per hoc quod sunt sequaces pape heretici a iurisdictione episcoporum et prelatorum minime sunt exempti, cum ipsemet papa hereticus propter hoc quod sit hereticus iudicio catholicorum reddatur subiectus. | The third is that the followers of a heretic pope are by no means exempt, by the fact that they are followers of the heretic pope, from the jurisdiction of bishops and prelates, since the heretic pope himself, because he is a heretic, is rendered subject to the judgment of Catholics. |
| Capitulum 39 | Chapter 39 |
| Discipulus: Nunc mich apparet quod, ex omnibus auctoritatibus tam scripture divine quam sanctorum patrum prescriptis, scio sumere argumentum ad probandum quod episcopi et prelati sequaces pseudopape heretici cohercere tenentur, si possunt. Ideo nunc dic qua pena, si episcopi et prelati sequaces pape heretici neglexerint cohercere, sint merito percellendi. | Student: Now it appears to me that, from all the authorities quoted above of both divine Scripture and the holy fathers, I know how to make an argument to prove that bishops and prelates are bound to coerce the followers of a heretic pseudo-pope, if they can. Therefore now tell me with what penalty, if bishops and prelates neglect to coerce the followers of a heretic pope, they deserve to be struck. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod sint excommunicationis vinculo alligati, ac etiam ab officio suspendendi, et ab episcopali officio et omni alio deponendi. | Master: The answer made is that they are bound by the bond of excommunication, and also by suspension from office, and by deposing from the episcopal office and every other. |
| Quod sint excommunicationis vinculo innodati patet, quia sunt fautores et hereticorum quos non corrigunt et castigant, cum debent, et etiam heretice pravitatis, quam de suis iurisdictionibus non extirpant. Tales enim fautores sunt excommunicationis sententia innodati (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Noverit, et Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o). | That they are bound by the bond of excommunication is clear, because they are supporters of heretics whom they do not correct and chastise, when they should, and also of heretical wickedness which they do not extirpate from their jurisdictions. For such supporters are bound by a sentence of excommunication (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Noverit, and Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o). |
| Sunt etiam ab officio suspendendi, nam non minus est ab officio suspendendus qui non impugnat hereticos sequaces pseudopape heretici, quam qui non impugnat fornicatores. Sed episcopus qui non impugnat fornicatores est ab officio suspendendus, teste Gregorio, qui, ut legitur dist. 83, c. Si quis, ait: "Si quis episcopus fornicationem presbyterorum, diaconorum, vel crimen incestus in sua parochia precio vel precibus interveniente consenserit, vel commissum sibique compertum auctoritate sui officii non impugnaverit, ab officio suspendetur.” Ergo episcopus qui hereticos sequaces pape heretici non impugnat, multo fortius est ab officio suspendendus. | They are also to be suspended from office, for someone who does not attack heretics who are followers of a heretical pseudo-pope should be suspended from office no less than someone who does not attack fornicators. But a bishop who does not attack fornicators should be suspended from office, according to Gregory, who, as is read in dist. 83, c. Si quis, says: “If any bishop consents to the fornication of priests or deacons or the crime of incest in his parish by the influence of money or pleas, or if he does not attack the commission [of such crimes] that has been proved to him, he shall be suspended from office.” Therefore, much more, a bishop who does not attack heretics who are followers of a heretic pope should be suspended from office. |
| Quod vero episcopi qui tales non cohercent sint ab episcopali officio deponendi, testatur concilium generale sub Innocentio tertio celebratum in quo, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o sic legitur: "si quis enim episcopus super expurgando de sua diocesi heretice pravitatis fermento negligens fuerit vel remissus, cum id certis indiciis apparuerit, ab episcopali officio deponatur, et in locum ipsius alter substituatur idoneus, qui velit et possit hereticam confundere pravitatem.” Quibus verbis clare asseritur quod episcopus negligens suam diocesim de pravitate heretica expurgare est penitus deponendus. Quare, cum sequaces pape heretici a iurisdictione episcoporum nullatenus sint exempti, episcopus qui eos non cohercet est omnino deponendus. | That bishops who do not coerce such people should be deposed from their episcopal office the general council held under Innocent III testifies. In Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, it is read thus: “If any bishop has been negligent or remiss in purging the leaven of heretical wickedness from his diocese, when this has appeared by certain indications, let him be deposed from his episcopal office, and in his place let another suitable person be substituted who would be willing and able to confound heretical wickedness.” In these words it is clearly asserted that a bishop who neglects to purge his diocese of heretical wickedness should be completely deposed. Therefore, since the followers of a heretic pope are in no way exempt from the jurisdiction of bishops, a bishop who does not coerce them should be completely deposed. |
| Discipulus: Verba concilii generalis non sunt intelligenda de episcopo non cohercente sequaces pape heretici, quia talis episcopus non est deponendus, quia non est deponendus a papa, cum papa hereticus talem episcopum magis confirmaret, nec ab aliquo alio archiepiscopo, vel primate, vel patriarcha, quia nullus eorum potest episcopum ab officio episcopali deponere. | Student: The words of the general council should not be understood of a bishop who does not coerce the followers of a heretic pope, because such a bishop should not be deposed. Because he should not be deposed by the pope, since the heretic pope would rather confirm such a bishop, nor by any other archbishop, or primate, or patriarch, because none of them can depose a bishop from the episcopal office. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod episcopus qui negligit sequaces pape heretici cohercere deponendus est a papa catholico quandocunque fuerit canonice ad papatum assumptus. Unde accusandus est a catholicis coram pape catholico quando fuerit, et papa catholicus ipsum habet deponere. | Master: The answer made is that a bishop who neglects to coerce the followers of a heretic pope should be deposed by a Catholic pope whenever he is canonically assumed to the papacy. Therefore he should be accused by the Catholics before the Catholic pope when one exists, and the Catholic pope has the power to depose him. |
| Discipulus: Quid facient interim subditi talis episcopi? | Student: What will the subjects of such a bishop do in the meantime? |
| Magister: Respondent quidam quod subditi vitabunt ipsum tanquam excommunicatum, et expectabunt papam futurum catholicum qui deponet eum. Unde idem facient de tali episcopo quod facerent de episcopo qui, propter abnegationem spontaneam fidei vel propter occisionem alterius episcopi vel sacerdotis, manifeste et publice incurreret excommunicationis sententia. | Master: Some answer made that the subjects will shun him as excommuncated and will wait for a future Catholic pope to depose him. Thus they will do the same regarding such a bishop as they would do regarding a bishop who, because of a spontaneous denial of the faith or because of the killing of another bishop or priest, manifestly and publicly incurred a sentence of excommunication. |
| Capitulum 40 | Chapter 40 |
| Discipulus: Dic breviter et in summa quid, secundum priorem sententiam, episcopis esset agendum, si in suis diocesibus sequaces pape heretici doctrinam eius erroneam predicarent, docerent, et tanquam catholicam divulgarent. | Student: Say briefly and in summary what, according to the previous opinion, bishops should do if in their dioceses the followers of the heretic pope were to preach, teach, and spread as Catholic his erroneous doctrine. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si episcopo per famam constiterit quod papa in hereticam inciderit pravitatem, dubitare debet ne aliqui de grege suo perfidiam pape sequantur. Quia pusillanimes et ambitiosi, quorum magnus imo forte infinitus est numerus, errorem capitis, vel ut placeant vel ne displiceant, de facili amplectuntur, iuxta illud Ecclesiastici 10: "secundum iudicem populi sic et ministri eius, et qualis rector est civitatis tales et inhabitantes", et iuxta illud quod scribitur 6 q. 1, c. Sunt plurimi, § Verum: "capite languescente facilius reliqua corporis membra inficiuntur, sicut scriptum est 'omne caput languidum, et omne cor merens; a planta pedis usque ad verticem non est in eo sanitas'". Et ita, pape labe heretica maculato, timendum est ne plurimi labe consimili inficiantur. Quare, cum episcopus officium gerat speculatoris, cuius est diligentissime circumspicere ne hostes appropinquent, sollicite debet inquirere an fama de perfidia pape heretici contineat veritatem, et qua heresi est infectus. | Master: The answer made is that if it is established to the bishop by fame that the pope has fallen into heretical depravity, he should consider whether some of his flock may follow the pope’s faithlessness, because the faint-hearted and ambitious (of whom there is a great, nay, perhaps infinite, number) easily embrace (either to please or not to displease) the error of the head (according to the verse of Ecclesiasticus 10, “According to the judge of the people so also are his ministers, and as is the ruler of the city such also are its inhabitants”, and according to that which is written in 6 q. 1, c. Sunt plurimi, § Verum, “When the head is weak, the rest of the body's members are more easily infected, as it is written, 'Every head is weak, and every heart is feeble, from the sole of the foot even to the crown of the head there is no soundness in it'“). And so, when the pope is disfigured with the stain of heresy, it should be feared that many will be infected with a similar stain. Therefore, since the bishop performs the office of a watchman, whose duty it is to look around most diligently lest enemies approach, he must diligently inquire whether the fame about the heretic pope’s faithlessness contains truth, and with what heresy he is infected. Having ascertained this, he must examine carefully himself and through others how it conflicts with the orthodox faith. |
| Qua comperta, scrutari per se et per alios debet attente qualiter fidei obviet orthodoxe. Quo facto, non segniter investiget an aliqui heresim pape in gregem suum introducere moliantur, presertim si fama est quod aliqui in sua diocesi doctrinam pape heretici imitantur, docent, publicant, predicant et divulgant tanquam catholicam et tenendam, iuxta preceptum Innocentii tertii qui, ut habetur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, ait: "adiicimus insuper, ut quilibet archiepiscopus vel episcopus per se aut per archidiaconum suum, aut alias honestas idoneasque personas, bis aut saltem semel in anno propriam parochiam, in qua fama fuerit hereticos habitare, cirmumeat, et ibi tres vel plures boni testimonii viros, vel etiam, si expedire videbitur, totam viciniam iurare compellat, quod, si quis ibidem hereticos sciverit, vel aliquos occulta conventicula celebrantes, seu a communi conversatione fidelium vita et moribus dissidentes, eos episcopo studeant indicare. Ipse autem episcopus ad presentiam suam convocet accusatos, qui, nisi se ab obiecto reatu purgaverint, vel, si post purgationem exhibitam in pristinam fuerint relapsi perfidiam, canonice puniantur.” | When this has been done, the bishop must not be slow to investigate whether any are trying to introduce the pope’s heresy into his flock, especially if there is fame that some in his diocese imitate, teach, publish, preach and spread the heretic pope’s doctrine as Catholic and to be held, according to the precept of Innocent III who, as is stated in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, says: “We add further that every archbishop or bishop, himself or through his archdeacon or other honest and suitable persons, shall twice or at least once a year go around his own parish in which there is fame that heretics reside, and there he shall compel three or more men of good testimony, or even, if it seems expedient, the entire neighborhood, to swear that, if anyone knows heretics there, or any who hold secret meetings, or who dissent in life and customs from the common way of life of the faithful, they shall endeavor to report them to the bishop. The bishop himself shall summon the accused to his presence, who, unless they have purged themselves of the alleged guilt, or if, after a purgation has been made, they have relapsed into their former faithlessness, shall be punished canonically.” |
| Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod, si fama est quod in aliqua diocesi sunt heretici sequaces pape heretici, episcopus debet eos cum diligentia debita investigare, et contra eos procedere secundum quod ordo iuris requirit. Si autem per se eos nequiverit cohercere, auxilium invocet brachii secularis. Si enim prelatus ecclesie pro defensione pauperum postulare debet auxilium seculare, ut legitur 23 q. 3, c. Ab imperatore, et q. 5 c. Administratores, multo magis pro defensione fidei Christiane contra hereticos sequaces pape heretici auxilium seculare debet cum instantia postulare. Ad quod faciendum publice potestates debent iuramento ligari, sicut legitur Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, § Moneantur. | From these words it is gathered that, if there is fame that there are heretic followers of the heretic pope in any diocese, the bishop must investigate them with due diligence, and proceed against them according as the order of the law requires. But if he cannot coerce them himself, he should call upon the help of the secular arm. For if a prelate of the church should demand secular aid for the defense of the poor, as is read in 23 q. 3, c. Ab imperatore, and q. 5 c. Administratores, much more should he urgently demand secular aid for the defense of the Christian faith against heretic followers of the heretic pope. To do this the public powers should be bound by oath, as is read in Extra, De hereticis, c. Excommunicamus 1o, § Moveantur. |
| Insuper, cum episcopi sciverint papam heretica pravitate respersum, circa reprobationem errorum suorum per se vel per alios debent insistere diligenter, tenenturque veritatem modis quibus possunt congruentibus publicare, et quantum possunt manifeste et occulte auribus omnium inculcare, ac reges et principes aliosque seculi divites et potentes sanctis exhortationibus et consiliis animare, ut causam fidei defendant viriliter et potenter. Omnia predicta multis modis, ut videtur, possent demonstrative probari. | Moreover, when bishops know that the pope is imbued with heretical wickedness, they should diligently set about the rejection of his errors, themselves or through others, and they are bound to publish the truth in suitable ways possible to them, and to impress it, as much as they can, on the ears of all, openly and secretly, and to animate kings and rulers and other rich and powerful people of the world with holy exhortations and counsels, so that they may manfully and powerfully defend the cause of the faith. All the aforesaid could, it seems, be demonstratively proved in many ways. |
| Discipulus: Tange breviter aliqua media quibus prescripta probari appareant. | Student: Briefly touch upon some means by which the above things appear to be proved. |
| Magister: Argumenta ad probandum predicta fundantur in quattuor propositionibus, quarum prima est quod episcopi et prelati nullam causam debent magis defendere quam fidem Christi. Secunda est quod sine fide recta nullum est spirituale bonum proficiens ad salutem. Tertia est quod episcopi et prelati pro salute gregis debent animam suam ponere. Quarta est quod pro veritate usque ad mortem certare tenentur. | Master: The arguments for proving the above are founded on four propositions. The first is that bishops and prelates should defend no cause more than the faith of Christ. The second is that without right faith there is no spiritual good conducive to salvation. The third is that bishops and prelates should lay down their lives for the salvation of the flock. The fourth is that they are bound to fight for the truth even to death. |
| Capitulum 41 | Chapter 41 |
| Discipulus: Satis coniicio quomodo ex his possunt accipi argumenta ad probandum illa que in capitulo precedenti sunt asserta, ideo illis obmissis circa episcopos et prelatos, tracta de illis qui impugnatores pape heretici et doctrine sue erronee molestarent, persequerentur, et graviter infestarent. | Student: I guess well enough how arguments can be derived from these materials to prove the things asserted in the preceding chapter. Leaving them aside, therefore, deal with bishops and prelates who molest, persecute, and seriously harass attackers of the heretic pope and his erroneous doctrine. |
| Magister: De talibus tenetur a multis quod sunt fautores heretice pravitatis. Si enim episcopi et prelati qui tacent et non corrigunt sequaces pape heretici sunt fautores heretice pravitatis, multo fortius episcopi et prelati qui ideo alios persequuntur quia pravitatem impugnant hereticam sunt inter fautores heretice pravitatis computandi. Sunt etiam tales proditores catholice veritatis et totius christianitatis. Nam si proditor est veritatis ille qui non libere veritatem pronunciat quam pronuntiare oportet (11 q. 3, c. Nolite), multo fortius proditor est veritatis et totius christianitatis qui persequitur vel molestat defensores catholice veritatis quam papa hereticus reprobat et confundit, persequitur et impugnat. | Master: Many hold that such people are supporters of heretical wickedness. For if bishops and prelates who keep silent and do not correct followers of the heretic pope are supporters of heretical wickedness, much more strongly should bishops and prelates who persecute others because they oppose heretical wickedness be counted among supporters of heretical wickedness. Such are also traitors to Catholic truth and to all Christianity. For if someone is a traitor to truth if he does not freely announce the truth he ought to announce (11 q. 3, c. Nolite), much more strongly is he a traitor to truth and to all Christianity who persecutes or harasses defenders of Catholic truth that the heretic pope repudiates and confounds, persecutes and opposes. |
| Discipulus: Quare episcopi et prelati non debeant persequi quoquo modo impugnatores pape heretici videtur ex tractatis supra libro sexto, ubi de impugnatoribus pape pro pravitate heretica defendendis dependere videtur. Si enim impugnatores pape heretici sunt a catholicis defendendi, non sunt ab eis aliqualiter impugnandi. Quare noli amplius hic probare quod episcopi et prelati, qui sciunt vel scire tenentur papam esse hereticum, impugnatores pape heretici non debent infestare. Sed dic qua pena episcopi et prelati qui impugnatores pape heretici persequuntur et infestant sunt merito feriendi. | Student: Why bishops and prelates should in no way persecute opponents of a heretic pope is seen from the matters treated above in Book VI, where it seems to depend on defending those who attack the pope for heretical wickedness. For if the opponents of the heretic pope should be defended by Catholics, they should not be attacked by them in any way. Therefore, do not prove here any further that bishops and prelates who know or are bound to know that the pope is a heretic should not harass the heretic pope’s opponents. But tell me with what penalty bishops and prelates who persecute and harass the heretic pope’s opponents are deservedly to be struck. |
| Magister: Sunt quidam dicentes quod omnes tales pena fautorum heretice pravitatis sunt plectendi, ultra quam penam diversi pro diversis et specialibus modis persequendi et molestandi impugnatores pape heretici sunt diversis penis et specialibus percellendi, quia pro diversis iniuriis eis illatis sunt inferentes diversimode puniendi. Contingit etiam eis iniuriari in iudicio et extra iudicium multis modis, scilicet verbo et facto. Verbo quidem, sicut diffamatione, detractione, contumeliis, derisione, et maledictione. Facto etiam tam in iudicio quam extra iudicium contingit eis multas iniurias inferre, quia possunt spoliari rebus suis, officiis, et honoribus, et iterum possunt incarcerari, detineri, mutilari, et occidi. | Master: There are some who say that all such people should be punished with the penalty of supporters of heretical wickedness, and, beyond that penalty, various people should be struck by various and special penalties for the various and special modes of persecuting and molesting attackers of the heretic pope, because for various wrongs done to them [the attackers] those who inflict them should be punished in various ways. It happens to them to be wronged both in court and out of court in many ways, namely by word and deed. By word, such as defamation, detraction, insults, mockery, and cursing. By deed, it also happens to them that many wrongs are inflicted both in court and out of court, because they can be despoiled of their property, offices, and honors, and again they can be imprisoned, detained, mutilated, and killed. |
| Discipulus: Cerno quod multe iniurie secundum istam opinionem possunt impugnatoribus pape heretici per episcopos et prelatos inferri, de quibus quattuor tantum prosequere. Primo autem dic de spoliatione, sive rerum sive officiorum. | Student: I see that according to this opinion many wrongs can be inflicted on attackers of the heretic pope by bishops and prelates. I will pursue only four of these. First, tell me about spoliation, whether of things or of offices. |
| Magister: Respondetur quod si episcopi et prelati impugnatores pape heretici rebus vel officiis duxerint spoliandos, ultra penam fautorie heretice pravitatis ad restitutionem rerum et officiorum sunt astricti, quia omne iniustum ablatum debet restituti (14 q. 6, c. 1). Unde et tales spoliatores illorum qui impugnant papam hereticum sunt raptores et predones censendi, quia nisi res ablatas restituerint, si possunt, sunt ecclesiastica sepultura privandi (Extra, De raptoribus, c. Super eo). | Master: It is answered that if bishops and prelates have thought that those who attack the heretic pope should be despoiled of things or offices, beyond the penalty of supporting heretical depravity, they are bound to restore the things and offices, because everything unjustly taken must be restored (14 q. 6, c. 1). Hence such spoliators of those who attack a heretic pope should be considered robbers and plunderers, because unless they restore the things taken (if they can), they should be deprived of an ecclesiastical burial (Extra, De raptoribus, c. Super eo). |
| Discipulus: Dic de diffamatione. | Student: Tell me about defamation. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod, si episcopi et prelati quocunque modo, sive per se sive per alios, sive legendo sive publicando, processus pape heretici diffamatorios contra impugnatores errorum suorum, sive quocunque alio modo diffamaverint impugnatores eosdem, vocando eos hereticos vel schismaticos vel crimen aliud quodcumque quod non est probatum legitime eis imponendo, de necessitate salutis tenentur famam restituere eorumdem, dicendo publice si publice diffamaverint, vel occulte si occulte se falsum dixisse, quia non minus tenetur quis restituere famam quam iniuste abstulit alteri, quam rem aliquam temporalem ablatam iniuste, cum fama sit temporalibus rebus preciosior. Et ideo, sicut nunquam est extra peccatum mortale qui non restituerit rem alterius quam abstulit iniuste, si potest, ita semper est in peccato mortali qui famam alterius abstulit vel denigravit iniuste, et non restituerit, si potest. Sed prelati diffamantes impugnatores pape heretici abstulerunt famam eorum iniuste. Ergo eandem famam eis restituere de necessitate salutis sunt astricti. | Master: It is said that if bishops and prelates in any way, whether themselves or through others, whether by lecturing or publishing the heretic pope’s diffamatory proceedings against those attacking his errors, or have in any other way defamed those attackers, or have in any other way defamed those attackers, by calling them heretics or schismatics or by imposing on them any other crime that has not been lawfully proved, they are bound of necessity for salvation to restore their fame, speaking publicly, if they have defamed publicly, or secretly, if they have secretly spoken falsehood. Because a person is no less bound to restore the fame he has unjustly taken from another than some temporal thing that has been unjustly taken, since fame is more precious than temporal things. And therefore, just as he is never outside mortal sin who does not restore, if he can, another's property that he has unjustly taken away, so he is always in mortal sin if he has unjustly taken away or denied another's reputation and does not restore it, if he can. But prelates defaming the heretic pope’s attackers have unjustly taken away their fame. Therefore they are bound of necessity for salvation to restore their reputation. |
| Discipulus: Dic de violentia. | Student: Tell me about violence. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod si impugnatores pape heretici sunt clerici vel religiosi, quicunque in eos manus iniciunt violentas, capiendo, detinendo, incarcerando, vel quocunque alio modo, sententiam excommunicationis incurrunt, et ab eodem sunt absolvendi a quo absolvendi essent si ex alia causa in eosdem manus inicerent violentas. Et propter idem, quicunque sunt in potestate constituti et eosdem non defendunt, sententiam excommunicationis incurrunt (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante). | Master: It is said that if the attackers of a heretical pope are clerics or religious, whoever lays violent hands on them, by arresting, detaining, imprisoning them, or in any other way, incurs the sentence of excommunication, and they [those who laid violent hands] should be absolved from it [the sentence of excommunication] by whoever would absolve them if they were to lay violent hands on them for some other reason. And for the same reason, those in positions of power who do not defend them incur the sentence of excommunication (Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante). |
| Discipulus: Dic de morte. | Student: Tell me about death. |
| Magister: Dicitur quod quicunque episcopus vel alius, sive fuerit legatus sive alio quocunque fungens officio, impugnatorem pape heretici propter hoc curie tradiderit seculari, vel aliquid aliud fecerit vel mandaverit, aut ratum habuerit, ex quo sequitur mors alicuius impugnatoris pape heretici, irregularis efficitur, et omnem penam incurrit quam incurreret si manibus propriis occidisset innocentem. Hoc probatur sic. Qui causam proximam dat homicidio irregularis efficitur, teste Alexandro tertio qui, Extra, De homicidio, c. De cetero, ait: "De cetero noveris, quod diaconus, qui homicidio causam dedisse videtur, non videtur ad sacrum sacerdotium promovendus.” Qui autem impugnatorem pape heretici tradit curie seculari, vel aliquid aliud facit aut mandat fieri ex quo sequitur mors corporalis, dat causam proximam homicidio. Ergo irregularis efficitur, et omnem penam incurrit quam homicide incurrunt. | Master: It is said that if a bishop or another, whether he be a legate or someone performing some other office, delivers up someone to a secular court because he attacks a heretic pope, or if he does or commands or ratifies something else from which the death of any attacker of a heretic pope follows, he becomes irregular and incurs every penalty he would incur if he had killed an innocent person with his own hands. This is proved as follows. Someone who gives a proximate cause for a homicide becomes irregular, as attested by Alexander III who, Extra, De homicidio, c. De cetero, says: “Be aware, moreover, if a deacon seems to have given cause for a homicide, it seems he should not be promoted to the sacred priesthood.” But if someone delivers up an attacker of a heretic pope to the secular court, or does or commands something else to be done from which bodily death follows, he gives an proximate cause of homicide. Therefore he becomes irregular, and incurs every penalty that homicide incurs. |
| Discipulus: Per istam rationem omnis prelatus qui quemcunque clericum hereticum vel alium tradit curie seculari irregularis efficitur, quia causam proximam dat homicidio. Sed constat quod tales non efficiuntur irregulares, ergo ista ratio non procedit. | Student: By this argument every prelate who delivers any heretical cleric or other heretic to the secular court becomes irregular, because he gives a proximate cause for homicide. But it is clear that such persons are not made irregular. Therefore this argument does not proceed. |
| Magister: Ad hoc in simili glossa Extra, De homicidio, c. Continebatur, respondere videtur, ubi rationem assignat quare unus ex cuius ludo secuta est mors irregularis efficitur, et alius ex cuius ludo etiam mors secuta est irregularis non fit. Unde, obiciens contra illud quod continetur in capitulo Continebatur super verbo Romani Pontificis, ait: "Infra capitulo proximo contra. Ibi libere promovetur ad ordines superiores, hic non sine licentia pape. Et idem casus videtur. Quid ergo fines fecit esse diversos?" Et respondens ait: "solutio: hic dabat operam illicite rei ludendo cum laico, quod non licet. Vel si etiam licitum fuisset, non adhibuit diligentiam quam debuit: quia cum sciret ludi consuetudinem, non removit falcem a se, unde fuit in culpa, quare promoveri ad superiores ordines non debet sine licentia pape, ut hic dicit, et in capitulo sequenti ludebat cum clerico, et licito ludo: et de illo cultello non sperabatur aliquod mortale, et ille potius ingessit se, proiiciendo alium ad terram: et sic non fuit in culpa.” Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod si clerici dant operam rei licite et debitam diligentiam adhibent, quamvis ex facto eorum mors sequatur, irregularitatem nequaquam incurrunt. Si vero clericus dederit operam rei illicite, vel dando operam rei licite diligentiam debitam non adhibuit, si ex opere suo mors sequatur, irregularis efficitur. | Master: In a similar case the gloss Extra, De homicidio, c. Continebatur seems to answer this, where it assigns the reason why one whose play resulted in death is made irregular, and another whose play also resulted in death is not made irregular. Hence, objecting against what is contained in c. Containebatur, s.v. on the word of the “Romani Pontificis”, it says: “The contrary below in the next chapter. There he is freely promoted to higher orders, here not without the permission of the pope. And the case seems to be the same. What then made the outcomes different?” And answering it says: “Solution: In this case he was engaged impermissibly in playing with a layman, which is not permitted. Or even if it had been permitted, he did not exercise due diligence: because although he knew the custom of the game, he did not remove the pruning knife from himself [they had been pruning vines and he had a knife on his belt], by which he was at fault; therefore he should not be promoted to higher orders without the pope’s permission, as it says here. And in the chapter following he was playing [wrestling] with another cleric, and in a permissible game: and nothing mortal was expected from that knife, and he rather stabbed himself, throwing the other to the ground: and thus he was not at fault.” From these words it is gathered that if clerics engage in something permissibly and exercise due diligence, although death results from their act, they do not incur irregularity at all. But if a cleric engages in something impermissibly, or, engaging permissibly, does not exercise due diligence, if death results from his act, he becomes irregular. |
| Cum ergo episcopi et prelati tradendo impugnatorem pape heretici curie seculari dent operam rei illicite, quia non licet eis quomodolibet molestare impugnantes hereticam pravitatem, si mors secuta fuerit, irregularitatem incurrunt. Episcopi vero et prelati, tradendo hereticos et quosdam alios malefactores curie seculari, non dant operam rei illicite, quia hoc incumbit eorum officio, et ideo, si debitam diligentiam adhibent, non efficiuntur irregulares, quamvis mors sequatur. | Since, therefore, bishops and prelates, by handing over to the secular court an attacker of the heretic pope, engage in the matter impermissibly, because it is not permissible for them to molest in any way those who attack heretical depravity, if death follows, they incur irregularity. But bishops and prelates, by handing over heretics and certain other malefactors to the secular court, do not engage in the matter impermissibly, because this is their duty, and therefore, if they exercise due diligence, they do not become irregular, even if death follows. |
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